

THE OPENING OF JAPAN, 1849-1854: AMERICA "FINDS THE KEY"*

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MOST AMERICAN HISTORIANS ARE FAMILIAR WITH Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry's mission to Japan. Most East Asian historians have some acquaintance with early nineteenth century efforts by several Western nations to breach the wall that surrounded Tokugawa Japan. Yet few historians or, for that matter, laymen know anything about United States Navy Commander James Glynn's successful mission to Japan in 1849. Fewer still appreciate the relationship of his singular exploit to the Perry expedition to Japan.¹ Why is Glynn so unfamiliar to us? It is simply due to Perry's spectacular achievements at Yedo Bay.² Today, most history textbooks (dealing with American or East Asian history), if they mention those early Western attempts to make contact with Japan at all, usually notice that James Glynn had been to Nagasaki and had rescued some American cast-aways³ in a brief sentence or two. Some merely include him among the several pre-Perry Americans who had called at Japan. Here, we can do more than recount what Commander Glynn did and indicate its relationship to the opening of Japan.

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¹ Perhaps, it was only the prolific nineteenth century writer, William Elliot Griffis, who best understood that relationship. See, in particular, his *America in the East* (New York: A. S. Barnes, 1900). The San Francisco press, among other contemporary journals, also had some understanding of the significance of Glynn's efforts.

² The earliest complete secondary accounts of Glynn's mission can be found in Richard Hildreth, *Japan As It Was and Is* (New York: J. C. Derby, 1855) and William Elliot Griffis, *Matthew C. Perry* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1890). There were lesser versions in the contemporary press. However, the only source for these came from Glynn's own report which was published as *House Executive Doc. 84*, 31st Cong., 1 sess. For a Japanese historian's account of the Glynn mission and the circumstances surrounding it, see Shunzo Sakamaki, "Japan and the United States, 1790-1853," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, Second Series, XVIII (1939), Chapters VIII and IX. See also Inazo O. Nitobe, *The Intercourse between the United States and Japan: an historical sketch* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1890). For the most recent American scholar's mention of Glynn, see Arthur Walworth, *Black Ships Off Japan* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), pp. 13-18.

³ The American cast-aways were, in fact, deserters from the American whaler "Lagoda." They fled their ship on June 7, 1848 while it was in Japanese waters. Needless to say, the deserters kept the fact of their mutiny quiet until they left Japan. They told the Japanese authorities that their ship had foundered and twenty of the crew had been drowned. See Sakamaki, pp. 50-51.

1.

In 1848 thirteen American seamen who were in Japanese custody⁴ wrote to the Dutch resident-merchant at Deshima, Nagasaki, pleading that he send word of their situation to the United States Navy. When news of their pleas reached Canton, John W. Davis, then United States Commissioner to China, informed Commodore David Geisinger, commanding the East India squadron on the China station, to "promptly detail such a portion of the squadron" as would obtain their release.⁵

This was all the East India squadron needed. The chance to vindicate the honor of the United States Navy which still smarted from the "insult" offered Commodore James Biddle in 1846 by some common Japanese soldier. Commander Glynn was given the task of effecting the release of the seamen.

On January 31, 1849, he received his orders: proceed to Nagasaki and demand the return of the Americans. If the local officials refused on the grounds that Yedo had to be consulted, he was to sail immediately for that place and begin, in person, such negotiations with the Imperial authorities. He was to "make a firm, temperate, and respectful demands for the immediate release of the seamen. His conduct was to be conciliatory, but firm." Finally, he was warned "to guard the interest of the Navy as well as the honor of your country." He was also instructed to seek a coaling depot either at Yedo or some island at the entrance of Yedo Bay.⁶

When Glynn arrived at Naha, principal city of the Ryukyu Islands, he was given a cool reception by the local authorities. From a German Protestant missionary, the Rev. B. J. Bettelheim, he learned that "exaggerated reports" concerning Commodore Biddle had reached those islands. This information undoubtedly influenced the posture he would assume at Nagasaki.⁷

On April 18, 1849,⁸ the United States sloop-of-war *Preble* 20 guns⁹ entered Nagasaki harbor. Immediately, signal guns fired warning shots and feverish preparations were made to scare away the "barbarians." The crews of the guard-boats which flitted about the *Preble* tried to

⁴ The "Lagoda" deserters were placed under protective custody for their own safety. After having landed in Japan to flee, presumably a hard life at sea, they proceeded to abuse Japanese hospitality. In fact, the Japanese intended to return the "cast-aways" to America through the agency of the Dutch. See Sakamaki, Chapters VIII and IX.

⁵ *House Ex. Doc.* 84, p. 4.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6. In a dispatch to the Foreign Office, Sir George Bonham, British Minister to China, remarked that he expected the American commander to use force to gain his objectives. See William G. Beasley, *Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, 1834-1858* (London: Luzac, 1951), p. 90.

⁷ Hildreth, p. 500.

⁸ The date is sometimes given as April 17.

⁹ The *Preble* is sometimes described as a brig of 10 or 16 guns.

patched with orders as to where the vessel should drop anchor. Glynn, however, showed the poor fellow exactly where the *Preble* would halt.¹⁰

When asked later if he had received a warning notice, Glynn answered:

No, one of your boats... threw on the deck... a bamboo stick, in which was stuck a paper. If this paper was intended for me, it was not the proper manner to communicate with me, and I ordered it to be immediately thrown overboard.... Now let me ask why you chose this method of sending me a letter?¹¹

The startled official could only say that he had his orders. This then led to discussion of the American's precise rank. Straight off Glynn placed the American people first, the President second, the Secretary of the Navy third, then Commodores, Captains, and Commanders. He could be received by officials of the sixth rank.

By April 22, Glynn became anxious for the safety of his crew and ship. The Japanese had been making no efforts to hide their belligerent preparations. It was thus that the American Captain felt obliged to train his ship's guns on the city. The local officials, we are told, trembled "in impotent fear of their cold, black, iron noses."¹² Imagine! a broad-side of ten guns against some sixty shore batteries.¹³

Annoyed at having been made to wait four days, Glynn suddenly hinted that he had orders "to do something else." Somewhat surprised, the Japanese sought to parry by announcing that the reason he had not received a reply from the Governor of Nagasaki was due to the fact that the negotiations were verbal. This worthy gentleman only negotiated in writing. At hearing this the American flew into a calculated rage. Distraught, the Japanese agreed that since the negotiations had begun verbally they might as well continue in that manner. Feeling that he had come to the proper moment, Glynn said:

Well, speak to your governor, and bring me back his reply to-morrow, or if you can, today. Understand me, let me know *to-morrow* if the governor means to send me a reply or not.¹⁴

stay the forward movement with their hands and feet. When it became apparent that the warship would not stop, a pilot-interpreter was dispatched. Then he asked if the letter he had sent to the Governor had been passed

¹⁰ *China Mail* (Hong Kong), May 31, 1849.

¹¹ *House Ex. Doc.* 84, p. 29.

¹² Wm. Elliot Griffis, "Millard Fillmore and His part in the Opening of Japan," *Buffalo Historical Society*, 9 (1906), p. 75.

¹³ For a denigration of Glynn's defense preparations, see Griffis, *Millard Fillmore: Constructive Statesman, Defender of the Constitution, President of the United States* (Ithaca: Andrus & Church, 1915), pp. 93,94. In view of his earlier accolades, it is obvious that Griffis had been caught up with the World War and the general call for peaceful ways to settle disputes.

¹⁴ *House Ex. Doc.*, p. 33.

along to Yedo, and approximately how long it would take for the document to reach the capital. The official admitted sheepishly that he did not know. Whereupon Glynn exclaimed:

What! born in the country, and living here all your life, and being in official position, cannot you tell me the time it would take...?¹⁵

The Japanese then sought to divert his verbal barbs by offering to send Mr. Levyssohn, the Dutch resident-merchant, to see him. But Glynn would not have it so. Turning to the hapless interpreter, he shouted:

My government knows very well how to recover its citizens. You need not point to your chief. I am as great as he is... Look *me* in the face when speaking to me.¹⁶

He quickly followed this up with the demand for a pledge that the seamen would be given up within two days. When the Japanese hesitated, he worried them by saying:

If this promise cannot be given; then I have no further business here; my errand is at an end. I will get under way to-day—yes, in five minutes—and report to my government that you decline complying with my demand for the release of the men.¹⁷

The Japanese had had enough and the promise was made.¹⁸

On April 26 the thirteen seamen plus the American adventurer Ronald MacDonald were put aboard the waiting *Preble*. In June, Commodore Geisigner wrote to the Secretary of the Navy that the

release... of these seamen... is probably the first instance in which the stubborn policy of the Japanese had yielded to the demand of the foreigner.

He continued by saying that he hoped that their imprisonment would afford an occasion to enforce upon the Japanese, if necessary, an observance of the rights of charitable hospitality towards those who, by an act of Providence, are cast away, or come in destitution upon their shores.¹⁹

Back in China, Commander Glynn's annoyance at the way he had been received was scarcely veiled. Sir George Bonham, the British Minister to China, was certain that a larger expedition would sail for Japan if the American commander had anything to say about the matter.²⁰ The opening of Japan would become a personal mission for James Glynn.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹⁸ In his biography of President Fillmore, Griffis suggests that the Dutch merchant helped negotiate a settlement. See Griffis, *Millard Fillmore*, p. 94. The fact that Glynn later wished (but was refused permission) to thank Levyssohn in person supports the suggestion that there might have been some backroom diplomacy. See *House Ex. Doc.* 84, pp. 39-40.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

²⁰ Beasley, p. 91.

By August 4, news of the *Preble's* successful visit was known in San Francisco when the *Alta California* reprinted an article from the *China Mail*. The report of the mission soon excited the interest of everyone interested in Far East trade.²¹ It especially caught the notice of Aaron H. Palmer who, as an active promoter of American Commerce, had accumulated vast knowledge of the commercial opportunities of the area. On September 17, 1849, he sent a plan (one of several he had forwarded to the government) for the opening of Japan to Secretary of State John M. Clayton. Commander Glynn, he added, "appears to have accomplished his mission with the characteristic promptitude, energy, and determination of an American naval officer"²² in defiance of Japanese opposition.

2.

The government, Palmer wrote, must adopt "immediate and energetic measures to compel" the Tokugawa shogun to make the "most satisfactory atonement" for the maltreatment of shipwrecked Americans. In his earlier plan of March 14 he had suggested that the United States Commissioner to China be sent to Japan.²³ But as a result of Glynn's success, Palmer suggested:

Let... a commissioner be appointed... Let him proceed... with the whole U.S. squadron in the Chinese Seas, ... to Yedo and demand an audience with the Seagoon [sic]... holding no official or personal intercourse with any subordinate... functionary...²⁴

The Commissioner would submit a five-point ultimatum: one, the indemnification of the lives of the lost shipwrecked Americans; two, the hospitable reception by the Japanese of shipwrecked sailors; three, the opening of ports to commerce; four, the right of having coaling stations; and five, a treaty based on the Sino-American treaty of 1844. If the Japanese refused, then the squadron would blockade Yedo Bay.²⁵ He concluded by saying that the commissioner "should conduct the negotiation with due courtesy, firmness of purpose, and unwavering decision;" and that the "gross indignity" to which Biddle submitted could "only be effaced by an imposing force."²⁶

On the West Coast it was not until March 18, 1850 that the *Alta California* would write of "Manifest Destiny" and the growth of Asian commerce. It was seven months later that the San Francisco *Daily Herald* wrote:

²¹ Griffis, "Fillmore," p. 76.

²² Aaron H. Palmer, *Documents and Facts Illustrating the Origin of the Mission to Japan* (Washington: Henry Polkinhorn, 1857), p. 11.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

we trust we shall soon hear of...Glynn being dispatched to demand this privilege [i.e., a coal depot]... That officer found out the only effectual mode of treating with them—that is, the exercise of firmness in everything essential, and the gentleness in that which was unimportant.²⁷

On December 7, the *Alta California* suggested that Glynn had discovered how to treat with the Japanese. Moreover, the

appearance of one of our fine steamers would undoubtedly do more to break down the prejudice of the Japanese against foreign intercourse than all the iron arguments ever hurled from the cannon's mouth.

Within the year, the editors of that newspaper would become rabid in their denunciation of Japanese seclusion and violent in their call for armed conflict if necessary.

By December, 1850 President Millard Fillmore was ready to support a naval expedition to Japan. According to one of his biographers, the President was moved by the cruel and unusual treatment given our seamen shipwrecked in Japanese waters. Moreover the possibilities of steam navigation on the Pacific and the resultant trade were also attractive to the man from Buffalo. As the President said, the Japanese expedition was discussed "in full Cabinet councils, in which there was no difference of opinion, but the fullest accord."²⁸ By January 1851 there would be no turning back.

With the decision of the government known, the *Daily Alta* argued that Japan could not be allowed to stand in the way of world progress. The editors thundered: "Japan is a problem — it must and will be solved."²⁹ Perhaps, they hinted, California might pursue an independent foreign policy and use some just-rescued Japanese seamen to open Japan. Three days later the paper returned to the idea of using the Japanese as a bargaining point. Continuing their reflections on the *Preble* visit, the editors believed that it had left a deep impression upon the Japanese. If only "a larger vessel had been sent," they concluded.

By July, 1851, the *Daily Alta* was livid with rage. It argued that it is for Young America to take the lead and secure such advantage as may be had by an early call on our exclusive neighbors, and, once taken in hand, it will not be such a difficult matter to bring that haughty govt. to terms.³⁰

With that spate of anger over the *Daily Alta* would not take up the fight again until December, 1852.³¹

Back on the East Coast, Commodore John Aulick had read of the rescue of those Japanese seamen and came to the same conclusion as the *Daily Alta*. He would take them back to Yedo. They would be used,

²⁷ San Francisco *Daily Herald*, October 3, 1850.

²⁸ As quoted in Griffis, "Fillmore," p. 79; see also Griffis, *Millard Fillmore*, pp. 95-103, *passim*.

²⁹ March 26, 1851. The *Daily Alta* and the *Alta California* are the same paper.

³⁰ July 29, 1851.

he informed Secretary of State Daniel Webster, to gain the confidence of the Japanese government. Accordingly, orders were drawn and preparations were made by the Fillmore administration to send the willing Aulick to achieve what others had failed to accomplish: a treaty, a show of Japanese hospitality, a coal depot.³²

As for James Glynn, he never stopped proselytizing for a diplomatic mission-cum-naval escort. His report which was published in August, 1850 caught the imagination of those anxious to pursue the advantages it appeared he had achieved. On February 24, 1851, in a letter to Howland and Aspinwall, founders of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, the intrepid commander wrote that only the government was capable of forcing Japan to yield up a coal depot. The policy of seclusion, he believed, could be eliminated by negotiation if properly handled. Being so far removed from Washington, he expressed disappointment that he was not home to "influence" the investigation concerning his visit to Nagasaki. As far as he was concerned, the nation had good grounds if forced to pick a "quarrel." However, we should "work peacefully with them if we can."³³

Once at home, Commander Glynn responded to the President's wishes for a detailed statement of his views on Aulick's pending mission. Although it was obvious that the gallant commander wanted the commission to return to Japan, the very size of the proposed expedition precluded so junior an officer.³⁴ This did not deter him, however, from fully stating his views. He believed that the present moment was favorable because there was no animosity between the two nations. He thought that a formal letter should be given to the Emperor from the President; but that the letter should be like any other state document. It would be a serious mistake "to treat with the Japanese as being less civilized than ourselves." He went on to suggest that the question of the maltreatment of our seamen be postponed. Perhaps, the fact that Japan had assured us through the Dutch government of hospitable treatment in the future prompted Glynn's willingness to let this issue rest for the moment.³⁵ He also argued that the British and Dutch should be conciliated and convinced that we would share any benefits received. By giving such assurances we would effectively neutralize them. He really did not have to worry about either country. The British Foreign Office was to tell the British in China to stop worrying about the Americans and their interest in Japan. Since they stayed out of our way, the For-

³¹ Among the several San Francisco daily papers, the *Alta California* (or *Daily Alta*) was the only one to have a consistent editorial policy toward Japan. In the Spring of 1851, for instance, that paper ran a series of editorial articles on Japanese religion, customs, military, and government.

³² Walworth, pp. 17-18.

³³ 32 Cong., 1 sess., *Senate Executive Doc.* 59, pp. 59-62.

³⁴ Griffis, *Perry*, p. 28.2

³⁵ *Senate Ex. Doc.* 59, p. 79.

eign Office said, the least we could do was to keep out of theirs.³⁶ The Dutch, on the other hand, made one last effort at cracking the wall around Japan before resigning themselves to the American expeditions.³⁷ Glynn, of course, could not know how attractive the thought of America opening Japan — perhaps by force — was in foreign parts.³⁸ Finally, Glynn stated that a naval officer should take charge since only he would know exactly “what a man-of-war could be made to do under any circumstances.”³⁹ That officer, according to him, should have “maturity of experience and judgement, tact, patience, intelligent obstinacy, and naval rank.”⁴⁰

With the recall of Commodore Aulick, Matthew C. Perry was offered the opportunity to carry forward the nation’s great purpose: the opening of Japan. More than any other man in the Navy, he best fit the description offered by Glynn. Although the Commodore was looking for a more prestigious command, he finally accepted the challenge when the President showed his willingness to enlarge the East India squadron.⁴¹ As one of Fillmore’s biographers put it, the President persisted in seeing that Perry got whatever he needed.⁴²

From March to November, 1852, the Commodore busied himself with preparations for the trip.⁴³ The delays inflamed the *Daily Alta*. When the paper learned in December that the expedition would carry American gifts to the Emperor,⁴⁴ it argued that Japan was not to be coaxed by presents. We must be firm. Then with a swipe at Biddle and a hint that Perry should show some aggressiveness, the editors concluded:

³⁶ Foreign Office to Bowring, No. 56, October 5, 1852, enclosed in Addington to Crampton, October 7, 1852, F.O. 115/121, *British Public Record Office Transcripts*, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

³⁷ 32 Cong., 2 sess., *Senate Executive Doc. 34*, pp. 6-21, *passim*.

³⁸ For some typical foreign press reaction, see San Francisco *Daily Herald*, July 24, 1852. As *Daily Alta* put it after learning that the London *Times* congratulated America on its Japanese expedition, “The British Lion is not only willing to forage in company with the American eagle, but ready to profit by [the] skill and sagacity of his ancient enemy.” See the July 18, 1853 issue. The British magazine *Punch* published a three stanza poem: “The American Crusaders.” The last stanza aptly describes the sentiments on both sides of the Atlantic and on both coasts of this country. It went:

We’ll teach them unsocial coons
 Exclusiveness to drop,
 And stick the hand of welcome out
 And open wide their shop;
 And fust I hope we shant be forced
 To whip ’em into fits,
 And chew the savage loafers right
 Up into little bits.

As quoted in Griffis, *Millard Fillmore*, p. 99.

³⁹ *Senate Ex. Doc. 59*, p. 79.

⁴⁰ As quoted in Walworth, p. 18.

⁴¹ Walworth, pp. 18-21, *passim*.

⁴² Griffis, “Fillmore,” pp. 77-78; see also Griffis, *Millard Fillmore*, pp. 95-103, *passim*.

⁴³ Walworth, pp. 22-23.

⁴⁴ See Appendix K in Walworth for a list of the gifts.

The ready acquiescence in the spirited demands of... Glynn, in the *Preble*, in contrast with the insult previously heaped upon the commander of a larger U.S. force, is sufficient example to our own Gov't. of the necessity of prompt and decisive measures with such a people.⁴⁵

Matthew C. Perry needed no lessons from the West Coast. From Madeira in the Azores he would write in strong language of the need for America to enter upon the Pacific with a determination to struggle with its rivals for the commerce of the East. He intended to use the discretionary powers given him.⁴⁶ The West Coast, however, was still afraid that if the commander had no power to back up his demands, he would come "back with his finger in his mouth."⁴⁷

The fact that San Francisco's trade with China grew from 57 out-bound ships in 1850 to 106 the following year to 148 by 1852 made the Perry expedition of vital concern. On May 9, 1853, the *Daily Alta* would write its last barrage in its struggle to open Japan. After reviewing the background of the naval force then preparing to go to Japan, the paper argued that "whether the Pacific is to be navigated by steam or hot air power, or by clippers or other sailing vessels only, there is an absolute necessity for ports of refuge." Then in a sarcastic conclusion, the editors told their readers:

Japan spits in our face.... Our great nation, having armed itself,... turns meekly round, takes out its bandana, wipes the spittle from its face, and the warlike General Jonathan becomes merely a militia colonel, held up as a target for the scorn-balls of creation.

Somewhere in the equation, the *Daily Alta* had forgotten "Old Matt" Perry. On October 18, 1853, when news arrived of Perry's first encounter with the Tokugawa shogunate, the paper opined that "the spirit of the age is truly progressive, . . . when it seeks its triumphs by the genial power of commerce and peace, instead of by fire and sword."

The news of Perry's treaty, however, was met in San Francisco with a lack of enthusiasm. After all, it was hardly a full commercial pact. Nevertheless, the press was glad that it provided America with a wedge for future negotiations and was achieved without the use of force.⁴⁸ The San Francisco *Daily Herald* in its June 10, 1854 issue wrote:

all honor to the officers who have worked the change. The work so well begun by the pioneers, and that of... Glynn, Commander of the *Preble*, has been well completed by the ability of Commodore Perry; an achieve-

⁴⁵ Decemember 3, 1852.

⁴⁶ *Senate Ex. Doc.* 34, pp. 11-14. Griffis tells us that Fillmore warned Perry "to use no violence, unless he was attacked." Thus, though Perry was cautioned against making any attack, he was fully authorized in the event of being attacked by the Japanese, to use the power of the government in repelling it, and to satisfy the jealous islanders that they were dealing with a Government competent and willing to protect its own citizens." See "Fillmore," p. 79; see also Walworth, p. 31.

⁴⁷ *Daily Alta*, January 10, 1853.

⁴⁸ *Daily Alta*, June 8, 1854; San Francisco *Daily Chronicle*, June 8, 1854.

ment which, in its result, cannot be rated too highly in its effect on this western world, . . .

Several days later in a moment of sober afterthought, the *Daily Alta* spoke of the effect that the treaty would have upon West Coast trade. It was rather a bleak prospect:

We have no manufactures to offer the Japanese, and of cereal productions, they are, from all accounts, quite independent of all foreign supplies. The progress of time . . . will work such amelioration in the character of the Japanese that the future presents itself to the imagination with an importance proportionate to the limited immediate results of the treaty, which we scarcely suppose can extend beyond taking from them a few fancy articles sufficient for our own restricted market, and giving them in exchange—money, as we do the Chinese, with whom we have not been able to create any export trade that deserves even the slight notice.⁴⁹

3.

What then is the relationship of Glynn's mission to the Japanese expedition of Perry? To their contemporaries it was obvious that the young commander had triggered a response, as well as a commitment, from Washington.⁵⁰ This is not to say that American trade to the Far East would not have elicited some reaction to the continued seclusion of Japan. As early as 1815, Captain David Porter wrote to President James Madison urging a naval expedition to the Pacific and Japan.⁵¹ Even Commodore Biddle's abortive attempt showed that Americans were not bashful about naval demonstrations. However, it is possible that Japan could have undercut any excuse we may have had for worrying about our shipwrecked seamen, storm-tossed whalers, and coal-hungry steamers. According to the Japanese, it was the crude behavior of those thirteen "rescued cast-aways" rather than calculated policy which led to their rough handling.⁵² As early as 1842, the Tokugawa had decided upon treating all foreigners in distress with dignity.⁵³ But as Richard Hildreth, a contemporary, expressed it for his fellow Americans: "the cases of Biddle and Glynn . . . prove that the humoring policy could not be relied upon, and that the only way to deal successfully with the Japanese was to show a resolution not to take no for an answer."⁵⁴

The brave Glynn was undoubtedly the "man for the hour."⁵⁵ There is little doubt that to him "belongs a considerable share of the credit

⁴⁹ June 17, 1854.

⁵⁰ Hildreth, p. 507; Griffis, "Fillmore," p. 76.

⁵¹ Allan B. Cole (ed.), "Captain David Porter's Proposed Expedition to the Pacific and Japan, 1815," *Pacific Historical Review*, IX (March, 1940), pp. 61-65.

⁵² Walworth, p. 14.

⁵³ *Senate Ex. Doc.* 59, p. 79.

⁵⁴ Hildreth, pp. 507-508.

⁵⁵ Griffis, "Fillmore," p. 75.

of working the President and Secretary of State up to the point of action."⁵⁶ As Griffis wrote, it was Glynn who "put into the hand of Perry the key" with which to open the doors of Japan. That key was scrupulous politeness, consummate attention to the details of etiquette, and, last but not least, the display of abundant and most efficient force....⁵⁷ He concluded that it was Glynn who "paved the way" for Perry's triumph.

It goes without saying that it *would matter little* to argue that Japan was already restless and anxious for a change from the exclusion-seclusion policy of two centuries. *It will always be said* that Matthew Calbraith Perry "opened" Japan. However, it should also be written that an unsung naval officer provided him with the key with which to turn the lock.

⁵⁶ Griffis, *Perry*, p. 282.

⁵⁷ Griffis, *America in the East*, p. 168.