A SURVEY OF PHILIPPINE-INDIA RELATIONS IN THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD*

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PHILIPPINE-INDIA RELATIONS IN THE POST-INDEPENDENCE period started on a note of unenthusiastic cordiality, almost devoid of warmth and certainly lacking in intimacy. Consciously absent in these relations was the appeal to past cultural ties, commonly shared religious and social customs and traditions that had characterized inter-Asian relations in general and India’s ties with her neighbours in particular. This, although India’s cultural influence on the Philippines was among the earliest influences that Filipino scholars acknowledged.1

Distance alone would not account for lapses in these relations. Even during their colonial periods, trade continued between the two countries.2 And more insistently, Indians and Filipinos held on to their spiritual bonds although their movements for independence had differences of approach and employed separate techniques. Though the political leaders of both nations were not in direct touch with each other, India was looked up to by generations of Filipinos who were acquainted with the works of Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru.3 No dispute arising from domestic or foreign affairs ever happened between the two countries. Yet, when they gained their independence within almost a year of each other, they found themselves estranged, pursuing divergent ways in world affairs, and looking at each other with disguised indifference and hostility.

The reason for this state of affairs must be seen in terms of an Asia that achieved freedom at the outbreak of the cold war among the Big Powers. In this context, it is evident that even before the process of

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2 Serafin D. Quiason, English “Country Trade” with the Philippines, 1644-1765 (Quezon City, 1966), p. 3.

3 Gleaned from a personal interview with Dr. C. P. Romulo, President, University of the Philippines, February 5, 1967.
decolonization started in earnest, cold war pressures had begun to dis-
tort events and unduly affect the perspectives of the people of Asia.4
The initiative of smaller and weaker countries to develop inter-Asian
relations and their own economic and political systems, was subtly cur-
tailed or subverted by their former colonial masters. Employing the
cold war as a convenient and convincing tool, they were successful in
legitimizing concessions and privileges which under different circum-
stances could never have been granted.6

By the time India became independent in August, 1947, the Philip-
ippines had entered into various political and economic commitments with
the United States including the Military Bases Agreement, a Trade Treaty
and Military Assistance Agreement. The Constitution of the country
was amended granting parity rights to American citizens in the Philip-
ines. Manuel Roxas, the first President of the Republic, during his
election campaign, pledged wholehearted support as well as intimate co-
operation with the United States. He agreed to most of these crucial
agreements and was, therefore, the prime architect of independent Phil-
ippines' foreign policy. In his final appeal to the people, he urged the
approval of the Parity Amendment at the polls, giving fundamental rea-
sons why the Philippines had to join hands with the United States. Should
the people reject the amendment, Roxas warned them of the conse-
quences rather frankly: 6

If we should make that kind of demonstrations by rejecting the parity
amendment, America will have reason to reexamine her attitude towards
us. Our entire foreign policy, so firmly based on our special relationship
with the United States would have to be reoriented. We must remember,
however great our pride in independence that we are a small nation, pre-

dently poor and defenseless. In a world far from stabilized no small

nation today is without its special ties with a greater or stronger power.

Do we prefer to establish special ties with China, with Russia or with
France? I do not think so. History had made our decision for us and
for this we must be fervently thankful. We have the privilege for
which every other nation in the world would pay in billions for a special
position in relation to the United States that position is our greatest asset
today. It is an asset which we cannot buy for any amount of money.

It lends us prestige, strength, security and economic support. (Italics
supplied.)

4 "The Peasant War in the Philippines'', Philippine Social Sciences and
Humanities Review (U.P. Golden Jubilee Number), Vol. XXIII, Nos. 2-4 (June-
December, 1958), p. 417. See also M. J. Desai, "Principles of Post-War Indian
Foreign Policy", The Australian Journal of Politics and History (Special Number,
Modern India), Vol. XII, No. 2 (August, 1966), pp. 221-222.

5 Most of the mutual defense agreements signed by the United States
with various Asian countries would fall in this category. The United States-
Philippines Military Bases Agreement, Trade Treaty and Parity Amendments
are specific examples.

6 Manuel Roxas, "Message to the Filipino People Urging Approval of the
Constitutional Amendment to Parity at Plebescite", on March 11, 1947, in
Important Speeches, Messages and Other Pronouncements of President Manuel
This forthnight statement by President Roxas set the tone of Philippine attitude towards world affairs. From then on considerations of Philippine-American relations were to determine the scope, nature, and direction of Philippine foreign policy. Despite obvious implications of such policy, Roxas won out, and the Parity Amendment was approved by the voters.

While the Philippines had decided to follow a policy of alignment, India chose to follow an entirely different course in world affairs. In September, 1946, when Mr. Nehru assumed leadership of the Interim Government of India, he laid down the fundamental guideline for Indian foreign policy. With varying degree of emphasis, this guideline was followed in India’s participation in the United Nations and in the conduct of her relations with other countries, particularly in Asia. “To keep away from the Power Politics of groups, aligned against one another” was the cardinal principle in this policy. India’s attitude towards Asia particularly was guided by considerations of her historic and geographic position in the region. Nehru had to revert to this theme, time and again, in the years to come. In the same radio broadcast, he told the Indian people:

We are of Asia and the peoples of Asia are nearer and closer to us than others. India is so situated that she is the pivot of Western, Southern and Southeast Asia. In the past, her culture flowed to all these countries and they came to her in many ways. These contacts are being renewed and the future is bound to see a closer union between India and Southeast Asia on one side, and Afghanistan, Iran, and the Arab world on the other. To the furtherance of that close association of free countries, we must devote ourselves.

Nehru’s vision of India playing a pivotal role in Asia was responsible for the convening of the first Asian Relations Conference in 1947 at New Delhi and subsequently, the convening in 1949 of a conference of Asian and African countries to discuss Dutch police action in Indonesia.* The Dutch action in Indonesia, with the tacit cooperation of Great Britain had further reinforced Nehru’s fear that the former colonial powers would use all types of pressure and tactics to creep back into Asia to regain their position of military and economic superiority. He, therefore, felt the need for India to declare her resolve that it would not allow Asia to be the “plaything of other countries.” He had been

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* Australia and New Zealand also attended the Conference. The United Arab Republic (Egypt) and Ethiopia were the two African countries. The Asian countries besides India were Afghanistan, Burma, China, Ceylon, Iran, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, and the Yemen. China, Nepal, New Zealand and Thailand sent only observers and other countries were represented by delegates at ministerial level. (See Ibid., p. 407.)

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* Ibid., p. 3.
continuously preparing Indian public opinion to be watchful and be prepared for such a role. Speaking in the Constituent Assembly he said: "however unworthy we may be, we have become — let us recognize it — the leaders of freedom movement of Asia . . . that we shoulder the responsibility of some kind of guide to vast number of peoples all over the world."9

While in Nehru's vision India was to play a leading role in the decolonization of Asia, the policies pursued by the United States and the United Kingdom, of course with the understanding of other colonial powers, seemed to oppose this view. It so happened that the Philippines became, by association and partly by deliberate policy, an active partner in the pursuance of this policy against Mr. Nehru's alleged leadership. It was this indirect and perhaps involuntary clash of ideas between India and the Philippines that was manifested in the initial stage of their contacts and behaviour towards each other in international affairs.

When the Philippines and India decided to establish consulates in Calcutta and Manila in 1949, their positions vis-a-vis the cold war politics and, therefore, their attitudes towards each other, had become well known. Each followed, to a large degree, a diametrically opposed course of action in Asian affairs as well as in the United Nations. It is significant that the two countries did not have any direct conflict involving their immediate national interests. However, they often crossed each others's path while advocating their views on issues that involved directly or indirectly their national interests.*

By this time, Mainland China was lost to the Kuomintang regime and was taken over by Mao's forces. The Truman Doctrine had further accentuated the antagonism between the Anglo-American bloc and the Communist bloc. Nehru's persistent criticism of the Western Powers, his plea for Asian unity to ward off neo-colonialism and to avoid cold war entanglements, was never fully appreciated by the West, particularly, the United States. In fact, India was considered to have a deliberate anti-Western posture.10 To the American political leaders neutralism seemed a one-sided affair, that is, in favor of the Communist bloc and it was marked out for systematic opposition. This Indo-Ameri-

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9 Nehru, Ibid., p. 12.

* For example, divergence in the views of the two countries was acute in their policy towards Communist China and the Korean War.

10 See U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon's speech at the Luneta delivered on July 4, 1956. It carries the basic American argument against neutralism that was to continue until the election of John Kennedy to the U.S. Presidency. Department of Foreign Affairs, Review, Vol. IV, No. 3 (Manila, August 1956), pp. 1-6.
can confrontation of opposing views on world affairs was naturally reflected in Philippine-India relations."

However, this apparent hostility and indirect criticism of one by the other could not obviate the necessity of regional cooperation between the two countries. They had also a great deal in common in their political ideals. The estrangement caused by pressures of cold war politics could not relegate the fact of regionalism to the background. So, when President Elpidio Quirino conceived the idea of a conference of Asian nations to consider problems of mutual interest, he could not but invite India to attend it, notwithstanding India's views on such conferences and towards cold war alignment which were not to the liking of the Philippines and the United States.

India was reluctant and in fact almost declined the invitation. In India's view, such alliances were not conducive to world peace and, secondly, she was definitely not inclined to join any pact that would aim to isolate the People's Republic of China. India's representative to the Baguio Conference, Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, was able to dissuade the Philippines as well as other members of this conference from insisting on the discussion of political and military problems of the area. However, it must be said to the credit of the Philippines that, in that particular episode of Philippine-India relations, she agreed to tone down her insistence, to discuss political and military affairs, in deference to India's wishes. In this connection, it must also be noted that in order to ensure India's participation in the conference, the Philippines also agreed not to invite the Government of Nationalist China. It involved delicate diplomacy because Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek had already agreed to participate in such a conference if the Philippines would take the initiative.

India's attitude towards the Baguio Conference was illustrative of her lack of a well-thought-out policy towards Asia. Nehru had, time and again, pronounced that India was closer to Asia than to other regions and that her own welfare and security was inextricably linked to the welfare and security of the region. He, however, failed to formulate a policy that could guide India's diplomats in the region, and also to provide other countries some inkling of the nature, scope, and

* Nehru speaking on the Objectives Resolution in the Constituent Assembly in January 1947, even before India had achieved complete independence, gave an assessment of Western attitude towards his policy: "Recently an American statesman criticized India in words which show how lacking in knowledge and understanding even the statesmen of America are. Because we follow our own policy, this group of nations thinks that we are siding with the other and that group of nations thinks that we are siding with this." Nehru, Ibid., p. 11.

11 The Hindu (Madras), editorial entitled "Trouble in the Philippines", May 26, 1950. See also the statement of Mr. M. Farol, Philippine Consul General, issued to the press in Calcutta, May 22, 1950, which is found in the same issue, allaying India's doubt about the nature of the Conference.

12 The Hindu, May 27, 1950.
direction of India's long-term aims in the region. Mere assertion of independent policy in this context seemed a negative attitude. For instance, while India looked up to China with mixed feelings of awe and respect, she failed to demonstrate to an understandable degree her appreciation of the fears as well as aspirations of smaller countries in the region. ¹³ Filipino leaders felt that Mr. Nehru's sentimentalism and high idealism, without positive leadership, created an imbalance in India's overall response to the events in the region. ¹⁴ When the Philippines hurriedly called the Conference at Baguio, although not clearly stated, she had at the back of her mind the frightening possibility of newly emerging Communist China coming to the direct aid of the Communist led Huk movement in Central Luzon. At that time, Government forces and the insurgents were at their worst armed clashes. ¹⁵ As a result of this internal disorder, compounded by economic difficulties, the Philippines had no choice but to lean heavily on the United States for military and economic assistance. The obvious consequences of this dependence was increased American pressure in all spheres of national life and activity. The emergence of China as a Communist power, therefore, had dangerous possibilities for the Philippines. At least, this was the assessment of most political leaders in the country. It was thus natural for the Philippines to find, in addition to her alliance with the United States, an alternative source of security in regional cooperation. However, India's response, legitimate as it was from the point of view of her policy of non-alignment, failed to fathom objectively the security needs of the Philippines and her fear of China. India then believed that Communist China was not a danger to anyone including the Philippines. In her view, this fear was engendered more by the cold war propaganda and the pressures from the United States. ¹⁶

In the post-war period, the Philippines came in direct contact with India on a number of occasions, such as the San Francisco Conference on the UN, the Asian Relations Conference in 1947, the Conference on Indonesia in 1949 and, of course, in the United Nations. But the Baguio Conference was perhaps the first and definitely the last occasion when the Philippines assiduously and with undisguised concern sought a rapprochement with India and attempted to open a dialogue with what General Romulo called, "mother India". But India was not disposed

¹³ Interviews with former Philippine President, Diosdado Macapagal, at his Forbes Park residence, Makati, Rizal, April 17, 1967, with Senator Raul Manglapus at his Senate Office, April 19, 1967 and with former Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto M. Serrano, Makati, Rizal, May, 1967. This was their assessment of India's Asia policy.
¹⁴ Interview with Felixberto M. Serrano, op. cit.
¹⁶ Nehru, ibid., pp. 87-88. See also Prime Minister Nehru's speech in Parliament, September 29, 1959, which deals with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and its implications in Asia.
to respond in equal measure. The two countries were being pulled apart by their diverse thinking.

As a direct consequence of India’s reluctant participation and toning down of the level of discussion to merely cultural and economic cooperation, the Baguio Conference ended on a note of unanimity, which also proved to be the cause of its virtual ineffectiveness.

The Philippines was not very happy at the final outcome of the conference. Although India was not the only one, Pakistan and Ceylon had also refused to discuss political issues. However, India’s obvious insistence frustrated whatever little was expected of it by the Philippines. India and the Philippines instead of coming closer in their outlook on cold-war drifted further apart.

The year 1954 was a period of crucial developments in the region. Colombo Powers sponsored the idea of holding an Afro-Asian Conference; India and China signed the now famous accord on Tibet in which the PANCHSHEEL, The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, were formally announced; the Geneva Agreement, the Southeast Asia Treaty, the Pakistan-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement and a similar agreement between Nationalist China and the USA, were signed the same year.\textsuperscript{17}

These contradictory developments reflected the underlying conflict of interests in the region. Attempts toward unity and regional cooperation clashed head-on with pressures from outside exerted through the manipulation of mutual fears and suspicion among the countries in the region. The establishment of the SEATO marked the beginning of an ever expanding political discord in Asia.

India participated reluctantly in the Baguio Conference, but the suggestion that she attend the Manila Conference was rejected outright. India was indignant and looked at the proposed alliance as a direct threat to peace in the region.\textsuperscript{18} The Philippines was equally disturbed by the vocal criticism of India.

There were, of course, valid reasons for India to react so strongly towards the establishment of SEATO. Pakistan with whom India had been at loggerheads since independence, was one of the three Asian members of the organization. And the reason why Pakistan agreed to join it was more than clear to India: The alliance was designed to contain China and to check the advance of Communism in the region. It, therefore, had no direct relevance to Pakistan except if it would lend her support against India in the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan’s chief con-

\textsuperscript{17}See Military Alliances, 1947-1957 (Texts of Documents) (New Delhi, 1957).

cern at that time was India and not China or the Soviet Union. To Nehru, who had been working hard to keep cold war alliances out of the region, it was a serious challenge because it would bring the cold war to the very doorsteps of India. To him, the alliance would not bring peace but further discord and conflict.\textsuperscript{19} The timing of the Manila Conference — soon after the Geneva agreement on Indo-China and and the Colombo Conference of Asian Prime Ministers — lent further support to Nehru’s suspicion that the Geneva accord would not be fully supported by the United States and it would be weakened by the establishment of anti-Communist defense alliances directed against China.\textsuperscript{20}

It must be stated that although SEATO was conceived and nurtured as an anti-Communist alliance by the United States (with the reluctant cooperation of the United Kingdom), the Philippines played a leading role in its development. It was considered as one of the major political accomplishments of President Ramon Magsaysay. The Philippines, being the host country, became very sensitive to any criticism that was levelled against SEATO, especially by non-Communist countries. Moreover, criticism coming from this sector was implicitly derogatory to the position of the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{21} To Nehru, SEATO was an Anglo-American design to perpetuate their position in Asia and to legitimate this; they had pressed into it the three helpless small Asian countries.\textsuperscript{22} However, in view of India’s fear that the alliance would directly infringe upon her security, these criticisms could not be regarded as entirely based on prejudice or on the bias of Nehru towards military alliances.

While Dulles, President Magsaysay and General Romulo took pains to allay India’s fear of SEATO, Pakistani leaders made no secret of the fact that their primary purpose in joining the pact was to ensure Pakistan’s security from external aggression from whatever quarter it might come, particularly India.\textsuperscript{23} Suprisingly, despite Nehru’s criticism of the Philippines and his disillusionment at Asian countries joining military alliances, the Philippines, in the subsequent years continuously opposed

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 89
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., pp. 403-404.
\textsuperscript{21} Interview with Manglapus, \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{22} Nehru, \textit{ibid.}, p. 83. Nehru said: “It seems to me that this particular Manila Treaty is inclined dangerously in the direction of spheres of influence to be exercised by powerful countries. After all, it is the big and powerful countries that will decide matters and and not the two or three weak and small Asian countries that may be allied to them.”
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Dawn} (Karachi), Sept. 11, 1954, editorial entitled “SEATO Pact”. It states that the Pakistan Foreign Minister, who initialed the agreement, declared in Manila that the treaty was a safeguard against aggression “from whichever quarter it may proceed.” See also editorials in the \textit{Hindu} (Madras), Sept. 15, 1954; \textit{Times of India}, September 13, 1954 and \textit{Times of Indonesia}, December 28, 1954. The editorial of \textit{Pakistan Times}, Sept. 11, 1954 significantly differed from the official Pakistan stand.
the attempts of Pakistan to directly involve SEATO in the India-Pakistan dispute. This fact, it seems, was never fully appreciated by India.24

India-Philippine relation had reached a critical point at least on the level of discussion, at the time of the Manila Conference in 1954. The idea of an Afro-Asian conference had by then been accepted and it was scheduled to be held in Bandung, Indonesia. As a consequence of the Philippines’ membership in SEATO, it was feared that perhaps India would oppose her participation in the Bandung Conference. India could not have done so, because Pakistan, which had also joined the defense organization, was one of the original sponsors of the idea in Colombo. The mere fact that such a fear was entertained in Manila reflected the degree of estrangement between the two countries.25

Before discussing their disagreement at Bandung, it may be mentioned here that, while ideologically the Philippines and India continued to drift apart, considerable improvement was made on the practical level of cultural and technical cooperation. Diplomatic missions were established in Manila and New Delhi, raising the level of their respective consulates to legations in 1952. A Treaty of Friendship was signed in the same year. India started to extend a token technical aid under the Colombo Plan.26 As a result, the two countries began to feel the political temper in each other’s capital. The flow of information and cooperation on a small scale in educational and cultural matters, began to improve understanding of each others’ current political and economic problems.

However, the wide gap in their political and diplomatic views made it “difficult and uncomfortable”27 for the diplomatic representatives to function in each capital. It was particularly true in the case of the first Indian Minister to Manila, Mr. M.R.A. Baig. Finding the diplomatic climate in Manila critical of India, he assumed a posture of “aggressive diplomacy”. Naturally, this led to implied criticism of the U.S.-Philippine ‘special relations’ and their foreign policies. At least on two occasions, Mr. Baig knowingly or unknowingly, created a sort of minor crisis in Philippine-India relations. One, when he protested to the Foreign Office in Manila the reported statement of General Carlos P. Romulo in the United States that Nehru’s policy of Asia for Asians was reminiscent of Japanese slogan of GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE during the last war.28 The statement was later denied by General Romulo upon his arrival in Manila. Nevertheless, the protest

24 Interview with Serrano, op. cit.
25 A Times of India correspondent called the Thai and Philippine delegations as “invited nations” implying that they did not “belong” to the Afro-Asian group.
27 Interview with Philippines Secretary of Foreign Affairs Narciso Ramos, who was the First Philippine Envoy to India, Manila, on June 21, 1968.
28 Interview with Ambassador Leon Ma. Guerrero, the incumbent Philippine Ambassador to India, Manila, on October, 1966.
of Minister Baig had aroused public controversy on Philippine foreign policy in general. The Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Leon Ma. Guerrero, repudiated the reported statement of Romulo and instead proclaimed that the Philippine government fully agreed with the policy: ASIA FOR THE ASIANS.\(^2^9\) The implications of Guerrero's statement were obvious: that Asia should be left to the Asians, and outsiders-meaning the Western powers, including the United States — should not interfere in its affairs.

Coming as it did from the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, it had the impress of the official pronouncement which ran counter to the basic foundations of Philippine-American relations based on military alliances and close political and economic cooperation. Vice-President Carlos P. Garcia, concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs, endorsed Guerrero's statement and this brought the whole issue to a crisis level in Manila. President Magsaysay, who had remained aloof from the controversy so far, intervened and disauthorized both Guerrero and Garcia from issuing any further statement on the controversy and on foreign policy in general.\(^3^0\) Magsaysay later issued a compromise policy statement on Philippine policy towards Asia with the concurrence of Congress.

The more significant outcome of the debate was the beginning of a new phase in the public discussion of the entire range of Philippine foreign policy, specifically the Philippine-American relations in the post-war period. The argument advanced by the late President Roxas that "history has made our decision for us and for this we must be fervently thankful" was no longer considered valid. The country had began to think anew. A small but articulate and vocal minority led by Senator Claro M. Recto had begun to question the basis of Philippine-American Relations. This nationalist movement was to influence deeply the future course of Philippine foreign policy. Indirectly, a dialogue between India and the Philippines seemed to have started because the open discussion on the subject began to be noticed in India and Indian interest in the Philippines increased considerably.

The minor side effect of the controversy was the transfer of Undersecretary Guerrero from the Department of Foreign Affairs to London as Ambassador. The power of Vice-President Garcia as foreign policy spokesman of the Magsaysay administration was curtailed; he was required to make prior clearance from the President. It is doubtful if this controversy added anything to the generally low stock of India in Manila.


\(^{3^0}\) Interview with Ambassador Leon Ma. Guerrero, op. cit.
A passing reference to the second incident is not out of place because this time Baig's alleged remarks were the object of controversy. Mr. Baig was reported to have told the correspondent of OBSERVER of London, "What can I report about this country? It is an American colony and Filipinos don't know it."³¹ Naturally, such a derogatory statement coming from a foreign Ambassador, when brought to the attention of the Foreign Office in Manila, drew sharp criticism. There was an outcry in the press to expel Baig and his wife. Baig was about to leave the country, after completing his tour of duty but because of vocal demand for his expulsion, his stay was deliberately extended by the Indian Government in order to avoid the impression that he was either expelled or recalled.³² Mr. Baig disowned the statement attributed to him and Mr. R. Knox of the Observer formally withdrew the remarks from his story.

This love-hate aspect of Philippine-India relations came to the open also at the Bandung Conference. Mr. Nehru had always been critical of alliances, particularly SEATO and CENTO (formely the Baghdad Pact), and he could not resist the temptation of repeating his criticism at Bandung although in a less vehement way. But, it seems, Mr. Nehru did not take into consideration that in the conference, the representatives of countries that he had chosen to criticize were present. He meant well but the delegates from the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan felt hurt, and were dismayed by the criticism. General Romulo, the chief delegate from the Philippines, took up the cudgel and replied to Mr. Nehru in a formal statement before the Conference. It gave Romulo an opportunity to criticize openly and in strong words, Communism and China and impliedly, Nehru and his policy of neutralism and non-alignment.³³ Romulo's statement was loudly proclaimed as a bold denunciation of Nehru and neutralism by the Western powers, particularly the U.S.A. While Romulo scored a point, it did not help bridge the gap that existed between the views of India and that of the Philippines.

Bandung had brought in diverse pressures and forces that played a decisive role in the final outcome of the conference. Public disagreement between Romulo and Nehru did not however affect the personal relationship between the two. They still had time to dine together in

³² Interview with Mr. M. R. A. Baig, New Delhi, April, 1967. Mr. Baig felt that the outburst of criticism was inspired by some private American foundations. It should be noted here that Foreign Secretary Narciso Ramos, who brought the alleged statement to the notice of the Foreign Office in Manila, could not recall if any request for Baig's recall was made by the Philippines. Interview with Foreign Secretary, Narciso Ramos, op. cit.
³³ Times of India, April 20, 1955, Mr. Reedy, the special correspondent reporting from Bandung, said: "The voice of Washington violently clashed with Chou of World Communism."
the company of Chou En Lai and the Foreign Minister of Thailand. Romulo not content with what he had said in public, before leaving his host, warned Nehru against trusting China too much. Romulo continued his attack on neutralism in the United States.

The Bandung Conference was a high watermark in the development of Asian nationalism that brought different countries, not only from within Asia but also Africa, together on a common platform. More than that, the Conference had raised hopes that the internal resources of the two continents could be made use of for mutual benefit. The idea of cooperation and collaboration, without the direct interference of the Western powers, seemed to have achieved a singular success in Asia. However, for different reasons, Bandung also unleashed dormant fear in the West of Asia and Africa uniting against it. Mr. Dulles was particularly disturbed and he sought to extend American policy of containment of Communism in Asia to the containment of Nehru, Sukarno and company, as well as the so-called Bandung Spirit.

In retrospect, it seems that the Western desire to check the aggressive trend towards anti-Western concord among Asian countries was realized more by the internal developments in the area than by the deliberate policy of the United States. The China-India boundary dispute and the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir added to the growing discord among Asian countries. The American policy of military alliances, supported by massive economic assistance, added to mutual fear on the one hand and excessive dependence on the United States on the other. Internal disputes and external pressures created a state of permanent crisis. Gradually, Africa drifted away from Asia. The Bandung spirit, despite brave attempts to the contrary, finally faded away. In fact, it seemed to have carried the seeds of its own dissolution.

The Philippine position on the Kashmir dispute remained largely ambivalent and it was a cause of concern to India. In the earlier phase of their relations this particular factor weighed heavily. The Philippines was aligned with Pakistan in SEATO. At the same time, she was careful not to involve herself in the India-Pakistan quarrel. However, India felt that, by following closely Anglo-American position in the United Nations, the Philippines was implicitly favouring Pakistan's position on Kashmir. Filipino officials, on the other hand, thought that they were maintaining a neutral policy. In SEATO, the Philippines opposed Pakistan's attempt to involve it in the Kashmir dispute. In the joint public pronouncements, the Philippines avoided to take sides and instead

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34 Times of India, April 15, 1955. Interview with Romulo, op. cit.
35 Interview with Romulo, op. cit.
36 C. P. Romulo, The Meaning of Bandung (Chapel Hill, 1956), is a collection of his critical lectures on Bandung Conference and Neutralism.
reiterated its position to abide by the U.N. decisions on the issue.\(^{37}\) To the Philippines, the Kashmir dispute — despite its potential danger to international peace — seemed remote and it could not but take an objective stand to stay clear of direct entanglement. In view of her membership in SEATO, and together with Pakistan as defense allies of the United States, Philippine policy in the long run was not entirely unfavourable to India. Finding SEATO useless for its purpose, Pakistan gradually lost interest in it.\(^{38}\)

The Philippines was openly critical of India’s action in Goa,\(^{39}\) and India was unhappy over the vacillating posture of the Philippines on the question of apartheid.\(^{40}\) On Red China’s entry to the United Nations and on the Korean question the two countries were on opposite sides. Their basic difference was largely ideological. As the ideological gap in their respective approaches receded, they began to discover wider areas of common interests.

Therefore, despite rigid and inflexible political positions, Indo-Philippine relations continued to improve: in 1956 their diplomatic missions were further raised to embassies; technical cooperation under the Colombo Plan which began in 1952-1953 was considerably increased; Student exchange, cultural delegations, and participation in official and non-official regional meetings, contributed towards the clearing up of webs of ignorance about each other. These exchanges however, were neither systematic nor dramatic but nonetheless, the small attempts and thoughtful gestures enhanced considerably the improvement in Philippine-India relations.

The visit to Manila in 1959 of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan then Vice-President of India and similarly Vice President Diosdado Macapagal’s tour of India in 1960 finally broke down the studied reserve which the two countries had adopted towards each other. The changing mood of India and the Philippines towards world problems was clearly discernable in their mutual relations. Inflexibility and rigidity began to give way to appreciation and understanding of their mutual problems.

Ill-founded suspicions of each other’s motives and unnecessary restraints imposed by cold war considerations, were found to be the

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\(^{37}\) See the Joint Communiqué issued in Manila at the conclusion of Pakistan Prime Minister H.S. Suhrawardy’s visit, April 29-May 6, 1957, *Asian Recorder* (New Delhi, 1957), p. 1492. See also the communiqué issued on President Macapagal’s visit to Pakistan, July 11-17, 1962. During a press conference, when asked by a Pakistani reporter, “Mr. Macapagal declined to pledge his country’s assistance to Pakistan in the event of a war between India and Pakistan on Kashmir.” *Asian Recorder* (New Delhi, 1962), p. 4749.

\(^{38}\) Pakistan President Field Marshall Ayub Khan, answering a question in a press conference during his visit to the United Kingdom, said, “As for SEATO, Pakistan was not responsible for setting it up, only for joining it. Pakistan had joined it to find security but when aggression came, it failed us.” *HINDU* (Madras) November 20, 1966.


\(^{40}\) *Hindu* (Madras), July 30, 1960.
main causes of their hostile attitude towards each other. Consequently, despite pressures of regional necessities, it was not until the end of 1962 that radical shift began to emerge in their relationship. China's attack against India in 1962 shattered many of India's illusions and, at the same time, exposed the weakness of its policy especially towards smaller countries in Asia.

Contradictions between pronounced foreign policy and its performance abruptly emerged on the surface when, as a result of a skilful Chinese diplomacy and the use of force, India found herself almost completely alone and isolated in Asia. Emotionalism and sentimental approach which characterized the early development of Indian foreign policy had given it the false aura of glamour and unrealistic self-pride. Placed on a moralistic level, non-alignment had acquired the significance of a religious doctrine. All this was rudely shaken when the Chinese through their attack exposed the soft belly of Indian foreign policy.

The entire super-structure of India's international relations was held together by the vaguely defined concept of non-alignment. But when this concept was exposed to doubt as a result of the Chinese attack, the super-structure of its foreign relations became under serious stress. India to her surprise and embarrassment found that, the Asian and African nations, with which her relations were based upon ancient ties and commonly shared historic beliefs, by and large stayed aloof. They either assumed a non-aligned stance or were openly siding with China. On the other hand, countries that merited little attention from India came out promptly and openly to support her against China. That indeed was an eye-opener for India and a painful realization of her past mistakes.

For the first time in Philippine-India relations, the initiative to bridge the gap in their relations was seriously taken up by India. This was the beginning of a change, although it was neither radical nor dramatic. However, change in Indian attitude towards the Philippines was not altogether in response to China's aggressive policy. India had come a long way from her earlier inflexible and moralistic attitude in world affairs. The Philippines, on the other hand, had gone through the painful process of total alignment with the United States for over a decade and half and, as a result, her emotional attachment to the "free world" had given way to sober thinking. The "special relations" with the United States were being openly questioned as one-sided impositions.

Beginning with the Kennedy administration, the attitude of the United States towards non-alignment had become more tolerant. Philippine policy towards Asia had become more involved and earlier suspicion of non-aligned countries had given way to trust and desire for cooperation. The intensity of purpose in forging closer relations with Asian countries was reflected in the Philippines' active participation in the
ASA and MAPHILINDO. The political leadership and Filipino diplomats had become more deeply involved in Asian affairs.

While the administrations of Presidents Roxas, Quirino, and Magsaysay, sought to strengthen Philippine-American relations as the cornerstone of Philippine foreign policy, the administration of Presidents Garcia and Macapagal encouraged the reexamination of Philippine-American relations. The aim was to remove irritants and inequities and, on that basis forge closer relations with other countries of Asia which were not incompatible with the basic interest and the security needs of the country.

Naturally, the changed attitudes of the two countries towards each other and the recognizable shift in their emphasis on cold war issues finally lessened the area of political disagreement between them. What they lacked in earlier stages because of the absence of emotionalism was finally achieved through years of adjustment and experience.

**Conclusion**

Philippine-India relationship started on a low key and continued to grow in an atmosphere of mutual indifference and mistrust. There was no eminent clash of national interests nor were they involved in a situation where direct confrontation was inevitable. However, as a consequence of their diametrically opposed positions in cold war politics, their ideas and views often came into direct conflict with each other. Despite these developments, the basic necessity of their Asian existence and the inevitable needs of cultural cooperation gradually improved their working relations. The change in international climate and reduction in cold war tensions, brought a marked change in Philippine-India relations. India's reassessment of her attitude towards Asian countries eventually brought a rapprochement between India and the Philippines resulting in extended cooperation, lessening of irritants, and broadening of political and cultural cooperation.