THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AS A NUCLEAR POWER: A STUDY OF CHINESE STATEMENTS ON GLOBAL STRATEGY

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During the 1960's China emerged as another nuclear power in the world. Since 1964, China has conducted ten nuclear tests.¹ Her first test, conducted on October 16, 1964, consisted of an enriched uranium (U-235) device (in contrast with the less advanced plutonium devices used by Britain and France) which yielded a blast equivalent to 20 kilotons of T.N.T. This indicated a considerable degree of sophistication on the part of the Chinese nuclear program. After the test, the British Royal Institute for International Affairs predicted that China might have hydrogen bombs within two to five years. China's later tests proved the Royal Institute's estimate to be correct.

The test further proved interesting to observers in that a no-fail trigger technique, known as "implosion," was used instead of the more conventional "gun-barrel" method.

The second test, yielding 40 to 50 kilotons T.N.T. equivalent, conducted on May 14, 1965, indicated that China was able to deliver warheads from aircraft. Experts estimated that China could test a dozen bombs of this type (low-yield enriched uranium) per year.²

On May 9, 1966, the third test, a 200-kiloton bomber-dropped device, was exploded using a fission trigger indicating that China was on her way toward H-bomb (thermonuclear) development.

In early 1966, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara estimated that China would soon be able to launch a nuclear attack on countries within 500 miles of her borders.³ His estimate was substantiated by China's fourth test, conducted on October 27, 1966, using a guided missile carrying a nuclear warhead approximately 600 miles, which reportedly hit the target accurately.

The fifth test was a detonation on December 28, 1966. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission observed that the detonation used a three-stage method which made the blast not only powerful but "dirty," in the sense that

¹ China successfully launched two space satellites in 1970 and 1971, respectively. These doubtlessly indicate the progress she has made in the development of her Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). However, since they were not nuclear tests, they will not be discussed in this article.
radiation and fallout were maximized. They further estimated that the blast had an equivalent of a few hundred kilotons.\(^4\)

On June 17, 1967 came the sixth test which consisted of a hydrogen bomb dropped from a high-flying bomber. It yielded 3 to 7 megatons equivalent of T.N.T. United States officials were surprised by the speed of China’s H-bomb development, and U.S. Senator John O. Pastore described the test as a “dramatic and upsetting event.”\(^5\)

On December 24, 1967, an attempted thermonuclear explosion was conducted. Only the first fission cycle in the process was completed, yielding 20 kilotons. The test was never officially announced by China.

After this abortive test, there was no nuclear testing until December 27, 1968, when a hydrogen bomb was detonated, producing a yield equivalent to 3 megatons of T.N.T.

Finally, in September, 1969, two tests were conducted. The first was an underground fission device detonated in September 22, yielding 200 to 250 kilotons; the second was a hydrogen bomb explosion equivalent to 3 megatons, conducted on September 29.

These tests indicate a very rapid nuclear development in China. By successfully developing a hydrogen bomb in only two-and-a-half years after her first test, reducing her warheads to deliverable form, and conducting an underground test, she has passed France and may yet overtake Britain in the near future.

China takes great pride in what she has achieved in her nuclear weapons development:

> The first nuclear test by our country surpassed the levels attained in the initial tests of the United States, Britain, and France! It took China just over a year to carry out a nuclear explosion containing thermonuclear material after successfully exploding its first atomic bomb. This big-leap-forward speed proves fully that the Chinese people, armed with the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, dare to break a path none before has walked and dare to scale peaks others have not climbed.\(^6\)

In late 1969, after she had successfully conducted two nuclear tests—one underground explosion and one hydrogen bomb—China claimed that she was “making the most rapid progress in science.”

Many U.S. officials, as well as the U.S. Joint Congressional Commission on Atomic Energy, admitted that China’s nuclear weapons progress had been more rapid, and surprisingly more effective, than had been expected or predicted. In October, 1966, Dr. R. E. Lapp observed that China could have one hundred atomic bombs and missile warheads by 1967. In 1967, this was confirmed by Japanese military officials who estimated that China already had about one hundred nuclear bombs. In June, 1967, another report conservatively estimated China’s nuclear power at thirty bombs at

least. The U.S. State Department said in 1970 that China would have a medium-range ballistic system soon and a moderate intercontinental ballistic missile force by the mid-1970's.7

The above discussion indicates that, judging from its present rate, China will become a major nuclear power in the foreseeable future, at most within the next fifteen years.

China critics opine that China is an irresponsible and dangerous nuclear power because of her alleged claim that a third world war is inevitable and that it would not matter much if half of the world's population were to die in this war. For example, the Soviet Union claimed that:

To prevent a new world war is a real and quite feasible task. [T]here is no fatal inevitability of war between states. This conclusion is not the fruit of good intentions, but the result of a realistic, strictly scientific analysis of the balance of class forces on the world arena; . . .

And what is the position of the CCP [i.e., Chinese Communist Party] leadership? What do the theses that they propagate mean: an end cannot be put to wars so long as imperialism exists; . . .

These theses mean that the Chinese . . . do not believe in the possibility of preventing a new world war. . . . 8

The Soviet Union further claimed "every Communist Leninist will feel disgust at an attitude to thermonuclear war such as this: 'Never mind if a half, of mankind perishes, if 300 million Chinese die. . . .'" What is more, the Soviet Union pointed out that the Chinese Communist statement "was no chance remark but considered conception." 9

However, it is very doubtful that China has actually made these claims. In fact, over the past years, China has reiterated that "1. China wants peace, and not war; 2. it is the imperialists, and not we, who want to fight; 3. a world war can be prevented." 10 It appears that China has not claimed that a world war is inevitable. Nor has she sought such a war. Instead, her statements show more apprehension than aggressiveness: "It is they and not we who want to fight; . . ." China's other apparently bellicose statements are of the same nature:

Should the U.S. imperialists invade China's mainland, we will take all necessary measures to defeat them. . . . With the defeat of U.S. imperialism, the time will come when imperialism and colonialism will be really liquidated throughout the world.11

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Another charge against China is that she "obviously underestimate[s] the whole danger of thermonuclear war" because she has contended that "the atomic bomb is a paper tiger" and is not terrible at all.

Through the years, China has indeed advocated the "paper tiger" assumption. In 1964, for instance, after her first nuclear test, China reiterated:

The atomic bomb is a paper tiger. This famous statement by Chairman Mao Tse-tung is known to all. This was our view in the past and this is still our view at present.12

However, the "paper tiger" argument does not necessarily mean that China has failed to understand the implications of nuclear weapons. In fact, as early as 1934, China had warned her people that "with the appearance of the atomic, hydrogen, and other types of weapons of mass destruction, a new war will bring greater sacrifices of lives and material power beyond comparison with former wars."13 In 1961, Marshal Yeh Chien-ying advised his troops to learn how to preserve their lives in a nuclear attack.14 China is particularly concerned about her vulnerable industrial and commercial centers which are concentrated in, and limited to, certain areas of the Chinese mainland. In February, 1964, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai pointed out that "the imperialists and certain other persons unscrupulously have distorted China's position and made widespread propaganda about it." He pointed out that in a nuclear war China would lose more people than would other countries.15

Thus, there is little reason to maintain that China does not understand the implications of nuclear weapons. She fully realizes that the "paper tiger" is quite capable of becoming a "living tiger."

By contrast, the statements that the Chinese have made after each nuclear test have emphasized: (1) her desire for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons; (2) a never-to-use-first pledge; and (3) the defensive purpose of her nuclear weapons.

China calls for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. For example, in 1964, after her first test, China stated:

In developing nuclear weapons, China's aim is to break the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers and to eliminate nuclear weapons.16

The Chinese also proposed a summit conference of all countries to discuss the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

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15 Peking Review, No. 7 (February 14, 1964), p. 16.
In 1969 after her ninth and tenth tests, a similar statement was made:

As in the past the Chinese people and government will continue to make common efforts and persevere in the struggle... to achieve the lofty aim of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.\(^\text{17}\)

China pledges that she will never at any time and under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons. In 1969, after two tests, China confirmed the consistency of her policy, formed after the first nuclear test in 1964:

The Chinese government has solemnly declared many times that at no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons.\(^\text{18}\)

China claims that she is developing her nuclear weapons for the purpose of defense only. For example, after her first test, China declared that \"the development of nuclear weapons by China is for defense and protecting the Chinese people. . . .\" A similar statement was made in 1969:

The conducting of necessary and limited nuclear tests and the development of nuclear weapons by China are entirely for the purpose of defense. . . .\(^\text{19}\)

According to these statements, one may be tempted to assume that China’s nuclear weapons development will not affect her foreign policy and her external behavior even after she has become a major nuclear power with a sizable stock of ICBMs and an invulnerable nuclear force of some size. However, such an assumption could be very misleading. It is one thing to say that China does not want a nuclear world war, does not belittle the lives of human beings, does not underestimate the mass destruction caused by nuclear weapons, and would like to see the complete destruction of nuclear weapons. It is quite another to say that she will not take advantage of her nuclear weapons, at least indirectly, to pursue major foreign policy objectives, such as the establishment of her hegemony in Southeast Asia.

It is quite true that an examination of China’s behavior over the past years indicates that China’s deeds do not always match her words — her bellicose statements have not been paralleled by her actions which are relatively cautious and realistic. In other words, there appears to be a gap between China’s words and deeds. One explanation of this gap may be that China realizes that so far she has not had the capability to give what she has pledged, such as vigorous and direct support to revolutionary wars in the world, or to challenge the superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) and establish her hegemony in Asia. China especially fears that any reckless moves might provoke the United States or provide the latter with an excuse to launch an attack on China or her nuclear facilities. Evidence indicates that this fear dates from approximately 1954. For ex-

\(^{17}\) NCNA, October 4, 1969. See also Peking Review (October 10, 1969).


\(^{19}\) Ibid.
ample, in that year, Marshall Yeh Chien-yeng warned his people to prepare against a sudden attack by the "imperialists," and admitted that in a nuclear war China's army would be in a comparatively backward position. In 1964, after her first nuclear test, China openly admitted that American nuclear forces in Asia were a threat to China.20 Later, China appeared to believe that the United States might be tempted to launch a sudden nuclear attack on China:

The perfidious imperialists are accustomed to launch sudden attacks in starting an aggressive war, and new techniques create more favourable conditions of carrying out sudden military attacks.21

But will this gap remain in the future? Will it be filled when China becomes a major nuclear power and therefore feels that she is capable of pursuing her foreign policy objectives? Perhaps these questions cannot be answered with certainty at present. Too many uncertain factors are involved, such as the Chinese leadership, the relations between China and the Soviet Union and the United States, China's economic conditions, etc. Nevertheless, it appears that as China's nuclear weapons capability increases, she is also becoming more confident of her ability to neutralize the nuclear deterrence of the superpowers. This tendency can most clearly be seen in the statements issued after each of her nuclear tests.

Before her first nuclear test in 1964, China had never indicated that she intended to break the superpowers’ monopoly of nuclear weapons. China only attacked this monopoly indirectly by criticizing the Partial Test Ban Treaty which had just been signed by the three nuclear powers (i.e., the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain) in an attempt to maintain nuclear monopoly and keep the rest of the world under nuclear threat.22

However, after her first nuclear test in 1964, China began to argue that she had decided to develop nuclear weapons to break the superpowers’ nuclear power monopoly and that her nuclear test was intended to "oppose the U.S. imperialist policy of nuclear blackmail and nuclear threat. . . [and] to break the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers." China also claimed that the test was conducted to ensure that the U.S. blackmail and nuclear threat would no longer be so effective.23 A similar statement was made by China after her second nuclear test in 1965. But China, in these and other statements, never claimed that her nuclear test had any direct effects on the superpowers' nuclear monopoly.

20 See NCNA, July 27, 1955; Current Background, No. 347 (August 23, 1955), pp. 29-31. See also Editorial, People's Daily, October 22, 1964, reprinted in Break the Nuclear Monopoly . . ., op. cit., p. 13. In this statement, China apparently had exaggerated the "nuclear threat" of the United States. For one thing, the United States does not have these "nuclear bases" in Asia.
Initially, after she conducted her first hydrogen bomb test in May, 1966, China claimed that the purpose of her nuclear weapons development was merely to oppose the U.S.-Soviet attempt to maintain nuclear monopoly. However, apparently believing that she had reached a "high level of science and technology" due to the development of a hydrogen bomb, China began to imply, although very indirectly, that her test was a "positive factor supporting all people opposing the nuclear monopoly, nuclear threats, and joint schemes of the U.S. imperialists and the Khrushchevian revisionists."  

After her fourth test, China repeated that the purpose of her nuclear weapons development was precisely to undermine the nuclear monopoly and oppose nuclear blackmail by the superpowers. But a few days later, on November 3, 1966, China issued another statement in which the word "blow" was introduced to describe the effects of her nuclear weapons achievement on the monopoly of nuclear weapons by the superpowers. Nevertheless, the word "blow" was not applied directly to the nuclear monopoly by the superpowers. Rather China merely claimed that the test was a blow to their "scheme" to perpetuate nuclear monopoly by seeking the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. A similar statement was made by China after her fifth test, but this time, the expression "heavy blow" instead of "blow" was used:  

The success of the three nuclear tests conducted by China in the one year of 1966 is a heavy blow to the plot of U.S. imperialism and Soviet modern revisionism which have been collaborating in a vain attempt to enforce their nuclear monopoly. . . .

Up to that moment, China had merely claimed that her test had only affected the superpowers’ "scheme" or "plot" to maintain nuclear monopoly and those only in an indirect manner. She declined to make any claims about the direct effects that her nuclear tests might have had on the actual "nuclear monopoly" of the superpowers.

However, after her sixth nuclear test, China claimed that her nuclear weapons development had further broken the nuclear monopoly of the superpowers:

China has got atom bombs and guided missiles, and she now has the hydrogen bomb. This. . . . greatly deflates the arrogance of imperialism, modern revisionism, and all reactionaries. The success of China's hydrogen bomb tests has further broken the nuclear monopoly of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism and dealt a telling blow at their policy of nuclear blackmail.  

In this statement, China made two very significant changes. First, by claiming that her test had "further broken the nuclear monopoly" of the

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24 NCNA, May 9, 1966. See also Peking Review (May 13, 1966).
28 NCNA, June 17, 1967. See also Peking Review (June 23, 1967).
superpowers, China apparently felt that her nuclear weapons achievement had already begun to have direct effect on the breaking of their nuclear monopoly. Secondly, in her previous statements, China had merely claimed that her nuclear tests were “a heavy blow to the plot of the superpowers to enforce their nuclear monopoly.” But in this statement, China directly began to claim that her nuclear weapons achievement was “a telling blow at their [the superpowers’] policy of nuclear blackmail.”

After she conducted her eighth nuclear test, China further indicated in her policy statement that the test had directly affected both the superpowers’ “nuclear blackmail” and their “nuclear threat.” In September, 1969, after her ninth and tenth nuclear tests, China further claimed that her new tests served as another heavy blow at the U.S.-Soviet attempt to maintain nuclear monopoly. Two months later, China declared herself to be a stronger power than ever.29

Thus, it appears that as her nuclear weapons capability grew, China increasingly claimed that her nuclear weapons development had direct and significant effects on the “nuclear monopoly,” “nuclear threat,” and “nuclear blackmail” by the superpowers. In other words, China appears to have become more and more confident of the military and political significance of her nuclear weapons. When China believes that her nuclear weapons capability can really neutralize the superpowers’ nuclear deterrence, she might possibly become more militarily and politically venturesome in Asia in order to establish her hegemony in that area.

In fact, the effectiveness of U.S. nuclear deterrence on China is likely to decrease as China emerges as a major nuclear power. In 1964, immediately after China conducted her first nuclear test, U.S. President Johnson assured American allies in Asia that the American commitments there would be honored, announcing at the same time that “nations that do not seek nuclear weapons can be sure that if they need United States support against the threat of nuclear blackmail, they will have it.”30 The Soviet Union did not give China any encouragement or guarantee of security.

However, Johnson’s guarantee was not mentioned after 1964. In fact, on July 19, 1967, one month after the sixth Chinese test was conducted, American Secretary of State Dean Rusk announced that the guarantees mentioned by Johnson in 1964 would only be discussed again in Geneva, where the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty would be negotiated, or in the United Nations Security Council. On April 26, 1968, Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. ambassador to the General Assembly, made it very clear that the United States expected the United Nations Security Council to take measures

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in accordance with the UN Charter to counter any nuclear aggression.\textsuperscript{31}

It would be questionable whether a security guarantee offered by the superpowers would be effective in deterring a possible Chinese nuclear threat. Asian leaders might doubt that the United States or the Soviet Union could stop or deter a Chinese nuclear attack in time to save their countries from destruction.

In addition, the United States will be in an uncomfortable position in case China has an operational nuclear force and is in a position to attack many of the American bases in Asia. If China were to attack a country whose security was guaranteed by the United States, the Americans would have to take into consideration the possibility that retaliation on their part might provoke a Chinese nuclear attack on U.S. bases in Asia, igniting a Sino-American nuclear war, or possibly a nuclear world war. The consequences of such a war the United States would certainly not be willing to accept.

Furthermore, if Chinese nuclear weapons can, in the future, definitely imperil the homelands of the superpowers and cause irreparable damage to them, Asian and other countries probably will not trust in the commitments and guarantees offered by either superpower, whose ability and willingness to come to the rescue at the risk of its own cities, would be considered suspect. As one renowned Indian political scientist pointed out, “If the Chinese ever succeed in building up a strategic balance with the U.S., . . . it is very questionable if [the United States] would sacrifice Boston for Bombay or Detroit for Delhi.”\textsuperscript{32}

Employing indirect methods, China could also convince or force Asian countries to remove superpower influence from their territories. On November 24, 1964, China appeared to apply such tactics to Japan.\textsuperscript{33} China resorted to the same tactics against Japan in 1969:

Placing itself [i.e., Japan] under the wing of U.S. imperialism, working hand in glove with Soviet revisionism . . . and acting as the vanguard in opposing China, the reactionary Sato government will . . . end shamelessly in being buried together with U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism.\textsuperscript{34}

If the present nuclear deterrence on China were neutralized in the future, then China’s huge ground force would become a much more effective instrument in the pursuit of her foreign policy objectives through such tactics as the support and encouragement of revolutionary wars. At present, China has a 115-division army of 2,250,000 men. She also has four armoured


\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Peking Review} (November 27, 1964), pp. 16-18; (December 18, 1964), pp. 6-8.

divisions and one or two airborne divisions. In addition, there is evidence that China is prepared to equip her ground troops with tactical nuclear weapons. More significantly, as China’s nuclear capability has increased, her attitude towards the military and political implications of her nuclear weapons on revolutionary wars, also appears to have changed. For example, in 1964, after her first nuclear test, China declared:

The mastering of the nuclear weapons by China is a great encouragement to the revolutionary peoples of the world in their struggles.

A few days after the test, China’s official organ, People’s Daily, carried in editorial which claimed that China’s experience in the world proved that she was a nation which could be relied upon to resist imperialism, support revolutionary movements, and ensure world peace. A similar statement was made by China after her third nuclear test.

Significantly, before her fourth nuclear test, China had never in her nuclear test statements specifically encouraged any particular revolutionary war, such as that in Vietnam. Instead, she had only vaguely claimed that China’s nuclear weapons development was a great encouragement to the revolutionary peoples of the world. Such an omission indicates the caution with which China described the military and political significance of her first nuclear weapons achievements. At least it indicates that China did not want to antagonize the United States and other non-Communist countries in Asia by pointing out any particular revolution she encouraged. Many noted writers have supported this assumption. For example, Alice L. Hsieh pointed out:

According to Peking’s propaganda, the mastering of nuclear weapons technology through China’s own efforts was a great encouragement to the revolutionary peoples of the world. . . . The Chinese, however, carefully avoided any specific application of this principle to concrete situations, such as those in Vietnam and Laos.

Similarly, John W. Finney, in an article in the New York Times, pointed out that China’s pride in her nuclear development was tempered by a cautious attitude toward any practical application of her increasing nuclear power to revolutionary situations in the world.

Based on this assumption, China’s estimate of the significance of her nuclear weapons capability certainly increased after her fourth nuclear test. On October 27, 1966, after her guided nuclear-missile test, China claimed:

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The possession by the Chinese people of guided missiles and nuclear weapons is a great encouragement to the heroic Vietnamese people who are waging a war of resistance against U.S. aggression and for national salvation and to all the revolutionary peoples of the world who are now engaged in heroic struggles.  

Here, for the first time, "a specific application," i.e., the encouragement of a particular revolution, was presented. A similar statement was made by China after her fifth nuclear test.

In June, 1967, after her sixth nuclear test, China began to include Arabs among those who she claimed were encouraged and supported by China's nuclear weapons. A similar statement was made by China in December, 1968, after conducting her eighth nuclear test.\(^{40}\)

After successfully conducting two more nuclear tests in October, 1969, China identified other revolutions supported and encouraged by her nuclear weapons achievement.

These new achievements in China's development of nuclear weapons are a great encouragement and support to the heroic Vietnamese people who are courageously carrying on the war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, to Laotian people who are fighting against the armed invasion by U.S. imperialism and the reactionaries of Thailand, to the Palestinian and other Arab people who are resisting the U.S. imperialist Zionist aggression, and to the people of all countries who are fighting for people's liberation.\(^ {41}\)

Therefore, it appears that, with increasing nuclear weapons capability, China has changed her attitude towards the impact of her nuclear tests on revolutionary wars. The original vague and cautious statement that her nuclear weapons achievement was a "great encouragement to the revolutionary people," has been replaced by more specific and concrete statements that her nuclear weapons achievement encourages the Vietnamese, the Laotian and other revolutionary wars. The "enemies" were also clearly identified, namely the United States, Thailand, and Israel.

**Conclusion**

The preceding discussion indicates a feeling on China's part that as her nuclear weapons capability increases, a new system of deterrence, more to her advantage than the previous one, is being developed, especially in Asia. As this new deterrence system develops, the likelihood of successful pro-Chinese or Chinese-supported revolutionary movements increases. The statements of Asian revolutionary movements seem to support this idea. North Vietnam viewed the Chinese nuclear tests as a great encouragement to her struggle against U.S. aggression. The Laotian Patriotic Front and the Communist Parties of Malaya, Thailand, and Ceylon regarded the tests as an

\(^{39}\) NCNA, October 27, 1966. See also **Peking Review**, special supplement (October 28, 1966).

\(^{40}\) NCNA, January 17, 1967. See also **Peking Review** (June 23, 1967). See also NCNA, December 28, 1968.

\(^{41}\) NCNA, October 4, 1969. See also **Peking Review** (October 10, 1969).

Many non-Communist Asian countries fear that the Chinese nuclear weapons development might encourage revolutionary wars in Asia. Thai Premier Thanon and Malayan Deputy Premier Razak both stated that the tests would encourage other Communist subversive activities, as did P. K. Banerjee, minister of the Indian Embassy in Washington. Indian Prime Minister Shastri pointed out that it was necessary to have some guarantees from the superpowers for the security of India. Japanese Prime Minister Sato expressed a similar view, saying that "China with a nuclear capability is, as far as Japan is concerned, a threat." Cambodia repeatedly reminded China that she "has solemnly declared that it [China] will never be the first to use these weapons of mass destruction."\footnote{For these statements, see for example, M. R. Masani, "The Challenge of the Chinese Bomb," \textit{India Quarterly}, XXI, No. 1 (January-March, 1965), 23; \textit{The Times} (London), December 5, 1964; "World Reactions to the Chinese Nuclear Bomb," \textit{Foreign Affairs Reports}, XIV, No. 1 (January, 1965), 9; \textit{New York Times}, October 17, 1964; October 18, 1964; December 5, 1964; May 15, 1965; November 4, 1966; Kei Wakaizumi, "The Problem for Japan," \textit{A World of Nuclear Powers?}, p. 82; \textit{Peking Review}, No. 22 (May 27, 1966), p. 38; No. 45 (November 4, 1966), p. 27.}

The Asian countries' fear of China as a nuclear power might have the following policy repercussions. First, these countries might become reluctant to resist, or accept help in resisting, Chinese-sponsored revolutionary wars in their countries. Secondly, they might consider it expedient to join in the Chinese hegemony and follow the Chinese lines of policy. Thirdly, they might unresistingly accede to Chinese demands in such events as border disputes. Thus, China's becoming an operational nuclear power will pave the way for her nuclear blackmail policy in Asia.

Furthermore, when China becomes a major nuclear power the superpowers' ability to restrain other countries from engaging in serious military conflicts will also be reduced. For example, the restraints that the superpowers successfully imposed in the 1965 war between Pakistan and India might have failed had China then been a major nuclear power. Capable of discrediting U.S. deterrence and containment, China might have decided to offer not only substantial military aid to Pakistan but also a guarantee of security, which could have seriously complicated the situation and made settlement impossible. Also, hopes stirred by the Paris talks of the 70's would have diminished if China, as a major nuclear power, had felt confident enough to supply the North Vietnamese and Vietcong with substantial military aid\footnote{For details about the Chinese involvement in the Vietnamese war, see for example, "Foreign Affairs: China's Motionless Army," \textit{New York Times}, May 6, 1966; article by Philip Franklin of \textit{Los Angeles Times} Services from Saigon, reprinted in \textit{Edmonton Journal} (March 24, 1969); \textit{New York Times}, January 17, 1965; \textit{Edmon}
restraint exercised by both superpowers on themselves and their Indochinese “allies” from taking advantage of the situation and engaging in military ventures, China’s recent support for the ousted Cambodian head of state, Prince Sihanouk, further indicates that the situation will complicate further when China becomes a major nuclear power.\textsuperscript{45}


\textsuperscript{45} For China’s position and attitude on this issue, see, for example, Mao Tse-tung, “People of the World, Unite, and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs,” \textit{Peking Review}, special issue (May 23, 1970). See also \textit{Peking Review}, No. 24 (June 12, 1970), p. 12ff.