THE PRIMATE CITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS AND COLONIAL ORIGINS*

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Although Southeast Asia remains one of the least urbanized areas of the modern world\(^1\) the accelerating rate of urban growth in both the mainland and archipelagic realms has recently generated mounting interest in the city and concern for its future among scholars and within national officialdoms of the region. To planners and governmental personnel involved in metropolitan development the urbanization process\(^2\)

\(^*\) An earlier version of this paper was presented at a panel seminar on “Future Urban Development in Southeast Asia” held at the Alumni House, University of California, Berkeley, California, on August 7-9, 1972. The Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group (SEADAG) of The Asia Society, New York, sponsored this meeting. I also wish to acknowledge with thanks the helpful comments and suggestions of Professor Paul Wheatley, Department of Geography, University of Chicago, and Professors Clarence J. Glacken, Risa I. Palm, and James J. Parsons, Department of Geography, University of California, Berkeley.


\(^2\) Definitions of the urbanization process are many and are usually tailored to reflect research concerns of individual scholars. Yet most deal directly or indirectly with the reordering of a given rural population in towns and cities, as well as with the associated impact upon man and environment. It almost goes without saying that the exact nature of the process of human concentration in larger settlements remains a subject or continuing discussion. The degree of urbanization, on the other hand, usually allowed more precise meaning. Increasingly social scientists use this term to indicate the proportion of a total national or regional population which dwells in towns and cities. Useful commentaries in accessible sources pertaining to these concepts are presented in Lampard, pp. 519-554; Breese, The City in Newly Developing Countries, Pts. 1-3; Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries, chaps. 1-4; Kingsley Davis, “The Urbanization of the Human Population,” Scientific American, Vol. 213, No. 3 (September, 1965) pp. 40-53; Kingsley Davis and Hilda H. Golden, “Urbanization and the Development of Pre-Industrial Areas,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 3, No. 1 (October 1954), pp. 6-24; Eric E. Lampard, “Urbanization and Social Change: On Broadening the Scope and Relevance of Urban History,” in Oscar Handlin and John Burhard (eds.), The Historian and the City (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1963), pp. 225-247. See also Philip M. Hauser and Leo F. Schnore (eds.), The Study of Urbanization (New
and associated social, economic and political problems are of immediate and obvious import, for they are faced with the complex task of providing workable solutions to the employment, educational, housing, transportation and recreational needs of the millions who now crowd into the major regional cities and towns. Accordingly there is a little doubt that the ongoing work of all developers and policy makers will be marked by an intensifying sense of urgency as the scale of urban expansion continues to become manifest through proliferation of squatter communities, exceedingly high unemployment and underemployment figures, rising social discontent and general deterioration in the quality of human life.

No less concerned with the matter of city growth in Southeast Asia are a number of Asian, American and European social scientists, who more than a decade ago began to display a growing commitment to the study of non-Western urbanism. In recent publications these scholars, like co-workers in South Asia, Africa, Latin America and East Asia, have expressed considerable discontent with old models fashioned to explain the multifaceted processes of modernization, industrialization and urbanization exclusively in terms of European and North American experience. Predictably some have begun to call for the rejection of the more inflexible constructs, which seem applicable only to Western cities. Though this group of researchers still remains small in number, even now it is clear that through their efforts a fundamental re-examination of established urban theory has been inaugurated. Preliminary investigations by certain of these workers are already bring-

York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965); Emrys Jones, Towns and Cities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968); Brian J. L. Berry and Frank E. Horton, Geographic Perspective on Urban Systems: With Integrated Readings (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), pp. 20-63; Jack P. Gibbs (ed.), Urban Research Methods (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nortland Company, Inc., 1961). Urbanization should not be equated with urbanism, for the latter word denotes the fact of city existence and of spatial organization in terms of a functionally integrated complex of higher social, religious, economic and political institutions. It is generally held that such institutional systems confer a distinctive character upon certain large and compact settlements, or cities, whose inhabitants are socially stratified and politically organized. These societies not only possess a distinctive manner of life, but also tend to extend their spheres of multi-faceted influence to surrounding territories. Through this steady spatial expansion of urban authority over the past five millennia all peoples of the world have been affected to a greater or lesser degree by the city. For a concise, readable and definitive statement pertaining to this theme, consult Paul Wheatley, "The Concept of Urbanism," in Peter J. Ucko, Ruth Tringham and G. W. Dimbleby (eds.), Man, Settlement and Urbanism (London:: Gerard Duckworth & Co., Ltd., 1972), pp. 601-637. One of the more recent collections of readings on urbanism is Sylvia Fleis (eds.). Urbanism in World Perspective: A Reader (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1969).

3 Probably the most systematic commentary concerning the need for development of a new body of theory through which to examine the contemporary process of urbanization and the nature of urbanism in non-Western nations has been presented recently by the geographer T. G. McGee, The Urbanization Process in the Third World: Explorations in Search of a Theory (London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1971), Pt. 1.
ing into serious question the formerly accepted correlation between industrial development and modern urbanization, the reality or even the heuristic value of the urban-rural continuum, the belief that social disorganization always follows the migration of villagers to cities, and the invariability of the demographic transition in the contemporary


metropolis of the Third World. At the same time other scholars, whose interests focus upon the origin and evolution of urban centers, have contributed significantly to our knowledge of indigenous Southeast Asian urbanism and to our understanding of the role of European colonialism in initiating reorganization of settlement systems throughout the region. Among the critical elements in the latter process was the development within the various Western dependencies of especially large and multi-functional colonial capitals, which today continue to serve as the political, educational, economic and cultural nerve-centers of emergent states. While it is true that nationalists have occasionally called for replacement of the former bastions of imperial rule by new administrative centers, these so-called primate cities presently remain unchallenged as the urban keystones of the most nations in Southeast Asia. Their paramountcy is firmly verifying through far-reaching national influence and steady growth in population.

As might be expected, the subject of metropolitan primacy has not gone unmentioned by students of Southeast Asian urbanism. Through the


10 Probably the first Southeast Asian leader to advocate abandonment of an established colonial capital in favor of a new urban site was the revolutionary General Emilio Aguinaldo of the Philippines. In 1913, during a visit to the cool and invigorating hill station of Baguio, he suggested transfer of the seat of insular government to the mountains of Northern Luzon. W. Cameron Forbes, “Journal of W. Cameron Forbes, First Series, February, 1904 - November, 1913”, Vol. 5, pp. 234-236. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
term primate city appeared only rarely in literature published prior to 1960,\textsuperscript{11} it became common currency during the past decade. But despite increasing acceptance by social scientists as an important theme worthy of serious investigation, researchers too often remain content to make the seemingly oversize national metropolis a subordinate topic embedded within large urban studies. Consequently they often neglect discussion of the theoretical implications of metropolitan primacy and also ignore its historical dimensions.\textsuperscript{12} The pages which follow, therefore, will be devoted to commentary concerning these subjects.

*The Nature of Metropolitan Primacy*

The concept of metropolitan primacy is not new, for it was first introduced to students of urbanism more than three decades ago. In his seminal statement on this theme the geographer Mark Jefferson\textsuperscript{13} drew attention to the fact that the leading city in many nations is not merely dominant in terms of population, but also stands foremost in diversity of functions and degree of effective national influence. To express this condition of supereminenence, he introduced the notion of the primate city.\textsuperscript{14} While admitting the significance of various combinations of economic, political, physical and cultural factors in the original generation of primacy within national urban systems, Jefferson still firmly contended that

once city is larger than any other in its country, this mere fact gives it an impetus to grow that cannot affect any other city, and it draws away from all of them in character as well as in size....[As a result] it becomes the *prime\textsuperscript{15}t* city.


\textsuperscript{12} The outstanding exception is T. G. McGee, whose book *The Southeast Asian City* is organized around the theme of metropolitan primacy. Other scholars have also made contributions through investigations of the origin and growth of individual primate cities. For instance see James L. Cobban, "The City of Java: An Essay in Historical Geography" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Geography, University of California, Berkeley, 1970); Pauline Dublin Milone, "Queen City of the East: The Metamorphosis of a Colonial Capital" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of California, Berkeley, 1966); Reed, "Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines", chaps. 5-7.


Accordingly metropolitan primacy was envisaged as a continuing condition which generally tends to persist regardless of chance reversals in rates of population growth or even the temporary florescence of secondary urban places. He further argued that the primate city is almost always the national capital, a cultural center, the focus of internal migration, a hub of nationalistic ferment and the multi-functional nucleus of a country’s economy. At the same time, according to Jefferson, the paramount urban place usually embraces at least two times as many residents as the second ranking city in any given state. By examining forty-four of the then leading independent nations of the world, he found strong support for the latter hypothesis. In twenty-eight of the countries, which were located on all of the inhabited continents, the primate cities proved to be more than twice as populous as their nearest urban rivals. Eighteen of these, moreover, had capitals over three times the size of the next largest centers. The available evidence thus indicated that in the 1930’s metropolitan primacy was a comparatively common urban phenomenon.

Though it cannot be denied that Jefferson convincingly demonstrated the widespread occurrence of primate cities in terms of the data in hand, his body of supportive material remains marked by a curious and especially noteworthy omission. Without providing the reader benefit of explanation, he excluded nearly all European dependencies from the investigation. While this gap in information certainly did not negate the essence of his conclusions, it somewhat reduced their immediate impact. If Jefferson had in fact elected to include in the survey the numerous colonies of Africa and Asia, most of which display a high degree of metropolitan primacy, his argument would have been strengthened even further. Despite this undue focus only upon sovereign states extant in 1939, the concept of the primate city ultimately proved of recognizable utility and has been gradually adopted by social scientists.

17 Jefferson, pp. 227-228.
18 The only exceptions were British India and the American dominated Commonwealth of the Philippines. But no explanation for their inclusion in the investigation was offered.
19 The long assumed correlation between a colonial inheritance and metropolitan primacy in the nations of the Third World was recently confirmed by Arnold S. Linsky, “Some Generalizations Concerning Primate Cities”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 55, No. 3 (September, 1965), pp. 506-513.
20 Scholars in a number of disciplines have confirmed the utility of metropolitan primacy as a category of research by relating it to investigations in their several areas of urban specialization. For examples of the interdisciplinary interest in the primate city, consult the following publications which have been selected respectively from the fields of geography, public administration, history, regional planning, and economics: A. James Rose, “Dissent from Down Under: Metropolitan Primacy as the Normal State”, Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 7, No. 1 (May, 1966), pp. 1-27; Aprodicio A. Laquian, The City in Nation-Building (Manila: School of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1966), pp. 2-5; Richard C. Morse, “Recent Research on Latin American Urbanization: A Selective Survey
For almost fifteen years following publication of Jefferson’s now widely cited article on great cities,\textsuperscript{21} scholars displayed relatively little interest in either the demographic or the functional aspects of metropolitan primacy. Yet by the middle of the 1950’s, short commentaries concerning the role of the primate city were beginning to appear within larger urban studies prepared by geographers, historians, sociologists and economists.\textsuperscript{22} Although the majority of researchers considered this theme only in a peripheral manner, even their brief discussions began to reflect a growing currency among students of urbanism and urbanization. This continues today. And while metropolitan primacy remains a topic of secondary concern for many researchers, in recent years a number have made it a focus of sustained inquiry.\textsuperscript{23} A clear reflection of this quickening interest may be found in new college textbookss for geography and related disciplines, where sections on the primate city now seem to warrant standards inclusion.\textsuperscript{24} Nevertheless, one should not assume that scholars are agreed on the precise nature or the manifold implications of metropolitan primacy. Presently all evidence seems to indicate that controversy will continue for some years concerning the political, economic and cultural roles of the primate city.\textsuperscript{25}

\textit{Questions of Urban Theory and Non-Western Primate Cities}

\textit{City-size distributions.} During the past two decades social scientist have explored four major avenues of inquiry in the continuing investigation of metropolitan primacy. One cluster of researchers has displayed

\begin{footnotes}
\item[21] The term "great city" is used frequently as a synonym for primate city.
\item[23] Among the more important theoretical works are Linsky, pp. 506-513; Surinder K. Mehta, “Some Demographic and Economic Correlates of Primate Cities: A Case for Revaluation”, \textit{Demography}, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1964), pp. 136-147; Clyde E. Browning, “Primate Cities and Related Concepts”, in Forrest R. Pitts (ed.), \textit{Urban System and Economic Development} (Eugene, Oregon: The School of Business Administration, University of Oregon, 1962), pp. 16-27. The most substantial statement concerning the primate city in Southeast Asia, of course, is McGee’s \textit{The Southeast Asian City.}
\item[25] Some of the corollaries to the condition of metropolitan primacy which seem to warrant future investigation are identified in Mehta, pp.136-147; Linsky, pp. 506-513.
\end{footnotes}
special interest in the various city-size distributions of nations and in their possible connection with comparative economic development. For many years urban geographers and other location theorists assumed that, with few exceptions, only industrially advanced countries display the tendency towards a regular hierarchical arrangement of urban places according to the rank-size rule.\(^\text{26}\) In such cases the paramount city in a state is roughly twice as large as centers of the second stratum, three times the population of those at the third level, and so on down. This regularity in the ordering of cities and towns by rank and size was thought to be indicative of considerable socio-economic viability within an integrated national urban system.\(^\text{27}\) At the same time early investigators believed that distributions reflective of primacy, in which a single oversized metropolis is markedly larger than cities, towns and villages of lower strata, were almost always associated with countries still in the early stages of economic development.\(^\text{28}\) Research carried out during the past fifteen years, however, strongly suggests the invalidity of these notions. While there is little doubt that a high level of urbanization and considerable industrial development are closely related, scholars now generally question the existence of a significant correlation between rank-size distribution of cities and economic advancement, or between the national presence of a primate city and underdevelopment.\(^\text{29}\) In fact some of the lesser developed nations, including the larger states of Brazil, China and India, display mark-

\(^{26}\) Mehta, p. 137; Brian J. L. Berry, “City Size Distributions and Economic Development”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 9, No. 4, Pt. 1 (July, 1961), p. 573. One of the more widely known ideas concerning the distribution of city sizes is that of George F. Zipf, who several decades ago formally set forth the notion of rank-size relationship. Following considerable empirical observation, he argued that in every country there is a tendency for a city of any given rank in a settlement hierarchy to exhibit a population which is in inverse proportion to its position. Accordingly if all urban centers were arranged in descending order by population, we should expect the second city to have half as many people as the largest, while the n-th settlement would embrace \(1/n\)-th the citizenry of the paramount place. Early commentary on rank-size regularity was offered in George K. Zipf, Nationality Unity and Disunity (Bloomington: Principia Press, 1941); Human Behavior and the Principal of Least Effort: An Introduction to Human Ecology (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley Press, Inc., 1949). Empirical evidence concerning this formula has been reviewed in Haggett, pp. 100-103; Walter Isard, Location and Space-Economy: A General Theory Relating to Industrial Location, Market Areas, Land Use, Trade and Urban Structure (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., and The Technology Press of M.I.T., 1956), pp. 55-60; Rutledge Vining, “A Description of Certain Spatial Aspects of an Economic System”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 3, No. 2 (January, 1955), pp.147-195. For further discussion of the rank-size role and useful references, consult Mehta, pp. 137-138; Berry and Horton, pp. 64-67, 92-93.

\(^{27}\) Berry and Horton, pp. 64-67; Berry, p. 573.


\(^{29}\) Berry, “City Size Distributions and Economic Development”, pp. 585-587; Haggett, pp. 103-105; Berry and Horton, pp. 64-75.
edly regular arrangements of urban places. By the same token certain economically advanced countries, such as Sweden, Greece, Austria and Denmark, exhibit a clearly recognizable condition of metropolitan primacy instead of the formerly predicted hierarchical structure. Though these results are seemingly inconclusive, the findings of recent investigations do in fact support several tentative generalizations. Scholars now believe that, regardless of geographical location or stage of economic development, almost all nations large in area or diversified industrially tend towards a rank-size distribution of cities and towns. Metropolitan primacy, on the other hand, is thought to be a feature of the smaller Western states, as well as of small and intermediate-size countries in the Third World.30

In the only serious attempt to test the above hypotheses within the context of Southeast Asia, the geographer Hamzah Sendut clearly demonstrated the regional presence of both rank-size and primate distributions of urban places.31 He found that Indonesia alone displays a truly regular arrangement of cities, though Malaysia also approximates this condition. In marked contrast the nations of Burma, Thailand and the Philippines reveal a distinct primate distribution. For some unexplained reason Hamzah combined the countries of Laos, South Vietnam, Cambodia and North Vietnam to illustrate a rank-size situation in the greater Indo-Chinese realm, while leaving unmentioned the fact that these several states when taken as independent political entities embrace capital cities which show clear-cut patterns of demographic and functional primacy.32 Accordingly the city-size arrangements in Southeast Asia seem to corroborate empirical findings from other parts of the world.33 Most of the small states in this developing region are marked by primate distributions. Only the large and populous nation of Indonesia is characterized by a rank-size arrangement of cities and towns. Thus there is no indication of any connection between relative economic development and city-size distributions within Southeast Asia. Nor does the available evidence suggest that the condition of primacy will necessarily begin to evolve toward a rank-size arrangement with the occurrence of economic progress. This latter question, nevertheless, will probably

30 Berry, "City Size Distributions and Economic Development", pp. 573-588; Berry and Horton, pp. 64-75.
32 These capital cities are Saigon-Cholon (South Vietnam), Phnom Penh (Cambodia), Vientiane (Laos), and Hanoi (North Vietnam).
33 The most comprehensive study of city-size distributions is Berry’s “City Size Distributions and Economic Development”, pp. 573-588, which contains information concerning thirty-eight countries. A summary of the results of this inquiry is presented in Berry and Horton, pp. 67-75.
demand serious exploration in future years, for such a trend has been identified elsewhere in the world and if discerned in Southeast Asia could undoubtedly have considerable impact upon urban and regional planning decisions in certain nations.34

Notions of parasitic and generative cities. A second and still controversial question associated with the study of metropolitan primacy concerns the role of great cities as "parasitic" or "generative" instruments of authority within the economies of developing countries.35 Since the middle of the 1950's many students of urbanism have believed that large capitals in nations of the Third World rarely serve as effective stimulants to economic growth. Instead these supereminent cities are viewed as national parasites or urban magnets which invariably extract considerable quantities of resources from underdeveloped hinterlands and lure more talented individuals to the metropolitan areas from scattered villages. At the same time the non-Western prime cities reputedly fail to provide in return an equitable amount of manufactured goods, organizational guidance and essential services. In a typical statement expressing this viewpoint Eric E. Lampard writes that

the presence of an overly large city in a preindustrial society may act as a curb rather than a stimulus to wider growth. Its growth and maintenance have been somewhat parasitical in the sense that profits of trade, capital accumulated in agricultural and other primary pursuits have been dissipated in grandiose construction, servicing, and consuming by a "colonial" elite. The labor and enterprise which might otherwise have been invested in some form of manufacture or material processing in the interior are drawn off to the great city by the attractive dazzle of a million lights.36

According to John Friedmann, whose words are especially emphatic, the

primate cities tend to feed upon the rest of the nation. Instead of generating a new socioeconomic order and new wealth, they feast on what may be ex-

34 In the aforementioned comparative investigation of city-size distributions (above, n. 33), Berry postulated the development of a trend from the condition of metropolitan primacy to a rank-size ordering of cities as nations experience economic progress. Several subsequent empirical studies designed to test the validity of this notion, however, remain inconclusive. While Berry's model seems to represent accurately the situation in Israel, it cannot be applied in New Zealand. Gwen Bell, "Change in City Size Distribution in Israel" Ekistics, Vol. 13 (1962), p. 103. cited in Berry and Horton, p. 93, n. 15; R. J. Johnston, "On the Progress from Primacy to Rank-Size in an Urban System: The Deviant Case of New Zealand", Area, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1971), pp. 180-184.

35 The seminar paper on this subject is "Generative and Parasitic Cities," which was written by Bert F. Hoselitz in the middle of the 1950's and is cited above, n. 22. It has also been reprinted in his Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth, chap. 8. Aprodicio A. Laquian in The City in Nation-Building, p. 4, suggests that urban geographers submitted the notion of "parasitic" cities as part of the original construct concerning metropolitan primacy. In rereading Mark Jefferson's "The Law of the Primate City," however, I found no support for his contention. Nor does Hiselitz credit any other scholar with the concept of urban parasitism.

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tracted by the sweat of poor, provincial labor. The reason for this essentially colonial relationship is that any center unopposed on the periphery, by counter-vailing powers will yield excessive influence in making basic political decisions. The periphery, therefore, is drained, and national progress will fail to occur, except as it accrues to a small elite of urban consumers at the center. 37

For almost two decades these impressions have been echoed and re-echoed by other researchers, who feel that the former colonial role of non-Western primate cities as political and economic “head-links”38 between the metropolitan powers of Europe and many dispersed dependencies remains intact even today. 39 Such writers, as one would expect, argue for the immediate implementation of policies geared to the reversal of this presumably parasitic condition, to the creation of economically generative capitals and to the growth of secondary urban places in each developing nation.

Despite the frequent indictment of non-Western primate cities as instruments of economic exploitation throughout the Third World, not all scholars are in full concurrence. Concerning the urban situation in West Africa, Sheldon Gellar offers the following observations:

The growing primacy of the capital city, at the present time, seems to be a step in the right direction since it is preferable to have a primate capital city with some industry than to have no primate city and no industry. Furthermore, the charge that the primate city, by absorbing a disproportionate share of the nation’s resources, prevents the emergence of other development poles does not hold true in West Africa. Ghana, Senegal, and the Ivory Coast, where the primate phenomenon is most advanced, are precisely those countries having other important development poles. 40

In an even more detailed statement pertaining to metropolitan primacy in Southeast Asia, Donald W. Fryer contends that

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in modern times at least, it is not possible seriously to claim that over an appreciable period any great city has been essentially parasitic. The European-created cities may initially have operated to impoverish the indigenous ruling and merchant classes and to lay heavier burdens on the peasants, but the effects of economic growth within the cities themselves and their repercussions on the countryside were such that ultimately these parasitic tendencies were greatly outweighed by new productive ones that did result in an increase in incomes per head. With an increasing urban population a specialized labour force came into being; the demand for food and for export crops increased, which together with improvements in transport did offer new opportunities to indigenous farmers; and the growth of processing industries at ports and the expansion of the production of inanimate energy began to lay the foundations for a higher degree of industrial activity.41

Many other social scientists, who seem to feel that economic growth in the typical developing nation is oftentimes facilitated through the medium of primate cities, have also lent endorsements to the essentials of the foregoing statements.42 Only in the very large urban places, they argue, are political and business authorities able to exploit the economies of scale essential to efficient industrialization.43 Individuals subscribing to this position usually admit the ultimate importance of intermediate-size cities and towns in guaranteeing economic progress on a broad geographical basis, but still believe that general prosperity depends upon the initial achievement of considerable commercial, administrative and industrial momentum in the primate city.44

Though commentary concerning the developmental role of great cities usually revolves around the subject of economic activity, some

41 Fryer, pp. 84-85. For permission to quote this statement I gratefully thank George Philip & Son Limited, London, who are the senior publishers of Emerging Southeast Asia: A Study in Growth and Stagnation, and the author Professor Donald W. Fryer.


43 A summary statement of this position and some useful references are presented in Mehta, pp. 138-140. Consult also Petersen, pp. 33-34; Ullman, pp. 5-8; Fryer, Megalopolis or Tyrannopolis in Southeast Asia?, pp. 4-6.

44 Even those researchers who contend that all primate cities are essentially parasitic in nature, and who advocate programs of urban decentralization in order to foster economic progress oftentimes acknowledge the possibility of persistent dis-economies in developing nations whose indigenous elites fail to fully exploit the commercial, administrative and social facilities available only in major metropolitan centers. For example consult Hauser, “The Social, Economic, and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization”, pp. 204-205; Gerald Breese, The Great City and Economic Development in Southeast Asia, SEADAG Paper No. 29 (New York: Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group, The Asia Society, 1968), pp. 5-8 (Mimeographed).
writers have questioned the validity of a parasitic or generative designation based upon a single criterion. They rightly contend that this is only one of the many functions performed by the primate city, for most ranking urban places serve additionally as national capitals, communications complexes, military headquarters, educational centers and hubs of cultural activities.\(^{45}\) According to these investigators, truly accurate assessments of the comparative generative and parasitic relationships between the metropolitan nerve-centers and their hinterlands must include full consideration of all function.\(^{46}\) The balanced evaluation of various urban external relations, rather than concentration upon economic linkages, is thus envisaged by such commentators as the key to a full understanding of the multi-faceted development role of great cities.\(^{47}\) In light of past controversy regarding the parasitic and generative influences of the primate city, therefore, it seems likely that related questions will command the attention of researchers for some years to come.

Over-urbanization. As in the case of the two foregoing topics corollary to the major theme of metropolitan primacy, the subject of "over-urbanization"\(^{48}\) remains a focus of continuing interest and debate among students concerned with the development of great cities in Asia and in other parts of the Third World. These individuals generally feel that the non-Western nations of today are over-urbanized because

larger proportions of their population live in urban places than their degree of economic development justifies. In the [so called] underdeveloped nations, a much smaller proportion of the labor force is engaged in non-agricultural occupations than was the case in the West at comparable levels of urbanization. Furthermore, during the postwar period, the rate of urbanization in the underdeveloped areas has...[proceeded]... more rapidly than the rate of economic development.\(^{49}\)

In such countries the urban labor force apparently expands both through the internal population growth of cities and the "push" of migrants from


\(^{46}\) Mehta, pp. 136-147; Breese, *The Great City and Economic Development in Southeast Asia*, pp. 3-8. It worthy of note that Bert F. Hoselitz fully recognized that the primate city could be parasitic or generative in a variety of functions, but elected to confine his discussion only to the economic realm. "Generative and Parasitic Cities", pp. 278-294.

\(^{47}\) Mehta, pp. 138-147.


especially overcrowded rural situations, rather than through the "pull" of unskilled workers from villages to rapidly industrializing metropolitan centers.\textsuperscript{50} Accordingly major urban places throughout the Third World have come to embrace populations far in excess of employment demands in the combined public and private sectors of their economies. This in turn has produced the serious problems of unemployment, underemployment and social unrest which now plague most primate cities in Asia and other developing regions.\textsuperscript{51} Conditions of over-urbanization among nations thus are usually described in terms of comparative levels of city growth, the distribution of labor between urban and agricultural occupations, poverty, job availability in major cities and relative economic progress.

While scholars are in general agreement concerning the typical occupational and economic elements of over-urbanization, their investigations have failed to produce a satisfactory index for the comparative measurement of this condition over lengthy periods of time and in both Western and non-Western countries. It is certainly true that attempts to find a direct correlation between the degree of industrialization and the degree of urbanization in a number of different regions at given dates in history are useful in identifying exceptional national cases of economic development, stagnation and city growth.\textsuperscript{52} But all efforts to find a clear relationship between these two variables through time and in var-


\textsuperscript{52} Many scholars have devoted themselves to the study of the relationship between industrialization and urbanization in the non-Western world. The more significant publications resulting from this research are cited in Breese, \textit{Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries}, p. 51, n. 15.
ious countries remain inconclusive. Researchers interested in the development of nations in the Third World, in other words, have yet to reach a consensus regarding the statistical dimensions of over-urbanization.\(^{53}\)

Regardless of continuing controversy concerning the precise definition of an over-urbanized country, there is little disagreement as to the physical and human results of this phenomenon. Almost without exception scholars seem to feel that everywhere in non-Western primate cities

the most visible consequence of overurbanization and rapid rates of urban growth is the decadence of the urban environment. The physical city is characterized by a large proportion of shanty towns and tenement slums; inadequate urban services, including housing, water supply, sewerage, utilities, and transport; uncontrolled land use; excessive population densities; deficient educational and recreational facilities; and inefficient commercial and marketing services. Rapid urbanization in the underdeveloped areas is accompanied by not a defective, but also by a deteriorating, urban environment.\(^{54}\)

It almost goes without saying that the miserable living and working conditions characteristic of the major cities in Asia and other developing countries\(^{55}\) have generated mounting pressures for massive social investments in the form of public housing, expanded job opportunities and marked improvements in the urban infrastructure.\(^{56}\) Yet even while such needs are being met in some nations on a minimal basis, many planners, involved governmental personnel and interested scholars, are constantly plagued by the belief that the woefully scare resources of most non-Western nations should be expended primarily upon economically generative industrial and agricultural enterprises. The immediate need of

\(^{53}\) Sovani, 113-117.

\(^{54}\) Hauser, "The Social, Economic, and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization", p. 207. Other scholars have echoed and re-echoed the essence of this statement concerning the deteriorating urban environment of primate cities in the Third World. See, for example, Fryer, *Emerging Southeast Asia*, pp. 90-98; Breese, *Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries*, chap 4; McGee, *Southeast Asian City*, chaps. 7 to 9.


contemporary urban masses for improved conditions of life, according to these individuals; must be sacrificed to provide sufficient developmental capital for more productive national projects.\(^{37}\) In short, the inadequate physical plant of the primate city, which is to a considerable extent the by-product of over-urbanization, has created serious secondary problems that will demand the attention of urban and regional planners for decades to come.

_**Urban origins and evolution.**_ Although comparative urban research is fundamental to each of the three foregoing approaches to the investigation of metropolitan primacy, the fourth avenue of inquiry remains much more specific in geographic focus. Its purview concerns the origin and development of primate cities within certain national or regional contexts. Such studies, as one would expect, deal primarily with those unique political, social and historical factors which have tended to condition the evolution of the paramount metropolitan center in a given nation or of several capitals situated within a particular region. Early formal contributions representative of this approach and relevant to Southeast Asia were made in the 1950's by the geographers Donald W. Fryer and Norton S. Ginsburg. In several widely quoted articles these writers concerned themselves with the colonial origins of primate cities within the region, discussed the long-standing role of such centers as generators of change and dealt with their continuing function as critical headlinks between East and West.\(^{38}\) They thus introduced the concepts of metropolitan primacy to students interested in Southeast Asian urbanism.

Responding to themes set forth in the aforementioned articles by Fryer and Ginsburg,\(^{39}\) other schools increasingly came to recognize the great city as a subject worthy of detailed study. Some workers, following the lead of these two geographers, soon began to investigate the growth of primate cities within more or less expansive regional frameworks. Though most of the results of their efforts have been presented in the form of short articles,\(^{40}\) one lengthy and quite comprehensive statement


\(^{39}\) Both of these geographers have remained interested in the Southeast Asia city. Among their recent formal statements are Fryer, _Emerging Southeast Asia_, chap. 3; "Cities of Southeast Asia and Their Problems", _Focus_, Vol. 22, No. 7 (March, 1973), pp. 1-8; Ginsburg, "Planning for the Southeast Asian City", pp. 1-8; "Urban Geography and 'Non-Western' Areas, in Philip M. Hauser and Leo F. Schnore (eds.), _The Study of Urbanization_ (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1956), pp. 311-346.

\(^{40}\) For example, see Dwyer, "The City in the Developing World and the Example of Southeast Asia", pp. 353-363; Rhoads Murphey, "New Capitals of Asia",...
on metropolitan primacy has also appeared. This, of course, is The Southeast Asian City, a book published in the middle of the 1960’s in which T. G. McGee offered an interpretation of our then current knowledge of urbanism and the process of urbanization in this region. Other scholars, in marked contrast, have proved especially interested in the development of particular primate cities in Southeast Asia. Among the monographs, articles and dissertations resulting from their investigations are several recent studies that feature substantial sections dealing with the beginnings of metropolitan primacy in individual European dependencies during the period of colonial dominion. In addition to discussions focused upon the economic role and physical form of selected coastal capitals in the region, the authors of these works also include useful statements pertaining to the institutional foundations of nascent primate cities. Through such sustained commentaries on colonial urbanism a clearer image of the processes underlying the origin and evolution of the great city in Southeast Asia has recently begun to crystallize.

In spite of our growing knowledge of both the past and present dimensions of metropolitan primacy, writers often seem less than willing to commit themselves to sustained inquiries concerning the historical roots of this condition in Southeast Asia. It is more than likely that their apparent lack of interest reflects an immediate, and predictable, preoccupation with contemporary developmental problems of the major urban centers in the region. But at the same time one cannot deny
that an understanding of modern Southeast Asian urbanism remains partly contingent upon the awareness of important social, political, cultural and economic factors which have contributed over the centuries to the processes of city growth and change. Accordingly in the subsequent pages I will discuss briefly the beginnings of metropolitan primacy in this region and the development of major regional centers. Drawing upon the research of scholars who have investigated the emergence of coastal capital in nations of both the peninsular and insular realms, I hope to show that the functional, demographic and cultural superemience of most primate cities is not a recent phenomenon. On the contrary, their national dominance was firmly established in most cases long before the dawn of the twentieth century.

A Preface to Metropolitan Primacy: The Indigenous City

During the early decades of the sixteenth century, when the Portuguese were attempting to establish their colonial authority in coastal areas to the east of the Andaman Sea, the Philippine Archipelago remained the only major sector of Southeast Asia without an indigenous urban tradition. Elsewhere in the region European adventurers found two characteristic types of cities which had existed in certain lowland and littoral locations for more than a millennium. The first was the coastal city-state. These urban places, which were epitomized by the famed emporium of Melaka, functioned as scattered commercial nodes in a maritime network with linkages extending far beyond the seas of Southeast Asia. In such port cities prosperity and effective politico-economic power directly reflected the foreign demand for local commodities, the relative productivity of surrounding lands, the number of client villages and the breadth of trade relations. As a result, enduring political and commercial policies of the indigenous elite in these centers were generally geared to the maintenance of a flourishing over seas exchange. Because their essential domain was the water, rather than the land, rulers of the ports seldom squandered resources by attempting to extend urban authority to territories beyond the frontiers of comparatively diminutive hinterlands. Instead they usually maintained fleets of trading and piratical vessels which were employed effectively to guarantee the commerce of their cities. Predictably these conditions collectively

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66 Ibid., pp. 282-328.

gave rise to a proliferation along the coast of both the peninsular and insular realm of city-states that remained small in size, but active in trade. Such indigenous settlements may be indentified appropriately as places of heterogenetic change, for they were cosmopolitan ports through which flowed diverse men, materials and ideas. It was in these centers that the far-ranging Lusitanians and other Western adventurers first began to trade and communicate with the Southeast Asians.

The second type of urban settlement encountered by the early Europeans was the indigenous sacred city. These places, marked contrast to the small coastal city-states, served as capitals of extensive kingdoms, were usually situated inland, profited little from international commerce and sometimes embraced more than one hundred thousand inhabitants. Although they did in fact obtain most of their wealth from taxes levied on agricultural lands and the corvée labors of peasants, the sacred cities should not be envisaged merely as economic mechanisms essential to the redistribution of surpluses extracted from dependent populations. Above all the inland capitals were politico-religious instruments essential to the definition and organization of Southeast Asian agrarian civilizations

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68 Even the famed emporium of Melaka boasted of only six to ten thousand permanent residents on the eve of European intervention in Southeast Asia. Wheatley, The Golden Khersonese, p. 312; McGee, The Southeast Asian City, p. 41.

69 In a very preceptive article published more than two decades ago Robert Redfield and Milton B. Singer presented a useful construct for the ordering of urban centers according to their comparative cultural roles. They drew a fundamental distinction between orthogenetic cities, which tend to carry forward and slowly elaborate an established local tradition, and heterogenetic cities, which provide an environment where old values disintegrate and new modes of thought are developed. According to their scheme the city of heterogenetic change

"is a place of conflict of different traditions, a center of heresy, heterodoxy and dissent, of interruption and destruction of ancient tradition, of rootlessness and anomic...[In such urban places] men are concerned with the market, with 'rational organization of production of goods, with expediential relations between buyer and seller, ruler and ruled, and native and foreigner. It is in cities of this kind that priority comes to be given to economic growth."


72 McGee, The Southeast Asian City, pp. 32-33; Reed, "Origins of the Philippine City," pp. 24-25; Clifford Geertz, The Development of the Javanese Economy: A Socio-Cultural Approach (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1956), pp. 51-52. (Mimeographed)
METROPOLITAN PRIMACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

COLONIAL SITUATION, 1941

Sources:
The Statesman's Yearbook, 1941
Pauline Dublin Milone, Urban Areas in Indonesia: Administrative and Census Concepts
CONTEMPORARY SITUATION, 1970

Sources:
on a broad territorial basis.\textsuperscript{73} As repositories of a complex of functionally integrated urban institutions, the forms of which derived in part from India,\textsuperscript{74} the sacred cities were intended as cosmic creations, substantive and symbolic pinnacles of and resplendent thrones for the Great Tradition,\textsuperscript{75} enshriners as well as administrators of a relatively homogeneous and particularistic culture to which the market towns and peasant villages of the Little Tradition\textsuperscript{76} also belonged. Their planned, monumental urban forms reaffirmed their role as the head pieces of unitary civilizations centered on their own cultural worlds. They were predominantly political and cultural rather than economic phenomena, functioning as microcosms of the national polity, symbols of authority, legitimacy, and power, creators and molders of literate culture, and seats of the dominant ideology. Commercial functions... were for the most part secondary, and were in any case under varying degrees of control or manipulation by the state, whose chief monument was the city itself.\textsuperscript{77}

The typical inland capital, therefore, was not merely the chief consumer of agricultural surpluses, the largest population agglomeration and the hub of administrative activity in each state. It also acted as a potent symbol of political and cultural unity in the indigenous kingdom. To the Southeast Asian peasantry and the urban masses alike the sacred city represented a critical magico-religious linkage between the macrocosmic universe and the microcosmic earthly realm.\textsuperscript{78} Accordingly the ruling elites planned numerous inland capitals as replicas of the Indian celestial

\textsuperscript{73} Probably the most authoritative statements concerning the role of ceremonial cities in the ancient kingdoms of Southeast Asia, China and other realms are Wheatley, \textit{City as Symbol; The Pivot of the Four Quarters.} Pt. 2.

\textsuperscript{74} For detailed commentary and numerous bibliographical notes concerning the transfer of Indian institutions from the subcontinent to Southeast Asia, as well as discussion pertaining to the origins of cities in the latter region, see Reed, \textit{"Origins of the Philippine City,"} chap. 1.

\textsuperscript{75} The anthropologist Robert Redfield has outlined the essential differences between the urban-based \textquote{Great Tradition} and the rural \textquote{Little Tradition} in the following statement:

\textit{"In a civilization there is a great tradition of the reflective few and there is a little tradition of the largely unreflective many. The great tradition is cultivated in schools or temples; the little tradition works itself out and keeps itself going in the lives of the unlettered in the village communities. The tradition of the philosopher, theologian, and literary man is a tradition consciously cultivated and handed down; that of the little people is for the most part taken for granted and not submitted to much scrunity or considered refinement and improvement."}


\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{78} Useful commentary concerning the notion of parallelism between the macrocosmos and the microcosmos, as well as discussion pertaining to the symbolic role of the city, palace precincts and the ruler within the traditional kingdoms of Southeast Asia, is presented in Robert Heine-Geldern, \textquote{Conceptions of State and Kinship in Southeast Asia}, \textit{The Far Eastern Quarterly}, Vol. 2, No. 1 (November, 1942), pp. 15-30.
archetype. The layout of the streets, temples, walls, moats and other morphological features often conformed to the heavenly models of Hindu or Buddhist tradition, thereby providing the surrounding populations with material evidence of the critical cosmic role of these urban centers. Thus there is little doubt that such sacred cities were centers of orthogenetic change, for they served by structure and function to perpetuate established civilizations.

Within the hinterland or “effective space” subject to authority emanating from each indigenous city of Southeast Asia the condition of metropolitan primacy apparently proved almost ubiquitous. In the more or less restricted territories of the city-states, of course, there was usually only one significant urban place. Such centers were clearly dominant in terms of size and functional diversity within their small spatial frameworks. Though perhaps less pronounced, metropolitan primacy was equally significant in the extensive agrarian kingdoms of Java and the lowland interiors of the mainland. Probably without exception the sacred cities were paramount in their respective states in population, diversity of functions, administrative influence and effective national power. To a considerable degree, in short, major precolonial urban centers throughout the region seem to have conformed to Jefferson’s model of the primate city.

While metropolitan primacy was apparently common in the states of Southeast Asia even before the arrival of the Portuguese early in the sixteenth century, it is not to indigenous urban centers that we must look in an effort to discover the historical antecedents of modern great cities. Though a number of coastal city-states and inland capitals continued to flourish for several centuries following the beginnings of foreign intervention, the advent of the Europeans effectively sealed the ultimate doom of precolonial urbanism. In fact Bangkok among the major metropolitan

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80 According to the scheme of Bedfield and Singer (p. 58), the orthogenetic city is a “place where religious, philosophical and literary specialists reflect, synthesize and create out of the traditional material new arrangements and developments that are felt by the people to be outgrowths of the old.” In these urban centers, therefore, cultures are preserved in their basic form and are carried forward by successive generations.

81 The notion of “effective space”, or that territory defined and organized in terms of an integrated complex of urban institutions, was first set forth by John Friedman in his “Cities in Social Transformation”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 4, No. 1 (November, 1961), p. 92.

82 Although demographic information concerning the indigenous kingdoms of Southeast Asia is scanty and difficult to handle, fairly reliable materials pertaining to Burma at the turn of the nineteenth century clearly illustrate the dominance of sacred cities in terms of population. Burney, pp. 335-347.
centers of today may be said to have strong roots in indigenous urban tradition. Accordingly it is within the historical record of colonial urbanism that we must search for clues to the origins and early evolution of the contemporary primate cities of Southeast Asia.

Colonial Urbanism: Nascency

The fall of Melaka to Albuquerque in 1511 signaled the beginning of a sustained Western presence in Southeast Asia, but it was not followed immediately by a period of general European conquest throughout the region. For almost three hundred years in fact, most independent traders, chartered companies and governments confined their interests to matters of trade and wherever possible avoided prolonged conflicts with indigenous states. This situation, as one might expect, was to a considerable extent the result of market conditions then obtaining in pre-industrial Europe. At that time, before the dawn of the nineteenth century, only the wealthy could afford the fine cloths, spices, jewelry, scented woods and other exotic commodities of high value and little bulk that comprised the East-West trade. Yet most of these could be obtained in Asian marketplaces without drastic modifications of traditional commercial patterns or direct manipulation of the means of production.\textsuperscript{83} As long as the demands of metropolitan societies remained restricted to luxuries of guaranteed sale in Europe and ready availability in Southeast Asia, therefore, the pragmatic merchant-adventurers simply did not feel inclined to promote colonial intervention on a broad territorial or formal political basis.

Although it cannot be denied that the Portuguese, Dutch, British and Spaniards sometimes applied force to discipline indigenous rulers who challenged the increasingly monopolistic commercial policies of the Westerners,\textsuperscript{84} they apparently did not relish the use of their small

\textsuperscript{83} Although the Portuguese, Dutch and English failed to inaugurate fundamental changes in the structure of Southeast Asian commerce during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they did introduce centralized military and administrative apparatus to help facilitate their trading operations. This unity of commercial and political organization was new to the region and ultimately proved to be a key instrument in Western control of the regional export economy. As M. A. P. Meillink-Roelofsz has pointed out, however, it definitely did not signal the immediate doom of the indigenous Southeast Asian merchant. \textit{Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630} (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), chap. 6 and p. 297.

\textsuperscript{84} While the Europeans did prove willing to use the ultimate sanction of force against Southeast Asians who hindered trading operations, these conflicts were usually short lived. Much more prolonged and costly were the wars among the Western nations, each of which sought to establish its commercial supremacy in the realm east of Melaka. For standard textbook treatment of the ongoing European competition for trade and power, see D. C. E. Hall, \textit{A History of Southeast Asia} (3rd ed. rev.; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1968), Pt. 2; John F. Cady, \textit{Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development} (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964), Pts. 3,4.
armies and navies. Most company and governmental officials well realized that military operations invariably proved costly in men, money and materials, and oftentimes led to further political and economic involvements. In short, they fully understood the direct relationship between peace and profits. The early European colonists thus refrained from excessive interference in the internal affairs of Southeast Asian states, shied away from exhausting wars and made few significant attempts to modify local cultures. Even when the Dutch Vereenigde Oostindisch Compagnie found it necessary in the seventeenth century to initiate periodic territorial conquests in parts of Indonesia in order to guarantee unhampered trade, the process of expansion proved hazardous and was not conducted according to a systematic plan of colonization. Following each military success, moreover, the V.O.C. usually hesitated to provide conquered peoples with direct administration. Instead the company introduced a system of indirect rule in which tractable native leaders were allowed to govern on a regional basis as long as they maintained the order essential to profitable commerce. These client administrators of Indonesian birth served not only to reduce the administrative responsibilities of the Dutch, but also acted as important buffers between rulers and ruled. Before the dawn of the nineteenth century, in other words, the enlargement of colonial territories was neither a goal of the V.O.C., nor of most other European companies or nations involved in Southeast Asia. This was indeed an era of "pin-prick" imperialism in which the Westerners confined most of their activities to the commercial sphere and avoided restrictive political or cultural entanglements.

Within such a context of limited territorial and administrative involvement the various European nations were not inclined to establish numerous towns and cities. In order to conserve both human and capital resources they maintained only rudimentary systems of colonial settlements, each of which was dominated by a single entrepôt. These so-called "stabilizing points," the most significant of which were Melaka, Batavia and Manila, served as the primary warehousing areas for goods

\[85\] For useful theoretical and substantive commentary concerning direct and indirect rule in Southeast Asia, consult Rupert Emerson, Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967).

\[86\] Ibid., p. 66.

\[87\] During the first three centuries of Western involvement in Southeast Asia most European governments were not official participants in the expansion process. In the case of the English, Dutch and others active colonization was effected through the instrument of companies. These, however, were chartered by metropolitan authorities and usually received their support in times of crisis. In the cases of the Portuguese and Spaniards, on the other hand, the monarchies actively participated in colonization. For informative commentary on the chartered companies, see George Cawston, The Early Chartered Companies (London: Edward Arnold, 1896).

\[88\] This is McGee's term. The Southeast Asian City, p. 42.
entering into the East-West trade. But at the same time such centers also functioned as military strongholds, critical places of political decisions and outposts of Western culture. They were in fact the multi-functional urban keystones of the embryonic European imperial realms then beginning to crystallize in Southeast Asia.

Markedly subordinate to these emerging colonial capitals in terms of size and functional diversity were numerous far-flung factories, or trading posts. The Europeans apparently established such scattered stations in order to reduce the costs of middlemen, to prevent the hoarding of certain commodities by especially aggressive competitors, to better control quality by dealing more directly with producers and to help assure steady supplies of both raw and fabricated goods. Some of the factories were situated within the walls or on the outskirts of major sacred cities, where the Western merchants became active participants in already flourishing regional markets. Others consisted of strategically located, though oftentimes isolated, trading posts from which merchants could service relatively extensive territories. Yet both types of factories shared one important feature in common. Operation costs generally remained reasonable, for each outpost required the services of only a handful of adventurous European traders to oversee commercial activities and a small detachment of soldiers to provide some measure of security. By thus limiting the early settlements to widely scattered factories and a single fortified colonial capital, the Westerners avoided excessive operational expenditures and so maximized the profits of their metropolitan sponsors.

Each of the early systems of European colonial settlements in Southeast Asia shared the essentials of the foregoing arrangement, but a truly stable hierarchy of commercial centers developed only in the emerging Dutch empire. While the Portuguese were the first to fashion a widespread network consisting of numerous outlying trading stations and a heavily garrisoned entrepôt, their fortunes declined precipitously following the loss of Melaka to the V.O.C. in 1641. In the absence of this secure warehousing and administrative center Lusitanian commercial activities became increasingly decentralized, with a resultant dissolution of less profitable factories. By the same token the British failed early in the seventeenth century to effectively fortified entrepôt in Southeast Asia. Though the East India Company did continue to maintain a number of more or less ephemeral factories in the area, with Bencoolen functioning as the regional administrative center, effective

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90 The rise and fall of the Portuguese commercial empire in Southeast Asia is discussed in Cady, chap. 9; Hall, chap. 13.
imperial authority emanated from the distant Fort St. George in Madras and proved less than convincing beyond the Straits of Melaka. Accordingly the English merchants for almost two centuries remained in a comparatively insecure commercial position in Southeast Asia. The Dutch, on the other hand, enjoyed a far-reaching and continuing presence along the littoral of Indonesia and Malaysia. As a result of effective commercial, military and administrative policies, the V.O.C. not only developed a well integrated entrepôt-factory arrangement, but slowly converted it into a fixed urban system. The only other major sector of Southeast Asia in which this transformation occurred prior to the nineteenth century was the Philippines.

From the earliest years of their imperial adventure in Southeast Asia the Spaniards attempted to carry out a program of colonization which differed significantly from those introduced by Europeans elsewhere in the region. As in the American conquista, they seem to have driven to new lands by a curious mixture of secular and religious motives. Even during the planning period prior to dispatch of the successful Legazpi expedition, metropolitan authorities in Spain and Nueva España envisaged the Philippine enterprise as an integrated effort of merchants, soldiers, bureaucrats and missionaries. To be sure most of the Spaniards, like Europeans in other parts of Southeast Asia, were attracted to the region by promises of gold, silk and spices. But at the same time the Castillian conquistadores, both individually and collectively, secular and priestly, proved firmly committed to the general religious conversation, political subjugation and cultural transformation of all subdued peoples. In pursuit of the goals the Spaniards initiated a program of systematic territorial conquest and direct rule soon after arriving in the Philippines. Their scheme of colonization also included detailed designs for the establishment of numerous towns and cities, which were to secure the archipelago and to provide strategic bases for the Hispánization and Christianization of Filipinos.

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91 or useful commentary on Anglo-Dutch conflict in Southeast Asia, see Hall, chaps. 15, 27-29; Cady, chaps. 10, 14.
93 The instructions for colonization given to the Adelantado Legazpi by the royal Audiencia of Nueva España prior to his departure for the Philippines, which clearly reveal the mixture of secular and religious motives underlying Hispanic imperialism, called emphatically for cooperation among all Spaniards participating in conquest and settlement. "Expedition of Miguel Lopez de Legazpi -- 1564-1568", (résumé of contemporaneous documents, 1559-1568), in Emma H. Blair and James A. Robertson (eds.), The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898 (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1903), Vol. 2, pp. 89-100.
Despite the concerted efforts of Spanish civil and religious authorities, the creation of an integrated and stable urban system in the Philippines was not achieved with ease. To a considerable extent the Hispanic developmental program suffered from continuing shortages of financial support, insufficient European personnel and conflict among the rulers over matters of bureaucratic jurisdiction. But by far the most serious obstacle to the foundation and rapid growth of colonial cities and towns was the nature of pre-Hispanic settlement. At the time of the Spanish arrival, the Malay inhabitants of the archipelago were scattered amongst thousands of isolated and fiercely independent barangay, or village communities, throughout the archipelago. These living groups usually consisted of 100 to 400 people who practiced swidden cultivation and occupied between 30 and 100 houses. None of these centers, as I noted in foregoing commentary, had attained urban status prior to colonial contact. Under such circumstances it proved physically impossible for the small corps of several hundred Catholic missionaries to convert and thoroughly indoctrinate the approximately 700,000 Filipinos then occupying the islands. While frustrated with this reality the Spaniards were also repelled by the political and social decentralization of the intensely independent barangay. As proselytizing Christians, heirs to an enduring Mediterranean urban heritage and proud citizens of an expanding imperial realm, they valued traditions of national societal organization and instinctually equated civilization with the city. To the Spaniards, in other words, the politically fragmented Filipinos remained in a state of barbarism. In light of these various circumstances, therefore, the colonial authorities launched a sweeping resettlement program in the Philippines late in the sixteenth century.

The Spaniards failed to congregate the majority of Filipinos into urban settlements of 2,400 to 5,000 people, as called for by certain

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95 Swidden can be defined minimally as any system of farming in which impermanent fields are tilled for one or more years before being returned to fallow for longer periods of time. This type of agriculture, which is widespread in the tropics and was formerly found also in middle latitudes, usually involves the use of fire in the preparation of farm plots. It is known by numerous vernacular terms in different parts of the world and appears variously in the literature as slash-and-burn agriculture, shifting cultivation and field-forest rotation. Detailed information concerning the swidden eco-system and many references are included in J. E. Spencer, Shifting Cultivation in Southeastern Asia (University of California Publications in Geography, Vol. 19 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966); Harold C. Conklin, Hanoopp Agriculture: A Report on an Integral System of Shifting Cultivation in the Philippines (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 1957); Clifford Geertz. Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 12-28.

96 Discussion pertaining to the physical and institutional form of the pre-Hispanic barangay is offered in Phelan, chap. 2; Doeppers, “Spanish Alteration of Indigenous Spatial Patterns on the Central Plain of Luzon,” chap. 1; Reed, “Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines,” chap. 3. For discussion concerning the question of pre-Hispanic urbanism consult Reed, “Origins of the Philippine City,” pp. 130-150.

97 Phelan, p. 44.
government officials, yet their efforts certainly were not in vain. During the three hundred years of Hispanic rule, the far-reaching Catholic friars succeeded in establishing more than 1,000 permanent towns and cities in the insular lowlands. While the majority of these urban centers embraced fewer than 2,000 inhabitants throughout the Hispanic period, a considerable number became substantial settlements. By the close of the nineteenth century, or the end of the Spanish period, there were in the Philippines more than two hundred places of at least 2,000 individuals. thirty exceeding 5,000 people, nine greater than 10,000 and a colonial capital with some 220,000 residents. Thus the Spaniards solidified their territorial conquest and fostered fundamental social, political and religious changes among the Filipinos through the widespread establishment of permanent cities and towns.

Almost from the beginning of sustained Spanish involvement in the Philippines, Manila ranked as the foremost city in the emerging urban system of the archipelago. Although the Spaniards had first attempted to established their insular capital in the Visayas, they were forced by insufficient food supplies to abandon several early administrative headquarters and to relocate in Central Luzon. The final selection of a site on the shores of Manila Bay proved to be well made, for this strategic location in a wet-rice region helped guarantee adequate provisions for the fledgling colony. Soon after capturing the small Muslim community of Maynila, and in accordance with Hispanic imperial policy, the conquistadores began to convert the indigenous village into a fortified city. From this stronghold, Spanish soldiers and missionaries fanned out to effect the military conquest of much of the archipelago in a matter of years and spiritual submission in decades. Through their efforts Manila was legitimized by the turn of the seventeenth century as the insular center of civil, religious and military authority.

Even before the new Hispanic city had been fully transformed into the administrative nerve-center of the Philippines, its Western citizens were beginning to concern themselves with matters of international commerce. But in marked contrast to the Portuguese and Dutch, the Spaniards did not seriously attempt to make their colonial capital an entrepôt for Southeast Asian commodities. Instead they capitalized upon trad-

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102 This point might be disputed by some, for the Spaniards certainly did make a concerted attempt to capture a portion of the Maluku spice trade and even main-
itional Sino-Filipino trade relationships and transformed Manila into a commercial center linking Nueva España and China. The rapid florescence of the resultant Pacific exchange was no less than spectacular. Only sixteen years after the founding of Manila, the volume of Chinese luxuries available for transport to America had far outstripped the cargo capacity of all commissioned Spanish vessels in the Philippines. Expansion in trade continued, moreover, and by the end of the sixteenth century the Hispanic colonial capital began to experience its most glorious days. In turn this commercial growth and increasing prosperity was reflected in the population and morphology of the insular capital. From a Malay community of only 2,000 persons, Manila in only two decades became a multi-racial city of more than 40,000 inhabitants. By the same token it was changed from a mere cluster of bamboo-nipa huts into a carefully planned and walled city of substantial stone, brick and tile houses. Although mercantilistic regulations and the general decline of the Spanish empire somewhat restricted the subsequent development of Manila during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, its urban paramountcy within the Philippines proved well founded and remained intact throughout the years of Hispanic rule.

In light of the foregoing commentary it is clear that the nascent primate cities of Manila and Batavia originated under somewhat different colonial conditions. Profiting from experience gained in the Americas, the Spaniards envisaged their Philippine colonial capital as a metropolitan center which would properly service a large territory subject permanently to Hispanic authority. Accordingly even while they pursued the military and religious conquest of the archipelago, the Castillian invaders invested considerable time and money in an attempt to convert Manila into a fortified, planned and imposing city. This early developmental program, of course, was sustained by profits of the prospering galleon trade. Within a matter of decades following the advent of the conquistadores, and almost twenty years before the Dutch founded Batavia, Manila became a flourishing entrepôt handling Chinese commodities and the crown of an embryonic hierarchy of provincial towns and cities, which themselves were developed in terms of a detailed Hispanic urban masterplan. While

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104 Reed, "Origins of the Philippine City", p. 507.
105 Ibid., pp. 463-476.
comprehensive design was thus the hallmark of colonial urbanism in the Philippines, unplanned change characterized the Dutch urban experience in Indonesia. For almost two centuries the V.O.C. displayed an obvious disdain for burdensome administrative entanglements and an apparent disinterest in the formal acquisition of a sprawling insular colony in Southeast Asia. Yet at the same time the Dutch were committed to expansionist trade policies which resulted in the widespread establishment of factories not only in Southeast Asia, but also at strategic points in South and East Asia. One of the most influential architects of the ambitious V.O.C. program, Jan Pieterszoon Coen, conceived of Batavia as the administrative hub and service center of this developing commercial system. In less than fifty years of colonial involvement, moreover, his vision had become fact.\textsuperscript{108} Although the Dutch subsequently lost many of their outlying Asian trading posts, the aggressive efforts to control and manipulate the international trade of insular Southeast Asia led to increasing political embroilments, sporadic territorial advances and stabilization of an embryonic system of colonial settlements in Indonesia. And by the same token the expansion of Dutch commercial and political power triggered the commensurate growth of Batavia, which was steadily transformed from a single purpose trading base into the multifunctional colonial capital of the largest European colony in Southeast Asia.

Regardless of these differences in colonial context it cannot be denied that even during their periods of genesis and early development both Manila and Batavia displayed certain features which were later to characterize most mature primate cities of the Southeast Asian realm. Firstly, they clearly originated as urban artifacts of foreign creation and continued to serve the needs of Europeans throughout the colonial era. Although each city developed on the site of a precolonial settlement, in neither case did the morphological or institutional forms of the indigenous community remain intact. Both places were in fact Western "replica" cities\textsuperscript{109} fashioned to serve as instruments of foreign authority. Secondly, the port locations of Batavia and Manila emphasized the essential function of the European colonial capitals as commercial and political head-links between East and West. Their coastal situation also tended to underscore the fundamental role of the major Western administrative centers in the process of systems change in Southeast Asia. While a number of sacred cities remained the nuclei of flourishing indigenous kingdoms for several centuries following the advent of the Europeans, from the earliest years of colonial intervention Westerners resident in the nascent primate cities began to formulate and to implement policies which ultimately opened inland areas throughout the region. Accordingly the

\textsuperscript{108} Milone, pp. 109-116.
\textsuperscript{109} McGee, \textit{The Southeast Asian City}, p. 49.
development of Batavia and Manila marked the beginning of a shift in
effective regional authority from indigenous cities in the interior to those
located on the coast.\footnote{110 Murphey, "Traditionalism and Colonialism: Changing Urban Roles in
Asia", pp. 67-84.} Thirdly, and corollary to their commercial role,
the Hispanic and Dutch colonial capitals acted as magnets which attracted
adventurous persons from points throughout the maritime fringe of Asia.
Especially numerous were the Chinese, whose energy and diverse skills
made them essential members of both urban communities.\footnote{111 Milone, chap. 4; Reed, "Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines", chap. 6-7.} Thus Ma-
ila and Batavia not only linked their developing colonial hinterlands to
commercial and political systems of international scope, but also served
as images of the primate cities which evolved in each Southeast Asian
colony during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

\textit{Colonial Urbanism: Florence}

During the waning years of the eighteenth century, the European
presence in Southeast Asia could hardly be described as pervasive. It is
ture that Western merchants were then trading in ports throughout the
region, but in more than a few of these places they still found it neces-
sary to conform to rules of the local market. Only in urban centers
of the Hispanic Philippines, on Java and in the relatively limited Dutch
sectors of the Indonesian outer islands did the commercial institutions
prove to be of European derivation. By the same token, before 1800 the
Westerners still controlled comparatively little territory in Southeast Asia.
Although the Portuguese occupied half of Timor and the British main-
tained permanent trading settlements at Penang and Bencoolen, these
represented mere colonial footholds in a vast of land and water.\footnote{112 Although conflict in Europe led to the British occupation of a number
of Dutch forts and factories late in the eighteenth century, most of these were
returned subsequently. Furthermore regional competition between the two powers
for Southeast Asian territory was effectively resolved through the Anglo-Dutch
treaty of 1824.} Even in the realms of Spanish and Dutch influence, moreover, territorial
conquest proved incomplete. In the outer islands of Indonesia a decl-
lining V.O.C. had failed to extend its rather limited coastal holdings
into inland areas in more than a few places. At the same time, and despite
numerous expeditions of conquest, the Spaniards remained unable to
subdue the Muslims of Mindanao and never defeated the proud mountain
peoples of Northern Luzon.\footnote{113 The extent of formal European territorial involvement in Southeast Asia at
the turn of the eighteenth century is illustrated in the \textit{Atlas of South-East Asia},
backpiece.} The implications of these conditions
in terms of the Southeast Asian city are almost self-evident. Throughout
most of the region indigenous urbanism still prevailed, for fixed systems
of colonial settlement existed only in the fully secure Dutch and Spanish territories. This situation, however, was soon to change dramatically as the era of "pin-prick" imperialism drew to a close.

In the early decades of the nineteenth century a second phase of European involvement began to dawn in Southeast Asia. To a great extent this development, which produced profound political, economic and social changes throughout the region, was an outgrowth of the Industrial Revolution. As the nations of the West began to undergo rapid industrialization, they experienced an escalating demand for raw materials and foreign markets. These conditions in turn generated a compelling drive among Europeans for the acquisition of territory in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. This quickening Western quest for overseas dependencies was further fostered by steady improvements in modern communications systems, increasingly sophisticated armaments, more powerful ocean vessels and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which permitted great increases in the volume of East-West maritime trade and shortened significantly the time of transit between the Indian Ocean and the North Atlantic. Accordingly the industrializing nations of Europe for the first time had the machinery to exploit distant resources on a massive scale, the need to create foreign markets and the military strength to assert themselves throughout the world. Furthermore most Westerners remained quite unconcerned with the ethical implications of their colonizing actions. As a result of these various developments, the imperial purpose of the European nations underwent a fundamental transformation during the nineteenth century and produced a scramble for territorial possessions. By the turn of the twentieth century Thailand alone among the major political units of Southeast Asia remained free of foreign dominion.\(^{134}\)

Following the acquisition of new dependent territories in the Southeast Asian realm, the British, French, Dutch and Americans each moved quickly to provide a flexible administrative framework which would not only serve to underwrite the order necessary to efficient manipulation of conquered peoples, but also to guarantee produce, profits and markets for distant metropolitan societies. Although it cannot be denied that private Western capital fueled the engine of economic development, at the same time the various colonial governments actively fostered the process of exploitation through a number of enduring policies. These included the provision of easy credit terms for European companies involved in mining or estate agriculture, programs that promoted the influx of immigrant Chinese and Indian laborers, agricultural experimentation designed to improve the production efficiency of plantations and infrastructural advances in the form of new roads, railways, harbor cons-

\(^{134}\) Standard historical accounts of the widespread European territorial acquisitions in Southeast Asia during the nineteenth century are presented in Cady, chap. 14-19; Hall, Pt. 3.
truction, irrigation projects and modern communications systems. Predictably in each of these public and private activities colonial towns and cities served as the West's primary instruments of institutional and spatial organization. Yet very few were centers of international significance. Most in fact proved to be smaller places of more or less specialized function. As one would expect, regional administrative centers and military settlement were scattered throughout each colony at strategic locations to assure effective supervision of indigenous peoples. The development of such essentially political places was paralleled also by the proliferation of small ports, mining camps, plantation towns, railway communities and hill stations, all of which served as outlying centers of colonial influence and authority. Yet while the smaller towns and cities undoubtedly acted as significant linkages between rulers and ruled, by far the most important urban elements in the emerging systems of colonial settlement were the coastal capitals. It was primarily through these large centers that the Europeans organized and directed processes which facilitated the conversion of the closed indigenous kingdoms of Southeast Asia into open colonial systems marked by a relatively free exchange of men, materials and ideas.

Though space does not permit detailed discussion of either the institutional or the morphological forms of the Southeast Asian colonial capitals, a short commentary concerning the more important characteristics of these centers should serve to illustrate both their role as multi-functional instruments of change and their very early development as primate cities. In first place, all of these cities--Rangoon, Singapore, Batavia, Bangkok, Saigon-Cholon and Manila--shared tidewater sites where transportation systems serving extensive agricultural hinterlands could be readily linked to international maritime networks. As one would expect, this consideration was paramount in the minds of the Westerners who founded the major urban centers of colonial Southeast Asia. In the words of Rhoads Murphey,

> European attention to the maritime fringes of each country was rewarded by the discovery of plentiful opportunities for a commercially minded and vigorously expanding West to establish trade centers on its own models, responding to situational advantages for trade which until then had been largely

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115 For a useful and recent overview of the economic geography of Southeast Asia, which includes much commentary concerning the role of Europeans in fostering development, see Fryer, Emerging Southeast Asia, Pt. 1.


117 The repeated mention in commentaries on Southeast Asian urbanism of the riverine or coastal locations of colonial cities serves to underscore their fundamental role as head-links between East and West. Fryer, pp. 475-478; Murphey, "Traditionalism and Colonialism: Changing Urban Roles in Asia", pp. 67-84; McGee, The Southeast Asian City, pp. 55-56.
neglected. It was the seaman and the mechant (usually in the same person) who sought out, from the deck of a ship, the most promising places for the establishment of settlements best calculated to serve the interests of external trade. Those....which eventually supported the dominant port cities combined maximum access to and from the sea....with maximum internal access to and from those parts of each country which were actually or potentially (with the help of Western capital and management) productive of goods for export. This was urban development from the point of view of the commercial entrepreneur, in sharp contrast to the urban patterns of the Great Asian Traditions.118

To further exploit the natural locational advantages of the tidewater colonial capitals, the Europeans during the nineteenth century began to invest heavily in modern transportation and communications system designed to link outlying urban places even more closely with the developing coastal centers. A second, and quite obvious, feature of the emerging primate cities in Southeast Asia was a pre-eminent administrative role within the framework of their respective colonies. With only few exceptions, the ranking Western officials in civil government and the military were based in the colonial capitals.119 Though European governmental executives and their immediate staffs in some colonies shifted headquarters to cool mountain hill stations during the dry season,120 the bulk of the imperial bureaucracy always remained in the large coastal cities to carry on the routine affairs of administration. The third, and probably the most far-reaching, characteristic of the colonial capitals was their great diversity of economic functions. Within these urban places were located the head offices of the agency houses, banks, shipping firms, insurance companies and other commercial institutions through which the Westerners organized and supervised developing Southeast Asian economies.121 At the same time the major cities served as processing and warehousing centers for goods leaving and entering the European dependencies. A fourth element shared by the colonial capitals was marked ethnic diversity. Not only did the coastal cities contain

118 “Traditionism and Colonialism: Changing Urban Roles in Asia,” p. 70.
119 The most important exception to the concentration of government functions within the coastal capitals occurred in French Indochina, where the colonial administration was seated in Hanoi, rather than in the larger city of Saigon-Cholon. By the same token in the Netherlands East Indies the key administrative functions were divided between several cities, for the military officialdom was headquartered in Bandung and the governor-general spent much of his time in the hill station in Buitenzorg (Bogor). Pauline Dubline Milone, “Indische Culture, and Its Relationship to Urban Life,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 9, No. 4 (July, 1967), p. 419.
121 A thoroughgoing statement concerning the effective power within the Malayan economy of European firms based in Singapore is offered in J. J. Puthucheary, Ownership and Control in the Malayan Economy (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, Ltd., 1960).
small European communities, but they also embraced very large numbers of Indians and Chinese who had migrated to Southeast Asia because of intense poverty in their homelands. Although some members of the alien Asian communities amassed considerable wealth through skillful commercial dealings and participation in processing industries, most were a part of the vast force of tertiary laborers who served the emerging primate cities. Finally, the colonial capitals served as the foremost beacons of Western education and culture in their respective dependencies. By the dawn of the twentieth century most of these urban centers were the seats of public and secretarian institutions which provided clerical, technical and higher educational training for aspiring indigenous peoples who wished to qualify as professionals or for positions in government, the imperial military or European companies. Corollary to progress in education was the development in this century of a Southeast Asian elite whose growing sense of identity ultimately converted the major coastal cities into centers of nationalism. Thus the colonial capitals acquired a multiplicity of integrated activities during their early decades of existence and soon became the urban “nerve-centers” through which the European dependencies were organized, managed and exploited.

While the emerging cities of Southeast Asia grew in functional diversity, they also expanded dramatically in population. Like Manila and Batavia, those colonial capitals founded during the nineteenth century were located on the sites of comparatively insignificant precolonial towns or villages. But as the developmental roles of the new alien cities began to crystalize, their populations multiplied rapidly. By the dawn of the twentieth century most of the Southern Asian colonial capitals embraced at least 200,000 persons. Equally impressive is the fact that in the four ensuing decades each of these centers doubled or even tripled its citizenry. Furthermore, this expansion in the population of the major ports was paralleled by equally significant relative gains over secondary urban places. As early as 1900 the colonial capitals of most Southeast Asian dependencies proved to be at least two times

122 McGee, The Southeast Asian City, pp. 58-60.
123 Following the demise of indigenous urbanism and the decline of the Great Traditions, ambitious Southeast Asians increasingly looked to government, the military and European business as effective avenues of social and economic advancement. In each of these bureaucratic realms success depended to a great extent upon clerical skills and proficiency in the prevailing European language. Thus the newly established schools played an important role in servicing individuals who required a Western type of education.
125 The major exception was Batavia, which had only 140,000 inhabitants in the city proper. Murphey, “New Capitals of Asia,” p. 227.
126 Ibid., pp. 226-227.
MAJOR URBAN CENTERS in SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1970

Population

- 1,000,000-5,000,000
- 700,000-1,000,000
- 500,000-700,000
- 200,000-500,000
- 100,000-200,000

RANGOON (1.2) Capital city

the size of the cities of second rank.\textsuperscript{127} In the decades which followed, moreover, the coastal centers continued to outpace other significant urban places in their rates of population growth. Accordingly metropolitan primacy intensified throughout the region. In terms of population, as well as diversity of functions, therefore, the colonial capitals of Southeast Asia had fully matured as primate cities even before the advent of independence following World War II.

\textit{Inherited Primacy: A Concluding Note}

Although the primate cities of Southeast Asia were originally established and developed as instruments of imperialism, the expulsion of Western officialdoms from the region in recent decades failed to initiate a decline in either the relative size or in the far-reaching influence of these major coastal centers. The coming of independence in fact brought little opportunity for effective restructuring of the urban and infrastructural systems fashioned during the period of European dominion. In the new countries of Southeast Asia national life had come to focus upon the former colonial capitals to a seemingly irreversible degree. These centers not only retained a complex of economic, cultural and administrative functions created during the days of Western empire, but also served increasingly as the regional loci of intellectual ferment and of nationalism. The various indigenous elites of Southeast Asia, in short, had little feasible alternative except to convert the alien colonial cities into the capitals of their newly emergent states.\textsuperscript{128} Accordingly despite periodic calls for urban decentralization in order to foster more uniform development throughout the region,\textsuperscript{129} the absolute and relative growth of these primate cities in terms of population and national influence continues unabated. In most Southeast Asian nations metropolitan primacy is thus becoming a permanent condition, and it seems highly unlikely that any but the most drastic remedial measures by public or private authorities could now effect an immediate reversal of this trend.

\textsuperscript{127} The exception to this pattern occurred in the Netherlands East Indies, where the cities of Batavia and Surabaya were roughly equal in size early in the twentieth century. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 227.

\textsuperscript{128} Murphey, "Traditionalism and Colonialism: Changing Urban Roles in Asia," p. 72.

\textsuperscript{129} For example see Poethig, pp. 15-20.