

NATION-BUILDING: SOME GLANCES AT THE PAKISTAN SCENE

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INTRODUCTION

THIS PAPER IS CONCERNED WITH ONE OF THE RECENT ADDITIONS to the lexicon of the political scientist, specifically, "nation-building." "Nation-building," like the terms "democracy" or "welfare state," can obscure more than it reveals. As short-hand symbolism, it has limited value. For purposes of communication, however, the term helps to simplify a subject matter of some complexity. "Nation-building," suggests Carl Friedrich, is "a matter of building group cohesion and group loyalty for purposes of international representation and domestic planning."¹

"Nation-building" refers to the fabric of a national community; to the elements that compose it; the relationship of those elements to each other and, collectively, to the world outside. This would imply both formal or constitutional and institutional links as well as informal or more functional contacts such as commercial and intellectual ones. In brief, the political scientist examining "nation-building" must analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the links holding a community together. Thus "nation-building" concentrates on national integration.

"Nation-building" evolves from the belief that there can be no nation, and hence no national development, until a majority of people within a state recognize that their personal interests are linked with that state and that their well-being is enhanced by membership in it. This, of course, is no simple matter. Every people seeks to preserve and defend particular qualities, and the merging of personal with national interests are at the heart of "nation-building."

¹ Carl J. Friedrich, "Nation-Building?" appears in: *Nation-Building*, edited by Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, (N. Y.; Atherton Press, 1963) p. 32.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATION

The proliferation of nations contributes almost nothing to our understanding of the contemporary world. It is still virtually impossible to predict the making of a nation. We are still unable to explain how nations mature; why they develop in the manner they do; and, why they pass away. The experience of the new nations and those still struggling to be born give special significance to these gaps on our knowledge.

The haphazard structures of the new states, to note one important feature, draws attention to arbitrary elements in the formation of older entities. The present firm existence of the United States, for example, gives its past a fictitious air of inevitability. Rupert Emerson notes that after the fact of existence, each nation may come to look like "a God-given entity." It is a far different story, however, when that nation is in a state of gestation, when "the divine intent is likely to be obscure."²

There was nothing inevitable in the emergence of the European states. Hans Kohn, dwelling on this point notes: "Neither the German nor the French nation is an entity predestined by nature, any more than the American nation is. They all, as well as the national consciousness which animates them, were formed by historic forces."³ And not too infrequently those historic forces have been the decision to choose a common enemy. The merging of personal interests and the growth of common interests often can be attributed to external threats. "Acute danger unifies people more than than does the undisputed enjoyment of the things they or their forbears achieved, for otherwise it is inconceivable that those members of a population who pay little attention to the affairs of their country in peacetime would so unflinchingly sacrifice their lives on the field of battle."⁴

Perhaps much of the confusion concerning the origins of nation-states stems from the awareness that some of the first nations of Western Europe, namely, France and England, were composed of peoples who in large measure had achieved a unity of purpose and identity before becoming politicized. Clearly, the

² Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation*, (Cambridge; Harvard, 1960) p. 91.

³ Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: MacMillan Co., 1944) p. 22.

⁴ Hermann Weilenmann, "The Interlocking of Nation and Personality Structure," Deutch, ed., *Nation-Building*, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

peoples of Western Europe combined their wills some time before becoming cognizant of their liberties and power. To oversimplify this thought, the demands for popular government and the cries of political nationalism that developed in the West came after the emergence of a cultural nationalism and not before generations of "nation-building."⁵

THE NEW STATES

In Asia and Africa today, nations have emerged with a startling suddenness and with no time to work out their internal relationships. Where a myriad of tribal, ethnic, linguistic and religious loyalties persist, where former colonial boundaries impose an arbitrary settlement on the drawing of new frontiers, and where a grinding poverty saps the vitality of the majority, the question of nationhood remains large and ominous. For these countries, leadership must set as its first task the stimulating of a national consciousness. The task in fact is obvious but there are few clues as to how it is to be accomplished.

The struggle for national unity takes many forms. For some within the new states, once independence has been won, the plea for national unity may have a hollow ring. Internal cleavages, subordinated in the period leading to independence are likely to reappear, and the prevailing authority may insist on the creation of authoritarian or one-party system. Although the one-party state can be described as the selfish attempt of a ruling elite to safeguard its personal power, it may also be a necessary expedient in the effort to preserve and integrate the nation, to consolidate the state structure, and to speed economic and social development. It is indeed difficult to challenge the argument which such ruling elites offer: that the crisis which confronts their new countries is just as urgent as that surrounding the struggle for freedom.

Perhaps we should be more appreciative of the one-party states. The fact that they refuse to engage in the hazardous alternation of political authority which characterizes mature western democracies should not be condemned on its face. The one-party achievements of some African and Latin American states may be cases in point. It might even be possible to accept the maneuverings of an Nkrumah, a typical leader of a new nation

⁵ For a discussion on the fusion of cultural with political nationalism, see: C.J.H. Hayes, *Nationalism—A Religion*, (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1960).

who needs a puffed image of his political prestige to overcome the tribal particularism in his midst.

In the quest for unity, the repeatedly elaborated doctrine of the threat of neocolonialism through oppositional counter-revolutionary activity is utilized to demonstrate that vigilance cannot be relaxed, that the only true leaders are those who have displayed their undying patriotism, and that all policies of the governing authority are justified in order to preserve the nation. In sum, the so-called nationalism, a-not-too-well-concealed xenophobiaism, reflected in the policies and pronouncements of the new elites is constructed of fearful negativisms. Herein also lies the logic for permanent revolution; for it is the task of the new leaders to articulate the desires and aspirations of a people whose national goals are still on the horizon.

PAKISTAN'S QUEST FOR NATIONAL UNITY

Pakistan provides excellent opportunities for studying the process of nation-building in the Asian subcontinent and the body of this paper is concerned with the efforts of the Pakistan government to treat the dilemmas created, in major part, by the physical division of the country into two separate entities. Pakistan is perhaps the most extraordinary case of a nation which only the most clairvoyant could have anticipated coming into existence. The country achieved independence virtually overnight. Before August 1, 1947, there never had been such a thing as a Pakistan nation. Yet once nationhood had been endowed, the fact that it confounded the observers was a matter of very little relevance.

On August 28, 1964, President Ayub opened the Dacca Centre of the Pakistan Council of National Integration and once more emphasized the imperative of developing unity in the country. He took the occasion to again urge the people of East Pakistan "to go deep into and develop (a) feeling of common destiny and desire to live together."⁶ He stressed the need for developing imaginative ideas on the subject of national integration and requested the Council to help in the evolution of a communication system which would make people familiar with the different regions of the country. The absence of a common language was given special consideration:

⁶ *The Pakistan Times*, August 29, 1964.

(It is) a challenge to our national integration. Let all of us admit this and face it squarely and devise ways and means to get over this difficulty.⁷

This call for a national language is reminiscent of Muslim League policies in the 1950's. But there are also significant differences. In February 1952, a renewed effort to make Urdu the only national language produced a violent reaction in East Pakistan. The Bengalis interpreted the proposal as one denying them equality with the West Pakistanis. In the demonstration that followed, national unity was reduced to an empty plea and even the agreement in 1954 to make the Bengali language co-equal with Urdu did not dampen the enthusiasm of the provincial nationalists and separatists. Their demands and the general chaos caused by them were among the principal causes for the promulgation of martial law in 1958.

Ayub's ability to bind up the wounds inflicted in Pakistan's turbulent first decade has developed somewhat remarkably. By operating on several levels simultaneously (in the political, social, economic, cultural and religious), by using the subtle techniques of persuasion and accommodation, by instilling confidence in authority and encouraging local initiative, he is slowly winning the trust of larger and larger numbers of people in all parts of the country, including East Pakistan. In calling for a national language, President Ayub insists on no time table. Nor is he saying that one language or another should be the *lingua franca*. He is merely stating what he believes to be a truism. That the population of Pakistan, if it is ever to share a common identity, will have to improve its means of communication. And in this matter he thinks a single national language is imperative. Ayub recognizes that a national language is not the sole answer to the question of national unity. Along with other general and more specific policies stimulating national consciousness, however, it provides a necessary link in the chain he hopes to forge.

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The central questions during Pakistan's first decade focused on whether the country's natural division ruled out any effective form of self-government. Could a nation so divided generate enough collective enthusiasm to bridge the gulf that separates its two far-flung regions? Was it possible to develop the conditions

⁷ *Ibid.*

required for representative government; especially the necessity of organizing political parties which placed national patriotism above sectional loyalties?

Like the great majority of new states, Pakistan needed strong, centralized government. Political stability and economic development demanded it. This also seemed to rule out the existence of multi-party politics. In western democracies it is accepted practice in times of emergency for opposition parties to forget their differences and to join together in support of national policies. In the new states of Asia and Africa "emergency" becomes the twin brother of independence. The new government sees its first duty as that of protecting the nation from those who would disrupt it. New states face multiple crises on the same day that their freedom is proclaimed; they lack trained administrators, they lack finances and above all, they lack time. Like Pakistan they are usually short of the essential elements which weld diversity into a constructive force. In such situations, one-party rule becomes something of a necessity and there is little opportunity for politics to flourish.

The Muslim League (1947-1958) took this view of its own rule. It considered itself the only party with a mandate to govern. But the internal squabbles, the inability to enforce discipline among its members, and the failure to inspire a national identity caused it to dissipate its monopoly status.⁸ From 1947 to the declaration of martial law in 1958 Pakistan was compelled to follow a different road from that of India or Great Britain. As a state it neither had two strong parties nor one with a variety of lesser opposition groups. The principal feature of Pakistan's inchoate party system was interminable struggle. Given this situation, the military and administrative bureaucracy harbored the fear that the country would fall apart.

The imposition of martial law sought to reverse centrifugal forces; and the abolition of the political parties followed the abrogation of the constitution and the dissolution of the national and provincial assemblies. In a period of general instability, the coercive instrument was brought into use.

A modified form of martial law remained in force until the promulgation of the Constitution of 1962. Cooperation between

⁸ Sir Ivor Jennings, *The Approach to Self-Government*, (Cambridge, University Press, 1956), pp. 17-18.

the different parts of the country was encouraged and serious attention was given to problems of national development, provincialism, corruption, smuggling and general skulduggery. It is only fair to state that Ayub received the support of the majority of the population in these activities.

President Ayub's reluctance to reinstate political parties was evident from his speeches and off-the-cuff remarks. Nevertheless, once the new constitution had been delivered to the country he was unable to withstand the pressure for their return. In the summer of 1962 a somewhat different version of political party activity was sanctioned with the Muslim League, revived but divided, filling both the government and oppositional positions.⁹ In 1963, a hesitant Ayub joined the government Muslim League Party, and shortly thereafter was made its President.

A major opposition group was hurriedly organized in East Pakistan. The formation of the National Democratic Front (NDF) was announced in Dacca on October 4, 1962. It combined elements of the old Awami League, Krishak Sramik Party, Muslim League dissidents and Jamaat-i-Islami. The convenor of the organization who has since died was a former Prime Minister, H. S. Suhrawardy. He chose not to identify the NDF as a political party, however. Suhrawardy thought that with the various restrictions imposed on himself and others like him it would be better to describe the NDF as a "platform." The ex-Prime Minister went on to explain that the principle which guides the NDF program was "the principle that Pakistan belongs to its people and not to any person, a group, or a party, and that no one has the authority to deprive the people of their inalienable right of freedom and democratic exercise of the supreme authority of the State."¹⁰

As in the past the revival of the political parties meant the renewal of the attack upon authority. The NDF set as its single objective "the democratization of the constitution."¹¹ The Front demanded the restoration of the Constitution of 1956, a document

⁹ The Muslim League (Conventionists) comprise the government party while the Muslim League (Councillors) take a place with the opposition. The Conventionists get their name from the Muslim League Parliamentary Party whereas the Councillors are represented by former members of the Muslim League Council who refused to accept the Conventionists as genuine Muslim Leaguers.

¹⁰ *Dawn*, September 25, 1962.

¹¹ S.M.M. Qureshi, "Political Parties and the Role of the Opposition," unpublished paper presented at McGill University, June 19, 1964, p. 11.

rejected by many of the same people during the sessions of the Second Constituent Assembly in 1955-56. But memories are short and the NDF was bent on making political capital of what they called Ayub's "undemocratic" constitution.

In September 1964, Miss Fatima Jinnah, the sister of the late Qaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, agreed to become the opposition's candidate for the presidency. This event resulted in the formation of a new political combination with the specific purpose of contesting the January 1965 election. Called the Combined Opposition Parties, it is more commonly referred to as the COP. It is interesting to note that the leadership of the NDF, despite its acceptance of Miss Jinnah's candidacy, cannot reconcile itself with the policies of the COP which incidentally is composed of basically the same political elements that make up the NDF. The principal difference appears to be in the leadership of the two groupings. Since the passing of H. S. Suhrawardy, the NDF has been dominated by opposition Muslim Leaguers whereas the COP is controlled by the more radical Awami League and National Awami Parties. This is even more apparent with the sudden death of Khwaja Nazimuddin, the leading Muslim League Councillor, in October 1964.

The COP, like the United Front opposition party of 1954, is rent by many divisions, in part created by the COP's Nine Point Programme which the NDF refuses to sanction even though the individual parties have subscribed to it. The NDF still claims not to be a political party. It insists that political parties can only be revived when "democracy is fully restored in the country."¹² Perhaps the NDF is of the view that the COP will wither and die after the elections and that it will assume control of the country's political affairs should President Ayub be defeated.*

The re-emergence of political parties brings little that is new to Pakistan's political scene. The Government has legitimated its rule. It has displayed a capacity for firm, stable authority beyond that of any of its predecessors. There is little surface dissension within government ranks and despite the verbal crescendos of the opposition, it has thus far been adequately neutralized.

In a recent visit to Dacca, President Ayub once more described the principles under which the opposition could expect to

¹² *The Pakistan Times*, November 18, 1964.

On January 2, 1965 Mohammad Ayub Khan was re-elected President of Pakistan.

operate. All political parties must adhere to the three fundamentals of Islamic nationalism, belief in a strong center and firm attachment to the soil, he said. He went on to note that the pattern of politics in the subcontinent had been agitational in order to dislodge British power. Once having crystallized it proved difficult to change. But this in fact was what his administration was pledged to do. The negative aspects of politics were to be rooted out and only "constructive" efforts would be tolerated.

Somewhat reflecting the doctrine of democratic centralism, Ayub noted that only a strong central government could relieve the sufferings of the masses and that:

There would be controversies and controversies were good but once a majority decision had been arrived at, there should be no going back. Returning to the starting point every time, he said, would never allow the country to move forward politically.¹³

Undoubtedly, Ayub means by this statement that political rule must be preceded by public order. He believes government must be taken seriously and recognized for what it is. Namely, the organization of a group of men in a given community for the purpose of survival. Put another way, where government becomes impossible, politics is impossible.

Ayub's method of rule does not deny the opposition their place. The time has passed for this policy. Groups are now to be recognized so that as far as it is possible, they can be conciliated. Their activities are legal and their security assured so long as they recognize the bounds of their responsibility. Politicians individually and collectively are encouraged to partake in public debate insofar as their contribution is positive and directed towards the general business of government and the maintenance of order.

The political philosophy to which President Ayub subscribes is as follows: Politics is an activity wherein different interests in a polity are conciliated by providing them with power commensurate with their importance to the welfare and survival of the whole nation.

The fact that Ayub has chosen conciliation and legal methods rather than violence and coercion to achieve his objectives classifies Pakistan with the free societies. And Ayub, despite his aver-

¹³ *The Pakistan Times*, August 28, 1964.

sion to "politics," is one of the chief subscribers to the theory, consciously or not, that politics is a way of ruling divided societies (and most societies are divided) without undue violence.

AYUB'S BASIC DEMOCRACY

In explanation of the declaration of martial law in 1958, General Ayub Khan candidly announced he possessed neither faith in nor patience with politicians.¹⁴ Time and again the politicians put themselves in situations which only the military could extricate them from. And their failure to maintain law and order, let alone preserve the unity of the state, reinforced Ayub's views that they could not be trusted with nation-building chores.

From the beginning of his rule Ayub consistently expressed the idea that Pakistan was not prepared for parliamentary politics as practiced in the West. Observing the gap between Pakistan's sophisticated political elite and the illiterate masses, he noted that what Pakistan needed was a form of government truer to its genius and in harmony with its overall level of political consciousness. Ayub stressed the awakening of the masses as well as the need to gain their active participation in the development process. Armed with the state's coercive power he set as his first objective the rebuilding of local government without the support of the politicians who were summarily immobilized under the disqualification order called EBDO, (Elective Bodies Disqualification Order). Their power was impaired further by the land reforms that followed. And finally, they were passed over when Basic Democracy, a form of local self-government, was formalized.

Local self-government is not entirely new to the subcontinent. And there are many who enjoy citing the Chowkidari Panchayat of 1871 and the Local Self-Government Act of 1885 when trying to limit the credit due Ayub Khan for the initiation of Basic Democracy.¹⁵ Though far from recreating Pakistani political life, Basic Democracy, in the four short years that it has been operative has helped to establish a sense of community among the present masses of Pakistan.

The activities of the Basic Democrats in East Pakistan, for example, have been turned to positive tasks. Contrasted with the

¹⁴ Martial Law is analyzed in: Joseph Minattur, *Martial Law in India, Pakistan and Ceylon*, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962).

¹⁵ For a description of these earlier enactments see: A.T.R. Rahman, *Basic Democracies at the Grassroots* (Pakistan Academy for Village Development, Comilla, 1962), pp. 3-9.

old line politicians whose principal objective seemed to be the harnessing of popular emotions, the directors of Basic Democracy have succeeded in attracting the population to concrete exertions. The politicians concerned themselves with the raising of slogans and never hesitated to malign their opponents. Given their limited power, they distributed patronage to some but often wound up frustrating the many. The leaders of Basic Democracy, with community development their prime concern, are more inclined to stimulate and guide the Bengalis in the improvement of their environment. The Basic Democracy approach has already proven that political dividends can be found in a more productive agriculture, better roads and increased credit facilities.

The importance of Basic Democracy in the quest for national integration cannot be minimized. The ability of the scheme to organize the rural population as well as initiate communication between the people and various levels of local administration, for the first time, permits diffusion of power in the community at large. The overall effect may be to convert the authoritarian character of district administration into one more democratic.

Basic Democracy is also a training device in self-government. Arranged in four hierarchial tiers, Divisional Council, District Council, Tehsil/Thana Council and the lowest Union Councils, it provides the first real experiment in public responsibility at the grassroots level. Although the upper three tiers maintain traditional postures, the jurisdiction of the Union Councils is relatively new. Each Union Council represents about six villages and the total number of elected Union Council members approximates 80,000. They are elected on the basis of adult franchise and make up the electoral college which in turn determines the presidency and the national and provincial legislatures.

The introduction of the Union Council has had a particular impact on traditional administration in the villages. It had been customary for local officials to spend their time with large village zamindars and leave their more numerous smaller land holders and tillers to their own devices. Peasant problems were very rarely aired and for them government was available solely for the collection of revenues or the punishment of offenders and law-breakers.

The formation of the Union Councils has changed this picture. The Union Councils have organized the peasants into a legitimate

representative body capable of communicating with higher authority. Channels of communication have been opened for the small landholders and the peasantry has become a pressure group of no insignificant proportions. At the same time, the landlord's power has diminished and "feudal predilections of the district administrator are being changed under the pressure of a new institutional set-up."¹⁶

In East Pakistan the 412 Thana Councils, the next tier above the Union Council, are even now being prepared for a larger assignment. The former director of the Academy for Rural Development at Comilla, Akhtar Hameed Khan, has suggested the opening of training centers in each Thana of East Pakistan for the purpose of educating the populace in the techniques of national development. It is hoped that the consuming of the energies and the exciting of the sensibilities of the East Pakistanis to the large challenges that lie ahead may go a long way in breaking the fatalism that has perennially gripped them.

A report entitled *An Evaluation of the Rural Public Works Programme, East Pakistan, 1962-63*, highlights some of the small successes of the Basic Democracy system and they will be treated below.¹⁷ Not only has economic development been made possible but more so, the two lowest tiers of the new total system have been invigorated with a willingness to work in behalf of themselves and the country. And the strengthening of the Union and Thana Councils, their acceptance of more responsibilities, their diminishing susceptibility to the cries of the political malcontents and their capacity for producing leaders with the political skills necessary for the close infighting in the decision-making process, lends encouragement to the future.

Thus Basic Democracy has been the catalyst for a change in attitude in both administrators and peasants. As the Works Program will illustrate, the administration is now concerned directly with the masses. For the first time, the rural population, sensing their own power and the value in working with government, have

¹⁶ Inayatullah, "Changing Character of District Administration in Pakistan" *District Administration in West Pakistan: Its Problems and Challenges* (Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, Peshawar, 1964), p. 118.

¹⁷ A.T.R. Rahman et al, *An Evaluation of the Rural Public Works Programme, East Pakistan, 1962-63*, (Comilla: Pakistan Academy of Rural Development, 1963). A thoughtful paper on the same subject is: R.V. Gilbert, "The Works Program in East Pakistan" delivered at the *Conference on Labor Productivity* in Geneva, December 1963.

endeavored to blend their activities with the policies of authority. But this is not to imply that the peasants have provided government officials with *carte blanche*. As Inayatullah notes:

...the presence of pressure from the Union Council for selection of their project and consequent clamour and protests when their resolutions were "justifiably" or "unjustifiably" ignored did create a climate in which district administration had to accommodate their interests as well.¹⁸

At the same time it would be wrong to convey the idea that Pakistan's Basic Democracy system has corrected all the old evils. Basic Democracy has been fused to an authoritarian structure of personalized rule. For many obvious reasons the tutelage and guidance provided by the more sophisticated officials cannot be dispensed with. It is also a fact that vested interests continue to exist and that favors are still bought and sold. "Also the official members (of the Basic Democracies) who had always taken decisions bureaucratically and had never been exposed to public accountability continue to believe that their administrative authority is effective to the extent the public believes them to be their superiors."¹⁹

What is to be emphasized, despite the imperfections, is that a real beginning has been made in removing the attitudinal and structural impediments in the way of peasant expression on problems that concern them. The activities and mentality of decades cannot be changed in an instant. Older ways will linger. But it is significant to note that the Basic Democrats and the villagers whom they represent are themselves cognizant of the changes that have been inspired by the new system of self-government.

Perhaps more than any other factor, it is this which has thus far made both Basic Democracy and the Works Program in East Pakistan a success. As President Ayub has declared:

Let us hope a time will come when these councils (Basic Democracies) would have attained such maturity as education spreads in the country that local administration almost withers away and they run their own police, they run their own revenue system and they run everything. I (would) like to see them go in (those) directions. In ten to fifteen years' time a situation may arise when the officials are only there to guide and not as administrators and rulers.²⁰

¹⁸ Inayatullah, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-119.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 119-120.

²⁰ Inaugural address presented at a seminar on Basic Democracy held in Lahore from 29 May to 31 May, 1963. *Pakistan Times*, May 31, 1963. As quoted by Inayatullah, pp. 122-123.

THE WORKS PROGRAM OF EAST PAKISTAN

Some students of the Pakistan scene would assert that the most important issue facing the country today is the ever-growing disparity between the two provinces. Although the precise extent of the disparity may be a subject of controversy, few would deny that the eastern province has lagged seriously behind the western. Even the sizeable increase in expenditures and overall economic capacity in East Pakistan in the last four years has not prevented the gap from widening further.

It is reasonable to suggest that in a country where one region is conspicuously behind the other in development, the disparity will not only act as a drag upon the general economy but will also generate serious inter-provincial tensions. In Pakistan, where the less-developed province is so isolated as to inhibit the possibility of automatic adjustment through the operation of the usual economic instruments, the difficulties and dangers are aggravated. Planned economic development in Pakistan presupposes an all-out effort to remove the disparity. This must be accomplished for two fundamental reasons. One, to ease the strains from the resulting disequilibrium. And two, to give the general economy an opportunity to move forward.

The Pakistan Government under President Ayub has given serious attention to these matters.²¹ In an effort to relieve tensions it has instituted policies calling for an acceleration in East Pakistan development. This has been done without affecting economic advances in West Pakistan. This is not exactly what the East Pakistan economists and planners have prescribed, however. In a special report of five members of the Finance Commission, the target date for eliminating economic disparity was given as twenty-five years.²² This was thought to be the amount of time it would take East Pakistan to come abreast of West Pakistan. But here was the rub. The commissioners noted that this goal could be achieved only if development in West Pakistan were drastically curtailed. Clearly, this deceleration to what would be a level of stagnation (if the proposals were put into effect) was out of the

²¹ The principal objective of the Third Five Year Plan (1965-70) is to attain a rapid growth of the national economy with a view to insuring a breakthrough to self-sustained growth. The plan envisages a reduction of existing disparities in per capita income between East and West Pakistan by about 20%.

²² *Report of Five Members of the Finance Commission*, (Dacca, n.p. 1963), p. 11.

question. The momentum of development in West Pakistan must be maintained. The huge expenditures being made on the West Pakistan Indus and Jhelum canals, barrages and hydro-electric projects will ensure this. Investment in West Pakistan's economy will certainly draw more in its wake. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that the gap may well grow larger before it begins to close.

Still, it is a fact that the Ayub government is endeavoring to aid East Pakistan. A case in point is the Works Program which is now completing its third year. Although not specifically provided for in the Second Five Year Plan (1960-1965), the program has proved so successful that it has been given major emphasis in the Third Plan.

The Works Program grew out of an expanded PL 480 agreement with the government of the United States in August 1961. It called for the giving of \$621,000,000 of United States surplus agricultural commodities over a four-year period. One of the purposes of this agricultural infusion was to finance a labor intensive works program which would make it possible to convert idle labor into capital. East Pakistan seemed to be the ideal region to test the plan.

It was theorized that East Pakistan's agricultural deficiencies could be overcome with the application of resources already on hand. The whole problem seemed to revolve about the matter of moving earth.²³ The Works Program sought to utilize the idle period of the East Pakistan peasants, said to run from December through April each year. Estimates indicated that about five million available man years were wasted annually, a figure equivalent to one-third the labor force available for agriculture in the province.

The Works Program was introduced by the Government of East Pakistan through the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development at Comilla. Under the supervision of the Academy's director Akhtar Hameed Khan, a pilot project financed with Rs. 200,000

²³ William C. Hollinger, "Implementing Pakistan's Second Plan, Some Lessons We Can Learn," unpublished paper, McGill University, June 17, 1964, p. 18. A. K. Pickering, United Nations Adviser on Social Development Planning to the Government of West Pakistan provides additional insights into the activities and objectives of the Works Program in West Pakistan in his paper entitled, "Rural Works Programme in West Pakistan up to March 1964."

(approx. \$40,000) was begun. The experiment was an immediate success and far exceeded expectations. Canals were excavated, embankments and dikes were constructed, roads were built, culverts, regulators and small erosion dams were installed. In addition to producing the best spring rice crops in years, the Works Program facilitated the movement of agricultural commodities from the farm to the local markets.

Impressed with the accomplishment, the Pakistan Government maintained its momentum by expanding the Program. Ten crores of rupees (approx. 20 million dollars) were allocated for rural development on a province-wide basis in 1962-63. Implementation of this plan was made the responsibility of the Provincial Department of Basic Democracies and Local Government. And again results were better than anticipated.

The physical accomplishments as enumerated by the searching evaluation prepared by the Comilla Academy were as follows: the program built 3,600 miles of new roads...repaired 8,700 miles of old roads...excavated 1,300 miles of new khals; re-excavated 450 miles of old khals; raised 160 miles of new embankments; and repaired 360 miles of old embankments. More than 500,000 man-days of supervision by local leaders on a voluntary basis, and almost wholly without cost, were provided on more than 17,000 local projects. Around 250,000 labourers were employed for more than 10,000,000 man-days.²⁴

Now thoroughly convinced of the value of the Works Program it was expanded to include the entire country, the Government committing 30 crores of rupees (approx. 60 million dollars) to its use in 1963-64. The largest portion of this money, some 20 crores, went to the lowest levels of local government in East Pakistan.²⁵ The allocation for 1964-65 was still higher with 40 crores of rupees being provided. Again East Pakistan was given the largest share, said to be 25 crores.

The Third Five Year Plan which is scheduled to begin in 1965 gives the Works Program special priority. In recognition of its accomplishments the Plan allocates Rs. 2,500,000,000 (approx. \$500,000,000) to it. Of this total East Pakistan will receive Rs. 1,500,000,000 (approx. \$300,000,000).²⁶

The most recent statistics again show that East Pakistan has produced the largest successes. According to preliminary evalua-

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 19.

²⁵ *Works Programme through Basic Democracies 1963-1964*, (Dacca: Government of East Pakistan, 1963) p. 1.

²⁶ Government of Pakistan, *Outline of the Third Five-Year Plan 1965-70*, August 1964, p. 235.

tion reports about 21,262 miles of roads and several thousand bridges and culverts were constructed and repaired in the years of the Program's operation. In addition, approximately 1,883 miles of canals have been excavated or re-excavated and 1,018 miles of embankments raised or repaired.

Analysis of the effects of these projects reveals that the "aus" (rapid growing rainy season) and "aman" (late autumn) crops have been protected from the seasonal floods and that the projected saving will result in an increase in the yield and could raise the income of the rural population by an estimated Rs. 140,000,000 (approx. \$28,000,000). Most important for the future, the Works Program continues to add to the network which will link economically backward areas with the market centers.²⁷

It may be too early to cite the nation-building benefits of the Works Program in East Pakistan but one thing seems clear. A beginning has been made in breaking down the Bengali's suspicions of government. The administrators for the first time, have drawn themselves close to the great mass of rural poor and in many instances have developed a rapport and an affection not hitherto in evidence. If the goodwill engendered by the Works Program can be sustained, if larger material benefits are forthcoming, the effects may be revolutionary.²⁸

Rural stagnation is a dilemma in all developing countries and experiments in community development abound. Why the Works Program has thus far succeeded in East Pakistan cannot yet be ascertained. Nevertheless the success of the operation has been attributed to its organization at the lower levels, to its having benefited the very people who are carrying out the physical aspects of the program and its concentration on a limited but significant number of projects. In combination these factors furnish part of the answer to this very intriguing question.

The Rural Works Program, despite its success, will not of itself solve the disparity problem in Pakistan, however. Much more will have to be done in the economic sector if the Bengalis are to feel fully at home within the Pakistan design. Government flexibility, imagination and the ability to take the risks involved in

²⁷ *The Pakistan Times*, August 28, 1964.

²⁸ The national consciousness and cooperation generated by the Works Program may have been adversely affected by the election campaign but this is yet to be determined.

development are to be commended. But not for a single moment can it avoid the complexity of the disparity issue.

East Pakistan, with 55% of the total population, receives less real income per person than West Pakistan. With a backward infrastructure, a minute industrial base, and large unemployment, it is no wonder that the province consumes little besides rice and fish.

Despite figures which try to prove that East Pakistan's per capita income was higher than West Pakistan's up through the Korean War boom years and that the province's economic decline occurred only with the 1955 implementation of the first year plan, it is fairly obvious that East Pakistan's economic difficulties pre-date the emergence of Pakistan.

If we compare the relative position of East and West Pakistan in 1949-50 and 1959-60, it is obvious that economic disparities between East and West Pakistan were fairly large to start with.²⁹

But even after citing this, it is still necessary to note that the pre-martial law Pakistan governments contributed to the disparity. Although the Ayub government has since 1959 attempted to arrest the problem, and in fact has slowed the rate of increase, much more must be done if the trend is to be reversed. Economic growth tends to concentrate in the more developed and more productive regions. Investment monies will naturally gravitate there. Foreign aid and loans will move to the region where "sound," "economic" projects are located. And consciously or not the government must justify its support for the "more developed" region in the name of the country's overall progress.

THE NATION-BUILDING RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ADMINISTRATION

In discussing the difficult equation of national integration it is necessary to understand the plight of peoples wrenched from their tragic but plausible situation and thrust into another of general rootlessness. Managers of national integration in the developing countries, despite their impatience, must always take into account the need to provide both physical and psychological security for those whom they expect to change. National integration is not the end but the beginning of the struggle for modernity and in itself offers no panaceas. In the days before independence the belief persisted that freedom would *ipso facto* produce the "good"

²⁹ Mahbub ul Haq, *The Strategy of Economic Planning*, (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 111.

life." The disillusionment that followed that experience can be avoided in this one. The generations which are not to eat of the fruits of their industry and sacrifice have to be provided with meaningful intermediary rewards of a spiritual as well as material nature.

National unity requires the compounding of already shared experiences. The past cannot be rejected. Policies that deny the past in the name of modernity will fail to create the group cohesion so fundamental in the building process. Thus a nation denies its past only at its own peril. To start with what exists does not saddle the innovator with fixed quantities or doom his plans to sterility. Nor does it limit his opportunities for encouraging change. New methods and ideas can be introduced where resources permit but the application of these as the utilization of the more familiar will require imagination, patience and the willingness to experiment.

It is said that the concept of "nationalism" and loyalty to a nation hardly exist at all among many people in the developing areas of Asia and Africa. It takes considerable time before the people whose loyalties have been circumscribed for centuries by a tribe or a village can experience the significance of "national" existence in their own daily routines.

Nation-building projects now underway in various developing countries reveal, by and large, that they have possibilities of success only if the people themselves share in what is being done. The extent to which they can be brought into the decision-making process, the kind of initiative that can be generated and the responsibility that they seem willing to shoulder, all act as indicators in determining the success or failure of the programs. In this the administrators, the implementors and guides of the projects must be capable of breaking down the suspicions of a people conditioned to expect little from officialdom. The new role of the government official, that of development manager, has been differentiated from the more traditional ones of revenue collector and peacekeeper. But no less than the villager, the administrator must develop new attitudinal and behavioral traits.

If this can be done and it has to be done no matter how difficult the task, not only will roads be constructed and canals dug but it is possible to envision a new respect for authority as well as a loyalty for the larger political unit which has contributed to making all this possible.

In the developing countries today, too many people live in such dismal circumstances that they are incapable of thinking about or planning their future. This obvious fact helps to explain why development administrators, desirous of leading their people into nationhood and a better life, must begin by generating popular confidence.

National integration can be achieved only when peoples sense the power it engenders and recognize the source of that power. No government official can fail to notice the renewed emphasis on the value and dignity of work or the loyalties created when workers become organized into political units under skillful leadership.³⁰

³⁰ See: Irving Swerdlow, ed., *Development Administration: Concepts and Problems* (Syracuse: University Press, 1963) and Hassan Habib and Guthrie S. Birkhead, eds., *Selected Papers on Development Economics and Administration*, (Lahore: Pakistan Administrative Staff College, 1963).