THE JAPANESE MINORITY IN THE PHILIPPINES
BEFORE PEARL HARBOR; SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IN DAVAO

JOSEFA M. SANIEL

The Philippine National Assembly’s approval of what was soon to become the Philippine Immigration Act signed by the United States President in 1940 (a year before Pearl Harbor) prompted a leading Japanese journalist, Mr. Yesotaro Mori, to write: “The passage of the anti-Japanese immigration bill... by the Philippine National Assembly makes a definite step forward in the Island’s effort to drive out Japanese influence.” On the other hand, the Japanese government’s reaction to this legislative action was revealed in the immediate filing by the Japanese Acting-Consul in Manila, of a memorandum with the Department of Labor of the Philippine Commonwealth Government, requesting for “the continuation of the fair and just treatment of Japanese immigrants to the Philippines” who had “always entered unrestricted” into the Islands.

1 This paper was submitted to the Specialist Panel on Philippine Foreign Minorities, at the April 1965 San Francisco Conference of the Association for Asian Studies. It is a preliminary study based on data gathered from a preliminary search of documentary or written sources as well as from open-ended, depth interviews with people (generally between 35 and 69 years of age) who could give information about the Japanese in pre-war Philippines. The plan of expanding the study into one of monographic length, involves the broadening of the base of data of this brief study. It includes a plan of using a systematized interview schedule for interviewing residents of selected areas in the Philippines where the Japanese had resided. Unless indicated, the sources of information are interviews with Filipino pre-war residents of Manila, Rizal, Ilocos Sur, Nueva Ecija, Mountain Province, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Cebu, Leyte, Cotabato, and Davao. Few in number, many of the interviews were conducted in Davao and Manila. The data gathered from them filled gaps left in the records.

I would like to acknowledge here, the help and/or criticisms of my friends and colleagues at the University of the Philippines: Dr. C. Parel of the Statistical Center; Dr. M. Concepcion, Acting-Director of the Institute of Demography; Prof. O.R. Angangco, Head of the Department of Sociology, and Prof. P.S. Manalang, Director of the Undergraduate Department, Graduate School of Education. I would also like to thank my research assistants: Mrs. Dolores L. Ventosa, who undertook interviews in Davao and helped me in the preliminary stages of the research, as well as Miss Teresita Corcuera, who undertook some interviews of informants in Manila and vicinity and gathered materials on the topic, wherever they were found. Except for Figure 3, all graphs used in this study were prepared from raw data by Mr. Pio A. Muñoz of the Statistical Center, University of the Philippines.

Formerly Managing Editor of the Osaka Mainichi and Executive Editor of the Japan Times and Mail, Mr. Yesotaro Mori was then associated with the Foreign Affairs Association of Japan. See note 42, chapter XXVIII of J. T. Hayden, The Philippines: A Study in National Development (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1945), 947.

3 Quoted from Yesotaro Mori, “Close Doors in the Philippines,” Contemporary Japan, IX (June, 1940), 669-697, in ibid., 725.

4 “Jones talks on action of Nippon Envoy,” Herald, July 21, 1939, 1. See also “Kihara lauds uniform quota for Orientals,” Bulletin, January 28, 1939, 1. Both clippings are in the Manuel L. Quezon Collection, National Library, Manila. (Hereafter cited as Quezon Col.)
Both responses to the passage of the immigration bill in the National Assembly suggest the existence of a significant and/or influential Japanese minority in the Philippines before the outbreak of the Pacific war, early in December 1941. Four years before, President Manuel L. Quezon described doing business in the Philippines... From 1918 to 1941, this Japanese minority as consisting of... Thousands of Japanese subjects residing in the Philippines was the second largest group of foreigners in the archipelago, next only to the Chinese which was about six and over four times larger than the Japanese in 1918 and 1939, respectively.

While the Japanese minority lagged behind the Chinese in number, the quantitative increase of the Japanese in the Philippines before Pearl Harbor, based on the Census data (this does not include the possibility of officially unrecorded increases), is impressive: more than twenty-two times and less than three times increase within the 1903-1918 and 1918-1939 intercensal periods respectively, or in 1939, more than twenty times over the 1903 Census figures. This increase is even more remarkable when we consider that, unlike the Chinese, there was hardly any Japanese settler in the Philippines at the turn of the century. For after Japan emerged in mid-nineteenth century from her isolation of over 250 years, available records indicate—among others—that there was only a negligible number of Japanese sojourners, contract laborers, Consular officials and personnel, traders as well as military men who were in the Philippines between the 1870's and the close of the century.

The number of Japanese in the Philippines, viewed in terms of the total population of the Island, appears insignificant: 7,806 compared to the total Philippine population of 10,314,310 in 1918, and 29,262 to 16,000,303 in 1939. But when we consider this number of Japanese vis a vis the influence of its members upon prewar Philippine society, its importance looms large.

Essential to an understanding of the degree of a foreign minority group’s impact upon its host country, is its social organization. Because of the present lack of data regarding the Japanese minorities in the other areas of the Philippines, this study of the Japanese social organization in the Philippines is limited to the case of Davao. It will, however, be preceded by a discussion of the general developments concerning the pre-war Japanese minority in the Philippines.

Available Philippine Census data of Japanese immigrants and emigrants before Pearl Harbor, cover only twenty-nine years: 1910-1939. (See Figure

---

5 Quoted from M. L. Quezon’s speech delivered at a banquet in his honor in Tokyo, Japan, February 1937. Messages of the President, III, pt. I (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1938), 41.
6 The Census of 1918 records the total Chinese population in the Philippines as 43,802 and the Japanese, 7,806. By 1939, the Census figures were: Chinese, 117,461; Japanese, 29,262.
7 The Census of 1903 records 921 Japanese residents in the Philippines.
Throughout this period, the number of Japanese immigrants far exceeded that of emigrants except in 1922, 1932-1935 and in 1939, during which years there were absolute decreases of the Japanese in the Philippines, as a result of increases in the number of Japanese emigrants and decreases in the Japanese immigrants of the Islands.\(^1\) The number of Japanese emigrants from the Philippines fluctuated within a range of 100-3,000 emigrants, averaging more than 780 per year from 1910 to 1939, and reaching only one notable peak of 2,945 Japanese departing from the Philippines in 1939—the very year which saw the largest number of absolute decrease of Japanese population in the Islands.\(^1\) Because of the escalation of Japan's war in China and the possibility of her being involved in a Pacific war against the enemies of her European allies—Germany and Italy—it is likely that this trend of absolute decrease of Japanese residents in the Philippines, continued until Pearl Harbor.

Japanese immigration, on the other hand, fluctuated within a range of 500-4,500 Japanese entering the Philippines, averaging more than 1,500 per year from 1907-1939 (around twice as many as the annual average number of emigrants, thus leaving a balance of an average annual increase) and reaching two marked peaks: 3,559 in 1918; 4,170 in 1937. Within the period under consideration (1910-1939), the four largest absolute increases in the number of Japanese in the Philippines took place during the following years: 1917, 3,304; 1918, 2,871;\(^1\) 1927, 2,394;\(^\) 1937, 2,235.\(^1\)

\(^1\)This decline might be ascribed to the overseas Japanese residents—especially women and children—returning to their homeland, as a result of the expansion of the undeclared Sino-Japanese war, the outbreak of the European war which called for increasing war preparations in Japan; possibly also, the approval of the Philippine immigration bill by the National Assembly in 1939.

\(^2\)The boom in Japanese trade and industries as well as in the prices of abaca during World War I, and the sale of American-owned plantations in Davao to Japanese entrepreneurs in 1917 which created a greater demand for both Japanese technical men and cultivators, might have caused the absolute rise in number of Japanese residents in the Philippines in 1917 and 1918. In connection with the sale of the American-owned plantations, it should be recalled here that the United States entered World War I in 1917, the year after the Philippines was given full autonomy under the Jones Law. It was a time when speculations were rife about Japan's ambitions in Asia and the inability of the Philippines to defend itself, in case Japan would choose to make certain demands upon the Philippines, while the United States was involved in the European war. For the economic development of Japan during the first World War, see W.W. Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan. Growth and Structural Change, 1868-1938 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1954), 38-42.

\(^3\)The 1927 banking crisis in Japan took place two years earlier than in the West. At the time, economic opportunities in the homeland hardly kept pace with the larger
Figure 1
Comparing H. Kamabara’s graph of the Japanese residents in Davao (see Figure 3) with the one depicting absolute increases and decreases of the Japanese population in the Philippines (see Figure 2), it can be noted that the trends of absolute increases or decreases observable in the latter are repeated in the former except during the first half of the 1930’s. Within this period, there was an increase of Japanese residents in Davao, notwithstanding the general trend of an annual absolute decrease in the total Japanese population of the Philippines.

Davao’s total Japanese population in 1918 and in 1939 was over 34.5% and around 69% more than the total Japanese population of the other parts of the Philippines for the same years. Compared with Manila’s, which ranked second in the size of its Japanese residents, Davao’s was 177% more in 1918; in 1939, 277%. The range of the number of Japanese in each of the Philippine provinces, not including Davao and the city of Manila, varied in 1918 from 0 (in the provinces of Batanes, Antique, Capiz and Bohol) to 195 (in Laguna); in 1939, from 1 (in the provinces of Abra and Batanes) to 1,188 (in the Mountain Province).

Outside of Davao and Manila, there were in 1918 only three provinces of Luzon and one in Mindanao with more than 100 Japanese: Laguna, Mountain Province, Zambales, and Zamboanga. Fourteen Philippine provinces—six in Luzon, five in the Visayas and three in Mindanao—had more than 100 Japanese by 1939: Mountain Province, Pampanga, Batangas, Laguna, Quezon (then Tayabas), Camarines Norte, Palawan, Masbate, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Cebu, Zamboanga, Cotabato and Misamis.

number of new job seekers pouring into the labor market each year as the population grew. This might account for the absolute increase of the number of Japanese immigrants in the Philippines in 1927. See Lockwood, op. cit., 42-43.

14 It is more different to attempt an explanation for the absolute increase of Japanese in the Islands in 1937, except perhaps, if there are proofs indicating that this increase resulted from the movement from China to the Philippines, of Japanese investors, agricultural cultivators, etc. Or, perhaps, the absolute increase of the number of Japanese in the Philippines in 1937, might have been encouraged by the sympathetic attitude of President Quezon towards the Japanese which is revealed in his statements to the press, after his return from his personal investigation of the so called “Davao problem,” and his assurance of protection of Japanese rights of, and extension of courtesy to, the Japanese in the Philippines, during his Tokyo visit in February, 1937. See the record of the Press Conference held at Malacanang, May 8, 1936, Quezon Mss., Quezon Col. In this conference, President Quezon categorically denied the existence of the “Davao problem,” adding “that it was ridiculous to believe that the Japanese control Davao.” For President Quezon’s speech in Tokyo, see the Messages of the President, op. cit., 37-38.

15 To cite some instances, when significant, absolute increases in the total Japanese population of the Philippines took place in 1917, and 1918, there was a parallel movement in the number of Japanese residents in Davao. The sudden decline of the number of absolute increase of the Japanese population in the Philippines between 1919 and 1923, had corresponding developments in Davao. And so was this parallel trend noticed in the marked expansion of the number of absolute increase of Japanese in the Philippines between 1923 and 1925.

16 One can speculate that for reasons given in footnote 11, supra, the Japanese in the Philippines, who resided outside of Davao, decided either to return home or to move to Davao where, they might have thought, they had better chances to survive.

17 The statistical data used are found in the Philippine Census for 1939, op. cit., 428.

18 Ibid.
INCREASE OR DECREASE OF JAPANESE IMMIGRANTS OVER JAPANESE EMIGRANTS IN THE PHILIPPINES: (1907 - 1939)

Source: Based on Table 22, Census of 1939 Vol. II, p.106

Figure 2
DAVAO HOJIN KAITAKUSHI
(HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE RESIDENTS IN DAVAO)

AVG. MARKET PRICE IN
PESOS PER PICUL PER
YEAR OF GRADE E ABACA

NOTE:
1. The statistical data for 1903-1909 are based on estimates, not on written records.
2. From 1919 to 1936, the statistical data are based on the report of the Japanese Association made annually, on October 1.

SOURCE:
KAMABARA HIROJI, DAVAO HOJIN KAITAKUSHI
(HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE RESIDENTS IN DAVAO)
(DAVID: NIPPÔ-SHIMBUNSHA, 1938).

NOTE: ON NUMBER OF JAPANESE IN DAVAO, U. KAMABARA.

Figure 3
If the Philippines is divided into ten regions, according to the classification of the Philippine Statistical Survey of Households (PSSH) of the Bureau of Census,19 (see Figure 4) we can make—among others—the following generalizations about the Japanese population in these regions: (1) there were significant increases of Japanese residents between 1918 and 1939 in all ten regions except in Region II,20 Region IV21 and Region V;22 (2) the regions of highest concentration of Japanese were Region I (Manila) and Region IX (includes Davao); (3) the region of least concentration of Japanese were Region II and Region X.23

In all ten regions, the number of Japanese males in 1918 was much greater than the number of Japanese females—the number of males being about fifteen times that of Japanese females in Region IX (includes Davao); five times, in Region V; four times in Region VI,25 Region VII,26 Region VIII,27 as well as Region X and only three times, in Region I (Manila).28 But while the numerical superiority of Japanese males existed in all ten regions in 1918 (see Figure 5) thus making inter-marriage very possible, the Census figures of 1939 seem to support a Filipino anthropologist's assumption that the Japanese residents in the Philippines "did not inter-marry extensively with the native population."29 Out of a total of 29,262 Japanese in the Philippines in 1939 (after over three decades of Japanese settlement in the Philippines, preceding Pearl Harbor) only 884 males married Filipino women. 874 of whom chose to retain their Filipino citizenship and only 10 took their husband's.30 Was this because of the ease in arranging for Japanese females to marry Japanese overseas males who could choose their future brides from among pictures furnished them by middlemen based in Japan (the "picture bride")? Was it because Japanese males were averse to marrying Filipino females and Filipino females not generally disposed to marrying Japanese males? Or was it a combination of all these reasons and, perhaps, others? Definite answers to these questions are not easy to make because—unlike countries, such as Peru, where there lived a pre-war Japanese minority group which has remained in the country until today21—in the Philippines, hardly any prewar Japanese residents survived death or post-war repatriation to Japan. Identifying those who are still alive among the former residents of the Philippines, and interviewing them today would be most difficult.

10 See Figure 4 of this paper.
20 Ilocos Sur, Ilocos Norte, Abra, Batanes and La Union.
21 Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Tarlac, Bataan and Zambales.
22 Batangas, Cavite, Palawan, Quezon, Laguna, Marinduque, and Rizal.
23 Agusan, Bukidnon, Lanao, Misamis, and Surigao.
24 Sulu, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Davao.
25 Albay, Camarines Sur, Camarines Norte, Catanduanes, Masbate, Sorsogon.
27 Bohol, Cebu, Leyte, Samar.
28 See Figure 4 of this paper.
30 See also, "50,000 Japanese from 3 Generations Live in Peru." Manila Bulletin, December 16, 1965, III.
JAPANESE POPULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES
BY REGION: 1918 - 1939

Figure 4
CITIZENSHIP AND SEX BY REGION
JAPANESE: 1918

LEGEND:  MALE  FEMALE

PHILIPPINE CENSUS, 1918: pp. 352-353

Figure 5
Whether the Japanese residing in the Philippines continued speaking their language, can be answered by comparing, on the one hand, the 1939 Census figures of the Japanese residents recorded in 1918 as well as in 1939 and, on the other, the data on the number of people who spoke Japanese in 1939 in each province of the Philippines as well as in Manila. With these two sets of statistical data in view, it can be said that the negligible balance between the two varied slightly.\(^{32}\) This would suggest that both the first and second generation Japanese in the Philippines, during almost four decades of this century, appear to have persisted in speaking their language—without, of course, eliminating the possibility of their acquiring an ability to communicate in one or more of the Filipino languages. What seems interesting to point out is that in three of the four ranking areas in size of their Japanese population in 1918 and in 1939 (Manila, Davao and the Mountain Province), a negative balance was recorded, while in the province of Rizal, the positive balance was an exceptional high of 502 speakers in Japanese.\(^{33}\)

What were the occupations of these Japanese residents in the Philippines who persisted in speaking their own language? It is well to note here the kinds of occupation in which they were involved and compare their number in each occupation to that of the Chinese, numerically the leading foreign minority in the Philippines\(^{34}\) (see Figure 6).

The Japanese entered all the recorded occupations in the Islands: the non-gainful, and each of the eleven Philippine Census categories of gainful occupations.\(^{35}\) Except in agriculture and fishing, the Chinese numerically exceeded the Japanese in every occupation, with the total number of Chinese involved in trade far outstripping the over-all number of Japanese engaged in all occupations of the Philippines. Over 6,700 Japanese compared to more than 1,200 Chinese were engaged in agriculture; in fishing, upward of 1,500 Japanese to less than 100 Chinese. A considerable number of offshore fishing establishments were operated by Japanese for Filipino owners. The former, operated only upward of 400 thousand pesos or 0.9% of a total of 46 million pesos assets of all fishing establishments in the Philippines in 1939; the latter, more than 43 million pesos or 94.8%.\(^{36}\) In the late thirties, direct Japanese investments in the Philippines increased and became more diversified

---

\(^{32}\) The balance varied from 1 (in Abra) to 57 (in Quezon, then Tayabas province) more people speaking Japanese in 1939 than the total recorded Japanese residents in a particular area (not including the exceptional high of 502 more people speaking Japanese in Rizal province); from 3 (in Bukidnon and Bataan) to 106 (in Davao) less people speaking Japanese than the Japanese living in a community (the high of 959 less people speaking Japanese in the Mountain Province is not included). For statistical data, see Census for 1939, op. cit., 367-373, 428. See also Census for 1918 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1920), II, 352-353.

\(^{33}\) It might be because, according to a respondent, a significant number of the members of the Makapili—a pro-Japanese organization established during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines—came from Rizal province and many of them had learned Japanese before the war.

\(^{34}\) For statistical data, see Census for 1939, op. cit., II, 505-521.

\(^{35}\) They are: (1) Agriculture, (2) Domestic and Personal Services, (3) Professional Services, (4) Public Services, (5) Fishing, (6) Forestry and Hunting, (7) Mining and Quarrying, (8) Manufacturing and Mechanical Industries, (9) Transportation and Communication, (10) Trade, and (11) Clerical. See Figure 6 of this paper.

\(^{36}\) See Census for 1939, op. cit., IV, 351.
OCCUPATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES, BY CITIZENSHIP
JAPAN AND CHINA; 1939

PHILIPPINE CENSUS 1939, VOL. II, pp. 305-321

Figure 6
while it is likely that Japanese capital (which is difficult to ascertain) was indirectly invested in mining and manufacturing (especially in textiles) under the cover of Filipino names in order to circumvent the law covering foreign ownership in certain sectors of the Philippine economy. The Japanese also worked for Filipino farm owners and/or lessors of public lands in Davao, where the Japanese in the Philippines mainly undertook their agricultural pursuits.

In the late thirties, while the number of Japanese involved in Philippine trade fell very far behind that of the Chinese, the former were fast developing a system of retailing (the Japanese response to the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods in the early part of the decade) which seemed to rival that of the Chinese in the Philippines. This was perhaps because Japanese retail shops were more modern and attractive than most of the Chinese shops, were financially backed by the great business houses of Japan and supported by branches of two Japanese banks in Manila.

These banks must also have been involved in the trade between Japan and the Philippines. The general trend of trade between 1900 and 1938 indicate a fluctuation of imports within a range of more than 850 pesos in 1900 and over 32 million in 1920; exports, over 500 thousand pesos in 1910 and more than twenty million in 1937. Imports exceeded exports for all years—that is, the balance of trade was unfavorable to the Philippines from 1900 to 1938—except in 1901, 1903 and 1912 when exports left imports behind and in 1904, 1915 and 1916 when imports and exports were practically balanced. The gap between imports and exports increased tremendously in 1918 when imports exceeded exports by around 64.5% and widened in 1920 when it was 116%; another wide gap is noted in 1937 when imports was around 61% more than exports. It might be pertinent to recall here that the last gap occurred in the same year the number of Japanese immigrants into the Philippines reached a second peak which was higher than the first one of 1918 (see Figure 7).

Early in the 1920's, Japan became the second leading market for Philippine exports, a position she alternately occupied with Great Britain in the twenties on to the beginning of the thirties, and then continuously held from 1933 to, perhaps, 1940 when the United States Embargo on trading in strategic goods with Japan, applied to the Philippines. Mainly consisting of Philippine cash crops, sugar and abaca took the lead in the Philippine exports list of the 1920's with lumber and scrap iron—among others—added to it in the thirties. Japan also held a leading position as a source of Philippine imports early in the twenties, and continued in this place through the next decade, except during the period of comparatively effective Chinese boycott of Japanese goods in the early thirties. By 1937, despite her entry into the

---

87 Hayden, op. cit., 713.
88 Ibid., 713-714.
89 See Census for 1939, op. cit., 240. See also Figure 1 of this paper.
90 See the annual reports of the Insular Collector of the Bureau of Customs covering the 1920's and the 1930's.
91 Ibid.
PHILIPPINES—JAPAN TRADE RELATIONS: 1900—1938

IMPORTS FROM JAPAN

EXPORTS TO JAPAN

Figure 7
Sino-Japanese war, Japan placed second to the United States in her total trade with the Philippines which was more than 52 million pesos. 42

The Philippine-Japan trade would add up to a more favorable balance for Japan, if we consider Japanese services to the Philippines, such as transporting part of the country’s imports and exports. As early as 1918, Japan became the third ranking (following the United States and Great Britain) in the number of vessels engaged in the foreign carrying trade of the Philippines. 43 She kept this position in 1925, even placing second to Great Britain during the last six months of 1933; 44 it is likely that she kept close to the first three positions in the carrying trade of the Philippines until Pearl Harbor. 45

II

The outbreak of the last Pacific war and the subsequent Japanese occupation of the Philippines, confirmed the pre-war Filipino fear of Japan’s intentions towards their country. An attempt will be made here to view the social organization of the Japanese minority in the Philippines—with Davao as a case study—as part of the larger social system, that is, the Japanese empire.

The empire of Japan which was dismembered at the end of the war, theoretically centered at the top in the emperor, who was considered co-extensive with the national polity (kokutai), and also the father of the nation—a family writ large. At the base of this social system’s vertical hierarchy, was the Japanese family which was also vertically and hierarchically organized and controlled from the top by the father of the nuclear family, upwards by the house head, village head and ultimately by the emperor whose decisions were, in fact, those of Japan’s national leaders working behind their divine emperor. The family system was the model for all other pre-war social groups in Japan, including economic groups which were also vertically and hierarchically organized from the small-scale family industries at the base, upwards in the family-owned-and-managed zaibatsu cartels—vast interlocking national and international business and commercial enterprises which could be manipulated from the top of the larger system. The decision-makers at the top held the power (behind the emperor) to allocate government subsidy to business and commercial concerns. Consequently, it was not the demands of the market but the national goals, set down by these decision-makers, which directed these economic groups’ investment, production and other economic activities. 46

Within the family system encompassed by the larger social system, conformity and hierarchy are the inevitable results; the individual is always

42 "P. I. Foreign Trade Remained Healthy in 1957," The Tribune, April 1, 1938, 10.
45 This speculation is made on the basis of Japan’s increasing total trade with the Philippines during the period, in the absence of available data at the time this paper was written.
46 This theoretical framework is discussed more closely in J.M. Saniel, "The Mobilization of Traditional Values in the Modernization of Japan," in Religion and Progress in
aware of the group’s judgment of his deeds. He is conditioned to recognize his “proper station” within the hierarchy, to accept directions from above, and to submerge his interests within those of his group. Group condemnation is the primary sanction for non-conforming behavior, a control mechanism which causes “shame” and “loss of face” to the individual.

It can generally be assumed that the first group of Japanese settlers, who came to the Philippines in the first decade of this century, were socialized within the aforementioned family system. They could have been educated under the educational system which was reformed in 1890 to facilitate control from the top and indoctrinate the students in the traditional values of filial piety and loyalty to parents and to the divine emperor. Moreover, these early Japanese migrants were participants in the larger social system, described earlier, which had been pushed by Japan’s decision-makers into a successful war with China in 1894-1895, and, ten years later, with Russia.

It can also be supposed that these first generation Japanese residents of the Philippines and the other first generation Japanese who arrived in the Islands in later years, tended to behave as they were conditioned within the Japanese family system, thus making it possible for the values of the social system — filial piety and loyalty — to be transmitted to the next generation. The strength of these values varied according to the presence or absence within the community where the Japanese settled, of reinforcing institutions (such as Japanese schools) and/or social groups or associations. It should also be stated here that the members of the pre-war Japanese minority in the Philippines could have consisted mainly of first and second generation Japanese, if we take thirty years as the span of a generation. Furthermore, they were close enough to the Japanese home islands and closer to the southernmost part of the Japanese empire—Taiwan—to feel secure and maintain contact with other members of their extended families back home as well as keep abreast with the developments in the larger social system.

With the preceding frame of reference and assumptions in view, an attempt will be made to look at the social organization of the Japanese minority in Davao. This does not imply that the conception of social organization of this minority applies to other Japanese minorities located elsewhere in the Philippines. It is quite possible that the social organization of these other groups varied. If such variations did exist, the data to support this notion have yet to be obtained.

Available data suggest that in spite of geographical separation from the home islands, the degree of integration of this Japanese minority in Davao with the larger social system was greater than its integration with the alien social groups surrounding it. With the latter, one can presuppose a minimum amount of interaction and accommodation sufficient for its survival in an alien setting. This also implies the non-occurrence of assimilation with Philippine society and culture—except, perhaps, of some Okinawans who married Bagobo (indigenous minority) wives— and the retention of its identity as a Jap-

Japanese social organization. Unremarkable as this hypothesis may seem, it is necessary to validate it with supporting positive evidence. Besides, compared, for instance, with the second generation descendants of diverse ethnic immigrant groups to countries like America—whose aspirations center largely on cultural identification with the majority—this continuing cohesiveness and voluntary segregation of the Japanese minority in Davao, seem to indicate the strength and the power of the Japanese social organization and its underlying major value orientations. Of course, had the state of affairs in Davao extended beyond a second generation, there is no way of determining what could have happened. The continued geographic separation and increasing interaction with Philippine society might have reduced this high degree of integration. Historically, however, this has become academic. The Japanese residents of Davao who survived the last war, were repatriated to Japan and their lands and other properties—confiscated during the war—were disposed to Filipinos after the war.

Records have it that a year after their arrival in Davao in 1903 to work in the Awad plantation, many of this first group of Japanese cultivators, led by Suda Ryosaku, departed. They were followed in 1904 by another group which was composed of part of the Japanese contract labor team constructing the Kennon road leading to Baguio. This group—together with those who joined Oda Ryosaburo (otherwise known in the Philippines as K.S. Ohta) to Davao in 1905, formed the nucleus of what was to develop into the Japanese minority in Davao.48 Having visited places in the Pacific and Asia as a result of his country’s promotion of overseas development, and with his entrepreneurial experience,40 it was no surprise to find Oda the leader of the Japanese in Davao. Always a “sympathetic listener” but also “a stern adviser,” Oda assumed the responsibility of looking after his countrymen’s welfare.50 Socialized within the Japanese family system, the loyalty of these Japanese was automatically due Oda, the accepted head of the group.

The group expended as Oda’s investments increased through the Ohta Development Company founded in 1907. A greater demand for Japanese labor was created and those who migrated to Davao either brought their families with them or waited after they were settled, before getting married. It is easy to imagine the expansion of the group who owed loyalty to Oda. Similar social relations were established between other Japanese entrepreneurs who invested in Davao, like Furukawa Yoshizo—founder of the Furukawa Plantation Company, and Akamine Saburo who managed the South Mindanao Company.51 These economic groups appear to represent the only group larger than the family and the group of three to five households within which the Jap-

49 He was the manager of a partnership with his brother—the Japanese General Import Company of Manila—which Oda liquidated before he departed for Davao.
51 For details about Furukawa and Akamine and their respective companies, see Cody, Ibid., 29-31, 33.
The loyalty of the members of such economic groups was inevitably drawn upwards to the center of the larger social system—the divine emperor—who had power to channel disciplined social action towards national ends which took precedence over other goals. This was obvious to a knowledgeable Filipino lawyer who wrote in 1935: “As a people, the Japanese are very nationalistic, and as such can never became Filipinos. Their traditions, religion, history and training make them so homogenous and compact. They are, and will remain, loyal to their Emperor...”

How homogenous and cohesive were the Japanese minority in Davao? Occupying the choicest lands along the Gulf of Davao—extending from Malita in the southwest coast of the Gulf, northwards through Padada, Santa Cruz, Davao city, Guianga, Panabo, Tagum and along the eastern coast of the Gulf, southwards to Pantukan, Lupon and Sigaboy—these Japanese seem to have avoided settling in the interior, except in Compostela to the north. The center of control of the Japanese residents in Davao, which was also the major area of Japanese concentration, appears to have been the Davao City-Guiana area, the first area where Oda’s company acquired its first portion of the public lands.52 It was also in this area where the largest concentration of lands cultivated by Japanese as well as a number of Japanese corporations were located.54 On this strip of land bounding Davao Gulf, the Japanese increased in number55 as their economic role in Davao grew.

Conditioned in the family to accept the values and norms of the group for the interest and success of the group, these industrious, frugal and skillful Japanese succeeded in the economic penetration and development of Davao. At that time, the other inhabitants of the area were people with different value orientations who were neither as well organized nor as solidly financed56 as the Japanese. The latter exploited Davao’s rich natural resources in various ways and were invariably aware of the necessity of, at least, appearing as law-abiding and civic-minded alien residents,57 if they were to attain the goals of their group. Thus, the Davao Japanese were often seen making frequent visits to lawyers and notaries, perhaps, to assure themselves that they were doing what was legally right.58

Though “intensely...Japanese” and self-sufficient, the Japanese in Davao were “...smooth, conciliatory and decent” in their relations with the local
population, even with the Bagobos who killed some of the Japanese pioneers. According to a Public Land Inspector, sometime in 1919-1920, despite the deaths of some Japanese, "some other Japanese takes up the dead man's work like a soldier filling in a gap in the rank... For this [i.e., the acquisition of more lands] they were willing to sacrifice a few lives as an unavoidable part of the price they must pay."  

To insure their success in Davao, the Japanese turned to their traditional social group of three to five households to protect themselves within Bagobo territory, and maintain "proper" relations with the non-Japanese inhabitants—especially with ranking local and national government officials whom they entertained and to whom they offered their services and facilities. (It is said that Mr. C. Murakami—the largest Japanese individual private land owner in Davao—often entertained national government officials visiting Davao.) Joining associations such as the local Rotary Club or the Chamber of Commerce, Davao resident Japanese freely contributed to civic and charitable drives of the non-Japanese community. Yet, the Filipinos in Davao generally felt that the Japanese, as a whole, kept to themselves.

By 1920, the Japanese community in Davao consisted of Japanese entrepreneurs, businessmen and consular officials, on the top with the Japanese laborers as well as agricultural cultivators at the base. Most of them were married to Japanese. The men either returned to Japan to get married or sent for their brides ("picture brides"). The women's marriages were traditionally arranged by their parents who—when they could afford it—sent their daughters back to Japan for an education and marriage. These Japanese families manifested a strong paternal authority.

Each family was usually self-sufficient, especially those living in farms who visited the town or city only to buy supplies from Japanese cooperative stores and to visit the Japanese Association's headquarters in Davao city. When the man of the house was a ranking businessman or consular official or non-agricultural worker, his wife generally stayed at home and did not enjoy the freedom to socialize with other members of the local community as did the Filipino women; if a farmer, his wife was often seen working with him in the fields. In Davao city, the affluent Japanese lived in well-appointed suburban houses while the employees and laborers, in cottages and tenements, respectively, or in apartments or rooms rented from local owners which were built and furnished in non-Japanese style. The Japanese houses in rural areas,

---

60 Ibid., 8-9.  
61 See "Japanese Bachelor Residents of Davao want 6,000 Picture Brides," the Manila Sunday Tribune, May 17, 1931, 1. This report was denied in the same news release by the Japanese Consul perhaps because of the apprehensions in the Philippines about the Japanese plans in Asia. However, until today, the practice of "picture brides" married to overseas Japanese continues. See "19 Brides," the Manila Daily Mirror, March 11, 1965, 2, covering the proxy marriages of nineteen Japanese brides to Japanese farm workers in Brazil.  
63 Loc. cit.
especially in Calinan and Daliao of the Guianga district, were low and unpainted, reminding the onlooker of similar structures in Japan. And as in Japan, guests at these houses removed their shoes before entering.

Both rural and urban Japanese, in any case, preferred Japanese food and drink and ate with chopsticks. The men usually wore Western-style clothes. However, the rural Japanese women wore their native attire while their urban sisters were seen more often in Western-style dresses. Within their homes, the Japanese spoke their language, although communication between the educated Japanese and inhabitants of Davao belonging to the same level, was in English; among the Japanese and non-Japanese residents of Davao, at the base, conversation was carried out in a mixture of Spanish and two of the Filipino languages—Visayan and Tagalog—referred to as “Abaca Spanish.”

Japanese children could go to two Japanese primary schools from 1924. And even when a high school department was added to one of them, the pattern was for these children—especially the boys—to be educated in Japan after their elementary training. So far, it has been hard to check who underwrote the expenses of those whose parents lacked funds. The establishment of nine more Japanese schools in various places in Davao between 1933 and 1937, could have resulted from the increasing Japanese population in the province and/or related to the need of reinforcing the transmission to the next generation—through indoctrination in school—of the values of filial piety and loyalty to the emperor, the center of the larger social system. These values, we recall, were first internalized within the Japanese family system and were crucially important in channeling cohesive social action as a response to directives—whether overt or covert—from the top. During the decade of the thirties, the larger social entity was faced with the repercussions of Japan’s aggressive moves in Asia. Therefore, except English teachers, all administrators and instructors in Davao’s Japanese schools totalling twelve in 1939, were recruited from Japan and were comparatively well paid. Guided by the teaching methods used in Japan, the Japanese children—initially disciplined within the family in unquestioningly obeying its head—were further conditioned to behave in this manner within a larger social institution: the school. The sight of disciplined Japanese students in the classroom made an observer compare it to what one sees in a military academy. It is reasonable to conjecture that the Davao Japanese school’s curriculum was similar to the homeland’s, if any of the students eventually continued, as they did, their education in Japan, and if these schools were supervised by agents of Japan’s Ministry of Education.

The retention by a number of Davao Japanese residents of their Shinto and/or Buddhist beliefs and practices, manifested by the establishment of Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples in Davao—especially in the Davao City—

---

THE JAPANESE MINORITY IN THE PHILIPPINES

Guia ninja area 67—intensified the integration and the cohesiveness of this minority as it simultaneously reinforced the barrier that served to segregate this minority from the non-Japanese residents. Segregation of the Japanese minority was further strengthened by the Japanese practice of policing themselves and settling outside of court civil and even criminal cases when anyone of them was the aggrieved party, 68 by their maintaining two hospitals employing Filipino doctors and Japanese nurses; publishing their own daily newspaper and other periodicals; building statues honoring prominent Davao Japanese leaders like Oda and Mikami, not to mention the establishment of their own radio station, market, moviehouse and other amusement places. 69

These obvious manifestations of Japanese society and culture in Davao, must have caused Manila reporters and writers of articles covering the Davao Japanese in the thirties, to describe the Japanese villages in Davao as “Japan­ized villages.” 70 The non-Japanese inhabitants of Davao were heard referring to Davao City as “Little Tokyo” and to the nearby town of Mintal in Guianga with its Japanese-owned industries, as “Little Nagasaki.” 71 W. J. Anderson, in his book entitled The Philippine Problem, 72 pictured Davao as part of Philippine territory which the Japanese “are running practically as an independent state . . . .”

What these reporters and writers seem to have missed perceiving was the operation of the strongly integrated social organization of the Davao Japanese, which could have been manipulated by Japan’s national leaders—operating behind the emperor—at the top of the larger social system encompassing it. Manipulation could have been done in two ways: through the Japanese business or commercial corporations in Davao and through the Davao Japanese Association, in conjunction with the Japanese Consulate of the province.

It is needless to point out here that the Japanese business and commercial enterprises in Davao depended largely upon the zaibatsu cartels and financial institutions in the homeland for aid and direction in conducting their economic activities. But these zaibatsu—interlocking business and commercial houses as well as financial institutions—in turn, depended upon government subsidy. In turn, the allocation of government subsidy was decided by Japan’s policy-making group functioning behind the emperor. Therefore, it is conceivable as well as possible (probable?) that these decision-makers (at the center of the larger social system) manipulated the economic group within it towards the attainment of national goals. In the thirties, these goals were obviously oriented towards Japan’s leadership in Asia.

67 See the map of the pre-war center of Japanese Settlement in Davao (the Davao City—Guianga Area) indicating the buildings within the area, which is attached to the text of Kamabara, op. cit.
68 See Cody, “The Japanese Way . . . .” op. cit., et passim. See also O. L. Walkup, op. cit., et passim. One respondent cited a case of theft of a bicycle committed by a Japanese against another Japanese which was settled out of court; the thief was ostracized by the Japanese residents of Calinan where the theft was committed.
69 Kamabara, op. cit., 164.
70 See, for instance, the Manila Sunday Tribune, October 23, 1932. See also T.V. Nano, “To Save or not to Save Davao,” Commonwealth Advocate, I, No. 10 (October-November, 1935), 43.
When, for instance, Japan's decision-makers decided to undertake the expansion of the Japanese navy during the third decade of the century, the project could have necessitated a larger supply of rope made of abaca fiber or hemp which, at the time, was practically supplied by Davao. The delivery of the required quota to the navy could have been directed from the top to the head of the house of one or more of the zaibatsu family cartels which dealt with hemp production and trade in Davao. Take, for instance, the Itoh cartel of the wealthy Itoh family of Osaka. The Itoh house could have been made to deliver to the navy a certain quota of hemp at particular periods of time. The head of the Itoh house could have then communicated the required quota to Furukawa Yoshizo—the founder of the Furukawa Plantation Company in Davao—who was married to one of the Itoh daughters. On the basis of scattered pieces of information from respondents and insights derived from other sources, an attempt can be made to reconstruct what could have taken place in Davao regarding the delivery of the quota of hemp required by the head of the larger social entity. Furukawa—either directly or indirectly, through his representative—could have done one or all of three things: (1) contact non-Japanese plantation owners and arrange for the purchase of their produce; (2) farm shares of the quota to managers of Furukawa-controlled plantation who, in turn, could have divided their respective quotas among foremen of the plantation in charge of making the laborers work to deliver their quota; (3) contact Furukawa-aided sub-agents running stores or trading stations, to purchase part of the quota from individual Japanese families producing abaca on land which they owned, or leased or subleased from Filipino owners or lessors (in this last instance, the family head looked after the delivery of the amount needed).

Barring unforeseen natural disasters, it is safe to hazard a guess that the deliveries required by the decision-makers at the top of the larger social system could have been made, if we view the aforementioned social process as being undertaken within the vertical, hierarchical social organization of the Japanese family and the economic group concerned, as well as the value orientation of the social organization which gave priority to the attainment of the larger social system's goals. Within this context, it can perhaps be said that this system of manipulation for national ends (from the top of the larger social system) of a business corporation concerned with the production of, and trade in, Davao abaca, could have been repeated vis a vis the other corporations dealing in other agricultural production and trade like coconut and coconut products as well as in other economic activities such as lumbering, manufacturing, retailing and fishing in which the Davao Japanese corporations were heavily invested.

Another means of channeling cohesive social action to the top of the larger social system, could have been through the Davao Japanese Association. By the eve of Pearl Harbor, the Davao Japanese Association had expanded from a small organization established in 1916 (four years before the establishment of a Japanese Consulate in Davao) for the promotion of mutual friendship and profit among its members, into a large one claiming all the Japanese residents of Davao as members. Quartered close to the Japanese Consulate in
Davao city, and exercising functions which could have been those of the Consulate, it can be surmised that the Association worked closely with the Consulate.

The Davao Japanese Association took charge of the census of Japanese arrivals and departures in the province as well as a record of births, marriages and deaths—always ready to aid Japanese who lacked funds to start their economic endeavors in Davao or to tide them through an emergency. The Association retained lawyers who appeared in court with their Japanese clients who were also furnished with interpreters by the Japanese Association. Through a committee composed of ranking members of the Association, it usually took charge of investigating cases which did not involve non-Japanese or if they did, when a Japanese was the aggrieved party. Generally, such cases were settled out of court.

The Association also exercised police functions to protect the rights and reputation of the Japanese in Davao and to keep them from any legal tangles with any non-Japanese. With contributions from its members, the Association—by 1939—had established twelve Japanese primary schools which it administered and supervised, in addition to a training school to orient new Japanese arrivals in the “proper” way of living life and carrying on “proper” relations with the non-Japanese residents in Davao. The rudiments and procedures of conducting business profitably in Davao were also taught in this training school which published in a booklet the basic rules and regulations each Japanese was to observe.

Besides extending long-term loans to farmers who were starting life in Davao, the Association took charge of depositing its members’ savings in Tokyo banks. It also furnished the capital for, and managed the Japanese cooperatives in Davao which were aided by the Kumiai or neighborhood associations, in the sale of goods directly to Japanese families. The Japanese in Davao were made to buy their supplies only from these cooperatives which specialized in selling Japanese goods. Finally, whenever the Japanese in Davao protested some act of the Philippine government—as they protested the application of the 1919 land law to certain categories of land they had cultivated—the Japanese Association brought such matters before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, though after the Consulate was established in Davao in 1920, it was the Consul with which the Association dealt to take action with Tokyo.

Led by ranking members of Davao’s Japanese community who were, in some instances, also heads of business or commercial concerns in Davao, and exercising socio-political-economic functions dealing with its members’ problems, the Davao Japanese Association was indeed an effective and powerful organization capable of channeling the cohesive action of the Davao Japanese minority upwards to the head of the larger social entity in the attainment of national goals. Being powerful in maintaining the cohesiveness of the Davao Japanese minority, and assuming that the Japanese in Davao always looked upwards for decision and direction, it is likely that the Association had a hand in the reported gatherings of thousands of Japanese residents in certain vicinities of Davao City in 1938 about which neither the Philippine
army nor constabulary intelligence could report because of language handicap. Secret meetings, according to a knowledgeable respondent, were at first held at the Japanese Association’s office until they were discovered by the government agents; soon after, these meetings were held at the Ohta Development Company compound in Talomo, Davao City.

Surely, no news release could have come closer to the truth on the cohesive social organization of the Japanese minority in Davao than that made in 1938 which partly reads:

...There are 16,000 Japanese residents in Davao province. The bulk of this foreign population is concentrated in the plantation districts surrounding the city of Davao.

It is a common belief in well-informed circles in his province that the Japanese plantations are so linked with each other as to facilitate not only close common communication but quick concentration of Japanese subjects upon a moment’s notice. It is said that the plantations are so arranged as to give each and every one of these their most strategic value in the event of an emergency.

This integrated social organization of the Davao Japanese minority could easily have been pushed towards a war footing (an emergency such as war, could have resulted in more intensive integration) by the policy-makers of Japan, working at the top of the larger social system, behind the person of the emperor.

To sum up, this paper has attempted to show, among other things, that bare statistics concerning immigration as well as emigration and commercial as well as other economic activities must be interpreted more subtly if they are to be meaningful. It is not enough to know that the Japanese numerically constituted an insignificant minority compared to the total Filipino population. The more significant question to raise, as in the case of Davao, is: under the circumstances, what effect, if any, did this relatively small group have on themselves and on the environing milieu—social as well as physical? The question can even be legitimately extended to include the effect on the large social system centered in the homeland. For purposes of this study, however, this survey and tentative interpretation of the social institutions—such as familial, economic, religious, educational institutions—and social groups or associations, which the Davao Japanese established for their operation and survival as a group, seem to support the hypothesis of greater integration with their indigenous culture and society. Every human activity connected with these institutions and the value system undergirding them showed a greater affinity, if not identity, with the Japanese social system. That this integration was incomplete is readily conceded—it is only for theoretical purposes that complete integration is ever postulated. A more significant and interesting issue is: was the social organization of the other Japanese groups in the Philippines similar to that of the Davao group?

---

73 “Meeting held by Japanese in Davao Intrigue,” Manila Daily Bulletin, May 17, 1938, Quezon Col. See also “Japanese have P.I. Army on the Spot in Davao,” Ibid., May 19, 1938, Quezon Col.

74 “Meetings held by Japanese...,” op. cit.