MALAYSIA: HER NATIONAL UNITY AND THE PAN-INDONESIAN MOVEMENT

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THERE ARE, OF COURSE, MANY DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF THE problem of national unity in Malaysia. Every country, especially in "develop­
ning areas," has its own particular difficulties in becoming and remaining a nation. In Malaysia, there are perhaps more disuniting factors than in any other Asian country. Because the Federation of Malaysia is a highly artificial country, divided by its heterogeneous components, criticism is not so much directed at the form of government but at the actual existence of the state.

There is no need to restate the immense problems of Malaysia's plural society which threaten to divide the country and retard (if not prevent) Malaysia from becoming a unified nation. A great deal of work has already been done on these problems. Every scholar, engaged on socio-political research in Malaysia, is confronted with an explosive situation and cannot disregard it. Over and above the racial composition of the country—the prime source of national disunity—there are other mainsprings of diversity and heterogeneity—cultural, economic, historical and ideological.

There is one precondition which is vital to the achievement of Malaysia's national unity: the joining together of the Malays themselves to form a solid bloc of action and ideology; without it, there will be no national feeling in Malaysia. This is an aspect that has been overlooked or dismissed by most British scholars.

The Malays are generally known to be peaceful, easy-going people who were (and still are) very much attached to Britain. This is true of the majority of the Malays. On the other hand, there is a minority to whom this description does not apply: to the anti-British pan-Indonesian movement. The movement came into being between the two world wars. Two phenomena caused its emergence. On the one hand, an ideological (racial and historical) element; on the other, the contributing factors of Islamic modernism, Indonesian nationalism, and Malaya's nascent plural society.

The history of the pan-Indonesian movement in Malaya can be divided into four stages:

1. The transformation of a latent and potential idea into organized action based on party structure.
2. The period of Malaya's occupation by the Japanese and the role played by the pan-Indonesian movement during that time.
3. The attempts of the movement, over a period of less than three years, to build a progressive Malay state in close relation to Indonesia. It also sees the beginning of the movements, rapid decline because of the Emergency Regulations.
4. The fourth and last stage is marked by a revival of the movement in the Malaysian territories as a reaction to the creation of Malaysia.
Within the scope of this paper, it is impossible to analyze in detail each of the four stages. It will, therefore, concentrate on some aspects of the emergence and the development of the movement, in order to show that the pan-Indonesian concept is deeply rooted in the history of Malaya.

In June 1937, the first genuine nationalist party of Malaya was started in Kuala Lumpur, then the capital of the Federated Malay States. It was named “Kesatuan Melayu Muda” (KMM) or the “Union of Progressive Malays”; it had an original membership of about 150. The initiative in founding the party came from Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob, still one of the most zealous advocates of the pan-Indonesian concept. The co-founders and members of the party were (almost without exception) teachers, journalists, and writers who had not received any English education. Many of them were second or first generation immigrants from Indonesia.

The KMM served (so to speak) as a basis for the frustrated Malay intelligentsia who opposed the status quo in their country. As a newly emerging cultural middle-class of Malay descent, they were not only in opposition to British colonialism but also to the traditional Malay aristocracy, which identified itself with the status quo. Thirdly, they were hostile to the Malayan Chinese who, supported by the Kuomintang, had tried “to convert Malaya into the nineteenth province of China.”

Owing to the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Malays were peasants and fishermen, and held aloof in their conservatism from the socio-political dynamics of change and the nationalist movements around them, the KMM found itself in political isolation: a group of intellectuals who could find no fertile soil for their aims in their country.

The program of the KMM demanded a socialist and republican Malaya that would attain independence within a free Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesia). Because of the political situation in Malaya at that time, there was no channel for the realization of these political ends, except through the Indonesian nationalism propagated by the Sukarno-led Partai Nasional Indonesia. No wonder, therefore, that many of the later KMM leaders had been overseas members of the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) as early as 1927. The whole program of the KMM was based on the conviction that, for racial, cultural, and historical reasons, the archipelago belonged together and should, therefore, become one political unit.

In the course of the archipelago’s history, migrations occurred again and again, for the most part, because of population pressure, economic needs or political oppression. The Malay peninsula experienced two great waves of migration of Indonesian people: those of the Minangkabau from Sumatra’s west coast, and of the Bugis from South-Celebes. In the 11th century, the Minangkabau arrived and settled in what they called Negri Sembilan (Nine States). The loose confederation of Negri Sembilan was ruled by a prince from the royal family of West Sumatra until the 18th century. Only at the beginning of the 19th century did they found their own royal dynasty.

At the end of the 17th century, a second wave of migrants consisting of the Bugis, settled in the region of what is now Selangor. They played quite

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1 I. K. Agastja (Ibrahim Yaacob’s pseudonym), Sedjarah dan Perduangan di-Malaya (Jogjakarta 1951), 72.
an important role in the history of the west coast of Malaya. In the early 18th century, they became very influential in the Sultanate of Johore; at about 1740, they set up the Sultanate of Selangor under a separate dynasty.

There were migrations to Malaya again and again, partly on an individual, partly on a collective level. Many of the migrants returned to their original homes; others—though settling permanently in Malaya—avoided absorption by the Malays by retaining their own traditions. Most of them, however, were accepted by the Malays as integral members of their own community and have since been completely assimilated. Since the west coast of Malaya was the region favored by immigrants, it is there, today, where Malay communities are largely intermingled with people from the whole archipelago.

It is clear that a census of Indonesian immigrants is difficult. Nevertheless, the colonial administration in 1931 and 1947 produced statistics about the percentage of immigrant Indonesians; these give some information about the situation at the time of the emergence of the pan-Indonesian movement. Statistical data indicate that in 1931, in the four western states—Perak, Selangor, Johore and Singapore—recent Indonesian immigrants who were not yet assimilated, numbered almost 40% of the Malays. Most of the immigrants consisted of Javanese, Boyanese, Bugis, Banjarese, Minangkabau, Batak and other people from Sumatra.

The Malays did not oppose this influx from the archipelago because it was a counterweight to the very high numbers of Chinese and Indian immigrants. The Indonesia immigrants were considered as subjects of the ruler, in the same position as the Malays; they were defined as "a person belonging to the Malay race or any Malaysian race, who habitually speaks the Malay language or any Malaysian language and professes the Muslim Religion." These migrations, together with the fact that Indonesian immigrants received legal status in Malaya, strengthened the feeling that the whole race belonged together and that they must unite against political and economic oppression by other races.

Another significant factor in the emergence of the pan-Indonesian movement was the historical consciousness of the Malays. The historical pattern of pre-colonial kingdoms was considered as a model for the political demand for the unification of all the territories of the archipelago ruled by different colonial powers. Although the kingdom of Malacca included only parts of Sumatra and Malaya in the 15th century, the borders of influence of the kingdom of Shrivijaya in the 9th and that of Majapahit in the 14th century, are supposed to have been nearly identical with the present territories of Indonesia and Malaysia.

The question of the borders of influence of these Indonesian kingdoms has often been discussed, mainly by Dutch scholars, but no unanimous conclusion has been reached. The attempt of Coedes to sketch a coherent picture of Shrivijaya, based on Chinese travel books and a few fragments of archaeological discoveries, suffers from the difficulty of a correct identification of geographical terms. It thus remains hypothetical. Shrivijaya evades the historian almost completely, and disappears in the dark of early history. But there are two works of Indonesian historiography that give some information about

\[2\) Definition to be found in several state constitutions of Malaya.
Majapahit’s range of power. These are *Negarakertagama*, composed in 1365 by Prapanca (a poet at the court of Majapahit) and *Pararaton*, of unknown origin but probably from the 16th century. Both books glorify the power and greatness of Majapahit, of which all the territories of the archipelago were said to have been direct or indirect dependencies. Because of the existence of these historiographical accounts, their view was also the prevailing opinion among the scholars until the research of the Dutch historian C. C. Berg who doubted the trustworthiness of the alleged facts given in *Negarakertagama* and *Pararaton*. Berg imputes to them a more or less mythical-sacral meaning and thinks that historical facts were arbitrarily manipulated for this purpose. Other sources, however, confirm a great deal of the data of *Negarakertagama* and *Pararaton*. There is no generally accepted opinion, therefore, about the problem. As Bernard Vlekke says: “... mythological concepts and historical facts are inextricably interwoven in these Javanese ‘history books’.”

It is hardly of such concern here, whether or not Malaya had been part of Majapahit or Shrivijaya. What is important, however, is the question of the nationalist interpretation of the existence of the kingdoms; i.e., what were the political conclusions the pan-Indonesian movement drew from its knowledge and interpretation of the history of these autochthonous and powerful kingdoms?

To begin with, it has to be stated that (irrespective of Dutch research) King Kertenagara of Singhasari (1268-1292) and Gajah Mada (1331-1364)—patib or prime minister of Majapahit—are still remembered by the Indonesians as statesmen who consciously created an Indonesian empire, with Java as its center. When in 1894 the *Negarakertagama* was discovered, it gave strong support to the oral tradition of the Indonesians concerning the glory and greatness of Majapahit. In 1945, in the course of a debate discussing the future boundaries of an independent Indonesia, Muhammad Yamin, Sukarno and others, pleaded for frontiers based on the *Negarakertagama*, “... which clearly shows that Indonesia comprises Sumatra, Java and Madura, the smaller Sundas, Borneo, Celebes, the Molukkas and Ambon, the peninsula of Malaya, Timor and West Irian, and that there is no change in our opinion of today. This is the fatherland of Indonesia... in these 600 years there has been no change in our feeling and thinking.” This supposed historical unity is highly glorified by the pan-Indonesian movement, exemplified by the following words: “I dedicate this book to all Malaysian people in order to nourish again the seed of unity until the holy heritage of Shrivijaya and Majapahit can return into the womb of our people and country...” Moreover, from this belief in the historical unity of pre-colonial times, the pan-Indonesian movement in Malaya derived the claim to legitimacy for its party and program.

The progressive pan-Indonesian movement was given a party structure only in 1937, after a preparatory period of self-expression in journalism and literature for about ten years. But this decade of preparation showed clearly
that pro-Indonesian anti-colonialism was confined merely to the emerging middle-class of a Malay intelligentsia and that it had no appeal to the Malay peasantry. This was due to the fact that the structure of Malay society remained intact—a fact still more evident as one went further east in the peninsula. In spite of the introduction of a money economy and western jurisdiction, in spite of the structural breakdown of the formerly self-sufficient and almost isolated village communities, the socio-economic balance of Malay society remained almost untouched.

The preservation of the society's equilibrium was due to the exclusive employment of Indian and Chinese labor for the economic opening-up of the country, and to the fact that no claim was made to the soil which was already being cultivated by the Malays. The contrary was true of Java where the Dutch—in the course of the liberal period of their colonial policy, under their so-called culture system—laid the entire burden of economic development on the shoulders of the peasantry. It meant imposed changes in the socio-economic structure of Javanese society, and it finally shattered its traditional pattern. On the other hand, it also led to xenophobic rebellions, which soon merged into a broad nationalist movement—the Sarikat Islam. Moreover, an increasingly eschatological atmosphere at the turn of the century encouraged revolutionary tendencies in Java, and helped to increase communist activity in the second decade.

In Malaya, however, there was neither a dissatisfied peasantry under population pressure nor a Malay middle-class. Pre-nationalist movements of an escapist or social-revolutionary kind, which might have created revolutionary atmosphere, did not therefore occur. The dynamic element, when it appeared in Malaya, was mainly in the economic and political sector; it affected only the British and the Chinese, i.e., the Malays were unaffected. It was the Islamic reform movement and the question of the relationship between religion and a modern order of society which became the center of discussion. For more than two decades, it made the headlines in the Malay press. It shows how much Malay society was stirred up over the problem of interpreting Islam, even if the outcome was a victory for extreme traditionalism.

The modernists never succeeded in finding a political outlet for their movement, and while they laid stress on the desirability of religious unity, it was the nationalists and anti-colonialists who emphasized the pan-Indonesian movement as the basis for the political unit of the archipelago. Islamic modernism in Malaya paved the way for the emergence of the pan-Indonesian movement primarily by breaking century-old taboos.

Thus, towards the end of the third decade of this century, the first phase of an attempt to emancipate the Malays by means of religion, came to an end. This phase was determined by Islamic modernism. At the turn of the third to the fourth decade, the growing consciousness of the Malay’s isolated situation, together with a gloomy prospect in view, began to assume a clear political shape in a radical, secular pan-Indonesian movement in which Islamic modernism had no part. It was largely the result of the strong influence of Indonesian nationalism.

Accordingly, the KMM, and Ibrahim Yaacob himself, defined the party again and again as leading and representing the “proletariat.” But this was
only a theoretical claim until after the war, when the movement tried to win over parts of the peasantry in order to secure a larger following. Indeed, the members of the KMM were mainly from the ra’ayat, and they retained their ties with their forbears.

Two main factors promoted the emergence of a Malay cultural middle-class: firstly, the above-mentioned Islamic reform movement, initiated mainly by the Malayan Arabs; and, secondly, the activities of a first generation of immigrants from Indonesia. In addition, some of the students and graduates of the Agricultural College at Serdang, the Technical College and the Trade School in Kuala Lumpur, joined the emerging intelligentsia of schoolteachers, writers and journalists. According to Ibrahim Yaacob, it was only after much pressure from the students of these schools that a nationalist party was founded. Thus the Kesatuan Melayu Muda came into being.

The main founders of the party were Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob, Ishak bin Haji Muhammad, Hassan bin Haji Manan, Abdul Karim Rashid, Muhammad Isa bin Mahmud, Onan Siradj and Mustapha bin Haji Hussein. Ibrahim Yaacob, together with Muhammad Isa bin Mahmud, Hasaan bin Haji Manan and Abdul Karim Rashid, had already founded, in 1929, a socialist and pro-Indonesian secret society in the Sultan Idris Teacher’s Training College of Tanjong Malim. Ishak bin Haji Muhammad joined the party through his literary and journalistic activity. Onan Siradj and Mustapha bin Haji Hussein were chairmen of the pro-Indonesian student unions of the Technical College in Kuala Lumpur and the Agricultural College in Serdang, respectively.

Ibrahim Yaacob and Ishak bin Haji Muhammad, the party’s two most influential leaders, were of families who had lived in Malaya for generations; on the other hand, they were always conscious that their ancestors came from other parts of the archipelago. The other co-founders and important leaders of the KMM are said to have been second generation immigrants from Indonesia. To what extent the party’s following consisted of first generation immigrants from Indonesia cannot be ascertained. But, in view of the fact that up to 40% of the Malay population in some of the west coast states had recently immigrated from Indonesia, it is probable that a good deal of the growing following of the KMM were “Indonesians.” There was a continuous movement of Indonesian people between Malaya and Indonesia in the thirties.8 Immigrants and workers from the overpopulated parts of the Dutch East Indies were welcomed by the Malays in order to weigh the racial balance in favor of the Malays as against the Chinese and Indians.

It was only after the second World War, and with the growing ideological split between Malaya and Indonesia, that the KMM’s partial Indonesian following became suspect. The definition of a Malay as a subject of the ruler (“a person belonging to the Malay race or any Malaysian race who habitually speaks the Malay language or any Malaysian language and professes the Muslim Religion”) shows clearly the underlying sentiment of belonging racially together despite regional differences. According to Silcock and Ungku Aziz, “The Malays owed allegiance territorially to their own Sultans. Culturally their allegiance was to Islam, and more specifically to the maritime branch

more than 100,000.

8 Between 1935 and 1939, the yearly migration of Indonesian laborers totaled
of it speaking Malaysian languages and having a common tradition of culture, trade, and inter-marriage among the royal families, extending along the coasts of Malaya, Sumatra, Borneo and parts of Java and other islands. Malaya itself was a political accident of British rule....

The real fear of the pan-Indonesian movement was that out of the "political accident" a lasting division of the archipelago would develop. With this fear, the vision of an isolated and hopelessly backward Malay population arose, deprived of power by the Chinese on their own soil. As early as 1930, the Majallah Guru (Teacher's Magazine) cited the pessimistic prediction of Arnold Toynbee, who maintained that "the race for wealth and power remains between the British and the Chinese. The prize will fall to those who can stand the climate and other geographical conditions of the country. But I have not the slightest doubt of the conclusion of this peaceful race: the Chinese will win." And he carries on: "A truly significant mark that the British Empire can leave in Malaya when she withdraws is the transformation of this country into the nineteenth province of China." 8

The gloomy vision that the Chinese would "convert their (the Malay) race into an aboriginal stock and their culture into a museum piece" 9 led the KMM to cooperate to some extent with the pro-British Malays, for both movements shared the fear of Chinese predominance. Ibrahim Yaacob, for example, helped to found the pro-British associations of Selangor and Pahang in 1937 and 1938, and Ishak bin Haji Muhammad in 1938-1939 held the office of General Secretary of the Kesatuan Melayu Singapura (The Singapore Malay Union). They both wrote articles for the government-supported Utusan Melayu (Malay Messenger). However, the predominance in these associations of the "nonchalant attitude of the western educated Malay group who seemed to us so contented with basking in the feudal moon and in the colonial sun," 10 led to the KMM’s retreat from the pro-British movement and to a more hostile attitude towards the aristocracy and the British. The failure of the attempt to enter into an agreement with the Malay associations (under the control of the aristocracy) in order to combat the increase of Chinese influence, had serious consequences for the future history of Malaya. Henceforth, Malay society was split politically into a conservative movement which was dominated by the aristocracy and attached to the British, and into the pan-Indonesian, anti-colonialistic and republican opposition movement which could only envisage the survival of the Malays in some form of close relationship with Indonesian nationalism. (The groups in between—for example, the people around Onn bin Jaafar—had no real influence.) Both political formations had almost no connection with the peasantry which remained apolitical and loyal to their respective Sultans.

Although the KMM never worked out or published a detailed party program, its outline emerged in various literary and journalistic publications.

8 Majallah Guru (March 1930), 47-48.
10 Ishak bin Haji Muhammad, "Autobiography" (unfinished and unpublished manuscript, 1959), 11-12.
In defending itself against the reproach that it had a "mixed-up ideology," the KMM took a clear political stand, although without ever setting it out in a manifesto. The most important points were as follows:

1. A clearly anti-Chinese attitude.
2. Anti-colonialism in general, specifically an anti-British attitude.
3. Republicanism.
4. Socialism.
5. Struggle for Malaya's political independence within a free Greater Indonesia.
6. Non-cooperation with the colonial government.

There was a second opportunity to heal the political split between the Malays. On April 1, 1946, the Malayan Union was established. This new form of government, characterized by a liberal policy of citizenship and the loss of sovereignty by the Malay Sultans, aroused unusually strong protests among the Malay conservatives. In March 1946, forty-one of the political associations already in existence, merged to form the "United Malays National Organization" (UMNO) in order to demonstrate a Malay-wide opposition against the new form of government, which was thought to deprive the Malays of most of their former privileges. The "Malay Nationalist Party" (MNP), successor of the KMM, was also represented at a historic congress in Kuala Lumpur. For the MNP, it meant participation in the great coalition of Malay nationalism although denying also in a sense their own avowed aims. The reasons for the MNP's decision were:

1. The republican and pro-Indonesia nature of the MNP, together with the suspicion that it was directed by the Malayan Communists, made the party somewhat unpopular. In view of the great success of the UMNO, the MNP was in danger of falling into isolation.
2. It was the intention of the MNP to make use of the favorable circumstance of this unique protest of all Malays against Great Britain, thereby hoping to be able to press the UMNO into a permanent anti-British policy by virtue of the influence the MNP could exercise within the UMNO.
3. Finally, it was another attempt to overcome the dangerous disunion of the Malays in order to find a common formula for the moulding of future policy. That the MNP was prepared to compromise in this can be seen from their later rejection of the idea of a republican Malayan state so as to preserve the Sultans as constitutional monarchs.

The impossibility of cooperation between MNP and UMNO soon became apparent. In June 1946, it was already clear that the British would submit to UMNO demands in order to avoid the possibility that the party might move to the left. Its demands were for little more than the reinstallation of the Sultans as sovereigns of their respective states and for a drastic reduction of the rights of non-Malays to citizenship. It was clear that the UMNO had struggled for nothing more than the restoration of the status quo ante, thus pursuing a reactionary racial policy.

On June 29, 1946, the inevitable happened. The MNP's leader, Dr. Burhanuddin, and his delegation walked out of the congress in Ipoh when it was unable to reach agreement on what the UMNO's symbol should be. The MNP insisted on acceptance of the Indonesian national colors; the majority of the assembled delegations pleaded for a flag which would symbolize the power of the Sultans. Disagreement over the design of the flag was, of course, only
the superficial reason for the split. The real reason lay in the insurmountable differences which divided the two parties of Malay nationalism. The split that was effected on that day meant certainly a temporary split, if not a final end of a common policy among the Malays of the peninsula. For the MNP, as for most national movements in Asia, leftism was a *sine qua non* for the achievement of national consciousness.

There were always two ideologies to which the pan-Indonesian movement owed loyalty: the concept of pan-Indonesia and anti-colonialism the latter tending towards a belief in socialism as a nation-building force. Thus, after its split with the UMNO, the MNP joined with several non-Malay political parties in an inter-racial coalition for the achievement of an independent Malaya. The amalgamation with Indonesia as a historical necessity remained the most important objective of the party’s program. But its realization had to be postponed because it was not feasible at the time. The party’s activity was now directed primarily towards independence for Malaya as a separate unit. Dr. Burhanuddin clearly stated what the party had in mind: “We have a three part program: first, to demand self-government for Malaya, then form a Malay independent government, and at that time we will decide the third stage—the amalgamation with the Indonesian Republic. Time will tell how long it will take. Everything depends upon the surrounding political situation. If it is not favor, it will take years . . . .”¹¹ Partly out of conviction, partly because of tactical demands, therefore, the MNP joined the non-Malay left wing parties in order to create a counterweight to the conservative forces of the country. This inter-racial alliance produced a draft constitution of a high standard, which, had it been introduced, could have paved the way for a democratic and self-governing Malayan nation.

It is a tragedy of Malayan post-war history that the policy of the moderate parties represented in this inter-racial coalition—especially the MDU, the MIC and the MNP, with their idealistic attempt to work for a democratic order which would overcome racial tensions—was never allowed to become effective. It was wrecked by the two extreme parties: the right-radical Malay UMNO, and the left-radical Chinese MCP (Malayan Communist Party). The moment when a nation-building binding force might have been created, passed disregarded. There had never been an opportunity like this before.

In 1948, all the parties of a left wing outlook were outlawed under the emergency regulations. The MNP delegated the organization of the party to Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob, who, after the war, had settled in Indonesia and had become an Indonesian citizen. He was given “the full right to carry on the Malay’s national movement outside the country, that is, in Indonesia.”¹² On June 27, 1950, he founded the successor-party of the MNP, the *Kesatuan Malaya Merdeka* (Association For A Free Malaya). In his words, the party’s objective was “to keep the flame of anti-colonialism and the ideal of a Greater Indonesia alive.”¹³ Ibrahim pursued this mission in two ways. First, by organizing a pan-Indonesian underground movement in Malaya, Singapore, Sa-

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¹¹“The MNP—by Them, unpublished series of articles concerning the MNP, n.d., to be found in the archives of the *Straits Times*, Kuala Lumpur, 4.
¹³Interview with Ibrahim Yaacob in November, 1962.
rawak and Brunei; secondly, by perpetual appeals to Indonesian public opinion, and especially to the Sukarno-led Government, not to lose sight of the pan-Indonesian concept.

Today, in 1965, the realization of the pan-Indonesian concept depends on an enormous number of inter-dependent factors, which cannot be even approximately analyzed here. However, some of the problems of importance in this connection can be mentioned. The decisive question is: to what extent will Malaysia succeed in keeping the existing balance of power between Chinese and Malays and in reducing internal tensions and racial differences in this plural society so that it will become a nation? This again will depend on how far all the ethnic groups are prepared to be loyal to the new state. In this respect, it is questionable whether the present ruling alliance as an advocate of a free market economy, dependent on and patronized by the British Government, will be able to attract this loyalty. Will it be possible for a Malaysian free market economy to survive, surrounded by the communist and socialist systems of neighboring countries?

The problem is closely connected also with the long-term foreign policy of Malaysia. The present dependence on Great Britain in defense matters cannot last forever. But while disengagement by Great Britain in this region might perhaps lessen Malaysia's present isolation within Southeast Asia, it would also leave a power vacuum which could easily become the object of Chinese or Indonesian expansion. Yet, so long as Great Britain is militarily engaged in Malaysia, the loyalty of the anti-colonialist, pan-Indonesian movement goes to Indonesia and seeks to undermine Malaysia by legal and illegal means.

Moreover, as long as Sukarno is able to hold together his heterogeneous state, supported by the Indonesian communists and the armed forces, Javanese centralism will remain a constant threat to the security of Malaysia. Yet there is reason to believe that the centripetal forces in the pan-Indonesian concept (which run together in Java) are strongly concentrated in the person of Sukarno. A possible change in the leadership of the Indonesian Government would have unpredictable consequences for the whole archipelago, but they are likely to assist autonomous aspirations.

The Maphilindo project, which was first proclaimed by the President of the Philippines, Diosdado Macapagal, is wholly unacceptable to the present Malaysian Government. It was probably never taken very seriously by Macapagal himself. For the present, a voluntary federation of the three countries is unthinkable. The realization of the concept of pan-Indonesia, therefore, in regard to the amalgamation of Malaysia and Indonesia, can be accomplished only by force. Because of its policy of rearmament, Indonesia is now in a position to give military support to the pan-Indonesian movement in Malaysia. And since Sukarno will avoid open conflict with Great Britain, the pan-Indonesian movement is the only instrument available to him that is committed to the realization of a greater Indonesia.