ASIAN UNITY AND DISUNITY: IMPRESSIONS AND REFLECTIONS
(1964-1965)
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When Dr. Carlos P. Romulo visited Pakistan in the early spring of 1965, this writer—as a Fulbright Lecturer stationed there—had the opportunity and pleasure of meeting him and listening to his talk at the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi. A presidential adviser on foreign affairs and head of the most influential university in the Philippines with a long, distinguished experience in world diplomacy and intellectual enterprise behind him, Dr. Romulo's remarks naturally carried a great deal of weight. No one, indeed, could fail to be directly impressed by his personal charm and eloquence, in the first place.

Among the things that struck me as most significant (although not unexpected under the circumstances) was his emphasis and apparent faith in the unity between Asian states. We are all familiar with the long tacitly understood, if not fully accepted, allegation that "there is no Asia" as a unit. Hence it was quite natural, especially in the South Asian context at the time (as Dr. Romulo traveled through the general area), that many challenging questions were asked by the audience and some of them were not very easy to answer. Yet, even on the ticklish point of a common policy on China (in view of the very apparent difference then obtaining between the Philippines and Pakistan), Dr. Romulo did not shrink in his stand. Nor did the skepticism seem to dampen his spirit or weaken his argument.

Is there, therefore, a real chance for, or trend toward, such an eventuality?

This question, as a matter of fact, had been ringing in my mind even before I heard Dr. Romulo, and I had also resolved from the very beginning of my Fulbright year (1964-65) to learn as much as possible in this regard while I had first-hand opportunities to do so—both inside the various major regions of the continent itself and from neighboring areas. On the whole, the immediate emotional and mental milieu of Asia (re-experienced in my case) was most conducive to such an undertaking, as expected. But this very immediacy also appeared to be giving the local observer a necessary "wrapped-up" feeling or outlook, if not otherwise compensated. My trip around the world in the same process, especially through the supposedly related or similar areas, such as North Africa and South America, proved to be just the needed compensation.

And yet, the net result of my observations and studies has tended to leave me in skepticism, or at least a puzzlement of which the end is not at all in sight.¹

¹ The information outlined in this article has come mainly from the press and other materials gathered in Pakistan. But this writer had also benefited from both official
Southeast Asia

Take the Philippines and Southeast Asia for example.

Dr. Romulo was certainly not alone in expressing himself in favor of Afro-Asian as well as Asian unity. President Macapagal, whom he advised and undoubtedly President Marcos again, did and would inevitably do the same, in behalf (as a matter of fact) of the Philippines as a whole. Nor have been such expressions limited to the verbal stage.

In the economic field, for instance, an attempt to establish an “Asian Common Market” was made at no other place than Manila, by way of “the first plenary session of the first Asian Conference of Chambers of Commerce meeting” actually convened there (February, 1965). Sixteen nations were to participate, presumably in a spirit of unity. Yet, Indonesia found herself unable to sit at the same conference table with Malaysia; Pakistan had to withdraw in the face of “political propaganda and publicity” allegedly made by “some businessmen from Formosa.”

In the cultural field, the Tenth Asian Editors’ seminar also took place in Manila (March, 1965) under the joint sponsorship of the International Press Institute and the Philippine Press Institute, with thirty-five senior journalists from nine countries present. The theme of the seminar discussions was supposed to be “Press Freedom and Responsibility.” But it was not only concerned with the existence of such freedom or awareness of such responsibility in some of the participating countries but also with such developments as Ceylon’s Press Law controversy (which turned out to be a significant factor contributing to the nation’s Cabinet change during the year) which further served to point at a regional disarray in this regard. Manila even concluded a Cultural Pact with far-away Pakistan (ratified in September, 1964), not without a touch, at least, from the Pakistani point of view, on religious (i.e., Muslim) affinity. And, for this matter, Pakistan and Indonesia, too, struck up additional friendship throughout the year. Yet, it is precisely on this same issue that Pakistan’s relationship with Malaysia (another Muslim country) turned out to be considerably different from that with Indonesia. It was rumored that opposition leaders from Kuala Lumpur had even attempted to set up an Indonesia-sponsored rival government-in-exile in Karachi (February, 1965), resulting in an even more antagonistic relationship between Muslim Indonesia and Malaysia. Besides, the Philippines—despite her small Muslim minority—started to appear perhaps even utterly un-Asian when she celebrated her fourth centenary of conversion to Christianity and accepted a special commendation from Pope Paul VI (May, 1965).

and journalistic resources while traveling through, and visiting, relevant concerns in other parts of South Asia, as well as East, Southeast, and Southwest Asia, plus North Africa, West Europe, and South America during the year. These travels and visits which constitute part of his study, besides the Fulbright award, have been assisted by a Colorado State University Faculty Research Grant, for which he wishes, hereby, to express his sincere gratitude.

2 Australia, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Republic of China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Republic of Vietnam.

3 Hong Kong, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Republic of Vietnam.
Militarily, the Philippines has been not only a loyal member of SEATO, and staunch supporter of its policies in the general area, but also an advocate for a “NATO-type” jurisdiction for herself in relation to the United States military bases and personnel in her territory (as reported in February, 1965). But, while NATO remains remote to Asia as a whole (except for Turkey), even the Philippines’ enthusiasm in SEATO itself has not been shared by her immediate neighbors like Indonesia—and recently by Pakistan, a fellow member in the same “collective defense” organization! Her close bilateral association with (or perhaps subjection to) the United States, in addition to the SEATO relationship, has never been looked upon with great favor by many Asian leaders inside or outside of the region, including some Filipino leaders. The Philippines, following the United States to South Vietnam militarily, appears even less popular in Asia as a whole.

Diplomatically, among the Maphilindo powers, the Philippines has shown more willingness to accommodate, especially in contemplating a further “summit conference” of local unity and amity (October, 1964); she has also shown more readiness to effect compromise elsewhere, such as mediating between India and Pakistan over Kashmir (March, 1965). But, the Indo-Pakistani dispute has proven to be beyond Manila’s capacity; the Sabah claim on the part of the Philippines vis-a-vis Malaysia, has remained unsolved, and so does the issue of Indonesian “illegal entrants” into the Philippines. In the larger arena of Asia and Africa, President Macapagal called for “solidarity” (January, 1965); in this connection, he broke relations with South Africa (February, 1965). But the President, himself, emphatically pointed out that his country would not do likewise with the United States, even if some other Afro-Asian states might have so wished and urged.

Moving to Malaysia and Indonesia, the situation between them continues to be one of “confrontation.” Rumors and gestures pertaining to a negotiated amelioration (through mediation) loomed large at times, involving many well-wishers and helpers. Malaysia, on her part, also aired her preference for an “Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission” or a “fair hearing” before the “Non-Aligned Nations’ Conference” at Cairo (October, 1964). But nothing materialized. Furthermore, in aspiring to association with the Afro-Asian and non-aligned countries, Malaysia was effectively blocked by Indonesia, despite the former’s diligent diplomatic activities (pursued often personally by high-ranking Malaysian officials), among the relevant circles. Even the common Muslim bonds between the two contenders and many other Afro-Asian countries, failed to give effect to Kuala Lumpur’s plea that “Muslims should not fight Muslims’ (as especially stressed in April, 1965). A “Qirat Contest” conducted by, and in Kuala Lumpur, likewise, failed to qualify Malaysia’s representation at the Afro-Asian Muslim Conference which was convened (unfortunately) at Jakarta in March, 1965! (At this Conference, even the Soviet Union was admitted.) The “confrontation” placed the whole range of in-between territories—Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei, as well as Kalimantan—in

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4 Attempts or indications of an attempt to mediate were reportedly made during the year, at least, by the following: Algeria, India, Japan, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand, UAR, Zambia, as well as other Afro-Asian and non-aligned concerns.
continuous jeopardy and instability, with Singapore eventually seceding from the Malaysian Federation.

Not discouraged, Malaysia sought to strengthen her own defense by looking primarily to the west (e.g., the United States as well as Britain and other Commonwealth nations, especially Australia, New Zealand and Canada), but also selectively to the East (e.g., India on air force training). While in doing so Malaysia became increasingly drawn into Western international politics (such as Vietnam, in particular, and “East of Suez,” in general), she nevertheless continued to attempt her own version of Asian unity. The measures she employed in this regard, however, were hardly effective. These ranged from the invitation of neighbors to a “Freedom Soccer Tournament” in Kuala Lumpur (March, 1965), to the suggestion of a counterpart of the Organization of African Unity for Asia (made in May, 1965). “It seems to me, we should set about the task of bringing Asia together in the interest of Asia,” said Malaysia’s Prime Minister while visiting Tokyo, calling upon Japan to “give the lead.” What kind of “lead” Japan can hope to give in the interest of Asian unity (in view of her very weakened position in Asia), must necessarily be opened to serious question, at least, for the time being.

Indonesia, on the other hand, left the United Nations because of Malaysia’s presence on the Security Council. She then called for the establishment of a rival world organization based on Afro-Asian solidarity and with the explicit support of the People’s Republic of China. According to President Sukarno, while his confrontation policy did not entail war with Malaysia (even after the withdrawal), this did not necessarily mean that the “real wishes” of the people, say, of Sabah, should not be determined anew by a U.N. mission in the absence of “colonialist interference” (as suggested in January, 1965). This, as accentuated by the secession of Singapore, made the fate of the Malaysian Federation necessarily precarious. President Sukarno, as a matter of fact, accused Malaysia of having actually tried to “subjugate” the Chinese majority there by incorporating it in the Federation. In this confrontation, the Indonesian President regarded his country’s being supported by “2,000 million people from all over the world,” including “the peoples of the Socialist bloc and Afro-Asian countries” (as he declared in January, 1965).

Thus, in strengthening herself, Indonesia chose to move exactly opposite that taken by Malaysia: Indonesia looked primarily to the East (basically Peking and Moscow, plus receptive Afro-Asian and non-aligned countries). At the same time, she spurned a part of the East itself, e.g., India on account of her aid to Malaysia, and most of the West, especially the United States and Britain. This general orientation seems to make Indonesia’s attempt at Asian unity more natural; it came, as a matter of fact, merely as a part of her attempt at Afro-Asian, Nationalist-Communist, or NEFO (New Emerging Forces) unity vis-a-vis “Necolism” (Neo-colonialism and imperialism).

In trying to acquire sufficient economic development and military expansion to become the most powerful state responsible for maintaining “peace,

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5 Invited were Australia, Burma, Republic of China, Hong Kong, India, Republic of Korea, Thailand, and Republic of Vietnam.
security and stability in the entire Southeast Asia," for instance, Jakarta is known to have struck up a special partnership with Peking (at least at a time), especially with regard to large scale aid and the nuclear development program. And along with Peking, Rawalpindi also came as a new friend on the basis of Muslim affinity as well as RCD (Regional Cooperation for Development) scheme. This latter scheme, developed in July 1964 by the Asian members of CENTO (i.e., Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, all being Muslim countries), could have far-reaching significance if the Pakistani-Indonesian link turns out to be a successful and firm one.

Muslim affinity, in turn, has been subject to a tremendous Indonesian effort for expansion toward Africa as well as other parts of Asia and, as a matter of fact, the entire world. An Afro-Asian Muslim Conference, therefore, was convened at Bandung—the very site of the first (general, non-Muslim) Afro-Asian Conference (of 1955)—to coincide with celebrations of the latter’s 10th anniversary (March, 1965). Here, delegates from some 35 countries—including the largest number from mainland China and a few from the Soviet Union, plus observers from some European states—were exhorted by President Sukarno to rely on “Islamic solidarity” for the elimination of imperialism and colonialism and achievement of national liberation and human progress.

Named by the Conference as the “Champion of Islam,” the Indonesian leader’s suggestions led to the establishment of a permanent secretariat for the Afro-Asian Muslim Organization in Indonesia itself, as well as other auxiliary political outfits like an Institute for the Study of Muslim Economics and an Afro-Asian Muslim Workers’ and Peasants’ Organization. Undaunted by the necessity of having to quell a last contingent of Darul Islam rebels inside its own territory, Indonesia expressed concern for the Muslims in India and mourned the murder of Malcolm X in the United States. As a result of the last Bandung Conference, a new avenue was also seemingly found and suggested to have the Malaysian-Indonesian dispute mediated at the then forthcoming World Muslim Conference in Mecca (April, 1965), although eventually to no avail. But this did not prevent Jakarta from airing its support for Muslim Arabs vis-a-vis Israel in Southwest Asia (April, 1965).

Hence, Indonesia’s effort appeared during the period to be concentrated on making something positive out of her negative withdrawal from the U.N. (January, 1965), she called, for instance, upon the world organization to “go beyond the 1960 declaration on decolonization” and “support the further development of the decolonized countries; upon the “imperialists,” to stop dominating the U.N. for intervention and other aggressive purposes in the Afro-Asian area; and upon the Afro-Asian countries, themselves, to “confront” the U.N. on the basis of “self-reliance” (a phrase which had sounded clear and loud from Peking). True to his own new status as “Champion of Islam,” President Sukarno alleged that Indonesia’s decision to withdraw from the U.N. was inspired by no other than the Prophet, Himself, who “once decided to move from Mecca to Medina because He could no longer live with the people of Mecca” (January, 1965).

But, not necessarily thus looking backward, the Indonesian leader saw “a New Asia and a New World now,” banking on the formation—under In-
donesian initiative, if not single-handed leadership—of a rival organization (in 1966?) such as CONEFO (Conference of New Emerging Forces), which would include the “anti-imperialist,” “anti-colonialist,” “national-liberation” forces of all Asia, Africa and Latin America. The existing framework of the Afro-Asian Conference conveniently furnished facilities to propagate this idea: for instance, the Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Journalists’ Association, Jakarta; occasions, such as the Bandung celebrations mentioned above. With as many as thirty-seven Afro-Asian countries represented in the Indonesian metropolitan areas at this juncture (Spring, 1965), help (in small ways) also came from such suggestions as the Afro-Asian mediation for the Malaysian-Indonesian dispute, the Afro-Asian support for Kashmir’s self-determination, the Afro-Asian condemnation of U.S. action in Vietnam and support for the Indo-Chinese People’s Conference at Phnom Penh to provide an “Asian solution for Asian problems,” solidarity of Southwest Asian oil producers vis-a-vis their Western counterparts vis the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), and a “pan-Arab oil body,” and even GANEFO (Games of the New Emerging Forces).

When it was a question of colonialism and anti-colonialism, in the Indonesian view, there was little room for “peaceful coexistence.” On this, Jakarta agreed wholeheartedly with Peking. And together, the two also conceived of a Jakarta-Peking-Phnom Penh-Pyongyang “axis” behind Hanoi, which would have wound up all the “leftist” countries in Asia for a cause. Not to be outdone by Peking along this line, Jakarta (on its own) further prompted such relatively self-confined countries, like Burma and Nepal, to participate more actively and extensively in Asian international politics. Holding “a very honorable position among Afro-Asian, Latin American and Socialist countries,” in President Sukarno’s terms (April, 1965), Indonesia should become “a lighthouse of world revolution against imperialism.” Present indications seem to be that, even after the recent coup and supposed “rightist” ascendancy in the country at the expense of Communist influence, Indonesia remains on the left.

The Malaysian-Indonesian differences appear to be basic. But, away from the Maphilindo area, the mainland of Southeast Asia has come no closer to even local unity due largely to the continuing conflict in Vietnam, although attempts to do so were not lacking. The Indo-Chinese People’s Conference at Phnom Penh (February, 1965) was a good example. The international agreement on the three-way coalition government in Laos was another. And between the three parts of Indo-China, recurring border incidents made even a projected international conference on Cambodia’s own “neutrality” impossible, although this version of neutrality (even if agreed upon) could hardly have fared much better. Consequently, Cambodia not only broke ties with the United States but also threatened to leave the United Nations or go Communist.

In Indo-Chinese border difficulties, as has been well known, also affected Thailand, which likewise had its own plans for Asian unity. Aside from its pivotal role in SEATO, Bangkok hosted a series of conferences along this line, such as the Asian Economic Planners’ Conference (October-November, 1964)
convened under the auspices of ECAFE and the Asian Jurists' Conference (February, 1965). "Asian Games"—a regional version of the Olympics—would also open in the Thai capital if not otherwise affected (1966). More significantly, Bangkok was actively involved (March, 1965) in a projected Nine Asian Foreign Ministers' Conference with the possibility of leading to what had become already dubbed as NEATO (Northeast Asian Treaty Organization). Like SEATO, this could prove equally divisive among the neighbors in East and Southeast Asia.

South and Southeast Asia

Perhaps, Southeast Asia is not a good place to review the positive indications for Asian unity, in view of its continued instability since the end of World War II. If we move to Ceylon, Colombo would appear to be a better symbol for regional and inter-regional cooperation without so much as a single publicized negative denominator. The Colombo Plan, it is true, involved (among others) South and Southeast Asian countries which had been functioning quietly, with results, since 1950. Moreover, the so-called "Colombo Powers," were successful in arranging the first Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in 1954-55. The sixteen-nation Asian Weather Conference which was held in the same place (May, 1965), further added to the impression of smooth harmony. Yet, Ceylon itself was not without turmoil. She witnessed the political consequence of the issue of press freedom (as mentioned above) and the Buddhist-Marxist struggle that developed in the country during the period. In the wider Asian context, both cases could only be symbolic of more extensive disunity and antagonism, whether real or potential.

The controversy centered on the International Buddhist Conference that took place (after the near-abortive threats) in India, presented itself as undoubtedly relevant in this connection (September, 1963): like Islam, Buddhism did not wholly unite the Buddhist countries in South and Southeast Asia. Besides, India's border confrontation with both mainland China and Pakistan was too disturbing to "unity" to be overlooked. In the eyes of Rawalpindi and Peking, as a result of events which took place since 1962, India had been deserted, or had been isolated from the rank and file of Afro-Asian neighbors or—on account of her reliance upon Great Britain and United States for military aid—from even the "non-aligned" world. New Delhi's coolness toward the tenth anniversary Bandung celebrations in Indonesia, served to accentuate this state of affairs. In this light, India was said to have changed from "non-alignment to neo-alignment"; from "multilateralism to bilateralism," relied on the type of military alliance that she had professed to abhor. The rumored Anglo-American approach to a new strategic deployment "east of Suez" (April, 1965), with the center of gravity somewhat located in the Indian Ocean (upon India's explicit acquiescence) further contributed to controversy and distrust than to harmony among the Asian neighbors. And even India's proposed "Anti-Nuclear Union" (November, 1964), in the face of Peking's new nuclear status and India's own seeming acceptance of a U.S.
offer of an “umbrella” of protection, did not seem to fire the imagination of any Afro-Asian neighbors for that type of “unity” based on peace.

Pakistan’s newly-found friendship with the People’s Republic of China (supposedly a measure for unity), only widened the gap between herself and India. While the creation of the RCD and its potential expansion from South and Southwest to Southeast Asia and even North Africa, under Rawalpindi’s quiet but determined drive, appeared to be a singular stroke of genius (minus the sting of internal Muslim strife, although covering basically Muslim areas) to the credit of Asian unity, increasing vexation with the United States concerns aid to India, intervention in Vietnam, hostility toward Peking, and others, nevertheless brought to light (almost unexpectedly) a new centrifugal tendency on the part of this common member of CENTO and SEATO, to develop away from its alliances.

Even the RCD, however, represented a clear limitation, when viewed in the Southwest Asian context: its members—Turkey, Iran and Pakistan—being all Muslim but at the same time non-Arab. This brings in the possible question of Arab unity (as represented by the Arab League, with seven of its thirteen members in Southwest Asia) versus non-Arab unity, which, in turn, points again to the lack of real Muslim unity in the larger Afro-Asian arena.

Arab unity, to be sure, has had more meaning than can be thus tarnished in this manner. The UAR, even though a thing of the past in its literal sense, still hovers as a potentially influential symbol for certain basic unity in Southwest Asian-North African area. A new unified political command, for instance, was formed (December, 1964) between the UAR and Iraq. And even deviationist Tunisia chose to continue calling upon the UAR to take the initiative for Arab unity and for a solution of the “Palestine problem.” The last problem was said to be “a problem for the Arabs to solve,” in contrast to Zionism which was considered “a problem of the imperialists” (February, 1965). However, when the problem did come to a head as a result of a West German-Israeli rapprochement in March, 1965 (presumably under the pressure of “the imperialists”), Tunisia’s President Bourguiba suggested compromise rather than a united Arab retaliation against Tel Aviv and Bonn, thus provoking the wrath of the Arab League to which his country belongs. But not entirely without any beneficial effect on Arab unity. For, as a result of the Cairo-Bonn confrontation and maneuver, common Arab sensitivity, vigilance and effort for bringing about an end to external colonial influence and authority in such Arab-populated areas as Aden, South Arabia and Oman, were intensified. This was indicated by the increasing terrorist activities, under the leadership of the National Front for Liberation from within, and additional pledge of support—for instance, by Iraq and Kuwait—and a call for British withdrawal (e.g., by UAR) from without (Spring, 1965). Efforts for an operative Arab Common Market were also reinforced through such measures as the holding of a new (5th) Arab Petroleum Congress meeting in Cairo, coupled with an advocacy of “nationalization of Arab oil” (March, 1965): visa abolition among members of the Arab League, as a result of a recommendation put forward by the Arab Economic Union Council (March, 1965); the meeting of Arab Economic Ministers at Tripoli (April, 1965). The existing Arab Council
for Atomic Research also called for joint search for radioactive raw materials (March, 1965). A new Arab Parliamentary Conference was likewise convened (May, 1965). The Arab states further launched a literacy campaign during this period (April, 1965), and even a project to develop the Arabic language throughout the Afro-Asian Muslim world was conceived (at Bandung, in March, 1965).

Moreover, the Arab unity movement was directly linked with the Muslim unity movement and, under a similar impetus with the Afro-Asian unity movement, in general. The Mogadishu (Somali Republic) World Muslim Conference (6th) involved most of the Afro-Asian Muslim and Arab countries (December, 1964-January, 1965). The Algiers Afro-Asian Economic Seminar (February, 1965), reportedly with as many as 60 delegations attending, also brought forth the issues of Afro-Asian and even Latin American economic cooperation and "self-reliance for developing countries." The Afro-Asian Muslim Conference (mentioned earlier) was to follow in the same vein (March, 1965), with an additional "Muslim summit at Mecca" looming as a sure project. The fourth Afro-Asian Solidarity meeting (which sponsored the Algiers Seminar) took place at Winneba (Ghana) with the usual expression of militancy (May, 1965). It resolved to extend such solidarity to Latin America by calling for the convening of its next meeting in Havana (January, 1966).

All this, however, led to the glaring failure for the Second Afro-Asian (Bandung) Conference, scheduled and re-scheduled to open in Algiers (June, November, 1965), to materialize, due to factors both foreseen (e.g., the Sino-Soviet controversy) and unforeseen (e.g., the Boumedienne coup in Algeria). And in the Southwest Asian area itself, both Arab and Afro-Asian unity movements seemed to have failed to involve the non-Arab Muslims (e.g., Turkey, Iran, and the RCD in general) very seriously. Turkey, in particular, not only started (as a result of the Cyprus dispute and subsequent diplomatic zig-zagging) to placate the Soviet Union, like Iran had been doing, but continued to have a pro-Western orientation, with its membership in both NATO and CENTO, which could be viewed as "un-Asian." Yet, Iran ironically was able to strike out, seemingly in conjunction with the Winneba development, in a new direction of the unity approach, to establish, via its visiting Shah, unprecedented cultural relations with far away Latin America during the period (e.g., Argentina and Brazil, May 1965).

North and East Asia

The improving relations between Turkey, Iran and the Soviet Union, whose control over the entire northern regions of Asia serves to simplify the question of unity there, may be viewed, within the Asian context, as having a bearing on Asian unity as a whole. For, indeed, Turkey's membership in NATO and CENTO as well as Pakistan's membership in CENTO and SEATO, had made it almost impossible for the Soviet Union to feel comfortable along its southern flank. Adding to the Soviet Union's apprehensions, is the fact that Iran—also a member of CENTO—had not been changed from an awkward buffer into an accommodating neighbor at the close of World War II. Now, not only the formation of RCD (embodied these same southern
Asian members of CENTO and especially the two crucial links to SEATO and NATO seemed to have mitigated their militarily antagonistic nature, but all three organizations have become friendlier with their northern neighbor or, in another sense, more neutral—that is, away from the West, during the year.

However, certain minority groups of common racial stock in North and Southwest Asian regions (like the Kurds), did and must be regarded as liable to create some political or border scuffle on both sides from time to time.

Between North and East Asia, where the most crucial factor for Asian unity (or disunity), in general, seems to lie, developments have not been as promising. While Mongolia has continued to lean heavily toward the North and, at the same time, has served as a tolerably effective buffer with respect to China in the south, and while Soviet leaders still occasionally denounce as futile “bourgeois propaganda” to divide the “Socialist camp,” the ideological split (and even border difficulties) between Moscow and Peking, had simply become one of the supreme realities in international life, in general, today. As a matter of fact, some even considered the Soviet move in the U.N. concerning the principle of peaceful solution of territorial disputes, as having stemmed primarily from a fear of the potentially explosive nature of the Sino-Soviet border situation (Fall, 1964). On the other hand, the Sino-Soviet alliance vis-a-vis a United States-dominated Japan still persisted, albeit necessarily inactive for the time being. But within East Asia itself, all the major powers in the region had their respective ideas of “unity”—more extrovertly than introvertly, it seems.

The fact that mainland China has been traditionally the most dominant nation in East Asia, helps explain that, save in certain particular periods, a measure of unity in the region—perhaps, in terms of a Pax Sinica—always existed. Even without communism as a factor, it was not hard to understand the easy rapprochement between Peking on the one hand, and Pyongyang and Ulan Bator and Hanoi on the other. Nor was it difficult to comprehend (with China’s newly gained power) why Japan—the modern encroacher upon China’s territorial and political integrity—became more and more compromised in the Chinese neighborhood even with U.S. backing. True, Japan continued to side more with the United States than with Peking in the Sino-American confrontation during the year (and hence more with Taipei). But Japan already had to accommodate a new, permanent trade mission from the People’s Republic of China before Premier Sato went to the United States (December, 1964), where he could only agree with President Johnson on close consultation over “the vital importance of the question of China.” Sato did not resist U.S. pressure to reduce trade and contact with Peking; instead, he simultaneously reciprocated a permanent trade mission and expanded tourist connection and activities toward that giant neighbor. The Japanese leader even expressed the wish for his country to become a “link” between the East and West (January, 1965).
Similarly, while attempting, on the one hand, to mediate the Indo-Pakistan dispute, Japan also tried to show understanding (or even support) for Indonesia's "confrontation" policy vis-a-vis Malaysia and the withdrawal from the U.N., on the basis of Japan's adjustment (in the words of her Diet mission to Jakarta) to "current developments in Asia," which, significantly, even included at one time a reluctance to support Soviet entry into the Afro-Asian Conference, seemingly in deference to Peking. Along the same line, Japan—urged by the United States—likewise improved her relations with South Korea (April, 1965), although to the dislike of Pyongyang and Peking, as well as some elements within South Korea itself.

But all these unfortunately, served only to accentuate the irreconcilability or disunity between Pyongyang and Seoul, and between Taipei and Peking. This was further aggravated by the two parties' different policies toward Vietnam during the period. Under the circumstances, the respective search for unity was also undertaken by Korea, Japan and China quite differently: the two Koreas and two Chinas vehemently spurned permanent division and failed to work for any compromise or reconciliation; they actively sought to ally themselves with opposing forces and organizations in the international arena. While Taipei and Peking became well entrenched in two different camps, South Korea (not to be outdone by the Afro-Asian oriented North) interestingly also started out to win friends in Africa as well as in Asia (March, 1965). And Japan, due both to its pre-war status and post-war development, as well as its close association with the United States and the West, in general, seemed to have embarked upon extensive and grand program for unity of its own.

Japan's gesture toward the conflict in Vietnam which is critical of U.S. bombing, fearful of the use of nuclear weapons, and reluctant to allow the use of U.S. bases in Japanese territory, but at the same time appreciative of SEATO's "sober judgment" of Communist threat in Asia and willing to provide economic and technical aid to South Vietnam—could only be a limited indication in this regard. Likewise, her gradual settlement of war reparations to her Southeast Asian neighbors, had been simply a requirement, although the opportunities were utilized to extend her technical aid and to establish new markets and investment outlets in these areas (as evidenced, for instance, by the Japan Productivity Center's mission and the Japan Industry Floating Fair Association's show-piece to South and Southeast Asia in late 1964). More positively, Japan has been extending financial aid and technical assistance—as part of the Western program—to many Asian areas not connected with the war (such as Pakistan), as well as African countries (such as Rhodesia), in fields ranging from rice cultivation and highway projects to steel and car industries. She even proposed to the Soviet Union a "joint development of Siberia" (February, 1965).

The Olympic Games that took place in Tokyo (October, 1964), of course, most typically symbolized Japan's peaceful re-emergence and ambitions as a new center of international influence in Asia and in the world. This is further spotlighted by the tremendous flow of tourists to and from the Land of the Rising Sun during the regular seasons. But, during the year, Tokyo
was also the site of a Southeast Asian Aviation Conference (October, 1964), an Asian Parliamentary Conference (February, 1965), and an Asian Maritime Conference (April, 1965). Japanese authorities also proposed inter-governmental cooperation to combat diseases in Asia (April, 1965), the elimination of political discrimination in Asian games, and general support for the Asian Development Bank (May, 1965). Japan's Ambassador to the U.N. was also elected to the chairmanship of the world organization's Economic and Social Council for 1965. The WFO requested Japan to supply food to developing countries especially those in South and Southwest Asia and Africa (March, 1965). Moreover, Japan was most enthusiastically disposed to participate in the cancelled Second Afro-Asian Conference at Algiers and prepared even to propose Tokyo as site for the Third Conference.

The Overall View

But the key to Asian (or Afro-Asian, or even world-wide) unity or disunity undoubtedly continues to remain more in the hands of China than in those of any other Asian country.

For one thing, mainland China's unity (or disunity) projects were on a much more grandiose scale, unmatched by any other Asian and most non-Asian powers. China's rapprochement with Japan—whether economic or political—could mean Japan's long-range status as a basically Asian or Western-oriented power, i.e., fundamental unity or disunity for East Asia, and hence, the whole of Asia. The five border treaties Peking has concluded (up to March, 1965, with Afghanistan, after Burma, Nepal, Mongolia and Pakistan) likewise made an essential difference as to whether or not there was to be unity between the East Asian colossus and its Southeast, South, and Southwest Asian neighbors. And through its new friend, Pakistan, as the common link between CENTO, SEATO and the Muslim world, Peking's acceptability was enhanced to become also appealing in other parts of Asia (and Africa). Turkey and Lebanon, for example, were rumored at one time to have considered entering into diplomatic relations with mainland China (Spring, 1965). Also, ironically, while Peking's dispute with Moscow might have seemed basically negative insofar as North Asian unity was concerned, this dispute could at the same time be interpreted as purposely designed to win greater unity with, or leadership over, the traditionally Eastern, less developed, and today basically anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist and anti-Western areas of Asia and Africa, and even Latin America. The cancellation of the Second Afro-Asian Conference at Algiers during the year—due to multiple irreconciliabilities and a final threat of sabotage from Peking—bespoke Peking's powerful position (for better or for worse) as well as its frustration in the attempt to forge an Afro-Asian unity primarily under its own terms. India's failure to form an "Anti-Nuclear Union" among the non-aligned countries (basically Afro-Asian) as mentioned above, pointedly suggests the substance and political implications of this position.

China, after all, did become the first and, so far, the only Asian and non-Western nuclear power. This commanding posture could hardly be taken to mean only negatively as to its vulnerability or inviting weakness in relation
to a possible U.S. attack, or as to apprehension and antagonism aroused in the Afro-Asian neighbors. The fact was that this new status actually aroused more admiration (secretly or openly) than hostility, and also led to additional diplomatic contacts with some of the more remote areas, such as Jordan, Kuwait and Cyprus in Southwest Asia.\(^7\)

Conversely, the eclipse of Japan and power political absorption of Turkey by the West since World War II, plus India's recent humiliation, could only reinforce mainland China's dominant position in all the major regions of Asia (and the non-West), increasing Western—especially U.S.—presence and antagonism around China, all the more accentuating that position; the singular making of a rival taking on both of the super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, plus India.

The presence of observers from the Philippines (if we were to return to our point of departure in this discussion) in Peking, with an apparent probing mission during the latter's recent anniversary celebrations (October, 1964, shortly after which the first Chinese nuclear device was detonated), has stood as a testimony to the very devilish attraction as well as threat of Peking's position in relation to its neighbors.

Yet, would this state of affairs necessarily mean that Asian unity is closer to reality because of the rise of mainland China?

Hardly.

Precisely because mainland China seems to have come a long way in pursuing a measure of inter-regional unity in Asia and inter-continental unity in the non-West, would perhaps indicate that the forces working toward such inter-regional and inter-continental disunity have also increased to overwhelming proportions; witness the Peking-Taipei division, the Pyongyang-Seoul stalemate, the Hanoi-Saigon conflict, the Jakarta-Kuala Lumpur confrontation, the Peking-New Delhi brewing, the New Delhi-Rawalpindi animosity, the Israel-Arab antagonism, the Arab and non-Arab Muslim schism, and the Cyprus dispute, plus the whole range of Washington-Seoul, Washington-Tokyo, Washington-Taipei, Washington-Bangkok, Washington and London-New Delhi, Washington-Rawalpindi, Washington and London-Teheran, Washington and London-Ankara, and the overall NATO, CENTO, SEATO, and contemplated NEATO and “East of Suez” alliances. All these, had come about precisely because of Asia's internal contradictions and the outside world's repulsions and attractions that invariably contributed to Asian DISUNITY!

Under such circumstances, it would be a miracle if Asian leaders (incumbent or forthcoming) could work together to straighten out their differences, or even just get together for some eventual purpose of that kind, in any foreseeable future.

This, I submit, is not to underestimate these leaders' intentions, goodwill, or possible efforts. Rather, the odds are too great, and too human, against any easy or superhuman solution. It seem obvious that, in order to have Asian

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\(^7\) See this writer's study of “Peking and the Third World,” Current History (September, 1965).

In a word, if it is to Asia's comfort, no other continent is really enjoying any significant measure of unity; or conversely, until there is a value standard established in favor of continental unity rather than power political domination-individually or collectively, until all continents are thus striving for such unity, and until the whole world aspires to unity—THERE WILL NEVER BE ASIAN UNITY.