

# THE MILITARY AND NATION-BUILDING IN KOREA, BURMA AND PAKISTAN\*

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THIS STUDY SEEKS TO INTRODUCE THE THESIS THAT THE MILITARY coup is crucial for the continuation and acceleration of nation-building in Asia and Africa. Many military coups have prevented either leftist takeover or conservative corruption in government. A review of the events which have culminated in military coups in Asia and Africa tend to support this thesis. This study, however, will be limited to coups in Korea, Burma and Pakistan, eventuating in the past two decades. But the task of nation-building and the necessity of change must first be elucidated.

## I

It is not easy to define the nature of the revolutionary changes which have occurred in the developing areas. The task of nation-building in Asia and Africa during the last decade has been the subject of serious attention and sharp controversy. This enormous task has affected the more than 75 per cent of the world's population that occupies 60 per cent of the earth's land surface. The thrust of this new but difficult era for the underdeveloped peoples has come from a convergence of three factors: the end of Western imperialism and colonialism, the revolution of rising expectations, and the rivalry between communist and non-communist forces for political, economic and social control.<sup>1</sup> A vast literature — both descriptive and theoretical — has been accumulated on the nature, scope, and methods of nation-building and the problems of political integration, modernization, political culture, communication, and political leadership. The old, feudalistic societies must be transformed into new nations that are "independent," "cohesive," "politically organized" and "internally legitimate." Professor Karl W. Deutsch has pointed out the possibilities:<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Robert E. Ward and Roy C. Macridis, *Comparative Asian Governments Series* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. vi.

<sup>2</sup> Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, *Nation-Building* (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), p. 3.

Nation-building suggests an architectural or mechanical model. As a house can be built from timber, bricks, and mortar, in different patterns, dependence from its setting, and according to the choice, will, and power of its builders, so a nation can be built according to different plans, from various materials, rapidly or gradually, by different sequences of steps, and in partial independence from its environment.

Different political ideologies and political power blocs have emphasized various aspects, methods, orientations and end-products of this phenomenal undertaking. Some stress the "open society" approach—democratic socialism or free enterprise. Others, however, elect totalitarian methods and rigid central control. But the most essential element in successful nation-building must be the individual's commitment to the principle of collective solidarity against stagnation, corruption, feudalism and repression. During the past decades, a few nations such as Malaysia and Israel have made encouraging progress in this direction. The vast majority of the new nations in Asia and Africa, however, have lost their initial dynamism and have become pessimistic. Thus, in many cases, the military coup remains the last alternative to national disintegration or corruption. Many scholars now suggest that "an integrated national identity may be too ambitious a goal for the new nations... that their immediate task is the establishment of a strong governmental apparatus able to serve and control the population."<sup>3</sup> In Asia, in particular, Professor L. W. Pye reminds us, "the fundamental question in all Southeast Asia countries is whether they are going to be able to build the modern organizations necessary for maintaining all the activities associated with modern nationhood."<sup>4</sup> It is clear that without a modernized new social system, no government in any of the new states can perform its functions well. A new social system will require new experience in industrialization and massive conversion of the old structures into the modern ways of life on the part of the peoples of the developing countries. We are reminded not to expect rapid emergence of such a new social system in each of the new states. In the nation-building process, the forces for change are at war with those against it. The unsettling character of internal war within each new state has been carefully noted by Professor Chalmers Johnson who states:<sup>5</sup>

... Between 1946 and 1959 alone, there occurred some 1,200 unequivocal instances of guerrilla war, organized terrorism, mutiny, coup d'états, and so forth. Therefore, barring some unforeseen improvement in men's political judgment, the future of revolution seems assured.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 117.

<sup>4</sup> Lucian W. Pye, *Southeast Asia's Political Systems* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 77.

<sup>5</sup> Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 172.

A new social system will also depend on a long period of sustained social mobilization which itself may demonstrate, at least, some "eleven principal characteristics" in a state that is undergoing the process of social mobilization.<sup>6</sup> Professor Lucian Pye considers these characteristics of change in terms of six major crises of political development in the new states:<sup>7</sup> the identity crisis, the legitimacy crisis, the penetration crisis, the participation crisis, the integration crisis, and the distribution crisis.

In short, it is not easy to identify the complex political, social, economic, cultural, psychological and religious elements of change in a transitional society. The process of change is further complicated by a lack of human and material resources in the new states to facilitate the inevitable process of modernization so as to avoid chaos and disruption. Outside powers, in their own self-interests, within the cold war context, have further aggravated the already difficult task for each developing state in Asia and Africa. But without their assistance, the task of nation-building may be further impeded. The democratic institutions imported by Asian and African countries have largely failed for lack of political leadership. Many Asian and African political leaders have lost much of the optimism of a previous decade. This failure has led either to an immediate military takeover in some countries, or to the challenge, both covert and open, of left-wingers, in others. In some new states that have experienced neither a military coup nor leftwing subversion, a precarious civilian leadership has relied heavily on military loyalty and support.

The rising influence of the military does not, however, apply to the Latin American scene, where the military establishment is part of, or identifiable with, the existing political system and bureaucracy. The existing literature on Latin America supports this conclusion.<sup>8</sup> Latin American nations have developed during the past one hundred years a pattern of military intervention which is unique and therefore defies comparison with the role of the military in the new nations. Professor Janowitz clarifies the difference:<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *The American Political Science Review*, LV, No. 3 (September 1961), pp. 493-514.

See also Wayne A. Wilcox, *Asia and United States Policy* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 39-40. The eleven characteristics are: (1) increased exposure to modern communications, (2) growth of mass media, (3) increase in formal political participation, (4) growth of literacy, (5) change of place of residence, (6) population growth, (7) decreasing percentage of work force in agriculture, (8) urbanization, (9) assimilation into the dominant cultural pattern, (10) growth of national income, and (11) growth of per capita income.

<sup>7</sup> Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. 62-66.

<sup>8</sup> John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964) and Robert D. Putnam "Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin America," *World Politics*, Vol. XX, No. 1, 1967, p. 37.

<sup>9</sup> Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. v.

It appears at first glance that Latin American nations are also confronted with similar crises of civilian-military relations. But there are fundamental differences in the natural history of militarism in South America. The forms of military intervention represent more than a century of struggle and accommodation which has produced political institutions different from those found in the new nations.

## II

The failure of the charismatic leaders and political parties naturally creates a leadership vacuum which is automatically filled by the modernized military profession at a time of leftist threat to the nation-building in which the military has a serious stake. Military coup has, therefore, become "a crucial institution and power bloc."<sup>10</sup> In many new states, military coups succeed because the people rarely question the legitimacy of the takeover, nor do they understand the super-imposed post-independence political elite leadership. Besides, political instability, pessimism and economic failure simply encourage the populace to accept austere discipline and a fresh change. Furthermore, the non-political generals and heroes are usually popular with the masses. A more basic explanation for staging a military coup seems to have been quite accurately put by Professor Morris Janowitz:<sup>11</sup>

Changing technology creates new patterns of combat and thereby modifies organizational behavior in the military. The more complex the technology of warfare, the narrower are the differences between military and non-military establishments, because more officers have managerial and technical skills applicable to civilian enterprise.

With its control of the instruments of violence, free from political factionalism and regional interests, the military, identified also with national purpose, rural background, and urgent modernization, do not have a strong loyalty to the political elite of the upper class. It is, therefore, not difficult for the successful coup leaders to develop a wide mass political apparatus to consolidate their own political power. In explanation of the role that the military play in modern China, one specialist states that "the military stand out because in a disrupted society they represent the only effective organized element capable of competing for political power and formulating public policy."<sup>12</sup>

As political, social and economic crises accentuate and as frustration and disappointment continue to mount, the military becomes increasingly restless and moves toward the central task of nation-building. The Indonesian army, for example, acted to prevent the palace coup in 1965. The Philippine army in the early 1950's successfully wiped out the Huk rebellion and saved the nation's democratic institutions. South

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. vi.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>12</sup> Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development, op. cit.*, p. 183.

Vietnam and Laos are awaiting the outcome of the military contest that will determine their future.

In the Middle East, the military is always prepared to effect a realignment of political forces. Among the African countries Algeria, Egypt, the Congo (Leopoldville), Sudan, Ghana, Nigeria and Dahomey are all presently experiencing or have recently experienced military rule.<sup>13</sup> It is no longer possible, therefore, to ignore the increasing role of the military in the task of nation-building.

The military leaders in the new states are best informed about the outside world and are extremely exposed to foreign influence through travel and military training abroad. They can compare and judge the success or failure of their own civilian government. They are, by origin, sensitive to the feelings of the rural population. Thus, they feel free to support, destroy, or replace the civilian leadership as they see fit. Those who have participated in the independence movement also look upon themselves as guardians of the territorial integrity of the nation. They have been the first to acquire organizational skills and technological capabilities. The military leaders are, therefore, most anxious to unite and develop national resources and new codes of social justice. But the military are short of the usual patience and cannot tolerate political and social chaos. They think more can be achieved through discipline and regimentation. Politicians, to the generals, are corrupt and deceptive, even though the military leaders and the civilian politicians may have the same objectives for their nation. They feel obliged to take over when the politicians fail to implement these objectives.

Recent events demonstrate that the military coup is useful only as a political makeshift. Most of the military regimes have not proved capable of governing for long terms. Democratic institutions and leadership in Malaysia and the Philippines have been largely free from the military influence. Other nations in Asia have relied in various degree on the military during crucial moments of national development. In Indonesia, for example, the military regime under the acting president, Suharto, has only recently launched the task of nation-building. The achievement of his regime cannot be evaluated at this early stage. Three earlier Asian military coups in Korea, Burma and Pakistan, on the other hand, have been identified with the task of nation-building and can, therefore, be studied for their contribution to the science of nation-building.

There seem to be several features common to all three coups. Each took place after one decade or longer of civilian rule. In each country, furthermore, the military had performed a necessary function in the initial stage of nation-building in presenting outright internal

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Chris Janowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22 have detailed information in Table 2 of armed forces, level of spending in armament, etc.

revolt as in Burma (1948), or in defending a territorial claim as in the Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir (1947). It is interesting to observe that at the time of the coups in all three countries, there was no imminent threat of internal or external communist takeover of the civilian government. Furthermore, neither of the three countries had had any genuine experience with effective two-party politics. Nor had any of them effected significant economic progress. It is necessary, on the other hand, to note several dissimilarities. First of all, the Korean coup of May, 1961 was against the continuation of President Rhee's corruption, inefficiency and political factionalism, which had provoked a spontaneous student eruption stemming from a sense of frustration and hopelessness with regard to the Rhee regime.<sup>14</sup> The 1962 coup in Burma, however, was not at all preceded by massive student riot. The coup was at first hinted and later plotted by the army at the rank and file level. The proven leadership of General Ne Win was the best alternative to that of U Nu. In the case of Pakistan, the coup was undertaken by Ayub Khan, the Defense Minister and the top general of the army, who had been disenchanted by a power-hungry civilian leadership which for more than a decade and according to Ayub, had corrupted party politics through deception, had deepened the division between East and West Pakistan through ceaseless argument over the role of the Islamic religion in the new state and had threatened to destroy the unity achieved during the dispute with India over Kashmir. The senior generals who led the coups in Pakistan and Burma were men who had won national prestige and popularity, but the Korean, General Park, was little known and during the early days of the military regime had to share political leadership with other generals.

The increasing role of the military in the politics and development of new states should stimulate more research on the function of military coups. Case studies and empirical knowledge are needed to construct models and theories in order to predict, explain and control military coups. We need to know the general conditions under which they are effected, their aims and tactics, the type of leadership that they call forth, and the popular responses to them in Asian and African countries. For example, what are the shortcomings of the generals? And what part does a military coup play in the process of nation-building? Can a Latin American type of coup be prevented in Asia and Africa? If so, how to prevent it? Many other questions can be asked. The following pages will consider the highlights of the three Asian coups in the hope that a theory on the function of military coups in the new states may emerge.

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<sup>14</sup> William A. Douglas, "Korean Students and Politics," *Asian Survey*, Vol. III, No. 12 (December 1963), p. 586.

## III

From August 15, 1948, the birthdate of the Republic of Korea, to April 28, 1960, when at the age of eighty-five, he rode through the streets of Seoul lined with cheering and weeping crowds, President Syngman Rhee guided the nation in his high-handed and stubborn way through various crises. The new republic, at the very start, was handicapped by a lack of industrial resources and other economic shortcomings, and by the problem of absorbing the refugees from North Korea. But not until early 1950, and "only then under heavy pressure from the United States, did Rhee come to grips with the serious inflation threatening his country."<sup>15</sup> While the President was consolidating his position during early years in office, the already faction-ridden legislative assembly was constantly fighting on behalf of landowners and other special interest groups. After more than 25 years of Japanese Imperialism, there was no awareness of and dedication to the new task of nation-building and modernization. Foremost in President Rhee's mind were two objectives: national unification on his own terms and a diplomatic settlement with Japan based on his own stiffening demands. Rhee's age, stubbornness, and strong suspicion of disloyalty alienated him from his cabinet members and the Korean people generally. His long tenure as president was best summarized as follows:<sup>16</sup>

... For Rhee time was rapidly running out. But in his hillside mansion Rhee worked in the morning, napped in the afternoon, and pattered in his garden. An appalling amount of his time was spent on trivia. . . . The R.O.K. cabinet met at varying intervals, but it was prone to go for long periods without meeting at all. It was characteristic of the Rhee administration that the cabinet had little function in policy-making: it merely listened to Rhee to expound it.

Finally, the rigging of the 1960 election touched off a student revolt against corruption, factionalism and in search for modernization and new leadership. The Korean army allowed Rhee to fall, apparently unwilling and perhaps unable to take over until 13 months after his fall. In the meantime the Democratic Party regime under Mr. John M. Chang tried but failed to provide a viable alternative to Rhee's misgovernment. The students, who were hopelessly divided in 1960, could not organize themselves into a sustaining political power, except in that spontaneous eruption of power in the street on April 19, 1960 as reported by Professor Douglas:<sup>17</sup>

It was completely the students' show, for the adults merely stood on the sidewalks and applauded. The students surged down the streets, burning

<sup>15</sup> Richard C. Allen, *Korea's Syngman Rhee*, (Tokyo, Japan: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1960), p. 105.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 219.

<sup>17</sup> William A. Douglas, "Korean Students and Politics," p. 585.

police stations, invading the homes of rich Liberals (Rhee's political party), and converging on government buildings. The next day the army refused to move against the students, and within a few days Rhee resigned.

The only alternative, therefore, was the coup staged by a small number of young and dedicated generals on May 19, 1961. They were the best hope that South Korea would begin seriously to undertake the task of building a new nation in her own image. They were "determined to save their country from chaos, corruption, and communism." As recalled by President Park later, the purpose of the coup was to create:<sup>18</sup>

The need for a great human revolution in Korea that would produce a basic change in national ethics and character; the liberation of Korea from poverty via a major developmental program; and the establishment of a welfare democracy free from the historic curses of corruption, factionalism, and class fixation.

The military Junta consisted of a 25-man Supreme Council of National Reconstruction (SCNR) under General Park Chung-hee. The SCNR abolished the existing constitution, disbanded political parties and suspended freedom of press and association. The military government arrested and sentenced 300 of 4,369 persons listed on an earlier blacklist.<sup>19</sup> During 1962, the Junta won the voters' approval of a new constitution which prepared the way for the May, 1963 election. The 4-1 margin by which the new constitution was approved, 20 months after the coup, was a strong indication that the voters apparently felt the military government represented their interests. This attitude was strengthened by the broad "social background of the cabinet ministers and SCNR members (serving) under the Military Government." This broadened participation sharply distinguished this government from all previous governments since 1948. In contrast to the Rhee and Chang regimes which were dominated by educators, professional politicians, career civil servants, and lawyers recruited from the upper classes, most of the post-coup leaders in the military government were sons of small landholders or laborers. The government's dedication to modernization and social mobilization was fully recognized by the Korean intellectuals:<sup>20</sup>

The May Revolution of 1961 produced a rather drastic shift in the nature of political leadership. Younger military men came to power, many of them from very different backgrounds than had been traditional for post war leaders. . . . The future of Korea may well depend upon the emergence of such patterns. The obstacles to social mobility — both traditional and modern

<sup>18</sup> Robert A. Scalapino, "Korea: The Politics of Change," *Asian Survey*, Vol. III, No. 1 (January, 1963), p. 31.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>20</sup> Bal-Ho Hahn and Kyu-Taik Kim, "Korean Political Leaders (1952-1962): Their Social Origins and Skill," *Ibid.*, Vol. III, No. 17 (July 1963), p. 323.

—must be removed, and all qualified persons must be eligible for active political life if the pressing problems of Korean society are to be seriously tackled, and if the confidence in government is to be fully established.

This same concern for social mobility must have haunted General Park before the May coup of 1961 as he himself recalled:<sup>21</sup>

Especially painful has been our national suffering since the Liberation in 1945; in the course of the past 17 years, two corrupt and graft-ridden regimes created the basis of today's crisis, keynoted by a vicious circle of want and misery.

But, I wonder, is there no way for national regeneration? Is there no way to mend our decayed national character and build a sound and democratic state? Is there not some way to accomplish a "human revolution," so that our people may stop telling lies, cast away the habits of sycophancy and indoence, and make a new start as industrious workers, carry out social reform, and build a country without paupers, a country of prosperity and affluence?

In short, he wanted to eliminate privileged class, political factionalism, and autocratic feudalism. In their places he pledged to provide social justice, economic equality, and human freedom. Democracy failed in Korea, he believed, because "we attempted to implant it while retaining semi-feudal forces." He justified his military coup, furthermore, as the last hope for Korea after 36 years of Japanese Imperial rule, 12 years of Rhee's dictatorship, and one year of chaos under the regime of John M. Chang. Park called his coup of May 1961 the "Surgical operation" for the emergence of "a new elite of capable and competent leaders from the younger generation to provide a new kind of government and administration."<sup>22</sup>

It is relevant to cite a few of the major achievements of President Park's last eight years in office. First of all, political power passed from the Rhee generation to the Junta generals during the first two years after the coup. The young leaders realized that political stability and economic progress would result only through a mass political party's pressing for various reforms. In the first national election of October 15, 1963, the anti-Junta "old politicians" reemerged to compete against Park's presidential candidacy. But he defeated the old forces in a very close but honest election.<sup>23</sup> Political stability during the next four years was highlighted by steady economic progress. President Park's new leadership seems to have replaced frustration with confidence. One writer has reported:<sup>24</sup>

<sup>21</sup> President Chung-hee Park, *Our Nation's Path* (Seoul, Korea: Dong-A Publishing Co., 1962), p. 3.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 660.

<sup>23</sup> Chong-sik Lee, "Korea in Search of Stability," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (January 1964), p. 659 (Park won by 1.55% of popular votes—156,028 votes out of some 10,081,200 valid votes cast).

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 660.

The remarkable achievement of the first Five Year Plan (1962-66) gave the Korean people, for the first time, a sense of self-assurance and confidence. Defeatism and fatalistic pessimism, reinforced by years of frustration and misgovernment, have disappeared. Koreans have gained strength and a sense of pride in their realistic vision of becoming one of the most industrialized nations in Asia by 1971.

Thus, in the presidential election of May, 1967, Park easily defeated his chief opponent by 1,162,125 or 10.5% of the total votes.<sup>25</sup> The prestige of this "New Korea" is mounting. Korea has also been praised for the performance of her well-trained soldiers now fighting the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. South Korea's strong anti-communist stand and her effort to create a new Asian regional bloc have brought serious concern and fear to North Korea. Of all the achievements since the coup of 1961, economic progress and planning has been the most startling. Former U.S. Undersecretary of State, George W. Ball, who headed the U.S. Investment and Trade Exploratory Mission to Korea in March, 1967, said in Seoul:<sup>26</sup>

Korea is a land where the yeast is working. What most impresses every American who comes to this beautiful country is a sense of vitality, a sense of determination, a feeling of surging strength, the persuasive confidence of a great country and a great people that have found their way toward progress.

The statistics of growth fully justify Mr. Ball's statement. Since 1962, for example, the gross national product has increased 8.5 per cent annually. Exports have gained by almost 50 per cent. Industrial annual production increases by 14 per cent. By 1971 self-sufficiency in food production may be achieved.<sup>27</sup> In short, economic progress seems to be nearing the take-off point. The Second Five-Year Plan is being carried out on schedule. The spirit of revival since the military coup has been expansive. Such a miraculous economic growth should be studied by policy-makers of all nations of similar size and with similar problems. Social scientists everywhere, especially in the United States, may find in Korea the key to progress in the new states of Asia and Africa.

Political stability and economic progress, however, may be interrupted or seriously reversed when the Democratic-Republican Party searches in 1971 for a popular and able candidate to replace President Park Chung-Lee, who is barred by the constitution from seeking a third term. The course of politics, especially the revival of the "old politics" of the Rhee era, may, in 1971 challenge the institutional stability and political charisma of the Park era. Whatever the long-term prospect

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<sup>25</sup> Soon Sung Cho, "Korea: Election Year" *Asian Survey*, Vol. 8, No. 1, (January 1968).

<sup>26</sup> Tristan E. Peplat, "Korea's Economic Growth Stirs Investors, Traders" *Korean Report*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1967), Embassy of Korea, Washington, D.C., p. 9.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

for the Korean people may be, South Korea will never revert completely to the pre-1961 era. The military coup has saved South Korea from hopelessness and put the country on the path of social mobilization and the task of nation-building. In his second inaugural address on July 1, 1967, President Park restated the nature of that task in these words:<sup>28</sup>

Our enemies are poverty, corruption, and communism. . . . Poverty negates life, represses man's gifted talents to flower, and strangles his honesty, sincerity and originality; corruption paralyzes his conscience and encroaches upon fraternity; while communism deprives us of freedom, dignity, and conscience.

#### IV

In Burma, as elsewhere in the developing areas, the civilian government failed to solve the problems of nation-building. These problems are so general in nature that no immediate solution is possible. They are, as pointed out by Professor L. W. Pye,<sup>29</sup> "shortage of capital, absence of trained personnel, inadequate social and educational facilities, excessive population in relation to land, and grossly imperfect means for mobilizing both human and material resources." Burma's other difficulties must include conflicts between rural and urban areas, politicians and civil servants, communist insurrection and revolt by ethnic minority during the 12 years of civilian control.<sup>30</sup> The failure of party politics since 1956, especially after 1958, was further aggravated by Prime Minister U Nu's personal inability to translate his popular mandate in the 1960 election into positive authority. After the 1960 election, he became "the most popular Burmese political leader of all time and possessed greater potential influence than any other person or group, including the Army."<sup>31</sup> But he was unable even to resolve factional conflict within his Union Party. The Army, therefore, became increasingly restless. And finally, General Ne Win staged the coup of March 2, 1962 and assumed the task of protecting the country from the "greatly deteriorating conditions." The second most important leader of the coup, Brig. Aung Gyi, best expressed the concerns of the rank-and-file members of the army:<sup>32</sup>

In Burma we had economic, religious, political crises, with the issue of federalism as the most important reason for the coup. . . . A small country like Burma cannot afford division. The states enjoy autonomy and the right of secession guaranteed by the constitution, but if secession were to be exercised, small and independent Burma would sink like Laos and Vietnam.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>29</sup> Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building: Burma's Search for Identity*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. xv.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapters 15, 16 and 17 on problems of search for new identity.

<sup>31</sup> Richard A. Butwell, *U Nu of Burma* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 245.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 241.

During the early 1950's the internal unity of AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League) was strong enough to meet the challenges of communist insurrection and the complaints of other political parties. However, after the 1956 election the strong influence of the National Unity Front (NUF) and other minor parties broke the personal charismatic leadership of U Nu. He was forced to resign temporarily the premiership in order to rebuild his party. His resignation was, perhaps, responsible for the formation of hostile factions in April, 1958. This split, therefore, reduced the parliamentary majority of the government and thus brought out the serious concerns from the army in 1958. Professor F. N. Trager wrote:<sup>33</sup>

Several times during 1958, the Armed Forces, speaking through Commander-In-Chief Ne Win and his close associates, made it clear that they would assist any government to keep law and order, would impartially refrain from playing politics. General Ne Win warned both AFPFL factions against the use of violence, cautioned Prime Minister Nu against accepting parliamentary support from the communists, and rejected all attempts at inducting any of the surrendering rebels into the armed forces.

This candid willingness of the military to help caused U Nu, in 1958, to broadcast his invitation to General Ne Win to form a caretaker government which would remain in power until the elections, now postponed to April, 1959.

The personal integrity of General Ne Win and the military's concern for national unity made it very easy for politicians to accept the formation of a caretaker government by General Ne Win. His appointment of an all-civilian cabinet during the first six months confirmed their confidence. In "guarding the conditions for democracy,"<sup>34</sup> the Army achieved "a most respected position." Such a transfer of power was very unique. Generals do not usually win such confidence and respect from political parties. This could not have happened in either South Korea or Pakistan.

The coup of 1962 was acceptable because the leader of the coup, Ne Win, had an excellent record of achievement, including heroic contributions to win the civil war. The populace had full knowledge of General Ne Win who had been a close follower of Bogyoke Aung San, the George Washington of Burma. Ne Win had been Commander-In-Chief of the Army since 1949, Defense Minister, and Deputy Prime Minister in U Nu's cabinet. The caretaker government (1958-60) was unusually efficient and fully implemented its promises before relinquishing its powers in April, 1960, after the election of U Nu as premier.

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<sup>33</sup> Frank N. Trager, *Burma, From Kingdom to Republic* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 172 and also both chapters 8 and 9 are most relevant to the coup.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 180.

This election made him immediately unchallengeable in the parliament.<sup>35</sup> As a result, democratic institutions failed again and the Burmese search for identity continued.

The crucial factor of the military coup on March 2, 1962, was, of course, a personal tragedy for U Nu. The coup was an indication of incompatibility between U Nu's ability to win a smashing election as a statesman, who unfortunately turned to traditionalism after the election, and his inability to reconcile conflicts among his followers. Premier U Nu's downfall was largely due to certain misguided policies. In particular, the adoption of Buddhism as the state religion and the promise of new statehood for the Arakanese and the Mons at the expense of national unity proved unacceptable to many of U Nu's own followers. On the other hand, lack of a firm and clear policy toward the insurrectionists, the communists, and his decision to resign as head of the Union Party became intolerable to the army officers. All these difficulties culminated in his reshuffling of the army, the closing of the National Defense College and the creation of a Central Intelligence Organization. Thus a showdown was in the making between U Nu and the Army. When, in 1962, the military coup came, "most articulate Burmese" responded with "reserved approval."<sup>36</sup> The leaders of the coup were well-known and respected by all political factions, especially since Ne Win's capabilities and integrity had already been demonstrated. The disillusionment with party politics, therefore, gave support to a military leadership that might once again reconcile the various political factions and then return Burma to civilian government.

Ne Win's government, however, proved somewhat disappointing. It neither fully succeeded in achieving a coalition party in the pattern of AFPFL nor has "the Burmese Way to Socialism" achieved the success expected during the seven years since the coup.<sup>37</sup> The Revolutionary Council has encouraged a Burmese way of life as "a revulsion from western ways." This might be the means to legitimize or rationalize its power and leadership. Whether the Revolutionary Council will ultimately succeed in building "a single political community based on a Burmese culture" remains to be seen. The single united party conceived on the principle of democratic centralism has not been as successful as the Democratic-Republican Party built by General Park in South Korea. Ne Win himself publicly acknowledged that the economy was

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<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 186-87.

<sup>36</sup> John H. Badgley, "Burma's Military Government" in *Garrisons and Government: Politics and the Military in New States*, Wilson C. Williams (Ed.), (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1967), p. 171.

<sup>37</sup> For details and evaluation see the following: John Badgley, "Burma: The Nexus of Socialism and Two Political Traditions," *Asian Survey*, (February 1963) and Fred R. von der Mehden, "The Burmese Way to Socialism," *Ibid.*, (March, 1963), Vol. III No. 2.

still "in a mess" four years after the coup.<sup>38</sup> According to specialists on Burma, the Revolutionary Council has scored no dramatic success in any area.<sup>39</sup> It is still confronted with the problems posed by ethnic minorities, and insurrectionists, and the opposition of individual Buddhist Monks. However, signs for significant, if not dramatic, changes have appeared. One was Ne Win's visit to the United States in September, 1966. Another was the interest he showed in rejoining the Colombo powers in an effort to improve relations with the West.

Above all, the sudden crisis with Communist China since 1967 might have serious consequences in Burma's task of nation-building. The earlier hostility to foreigners has abated. As one specialist observed, "There can be no doubt that Burma is moving with increasing speed back into an international life that was temporarily rejected five years ago."<sup>40</sup>

Complete economic socialism, or total government management of the economy of the new nations, seems destined to failure. The economic stagnation of North Vietnam and North Korea appears in clear contrast to the bright mixed-economics of Malaysia, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea. Several factors may be responsible for the economic retardedness of Burma. First of all, the Revolutionary Council has pushed "the Burmese Way to Socialism" too far through rapid nationalization, which required far more managerial skill than the regime could provide. Secondly, by the same token, the Ne Win regime has neglected the theory of the "mixed economy" and the indispensable contribution that the private sector makes in stimulating economic growth and competition. Thirdly, the absence of political opposition to the regime has allowed the government to procrastinate in its revision of economic policies and to delay return to civilian rule. Fourthly, the continuation of communist insurgency and the separatist tendency of the ethnic minorities have made the continuation of the military rule and its economic policies easy to justify. In view of these factors, the current crisis with Peking has a much larger meaning to the Revolutionary Council and the people of Burma. They must now sense the urgent need for greater unity in the formulation of political as well as economic policy.

The military regime must also be evaluated in terms of its political role, particularly with respect to the preservation of national unity. The Ne Win regime may have adopted a wrong economic approach to modernization and nation-building. But it has, on the other hand,

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<sup>38</sup> *New York Times*, December 13, 1965.

<sup>39</sup> For details and evaluation see Josef Silverstein, "Burma: Ne Win's Revolution Reconsidered," *Asian Survey*, (Feb., 1966), pp. 95-102; and also Frank N. Tager, "Burma: 1967 — A Better Ending Than Beginning," *Ibid.*, (February, 1967), pp. 110-190.

<sup>40</sup> John H. Badgley, "Burma's China Crisis: The Choice Ahead," *Asian Survey*, (November, 1967), p. 757.

prevented a catastrophic sequence of events that threatened to develop from the political disunity which plagued the regime of Premier U Nu. The coup assured the majority of the people of an alternative to political chaos without significantly altering the democratic character of nation-building. As the military continues to weigh the balance for the forces of national integrity, the civilian leaders and the political groups of the nation find an opportunity to prepare themselves to take over more effectively the task of governing. Politics and politicians need time to heal old wounds and make compromises. Only then, can they organize themselves to meet the task imposed on them. Furthermore, law and order in the last seven years has never been seriously threatened. The life of the people has never been unnecessarily interfered with by the military regime. Clearly, what General Ne Win feared to happen and what he sought to preserve might have been fully carried out. But what he expected of his regime in the way of economic progress and political reform has not been accomplished. The military failed to achieve in Burma what General Park achieved in South Korea. What is most significant has been the fact that twice Burma has turned to the military for the maintenance of its national integrity in 1958, when it invited Ne Win to take over; and in 1962, when a military coup again put Ne Win in power with only the "reserved approval" of the nation.

Would other countries in Asia and Africa be able to avoid a period of military rule in the process of becoming modern nations and states, if national unity were threatened as happened in Burma? Political process in Laos, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia have, at one time or other, relied on the military for national survival when faced with internal threat. The military intervention, therefore, is clearly a "preventive alternative."<sup>41</sup> The crisis with China may help Ne Win now to achieve what he could not accomplish otherwise during the past seven years. In time of external challenge, it is often easy to unite internally. The Revolutionary Council has now the support to meet the crisis with Peking. As F. N. Frager has pointed out:<sup>42</sup>

There is little doubt that the conduct of Communist China against the Revolutionary government of General Ne Win has brought a kind of closing-of-the-ranks in Burma. After having released some 5,000 detained political prisoners in October, 1957 — including an ex-president and several cabinet ministers — the Revolutionary Council at the end of February 1968 virtually completed the process of releasing detainees. All prominent political, military, ethnic and journalistic leaders and civil servants who had been under arrest — some since 1962 — were released. The "Shan Resistance Movement" by

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<sup>41</sup> Guy J. Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," *World Politics*, Vol. II, (1959), pp. 325-45.

<sup>42</sup> Frank N. Trager, "Sino-Burmese Relations: The End of the Pauk Phaw Era," *Orbis*, Vol. XI, No. 4, (Winter 1968), p. 1052.

its own testimony in opposition since 1958, publicly announced on March 4 "that it is now time for greater cooperation and understanding between the Shan and Burmese people" because of the renewed activities of the Burma Communist Party and its foreign backers. . . . This threat of a Communist takeover is, we feel, enormous and serious.

It may be significant to relate the lack of any spectacular achievement on the part of the Revolutionary Council to the lack of an external enemy that would create among the citizens a sense of national urgency and unite the citizens in support of their government. The coup of May, 1961, in South Korea, for example, was helped by the shadowy threat of North Korea. The tense struggle among the leaders of the Korean coup made urgent a rapid return to constitutional government with broad participation. The military coup in Pakistan did capitalize on the Kashmir crisis with India as an external threat to Pakistan's national integrity. In Burma, however, Ne Win's continuation of a neutralist foreign policy and his militant stand against all foreign influences have in isolating the nation, provided a false sense of security and a general complacency. Now Communist China has provided an external target for the Revolutionary Council to focus national attention and to rededicate the people to the task of nation-building. The anti-Burmese propaganda of China might further incite the people of Burma to action. For example, the New China News Agency said:<sup>43</sup>

The reactionary Ne Win government has been sabotaging relations between China and Burma under the label of Burma-China Friendship. Now when class contradictions within Burma have become more acute, the reactionary Ne Win government's hostility toward China has become more exposed, and it finally embarked on the path of opposing China in an all-round way . . . last year (1966), the reactionary Burmese government . . . outrageously stirred up a nationwide anti-China and anti-Chinese campaign last June.

## V

Pakistan never had a pre-colonial national history or identity of its own. From 1947 to 1958 the country suffered numerous changes and uncertainties. Political leadership of this infant nation took an early casualty in 1948 with the death of the Founding Father, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. Until 1958 political parties have waxed, waned and suffered eclipse. Political leaders have argued, intrigued and reduced each other to "impotence."<sup>44</sup> The country was essentially run by civil servants with the backing of the Army. The search for a national identity was complicated by the fact that inherent in the faith of Islam, to which the majority of the people belong, is the belief that "religion pervades

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1037-38.

<sup>44</sup> Keith Gallard, *Pakistan. A Political Study* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), p. 5.

all aspects of life, private and public. Islam is a complete way of life."<sup>45</sup> The secular state is unacceptable to many orthodox Muslims. Other problems facing the nation during the first decade of its existence were the disparity between East and West Pakistan (in population, natural resources, and living standards), adoption of a national language, relations between the state and Islamic religion, and especially economic stagnation. In the view of General Mohammed Ayub Khan and many of his officers, the politicians "had brought the nation to the verge of disintegration." In one of his speeches, President Ayub Khan said:<sup>46</sup>

These people had made politics a profession and democracy a toy to fondle with. Their only business was to misguide the people by making fiery speeches and raining empty slogans from time to time and acquire personal power... Their only wish is that the same outmoded system should again return to the country wherein disruption, misguidedness, and selfishness should have their play...

Thus, the inevitable military coup that came on October 7, 1958, was hailed by the nation as a "peaceful revolution." The military brought an end to the parliamentary government. It dissolved all three legislatures, dismissed the cabinet, abrogated the 1956 constitution, abolished political parties, and eliminated the office of the Prime Minister. General Ayub Khan became Martial Law Chief Administrator. Twenty days later he became president and created a presidential cabinet. The entire country came under his personal (totalitarian) control until June 8, 1962. The new president proclaimed that his purpose was to "clean up the mess" and to "attack the problems of smuggling, black-marketing, and corruption."<sup>47</sup> He also promised to give the country a workable new constitution for effective democracy as dictated by internal conditions.

The charismatic new leader retained the national integration formula as envisioned by the 1956 constitution. His new "constructive problem-solving approach to the political arena" was his emphasis on modernization. He was devoted to creating confidence among the people in the destiny of Pakistan. His immediate concern was to maximize the rate of economic growth.<sup>48</sup> Ayub ignored, at first, the need for a political party to carry out the long-term task of nation-building. He chose instead civil servants to execute his plans for economic growth. He recognized that the fate of the nation depended on solutions to

<sup>45</sup> Robert T. Campbell, *Pakistan: Emerging Democracy* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1963), p. 8.

<sup>46</sup> Donald N. Wilber, *Pakistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture* (New Haven, Conn. Human Relations Area Files, Inc., HRAF Press, 1964), p. 231.

<sup>47</sup> Keith Callard and Richard S. Wheeler in *Major Governments of Asia*, George Mct. Kahin (Ed.), (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1963, Second Edition), p. 440.

<sup>48</sup> Talukder, Maniruzzaman. "National Integration and Political Development in Pakistan," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 7 (December, 1967), p. 878.

many problems concerning national integration and unity. Under Ayub, Land Reform, for example, was successfully accomplished.<sup>49</sup> The rural reconstruction program was able to attract massive participation of the people in each locale. The stagnant economy of the previous decade gave way to notable success. Average increase in GNP was 5.3 per cent for several years. This was twice the rate of the increase in population. He made it possible for per capita gross income to rise faster in East Pakistan than in West Pakistan, thus reversing their comparative growth rates. The same high rate of annual income was registered for East Pakistan in agriculture and manufacturing. Furthermore, the success of the Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65) has brought a large number of industrial enterprises to East Pakistan. In spite of the regionalism that has risen in recent years in opposition to the central government, the President has pressed ahead his third Five-Year Plan (1965-70) and narrowed the economic gap between East and West Pakistan. He took strict and authoritarian measures against "disruptionists" who interfered with national economic and cultural integration. Reforms have been made in education, public health, fiscal systems and law courts. The object of these reforms is to get the nation to initiate long-term development and "to achieve socio-economic growth in as short a time as possible."<sup>50</sup> For example, industrial growth can be measured by consumption of iron and steel, the demand for which has increased over 500 per cent between 1958 and 1964. During the same period the number of schools has increased by many thousands. New technical universities, professional colleges, and vocational schools were built as scheduled in recent years.

In contrast to Burma, Pakistan's economic planning has not followed a "dogmatic or doctrinaire" approach. Government investment has been heavy. Private enterprise has been fully supported and protected by the government. The President in 1964 boasted of the "healthy and cheerful contrast to the nearly bankrupt economy of five years ago."<sup>51</sup> He pledged "full political support to socio-economic planning." And thus he made economic growth the "primary goal" of all his efforts. The long range 20-year Perspective Plan (reaching 1980) included the following policy objectives:<sup>52</sup> (1) a tripling of GNP; (2) elimination of dependence on foreign assistance; (3) provision of full employment; (4) parity in per capita income of the two regions; (5) universal literacy. In short, this record of economic progress could not have been achieved without the political stability and preservation of law and

<sup>49</sup> George Mct. Kahin, (Ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 510-514.

<sup>50</sup> President Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Pakistan Perspective* (The Embassy of Pakistan, Washington, D.C., 1966), p. 83.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 91.

<sup>52</sup> Sandra Richard, "A View of Pakistan's Industrial Development," *Asian Survey*, Vol. V. (December 1965), p. 951.

order. The personal strength, persuasive power, and coercive pressure of President Ayub Khan, aided by democratic planning, have generated hope and confidence in the country's economic future.

President Ayub Khan showed a stern and determined commitment to the reform of political institutions. He was committed to the concept of "guided democracy" or "basic democracy," as he called it. He emphasized that "he was not satisfied with short term, makeshift political improvisations. Instead, his primary efforts would be directed toward the long-range system that could guide economic and social change."<sup>53</sup> Long before the October coup of 1958, he had developed his "definite ideas" for delivering the nation from a "chronic and devastating political instability." As early as 1954 when he served as defense minister, he issued a memorandum which "proposed a strong presidential system... a decentralized administrative system, and local development boards. Perhaps most interesting of all, were his comments on the electoral process. He did not disguise his distrust of universal suffrage."<sup>54</sup>

The new constitution President Ayub Khan presented to the nation in March, 1962, included many new features. It provided, as noted already, for a presidential form of government which gave enormous power to the President. The President is, for example, helped by a Council of Ministers who may not have any voting rights in the National Assembly. An electoral college of some 120,000 "elected members" would select the President.<sup>55</sup> The Ayub constitution reflected a serious distrust of political parties and public opinion. Until 1964, when the first amendment was passed by the National Assembly, it did not contain even a list of the fundamental rights of citizens. There was a gradual tendency, however, toward more institutional liberalism. For example, the President realized in recent years the need for a mass party and direct popular support if any strong regime is to survive normal political attack.<sup>56</sup> The new constitutional system in one sense, has brought government and the people much closer than before. As one specialist has pointed out:<sup>57</sup>

Political life in Pakistan has reached the stage at which the people have begun to realize that they have power. The shock of Martial Law, the effort of the President to speak directly to the masses, the Basic Democracy elections and the functioning of the various councils... have all combined to extend political awareness and to bring into effective political community new elements. Neither the governments nor the bureaucracies, nor the parties can return completely to the old indifference to popular feelings.

<sup>53</sup> Karl von Vorys, *Political Development in Pakistan* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. x.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xii.

<sup>55</sup> Sushella Kaushik, "Constitution of Pakistan at Work," *Asian Survey*, Vol. III. (August 1963), p. 384.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 387.

<sup>57</sup> George Met. Kahin (Ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 504.

Despite the uncertain outcome of its experiment in government, Pakistan has demonstrated to the world that a military commander, if supported by the armed forces, can occupy the highest political office and put his supporters in policy-making positions. This experiment in government was largely a single general's personal effort.<sup>58</sup>

With unity at home either under martial law or the new constitution, President Ayub Khan was able to conduct a dynamic foreign policy to gain wider recognition and contact for Pakistan. This was achieved largely at the expense of good relations with the United States. Contrary to General Ne Win's deteriorating relations with China since 1967, President Ayub Khan created friendly relations with China. His regime also "displayed increasing resentment towards the United States for offering military aid to India against China."<sup>59</sup> Pakistan insisted that the Chinese danger was being unnecessarily overrated and that American aid to India would ultimately be used against Pakistan. Both China and the Soviet Union have recently improved their relations with Pakistan. Trade, economic aid and personal visits among them have all been increased. The Soviet Union, for example, scored a substantial achievement in bringing about the Tashkent Agreement over the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War.<sup>60</sup> This turnabout and new orientation in Pakistan's foreign policy might have been caused by numerous factors. But the official reason was the massive military build-up provided to India by the United States since 1962. Too proud to accept the status of American satellite, Pakistan, as one author concluded, "has been forced since 1962 to re-evaluate its foreign policy. Its overcommitment in military alliance with anti-communist powers created the paradoxical situation in which... Pakistan had to face across her long frontiers the world's three largest unfriendly nations without getting from her American ally any support..."<sup>61</sup>

The foregoing pages have demonstrated the necessity of a military coup for the building of a modern Pakistan as Ayub Khan saw it in 1958. His achievements were acknowledged by the overwhelming vote of the people in the January 1965 presidential election. The combined opposition parties nominated the most venerable lady of the country, Miss Fatima Jinnah, the sister of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, as his opponent. He was accused of "dictatorship" during his six years in office. But he simply responded with citations of his record of achievements in various reforms and his theme "stability

<sup>58</sup> Karl von Vorys, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

<sup>59</sup> Khalid B. Sayeed, "Pakistan's Constitutional Autocracy," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4, (Winter 1963-64), p. 377.

<sup>60</sup> For full discussion see Mohammed Ahsen Chandri, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 6 (September 1966), pp. 492-500.

<sup>61</sup> George J. Ierski, "The Pakistan-American Alliance: A Reevaluation of the Past Decade," *Ibid.*, Vol. 8, (May 1968), p. 414

versus chaos." The final result of the election was a crushing defeat for Miss Jinnah.<sup>62</sup> In East Pakistan, and with "massive hold in (its) rural areas," the President won by an absolute majority of 52.9%. This victory implied, perhaps, the voters' preference for stability, modernization through reforms, and economic development. However, by 1969, the President's mass political party, the Pakistan Muslim League had apparently failed to integrate the political forces of the nation. Economic process did not prevent his downfall in March, 1969. Nation-building is apparently not a task for one man only. The masses must be won politically to prevent organized resistance. Unfortunately, after one decade of stability, Pakistan is now again under martial law and in search for a new political-institutional formula.

The resignation of President Ayub Khan came on March 25, 1969, after five months of student demonstrations in the streets of Pakistan. The students were for educational reform, but the President's political opponents escalated these demands to a challenge of the entire political system. The President's "basic democracy" was, to his opponents, no more than a disguise for personal dictatorship. In East Pakistan, army troops and demonstrators confronted each other with automatic weapons and bamboo sticks. At first, President Ayub Khan tried to calm the nation by cancelling the emergency regulations in force since 1965, by releasing political prisoners, and by trying to negotiate reforms with his opponents. The strongest of these was his former foreign minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who incited rioting and was violently anti-India. By the middle of February, 1969, the President announced his decision not to seek the presidency in the general election of January 1970. As reported by the *New York Times Magazine* on February 28, 1969, the President's difficulties were the results of his "reluctance to delegate authority." Among other charges were those of corruption. The real cause of the present crisis lay in the fact that the nation's small and divided political elite had been "shut out from power" by the President. Negotiations to end the bloody rioting were hopeless because no amount of concession on the part of the President would satisfy his opponents.

On March 26, 1969, the President resigned from office and turned over the government to the military, which might have caused the resignation in the first place. General Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan, as the newly appointed military dictator under martial law, immediately ended "the state of near anarchy." He promised to prepare for free elections without giving any time schedule. All strikes, demonstrations,

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<sup>62</sup> See Sharifal-Majahid. "Pakistan's Presidential Elections," *Ibid.*, p. 292. (As reported Ayub received 62.7% and Miss Jinnah 36%. West Pakistan gave Ayub 73.3% and Miss Jinnah 26.7%. In the east wing, Ayub received 52.9% and Miss Jinnah 46.5%).

and political meetings have been banned. Nor is the press allowed to criticize the martial law regime. Military courts are being set up under martial law. The new strong man has appointed the chiefs of the Navy and Air Force as deputy martial law administrators. Yahya himself also became the new President under martial law.

Five months of nation-wide street rioting resulting in a new military rule have greatly retarded the task of nation-building. The fall of President Ayub Khan saw the end of his "basic democracy." A period of military regimentation will be followed by a struggle for new national leadership and a new constitutional framework. In his exercise of power, President Ayub Khan could not be accused by anyone of selfishness or a lack of dedication to his people. He was a man of austere dignity and grace. Under his regime the country made rapid economic progress. This could not have been possible without a decade of political stability. The concern for stability which brought him to power in 1958 was emphasized when he declared in a final broadcast to the nation that the situation in the country is fast deteriorating. Administrative institutions are being paralyzed. . . . The economy of the country has been crippled, factories are closing down and production is dwindling every day.

## VI

The brief survey of certain pre-coup conditions to each country indicates a pattern of problems and frustrations arising from the failure of political parties and professional politicians. In each country the military was the only alternative to further chaos and deterioration. The military takeover was met with general approval by a majority of the population. In all three cases, the military leadership committed itself to sweeping reforms and with special emphasis on the welfare of the rural population. All military governments pledged themselves to sweeping economic changes as a major step in national reconstruction. The military regimes, on the whole, achieved much better results than could have been expected from civilian leadership. The military regimes accepted Western political institutions but adapted them to local political traditions or needs.

In all three countries, the military regimes acted swiftly and sometimes offered pragmatic concessions, such as an early return to a constitutional system and a restoration of political parties. But only belatedly did they recognize the need of creating their own political parties. In Korea and Pakistan the Junta leaders presented themselves as presidential candidates under their own new constitutions. Elections in each country were honestly guarded and properly held. The generals won the election on the basis of their reforms and economic achievements.

It can be assumed at this point that, in developing countries, the iron discipline and political stability of military rule are preferred by the people to the inefficiency and instability of democratic government. It may also be assumed that military leaders generally adhered to the pre-coup foreign policy objectives. Thus, they could easily gain diplomatic recognition from concerned foreign powers. One may observe further that the military regimes generally condemned left-wing influence in politics. Thus, military regimes in Asia and Africa can more easily become an ally of the Western democratic countries in the cold war context. Unlike the generals of the Middle East and Latin America, the military leaders of Asia and Africa are far more committed to reform and modernization in their dedication to nation-building. Military leaders seem more fearful of stagnation, deterioration, or national disintegration than any other group in a new nation. For this reason, the major nations in the world must guide and influence the nature and purpose of such military coups. But they ought not by direct interference foster conditions for armed revolt. It may be recalled that "Yankee Imperialism" was often connected with U.S. opposition to certain changes of government in Latin America during the 1920's, a kind of negative intervention.

In short, contemporary military coups in Asia and Africa may be regarded as providing necessary and tolerable periods of transition. The coup is a necessary link in the process of modernization. For the new nations, it seems far better to accept a military government that preserves law and order than to face radical subversives or guerrilla warfare of protracted duration. Greater popular participation in institutional development seems better provided under military than under communist rule. The military coups in Indonesia in 1965 and in Vietnam in 1963 may eventually provide still stronger justification for military rule as a necessary step in the process of nation-building in Asia. Ayub Khan's decision to resign as President of Pakistan, for example, shows that the military is not a permanent threat to the political development of new nations. One writer has observed:<sup>63</sup>

Those organizational and professional qualities which make it possible for the military of a new nation to accumulate political power, and even to take over political power, are the same as those which limit its ability to rule effectively. Thus once political power has been achieved the military must develop mass political organization of a civilian type, or it must work out viable relations with civilian groups.

As a society becomes more modernized and articulate or differentiated, the military will not be able to take over the government and operate it directly. As a general rule, modern societies create a reliable military

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<sup>63</sup> Morris Janowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

profession that usually cannot rule directly.<sup>64</sup> Today in Asia and Africa both military and civilian leaders are needed to carry out the task of nation-building. If the politicians fail, the generals step in when feasible. Should this interdependence become threatened as the result of political corruption or communist threat, the military will almost invariably stage its coup.<sup>65</sup>

In short, the three military governments in Korea, Burma, and Pakistan have demonstrated a pattern or sequence in the process of nation-building as follows:

1. After a decade or so following national independence, party politics had generally failed and was suspended and replaced in many states by the military governments. The new regimes generally embarked on an effective economic development program.
2. The military regimes would eventually realize the absolute need of a political party to run the country. Immediately after a military coup, the generals usually would promise a new and workable constitution and free election. Except in Burma, which has not completed the full cycle of the course, the generals have carried out their promises, offered themselves as civilian candidates and won the elections. Their political careers depended on their organizing strong political parties.
3. No military regimes have through the abuse of political power become so unpopular as the civilian governments which preceded them. They often staff their administrations from a broad base that includes younger men.
4. It may be necessary to think that national unity may depend on the military in Asia and Africa as a final alternative to communist takeover (as in Laos and Indonesia). The coup in each country came with no evidence of immediate and direct influence from the outside. In terms of new direction none of the military regimes moved the nation away from the task of nation-building as charted originally by the politicians. But they have simply made the task of nation-building more successful.

Therefore, one may conclude that the military government is an effective and constructive alternative to chaos, corruption or leftist threat. The military coup is, at least temporarily, a necessary or unavoidable measure for many new nations during their transitional period of modernization and social mobilization.

<sup>64</sup> Wilson C. McWilliams, *Garrisons and Government* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1967), p. 37.

<sup>65</sup> Morris Janowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11, (In the chart he has described five models of civilian-military relations into which he divided some 43 new states in Asia, Africa and the Middle East).