

SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF REVOLUTION

CESAR ADIB MAJUL

FILIPINO NATIONALISM BEGAN AS A PROCESS INITIATED BY AN ETHNIC group trying to transform itself into a national community in order to make operative an original concept of what was believed to constitute individual progress and social betterment. It slowly emerged and developed as a response to what was judged to be the oppressive and exploitative character of foreign domination.

In time, on account of rising expectations from within and pressures from without, it began to generate new values and techniques, although its general direction remained practically unchanged. The revolution against Spain as well as its transformation into a vigorous resistance against the imposition of American sovereignty were resorted to in order to remove formidable obstacles to the formation of a national community which by its very logic implied political independence. The conception of a national community initially germinated in the minds of some members of the relatively more educated and articulate segment of the native population in the Philippines during the last few decades of the nineteenth century. How and why this conception arose as well as what it intended to accomplish were primarily determined by the nature and results of the Spanish Conquest.

At the beginning of Spanish colonialism in the Philippine Archipelago in 1565, what existed in the islands was a constellation of settlements called *barangays*. Generally representing kinship groups under the leadership of *datus*, they included from a dozen to about a hundred families. While some were linked by trade ties; others were isolated from or hostile to one another. Manifesting varying levels of political development and complexity, some had begun to weld themselves into a wider and relatively more centralized political entity where different *datus* looked up to a *rajah* as their overlord. Such wider political entities were already found among Muslims in the southern part of the Archipelago like those under the rule of the *rajahs* of Sulu, Maguindanao, and Buayan.

The Spaniards came to the Philippines with two unambiguous aims: to Christianize the natives and to extend the material domains of the Spanish King. As a corollary to these, those who had served their King well were to earn their reward from the work of the native and the sustenance of the lands conquered. The Spaniards came when the sultanate of Brunei was extending its political and economic sway over the Archipelago. But the fall of Maynila to the Spaniards in 1571, the destruction of Brunei in 1578

and 1581, the abortive Tondo Conspiracy of 1588, and the gradual elimination of Bornean traders from the Islands, doomed to death Brunei's ambitions in the area. Meanwhile, the Spanish *conquistadores* and missionaries, working hand in hand, carried out the pacification of the Archipelago. Although they failed to conquer the major Muslim sultanates in the South, they at least succeeded in checking the political tendency of these sultanates to expand northwards to Mindoro and the Visayas. Also, the Spaniards were not very successful in fully extending their complete sway over the tribes in the mountain fastnesses of Luzon.

The occupation of the areas collectively denominated "Las Islas Filipinas" or "Filipinas" (after Felipe II) was not entirely unopposed by the natives. A few belated attempts by scions of old ruling families to do away with the Spanish presence and recover a claimed leadership never succeeded. The same fate befell organized attempts to revert to the older religion. Quite a significant number of natives fled to the hinterlands, refusing to the very end to accept the new rulers and their strange ways and beliefs. But that as it may, by the opening of the seventeenth century, Filipinas was securely under Spanish domination.

To more effectively consolidate their gains, collect tributes, govern the natives, and Christianize them or at least prevent them from losing the newly acquired faith, the Spanish authorities began to gradually replace the *barangay* system with new social groupings. A process of resettlement was slowly but progressively carried out which eventually established the new towns or *pueblos*. In effect, a town constituted a parish center. But the process of urbanization initiated by the Spaniards took a long time to accomplish.¹ In the eighteenth century, Spanish authorities were still trying hard to encourage natives living in the mountains to come down and settle in organized communities.

As a reward to those adventurous subjects who had dared to cross strange seas into unknown frontiers to extend his Empire, the Spanish King authorized the *encomienda* system. In certain delineated areas, deserving *conquistadores* or colonizers were granted *encomienda* privileges among which was the authority to collect for themselves part of the tribute. In return, the *encomienderos* were charged with the task of looking after the educational and religious needs of the natives. The *encomienda* served as a very effective arm of the government in its efforts to control the natives, preserve Christianity, and even to collect its revenues, but the invariant rapacity of the *encomienderos* and continuous ecclesiastical objections to the system eventually brought about its dissolution by the end of the eighteenth century.

¹ The most recent work on Spanish attempts at urbanization in the Philippines is Robert R. Reed, *Hispanic Urbanization in the Philippines: A Study of the Impact of Church and State* (Manila: The University of Manila, 1967).

Apart from paying the tribute, the pacified natives, with a few exceptions, rendered forced labor which lasted for a certain number of days a year. To protect the natives (called *indios*, since the term "Filipino" was reserved for Spaniards born in the Philippines) from the rapacity and abuses of adventurers as well as to moderate the conflicts that might ensue from the impact of an advanced civilization on a basically agricultural people, the Laws of the Indies were applied to them. But whereas earlier, these laws tended to protect the *indios* from the harshness of a colonial system that was too far away from the Mother Country to be checked, a time came when its continued application reflected a telling accusation against Spain to the effect that she had done nothing to prepare the *indios* for a time when they would no longer need their protective umbrage.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century what any keen observer of the Philippines scene would have recognized was the existence of two distinguishable but coincident communities. Making some allowances for unchristianized tribes in the interior of the large islands and few pockets of Muslim inhabitants in that part of Mindanao already considered as an integral part of Filipinas, the inhabitants of Filipinas can be conceived as having been integrated into a political community as well as into a religious one. As member of the first community, the *indio* was a colonial subject of the Spanish King; as a member of the second community, he was a Catholic ward of the friars and subject to the Roman Pontiff. Here therefore were two of the most important identity factors for the native as far as the Spanish authorities were primarily concerned. His family, region or linguistic group, were not important, for, as a member of such, he was merely an *indio*.

The above-noted community distinctions can be better appreciated by a short digression on Spanish colonial and ecclesiastical administration in the colony. At the head of the colonial system was the Spanish Governor and Captain General; the first title emphasized his civil functions while the latter referred to his military powers. The different provinces were under the administrative supervision of governors (*alcalde-mayores*) while the different towns were nominally under the administration of native *gobernadorcillos*, assisted by petty native officials. Parallel to this colonial system was the ecclesiastical body. At the top of the hierarchy was the Archbishop of Manila, followed by a few bishops who headed their respective dioceses. A parish priest, who was usually a friar curate, took charge of the smallest unit, the parish. There seemed to be two entirely separate and clearly delineated systems. In practice, however, there was much overlapping of functions between them. For instance, the Governor General exercised the vice-Royal prerogatives in ecclesiastical matters while Archbishops wielded some political powers and quite a number at various times served as *ad interim* Governors General. In brief, there was no separation of Church and

State, an arrangement which consistently produced disquieting results in the colony.

THE SPANISH COLONIAL AUTHORITIES did not actually eliminate the authority of the former *datus* and their families or descendants who, in effect, came to constitute the so-called *principalia*, the principal men of the towns. Since there were not enough Spaniards in the colony, it was essential to utilize the traditional leadership for their experiments in social organization and other colonial purposes. The former *datus* were initially instrumental in persuading their followers to resettle in the larger settlements determined by the Spaniards. They were the agents in collecting the tribute, in harnessing manpower either for the Army and Navy or for labor projects. Moreover, it was from the ranks of the *principalia* that the *gobernadorcillos* and the *cabezas de barangay* were chosen. These were the petty officials in the municipal level and the highest civil positions that an *indio* could aspire to almost up to the last decade of the Spanish regime. The bases of *principalia* power lay initially in their traditional authority, in the fact that their ranks supplied most, if not all, of the native officials, and in political privileges like exemption from the tribute, forced labor, etc. They were privileged, if not encouraged, to have their houses in the centers of the towns, near the churches and government offices — a way of inducing their followers also to move to the town. The *principalia* members stood as intermediaries, between Spanish officials, both civil and ecclesiastical, and the generality of the natives. At times they had to moderate the excessive or harsh demands of Spanish officialdom on the people while exhorting loyalty on the part of the latter to the government — all the while trying to maintain or strengthen their power base. In an important sense, the existence of the *principalia* served to prevent a radical social dislocation in the lives of the natives when the colonial authorities implemented their system of social reorganization.

In the early part of the nineteenth century, through an accelerated movement towards resettlement, a great part of the native population came to live within hearing of church bells. The *indios* stood as mute witnesses to the internal squabbles between and among Spanish colonial and ecclesiastical officials; and the history of Filipinas as written by friar historians remained primarily a history of the Spaniards in the colony. Meanwhile, the *indio* population grew. Probably at this time, the native Christian population had reached about 2 million.

All of these does not mean that the native population had completely adapted themselves to alien rule. From the inception of Spanish rule, at least twenty-five major uprisings took place.² The causes were various:

² A fair summary of uprisings against Spanish rule in the Philippines is found in Gregorio F. Zaide, *Philippine Political and Cultural History* (Manila: Philippine Education Company), Volume I, pp. 343-367.

attempts of members of the old nobility to regain privileges which had been withdrawn by Spanish officials; abuses and cruelties of Spanish *encomenderos* and government officials; imposition of heavy tributes as well as forced labor; and a desire to revert to the older religion. But the preponderant issue was agrarian in character with tenants or peasants questioning the ownership of land by friar landlords. Regional or local in character and devoid of the notion of nation or even race, most of them were easily crushed by the cunning use of loyal native troops from other regions. However, all this had one thing in common: a general resentment of what was considered the imposition of an alien rule and a general though vague desire to revert to a system of relative greater freedom of movement, thought, and choice. The British capture of Manila in 1762 and the evident inability of the Spanish government to contain the attacks of the Muslims from the South played their part in transforming a belief of Spanish invincibility to that of weakness. It was not with exaggeration that Francisco Leandro de Viana, a Spanish royal official in Manila, wrote in 1765:

It is certain that the Indians desire to throw off the mild yoke of the Spaniards; that they are Christians, and vassals of our king, simply through fear, and fail to be either Christians or vassals when they consider us weak; and that they neither respect nor obey any one, when they find an opportunity for resistance.³

But the general resentment to foreign rule however mild it might have been asserted was sharpened by certain changes which took place in the colony. These changes resulted from the economic expansion around the middle of the nineteenth century, educational reforms, and the coming of European liberal ideas — all contributing to the rise of an educated and professional class of *mestizos* (both Chinese and Spanish) and *indios*.

During the first centuries of Spanish colonial rule, there was no special effort to exploit the natural resources of the country. The native population continued to depend on a subsistence economy. Most Spaniards lived in Manila where a great number of them speculated in the galleon trade. This explains to a great extent why, except for the friar corporations, few landed estates were owned by Spanish settlers. Spanish mercantile policy was restrictive in nature: the galleons that traded with Mexico were government-owned, while the trade with neighboring Asian nations was strictly supervised and regulated. But by the end of the eighteenth century, a determined effort to depend less on Mexican subsidy made it imperative to develop the agricultural possibilities of the country as well as to relax the economic policy. The latter was in line with the shift in Europe from the mercantilistic to the *laissez faire* policy. Corollary to these efforts was the adoption of a new system of taxation calculated to make tax payments more equitable and collection more systematic and effective. Under the more

³ Viana's Memorial of 1765," Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands* 1493-1898 (Cleveland, Ohio: 1903-1909), Volume XLVIII, p. 202.

liberal commercial policy, free trade existed between Spain and the Philippines: Manila was opened to world commerce. Soon other ports were also opened.

It was in the middle of the nineteenth century that more and more commercial activities fell into private hands. At this time there were about fifteen foreign commercial firms in Manila which progressively acquired the characteristics of an urban port and commercial center. Hemp, sugar, and copra were exported and plantations were on the increase, especially in the Tagalog provinces and in Central Luzon. At around this time, too, the *principalia* began to strengthen its economic base by acquiring land, some of which had previously belonged to the *barangay* as communal land. According to John Phelan, although the Spaniards recognized communal ownership of land, they introduced the notion of individual ownership of land as a source of wealth. What then ensued was a tendency of the *datus* and their families to "assume the formal ownership of that portion of the *barangay* land which their dependents ordinarily cultivated (as communal land). During the seventeenth century the trend increased, more and more Filipino chieftains acquiring the actual title to the land that their dependents cultivated." ⁴ But the best cultivated lands, especially those around Manila, were in the hands of the friar corporations. There were so many agrarian problems and unrest in these lands that the Spanish government in 1880 decided to adopt a system of land titles. But this well-intentioned law enabled the *principalia* to strengthen its economic base, for it was the more intelligent and alert segment of the population that could understand and take advantage of the law. According to Apolinario Mabini, a prominent revolutionary leader, and who as a lawyer became intimately acquainted with the manner of how titles to land were acquired, the law benefited a few to the dispossession of many. Writing in 1900, he reflected:

When we were adolescents, the General Government of the Islands required that landlords present a sort of declaration of their properties specifying the situation, area, and boundaries of each parcel in order to acquire the titles called "Composicion con el Estado." Setting aside those who include in their declarations the land of others, it can be said that only a few were able to obtain titles and they were the ones who could afford the costs or who were precisely the ones who needed documents to give an appearance of legality to their spoils. Finally, the Mortgage Law (*Ley Hipotecaria*) came, and while it gave a surer title to some honestly acquired properties, it, instead, gave greater stability to the ownership or possession of many invalidly acquired properties; thus favoring the rascals. ⁵

⁴ John Leddy Phelan, *The Hispanization of the Philippines*, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1959), p. 117.

⁵ Apolinario Mabini, "Cuestiones en relacion con las corporaciones religiosas," *La Revolucion Filipina* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1931), Volume II, pp. 146-147.

According to Mabini, the tillers of the soil then ended up as tenants to their new owners but were allowed to remain in the lands of their ancestors, as long as they kept saying the *canon*. Mabini claimed he was witness to all these in the Tagalog areas, that it became a problem to the Revolutionary government, and that a similar situation also existed in the northern part of Luzon.⁶

That before the Revolution in 1896 agrarian unrest or resentment was generally confined to friar estates can be explained partially by the fact that although landlords belonging to the *principalia* had homes in the town centers, they kept familial and familiar relations with their tenants and kept close contacts with their lands, unlike the friar corporations which kept their central offices in Manila and left the supervision of their lands mostly to administrators who were, in effect, business managers solely interested in increased production and profit.

Alongside economic expansion came educational reforms. On December 20, 1863, a royal decree provided for compulsory education with free instruction for the poor. It also stipulated the establishment of a normal school for teachers in primary education. Primary schools were supervised by parish priests while the normal school was placed under the Jesuits. Before this decree, what generally existed for *indios* were parochial catechism schools.⁷ Now, the three R's as well as geography, Spanish language and history, and even elements of agriculture were included in the curriculum.⁸ Significant about this decree was its provision that teachers who had performed some years of notable service could assume the title of "principal" and be entitled to the same privileges granted to the *principalia*. In this manner the *principalia* was later strengthened by a new factor — the integration into it of relatively more educated men.

By 1870 there were already 1779 primary schools attended by about 385,907 students of both sexes. However, it can be calculated that less than 3% of the students had an adequate mastery of Castilian.⁹ In this same year, out of 1,883 students enrolled in secondary schools, 1421 were either *mestizos* or *indios*.¹⁰ There is no evidence that in 1870 there were *indios* in Sto. Tomas University in Manila enrolled in courses of higher learning or studying for a profession. However, around 1875, some *indios* who had been earlier in the secondary schools began to be admitted to study for the professions like Law, Medicine, and Pharmacy. Many persons who were to play roles in the movement for reforms or the Revolution belonged more

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 147-148.

⁷ Cf. Domingo Abella, "State of Higher Education in the Philippines to 1863—A Historical Reappraisal," *Philippine Historical Review* (I, 1), 1965, p. 23.

⁸ A copy of this educational decree is found in "Primary Education," Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, Vol. XLVI, pp. 79-118.

⁹ Cf. "Public Instruction," *ibid.*, Vol. XLV, pp. 299-300.

¹⁰ Domingo Abella, *op. cit.*, Appendix A, p. 29.

or less to the first or second batch of *indios* who studied for a profession. Among them were Jose Rizal, Emilio Jacinto, and Apolinario Mabini.

Before 1870, the highest if not the only important profession generally opened to the *indio* was the priesthood. In 1870, out of nearly 800 parishes only 181 or about 23% were in the charge of native priests. Moreover, whereas parishes under friar control averaged about 6,000 each, those under the native secular priests averaged about 4,500 each.¹¹ Significant about these figures is that whereas in 1880 the number of native priests rose to 748, the proportion of the parishes held by them did not increase at all but decreased instead. At this time, there were about 911 friars.

The majority of the candidates for the priesthood originated from the *principalia*, for this was relatively the most aggressive and economically better off segment of the native population. *Mestizos*, too, trained for the secular clergy. Because of what they felt as discriminatory policies towards them, the native secular clergy became fierce antagonists of the friars whom they claimed could not validly hold parishes but should have been confined to their monasteries. At bottom, the conflict between the Spanish friars and native secular priests was for the control of the parishes with their attendant political powers and social prestige. When therefore, in 1872, three native priests, one of them a Spanish *mestizo*, were garroted by the Spanish government on alleged complicity in a mutiny of native soldiers, some natives judged the execution as the result of a conspiracy of Spanish officials and friars to do away with the three priests since they were known champions of the native secular clergy. Other members of the *principalia* looked at the issue as a racial one. The so-called secularization controversy thus became such a serious one that the Archbishop of Manila, writing earlier to the Spanish Regent in 1870, warned and foretold that the continued resentment of the native clergy might eventually be transformed into an anti-Spanish sentiment, more so because of the growing belief that the colonial government invariably took the side of the friars in the controversy. He also reflected that the issue was slowly assuming racial implications; sympathy and moral support for the cause of the native priests had reached beyond their families to the larger community.¹²

In the meanwhile political events in the Mother Country were to have repercussions in the colony. Consequent to the Spanish Revolution of 1868 which toppled the monarchy and introduced freedom of speech, press, and assembly, as well as religious toleration in Spain, a confirmed liberal, Carlos Maria de la Torre, was named Governor General of Filipinas.

¹¹ Cf. James Le Roy, *The Americans in the Philippines* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1914), Volume I, pp. 60-61.

¹² For an English translation of this letter, see Nicolas Zafrá, *Readings in Philippine History* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, Revised Edition, 1956), pp. 485-498.

His appointment was hailed by different segments of the Manila community —by the Filipinos (as distinguished from the *peninsulares* or Spaniards born in Spain), Spanish *mestizos*, and educated *indios*. For the first time, during 1869-1871, Manila had a respite from the traditional colonial policies of Spain. De la Torre's numerous reforms implemented the ideals of the Revolution of 1868. Spaniards, *mestizos*, and educated *indios*, were all placed on the same footing. The governor's official residence was thrown open to all, even as the incumbent himself discarded the trappings of his high office. Freedom of speech, press and assembly generated a sense of urgency and hope for political and religious reforms. But in 1871 the monarchy returned to power in Spain, followed shortly by the designation of Rafael de Izquierdo as successor to De la Torre. A period of reaction set in, characterized by attempts to do away with the liberal changes De la Torre had introduced. It was during Izquierdo's term of office that the Cavite Mutiny of 1872 took place. Although from all indications the affair was a mutiny initiated by native soldiers in Cavite in collusion with others in Manila, to colonial authorities, it was actually a preview of separation from Spain led by those very men who agitated for reforms under the previous regime. Aside from the three native priests who were publicly executed, many Spanish *mestizos* and scions of prominent native families or the *principalia* were exiled. Rumor was rife in Manila that the actions of the government were mostly instigated by friars who were out to eliminate those men who had previously demanded for reforms, and to stop, one and for all, native aspirations for increased secularization of the parishes. This is probably the first time when some members of the *principalia* began to be seriously disillusioned with the colonial government and *status quo*. In an important sense, the secularization controversy, in so far as it represented an attempt of native priests to increase their share of parishes and in their attendant political and social benefits, was a function of the *principalia's* general struggle for a more active share in the control of the social life of the colony. The execution of the three priests in order to be understood in its true significance must be viewed with this background.

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE of the Philippines in 1880's is definable. The Spaniards in the colony were born in Spain (*peninsulares*) or born in the Philippines (*creoles*, Filipinos). The *peninsulares* tended to look down at the Filipinos who, in turn, bitterly resented the fact that the choice offices in the colonial bureaucracy were given to the former.¹³ The Spanish friars represented a special group. Their corporations owned vast stretches of the best cultivated land, and those who were curates enjoyed political and

¹³ Cf. Sinibaldo de Mas, *Report on the Condition of the Philippines in 1842*, III, Secret Report (Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1963), pp. 17-20; and pp. 122-126.

civil power. On account of the original evangelical aims in the conquests, they enjoyed a special position and the prestige that went with it. The Spanish *mestizos* also formed another segment. The pure-blooded Spaniards also tended to look down on them. According to the figures of 1864, out of 4,050 Spaniards in the colony, there were 500 clerics, 270 merchants, land owners, and proprietors and 3,280 government officials, Army and Navy officers, etc.¹⁴ In 1870, there were 3,823 *peninsulares* (1,000 clerics, 1,000 Army men and soldiers, and 1,800 civil officials and others), and 9,710 *creoles* and *mestizos*.¹⁵ In 1898, the number of Spanish civil and military officials reached 5,800.¹⁶

The native population can be generally classified into the *principalia* and the masses of the people. The *Guia Oficial* reported that the population of the Philippines in 1871 was 5,682,012, which increased to 6,252,987 in the next twenty years. In 1880, there were about 748 native priests. What is significant about the *principalia* in the 1880's was that Spanish and Chinese blood were being assimilated by it. To strengthen their economic base and probably because many of them had come to look at the colony as their home, some Spaniards married into the best native families. The ever industrious Chinese mestizos also followed the same route.¹⁷ Thus some *principalia* members acquired some prestige by having Spanish blood while others profited by the infusion of the blood of an industrious people. Whatever Spanish or Chinese blood a native might have, he was still generally called an *indio*.

While in the 1870's, the term *ilustrado* could be applied to any educated individual in the colony, it began to be more definitely applied to that segment of the native population which in the 1880's was classified as educated. Probably possessed of a good mastery of the Castilian language, the *ilustrados* were made possible by the educational decree of 1863 providing for universal primary education and normal schools. These, in turn, made it possible for some *indios* to be included among the 1,421 Spanish *mestizos* and *indios* attending secondary schools in 1870. Some of these and certainly others following them would then work for a Bachelor's degree in the few colleges in Manila. By the middle of the 1870's, *indios* were allowed to enter the University and work for degrees in Law, Medicine, and Pharmacy. However, other colleges were also already offering degrees in Law as well as vocational courses.

¹⁴ Edward Gaylord Bourne, "Historical Introduction," Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, Volume I, p. 60.

¹⁵ "Le Roy's Bibliographical Notes," *ibid.*, Volume LII, footnote pp. 115-116.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

¹⁷ Although pioneering in nature, the best comprehensive treatment of the social structure of the Philippines just before the Revolution in 1896 is Reed, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-173.

The *ilustrados* as an educated elite always enjoyed a prestigious position in the native population especially when they practised a profession. Earlier the only profession open to an *indio* was that of the priesthood, now he could demonstrate other achievements to be at par with the conquerors. It is reasonable to surmise that in the same manner that the *principalia* would supply the bulk of the native clergy, it would also produce most of the *ilustrados*. Only people with means were generally able to send their sons to secondary schools or to the university. However, this is only part of the picture since facts demonstrate that superior students from the humbler strata of the native population were able to study for a profession and thus earn the right to be classified as *ilustrados*. But because the *principalia* had the edge in sending its sons to work for a higher education, there was a tendency in native colloquial speech to identify the term *ilustrados* with that of *principalia*.

Soon after the events of 1872, a few Spanish *mestizos* and *principalia* members left for other centers of Asia and Europe, principally to study for the professions. They were able to meet some escaped exiles and reflect further on the ills of the colony. The opening of professional schools in Manila to *indios* around 1875 did not stop the steady stream of young native students going to Europe where the political and educational atmosphere did not appear as stifling as that in the colony. Others went to Spain simply to develop greater professional competence or to study something not available in the colony. According to Mabini:

In order to prevent you Filipinos from going to Spain or abroad to acquire knowledge not offered in Manila and thereby acquire liberal and anti-religious ideas, the friars changed their program of studies and established colleges for medicine and pharmacy to better their control on the choice of textbooks and have a hand in the selection of professors. Among the necessary evils, it was preferable to choose the lesser one. However, such was the desire to learn and become educated that many scions of well-to-do families preferred to study in Spain and thus they travelled to Europe . . .¹⁸

Continued harrassment from colonial authorities and friars increased the number of natives going to study in Spain. They brought with them a litany of what was wrong with the conditions in the colony. Breathing in a relatively freer atmosphere, getting themselves exposed to liberal ideas, witnessing the political ferment in Spain, actively joining secret societies, and becoming increasingly conscious of the evils of the colonial regime to which some of their families fell victims, the young *ilustrados* in Spain generated a movement later called "the propaganda." By means of a newspaper, novels, articles, meetings, speeches, and even some pressure on Spanish ministers and politicians, these reformers tried to expose the ills of the colonial regime while proposing remedies for them. Among the most pro-

¹⁸ "La Revolución Filipina," *La Revolución Filipina*, Volume II, p. 285.

minent reformers were: Jose Rizal, Marcelo H. del Pilar, Graciano Lopez-Jaena, Mariano Ponce, Antonio Luna, Juan Luna, Pedro Paterno, and Jose M. Panganiban.

Worthy of note was that although some of these *ilustrados* had once called themselves "*indios bravos*," they had begun to call themselves "Filipinos" for they had assumed that Filipinas was their country. Some Spaniards, too, in Spain, called them "Filipinos"—something that was still not done in the colony.

What the reformers wanted initially and primarily was the extension of the political rights already enjoyed in Spain under the Constitution of 1876 to all the natives and Spaniards in Filipinas. The liberties asked were those of speech, press, communication, assembly, and the right to petition for the redress of grievances. The demand for equality before the law implied that the natives would naturally be given the same opportunities to hold civil, judicial, and even military positions in the colony if they were so qualified. For the Mother Country to know better the state of the colony, it was demanded that Filipinas be represented in the Spanish Cortes. The secularization of the parishes was also a constant demand. Later on, the reformers asked that Filipinas be transformed from a colony into a regular province of Spain.

The reformers had a great deal of native sympathizers, including priests, who supported their newspaper *La Solidaridad* and helped sustain the movement. The supporters had various motives: the *principalia* who wanted to strengthen its position by the exercise of political rights, the ambitious natives who desired in time to be able to hold civil and military positions monopolized by Spaniards, the ordinary native who aspired to be spared from the vexations of a brutal police and an oppressive political system, and the native priests who wished to have a chance to administer more parishes. The Reform Movement, in effect, represented the desire of a segment of the population to have a greater hand in determining the destiny of the country while ensuring the population of greater share in its social and economic benefits.

But the movement generated the expected reaction not only from colonial authorities in the Philippines but from the Spanish friars as well. If the movement were successful, the Spanish officials would slowly have to give up to the natives many of their offices—both civil and military. If the parishes were secularized, the friars would have to confine themselves to their monasteries and leave the parishes which were the source of their political and civil power.¹⁹ The fact was that the Spanish colonial and ecclesiastical bureaucracies in Filipinas were, except in the very lowest

¹⁹ For an enumeration of the duties of parish priests which demonstrates their religious, political, and social power, see *U.S. Senate Document No. 190*, 2nd Session, pp. 64-66.

levels, a monopoly of Spaniards. Thus Spanish officialdom in the colony represented a special class. So did the friars and the ecclesiastical authorities. There was practically no demand by the reformers that the friars did not oppose vehemently, as evidenced by their Memorial of 1898 which they framed when some quarters in Spain blamed them for the Revolution in 1896.²⁰ It was the contention of the friars that the demands of the reformers and their attitude towards friars was not a universal phenomena and that they, the friars, were loved and respected by the generality of the people, while the reformers represented a chronically unhappy and ungrateful lot. To belie this contention, the reformers saw to it that their ideas became more widely spread and popularly supported.

What should be noted is that many of the reformers were not simply against what they believed to be friar dominance in the political life of the nation and in the social life of the people but that they were also against those *principalia* members who, besides being under friar dominance or positively corrupt, were profiting from the colonial system and satisfying personal interests. The municipal reforms suggested by M. H. del Pilar in *La Solidaridad* were not only designed to enlarge the electorate but to reduce, in effect, the traditional power and privileges of the *principalia* in the towns. Rizal, in his novels, tried to portray the *principalia* in the towns as tools of the friars and cacique benefiting from the colonial system. As Le Roy put it, the campaign of the reformers "was not alone a protest against ecclesiastical domination, but also against economic and administrative caciquism . . ." ²¹ Although some of the *ilustrados* who had participated in the Reform Movement were of *principalia* origin, they, for a number of reasons, were able to emancipate themselves from their class interests, and they began to view the interests of a wider community transcending class interests. In brief, a movement initially seeking opportunities for the educated segment of the native population became inevitably transformed into a movement for the rights of a whole people.

Among the reformers, Rizal conceived the clearest and most cogent statement of a national community. He first thought that political reforms in the colony might bring about increased political rights; but realizing that these were not possible as long as Filipinas remained a colony, he began to agitate for her transformation into a province of Spain. Arriving at the sad but realistic conclusion that the Spaniards would never consider the *indios* Spaniards, he sought for another social situation where the *indio* was accepted as a human being with natural rights. By an uncanny and brilliant utilization of various characters in his novels which were in effect veritable social analyses and commentaries, he demonstrated how educational, economic, and social attempts of the natives were blocked. He left it to

²⁰ See "The Friar Memorial of 1898," Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, Volume LII, pp. 227-286.

his perceptive readers to conclude that the *indio* as a member of a colony was exploited since the essence of a colony implied this; moreover, as a subject of the Spanish King he was denied justice though he paid the tribute and performed other forms of services for his sovereign. As a member of a Church community, his religiosity was not only taken advantage of but did sometimes serve to prevent his progress. Furthermore, ecclesiastical authorities were not only denying the Christian *indio* a desirable form of education but constituted the very enemies of his political and educational betterment. The conclusion was inevitable; there was need to integrate the natives of Filipinas into another community wherein he was neither identified as a subject of the Spanish King or as a Church member. This had to be a national community.

Rizal believed that if there was a larger community to which the natives were loyal and committed, they would be able to discard their petty and even family or regional interests in favor of a greater good. Although he was aware that some *indios* were able to arrive at certain heights of educational attainments or economic well-being, these to him were not significant since they did not necessarily imply social progress. This is the meaning of his lament, "in Filipinas, a man is only an individual; he is not member of a nation."²² This was as well the meaning of his complaint to a native priest, "In Filipinas, there is INDIVIDUAL progress and perfection but not a NATIONAL or GENERAL one."²³

Partially blameable for the so-called proverbial indolence of the *indio* and a slowness in the progress of his economic well being was, according to Rizal, the absence of what he termed as "national sentiment."²⁴ This absence was exemplified by a depreciation of the results of one's labor, an undue admiration of what was foreign simply because it was not native, and the tolerance of injustice either because fighting it endangered personal interests or simply because one could in some manner benefit from it. On the other hand, the existence of national sentiment meant that a person had self esteem, was not ashamed of the products of his labor, and would fight any form of injustice even at the risk of his life. Reduced to its basic essentials, national sentiment was nothing else but unqualified integrity and a high form of social consciousness. What was thus exhorted was the development of a will to work for the benefit of all as against personal or petty interests. But Rizal himself bewailed the fact that there was unfortunately no nation to speak of. This he started to construct and explain through

²¹ James A. Le Roy, *Philippine Life in Town and Country* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1905), p. 181.

²² "Sobre la indolencia de los Filipinos," *Escritos Politicos e Historicos* (Manila: Comision Nacional del Centenario de Jose Rizal, 1961), p. 257.

²³ "De Rizal al P. Vicente Garcia," *Epistolario Rizalino* (Manila. Bureau of Printing, 1933), Volume III, p. 137.

²⁴ "Sobre la indolencia de los Filipinos," *op. cit.*, pp. 254-257.

historical studies. Rizal tried to demonstrate that once upon a time, before the arrival of the Spaniards, the natives of the Archipelago had a culture and an ethics of their own and were not the savages doomed to perdition as portrayed by later friar historians. Moreover, the natives were once an industrious people having commercial relations with other parts of Asia. Here, Rizal was not simply blaming the conquest for a great number of ills plaguing the natives; he was aiming at the development among the Filipinos, of a sense of racial affinity; of continuity with their past and pride in them. In this manner they would come to look upon themselves as an historical people and thus a sense of unity or brotherhood might perchance be effected.

Added to an awareness of a common racial origin and history, Rizal believed that with an educational system fostering intellectual and moral virtues, and with the development of a will for the good of all and the habits of industry, the natives would be progressively integrated into a national community which was essentially to be a moral one. Then and only then would the Spaniards realize that they were facing a matured people who were aware of their rights, had a sense of justice, and most important, were willing to die in its defense. Rizal was once optimistic enough to believe that Spain would slowly but increasingly grant political rights to the natives, such that, after a period of autonomy, independence would normally follow.²⁵

Carefully distinguishing the enjoyment of rights from independence,²⁶ Rizal asserted that independence did not necessarily imply the existence of political liberties since it was possible for a people to become independent while remaining ignorant and politically indifferent or even corrupt. Under such conditions, the existence of a native tyranny would be the more likely possibility. Hence Rizal insisted that before the attainment of independence, the people had to be educated—this was the major criterion to prevent the substitution of an alien oppression by a local one. Again, perceivable here was Rizal's fear that the *principalia* would simply succeed Spanish colonial officials and perpetuate the same abuses should the people not change their habits and attitudes.

When Rizal wrote his novels and major articles, it was significant that he had begun to call the natives of the colony "Filipinos"; but what was revolutionary here was that he asserted that the *indios* were the real Filipinos and that Filipinas was their native country and thus belonged to them. Not all Spaniards in Filipinas cherished such ideas.

But Rizal did not remain content to propose the problem of the necessity of a national community. He devised an organization to bring about an integration of the natives into such a community. The *Liga Filipina* aimed "to unite the whole archipelago into one compact, vigorous, and

²⁵ "Datos para mi defensa," *ibid.*, p. 333.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

homogeneous body," and have its members protect each other in "every want and necessity." It was to encourage education, agriculture and commerce, and more important, the organization was to represent a "defense against all violence and injustice." The *Liga* envisioned that ultimately all of the natives of the Archipelago would be members of it—constituting a veritable third community in Filipinas which, by its very logic, would not only give the natives, the true heirs of the land, a new identity, but would dispense with the other two communities as identifying factors for them. Noteworthy, again, about the *Liga* was that it was qualified as "Filipina."²⁷

Probably one of the reasons that compelled Rizal to return to Filipinas in 1892 was to establish the *Liga*. In less than a week after his arrival he addressed a group of professionals to explain the plans of the *Liga* and have officers handle the organization. But the organization disintegrated after a few days, for Rizal was exiled to Mindanao on some charges. In the hands of others, nevertheless, it was reorganized in 1893 but then it was dissolved the next year on account of internal dissensions among its officers: those still interested in supporting the Reform Movement that was becoming moribund in Spain and those who had given up hope in a peaceful agitation for the political and social improvement of the colony.

Rizal's exile to Dapitan, the ineffectivity of the *Liga*, the harrassment of *ilustrados* who made a bid for reforms, and the general despair engendered by the increasing repressive character of the colonial government, brought about the formation of the secret society called the *Katipunan*. Its leader, Andres Bonifacio, and its founders generally came from the urban working class in Manila and Tondo. In time its membership extended to other urban areas, in the Tagalog provinces and beyond. In 1895 the organization was becoming complex enough; its Supreme Council had all the characteristics of a government cabinet. It was estimated, probably with some exaggeration, that on the eve of the revolution in 1896, the *Katipunan* had at least 100,000 members, including women. By this time, too, *ilustrados* and priests were, if not formally, enlisted in its ranks or at least supporting it. In Manila, a few scions of the *principalia* also joined it. The appeal of the *Katipunan* lay in its secret character, its impressive and mysterious initiation rites, its native and folk symbolisms, and its revolutionary character—all producing the culminative result that here at last was a truly native power organization. It also performed, by means of its modest publications, a form of outlet for the expression of indigenous literary talents without the normal downgrading by Spanish critics.

²⁷ For a more comprehensive and detailed analysis of Rizal's idea of a national community and what it could accomplish as well as how the *Liga Filipina* could help bring it about, see the author's monograph *Rizal's Concept of a Filipino Nation* (Quezon City, 1959).

The leaders of the *Katipunan* were deeply influenced by the works of the reformers and they maintained to the very end the deepest respect for Rizal, who personally never cared to join them. But they had arrived at the conclusion that the Reform Movement was doomed to failure and that what constituted the social good could not be attained except by armed revolution to bring about the independence and that atmosphere of freedom pre-requisite to the good life. Emphasizing that the Filipinos, before the coming of the Spaniards had a developed culture and that the friars had capitalized on the religiosity of the people for their own benefit, the *Katipunan* exhorted its members to develop patriotism and those virtues of industry, bravery, and perseverance, that would make possible a sort of utopia in the not too distant future.

The discovery of the *Katipunan* in 1896 forced the *katipuneros* to raise the standard of revolt at a time not determined or anticipated by their time table. Consequently, they had to suffer a few military reverses. The Spanish authorities and friars prejudging that the revolt was the work of liberals, Masons, anti-clericals, etc., started to arrest numerous *ilustrados* and *principalia* members, to the extent of executing scores of them. Among these was Jose Rizal. This belief enabled the real leaders of the *Katipunan* to escape the Spanish dragnet and flee to the provinces, while innocent men were liquidated by firing squads. Many *ilustrados* were genuinely shocked by a movement that essentially signified force and violence; while other *principalia* members, conservative by nature, feared that any violence might spell a disruption in their enjoyment of a privileged position and a threat to their economic interests. But the panic that governed the highest offices of the colonial government as well as the general cry for blood by the friars and other Spanish residents brought about a heightened repressive policy on the part of the government. Even conservative natives became resentful of the Spaniards while fearing for their lives. Thus was the atmosphere of general disobedience widened.

The *Katipuneros* under Bonifacio suffered a few reverses in the hands of well-disciplined Spanish troops; however, in Cavite, under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, the *katipuneros* were not only able to hold their own but even win some battles. Aguinaldo joined the *Katipunan* while a young student in Manila. Upon his return to his home town, he was elected *capitan municipal*, a position his father had once held. By all indications, he belonged to the local *principalia* and would normally have attained a professional degree in Manila were it not for his father's death which led him to return home to take charge of family affairs. It was inevitable that the contest for the leadership of the Revolution would be between Bonifacio and Aguinaldo. Where Bonifacio believed that the original organization of the *Katipunan* was sufficient to pursue the movement, many of the Cavite *Katipuneros* under the leadership of members of the *principalia* insisted

that another system of government be instituted. It was Aguinaldo who emerged as the president of the new government. The divisions were so clear that even the election of Bonifacio as the Director of the Interior was questioned by the remark that he was not even a lawyer. It may be speculated that regional bias was involved in the election of most of the officials in the new governmental set-up; but what was obvious was that *principalia* members of Cavite played an important role in the election of Aguinaldo. The tragic death of Bonifacio not much later and the practical necessity to close ranks on account of the Spanish offensive, as well as genuine popular support of a hero, all pushed Aguinaldo to become the undisputed leader of the Revolution.

The Spanish offensive was of such an intensity that Aguinaldo and his troops had to leave Cavite for Biak-na-Bato where the decision for renewed effort for the Revolution was made. A provisional constitution along republican lines was then adopted. Realizing that the capture of Biak-na-Bato would not spell the end of the Revolution, the Spanish Governor General Primo de Rivera decided on a new approach which was that of a peaceful settlement in which the revolutionary leaders were to receive a large amount of money in return for their exile and the granting of a general amnesty to all who revolted. With part of the amount given to him and other revolutionary leaders, Aguinaldo and his closest companions left for exile in Hongkong. However, the so-called Pact of Biak-na-Bato did not accomplish what it was intended to do. This was the situation in 1897.

The outbreak of the Spanish American War in April 1898 and United States' ambitions in the Pacific brought a new factor in the resurgence of the revolution against Spain. The defeat of the Spanish Navy by an American squadron in May forced the Spaniards to court support of the Filipinos. Abroad, Aguinaldo was already in contact with American consular officials and his help was solicited. On May 19, Aguinaldo with his aides arrived in Cavite, and the first thing he did was to raise an army with the help of captured Spanish guns and ammunition made available by Admiral Dewey. Soon after, more guns and ammunition purchased from part of the money given to Aguinaldo through the Pact of Biak-na-Bato arrived. With initial successes against Spanish troops, his army grew and it was further swelled by Filipino troops who had deserted the Spanish Army. Appeals of the Governor General for Filipino loyalty and promises of future reforms as well as exhortations by the Manila Archbishop for Filipino support on the basis of a common faith fell on deaf ears. In the meantime, the Filipinos established a dictatorship under Aguinaldo and on June 12, 1898 the independence of the Philippines was solemnly declared. Many *ilustrados* left Manila to join Aguinaldo, offering him every kind of advice and help. With Apolinario Mabini as his major adviser, the Dictatorship was changed into the Revolutionary Government on June 23. To reassure

the new government of their loyalty and commitment, a few hundred municipal officials met in Bakoor on August 1 and ratified the previous declaration of independence.

The refusal of American officers to allow armed Filipino troops to enter Manila after its surrender on August 14, in spite of the fact that the Filipinos played a major part in the siege of the city, signified to Filipino leaders that the Americans were not only determined to deny them a share in the victory but that they intended to stay indefinitely in the country. In the mind of some of Aguinaldo's advisers, war with the Americans seemed inevitable, and therefore, every care was taken to prevent any American pretext for war.

In response to what was considered the American threat, the Revolutionary government made strenuous efforts to extend its sway on as large a territory as possible. By the end of the year, except for the city of Manila and a few pockets nearby occupied by the Americans and other spots occupied by harrassed Spanish garrisons, practically the whole of Luzon had fallen under the authority of the Revolutionary government. Not long after, other islands in the Visayas and some towns in Mindanao pledged their loyalty to it. The Revolutionary government also transferred the capital to Malolos which was not only easier to defend than the towns in Cavite but also made it possible for Filipino troops to have greater maneuverability or even convert themselves into guerrilla units should the need arise. Diplomats were sent abroad to get foreign recognition of the independence of the Philippines—but without success. To strengthen itself further in the face of the American challenge, a Congress was convoked at Malolos to frame a constitution along republican lines and thus while gaining more popular support among all segments of the Philippine population, it was to be demonstrated to all foreigners that the Filipinos were determined to govern themselves and had the capacity to do so. In accordance with the republican constitution promulgated by Congress, the Philippine Republic was proclaimed with Aguinaldo as President on January 23, 1899.

The Malolos Constitution was republican, mainly based on South American models and European ones to some extent. Noteworthy about it was that nearly thirty percent of the document referred to the rights of citizens exemplifying that the Filipinos were out to enjoy those rights never enjoyed before and for which elaborate safeguards had to be secured. It was designed to make the legislature the supreme branch in the government. As a formal document it reflected one of the most important steps in the political development of the Filipino people.

As expected, practically all of the members of the Congress at Malolos were *ilustrados* or members of the *principalia*. Although the membership fluctuated, at one time, out of nearly one hundred members, about eighty percent had professions. Whereas most of them were local graduates,

a few studied in European universities. The majority of the delegates were appointed not only because conditions did not warrant elections in all districts but also to have the town aristocracy become members and thus support the Republic. The electoral laws promulgated by the Revolutionary government in providing that the local officials were to be elected by the leading citizens of the towns guaranteed that the *principalia* would not only remain in control of the towns but would, when elections were possible, be elected into Congress. The *principalia* was now determined to rule in the place of the Spaniards.

More than once the *principalia* tried to exercise undue influence on Aguinaldo as when they almost induced him to approve their plan to have a national bank with the authority to float loans. It was Mabini who thwarted their plans. However, Aguinaldo's recognition that the Malolos Congress had the power to promulgate a constitution represented a victory on their side. Felipe Calderon, the father of the Malolos Constitution, himself confessed that his constitutional plan was to see to it that the *ilustrados* rather than "an oligarchy of the ignorant" would rule the country; probably referring to some Army leaders and soldiers whom he characterized as "ignorant almost in their entirety."

Although probably all *ilustrados* saw eye to eye with Calderon who insisted on the principle that the government ought to be in their hands, not all agreed that the *principalia* should play this role of leadership. The fact was that not all *ilustrados* had the same economic origins or prejudices. Mabini, who was of humble origin, was ever suspicious of "the rich in Manila" and he opposed the idea to allow the Malolos Congress to frame a constitution. To him it was merely a consultative body to the revolutionary government and was intended to reflect a visible sanction and loyalty to the Revolution on the part of a segment of the population. The irony of it all was that it was Mabini who framed the electoral laws that made possible the Revolutionary Congress, which, once convoked, refused to be satisfied with remaining a purely consultative body.

It was agreed by all that Aguinaldo had to remain as head of the state for an indefinite period. Having the general loyalty of the Army and admired for his achievements, he came to be identified with the humbler strata of Filipino society. He was not entirely opposed by the *principalia* as long as he offered them concessions. The *ilustrados* of humbler origin were determined to see to it that he was not made a prisoner of the *principalia*. Yet these *ilustrados*, in common with other *ilustrados*, wanted to guide the direction of the Revolution; depending all the time on Aguinaldo not to allow the "ignorant" to get out of hand.

Meanwhile, the ordinary soldier, of peasant origin, was there to serve and hope for a better future where he could own a piece of land unmolested. But after the friar estates were confiscated by the Revolutionary government,

the ensuing Republic, needing an additional source of income, passed a law enabling "men of means" and "local chiefs" to administer them provided they could present security either in cash or in bond.²⁸ In brief, the *principalia* was allowed, by law, to further strengthen its economic base by additional land ownership.

But regardless of different interests and basic conflicts a spirit of optimism had permeated all classes in the Philippines. Patriotism became the rule and a sense of nationality was dramatically beginning to extend itself. The Filipino government in extending its sway over a great part of the Archipelago meant that Filipinas was beginning to belong to Filipinos, now the real natives of the country. The persons in the highest offices of the government who had begun to exercise or manage the coercive powers of government began to have a stake in the preservation of their authority. They were all determined to keep it. The generality of the people, having been oppressed in the past, now hoped that the new social situation would eventually offer them many of the things they felt they were denied before. Thus, a new series of aspirations and expectations were generated, bringing, in turn, greater loyalty to a government believed to be the very tool that would concretize such aspirations. All of these factors led Mabini to assert categorically that the Filipinos during the Revolution were able to take the first few steps in the building of a national life.

But the outbreak of hostilities with the Americans dashed all hopes of the expected social amelioration. Faced with superior troops and heavy artillery, the Filipino troops were forced to lose ground steadily. Malolos fell on March 31, 1899 and the capital was transferred various times. American military officials thought the war would soon be finished and the only problem would be one of mopping up operations. But they were mistaken, for they had underrated the persistence of the Filipino soldier and the determination of many revolutionary leaders. But the Filipinos needing pace so badly made various overtures for it. The Americans refused to listen to them unless it was under the premise of unconditional surrender and the laying down of arms by all Filipino troops. On account of the military offensive of the American army, Aguinaldo, on November 12, formally disbanded the Army and converted it into guerrilla units. Thus the war became more difficult for the Americans to contain.

With the American advance scores of members of the Revolutionary government fell as prisoners. Fifty-seven of those well known for their inveterate resistance to the imposition of American sovereignty, including Mabini, were deported to Guam. Their deportation was decreed because, not

²⁸ For this law passed on February 19, 1899, see John M. Taylor, *Report on the Organization for the Administration of Civil Government instituted by Emilio Aguinaldo and his followers in the Philippine Archipelago* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903), pp. 70-71.

having accepted the fact of the American presence, they stood as a symbol of opposition that encouraged Filipino resistance in the fields and mountains. Many of these prisoners actually encouraged resistance not because they thought that the Filipinos were eventually to be the military victors but simply to demonstrate to the Americans that they were facing a determined foe that deserved better peace terms that would include the recognition of political rights in the new regime envisioned for them. The capture of Aguinaldo on March 23, 1901, and his taking an oath of allegiance to the United States the next month only signified that the end of the armed struggle against the United States was near at hand. True enough, by 1902, the majority of the resisting generals either surrendered or were captured.

Brutalities of American soldiers and cases of racial prejudice on their part were soon moderated by the introduction of an American system of education even while the war was going on. In pacified areas, the American offer to some of the old leaders of Filipino participation in government appeared sincere, and in a matter of a few years the scars of the war were erased. Many members of the former Revolutionary Congress and government began to assume positions in the new order, and they cooperated with the American authorities. But not all of them gave up their work for the eventual independence of their country. They were biding for their time when political liberties would be given to them such that they could peacefully agitate for it. What appeared as indelicate to Mabini was how some persons who once held high offices in the Revolution rushed unashamedly to cooperate with the new master. He believed that more prudence on their part would have merited the respect of the Americans. Actually to Mabini, the war against the Americans was merely a continuation of the previous struggle against Spain since the Filipinos were still struggling to regain and enjoy those rights that properly belonged to them and which the Americans appeared to be denying. However, Mabini was led to hope that the history of the Americans and their political ideology might eventually force them to progressively grant Filipinos more political rights. Essential to him was that the Filipinos had to merit such rights by working for them instead of waiting for a colonial power to grant them as a sort of grace.

The lack of a truly radical economic program on the part of the revolutionary leaders left unsolved the chronic agrarian problems of the country. It can be speculated that if the Revolution was allowed to run its normal course without American interference, the agrarian problem would have vexed it and affected its direction. This was revealed by Mabini when he wrote:

When we were connected with the Malolos government, some very frightened *ilustrados* told us that the cry for liberties had begun to germinate socialistic or communistic ideas in the minds of people who got a bad deal in some pro-

perties of questionable origin, without understanding that the discontented ones precisely belonged to the class of those unfortunates who were dispossessed by *hacenderos* and big landowners.²⁹

Neither did the Americans introduce any novel economic program to solve the chronic economic ills of the Philippines. Actually, their recruitment of principalia members to hold political or civil offices served, it not to postpone the solution, to make it more difficult. Moreover, friar lands purchased by the civil government were sold to corporations and to those with easily available means to purchase them. The change of ownership did not eliminate the problem.

THE ROAD OF THE NATIVES of the Philippines towards increasing freedom and their integration into a national community as Filipino has been a long and difficult one. From scattered settlements they were welded into a community of subjects to the Spanish King that formed simultaneously a Church one. Finding in time that both systems failed to provide them with what they later on considered essential to a fuller life, they were led to reflect on an alternative one. In the historical stage they found themselves, it was imperative that this community had to be national and independent. Because of colonial obstruction, a revolution was resorted to as a technique to attain independence. The struggle against the Americans was viewed as part of the process initiated against Spain. Independence, too, was looked up to as a means to secure that social situation where Filipinos could develop their native talents in an atmosphere of freedom and where values were not imposed from without but were the result of their free choice and deeply felt needs. Then and only then could the Filipinos effectively contribute to world culture. In brief, to be a universal man, it was essential first of all to be a Filipino.

In a national community, at least in the minds of those who originally conceived it, there was to be no racial prejudice, humiliation, and denigration of the results of one's efforts at self-improvement. In it each person counted as an individual with intrinsic worth but endowed with a preeminently social consciousness directing him to work for the good of all rather than for selfish motives. It was therefore essential that there was to be a complete absence of any form of exploitation in order that each citizen might be more committed to the national community. These then are the major invariants that entered into the original concept of the national community. As the Filipinos become progressively integrated into a national community, their problem is whether these elements are to be retained and achieved or discarded.

²⁹ "Cuestiones en relación con las corporaciones religiosas," *op. cit.*, p. 148.