INDONESIA-INDIA RELATIONS, 1955-67

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Strung along the fringes of the equator for nearly three thousand miles like a girdle of emeralds, lie the three thousand islands of Indonesia. It is the largest island group in the world, lapped by the waters of the Indian Ocean in the south and east, and the Java Sea in the north.

A careful study of the map of South-East Asia will highlight the strategic and geo-political importance of Indonesia. This fact is more obvious to India than to any other country, perhaps, for historical, economic, strategic, political, diplomatic, and sentimental reasons.

India and Indonesia have known each other for centuries. Their contacts date back to the beginning of the 2nd century A.D. with the arrival of the first Hindu traders from South India who settled along the coast of Java. At first the contacts were mainly commercial in nature, but with the spread of Hindu culture, religious beliefs and practices, the first cultural links were established between the two countries.

These early cultural and economic contacts continued until the arrival of the Dutch. During the Dutch colonial rule, Indonesia's links with her Asian neighbours virtually snapped. The advent of Indonesian nationalism and that country's drive for independence, witnessed the re-establishment of friendly ties between the two countries.

The years 1950-1955 were marked by extreme cordiality. India's efforts at mobilizing international recognition of the Sukarno-proclaimed Republic of Indonesia; the convening in New Delhi by Mr. Nehru of a conference of eighteen governments in support of the Republic; the signing of a Treaty of Friendship on March 3, 1950 and a Trade Agreement on January 20, 1951; the adoption of a policy of non-alignment by Indonesia following India's example, which resulted in the establishment of a community of views between India and Indonesia on various issues—all these and many other factors resulted in creating boundless goodwill for India in Indonesia. The close cooperation that existed between the two countries finally culminated in the convening of the Bandung Conference in 1955 which proved to be the high-water mark in Indonesia-India relations.

At first India's Jawaharlal Nehru and Burma's U Nu, while both nodding polite approval of the idea, were skeptical of the feasibility and value

1 The cultural agreement that was signed between Indonesia and India was the first friendship treaty signed by Indonesia with a foreign country. The Trade Agreement provided for a three-fold increase in trade. As a result of this agreement, trade between Indonesia and India increased perceptibly. Cultural and Air agreements were signed on December 25, 1955 and February 8, 1955, respectively.
of the conference. But once Nehru had been won over to the idea of holding the conference, India and Indonesia cooperated closely at Bogor and Bandung so that the conference achieved "a surprising degree of success, modest it is true, but more than most statesmen Western or Eastern had expected."2

Also furthering the consolidation of goodwill were some important ways in which the two countries contributed to each other's vital national interests. Djakarta was viewed by New Delhi as the key to the latter's aspirations for the leadership of Asia.3 Indonesia provided India with a wonderful opportunity to use South-East Asia as a laboratory for her fond concepts, "the area of peace" and the Panch-Sheel. Friendship with Indonesia was also valuable to India in order to isolate Pakistan—her persistently irritating neighbour. Intimacy with Indonesia (and the UAR) provided proof that India's frictions with Pakistan did not arise from her hostility to a Muslim country as such. On the other side, India's rising prestige in the early years of her statehood helped Indonesia elevate herself in world affairs, partly by identifying herself with India and partly by being able, largely because of Indian encouragement and support, to organise events such as the Bandung Conference.

The community of views between Indonesia and India during the period of 1950-1955 was so close that Premier Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia could say that the foreign policy of Indonesia "was parallel" with Indian foreign policy and that for an Indonesian to speak of Indonesian problems to an Indian audience was like "speaking to a sounding board."4

II

Bandung, however, marked the culminating point of close cooperation between Indonesia and India. The years following the Bandung Conference witnessed a gradual beginning of the rift between the two countries. In one sense, the rift between the two countries might have had its beginning as early as 1952. However, it became more pronounced after the Bandung Conference. A number of factors were responsible for this development. Perhaps the most important was the growing instability in Indonesia.

The general elections had long been awaited and urged by the socialists. On September 29, 1955 the first general elections since independence, were held for the selection of a parliament. However, the elections failed to produce a party strong enough to run the government. As a result, short-lived coalition governments followed, no party gaining more than twenty-five percent of the seats.5

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4 The Statesman (Calcutta), November 29, 1954.
5 During the period 1945-1958, there were seventeen cabinet changes, an average of a change every ten months.
The political situation being unstable, disorder and confusion became the order of the day. As a result, extra-parliamentary forces were bound to play a role of considerable importance. As Dr. Soedjatandke pointed out in his article "Role of Political Parties in Indonesia," disregard of them . . . [and] inability to cope with them will lead to extra-parliamentary political crisis." Political power being as diffused as it was, too much emphasis, for instance, on centralism—on one particular area, on one particular region, or on one particular ideology—upsetting the system of political balances, may lead, and in some cases had led, to armed rebellion and eventually to the breakdown of the national political structure, either through separatism or through chaos without a clear and open break.

Amidst squabbling parties, enfeebled ministers, and economic crisis, Sukarno emerged as a powerful political factor extending beyond the scope of political parties. He had always been the biggest fact in the Republic. But whereas Prime Ministers Hatta and Natsir restricted him to the role of Head of State, their less secure successors drew him into the political arena.

This was due in no small measure to the fact that since 1950 no cabinet had been able to function with an absolute majority in parliament. As a result of this, all the cabinets were to a large extent dependent for their continued existence upon the whims of the President. This weakness was exploited to the hilt by President Sukarno to enhance his own position and prestige. Hence, despite the fact that his constitutional position placed him outside the political arena, the President at frequent intervals had been forced to assume emergency powers, and Sukarno, by means of his personal authority and political acumen, was able to transform the machinery of government to suit his own ends.

Another important factor was the rise of the army. This was due to the fact that popular discontent, which was in evidence during this period, also affected the army and other sections of the country. Officers became emotionally restive and politically active. Consequently, the army, which in the past had refrained from interfering in government affairs, forced the resignation of the Minister of Justice in the Sukiman Cabinet in June, 1951, because he refused to sanction the arrest of some guerrilla leaders. Friction also developed between the military and Mr. R. T. Sewaka, Sukiman's Minister of Defense. It is not surprising to learn, therefore, from the carefully judicious, authoritative Cornell University White Book on the Wilopo Cabinet (1953-1955) by Herbert Feith, that "the army leadership representing an enormous centre of political power, played a role of importance in ousting the cabinet" of Sukiman on February 23, 1952. "This date," pointed out Louis Fischer, "marks the emergence of the army as a primary political factor" in Indonesian politics.7

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Six-and-a-half months after the Wilopo Cabinet took office (April 4, 1952), there occurred a major event which is recorded in the chronicles as “the October 17 affair.” On this date the army made its first attempt to seize power. This attempt was, however, foiled by the personality and oratorical genius of Sukarno. Hence, the army would, for sometime in the future, continue to be one of the extra-parliamentary factors to be seriously taken into account in plotting the course of the nation.

Finally the Partai Kommunis Indonesia (PKI), which had so long been an important factor in Indonesian politics, began to make its voice felt under the protective umbrella of President Sukarno. The PKI’s success in the 1955 general elections proved beyond doubt that one of the most important outcomes of the elections in Java in 1957, was the improved position of the party. The success of the PKI hence made itself felt on the policies of the government in the post-election period.

The political situation that prevailed in Indonesia at this time was in direct contrast to that in India. India, having successfully experimented with a parliamentary system of government and having attained a large degree of political and economic stability, was naturally disillusioned at the breakdown of democratic government in Indonesia as a result of the struggle between rival political parties and factions for control of the seat of power.

Consequently, India’s interest in Indonesia was marked by a steady decline. India welcomed the news of the holding of general elections but the subsequent instability in Indonesia was the subject of adverse comments in the Indian press. For instance the editorial in The Sunday Statesman commenting on the political and economic instability in Indonesia stated:

> It had been hoped after the general elections that a new government with a popular mandate at last would get down to serious work. But that hope seems so far to have been disappointed.9

Later, President Sukarno’s call for the “burial of political parties,” the increasing interference of the army in politics, the alarming activities of labour unions, and, last but not the least, the sudden increase of the powers of the President, were all subjects of critical comments in India. There was a general tendency to compare the situation in India with the situation in Indonesia. It is interesting to note that in Indonesia, itself, the image of India was not very complimentary: India’s continued membership in the Commonwealth and her extremely cautious approach to many world problems were criticised by Indonesian observers. The editorial in the Times of Indonesia on November 12, 1956, perhaps summed up the prevailing opinion about India. The editorial commented on India’s attitude towards the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt. It stated:

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8 For details, see “Press Comments on ‘October 17 Affair,’” Indonesian Affairs (September-October, 1952), 29.
9 The Sunday Statesman (Calcutta), September 4, 1962.
Mr. Nehru did not feel that strong angry reaction which the greater part of the world in general, and Afro-Asia in particular, has felt and still feels. We in Indonesia have for very long kept parallel with India in the field of foreign affairs, but the time has come to ask ourselves with the utmost seriousness if we can continue to do so indefinitely after Mr. Nehru's confession that he did not sense what every Indonesian felt, that strong angry reaction.10

The emergence of differing views in Indonesia and India towards Communist China, and the consequent divergence of their relations with Peking, had been a prime factor in deteriorating New Delhi-Djakarta relations. During the early 1950's, India and Indonesia viewed China as a great neighbour, led by genuinely popular leaders working to restore Asia's lost prestige in the world, and trying to build a just social and political order somewhat similar to their own. They believed that if China could be brought out of her isolation, she would not be aggressive.11 Furthermore, like Mr. Nehru, Indonesian leaders believed that if an "environment" could be created by China's reiterated public pledges of adherence to the Panch-Sheel, it would be made difficult, or at least embarrassing, for her to flout those principles and violate the integrity of her neighbours—extremely wishful thinking as subsequent events were to prove. But by the years 1958-1959, Mr. Nehru himself began to feel that his device was not working. The boundary dispute between India and China, the Tibetan uprising of 1959, and India's moral support to the Tibetans, made it public that all was not well in Sino-Indian relations. The "honeymoon period" (if it ever were so) had come to an end. But to the Indonesian leadership China remained an anti-imperialist, aggressive power with whom it was worthwhile to cooperate. The differing views of India and Indonesia with regard to China began to cause serious misunderstandings. The Indonesians were dismayed by India's persistence in clinging to the British-made frontiers and refusing to understand Peking's viewpoint. This, in turn, led Indians to question Djakarta's friendship.

A significant factor which eventually led Sukarno to lose patience with Mr. Nehru was his refusal to agree to Sukarno's favourite plea for a second Bandung Conference. The first conference had given Sukarno and his country tremendous international prestige. Moreover, the Indonesian leader found boundless emotional satisfaction in inaugurating pompous conferences of this kind. Ever since Bandung, he had again been keen to play host to a similar meeting. But Bandung had confirmed Mr. Nehru's views that a second conference would do more harm than good to Asia and Afircá, by publicly displaying intra-Afro-Asian tensions. With China and Pakistan sharpening their talons and with the distinct possibility of the conference degenerating into an unedifying brawl, it was only natural that India should approach the conference with a certain amount of unconcealed trepidation. There was also the fear that if she attended the conference—and there was

10 *Times of Indonesia* (Djakarta), November 12, 1956.

11 A rather false notion as was proved later. This line of reasoning coupled with Chou En-lai's astute diplomacy, only succeeded in enhancing China's image vis-a-vis the Afro-Asian nations.
little chance that she would not—India would undoubtedly return bruised in spirit and reputation.

If she stood to gain little from it and lose much, why did India attend the conference? The complex, in fact somewhat tortuous, thinking that sometimes goes into the formation of her attitude in certain situations, makes it difficult for one to give a simple answer. Perhaps she was dragooned into joining the conference by the fear of isolation or by the charge that she was unwilling to face the bar of international opinion. Or maybe Mr. Nehru did not wish to miss an opportunity, however uncomfortable and unprofitable it might have seemed at that stage, of a talk with the Chinese leaders. Perhaps again, India was anxious not to antagonise Dr. Sukarno who was working with the sort of single-mindedness that he and his Government displayed later over the Asian Games.12

Quite apart from the expected hostility from China and Pakistan and the unpredictability of Dr. Sukarno, what contributed in no small measure to the Indian delegation's discomfiture at the time of attending the conference, was the fact that during the past few years she had neglected to cultivate friendly relations with the leaders of the African and Asian nations.

India was the founder of the Afro-Asian club, yet, due partly to her own volition and partly to the force of international circumstances, she found herself out of touch with most of its members. Owing to the wider perspective that Mr. Nehru had always kept before him, India had been taking a greater interest in the issues involving the big powers of the world than in the problems concerning the small nations of the two continents.13

However, Mr. Nehru and his advisers were becoming increasingly conscious of this weakness. The Prime Minister's decision to visit Ghana, Nigeria, and Mali on his way back from the Commonwealth premier's conference was itself an attempt to win over some of his hitherto neglected friends.

As has been pointed out earlier, Pandit Nehru was extremely reluctant to attend the conference and had on several occasions turned down suggestions of a second meeting. Peking, in contrast, became an ardent supporter of Indonesia's aspirations to convene another Bandung-type gathering. Tito, Nasser, and Nehru, much to the resentment of Sukarno, shelved the proposal of a second conference and, instead, planned a conference of non-aligned countries which eventually took place at Belgrade in September, 1961.

III

The outbreak of hostilities between the Dutch and the Indonesians over the question of West Irian, witnessed the emergence of a new irritant in Indo-

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12 In Indonesian minds, India's refusal to attend would be adequate justification for another mob attack on her embassy.
13 To contribute something to the world's thinking on the futility of the armament race and East-West tension, should indeed give one a sense of history, but sympathetic understanding of the petty problems of small nations establishes links which could prove valuable on occasions like the Bandung Conference.
nesia-India relations. From 1954 to 1957, Indonesia had tried to settle the West Irian dispute through the United Nations, but following the 12th General Assembly's inability to initiate action, Indonesia forsook further efforts through the United Nations. During the period 1957-1961 nothing was done to improve the situation. Indonesia thus adopted what Sukarno had spoken of as a new "policy of strength" and started preparing itself for an armed confrontation with the Dutch. Speaking on the occasion of the inauguration of the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian on August 15, 1958, President Sukarno said that a "sweet reasoning and persuasion policy" cannot be continued any longer in Indonesia's efforts to secure control of West Irian from the Dutch.\(^{14}\) The struggle to gain control of West Irian should take the form of building up power and applying such power. Though President Sukarno did not elaborate on what he meant by "building up power," observers felt that he wanted the country's military potential to be strengthened.

This posture of the Indonesian government was viewed with alarm in India, and when Dr. Sukarno visited India in July, 1958, he failed to sway Mr. Nehru to endorse Indonesia's policy of occupying West Irian by force. In a press statement issued on this occasion, Mr. Nehru reiterated his opposition to the continuance of colonialism, but, at the same time, he expressed the hope that the problem of West Irian would be resolved in a peaceful way.

Indonesia, however, did not pay any heed to India's view on the question of West Irian, and was determined to obtain this territory by all means, not excluding force. It should be noted in this connection that if India did not give unreserved support to Indonesia in its dispute with the Netherlands, neither did she receive support from Indonesia in her dispute with Pakistan. Indonesia was bound to India for political and sentimental reasons, but, at the same time, it was anxious not to offend Pakistan.

The differing attitudes of Indonesia and India in their approach to the settlement of the West Irian disputes were only the prelude to the almost violent, and sharply differing, attitudes that emerged at the Belgrade Conference in September, 1961. Here the differences in outlook and attitude of the two countries to world problems were made crystal clear in the course of the proceedings of the conference.

At the Belgrade Conference an angry Sukarno challenged with full vigour Mr. Nehru's pre-eminent position in the "Third World." He insisted, and was allowed, to deliver the first major address after Tito's welcoming speech. In the group photo of the participants, Sukarno, not Tito, Nehru, or Nasser appeared in the centre. He also tried vainly to repudiate the prevailing belief that India, or more precisely Nehru, was the originator of the idea of non-commitment in the cold war. More than that, Sukarno disregarded a gentleman's agreement not to turn the conference into an anti-

Western tirade, nor make any proposals of substance without the full agreement of all. Disregarding this informal understanding, he went ahead on some controversial issues and supported, for instance, the recognition of two Germany's. Sukarno's bid to dominate the conference and to determine its statements on his own terms, upset Nehru to a point of necessitating friendly intervention by third parties on the very first day of the conference.

Perhaps, the main bone of contention between Sukarno and Nehru at Belgrade was over the question of colonialism, in its varying forms, as outlined by President Sukarno. Nehru argued the question of eradication of colonialism was of secondary importance, in comparison to the growing crisis over Berlin and the resumption of nuclear tests. A study of the speech delivered by Mr. Nehru makes it clear that the danger to international peace and security according to him was the rivalry between the two power blocs.15

During the course of his speech, however, President Sukarno totally disagreed with Mr. Nehru's views. To President Sukarno, the question of eradication of colonialism was of primary importance and, hence, should be the chief concern of the nations of the Afro-Asian world. The source of all international strife and tension, he pointed out, was the struggle of the "New Emerging Forces" against the "Old Established Order" of the world.16 As to the question whether the forces of colonialism and imperialism were still a potent factor in the world, Sukarno and Nehru held diametrically opposite views. Nehru felt that "the era of classic colonialism is gone and is dead, though of course it survives and gives a lot of trouble yet; but essentially it is over."17 Sukarno, on the other hand, pointed out that even though the forces of colonialism and imperialism may be dying, they were as yet far from dead.

In his later speeches, he elaborated his ideas still further, and, in short, he suggested a closer alliance of the Asian and African states so as to form a powerful and unified bloc against the "Old Established Order." His violent attacks against colonialism and imperialism, represented by the Western democracies, was naturally viewed favourably by Peking and was instrumental in bringing Indonesia closer to China.

The failure of Nehru to follow the Sukarno line in world affairs thus further embittered the already rapidly deteriorating relations between Indonesia and India, particularly with the introduction in later years of President Sukarno's favourite conception of "guided democracy."

IV

The adoption of guided democracy in Indonesia resulted in drastic

16 For a detailed analysis of his theory of conflict, see New Forces Build a New World, Indonesian Policy Series (Djakarta: Dept. of Foreign Affairs, 1965), pp. 7-19.
17 No. 15, p. 107.
changes in Indonesia’s foreign policy. With the scrapping of the constitution of 1950 and the revival of the 1945 constitution by a presidential decree, Sukarno was able to transform the machinery of government and to exercise almost unchecked legal power. The return to the republican constitution meant not only a return to a presidential cabinet secure from parliamentary attack, but to the “1945 spirit,” sometimes called the “Rails of the Revolution.” Under Sukarno’s authoritarian leadership, Indonesian foreign policy took on a more aggressive character. The “active and independent” foreign policy of Indonesia was not far different from the policies of India, Burma, and several other countries in the post-independence period. Indonesia kept out of power blocs in general, though from 1950-1952 she was closer to the United States. However, the bitter controversy over the signing of an agreement with the United States (Mutual Security Act, 1951) by Foreign Minister Subarjo in 1952, and the eventual fall of the cabinet on this issue, deterred the succeeding ministers from moving closer to either bloc. The Ali Sastrojandomiojo Cabinet that came to power after the general elections, confirmed the “non-alignment” policy, but numerous factors, the most important of which were internal problems, began to influence foreign policy in the post-election period. The increasing criticism of the failure of the government to recover West Irian and the disappointment that the Western nations were not helping Indonesia to solve her dispute with the Netherlands, considerably influenced her foreign policy in later years.

President Sukarno’s visit to the Soviet Union and other Communist countries and the exchange of delegations since 1956 had undoubtedly brought Indonesia closer to the Communist countries. In 1959, while addressing the students of the Padjajaram University at Bandung, President Sukarno declared:

It is in Moscow that they justify Indonesia’s claim for West Irian. It is there that our independent policy has been justified. . . 18

President Sukarno’s domestic policies received bitter criticism abroad; and there was a suspicion among many Indonesians that the Western nations were sympathising with the cause of the rebels in Central Sumatra. This attitude in turn led to the further estrangement of Indonesia from the West.

When the Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakyat (MPRS) laid down the basic policies to be pursued under guided democracy, the general lines of foreign policy were explained. The MPRS stipulated that the President’s address before the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations on September 30, 1960 provide the basic principles that could serve as the basis of foreign policy. An executive direction issued later explained:

The foreign policy of the Republic of Indonesia must be based on the ideals of the Indonesian people as contained in the framework mentioned above: The obligation to wipe out imperialism and colonialism from the face of the earth while aiming at perfect world peace is the task of mankind.19

A militant anti-colonial stance was adopted by Indonesia more and more since 1960. In his speech to the United Nations, Sukarno elaborated Indonesia’s view that imperialism and colonialism and continued forcible division of the nations are the causes of all international tensions:

... Look around this world of ours. There are tensions and sources of potential conflict in many places. Look closer at those places and you will discover that almost without exceptions, imperialism and colonialism in one of their many manifestations are at the root of the tension or conflict. Imperialism and colonialism and the continued forcible division of nations are the root of almost all international and threatening evil in this world of ours.20

The same view was reiterated during his address at the conference of the heads of state or of governments of non-aligned countries on September 1, 1961 at Belgrade. Here Sukarno stated that “there can be no co-existence between independence and justice on one side and imperialism-colonialism on the other.”21

Indonesia in the fifties, like many other non-aligned countries, was not in favor of these non-aligned countries forming a bloc. But since 1960, President Sukarno had repeatedly urged that the uncommitted nations should come closer together and should exercise their influence for the preservation of peace in the world. He demanded that the uncommitted nations should be represented at the Paris summit meeting of the major powers. In due course President Sukarno increasingly attempted to identify non-alignment with anti-colonialism. In his independence day speech of August 17, 1965 he declared:

In Indonesia’s view, non-alignment is, I think, sufficiently clear. In Indonesia’s view, non-alignment is in reality already aligned, because it favours anti-imperialism.22

Though President Sukarno spoke of the “need for the new emerging forces” to come closer together at the Belgrade Conference in 1961, it was only during his address to the nation on August 17, 1961 that he elaborated his ideas of the “new emerging forces.” He said:

The New Emerging Force is a mighty force that consists of ... the oppressed nations and the progressive nations. The New Emerging Force is composed of the Asian nations and African nations, the Latin American nations of the Socialist countries, the progressive groups in the capitalist countries.23

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19 "Two Executive Directions of Manipol," Handbook of the Political Manifesto (Djakarta: Department of Information, 1961), p. 89.
21 Ibid.
23 Extracts of President Sukarno’s speech on August 17, 1963, reproduced in New Forces Build a New World (Djakarta: Department of Information, 1963), p. 16.
These ideas have their roots in Sukarno’s “theory of conflict” which was developing towards the end of 1957. This theory was first outlined in its concrete form to the world during the Belgrade conference of non-aligned countries in September, 1961. The conception of the “New Emerging Forces” versus “The Old Established Forces,” formulated for the first time in 1960, steadily grew in emphasis. In his speech at the Bandung Conference in 1955, the Indonesian President had faithfully preached the precept of non-alignment. Sukarno’s idea of the neutralist position as a rational break in the power-maddened nuclear rivalries of the two world blocs, is a continuous theme in early Indonesian statements about the world, and remains operative today in Indonesia.

The increasing emphasis on the need to forge a strong unity among the New Emerging Forces, put Indonesia on a different road, and President Sukarno moved well to the left of other Asian leaders. The left-wing radicalism and nativism of the emerging African leaders appealed to the Indonesians more, and Indonesia sought closer contact with them. The shift from the authoritarian system within the country had considerable impact on her foreign policy. This brought her closer to countries with monolithic party systems. There was increased contact with the East European countries, the United Arab Republic, China, and other countries with such systems.

Like many other charismatic leaders, President Sukarno also had systematically attempted to inspire and sustain the loyalty and devotion of the people around him by constantly reminding them of the country’s glorious past. Many other Indonesian leaders have followed his example in reminding the people of Indonesia’s importance in the world and of what she could achieve. The foremost of these was Prof. Muhammed Yamin who has written extensively about the past history of the country. Indonesia, or Nusantara as it was known in pre-colonial days, argued Prof. Yamin, consisted of eight groups of Islands (Astadwipa): the Malay peninsula, the islands of Sumatra, the Kalimantan (Borneo), Java, the southeastern islands, the islands of Sulawesi, the groups of Moloccas, and West Irian.

The present-day Indonesia, according to Yamin, is the rightful heir to these areas. Such arguments obviously had tremendous appeal for the Indonesians. The constant reminders of past achievements roused hopes of

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24 In this respect Indonesians seem to be rather history-conscious, like the Chinese. This “history consciousness,” if it can be so called, was perhaps partly responsible for the aggressive claims of Indonesia and China on West Irian’s and India’s northern frontiers, respectively. This seems to be indicated by the fact that Indonesia, in claiming West Irian, and China, in gobbling up large stretches of territory in Ladakh, have sought to justify their claims on historical grounds.

the possibility of playing an equally important role in the present-day world. Indonesia's "confrontation" policy is partly the result of her ambition to play such a dominant role in the above areas. While taking these steps, Indonesia's foreign policy makers took the country away from the countries whom she had once considered close to her. Thus, since Indonesia came under guided democracy, she has moved away from India. The aforementioned differences between Indonesia and India came out clearly during the 1961 Belgrade Conference. Although subsequent efforts were made to patch up these differences, the Indian stand with regard to Malaysia largely undermined these efforts.

Before Indonesia had taken over the administration of West Irian in May, 1963, she was entangled in another issue which promised to become more demanding than the "confrontation" with the Dutch over West Irian. In May, 1961, Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman broached the idea of "closer association" of Malay with Singapore, the British protectorate of Brunei, and the British colonies of Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo). In August, Lord Selkirk, British Commissioner-General for South-East Asia, visited Djakarta with plans for a federation of the five units, now known as Malaysia. In an address to the United Nations General Assembly on the West Irian issue on November 20, 1961, Dr. Subandrio made the following statement:

... When Malaya told us of her intention to merge with the three British Crown colonies of Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo as one federation, we told them that we had no objections and that we wish them success with this merger - so that everyone may live in peace and freedom.26 This neutral, even permissive, attitude of the Indonesian government towards the proposed Federation of Malaysia, continued vaguely in 1962, although the PKI, in line with the international Communist view that "Malaysia" was a British neo-colonialist plot, stated its opposition clearly at a conference December 30-31, 1961. On December 8, 1962, however, the leader of the Brunei Party Rakyat, A.M. Azahari, who opposed "Malaysia," staged an armed rebellion in Brunei. The rebellion, however, was smashed in five days by British troops flown from Singapore. The Azahari rebellion received widespread support from Indonesia. In January, 1963, Sukarno emphatically rejected the "Malaysia" concept on the ground that it was based on the will for freedom of the peoples concerned. On January 21, Subandrio announced that Indonesia's patience was not inexhaustible and declared a policy of "konfrantasi" (confrontation) towards Malaysia. At the same time, the campaign against Malaysia mounted in Djakarta.

Towards the end of May, however, with Australian and Philippine efforts to bring Indonesia and Malaya to the conference table, there was a lull in the exchange of propaganda, and at the end of May, Tunku Abdul Rahman and Sukarno met in Tokyo. They reaffirmed their faith in the 1959

26 New Forces Build a New World, op. cit., p. 48.
Malaya-Indonesia friendship treaty and captured the headlines with smiles and handshakes. On June 7, the three foreign ministers met in Manila and agreed to “welcome” Malaysia, provided the support of the Borneo territories was ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative. The three ministers concluded their conference with a declaration of friendship and unity. A summit was prepared for July 30. On July 10, however, President Sukarno, in a speech on the 40th anniversary of the Indonesian Catholic Party, reverted to “confrontation,” claiming that the Malaysian agreement signed the day before in London, broke the guarantees given in Tokyo and Manila for ascertaining the wishes of the people. After weeks of apparent hesitation and some powerful rally oratory by Sukarno (“We will crunch up Malaysia and spit out the pieces.”), the President attended the three-nation summit meeting in Manila which ratified the foreign ministers’ agreement and proposed a detailed form for United Nations ascertainment.

Indonesian press and public response to the results of the meeting was cautiously favourable, encouraged by British criticism of the Tunku for having conceded too much. Djakarta comments stressed that Indonesia’s position in Southeast Asia had been recognised by the consultations on Malaysia. But it was evident that, in spite of what was said in public, the mechanics of confrontation were continuing. General Nasution visited Kalimantan and made several tough speeches urging the frustration of Malaysia “by force if necessary.”

The disputes in the following weeks over the United Nations team and the time given to the team to complete its task, seemed peripheral to the fact of confrontation. This was indicated by the raid on the Sarawak border by Indonesian-trained guerrilla bands when the Secretary-General of the United Nations (U Thant) announced the team’s strong endorsement of the majority will for Malaysia.

The finding of the United Nations team was rejected by Indonesia on the ground that it was not a fair reflection of the wishes of the people. To support its claim, the Indonesian government pointed out that the ground covered by the United Nations team was approximately the same as that covered by the earlier inquiry of the British Cobbold Commission. Often, the very same groups were interviewed all over again, except that two weeks were spent by the team in Sarawak and Sabah, instead of the Commission’s two months. The atmosphere of intimidation was even more pronounced than at the time of the Commission inquiry whose finding had been far from conclusive. Indonesia further pointed out that the British were determined to establish the “Federation of Malaysia,” regardless of the findings of the United Nations team. In this connection, Indonesia referred to a statement made at Kuala Lumpur by British Colonial Affairs Minister Duncan Sandys, that no matter what the results produced by the United Nations, the “Federation of Malaysia” would be set up on September 16, 1963.
The “Federation of Malaysia” was formally proclaimed and in due course became a member of the United Nations. Except for Indonesia and the Philippines, most countries, including India, supported Malaysia. On September 17, the Kuala Lumpur regime severed diplomatic relations with both Indonesia and the Philippines. Indonesia, in retaliation, severed economic relations with Malaysia and Singapore. This brought the political and economic relations of the Southeast Asian neighbours to the lowest point since they achieved independence.

Indonesian disillusionment with the United Nations, which had started with the failure of the organisation to solve the West Irian dispute, reached its peak with the seating of Malaysia as a member of the Security Council. On December 30, 1964, President Sukarno, in the course of an address referring to the possibility of Indonesia leaving the United Nations, observed:

Recently Malaysia has been working hard in order to become a member of the Security Council of the United Nations. We have already stated our stand. We do not want Malaysia to become a member of the Security Council of the United Nations.

If in spite of our explanations in the United Nations, Malaysia is nevertheless made a member of the United Nations Security Council, we will leave the United Nations.  

Malaysia did become a member of the United Nations, and Indonesia withdrew in January, 1965.

One important reason for the withdrawal was that, in September, 1964, when the question of Indonesian infiltrators in Borneo territory was brought before the Security Council, a resolution deploiring the Indonesian attitude was introduced therein and was supported by Morocco and the Ivory Coast. The resolution, however, was vetoed by the USSR. Apparently, Indonesia was worried that, with Malaysia in the Security Council, she would have to face criticisms of her anti-Malaysia campaign. USSR attempts to dissuade Indonesia from taking a hasty step did not succeed. Indonesia’s action was hailed by Communist China, and Indonesia’s threat that she would try to establish a new-style United Nations, was applauded by China.

In letters sent to friendly heads of state to explain the background and the reasons motivating Indonesia to withdraw from the United Nations, President Sukarno gave the following reasons:

... The Malaysia issue is a long-outstanding problem. We have explored many avenues ... to bring the problem to a solution ... but to no avail. The acceptance of Malaysia as a member of the Security Council was the culminating point of a long and arduous search for a solution acceptable to all the parties concerned. Indonesia cannot accept an engineered situation whereby Malaysia becomes a member of the agency of the United Nations that is charged with the responsibility to safeguard international peace and security.

when that country, in fact, is a tool of neo-colonialism...and non-existent for Indonesia...

It is to be hoped that our withdrawal will bring about renewed vigour for the endeavour to reflect a reorganisation and renewal of the United Nations, a complete overhaul of the mental and structural set-up of that body...
The withdrawal of Indonesia from the United Nations will serve as a catalyst to strengthen the solidarity amongst us, the new emerging forces (especially among the Asian-African nations) in our bilateral relations as well as collectively. In this way we hope that the internal reorganisation of the United Nations will be accelerated, and in such a renovated and rejuvenated United Nations, Indonesia may find it possible eventually to resume its membership.28

Indonesia had been an important beneficiary of U.N. membership, and very often it was the U.N. and her allied organisations that had helped the country to tide over her difficulties. To deprive the country of the services and assistance rendered by such an organisation for the purpose of pursuing the confrontation policy against Malaysia, was perhaps the most thoughtless action of President Sukarno.

India welcomed the proposal for the formation of Malaysia. From the beginning, India felt that the move was in the right direction and constituted the best step towards the emancipation of the Borneo territories. India's support for Malaysia, in her dispute with Indonesia, infuriated the latter; and from this time onwards we find Indonesia increasingly identifying India with the Old Established Forces or neo-colonialists. Perhaps, in this connection, an extract from President Sukarno's speech entitled "New Forces Build a New World," is revealing:

Most regrettably, some misguided nationals of the 'decolonised country' (India) had played a role in these acts of arrogance, having unwittingly or unwillingly become amenable yes-men of the old forces of colonialism and imperialism which continued their domination of the former colony.29

Taking advantage of the deteriorating relations, Pakistan intensified her propaganda in Indonesia. In 1964, Indonesia organised the Asia-African Islamic Conference which was attended by representatives from several Asian countries, excluding Malaysia. During the conference the Pakistani representative attempted to raise the Kashmir issue, and there were heated exchanges between the Indian and Pakistani representatives. Though the final communique did not mention anything about self-determination for the people of Kashmir as desired by Pakistan's representative, the conference itself revealed the extent to which Pakistan had intensified her campaign to woo Indonesia.30

29 New Forces Build a New World, op. cit., p. 56.
30 The usual mass demonstrations in front of the Indian Embassy turned out to be more violent and Embassy losses were heavy. The Indonesian government, however, later expressed its regret for the incidents.
The militant and aggressive posture of Indonesia in her foreign relations, under guided democracy, alienated her from the countries whom she had once considered very close to her. Thus, with the advent of guided democracy, Indonesia moved farther away from India.

V

The extent to which Indonesia-India relations had deteriorated was demonstrated by the incidents during the Asian Games in Djakarta in September, 1962. Indonesia’s refusal to grant visas to the teams from Nationalist China and Israel resulted in spoiling an otherwise well-advertised event. G. D. Sondhi, the Federation’s vice-president and the Committee’s official observer (incidentally an Indian national), warned the organisation that the bodies he represented would withdraw recognition of the Asian Games because of the exclusion of two accredited members. The government-controlled Djakarta press whipped up mass hatred not only against Sondhi’s statement but against India as well.

President Sukarno and the organisers of the Games took Sondhi’s statement as a grave offense. The government of India, sensing the increasing resentment over the controversy, privately and publicly let it be known that it “completely dissociated itself from the statements and activities of Sondhi,” who, it was evident, was neither a representative of India nor a member of the Indian athletic contingent.81 Even then, a well-planned, violent anti-Indian campaign followed, which seems to indicate that the whole affair had the blessing of President Sukarno himself.

Strong and anti-Indian feeling was aroused by the National Front despite the explanation given that Mr. Sondhi had acted as a private person and had nothing to do with the Asian contingent. The National Front passed a resolution which read:

The attempt of Mr. Sondhi (India), Vice-President of the Executive Committee of the Asian Games Federation, to sabotage the Fourth Asian Games, is an insult to President Sukarno and the people of Indonesia.82

Anti-Sondhi posters and banners were splashed all over town, and Indonesian resentment was expressed (as has already been pointed out) in terms of an unpleasant demonstration on the premises of Hotel Indonesia where Mr. Sondhi was staying. Almost simultaneously came the storming of the Indian Embassy in Djakarta.

After winning the soccer finals, the Indian team was booed and jeered by a large section of the crowd at the main stadium during the victory ceremony, and the Indian National Anthem was drowned by a deafening din. Finally, the Indian contingent was jeered during the closing ceremony to end the story on a most unhappy note for India.

81 The Economic Weekly (Bombay), September 8, 1961, pp. 1428-29.
82 The Statesman (Calcutta), September 9, 1962.
Although Dr. Subandrio expressed his "regret" and emphasised that "friendship with the Afro-Asian countries and particularly with India is of the greatest importance," it is significant to note that President Sukarno did not care to say one word of sympathy, let alone apologize for the unfortunate episode. Even though Indonesia might have been sincere in her desire to maintain cordial relations with India, in spite of the Djakarta incidents, she wanted India's goodwill on her own terms. Statements, like the one made by First Minister Dr. Djuanda that the Sondhi incident "should be a lesson to both parties," imply that Indonesia continued to hold the Indian government responsible for Mr. Sondhi's actions and that there was still no unequivocal condemnation of the disturbances.

Side by side with disgust and distress over the Djakarta incidents, one noted in India a sense of puzzlement. How could a large fund of goodwill, personal and national, built so assiduously over the years by a leader as senior as Mr. Nehru, be dissipated in a matter of a few days and over something as utterly trivial as a controversy in a sports organisation? Perhaps, as many said, Mr. Sondhi was tactless (although there is no reason why the functionary of a non-official, multi-national body should be expected to act as his country's diplomatic representative); perhaps the Indonesians are a volatile people who had set their hearts on the success of the jamboree. Perhaps, again, there is a strong pro-China group among the Indonesian leftists. But even the combination of these factors does not convincingly explain the sudden outburst against India.

The real reason is obviously much deeper than Mr. Sondhi's indiscretion. Feelings against India must have been simmering for some time for them to boil up in this manner. Why, despite all the Indian show of friendliness, such an unhappy development should take place, is the baffling question to which India might have tried to find an answer. To say that it was an isolated episode and that good Indonesians themselves are penitent is a rather simple answer to a very complex question. If the Djakarta incident had led to a soul-searching among the policy makers of India, one might well have asked himself if there were not something basically wrong in Delhi itself.

When Communist China attacked India a week later, Indonesia failed to show any sympathy over the troubles of a fellow Asian and non-aligned nation. It was Indonesia's attitude that shocked many observers in India. Earlier, in 1959, Indonesia had taken a strong stand against China in the dispute regarding the status of overseas Chinese in Indonesia. Many observers in India felt that India's case against that of China should have been supported by Indonesia. The first indication to the contrary came as early as October when the influential Communist daily, *Harian Rakyat*, came out with background reports supporting China's claim and condemning India's

33 *The Statesman* (Calcutta), September 5, 1962.
occupation of these disputed territories. Later, when China started its campaigns on a major scale, Indonesia criticised India for precipitating a crisis.

At the Colombo Conference of the six non-aligned nations in December, 1962, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Subandrio clearly stated that he was not interested in knowing or saying who was the aggressor and who was the victim; his main concern was to ensure the solidarity of the peoples of Asia and Africa. The Indian government, press, and political public were quick to note the difference between the Indonesian stand and that of the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.), which was the only non-aligned country among the Afro-Asian nations to express genuine sympathy with India's ordeal and which demanded that there be no territorial gains on account of the recent military clashes.\(^{35}\) On April 21, 1963, President Liu Shao-chi and President Sukarno issued a joint communiqué at the end of President Liu Shao-chi's state visit to Indonesia. The communiqué made clear that China did not yield any ground on the Sino-Indian border conflict and that Indonesia did go some way in endorsing the Chinese line on a number of important points arising out of the conflict—perhaps in an effort to placate China. Indonesia also expressed her appreciation of the Chinese ceasefire and subsequent withdrawal.\(^{36}\)

One of the direct consequences of Sino-Indian tension has been a growing friendship between India's principal adversaries—China and Pakistan. The strained relations between India and Indonesia and the growing friendship between China-Indonesia and China-Pakistan, resulted in another international marriage of convenience: the Peking-Djakarta-Rawalpindi Axis. From 1963-1965, President Sukarno visited Pakistan several times, and in the process he seemed to have privately given some psychological comfort to the Pakistani leaders in their desire to win Indonesia's support for Pakistan in her dispute with India over Kashmir. The Sukarno-Ayub communiqué on June 26, 1963 expressed "their resolve to liberate the Afro-Asian peoples and to secure the right of self-determination of peoples still held in bondage."\(^{37}\) The communiqué clearly proved that Indonesia was gradually abandoning her neutrality in regard to the Kashmir problem, just as Pakistan went a long way to support Indonesia's "Crush Malaysia" campaign.

The growing Indonesian-Indian rift affected the non-aligned group as well. Within this "Third World" Indonesia and India became the symbols of two poles. Indonesia and the militants viewed the main function of non-alignment as the eradication of colonialism by every means. India and the moderates, while no less anti-colonialist, viewed the main function of non-alignment as the prevention of situations which threaten world peace, partic-

\(^{35}\) For details see \textit{Asian Recorder}, IX, No. 2 (January 8-14, 1963), 4979-80; and \textit{Far Eastern Economic Review}, January 3, 1963, pp. 17-19. \\
\(^{36}\) For details of the communiqué see \textit{ibid}. \\
\(^{37}\) \textit{Asian Recorder}, IX, No. 3 (August 17-19, 1963), 5350. It is noteworthy that the Pakistanis and Indonesians themselves have denied self-determination to the Paktoons and Bengalis, and the West Irianese, respectively.
ularly a nuclear war involving the two super powers. As a result of the polarisation of views around the two countries—Indonesia and India—the Belgrade Conference, as noted earlier, had been faced with the emergence of divisions within the “Third World.” Sukarno further intensified his militant attitude towards various world problems. Hence, at the second conference of non-aligned nations at Cairo in October, 1964, President Sukarno declared that peaceful co-existence was impossible. How could co-existence be applied to the situation in Malaysia, Cyprus, Vietnam, and Cambodia, he asked.\(^{38}\) Thus at Cairo, as was to be expected, Indonesia and India had crossed swords over the concepts of peaceful co-existence and non-alignment. India, in an effort to save the concept, put up a staunch defense so that in the end the India-Yugoslavia-U.A.R. (the moderate trio) view of peaceful co-existence prevailed. Indonesia and India, besides violently disagreeing at the Cairo Conference on the meaning and feasibility of peaceful co-existence, clashed on practically everything, including the question of what the main business of the conference should be.\(^{39}\)

It must be stressed that the greatest setback for Indonesia at Cairo was the exclusion of the Malaysian dispute from the agenda, thanks to Indian diplomacy. Although India favoured the idea of a Malaysian Federation, she did not wish to annoy Indonesia by publicity, questioning Djakarta’s motives. The growing anti-Indian posture of the Sukarno regime and its flirtations with Peking (in comparison to Malaysian Premier Tunku Abdul Rahman’s unequivocal support for India in her dispute with China) in the end led India to give up her reluctance to support Malaysia publicly. If one takes into account the massive propaganda mounted by Indonesia, the exclusion of Malaysia from the agenda was a great victory for Indian diplomacy (in concert with the U.A.R.), particularly since the conference did pronounce on a number of controversies involving states represented there. For the second time (the first at Belgrade), Indonesia’s aspirations to legitimize through the support of international gatherings its adventurous policies, were thwarted largely by Indian initiative. An angry Sukarno did not attend the final session of the conference. Here again India struck directly at the root of Indonesian aspirations. She proposed, to the great dismay and disappointment of the pro-Peking groups, and succeeded in persuading the delegates, that the second Afro-Asian Conference should not only be convened in 1965 (after the conference of non-aligned nations) but should meet in Africa. India’s Swaran Singh outmaneuvered the chairman of the meeting, Dr. Subandrio of Indonesia, with these clever words:

\(^{38}\) *The Hindustan Times* (Calcutta), October 7, 1964.

\(^{39}\) During the course of the conference President Sukarno and his lieutenant Subandrio made a concerted effort to give the “war of liberation” or the “Confrontation between NEFOS and OLDEFOS” priority over everything else. However, this effort was foiled by “the moderates.”
The anniversary of that historic (Bandung) conference will fall on April 18, 1965. What can be more appropriate and befitting, what can be more inspiring to the people of Asia and Africa than that the second Asia-African Conference should be held on the auspicious occasion of that anniversary?40

Recalling that at Bandung there had been a general feeling that the second Asian-African conference should be held somewhere in Africa, the Indian Foreign Minister suggested that it would be a fitting tribute to the achievements of new Africa if the next conference were to be convened at a place in Africa to be selected by the Organisation for African Unity. The Indian move thus not only embossed the militant trio but enhanced Indian prestige with the African states which outnumbered the Asian. Something else was yet to come from India, much more perturbing than the time and venue of the proposed conference. India's Foreign Minister surprised the meeting by proposing that USSR and Malaysia also be invited to participate in the conference. The militant trio put up a strong fight, and the question of the Soviet and Malaysian participation was left undecided. The government-controlled Djakarta press accused India of insulting Indonesian sensibilities and deliberately trying to wreck the conference.41

By early 1965, it became abundantly clear that there was no love lost between Indonesia and India. At the Bandung Conference's "Dasavora" celebrations in Djakarta, to which China sent her Prime Minister, India was represented by her Food Minister (who, incidentally, had been asked to drop in at Djakarta on his way home from Australia). While Chou En-lai, Pham Van Dong (North Vietnam), Sihanouk, and Bhutto (Pakistan) all shared the limelight, the representatives of India, Japan, and Thailand were left out. (The representatives of these countries, not being able to bear the insult, walked out.) As one commentator admirably put it:

Bung Karno's regime reserved its most clamorous accolades for the most conclusively Communist of its Afro-Asian guests and muscled away from the microphone all the friends of the West.42

Indonesian-Indian rivalry reached its peak with the approach of the proposed Afro-Asian Conference. Indian diplomacy, in conjunction with Japan's and the U.A.R.'s, foiled an attempt by Communist China and Indonesia to dominate the conference. When China, Pakistan, and Indonesia sent their ministers to Japan, Southeast Asia, and Africa, India also did the same to offset the visits of the representatives of the militant trio. In this regard, Indian diplomacy on the eve of the Algiers Conference (scheduled for June 29, 1965) was rather successful in so far as India was able to secure an adequate number of concurrences for the admission of Malaysia, and at least partially successful regarding Soviet participation. The frustrated Sukarno immediately burst out: "I really do not want to criticise India but I

40 Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi), X, No. 4 (April, 1964), 122-23.
42 Indonesian Observer (Djakarta), April 15, 1964.
cannot stand it any longer."\textsuperscript{43} Unable to do anything, he gave the green signal to the violence-addicted mobs of Djakarta who once again stoned the Indian Embassy on June 23, 1965 and carried banners marked: "India and Malaysia are Necolim Siamese twins."\textsuperscript{44} In retaliation India further destroyed Indonesia's hopes of dominating the Algiers Conference by successfully securing the approval of the member nations to a resolution postponing the conference until November 5, 1965. This resolution, sponsored by Ethiopia, clearly bore the stamp of Indian draftsmanship.\textsuperscript{45}

The Indonesian press continued to whip up anti-Indian sentiments in the subsequent months. In retaliation socialist-led demonstrations in Delhi burned an effigy of Sukarno.

If one studies how India's policies were executed during this period, one may quite accurately point out some glaring weaknesses. Time and again, foreign diplomats, visiting politicians, and observers had talked with ill-concealed irritation of India's tendency to "sermonize." Indian leaders and diplomats have always talked a bit too much of the country's rich and ancient culture and of having exported some of it to the South-Asian countries. Latterly, they had also been flaunting India's success with democracy and her five-year plans, in a similarly aggressive manner. In fact, India seemed to wear her moderate political system like a badge.

Her friendly relations with Indonesia derived sustenance chiefly from Mr. Nehru's personal friendship with Indonesia's top leaders. India's historical ties with Indonesia had partly bound India all those years with the latter, but primarily the closeness resulted from Mr. Nehru's relation with Sukarno. There was little evidence of any strong emotional and commercial integration. Cordiality with the leaders at the top is indeed valuable, but the individual leaders do not last forever, nor are they above displaying a mercurial temperament.

Last but not least, India's choice of diplomatic representatives has sometimes been far from happy. At the External Affairs Ministry, stories are often heard purporting to describe the offensive behaviour of some of India's diplomats abroad.

When, much to the shock of the Indian people, Pakistan launched its attack against India on August 15, 1965, the sub-continent became engulfed in an undeclared war. The outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan war, however, proved to be a source of discomfort and embarrassment for most of the Asian countries, since two fellow Asian nations were involved in the dispute. While most of the countries in the region maintained an uneasy silence, it is significant to note that Indonesia hesitatingly expressed her support for Pakistan while condemning India in the war between the two countries over Kashmir. Thus, on the anniversary of the Indonesian Islamic Party,
President Sukarno said that all Muslim countries should give their sympathy and support to Pakistan in its struggle against India because Islam always defended justice and truth and always opposed tyranny.46

In a speech at the presidential palace on September 9, 1965, President Sukarno further expressed his admiration over Pakistani resistance to the onslaughts of what he called the “far superior military might of India,” and said that “the strength” of the Pakistani people lies in their “love of liberty.”47

In Indonesia itself demonstrations organised by the Communist “Central Youth Front” took place outside the Indian Embassy. On September 9, 1965, in sympathy with Pakistan, many Indonesians ransacked the Indian Embassy in Djakarta. These actions were applauded by Foreign Minister Subandrio who said that he “appreciated the revolutionary actions taken by the youth in their denunciation of India’s actions against Pakistan.”48

When Pakistan officially asked for Indonesia’s help in the fighting in the subcontinent, Foreign Minister Subandrio, after consultations with President Sukarno, said that it was the obligation of “all nations belonging to the new emerging forces” to give help to Pakistan, to face what he called “India’s aggression.”49

Earlier, the Madjelis Permursjawaratan Rakyat Sementara (Provisional Peoples’ Consultative Congress), Indonesia’s top legislative body, unanimously asked the government to aid Pakistan against India as early as possible. In a resolution the Congress endorsed President Sukarno’s earlier statement that:

Indonesian sentiments, sympathies and prayers are with the people of Kashmir and the people and Government of Pakistan who are courageously and heroically defending their independence and sovereignty.50

Djakarta retained this anti-Indian posture even after the abortive September 30, 1965 coup. As late as January, 1966, the Indonesian Herald, organ of the Indonesian Ministry of External Affairs, was warning India that “she could not continue to bully Pakistan into accepting her expansionist policies,” and was praising Pakistan’s “burning will” and “invincible strength” in standing by what was “legally and legitimately” her right in Kashmir. The hostile attitude and pronouncement of the Indonesian people and government further embittered the already rapidly deteriorating relations between Indonesia and India.

President Sukarno’s failure to provide a suitable answer to the most pressing political and economic problems of the country brought about the downfall of the regime he had established during the last six years. On September 30, 1965, a group of army officers led by Lt. Col. Untung suddenly

47 Hindustan Times (Calcutta), September 10, 1965.
50 Ibid.
swooped down on the capital, arrested the leading army generals, and announced later that these steps had been taken to protect President Sukarno. However, at 8:45 p.m., on October 1, 1965, an announcement over Djakarta radio established that the September 30th movement had failed. Troops under Major General Suharto had regained control of key Djakarta installations from the handful of army units supporting Untung's plot. Moreover, the commander of the army, General A. H. Nasution, and President Sukarno were both safe and well. Suharto soon emerged as the strongman in the country and proceeded to take firm steps against Untung and his followers. It was then alleged that the P.K.I. had been behind the September 30 coup, and Suharto began a brutal policy of extermination of the P.K.I. and its sympathisers.51

The ill-fated Communist coup of September 30, 1965 upset the precarious balance in favour of the army as the Communists were largely eliminated. The edifice of “Guided Democracy” which Sukarno had constructed on twin pillars collapsed suddenly with the fall of the P.K.I. In a series of trials begun in Djakarta in 1966 most of the close associates of President Sukarno, including Subandrio and Chairul Saleh, were tried and imprisoned. An attempt was made to discover whether President Sukarno was aware of the alleged P.K.I. plot and whether he had tacitly approved of the plans. However, within a year he was deprived of his favourite titles and, early in 1967, was politely asked to surrender his powers as president, and was virtually removed from office in spite of his objections.

The leaders of the new regime, the Suharto-Malik-Sultan Hamengku triumvirate, recognised the necessity of hearing the “message of the people’s sufferings,” which Sukarno had ignored for a long time. In an effort to re-establish Indonesia's shattered economy and tottering international prestige, the new leadership decided to call off its “confrontation” with Malaysia and to restore friendly relations with the countries of the West in order to attract badly needed foreign economic and financial assistance. The Peking-Djakarta axis, having been demolished (because of the alleged complicity of the People’s Republic of China in the September 30 coup), the stage was now set for improving relations with those countries which had been declared enemies during the Sukarno-Subandrio period.

The drastic change wrought in the Indonesian administrative set-up was welcomed by Malaysia. Adam Malik proceeded “to clear up the present climate” prevailing between India and Indonesia and to re-establish friendly ties between the two countries. For obvious reasons, India responded promptly, particularly when Malik indicated abandonment of the pro-Pakistani policy of his predecessor. Both Malik and Finance Minister Sultan Hamengker Buwono visited New Delhi in September, 1966 and they were offered Rs. 100 million worth of credit facilities. The Indian government

51 The Tokyo newspaper Asahi Shimbun reported in February, 1966 that Indonesian Communist leader D.N. Aidit had confessed leading the attempted September 30 coup d'etat before being executed by the army.
and the press welcomed the new orientations in Indonesian policy towards New Delhi as a "vindication of India's policy of showing patience and forbearance towards the excesses of the previous Indonesian regime." Additional trade agreements were concluded in early 1967.

VI

A survey of the relations between Indonesia and India reveals a broad trend with important implications so far as Indian future relations with that country is concerned. So long as there was a similarity of views and objectives the two countries were able to cooperate admirably in various fields. But when Indonesia's views and objectives differed from those of India, the two countries found themselves at loggerheads with each other.

Hence, the re-establishment of cordial relations between the two countries in recent years should not lead to complacency on the part of Indian policy makers. If the past is any indicator of the future, and if one takes into account Indonesia's ambitions of being recognised as a major power in Southeast Asia, then it is conceivable that in the near or distant future Indonesia and India might again find themselves at loggerheads. Still, one need not despair of the possibility of building a close relationship between the two countries. This of course would call for a high level of diplomacy on the part of both nations. Much will depend on serious attempts to discover areas of agreement.

The first and foremost task is to establish close cooperation between the two countries in the economic field, an area sadly neglected in the past. There is much that India can offer Indonesia. India's technical superiority can benefit a rising country like Indonesia. In the same way, Indonesia can offer her raw materials, tin, teak-wood, rawhides, and so on. In the past, trade between the two countries had been erratic mainly because of badly administered commercial policies on both sides.

In the final analysis, it cannot be ignored that there are more common points between Indonesia and India. It is true that for a brief period, when Indonesia was under "Guided Democracy," the country was moving closer to China. The administration in Djakarta somehow discovered common points between China and Indonesia and attempted to cement closer relations. Even during those days of "glorious" relations between the two countries, public protestations against the Chinese were not uncommon in Indonesia. For centuries the average Indonesian has resented the economic domination of the Chinese. They would certainly resent a politically dominant China near their frontier. It is this fear of Chinese expansionism that

52 The Times of India (Bombay). May 8, 1966.
53 Certain goals related to a position of Indonesian dominance in the region have been common to the attitudes of its leaders. Clear evidence of the "Greater Indonesia" thesis was to be found in the statements of Sukarno himself, and its crudest manifestation was the willingness of some Indonesian leaders to accept certain expansionist goals.
is likely to bring Indonesia closer to her Asian neighbours. One of the first acts of the new regime in Djakarta was to show a keen interest in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), an organization comprising most of the Southeast Asian Countries. It is now an accepted fact that for many years India has had to reckon with a hostile neighbour in the north. Undoubtedly, in her search for allies to meet the Chinese challenge, Indonesia should have a prominent place. If Southeast Asia is to be retained as an "area of peace," as Pandit Nehru once dreamt, then it is the task of Indian and Indonesian diplomats to discover possibilities of closer co-operation in the future.