THE INSTITUTIONAL GROWTH OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN TREATY ORGANIZATION: CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CHANGES

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THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE CRITICISM THROUGH THE YEARS of the institutional structure of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). This criticism has stemmed primarily from the Asian members of the selective security organization, who have wanted a stronger structure for a number of reasons. Such criticism has been dismissed by various Western members of the security community and by many impartial observers as irrelevant. If SEATO has weaknesses, they have said, these are to be found in differences among the membership—differences in levels of economic and political development, interest in (and commitment to) Southeast Asia, and preferences for particular policy alternatives which have been considered by SEATO organs from time to time—and not in factors of organizational structure.

That such differences exist cannot be denied. However, it should be noted that such differences also found expression in the initial structuring of SEATO, which was intended to limit the scope of activity of the security organization. Equally important, SEATO as an organization has changed through the years, and such changes have reflected the interaction of contending interests and forces. The more important of these changes in the political, or civilian, organs of SEATO will be discussed in this paper.

American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the main architect of SEATO as it came into being as the chief result of the Manila Conference of 1954, wanted the minimum possible structure for the defense grouping. Dulles even disliked the term SEATO, and said so publicly, because of its suggestion of similarities with NATO—an image which he did not wish to encourage. Australia and New Zealand, partners already with the United States in the loosely structured and successful ANZUS relationship, also sought to limit the number powers of formal decision-making organs of the new security organization. Nor did Britain or France

want strong, let alone independent, SEATO organs, a reflection partly of their unwillingness to contribute financially any more than they were required to do in an area of declining importance to them. The Philippines and Thailand, however, wanted a strong organizational structure as well as a joint military force committed to the area (although not without some expressed fear in their ruling circles that their national freedom might be excessively limited as a result). Pakistan preferred a common command structure with a portion of national military forces designated as SEATO units but not a SEATO force stationed in Southeast Asia.

The Filipino-Thai point of view could not prevail against such odds. The only organ authorized by the Manila Pact of 1954, accordingly, was the Council of Ministers, which is supposed to meet annually and is constitutionally the ranking SEATO organ. Even this modest institutional start was a concession to the two Southeast Asian member-states, however.

Probably the main reason SEATO began its existence with such a limited institutional structure was its military strategy, which was very different from that of NATO. The concept of a mobile striking force which could hit the enemy "at times and places of our choosing," as Secretary Dulles put it, was at the heart of the stated SEATO military strategy. This mobile striking force was largely American. As the United States saw it, there was no reason for an elaborate set of coordinating institutions similar to those which had been developed in Europe to integrate the military, and subsequently other, activities of the NATO allies. Such organizational arrangements, indeed, could prove cumbersome. No attempt, accordingly, has ever been made by the United States in Southeast Asia to encourage an increase in the size of local standing forces comparable to its efforts to induce its European allies to carry a larger share of the NATO defense burden. At the same time, it should be noted that the SEATO countries, including the United States, have come to believe through the years that retaliation of the sort originally envisaged may not be appropriate to the situation at hand. This change has had some impact on the SEATO institutional structure, but it will probably have more if the membership can ever agree on how Laos-like indirect aggression can be most effectively combatted—which they have not done to date.

Although a decade after its founding SEATO was still underdeveloped institutionally, it seemed to have moved steadily closer to the Filipino-Thai image of what a Southeast Asian selective security community should be in terms of its powers and parts. Were the smaller and weaker states still able, however slowly, to get what they want in spite of the opposition of most of their bigger and stronger partners? If some of the members have changed their views on important institutional questions, why have they done so? Why did the United States acquiesce in the Rusk-Thanat Agreement of 1962, changing in a major way the type of agreement required before nations might act in fulfillment of their Manila Pact obligations?

There are today three SEATO political organs. The ranking of these, the Council of Ministers, is the only one mentioned in the Manila Pact, SEATO's constitution. The others were subsequently added as it became apparent that more frequent and different-level diplomatic contacts were necessary. The senior of the other two organs is the Council Representatives, which acts on the Council's behalf when it is not in session—which is most of the time. The third body is the Permanent Working Group, which meets on an almost continuous basis in Bangkok, headquarters site of SEATO.

The Council, which met for the first time in Bangkok from February 23 to February 25, 1955,[1] is constitutionally the supreme coordinating body of SEATO. The other political organs (and the military bodies) are subordinate to it. In fact, however, meeting usually only once a year in secret session, the Council is no more than formal symbol of the SEATO membership—and its meetings the occasion for review of developments in the treaty area as well as for public pronouncements hailing the accomplishments of the previous year, whether or not there have been any. The Council might have been of greater relative importance if the work-load of the security community had not necessitated formation of the Council Representatives to be able to meet on a virtually instant basis for the purpose of diplomatic consultation. It is probably desirable that the ranking foreign policy officials of the member countries should meet annually, but they are, after all, also representatives of the same governments whose delegates meet around

[1] The text of the communiqué of this meeting can be found in *Collective Defence in South East Asia* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956), pp. 189-192.

the bargaining table week after week in Bangkok. Moreover, the same decision-making and other restrictions apply in the Council as in the Council Representatives and the Permanent Working Group, and there is little likelihood, accordingly, of significantly different behavior in one forum than another. Discussions among the delegates to the Council meetings, on the other hand — who are usually their nation's foreign ministers[2] — are outspoken and informative and seem to have broadened the outlook of the member state's chief foreign policy makers. The Council meetings, however, have rarely ranged wider than Southeast Asia and adjacent areas and cannot be regarded as any kind of policy-making sessions.

When the Council does not meet, as happened in 1962, this is an event of significance. No Council meeting took place in that year because of the fear of the United States in particular — but also of Australia and New Zealand — that Filipino and Thai proposals for constitutional change would split the organization.[3] Defeat and loss of face would be at least symbolically more important at this high level of consultation, and such a clash was to be avoided if at all possible. This "barometric function" may be the most important one performed by the Council (as suggested, also, by France's decision to send only an observer to the 1965 London meeting of the organ).

The constitutional controversy that forced cancellation of the 1962 Council meeting—never announced as such, of course, in the interest of alliance solidarity — really had more to do with the Council Representatives than the Council itself. Created in 1955 to coordinate the diplomatic positions of the member states on questions of mutual interest in Southeast Asia on virtually a day to day basis, the Council Representatives comprise the ambassadors of the participant countries resident in Bangkok with two exceptions. These are Thailand, which is represented by a senior official of its Foreign Ministry, and Britain, whose representative

[2] The French Government sent only an observer to the 1965 London Council meeting as a reflection of serious differences between it and the other members which were openly aired at the 1964 Manila session of the body.

[3] Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman stated publicly on December 20, 1961, that, if constitutional changes were not forthcoming, "Thailand will study the question of whether or to what extent it should be represented in the next SEATO Council meeting." *Bangkok Post*, December 21, 1961. For background, see Vicente Albano Pacis, "It's Getting Late for Southeast Asia," *Weekly Graphic*, April 25, 1962, and the *Manila Times*, April 14, 1962.

is its Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia (with his office in Singapore). The Council Representatives ordinarily meet two or three times a month—more frequently when there are crises (such as 1960, when 48 sessions took place, dealing mainly with Laos) and less often when there is no trouble. The Council Representatives is clearly the most important SEATO organ, but its significance is still fairly limited in a decision-making sense in view of its — and SEATO's — subordination to national policy-making machinery. The Philippines sought to give the Council Representatives greater authority and autonomy at the time of the organ's creation, but this was opposed by American Secretary of States Dulles as well as by most of the other countries.

All the SEATO political organs, including both the Council and the Council Representatives, have been governed by the requirement of unanimity. In addition, these are only consultative organs—so that, sovereignty being what it is, there can be no way of assuring that a particular state will fulfill a decision even if it is unanimously reached. During the Laotian crises that followed one another from mid-1959 on, the Council Representatives took little by way of positive action largely because of the absence of consensus as to what to do among the members, possessed as they were of different degrees of interest in what happened in Laos and also perplexed by the novelty of the type of challenge posed by the Communists in that country. The difficulties were further compounded by the fact that delegates frequently claimed that they lacked instructions from their goverments, the result of inadequate communications facilities (between Thailand and both the Philippines and Pakistan) as well as of a delaying strategy on the part of other countries that might be opposed to a proposal before the Council Representatives. Thailand, most threatened of the member states by Communist activities in Laos, wanted to change the voting rules so as to facilitate action and prevent what it considered to be the prospect of perpetual immobilization of the security organization.[4] According to Thailand, the unanimity rule was not part of the procedures adopted by the signatory states at Manila in 1954; the question first came up at the initial meeting of the Council of Ministers in 1955 and apparently gained grudging Thai acceptance. The Thai also favored greatly strengthening the Secretary General of SEATO in his political powers. The Philip-

[4] For the view of then Thai Premier Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat on this subject, see the *Bangkok Post*, September 6, 1961.

pines generally endorsed the Thai stand on both issues,[5] although its position shifted somewhat from time to time, and both the Filipinos and the Thai were frequently vague in discussing the general need for reform of the defense grouping.

What Thailand proposed was that a three-fourths vote be necessary to take any action, this figure being chosen because it would allow SEATO to act without the concurrence of Britain and France, the two chief obstacles to positive moves (as the Thai saw it) at various stages in the Laotian crisis. The resulting action would be SEATO action, but the countries not voting for it would not be bound by the decision. Even earlier, the Philippines had proposed voting distinctions between procedural questions, non-substantive questions likely to prejudice future action on substantive matters, and substantive problems proper. The Philippines subsequently simplified the distinction to one of procedural and substantive matters.[6] Australia countered the Thai plan in 1962 with a reform proposal of its own which would have allowed a three-fourths vote if the two non-affirming members did not vote because of lack of instructions (but the resulting action would not be SEATO action binding on all the members but action "in conformity with the Manila Pact"). (Australia apparently advanced its proposal in the interest of alliance solidarity not because it strongly wanted this kind of reform). It was also proposed that the unanimity rule be applied only to important questions. None of these alternatives were acceptable to Thailand at the time and probably not to others either. The result was that no reform took place at the time in the voting procedures of the SEATO organs.[7]

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[5] See for example, the *Manila Times*, April 19, 1962.

[6] Former Philippine Foreign Secretary Felixberto M. Serrano discussed this question with the author in Manila on September 5, 1962.

[7] According to a French spokesman, "France was not the only country opposed to the Thai proposal to change the unanimity rule — so, too, were the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. France had almost come around to accepting the Australian counter-proposal when Britain made a very strong speech indicating that it was not acceptable." As for France's objection to the Thai proposal, "France cannot allow itself to become involved in a local war in Southeast Asia just because three-quarters of SEATO want it." These remarks were made to the author in Bangkok on July 17, 1962. British officials confirmed this statement of their position.

The British argued that the Thai voting proposal "missed the point and was divisive,"[8] as one United Kingdom diplomat put it. "The problem was one of varying approaches not basically of procedure," according to this British spokesman.[9] "The Thai proposal could not help but have undesirable results. Those not yet voting would be asked, 'do you vote for or against an action?' not 'what insight can you contribute to solution of this problem?' "

The United States was fearful of the form that Thai resentment and frustration might take. This was the basic reason for American acquiesence in a Thai request for a joint statement redefining the members' obligations to one another in bilateral as well as multilateral terms. Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman visited Washington in 1962, and he and Secretary of State Dean Rusk issued a joint communiqué on March 26 stating that the SEATO partners had individual as well as collective responsibilities toward one another in the event of aggression against any one of them. Other members, however, were not happy over the fact that they were not informed beforehand of the contents of the Rusk-Thanat communiqué, particularly in view of its constitutional implications.[10]

The Rusk-Thanat communiqué did not satisfy the Thai as much as the United States hoped. Nor did it lessen the strain on SEATO organs, including the Council. Indeed, it tended to detract further from the sense of solidarity of the whole membership and to emphasize bilateral ties between particular members, such as Thailand and the United States. Indicative of this sentiment was the attitude of the influential Thai language newspaper *Siam Rath*, which said in its issue of June 12, 1962: "The action of some and nearly all SEATO member countries in sending armed forces to be stationed in Thailand to help protect it against the danger threatening is the action of individual countries and cannot really be considered as being an action on the part of SEATO. Though it is proof of the feeling of unity among member countries and a sense of responsibility to their commitments under SEATO, no resolution was passed by SEATO for such action to be taken."

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[8] The similarity of this point of view to Indonesian President Sukarno's stand on the application of majoritarianism to political decision-making in his country is interesting in view of the objection of most Britishers to the Indonesian leader's position.

[9] Interviewed in Bangkok on July 26, 1962.

[10] For example, the Philippines, whose Ambassador to Thailand and delegate to the Council Representatives, Jose D. Ingles, discussed the question with the author in Bangkok on July 13, 1962.

The United States, concerned (as it was in 1954) that it find itself standing alone against Communism in Southeast Asia, was alarmed by this state of affairs and proceeded to increase its emphasis on SEATO as a multi-nation selective security community. Thus, one had the solidarity-straining situation of the United States, the outsider, championing SEATO the Southeast Asian defense community, in contrast to the emphasis of Thailand, a Southeast Asian member state, on the Thai-American partnership.

The American response to the Thai strategy was appropriate enough to the circumstances, but it should not be allowed to disguise the fact that what the Thai were saying reflected more accurately than the words of the Americans the realities of the situation. The Thai wanted the United States forces labelled American, but Washington went to great lengths to publicize them as SEATO contingents. A key American participant in the series of events that brought the United States and other SEATO troops to Thailand in 1962 following Communist violation of a Laotian ceasefire told the author: "The United States made the decision to intervene in Thailand and in effect asked the Thai government to invite it to take the action it subsequently took. It was indicated certainly that troops from other countries would be welcome, but there was no specific request." Britain, Australia and New Zealand did in fact also dispatch troops. Pakistan did not do so but apparently was willing to participate. The Philippines, a longtime champion of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia, has claimed that it did not send any force because they were not really needed (which was so) and the costs involved would have been heavy for only a show of force. However, it is also true that Philippine-American differences over failure of the United States Congress to appropriate funds for World War II debt obligations to the Philippines and the political rivalry between President Diosdado Macapagal and Vice President (and then Secretary of Foreign Affairs) Emmanuel Pelaez also played a part in Manila's decision not to cooperate; the military, however, clearly wanted their country to send troops to Thailand. The Philippines probably would have sent troops to Thailand in 1962 if there had been a real need for it to do so. France, however, flatly refused to dispatch even a token force.

The result of all this was that the SEATO members, encouraged by the mildly alarmed Americans, made their first change in the voting rules of the security community in nine years. A com-

promise Thai plan, a modification of the earlier Australian counter-proposal, was adopted by the Council of Ministers in March 1963, a year after the Rusk-Thanat Agreement, allowing for adoption of a resolution by as few as five members—if the others did not vote at all. Unanimity, however, was still required in the sense that a single negative vote was enough to defeat a motion. "What we seek is something akin to the situation in the United Nations Security Council," Nai Konthi Suphamongkol, then Special Adviser to the Thai Prime Minister (for Foreign Affairs) and later himself SEATO Secretary-General, said in July 1962, "where an abstention does not count as a negative vote."[11] Representatives of all the non-Asian member states had privately vowed previously that such a change would never take place, [12] but they had clearly been wrong.

The constitutional change was not of major significance by itself, but it was important when considered as part of a persistent movement toward development of political institutions in which state sovereignty was diluted, however slightly or slowly. Equally important, the small nations had triumphed over the big and powerful ones. None of the non-Asian countries had originally desired a change of this sort. But the Thai, more or less continuously seconded by the Philippines, had carried the day against considerable odds. The development was a measure, too, of the increased importance accorded to Southeast Asia by the United States and Australia.

Thailand was also the chief agitator for another change in the procedures by which the SEATO political organs considered questions referred to them. Created in 1956[13] and composed of aides to the Council Representatives, the Permanent Working Group was intended to lessen the increasing burden on the Council Representatives by considering all questions prior to that body and referring only the important ones to the senior organ. Various of the members were bringing comparatively unimportant matters before the Council Representatives, and efficiency required an easing of this pressure. Thailand took increasing exception to this procedure, however, resenting the need to refer important questions to relatively junior officials before having them considered at the level it desired with a resulting slowness of response

[11] Interview with the author in Bangkok on July 9, 1962.
[12] In interviews with the author in Bangkok in June-July, 1962.
[13] For authorization, see the text of the communiqué of the Karachi Conference of the Council of Ministers, *Collective Defence in South East Asia*, p. 196.

from its allies. The complaint was remedied in 1961 to the satisfaction of the Thai by requiring that all questions specifically involving the Council Representatives be initially reviewed at least by that organ.

The increasing differentiation of duties between the Council Representatives and the Permanent Working Group pointed to another institutional difficulty within the SEATO superstructure. Valuable though the contributions of the Permanent Working Group have been to SEATO diplomatic coordination, much of the work with which this particular body is concerned, such as the preparation of position papers, is the responsibility of the secretariat in various other regional international organizations like NATO. Preliminary negotiations do take place in the Permanent Working Group and the frequently differing interests of the participants are identified, but only too often this body gets bogged down on what are narrowly administrative matters. It is a sign of the still limited institutional development of SEATO that this should be the case. What is so of the Permanent Working Group is even more true of its Budget Subcommittee.

Besides the three political consultative bodies, the civilian organs of SEATO also include three committees, the Committee of Security Experts, the Committee of Economic Experts, and the Committee on Informational, Cultural, Educational and Labor Activities. These committees, which meet several times a year, are composed of experts in these fields from the member nations and meet periodically to discuss the relevance of the experiences of various of the countries to one another. Through the years their personnel have come to know each other and to develop mutual trust. Probably the most successful has been the committee dealing with security matters. Communist gains by subversion in neighboring Laos and Vietnam have been considerable since SEATO's formation in 1954, but paradoxically greater progress in mutual aid has been achieved in this field. The Committee of Economic Experts has been the least successful, largely because of the difficulty in devising programs of economic cooperation and assistance satisfactory to SEATO's diverse membership.

To the extent that any of the member states has played the role of leader in the Council Representatives, this has clearly been the United States. The reason for qualifying such a statement is the fact that the United States has been more the dominant partici-

pant than the leader in the sense of giving the body constant and effective guidance in deciding issues. The Americans have frequently been led by others (the British and French in the Laotian crisis and Thailand in the matter of constitutional enlargement of the SEATO relationship), but they have also been more active than any of the other participants in terms of trying to make SEATO amount to something. When the United States has known what it wanted, it has gotten its way; its indecisiveness has usually been the result of a failure to make up its own mind. Of the other countries, probably Australia has been the second most active — very close, indeed, on the heels of the Americans. The Australians also have gotten what they wanted more often than not. American dominance has been a reflection of its power position and its level of political development; Australia's importance has stemmed more from the latter consideration and its growing awareness of the importance of a non-Communist and stable Southeast Asia to its future. Both the Americans and the Australians, in addition, have been represented by highly competent personnel in all the SEATO organs through the years. None of the other countries has been so well represented in terms of talent and experience by their ambassadors assigned to the Council Representatives.

Supporting the Council Representatives and the various other civilian organs has been a secretariat, headed by a Secretary-General, which has grown steadily, if slowly, through the years. The modest dimensions of the secretariat are indicated by the fact that both its staff and budget are considerably smaller than those of the United States Information Service in Bangkok, which is only one of the many operations of the American Government in Thailand. The Secretariat numbered 132 persons in 1961, a considerable growth from a start of six only five years earlier (although 97 of these were local employees). The Americans and the Australians in particular opposed the establishment of a secretariat at SEATO's start, and it was only grudgingly that a small unit was inaugurated for housekeeping purposes in the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 1955. An Executive Secretary was named in 1956 to coordinate the already growing number of SEATO activities. And in 1957 the office of Secretary-General was established. "The office has expanded considerably since then," Pote Sarasin (a Thai), its first occupant, said in 1962; "out of absolute necessity. It formerly had so little power."[14] Both the

[14] Pote Sarasin was interviewed in Bangkok on July 27, 1962.

Filipinos and the Thai have urged a greater increase in the authority of the Secretary-General.[15]

The personnel who staff the SEATO secretariat are drawn from the various member states, and most return to the national administrative services from which they came after a tour of duty of two to three years' duration. SEATO civil servants are supposed to give primary loyalty to the organization and are forbidden to take instructions from their national governments. Such personnel staff the six non-military subdivisions of the Secretariat: Central Services, Cultural Relations, Economic Services, Public Information, Security, and Research Services—the latter producing "reports on current developments in Communist activities" partly for the purpose of ultimate dissemination to member and non-member Asian governments. On the whole, their level of competence is not notably high. This is partly because of the shortage of trained manpower in some of the participant countries, including host Thailand, and partly the result of the low level of interest of some of the member countries in SEATO's operations. A minority of the civil servants identify strongly with SEATO; most, however, do not. This should not be surprising in view of the strong identification of the first Secretary-General, Pote Sarasin, and his successor, Konthi Suphamongkol, with their (Thai) government. The fact that members of the secretariat come from such diverse cultural and educational backgrounds as well as from different national administrative traditions also tends to hinder both identification and cohesiveness.

More than anything else, the Secretary-General is a combination of chief administrative officer and public relations personality. Possessed of far less authority than his NATO counterpart, he also is more than a little bit of a figurehead. Pote Sarasin, the first Secretary-General, was a competent and worldly person but not any kind of political leader of SEATO after the model of Dag Hammarsjhold or U Thant of the United Nations. Although he chairs meetings of the Council Representatives and helps to expedite discussions, the Secretary-General does not serve as a political broker in any way. Nor did Pote Sarasin consider this necessary. "The United Nations is a body of opposed interests," he said, "but we are all friends. It is only a question of how to do something—not of preventing war or something else unfortu-

[15] For the views of Philippine Vice-President and then Foreign Secretary Emmanuel Pelaez, see the *Bangkok World*, March 31, 1962.

nate among ourselves. There is no need for the Secretary-General to seek to mediate diverse positions." Secretary-General Pote, however, did support Thai efforts to revitalize SEATO; he stated in September, 1961, for example, that it was time to revise procedures to make it possible for SEATO to act more expeditiously and efficiently. He also strongly endorsed expansion of SEATO cultural and economic activities.

Both the Secretary-General and the secretariat do perform an important function in "serving as the lubricants," as Pote Sarasin has put it, of SEATO decision-making. "Thailand requested a college of engineering," SEATO's first Secretary-General has said, "and we circularized the membership with favorable results. Pakistan, however, wanted aid for an interlocking national road network, and we approached the potential donor nation, who said 'no'." (The reason for United States opposition in the latter instance was that the Americans did not want to give the impression that SEATO membership was a prerequisite for this kind of aid). "The fact that we exist to thus lubricate the system has made SEATO cooperation develop much more rapidly than would otherwise have been the case," according to Pote.

What the Secretary-General has primarily done has been to issue statements on behalf of the organization and to meet with the press from time to time. He has also travelled abroad to SEATO countries (and elsewhere), serving as symbol and spokesman of the security community. The most important political function of the Secretary-General to date may have been in maintaining support of the frequently disappointed Thai government for the organization, a by no means unimportant job.

The fact of a secretariat, however, is an influence in itself countering disintegrative tendencies among the security community's membership. More than symbolically, the secretariat serves as a reminder of the benefits of international cooperation among like-minded nations or countries with common problems which they cannot solve individually. The secretariat is the ever-present staff facility serving the ends of coordination and cooperation, and it could become much more important in the years ahead. To date, however, the secretariat's concerns have been mainly economic and cultural—which, considering the modest dimensions of SEATO programs in these areas, is one measure of its contemporary significance.

Three things stand out concerning the civilian political organs of SEATO as these have been evolved through the years since 1954. There are, in the first place, far more of these than most of the members originally desired. Secondly, this organizational growth has been the result of two forces mainly: the agitation of the Asian members, especially Thailand (and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines), and an expansion in the work-load of the regional security community. Thirdly, the procedures for consultation and reaching agreement have also changed; they have been liberalized. This latter change also has been due to agitation on the part of the smaller states. At the same time, however, there has been growing agreement on both organizational and procedural questions between the two most concerned Asian states, Thailand and the Philippines, and the two most active Western members of SEATO, the United States and Australia. Given the newness of regional international organization as both concept and practice, the persistence of the frequently intensely expressed forces of nationalism and state sovereignty, and the still limited number of years SEATO has been in existence, the institutional growth of the security community has probably been as much as could reasonably be expected. Expectations, however, are frequently unreasonable, and there has been criticism and disappointment. It would be genuinely unfortunate if realistic expectations were to serve in any way as a brake on the further evolution of what is still a highly useful security community of the non-Communist countries of, and interested in, Southeast Asia.