

IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1965 PHILIPPINE ELECTION: THE VIEW FROM AMERICA

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SINCE WORLD WAR II, THE FOCUS OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN over the possibility of a "hot war" has shifted from one part of the world to another. Europe, the Middle East, Africa—each area has been viewed, at one time or another, as the most likely source of an incident that could lead to a direct confrontation between the communist and non-communist alliance systems. In recent years, Asia has been looked upon as the "key to the cold war." More specifically, Southeast Asia, in particular, has gained the unenviable distinction of being generally regarded as the most crucial arena in world politics. There are good reasons for such a judgment: in the last half of 1965 alone, for example, unsettling occurrences in the area included the continuing Indonesian-Malaysian dispute, the secession of Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia, and the upheaval in Indonesia. International attention, meanwhile, remained centered on the struggle in Vietnam, which "escalated" tremendously in 1965 and which threatens to embroil Cambodia and Laos in 1966.

The only bright spot, in the whole of Southeast Asia, is the Philippines, which appears to be immune to the many and varied difficulties that have afflicted its neighbors. Even the Philippines, however, has begun to worry some students of international affairs (mainly Americans). For instance, American officialdom was upset by certain actions taken by the Macapagal administration—such as the claim to North Borneo and the "flirtation" with Indonesian President Sukarno. Furthermore, many Americans were alarmed by the wave of so-called "anti-Americanism" in the Philippines during 1964-1965, and they have been further disturbed by reports (in the American press, at any rate) of an alleged resurgence of the long dormant communist-led Huk movement. Nevertheless, the Philippines is usually considered by advocates of Western-style democracy as the country having the most stable government of the many states which have become independent since World War II. Certainly, it has been the most trouble-free country in all of Southeast Asia, at least, since the Huk threat was quelled early in the 1950's.

The Philippine reputation as a stable, democratic government and growing political maturity, was strengthened by the presidential election of November 9, 1965. Not only was the campaign relatively peaceful, but the voting resulted in a popular mandate for a change of administration—a change which was carried out in the customary orderly manner, at the end of 1965. The outcome of the election appeared to be encouraging for the United States as well, because it enhances the Philippine reputation as the "show-case of democracy" in Asia; more immediately, because the new President-Ferdinand E. Marcos—is considered to be friendly to the United States. This is a crucial point, in view of the important American military bases and other

facilities in the Philippines, which is strategically located with respect to Southeast Asia, currently the world's leading tinder-box.

But the 1965 election can be interpreted in a much less optimistic light. Indeed, a closer look at the election results reveals some disturbing possibilities for the future—disturbing from the standpoint of both the Philippines and the United States. The principal purpose of this paper is to examine these possibilities, and this requires an analysis of the *implications* of the election rather than of the election itself (although the latter subject will not be ignored). Another point to note here is that this study concentrates on those aspects of the 1965 election that would be of chief interest to Americans. Such an approach should help give Philippine readers better insight into the American perspective and should also indicate the increasingly significant position of the Philippines in Southeast Asia generally, and in United States foreign policy, in particular. To achieve these objectives, this account focuses on the implications of the 1965 election as they relate to (1) the prospects for the future of democratic government in the Philippines, and (2) United States interests, *vis-a-vis* both the Philippines and Southeast Asia.

I

In considering the implications of the 1965 election for the future of Philippine government, it would be appropriate (keeping in mind that this is being approached from the viewpoint of an American observer) to begin with a brief look at the Huk movement, which, as noted, has been attracting a growing amount of attention in the American press. The official Philippine view—at least, as enunciated by Philippine military intelligence sources—by implication, disputes the notion of an insurgent revival. According to these sources, the Huks are in bad shape, in terms of both numbers and morale, and their condition is not improving. If this interpretation is correct, how does it fit in with reports of Huk revival?

Actually, the official position seems to admit that Huk activities have intensified lately, but this is attributed to a Huk attempt to keep morale from sagging and to maintain their reputation in the *barrios* of Central Luzon. According to this explanation, the Huks are engaging only in acts of banditry, not in the kind of campaign that heralded the start of Vietcong activities in Vietnam, for example. Is the official view of the status of the Huk movement valid? Or is it possible, on the other hand, that the Huk revival—at least, in part—reflects an attempt to take advantage of several recent developments, including strained Philippine-American relations, growing Philippine nationalism, the situation in Vietnam, and the condition of the Philippine economy?

In attempting to answer this and to assess Huk prospects for the future, it is necessary to consider the basic question confronting any insurgent movement: what kind and what amount of support, external and internal, might the Huks reasonably expect to receive if they were able to launch large-scale operations? Under present conditions, they would receive very little support, according to most observers. Insofar as internal support is

concerned, one factor stands out above all others: the Filipino people are strongly attached to the democratic ideology. At the present time (and this qualifying phrase is important), Filipinos are deeply committed to the techniques and processes as well as the objectives of democracy. As for external support, any Philippine insurgent movement is further handicapped by the factor of geography. Because of its location, the country is relatively invulnerable to external sources of support for internal subversion. This was one reason why it was possible to stop the Huks in the 1950's; in contrast with the situation in Vietnam today, the rebels could neither receive substantial aid from abroad, nor take refuge in neighboring states. The consequences of this geographic element, moreover, are not limited to the matter of rebel contacts with foreign sources of assistance. It could be argued, for instance, that there is an inverse correlation between communist fortunes in Southeast Asia, and the extent of Filipino support for the Huks. That is, the more successful are communist-led movements on mainland Asia, the more intense becomes the Filipino sense of unity and concern over communism—and vice versa. While the Philippines is not unique in this respect, the policies it has pursued as a result of this situation are quite different from those adopted by many other states not so favored by geography, such as, say, Cambodia.

In brief, it is largely because of the factors described above that the Philippines, thus far, has been able to withstand the efforts of Huk insurgents, and has not adopted a policy of accommodating itself to communist encroachments or threats in nearby areas (including Indonesia, prior to the recent upheaval there, at any rate). As a matter of fact, the Philippines has acted more militantly—and at times more absurdly—in demonstrating its hostility to communism than even the United States. The Philippines has followed a rigid policy of avoiding all contacts—diplomatic and otherwise—with communist nations, including the Soviet Union. The attitude on which this posture is based, furthermore, is not limited to Philippine officialdom (which, some would argue, has no option but to follow the United States line in foreign policy matters); it is held by most Filipinos (though they would not necessarily agree with some of its extreme manifestations, such as the government's refusal, a few years ago, to allow a Yugoslavian basketball team to participate in an international tournament in Manila).

Thus, the Huk movement faces serious obstacles in the Philippines, under present conditions. But Huk prospects are not entirely bleak, for a number of reasons. First, it should be noted that the geographic element is a limiting but not a determining influence—that is, its effects on the fate of the Huks are less important than, and are subordinate to, those of the internal factors. And these domestic factors—such as the Filipino belief in democracy and hostility toward communism—are not necessarily immutable. They require for their continued existence certain reinforcing conditions; but such conditions seem to be absent from the Philippine scene. Indeed, there are indications that the Filipino's patience and optimism—for which he is justly famed and renowned—are starting to fray at the edges. If this judgment is correct, it raises another question: what conditions are responsible for this development? In more general terms, what considerations might provoke the Filipino people to alter their pro-democratic and pro-Western orientation? To

answer this requires an examination of the state of the Philippine economy, which—in the long run—could prove to be the principal ally of the Huks or of any other insurgent movement in the Islands.

II

An analysis of the Philippine economy could produce optimistic or pessimistic conclusions, depending on which side of the picture is emphasized. On the positive side of the ledger, there is no doubt that the Filipino people are better off today as a whole than at any time since they became independent. This improvement is measurable—both quantitatively and qualitatively—that is, in terms of (1) a consistent and steady rate of economic growth (which has averaged about 5 per cent annually over the past decade), and (2) a decreasing dependence on the agricultural sector and the growing importance of the industrial sector. On balance, the long-run economic outlook for the Philippines is encouraging, particularly in view of the country's record of political stability and the emergence of an ambitious and energetic class of young entrepreneurs. As I have noted elsewhere, "The Philippines has been progressing steadily and, moreover, has been doing so within the framework of an essentially free enterprise economic system and a stable democratic political system."¹

The fact remains, however, that the defeat of President Diosdado Macapagal—in the view of virtually every commentator on the 1965 election—can be attributed almost exclusively to Filipino dissatisfaction with economic conditions in the islands. What is the basis for that dissatisfaction, and what are its implications? To answer this, it is necessary to stress the pessimistic side of the picture at this point. For the above description of the Philippine economy leaves some fundamental questions unanswered. Is economic improvement occurring rapidly enough to satisfy most Filipinos and to reinforce their prevailing values? Has this improvement affected all segments of Philippine society? Unfortunately, the answers are no.

Without going into details, the reasons for such an answer are indicated by the following survey. The Philippine economy is characterized by the existence of gross disparities, along social as well as geographic lines. There is a geographic or "vertical" cleavage in that industrial development, thus far, has been confined chiefly to the urban areas. This has resulted in a number of undesirable consequences: for example, the median annual income of non-agricultural workers is about seven times as great as that of agricultural workers (and the Huk problem, of course, basically is an agrarian problem). The discrepancy is even more marked in terms of the social or "horizontal" cleavage. A very small minority of the population, for instance, receives more than half of all income earned in the Philippines. In more general terms, the Philippine middle class—though growing absolutely and proportionately—still constitutes less than 15 per cent of the population, compared with a lower class of more than 80 per cent of the population. Attempts to carry out economic reforms, needless to say, are opposed by the "haves." This is

¹ See my article on the Philippine economy in the *Washington Post's* "Pacific World" section, June 6, 1965, F 6.

particularly true with regard to land reform. These and other factors that cannot be discussed here—such as the high rate of unemployment and underemployment, inflation, and so on—are all relevant to the Huk problem as well as to the prevailing discontent, throughout the country, with economic conditions.

In addition to all these, the Philippines faces the problem of population growth. From the standpoint of economic development, this may well be the country's single most important problem. The population is growing at an annual rate of 3.3 per cent; this is one of the highest rates in the world, and it adds one million persons to the population yearly. There is no need to belabor this familiar refrain. One thing is worth noting, however (as pointed out by famed demographer Frank Lorimer in a talk at the University of the Philippines early in 1965): if Philippine birth and fertility rates continue at their present levels for 80 years, the Filipino population will equal India's present population of some 480 million.

The preceding description of Philippine economic conditions was not intended to criticize or downgrade the country's efforts in the economic sphere, but rather to indicate the potentially explosive nature of the socio-economic environment in which the Huk movement finds itself. The above account also suggests some answers to the question as to the prospects for democracy in the Philippines. It is widely believed that the possibility of a successful Huk rebellion—that is, one with general popular support, at least, among the peasantry (and one with which the United States does not interfere)—is ruled out by such factors as the Filipino belief in, and commitment to, democracy. This view overlooks two points. First, the Huks (who almost succeeded once) simply need manpower and sympathizers, not ideological converts. Second, the Philippines seems not much closer to a solution of its ancient agrarian problems today than it was at the height of the Huk insurrection. Given the prevailing economic conditions in the country, the Huk threat cannot be dismissed lightly—from a long-range standpoint (speaking in terms of, let us say, the post-1970 period). Indeed, the paradoxical fact is that, although the Huk movement supposedly is now at its lowest point ever, the potential threat to Philippine democracy is perhaps graver than it has ever been, and it is becoming increasingly more serious. This conclusion is supported by an analysis of the results of the 1965 election and its implications, to which we now turn.

In the context of the conditions described above, it is not difficult to explain the defeat of President Macapagal. This defeat occurred despite the facts that (1) Macapagal had at his disposal all the powers and resources of one of the most powerful democratic leaders in the world (in terms of formal and informal powers), and that (2) most of the events that took place during the campaign (such as the formation of a third party, the endorsement of Marcos by the *Iglesia ni Cristo*, and so forth) supposedly should have benefited the incumbent. It can only be concluded that the Filipino people in 1965 were, as noted earlier, completely dissatisfied with the country's economic status.

Both sides sought to take advantage of this attitude, but—of course—the Nacionalistas were in a better position to do so. As usual, the opposition campaign was based on an attack on the administration's record, especially in economic affairs, and on the claim that it could do a better job of running the country (without actually specifying, however, in other than general terms, how it proposed to do this). As for the Liberals, one of their main campaign themes was the argument that the opposition was to blame for the nation's economic ills. As Macapagal explained it, the Nacionalistas had controlled the Senate throughout his term of office and had refused to cooperate with him in implementing his Five-Year Socio-Economic Program; the only solution to this obstruction, he concluded, was to re-elect him and this time give the Liberals control of both houses of Congress. But this approach, in effect, admitted that the administration's record was not what it should have been, as the opposition argued.

In short, there was really only one dominant "issue" during the 1965 election campaign, and the only question was whether the voters would accept Macapagal's rationale or the promises of the opposition to do better. The widespread attitude of discontent was quite apparent during the year-long campaign and, indeed, even before then—so apparent that it was possible to conclude an analysis of the 1963 senatorial elections with this statement: "An examination of the 1963 campaign and its results justifies the conclusion that, unless the administration can begin to make some progress in improving the lot of the average Filipino, President Macapagal and the Liberal Party will encounter considerable difficulty in the 1965 election."²

What implications can be drawn from the 1965 election? It could be argued, as noted at the outset of this paper, that the outcome of the election further strengthened democracy in the Philippines. But this is a short-range outlook; to answer in terms of the long run, two other questions must be considered. First, what are the prospects that the Marcos administration will do any better than the Macapagal administration (or any earlier one, for that matter) in improving economic conditions? President Marcos is regarded as a strong and domineering politician; it is possible, therefore, that he might be able to provide the necessary leadership to accomplish much while he is in office. On the other hand, even the late and now legendary Ramon Magsaysay was able to make little headway in implementing his reform programs in the face of determined opposition by vested interest. Based on the record of the past and the realities of the present, then, most observers agree that there is likely to be little change in the *status quo* in the foreseeable future.

If this assessment is correct, a second question becomes all-important: what are the prospects that the Filipino people will continue to tolerate this kind of situation? Is their optimism unlimited and unquenchable? If not, when will they finally abandon their faith in the democratic process and select other means to achieve their ends? There are signs that Filipinos are rapidly losing patience with the brand of political leadership they have endured for some two decades and with the choice—or rather lack of one—

² The quotation is from my article, "Challenge to the 'New Era' in Philippine Politics," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXVII (Fall, 1964), 306.

presented by the two major political parties. It was in response to this growing discontent that a third party—the Party for Philippine Progress—was organized in mid-1965. The PPP campaign stressed the similarity of the major parties and their subservience to the vested interests. Yet, despite this essentially negative approach and the many formidable handicaps facing minor parties in Philippine politics, it is significant that most Filipinos whom I questioned during the campaign, stated that their first choice was PPP presidential candidate Raul Manglapus; they added, however, that they would probably not vote for him because the PPP had no chance to win and they did not want to waste their votes. Admittedly, this type of response is not a new one in the Philippines, where third parties have been involved in several previous presidential elections. Nevertheless, it appeared to be much more widespread than ever in 1965. Indeed, it may not be too far-fetched to speculate that, although he eventually received a surprisingly small percentage of the vote, Manglapus might have been elected President if all Filipinos had voted in accordance with their first preferences.

All this is not to imply that the Philippines soon will experience a *coup d'état* or some similar upheaval. In the immediate future, Filipinos probably will continue to follow democratic techniques in expressing their discontent. But their voting patterns may begin to reflect their dissatisfaction; it is likely, for instance, that they will react against the repeated failures of the two major parties to improve economic conditions and will begin to give growing support, in forthcoming elections, to third-party movements such as the PPP. In the long run, however, Filipino recourse to democratic procedures will become increasingly less likely unless there is evidence that the present system can perform satisfactorily.

There is general agreement, as noted earlier, that the economic factor was primarily responsible for Macapagal's downfall; not everyone, however, would draw such pessimistic conclusions from the outcome of the 1965 election. Many would dispute these conclusions on the ground that Macapagal's defeat was not at all unusual or expected in the light of Philippine political history. According to this argument, no Philippine President has ever managed to win re-election, so that Macapagal's case is nothing out of the ordinary. This fact received much emphasis in every account of the 1965 election, and justifiably so, for it is indeed remarkable. On the other hand, this position overlooks a significant fact—one which supports the view that Filipino patience is fading: the 1965 election was the first one in Philippine history in which an administration party failed to win the opportunity to serve two consecutive terms in control of the presidency. In brief, then, the long-run implications of the election for the future of Philippine democracy are not at all encouraging.

IV

We turn now to a consideration of the implications of the 1965 election for the United States. Here, it is also necessary to distinguish between the likely immediate consequences and the long-range possibilities. As far as the immediate future is concerned, it appears that American interests (both economic and foreign policy interests) were not adversely affected by the outcome of the election, as the following account indicates.

It is widely believed in the Philippines that no serious presidential aspirant can afford to antagonize the United States, for this would mean that American "support" would go to friendlier candidates. Whether or not this view is correct, American interests did not face an especially difficult choice in the 1965 campaign, for neither Macapagal nor Marcos—nor Manglapus, for that matter—was thought to be hostile to the United States. It is true that Macapagal started his term as President on a highly nationalistic note. Among other things, he changed the date of Independence Day from July 4 to June 12; cancelled a scheduled trip to the United States when the American Congress failed to pass a bill providing for war damage payments to the Philippines; pursued the Philippine claim to North Borneo despite American disapproval; and appeared to be on increasingly friendly terms with President Sukarno at a time when the latter's public statements were becoming highly anti-American. Toward the latter part of Macapagal's term in office, however, it became evident—in view of the Vietnam crisis, the growing strength of the Indonesian Communist Party, and the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation—that the Philippines could not act as independently as it had been. As a result, the Macapagal administration played a very "reasonable" role (from the American standpoint) during the 1964-1965 period, when relations between the two countries became greatly strained. This proved to be disappointing to the more extreme nationalists in the islands, but these elements were unable to find any solace in the position of the Nacionalista presidential candidate, who also followed a cautious, non-committal line on the subject of Philippine-American relations. Thus, the 1965 election presented American interests with less of a clear choice between candidates than did a number of earlier elections (such as that of 1953).

If there was any American favoritism during the campaign, it might seem, on the surface, that Macapagal should have benefited from it. For one thing, he had already proven himself to be "reliable" whereas Marcos was something of an unknown quality, at least, by comparison. For another, Americans might have been suspicious of Marcos because his campaign supporters included the extreme nationalist groups in the Philippines, including those advocating Philippine adoption of a policy of neutralism and the elimination of American bases in the islands. Nor was Marcos helped any by the fact that the Nacionalista Party opposed a Macapagal-backed proposal that Congress approve the dispatch to Vietnam of Filipino engineering and combat battalions. This opposition, based on the ground that it would be better to send non-combat social-action teams to Vietnam, helped kill the proposal during the 1965 session of Congress.

On balance, therefore, Marcos might have appeared to be less "pro-American" than Macapagal; at least, some of the Marcos supporters tried to give this impression. Conversely, the latter accused Macapagal of having sold out to the United States, citing as evidence the President's trip to America in October 1964, his failure to insist on full implementation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Act, and his apparent reluctance to press for revision of the various Philippine-American military pacts. Thus, if American interests played any role in the 1965 campaign, it would seem that Marcos should have been at a disadvantage in this regard. On the other hand, soon after

his victory, Marcos came out with a statement that he intended to follow the pro-American policies of his predecessor. This raised the possibility that American interests might have reached some kind of understanding with Marcos prior to the election as, in fact, some Manila journalists hinted after the election. In any event, it is unlikely that there will be any sudden changes in Philippine foreign policy in the near future, at least, where American foreign policy objectives are directly concerned.

Because of the recent wave of "anti-Americanism" that received so much publicity in the United States, some people might attack the preceding conclusion. But it is not difficult to refute any such attack. In the first place, it is erroneous and misleading to apply the term "anti-Americanism" to events which essentially reflect growing Philippine nationalism. Frequently this nationalism, or "pro-Filipinism" as some prefer to call it, is directed at American targets, but this is unavoidable for a number of reasons: (1) virtually the only targets available for this emergent nationalism are American interest and their representatives; (2) Philippine manifestations of nationalism normally are not destructive but are aimed at rectifying grievances and inequities stemming from various aspects of Philippine-American relations; and (3) Americans have a lamentable tendency to regard critics of American actions or policies as hostile if not communist-inspired.

In the second place, the recent displays of Philippine nationalism—whether motivated by anti-American sentiment or not—result from the combination of a number of factors quite unrelated to the influence of communist agent, regardless of what the American press has to say. These factors include the following: (1) although Filipinos are dissatisfied with their nation's rate of economic development, nevertheless, the Philippines has progressed economically to such an extent that it now feels able to protest vigorously against the remnants of its colonial past, such as the 1946 "parity amendment" to the Philippine Constitution and the 1954 Laurel-Langley Trade Agreement; (2) as noted above, Filipinos strongly resent the various inequities contained in commercial, trade and military treaties between the two countries; and (3) also involved is a psychological reaction, on the part of Filipinos, against their dependence on the United States for defense against external aggression; this dependence has become more obvious (with the emergence of threats in Indonesia and Vietnam) precisely at a time when Philippine nationalism has been growing, thus arousing more tension and irritation than ever.

Because of all the above-mentioned elements, it would be risky to state categorically that the Philippines in the near future (that is, in the period up to 1970) will not make decisions which American officials would oppose. To make such a statement would commit the error of taking the Philippines for granted, an American habit which Filipinos find most distasteful. Thus, it would be unwise to rule out the possibility that the Philippines, for instance, might adopt a neutralist foreign policy by 1970. Admittedly, this is unlikely, for most Filipinos—aside from being committed ideologically to democracy—do not deceive themselves as to the nature of communism or as to their country's vulnerability to external aggression in the absence of United States military power. The point is that a Philippine swing to neutral-

ism, if this occurs in the near future, would be chiefly attributable to American actions and policies, which have done so much to provoke "anti-Americanism" in the islands in recent years. This view is supported by an analysis of the developments that led to strained Philippine-American relations during 1964-1965. Much of the responsibility for that situation was directly and unequivocally traceable to obvious and avoidable errors of omission and commission on the part of United States policy-makers. In brief, if Philippine nationalism contains any significant element of "anti-Americanism," much of this sentiment derives, not from "irrational" Filipino attitudes toward the United States nor from Communist influence, but from American treatment of the Philippines.³

Not long after the communist takeover of mainland China, the noted English political scientist and historian, Denis Brogan, commented on an American tendency to believe that significant happenings in international politics are dependent primarily on United States actions, or lack of them. This is illustrated, for example, by the old and familiar claim that the United States "lost" China to the Communists. I do not think that the preceding argument is based on what Brogan called the "illusion of American omnipotence." The Philippines is not China, and it should be recognized by all concerned that the Philippines and the United States do have a "special relationship" (though it may be rather one-sided, as many Filipinos feel). In this context, then, there is some validity in maintaining that the United States might "lose" the Philippines in the short run.

Turning now to an examination of the long-run implications of the 1965 election for American interests, we find that, from this standpoint, the situation is quite different. There are two main reasons. First, there is a much greater possibility that the Philippines will go neutralist in the long run—that is, in the post-1970 period—than in the near future. Second, such an occurrence would result principally from internal Philippine developments rather than from United States actions. These conclusions are based, of course, on the earlier analysis of the implications of the 1965 election for the future of democratic government in the Philippines. As was argued above, there is a distinct likelihood that, in the absence of definite economic progress in the next few years, the Philippine record of political stability will be cut short and that the country will join the ranks of the uncommitted nations.

While this would not necessarily be "bad" for the Philippines, it would confront the United States with certain obvious problems affecting its whole Asian foreign policy. Indeed, it would pose a grave threat to the American position in Vietnam. It is not absurd, as some might think, to talk about the Vietnam struggle in terms of the post-1970 period, for, according to all reports, the Vietcong and North Vietnam are prepared to continue the conflict as long as necessary to drive out the "imperialist aggressors," even if this takes another twenty years or more. It is essential, therefore, for American foreign policy-makers to think in terms of the long run, particularly with regard to strategically located countries like the Philippines.

³ See my article, "Recent Developments in Philippine-American Relations: A Case Study in Emergent Nationalism," *Asian Survey*, V (June, 1965), 305-318. (Also reprinted in the American Embassy's Manila publication, *The American Journal*, December 1965.)

In summary, there are a number of ominous undertones implicit in the outcome of the 1965 election. The implications of the election, for both the Philippines and the United States, are clearly dangerous. This is a disturbing and pessimistic interpretation, but it does not do violence to the available evidence. It is also a bluntly-phrased interpretation, but deliberately so. It is prompted by the hope that it will help spur immediate Philippine action, and American cooperation, in the task of promoting the urgently-needed reforms for the situation which the average Filipino has endured optimistically and patiently for so long.