

PAKISTAN, INDIA AND THE WEST

DR. MOHAMMED AHSEN CHAUDHRI

I

PAKISTAN AND INDIA ARE THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRIES of Asia. In area and population India ranks fourth and Pakistan fifth in the world. Although barely eighteen years ago they together formed the British Indian empire, their relations, since their emergence as independent states since August 1947, have all along remained strenuous.

Paradoxical though it may sound, the Western policies towards Pakistan and India respectively have a direct bearing on their mutual relations, even to the point of generating misunderstanding, causing irritations and arousing apprehensions, at once deep and foul. The people of Pakistan, for instance, have often been at a loss to understand why should India, an avowedly non-aligned country, have more often than not received more favourable treatment from the West than Pakistan, which, despite her alliances with the West, has failed to get Western support even on such crucial issues as her security.

Lately, the Anglo-American arms aid to India has aroused feelings of dismay and apprehension in Pakistan. The people and the Government of Pakistan have expressed apprehensions that India would use these arms to absorb her. More devastating is the surmise that "the West might welcome such a move because it might erroneously think that a reunited subcontinent would be stronger and best equipped to fight China."¹

Why does the West think on these lines? There are numerous factors influencing the West's attitude towards India and Pakistan respectively. They relate to the strategic needs, contingencies of international politics, and the mental outlook of the policy makers and their environment. This calls for elucidation at some length.

¹ I.H. Qureshi, "Foreign Policy of Pakistan" in Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson (ed.), *Foreign Policies in a World of Change* (New York, 1963), p. 476.

II

For centuries the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent has played an important role in world affairs. It could not be otherwise, for the sub-continent lies on the crossroads of Southeast Asia, Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East. The ocean surrounding the sub-continent has been vital for trade between the East and the West. In the nineteenth century the control of the sub-continent was a major factor in Britain's preeminence as a world power. The rise of the United States and Japan at the beginning of the 20th century heralded the decline of Britain's political, economic and naval supremacy. The Second World War further reduced Britain's status as a world power and she found it difficult to capitalize on her past influence and prestige.

At the end of Second World War Britain could not maintain its control over the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent against a critical public opinion. Both Hindus and Muslims, though subscribing to different political ideals, were determined in their opposition to the foreign rule. An English writer, Beverley Nichols, summed up the political situation in the sub-continent after the Second World War when he said that should Britain decide to unite Hindus and Muslims under one Government, she could maintain control over India and continue to rule the country, but should Britain decide to divide the sub-continent into Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India, she would be left with no choice but to quit the sub-continent.² The first course, Britain knew, was too costly a venture in the face of widespread demand by the one hundred million Muslims of the sub-continent for the establishment of Pakistan. Therefore, Britain at last agreed to the establishment of Pakistan, a separate homeland for the Muslims.

On becoming independent, both India and Pakistan felt that they might contribute to the cause of world peace by avoiding closer alliance with either power bloc. In a foreign policy statement on the morrow of the establishment of Pakistan, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan stated: "I wish it to be clearly known abroad that Pakistan starts on its career without any narrow and special commitments and without any prejudices in the international sphere."³ In a similar strain did he speak five years

² Beverley Nichols, *Verdict on India* (London, 1944), p. 195.

³ Quoted by K. Sarwar Hasan, "Foreign Policy of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan." *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. IV, No 4 (December, 1951), p. 184.

later (March 9, 1951), when he said that Pakistan was not tied to the apron strings of any power bloc; she had all along been uninfluenced by the inter-bloc struggle going on in the world and has supported the cause which she thought was right and just.⁴ Likewise, Pandit Nehru, in his numerous foreign policy statements, expressed the desire that India would steer clear of power blocs. In fact India's foreign policy found expression in a resolution of the ruling Congress Party at session held at Jaipure in 1948. The resolution provided: "It should be the constant aim of the foreign policy of India to maintain friendly and cooperative relations with all nations and to avoid entanglements in military or similar alliances which tend to divide the world in rival groups and thus endanger world peace."⁵

Thus both India and Pakistan started their career in the field of foreign relations without any commitments to any power bloc. The big powers also left India and Pakistan alone; no special attempt was made to woo them on their side. Perhaps the reason was that the big powers at that time were deeply involved in European affairs. The division of Europe into Communist and non-Communist states, the former led by the Soviet Union and the latter by the United States, was appalling. The blockade of Berlin in 1948 stepped up the cold war between the two power blocs. Indeed, from 1945 till 1949, Europe remained the major arena of world politics.

In 1949, however, the focus of the World's attention shifted from Europe to Asia. Following the Communist victory in China, which had brought the greatest swing in the balance of power in Asia, the Communist movement in a number of Asian states had gained momentum. It was feared by the West that if they failed to find a remedy to the situation created by the rise of Communism in China, their economic and political interests in Asia would suffer a severe setback. Hence they began to make plans to build up India as the leader of Asia in order to counter the increasing influence of the People's Republic of China in Asia.⁶

⁴ *Pakistan News* (Karachi), March, 1951. Also see Liaquat Ali Khan, *Pakistan: The Heart of Asia* (Cambridge, 1951).

⁵ The full text of the resolution is given in N.V. Rajkumar, *The Background of India's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi, 1951) p. 95-97.

⁶ Even before the Communist Victory in China, the British leaders had started talking of India as leader of Asia. See Richard Symond, *The Making of Pakistan* (London, 1949), p. 170.

India, as is well known, is a big country. One of the imperial commentators wrote in 1948 that India will "recognize that she has, by virtue of her geographical position and her capacity for leadership in Southeast Asia, wider responsibilities to fulfill."⁷ To this he added that a "neutrality bloc is likely to provide only an illusion of security for the countries composing it, "but a defence system under the leadership of India would be able to provide security to the states of Southeast Asia."⁸ The United States, which had neither any experience of dealing with the Southeast Asian countries nor any sound understanding of the history of that part of the world, followed into Britain's footsteps. *The New York Times* observed on August 29, 1952; "The struggle for Asia conceivably could be won or lost in the mind of one man—Jawaharlal Nehru... To have Pandit Nehru as an ally in the struggle for Asiatic support is worth many divisions." With the loss of China to the Communists, the United States could not but look with increasing interest at India. Nehru and other leaders were "listened to attentively in the United States, not only as India's spokesmen but as potential spokesmen for all Asia."⁹

Since the distrust of the West was widespread in Asia, India decided to pursue a cautious foreign policy, commonly called a policy of neutrality or non-alignment. Was this policy really meant to gain the leadership of Asia? Only future historians may be able to throw sufficient light on it. But it would suffice to say here that India, despite her claims of neutrality between the two power blocs, had in practice followed a policy of closer collaboration with the West. The Mutual Defence Assistance Treaty between India and the United States signed in 1951, renewed in 1958 and 1962, bears testimony to this fact. The agreement provides that "the Government of India is prepared to agree... to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self-defence... to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defence or to permit it to participate in the defence of the area of which it is a

⁷ Nicholas Mansergh, *The Commonwealth and the Nations* (London, 1948), pp. 160-161.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Vera M. Dean, *Main Trends in Post War American Foreign Policy* (Oxford, 1951), p. 36.

part."¹⁰ The treaty in effect amounts to India's membership of a defence alliance or a regional defence organization.

Publicly, India has always expressed contempt for defence alliances and criticized the states which aligned themselves with the West.¹¹ There were, of course, many advantages in maintaining this posture. India could then speak for the Asians, who as already said, were suspicious of the West. And, moreover, India could take up the claims of the Asian nationalist movements in her dealings with the West and acquire the status of a spokesman for Asia.

In the beginning the West, particularly the United States, was impatient with this policy of India. For the United States wanted India to take sides in the cold war and to come forward to redress the balance that was upset in Asia by the Communist victory in China. However, gradually the United States recognized that India's policy was not detrimental to her interests and that India might be able to fill the so-called power vacuum created by the withdrawal of Western powers from Asia. *The Times* (London) wrote on June 27, 1953: "Mr. Nehru has sometimes been accused of aiming at the leadership of Southeast Asia. He has always disclaimed any such ambition. Yet simple observation shows that this leadership, however unsought it may be to Indians themselves, is now a factor to be reckoned with in international affairs."

India's role as the spokesman of Asian-African nations, it seems, impressed the West. Besides, the establishment of parliamentary system of Government in India went a long way towards bringing India into the good books of the Western powers. Mr. Chester Bowles, the United States envoy to India said on January 19, 1952: "If the democratic Government fails in India, the entire free world

¹⁰ The Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement was effected by an exchange of notes signed at Washington, D.C. on March 7 and 10, 1951; and it entered into force March 16, 1951.

See *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, Vol. II, Part I, 1951, pp. 872-874.

¹¹ Speaking for the Southeast Asian States, the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, said in 1952, that "SEATO smells of colonialism since it gives the five Western powers a hand in Asian Affairs." He also said that SEATO is directed against non-members. See Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Thoughts Along the China Border," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (January, 1960), p. 245.

In another statement on Pakistan—U.S. negotiations for military aid Mr. Nehru said in the House of people on December 19, 1952 that such aid would reverse the process of Asian liberation, because when military aid was given freely, it led to colonialism. He further asserted: "No country received free military aid without certain consequences following it." *Statesman* (New Delhi), December 20, 1952.

will suffer a catastrophic setback all through Asia. The setback will be greater in my opinion than that which the free world suffered when China was conquered by the Communists."¹² To insure themselves from this "catastrophic setback all through Asia," the Western powers started giving enormous economic aid to India which enabled her to divert her own economic resources for building up her military strength.

Fortunately for India, there occurred, after Stalin's death, a marked change in the global policy of the Soviet Union. She abandoned her revolutionary doctrine and laid stress on peaceful means to advance Communism. Due to its size and population, India figured prominently in the Russian strategy. The new Russian leaders preferred to see India neutral or non-aligned than to see her falling like a ripe fruit into the lap of their rival for power, namely, the United States. This led the Russians to follow a policy of competition with the United States to win over India. It suited India very well; she began to hunt with the hound and run with the hare and got the best of both the worlds.¹³

The attempts by major powers of the world to woo India on their side made India more obdurate in finding an amicable settlement of the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. The two major powers of the world, which were capable of pressing India into abiding by U.N. resolutions on Kashmir, were now more interested in winning India's favour than in seeing a major international dispute settled. India could not but take advantage of this situation.

III

Apart from refusing to honour her commitments on Kashmir, there are people in India who have not reconciled to the creation of Pakistan as an independent state. An American expert on India lately noted: "The fulfillment of Indian nationalism requires an assertion of Hindu hegemony over the Muslims of the sub-continent in one form or another. Most Hindus would be satisfied with an acquiescent Pakistan within an Indian sphere of influence, some hope for a confederation, and a vocal view would welcome an excuse to annul Partition by force."¹⁴ Indians are of course openly

¹² *Amrit Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), January 20, 1952. Also see Karmukar Gupta, *Indian Foreign Policy* (Calcutta, 1956), p. 6.

¹³ See Mohammed Ayub Khan, "Pakistan Perspective," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (July, 1960), p. 555.

¹⁴ Selig S. Harrison, "Troubled India and Her Neighbours," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (January, 1965), p. 319.

striving to merge Pakistan with India. This has given Pakistan a sense of insecurity. Also, several times India massed bulk of her army and all her armour on Pakistan's borders. Pakistan, as compared with India, is a small and weak country. India has five times the population of Pakistan and has far greater resources. Moreover, India has an industrialized economy and has been fortunate in inheriting all the ordnance factories and arsenals of the former Government. Conscious of her weakness and of India's hostility towards her, Pakistan in 1954 entered into a military defence pact with the United States. There were many other factors also which weighed with Pakistan. The strategic location of Pakistan is of some significance in this connection. Pakistan's territory is divided into two parts separated by a thousand miles long stretch of the Indian land mass, and each part is a separate geographic unit. West Pakistan borders on Iran, Afghanistan and Chinese Turkistan. The shortest distance between the borders of Pakistan and the Soviet Union is less than one thousand miles. East Pakistan, which lies on the waters separating the Pacific from the Indian Ocean, borders on Burma. Together the two parts of Pakistan constitute a bridge between the Middle East and the Southeast Asian region. It was therefore in the interest of world peace that Pakistan should become militarily strong. Also, Pakistan was aware of the fact that small states are an element of weakness in the structure of peace. Being unable to defend themselves, they invite aggression from powerful neighbours. Taking these factors into account, Pakistan, a year after signing the Mutual Defence Pact with the United States, became a member of SEATO along with Britain, the United States, France, Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand and Australia.

The circumstances which led to the creation of SEATO were the result of war in Indo-China which appeared to be coming to an end with victory for the Communists. The United States had threatened to intervene on behalf of France. The danger that Indo-China might turn into another Korea was imminent. To save this situation, the four big powers decided to hold a conference in Geneva to discuss peace in Indo-China.¹⁵

The Geneva Conference succeeded in securing the cease-fire in Indo-China, but the partition of the country became inevitable.

¹⁵ See Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Regional Pacts* (Karachi, 1958), p. 78. Also see G. Modelski (ed.), *SEATO: Six Studies* (Melbourne, 1952).

In North Vietnam, a Communist republic was firmly rooted and the associated States of Laos and Cambodia were neutralized. The danger of Communism in Asia was lessened but it was far from being removed. Consequently, a conference of Asian States and the Western Powers was convened at Manila to create a treaty organization for securing peace and stability in Asia.

Pakistan became a member of this organization, not because she was against any particular country, but because she believed that so long as the United Nations was ineffective, the natural course for small and weak states was to enter into defence alliances which could guarantee the preservation of their freedom and territorial integrity. However, the idea underlying the creation of SEATO was not to strengthen its Asian members militarily but to counteract the damage to Western prestige in Asia caused by the partition of Indo-China at the Geneva Conference.¹⁶ This very fact led to the weakening of SEATO as a regional organization.

Nevertheless, in 1955 Pakistan also joined the Baghdad Pact which in 1958, when Iraq left the Pact, was renamed CENTO (Central Treaty Organization). The background which led to the creation of CENTO is rather complex. At the end of the Second World War, the Middle East had emerged as a political tinder box. The Arab-Israel dispute, the Anglo-Iranian Oil dispute and the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Suez Canal zone had increased the discord between the Arabs and the West. Britain, which was the major power in the area, began to realize that with the withdrawal of her troops from the Suez Canal zone a power vacuum might be created. At the same time Britain and other Western Powers were alarmed by the Korean War and the Communist gains in Asia. Therefore, they envisaged the idea of setting up a Middle East Defence Organization based on the model of NATO. But it was not an easy task, as the Middle East was not Europe. The Arab States were so engrossed with their quarrels that they were not willing to subscribe to the idea of a collective security system.

Such willingness, however, was found among the non-Arab States of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. These states are on the flanks of northern tier of the Middle East and have strong religious and cultural ties with the people of the Middle East. But the Arab States, with the exception of Iraq, showed no inclination to align with the non-Arab States. Iraq, partly because her traditional ri-

¹⁶ *New Republic*, 19 March 1956, p. 16.

valry with Egypt, was interested in strengthening her defences. Iraq, therefore, concluded a treaty of defence and friendship with Turkey in January 1955. Later, Britain, Iran and Pakistan adhered to this treaty which then came to be known as the Baghdad Pact. The United States, which did not adhere to the Pact formally, became a member of almost every important committee of the Pact.

Pakistan's decision to join the SEATO and the CENTO was dictated solely by her desire to strengthen her defences and to seek Western support in finding an amicable settlement of the Kashmir dispute. But the Western Powers were more interested in containing Communism in Asia than in settling a dispute between two Asian states. Moreover, the Western powers were afraid to annoy India, for they were contesting with the Soviet Union to win India's affection. Such a development could not but have its impact not only on the relations between Pakistan and India but also on the world peace in general, and on peace and stability in South Asia in particular.

Following closer alliance with the West, Pakistan's relations with India deteriorated further. India strongly opposed the grant of military aid to Pakistan. It was not that India feared Pakistan whose armed forces even with the aid from the West were not more than one third of India's strength before her border clash with China. The idea underlying India's opposition to military aid to Pakistan was that India wanted to see Pakistan weak and defenceless.¹⁷

India, it may be noted, was not opposed to defence alliances in principle as she had neither opposed NATO and other defense alliances among the Western states, nor military alliance among the Communist states. India's opposition to Pakistan's defense alliance with the United States, appeared to be motivated by the fear that Pakistan might one day with the help of aid from the United States be able to back by force of arms the demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir, which India intends forcibly to retain.

However, while negotiations for military aid were going on between Pakistan and the United States, Prime Minister Nehru protested strongly and indicated that if Pakistan went ahead with

¹⁷ See Mohammed Ahsen Chaudri "Pakistan, India and the United States," *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 6, No 4 (December, 1953), p. 177.

its project, then the UNICP resolutions on Kashmir would lapse.¹⁸ It was hard to understand the logic of Nehru's argument. Why should military aid to Pakistan be a block in the way of the people of Kashmir exercising their right of self-determination? Despite India's protests, Pakistan joined SEATO and CENTO, Nehru then flatly refused to abide by his commitment to hold a free and impartial plebiscite in Kashmir. The Western Powers for reasons already stated made no effort to persuade Nehru to adopt just and reasonable attitude.

Pakistan paid a heavy price for its alliance with the West. She lost the sympathy of Communist states without gaining support from the West.¹⁹ The Soviet Union had previously maintained a neutral stand on the Kashmir dispute. Its representatives had abstained from voting whenever the Kashmir question came up for discussion in the Security Council. But the Soviet attitude changed after Pakistan joined SEATO and CENTO. She not only charged Pakistan with joining "an aggressive western alliance," but also openly supported India's stand on Kashmir.²⁰ In 1962, the Soviet Union even used veto in the Security Council to bloc progress towards a settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

The Soviet attitude hurt Pakistan, but it did not hurt as much as the attitude of her allies. Pakistan received aid from the West because, as a member of regional alliances, she had undertaken certain obligations. India, on the other hand, received massive economic aid from the very beginning, and later she also received military aid from the United States without accepting any obligations that generally go with such aid.

This shows that the Western Powers made no distinction between a neutral and an ally. As a matter of fact neutrality in the West came to be regarded as respectable. The Western Powers

¹⁸ The first resolution was adopted by the United Nations' Commission for India and Pakistan on August 13, 1948. The second resolution adopted at the meeting of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on January 5, 1949 was supplementary to the Commission's Resolution of August 13, 1948.

¹⁹ In a note of protest sent to the Pakistan Charge d'Affaires in Moscow on 29 March 1954, the Soviet Union warned that the inclusion of "Pakistan in the military bloc which is the tool of the aggressive forces of imperialism would harm Soviet-Pakistan relations." *Chronology of International Events and Documents*, 18 to 31 March 1954, p. 220.

²⁰ During their visit to India on Dec. 1955, the Soviet leaders, Bulganin and Khrushchev openly supported India's claim on Kashmir in order to punish Pakistan for joining the Western sponsored regional alliances. See *Dawn*, October 24, 1956.

probably felt that a strong India would be able to exercise influence over its smaller neighbours in Asia.²¹ This is an erroneous thinking, for a strong India is likely to make its smaller neighbours look towards China for security. For South Asian Countries, while they are suspicious of India's intentions, have nothing against China. Pakistan, for instance, had openly declared at the Bandung Conference that she was not against China and that she would not be a party to a war of aggression against that country. The Chinese Foreign Minister accepted this assurance, and supported Pakistan on a number of issues, including the right of self-determination.²²

Probably, it led India to realize that she may not be able to come to an understanding with China over creating spheres of influence in Asia. Consequently, India's attitude towards China underwent a change. Moreover, India was disappointed with China's actions in Tibet in 1956. Following this the frontiers between China and India became the bone of contention between the two countries.²³

An open clash occurred between China and India in October 1962 when Prime Minister Nehru announced, before leaving for Ceylon on a state visit, that he had ordered the Indian troops to throw the Chinese out of 'our territory in the North West Frontier Agency (NEFA) area.'²⁴ There is hardly any doubt that the Indians in compliance with Nehru's order started the offensive. Testifying before the U.S. Congress Committee, General Maxwell Taylor confirmed the fact that the Indian troops provoked the fighting by trying to occupy area beyond the Chinese posts.²⁵ Why did India

²¹ Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto in a statement published in *Dawn*, December 13, 1964 recalled "that as far as 1961, much before the outbreak of hostilities on the Sino-Indian border, the late President Kennedy sent then Vice-President, Mr. Lyndon Johnson to New Delhi where, on behalf of the United States Government, he urged India to extend its leadership to other areas in Southeast Asia.

"At about the same time Dr. Kissinger, Adviser of the State Department, also visited Delhi and lauded India's role in Asia and decided the American malady of "pactitis."

"America's dream of building up India as a great power in Asia and Africa and as a bastion of Western interests in this region is therefore, not new when in September last, Senator Hubert Humphrey (now Vice-President), called for the creation of an Asian coalition under India as a counter balance to the power of China."

²² G.M. Kahin. *The Asian-African Conference* (New York, 1955), p. 63.

²³ See *Report of the Officials of the Government of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question* (New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs, 1961).

²⁴ *Times of India* (Bombay), October 13, 1962.

²⁵ *Dawn*, June 8, 1963.

start this move against China? First, it may be said that India after having failed to come to an understanding with China to demarcate their spheres of influence in Asia had become restive. She therefore decided to use pressure tactics. Another likely reason is that India had calculated that conflict with China would be welcome to the United States and other Western countries. The pretext of Chinese aggression would enable India to receive military aid from the West without abandoning the posture of non-alignment. Military aid from the West, India knew, would give her the strength she needed to establish her leadership over her small and weak neighbours.

The Western Powers desired to build up India as the leader of Asia so that she may become their associate in countering the danger of Communist expansion in Asia.²⁶ Thus an undeclared understanding existed between India and the West. India was to help the West in containing China, and the West was to give India dollars, warheads and propaganda devices to establish the Indian hegemony in Southeast Asia. Indian President Radhakrishnan, during his visit to Washington in July 1963, testified to this fact when he said that India was determined to safeguard not only its own freedom but the interest of the whole of Southeast Asia.²⁷

Following the clashes between the Chinese and the Indian troops along their disputed border, Britain and the United States rushed massive military aid to India. This aid may be justified because India and the Western Powers at that time thought that the border conflict might escalate into a major war. But on November 21, 1962, the Chinese suddenly declared ceasefire and unilaterally withdrew their troops behind the MacMahon Line and the entire territory they had overrun. They at the same time offered to negotiate with India. The emergency was over, and the way lay open for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. By settling its border problems with Burma, Nepal and Pakistan, China had demonstrated that it is immersed with a reasonable spirit of good will and accommodation.

²⁶ An American theologian put his finger at the right spot when he said: "Curiously enough, our anti-imperialist creed has not prevented us from interfering with the institutions of client states. Usually, however, our interference has not been for the purpose of establishing democracy, our objective has been to insure strong anti-communist policy." *The New Leader*, November 25, 1963, p. 11.

²⁷ *Dawn*, July 3, 1963.

It may be asked that after the Chinese had declared ceasefire and offered to negotiate the dispute, what was the need to arm India to the teeth? It was done either to make India dependent on the West or to give her the strength she needed to establish her hegemony over her small and weak neighbours.²⁸ On December 29, 1962, the Western Powers met at Nassau and decided to continue to give military aid to India, without first resorting to peaceful methods of settling a dispute as provided in the United Nations Charter. During their meeting at Nassau, the United States and the United Kingdom committed 120 million dollars worth of military assistance to India. Pakistan was then told that this aid was of a temporary nature. But in 1963, the United States and the United Kingdom committed further aid to India to the tune of sixty million dollars. Again in 1964 additional aid of sixty million dollars was committed. Now, lately they have announced that India will receive long term military aid from the United States of the value of 100 million dollars a year.²⁹

Pakistan naturally fears that military build-up in India, which has already disturbed the balance of power in South Asia, is bound to add to India's aggressive designs. President Ayub in an article published in an American Journal expressed the feelings of the people of Pakistan when he said:

India is planning to raise two armies one with which to face China and the other to use against Pakistan and other smaller neighbours in pursuance of her expansionist objectives. It should also be noted that any army meant for China would by the nature of things be so positioned as to be able to wheel around swiftly to attack East Pakistan. Thus both the armies pose a great threat to this country.³⁰

To this the President added:

Having built up this enormous war machine, Indian leaders would need to justify the great hardship it has imposed on the Indian People in that process. It might also regain face which India has lost in the fighting with China. It is possible, therefore, that India

²⁸ In an interview given to Kingsley Martin, Prime Minister Nehru admitted that India "did not contemplate a great war with China, but was determined to be strong enough, as a still non-aligned power with aid from both East and West, to defend India's Himalayan frontier." *New Statesman*, December 21, 1962, p. 893.

²⁹ See Z.A. Bhutto, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan* (collection of speeches in the National Assembly, Karachi, 1964), p. 105.

³⁰ Mohammed Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan-American Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (January, 1964), pp. 204-205.

might decide to do so as soon as a suitable opportunity offers itself—by throwing its massive armor against Pakistan and possibly striking in the first instance against that part of Kashmir which is under Pakistan's control but which India claims to be Indian territory.³¹

IV

The Western policy of arming India is bound to affect the relations between Pakistan and India. A strong India, as already noted, would be less inclined to find an amicable settlement of the Kashmir dispute. India has already refused to abide by the United Nations' resolutions on Kashmir. Apart from this, she claims sovereignty over the whole of Kashmir and threatens to drive Pakistan out of the area under its control.³² Now that India's twenty-two army divisions equipped mostly with Western aid far outnumber Pakistan's six and a half divisions, the possibility of India seeking a just solution of the Kashmir dispute seems remote. India is moving rapidly to merge occupied Kashmir into the Indian Union.³³ It has created a grave situation. Should Pakistan decide to move into Kashmir, the Western allies are not likely to come to the assistance of Pakistan.³⁴ The Anglo-American decision to give military aid to India without making it contingent on a settlement of the Kashmir dispute brings testimony to this fact...

True, the Western Powers never gave Pakistan any specific guarantee of support in its dispute with India. But it was at least expected that Pakistan's vital interests will not be overlooked by her allies. Unconditional military aid to India by Pakistan's allies has disillusioned the people of Pakistan to such an extent that they are now looking towards China for help in order to face the danger of Indian aggression.

Pakistan feels that she has been let down by her allies in pursuance of their anti-Communist policy. The modern weapons and other armaments given to India by the West are enough to tilt the military balance against Pakistan. In 1961 President Kennedy had given an assurance to States, that if Sino-Indian war broke out and India asked for military aid, such aid would not be given to India without previously consulting Pakistan.³⁵ Not only this assurance was completely disregarded, but the United States

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *New York Herald Tribune*, December 30, 1964.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Dawn*, January 8, 1963.

appeared to be playing with schemes which amounted to striking at the very existence of Pakistan. The late Khawaja Nazimuddin, who had served Pakistan as its Governor-General and the Prime Minister respectively, confirmed this suspicion. In a statement, he said that a foreign power "wanted to partition this country and was instigating the people of East Pakistan by various methods to secure secession from Pakistan and to set up an independent sovereign state of East Pakistanis or Bengalis."³⁶ He further said: That foreign power, "which was luring East Pakistan to declare itself an independent state, had also promised to give it separate economic and certain other aids which at present it was extending to the whole of Pakistan."³⁷ In its issue of December 22, 1962, *Dawn*, Pakistan's leading daily, also reported: "Indication available in political circles in Delhi confirm the allegation made by a certain political section in Pakistan that a Western Power has recently sponsored the idea that the two wings of Pakistan be separated into different autonomous units and be made to join India into some kind of confederation." This news sent a wave of anger throughout Pakistan; it tarnished the Western image in Pakistan, it seemed, beyond repair.

Earlier the Western diplomats were also accused in the Pakistani press of inspiring a whispering campaign aimed at the secession of East Pakistan. The public had then ignored it as an attempt to divert their attention from Anglo-American aid to India and the Kashmir dispute. But later the suspicion of Western design was confirmed by Nehru's remark in an interview given to *Washington Post*. He said: "Confederation remains our ultimate goal, though if we say it they are alarmed and say we want to swallow them up."³⁸

It may be recalled in this connection that Hindu Community in India from the very beginning was opposed to the creation of Pakistan. Even a decade after the emergence of Pakistan "Many Indians continue regarding Pakistan," as a western writer put it, "as a tragic mistake which might still be corrected, at least so far as East Bengal is concerned."³⁹ An English writer, Ian Stephens,

³⁶ *Dawn*, December 20, 1962.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Quoted in *Dawn*, December 21, 1963.

³⁹ Keith Callard, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (New York, 1957), p. 14.

former editor of the influential Indian newspaper, *Statesman*, expressed similar views. He said that in the average Hindu heart even now, years after a mutually-accepted Partition, Pakistan as an independent State had no real right to exist.⁴⁰

The heart of the matter is that the creation of Pakistan has frustrated India's ambition to be a great power in Asia. Pakistan has been a stumbling block in her way to realise this ambition. Commenting on India's role in Asia, Nehru had written before the partition of the sub-continent:

The Pacific is likely to take the place of the Atlantic in the future as a nerve centre of the world. Though not directly a Pacific State, India will inevitably exercise an important influence there. India will also develop as the centre of economic and political activity in the Indian Ocean area, in Southeast Asia and right up to the Middle East. Her position gives an economic and strategic importance in a part of the world which is going to develop rapidly in the future. If there is a regional grouping of the countries bordering on the Indian Ocean on either side of India, Iraq, Afghanistan, India, Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, Siam, Java etc.—present day minority problem will disappear, or at any rate will have to be considered in an entirely different context.⁴¹

This statement confirms that Nehru would have liked to extend the Indian influence from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. His colonial system would have surpassed the system established in Asia by the British Empire. Further, Nehru would have liked regional grouping with India as "the centre of economic and political activity," because it would have solved the minority problem. Furthermore, Nehru also wrote in the *Discovery of India*, that "the small national state is doomed; it may survive as a culturally autonomous area but not as an independent political unit."⁴²

The Western Powers appear to be in agreement with Nehru's thesis, but obviously for different reasons. A United sub-continent, they might say, would make the containment of China possible. The United States, at any rate, since the loss of China to the Communists, is looking at India as her main hope and aspiration in Asia.⁴³

Over the years, American intellectuals, awed by India's sheer size and population and hypnotized by the personalities and phi-

⁴⁰ Ian Stephens, *Pakistan* (London, 1963), p. 220.

⁴¹ Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (New York, 1945), pp. 547-548.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *New York Times*, August 29, 1950.

osophies of Gandhi and Nehru, have formed a strong pro-India lobby. In contrast Pakistan and the conception of Hindus and Muslims as two nations has been widely misunderstood by the Westerners who are inclined to compare the situation with Catholic and Protestant struggle during the Middle Ages. Both Protestants and Catholics, and all the sub-divisions of Protestantism, draw upon the same Christian heritage and the same body of European political experience; a cultural and political compromise between them represents relatively few major problems. The Hindus and Muslims, on the other hand, derive their political, cultural and religious influences from widely different and even antagonistic sources.

In fact the Hindu mentality differs as much from the Muslim philosophy as it does from the philosophy of the West.⁴⁴ The way of life which is called Western civilization stems from the two sources, the religion of the Old and New Testament of the Christian Bible and the science and philosophy of the Greeks. Muslim thought draws on the same two sources and adds to them the revelation of God through prophet Mohammed as recorded in the Quaran.⁴⁵ The Muslims have at least something in common with the Christians, but nothing in common with the Hindus, except the memory of common sufferings under the colonial rule.

The factors which led to the creation of Pakistan have not been well-understood and appreciated in the West. The Westerners look upon Pakistan as a very incongruous country, divided into separate and distant parts. But it is not usually realised that Pakistan's incongruity lies in history. Pakistan was created to provide a home-land for the Muslims of the sub-continent where they could practice their Islamic way of life and develop their culture quite apart from the Hindus. "So Pakistan," as a British writer put, "in a sense, is a very extraordinary country—a fact which gets less attention, here in the West, than it deserves."⁴⁶

Perhaps the difficulty is that when Westerners look at the situation in Asia they forget that Asia is not Europe. It has been difficult for the Western mind to grasp that Hindus and Muslims with virtually identical racial backgrounds, living side by side for hundreds of years within the same land ruled by different laws, subject to identical foreign influences, yet remaining in the words

⁴⁴ See F.S.C. Northrop, "The Mind of Asia," *Life*, December 31, 1951, pp. 39-42.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Ian Stephens, *Pakistan*, p. 13.

of the founder of Pakistan, (Quaid-i-Azam) "not only fundamentally different but often radically antagonistic to the Hindus..."⁴⁷

In defence of his determined stand for a Muslim way of life as opposed to the way of life of the caste-ridden Hindus, Jinnah asserted that Islam is not merely a dogma like all other religions but is a realistic and practical code of conduct. "I am thinking," he said, "in terms of our History, our art, our laws, our music, our jurisprudence."⁴⁸

Since the whole *raison d'être* of the State of Pakistan is Islamic faith,⁴⁹ it may be said that Pakistan owes its existence to Islamic ideology, a factor not properly understood in the West.

Few states in the twentieth century were established on purely ideological basis, yet each state in the world regards some kind of ideology or the other as its life blood. For instance, Communist ideology is the basis of the existence of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and Liberalism, which is described by a Western writer as what is best in European Christians political traditions, forms the basis of ideology of West European states.⁵⁰ In the same manner Islam forms the basis of Pakistan's ideology. But unfortunately the American and European attitude towards Islam as compared with their attitude towards Hinduism has been that of antagonism. The Hindus never posed any threat to the West in the past. The Muslims, on the other hand, had direct encounters with the West. The memories of crusades still linger in the Western minds which generally distorts their

⁴⁷ Beverly Nichols, *Verdict on India*, p. 190.

It may be recalled that in the sub-continent the Hindus outnumbered the Muslims by about three to one. Under the leadership of Gandhi and the Congress party the Hindus were committed to the ideal of United India—the formation of one constitution for both Hindus and Muslims. Since the Hindus constituted a large majority, the Muslims feared that under Hindu domination their own culture would suffer a great setback and might even possibly be totally eclipsed. This fear was intensified by the fact that the political leaders within the congress had given to its struggle for freedom a purely Hindu revivalist colour.

See Pakistan: *The Struggle of a Nation* (Karachi, 1949).

⁴⁸ Beverly Nichols, *Verdict on India*, p. 190.

⁴⁹ Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (New York, 1959), p. 214.

⁵⁰ John Hollowell, *Main Currents in Modern Political Thought* (New York, 1959), p. 111.

attitude towards Islam and the countries which adhere to Islamic ideology.⁵¹

The announcement in 1956 that Pakistan was an "Islamic Republic" created the impression on the Westerners that Pakistan was being run by reactionary *mullas* who formulated *fatwas* and were waiting for an opportunity to declare *jihad* and were bent upon imposing their dogma on non-Muslims. This is not true. On the contrary, the amount of dogma in Islam is almost negligible.⁵²

However, the purpose of this paper is not to discuss the genesis of Pakistan, but to explain the Western attitude towards Pakistan vis-a-vis India, with emphasis on the factors which have direct bearing on their mutual relations. It would therefore suffice to add to what has already been said that some of the intellectuals at Harvard and Oxford, who happened to be associated with the Governments in Washington and London respectively, instead of helping Pakistan and India in solving the dispute which poison their relations, appear to be thinking of merging Pakistan with India should it help the global strategy of the West. Should Pakistan be forced to enter into some kind of union with India, that, as an eminent historian put it, "will be the surest way of losing the Muslim majority areas to Communism."⁵³

The continuous flow of massive military aid to India has already done much harm. Since Pakistan, as already noted, cannot rely on the West in case of aggression from India, she has sought to solve the dilemma by moving closer to China. True, Pakistan's economic development rests on Washington's continued support but like Cambodia and Ceylon she can turn her back on such support. A hostile India and not so reliable Western 'allies' make friendly China indispensable for Pakistan. In fact Pakistan is already looking upon China not only as a friendly neighbour, but also as a protector against Indian aggression. Inaugurating the debate on

⁵¹ The British historian, Arnold Toynbee, in his book *Civilization on Trial* (New York, 1958), p. 30, observes:

"Centuries before Communism was heard of, our ancestors found their bug bear in Islam. As late as the Sixteenth Century, Islam inspired the same hysteria in Western hearts as Communism in the twentieth century, and this essentially for the same reasons. Like Communism Islam was an anti-Western movement which was at the same time a heretical version of a Western faith, and like Communism, it wielded a sword of the spirit against which there was no defence in material armaments."

⁵² See Ian Stephen, *Pakistan*, pp. 24-25.

⁵³ I.H. Qureshi, "Foreign Policy of Pakistan" in *Foreign Policies in a World of Change*, p. 475.

foreign policy on July 17, 1963, Foreign Minister Z. A. Bhutto had warned both India and the Western Powers that an attack on Pakistan would involve the largest state of Asia.⁵⁴ He was obviously referring to China.

Thus the policy of arming India, is not helping the West in containing China. At any rate the policy of containment, as an American political scientist of repute put it, "has been thus far successful only by virtue of the weakness of China, and of the relative military and political stability of the territories adjacent to China. Where that stability breaks down and China takes advantage of the breakdown by trying to fill the vacuum, our policy of peripheral containment is put to the test and is likely to fail."⁵⁵

V

All told, it seems that the obsession of Communism is the main source of respective Western policies towards Pakistan and India. Because of this, they fail to understand that not military aid to India, but rapprochement between Pakistan and India alone can create stability in South Asia which, in consequence, will halt the march of Communism. The continuation of military aid to India will increase the sense of insecurity among India's smaller neighbours, which, as President Ayub put it, "could force them to courses of action that might undermine the West's position throughout Southeast Asia."⁵⁶ Only India and Pakistan together, living side by side as good neighbours, can be the guarantee of peace and stability in this region. The good relations between the two countries are possible only if some just solution of the Kashmir dispute is found.

Also the West has injected an arms race into the subcontinent which would undermine the economic development programs of both the countries, and increase mutual fears and suspicions. A leading Pakistani daily has even gone up to the extent of stating that the real danger to Asia is not posed by the threat of aggres-

⁵⁴ *Dawn*, July 18, 1963. During the course of President Ayub's state visit to China in March 1964, Marshal Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister of China, had also assured Pakistan that China would help friends against aggression. See *Dawn*, March 7, 1964.

⁵⁵ Hans Morgenthau, "Realities of Containment," *The New Leader*, June 8, 1964, p. 4.

⁵⁶ Mohammed Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan-American Alliance," *op. cit.*, p. 209.

sion by international Communism but by the Western military aid to India because it will "overcast the new horizons of freedom which have opened up to one Asian nation after another only in the recent past."⁵⁷

History brings testimony to the fact that when the sub-continent stood divided within, it invited foreign intervention and aggression. Mutual understanding and cooperation between Pakistan and India can rule out such a possibility.

The Western Powers attitude towards Pakistan and India respectively appear to be based on certain erroneous concepts. They seem to assume that small countries will not react to their pressure tactics and will be forced to accept their policy.

The West must take note that the people of Pakistan will never reconcile to any scheme of merging Pakistan with India. The hundred million people are a factor to be reckoned with; they cannot be pushed around without any regard for their feelings and wishes. Any attempt in this direction would only bring disaster; it would disturb the peace and stability of the sub-continent beyond repair. It is the lesson of history that frustrated people would rather prefer to go Communist than being thrown around like a ball in the game of power politics.

⁵⁷ *Dawn*, November 25, 1963.