THE DESTRUCTION OF THE INDONESIAN POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM — THE PNI DURING THE EARLY YEARS OF GUIDED DEMOCRACY*

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In their drive to power, President Sukarno and the Army leadership worked hard to weaken their major rivals, the political parties. Partly because the political parties retained a measure of support among various social groups, Sukarno and his allies in the military had to do this gradually. In the 1956 to 1958 period, Sukarno and the Army leadership sought to weaken party legitimacy through a critique of the party system. The declaration of martial law in March 1957 allowed the military to increase its powers in the economy and the government, but the supposedly non-party Kabinet Karya continued to be dominated by partymen. It was only after mid-1958, when the central government victory over the PRRI-Permesta rebels was assured that Sukarno and the Army moved quickly and surely to destroy the institutional bases of party power.

In their effort to develop alternative participatory institutions to replace the political parties, Sukarno and the Army attempted to create a number of national front organizations and to encourage the development of various functional organizations. They tried to secure formal representation for these organizations in Guided Democracy institutions during the discussions of these questions at the National Council in late 1958 and early 1959. In the process, President Sukarno and the Army assisted the development of the ormas within the PNI. It was from among these elements that the drive to replace conservative PNI leaders at the PNI Ninth Congress began.

THE BATTLE OVER THE NATIONAL COUNCIL PROPOSALS

After the pause made necessary by the campaign against the PRRI-Permesta rebellion, the drive to Guided Democracy was resumed in mid-1958. From July to November 1958, the National Council worked to develop a basic set of proposals for “simplifying” the party system, creating a non-party national front organization and a parliament with functional group representation. The battle over these proposals raged from August 1958 to February 1959. The major combatants, arrayed against each other in a complex set of inter-relationships were President Sukarno and his supporters in the National Council, the Army leadership, and the political parties working through the Kabinet Karya.

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The participants in this battle were united in a common concern to develop new political institutions or to revise old ones in order to ensure greater stability in the national government. But apart from this, the Army, President Sukarno and the political parties were divided not only in terms of their political interests but also in their conception of the underlying causes of Indonesia's political malaise and the direction that should be followed in order to set the country back on the proper path.

For President Sukarno, the problem derived not only from the performance of the cabinet or the parliament per se but on their component parts, the political parties. Starting in 1956, he had attacked them for having divided the country, for opportunism, and for having abandoned the "rails of the revolution." The parties, he said, stood in the way of the development of a unified national movement based on mass mobilization and a radical nationalist ideology. In spite of his proposal that they "bury themselves," he knew that the parties would never consent to their own destruction except by force. It was because he was opposed to the use of force that he had earlier recommended the formation of the Kongres Rakjat, a national front type organization that would still be based on parties, at least those he thought were amenable to his ideological goals. The Kongres Rakjat proposal failed because the PNI, which was to have served as the keystone of that organization, refused to participate. In 1958, Sukarno continued to be attracted to the national front conception. But because he was now convinced that the parties were too hopelessly divided and therefore, for his purposes, unreliable, he now turned to the idea of a national front based not any more on parties but on what he called "functional groups," on worker, peasant, youth, and other mass organizations. In the National Council proposals which were heavily influenced by his ideas, functional groups were to be included not only in a national front but also in parliament and in other major government institutions.

To be sure, these proposals were not made without consideration of his own political position. But at this time Sukarno did not need and did not seem to want any formal increment to his already considerable powers. He did not need to solicit an increase in his powers because he knew that whatever new system emerged he would remain a key figure. By mid-1958, the only groups opposed to an increase in Sukarno's powers, the Masjumi, and PSI and the leaders of the regional movement were politically moribund.

In contrast to President Sukarno, the Army leadership was in desperate need of some means of legitimizing its increasing power in civilian politics.

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1 By mid-August, all three major parties, the PNI, the NU and the PKI had declared their support for some form of Guided Democracy. By this time the Masjumi was isolated politically and although it never declared support for Guided Democracy it was not anymore considered important in the whole debate.

Their powers under martial law could not be expected to last forever. A year after it was promulgated, there were already strong pressures for its termination. Army efforts to improve its relations with functional groups through the various Badan Kerjaja Sama (BKS-Cooperation Body) were not noticeably successful. Its attempt at mass mobilization through the establishment of the Front Nasional Pambebasan Irian Barat (FNPIB-National Front for Freeing West Irian) was similarly unsuccessful.

For the Army, the functional group conception was a godsend. Starting in mid-1958, it made increasing use of its martial law powers to push for the implementation of Guided Democracy. It provided the powerful threat of a coup d'état as a means to prod the political parties into accepting the National Council proposals. But it was precisely this threat which set a limit to its cooperative relationship with President Sukarno.³

For the President, the Army was useful in his effort to defeat the regional dissidents and their political supporters and as an ally in the anti-party campaign. He was willing therefore to support its demand for formal representation in the emerging Guided Democracy institutions. But at the same time, he recognized that ideologically, the Army leadership continued to be dominated by conservatives. While allowing it some degree of power, he also had to be careful to make sure that the Army did not become so strong that it could limit his own powers and act as an obstacle to his plans for the country. To do this he needed the political parties, in particular the PNI and the PKI. It is important to keep this seemingly paradoxical point in mind because it would otherwise be difficult to understand the position of the parties not only in late 1958 and 1959 but also in the rest of the Guided Democracy period itself.

For a short period in December 1958 and January 1959, it seemed as if the parties had managed to pool enough of their resources together to resist the more radical aspects of the National Council's Guided Democracy proposals. But as Lev put it, "... each party was not so much defending the political system which sustained it as trying to protect its own position in whatever system happened to emerge."⁴ More than ever the parties seemed weak and indecisive, divided not only among themselves but within their own ranks as well. They were willing to admit that the old system had failed but were unable or unwilling to take the risks necessary to take effective and meaningful political initiatives. The resumption of the drive to Guided Democracy in August 1958, came at a most inopportune time for the PNI. The formation of the Partindo early in the month channeled most of the leadership's energies towards preventing Partindo from making too much headway in its effort to draw PNI members. When the DPP PNI, members of Parliament, and PNI ministers met in an extended session from August 12 to 15, the threat of more explicit Sukarno support for the Partindo

³ Ibid., p. 184.
⁴ Ibid., p. 228.
hung over their heads. This may have been one of the considerations that went into the meeting's decision to come out in support of the Guided Democracy idea. In a statement released on August 16, 1958, it was said that "the PNI agrees with the Guided Democracy conception because it is not contradictory to Marhaenism. The guiding principle in Guided Democracy must be Pantja Sila." The meeting also decided to commission a committee headed by Mr. Hardi (who was Deputy Premier at this time) to prepare a detailed set of proposals for implementing Guided Democracy.

Although PNI propaganda in later years made it appear as if this decision had been made with ease, the fact was that the PNI national leadership had a hard time persuading provincial PNI leaders to accept Guided Democracy. The report of the organization department of the DPP to the BPK meeting in April 1958 tells the story succinctly. It said: "The Committee for the Revision of the party constitution proposed a change in the party's organizational guiding principle from 'democracy' to 'guided democracy' at the Eighth Party Congress in 1956. This proposal was attacked so violently at the Organization Section and the Party Doctrine section discussions that it could not be brought to the Congress' plenary sessions and thus the proposal died. Since President Sukarno himself has now come out in support of the 'guided democracy' idea, we hope that those who opposed it before have now changed their minds..."  

Although it had already accepted Guided Democracy in principle, the PNI joined the other parties in the Kabinet Karya in fighting a rear guard action against the proposals of the Dewan Nasional. Summarized briefly, these proposals were: (1) that 50% of Parliament be turned over to functional groups, (2) that functional group candidates should be chosen by a National Front established by law and led by Sukarno, (3) that Sukarno should determine the list of functional group candidates, (4) that election ballots should comprise two lists — one of the parties, one of functional groups — and that voting should be done by puncturing the ballot twice, once on the party side and once on the functional group side, and (5) that representatives of the armed forces functional group be appointed, not elected, to parliament.

These proposals were fiercely debated at the DPP-PNI, DPR fraction and PNI ministers' meeting on November 1 to 2, 1958. At that meeting, the Hardi committee report urging acceptance of functional group representation in parliament was accepted, but the National Council proposal for 50% representation and for the separate election of functional group representatives was rejected. The meeting also refused to accept the proposal that President Sukarno have the sole right to nominate functional group candidates for the elections, and that Army representatives be appointed rather than elected. Instead the PNI proposed that functional group representatives

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5 Suluh Indonesia, August 16, 1958.
7 Daniel Lev, The Transition.... op. cit., p. 236.
be limited to 1/3 of the total parliamentary membership and that they be elected in a single list with party candidates.\(^8\)

This was basically the position taken by all the parties in the debates that raged through most of December 1958 and January and February 1959. In the end, a compromise was reached through the adoption by the National Council of the proposal to urge the Constituent Assembly to promulgate a return to the 1945 Constitution. On the crucial question of functional group representation, it seemed at the time, as if the parties had won a minor victory with the adoption of the compromise that functional group representatives could either run on their own or join party lists.\(^9\) The adoption of the 1945 Constitution by the Constituent Assembly would also have served to increase the parties' legitimacy for the Constituent Assembly was a party dominated body. But instead the parties continued to fight among themselves. Beset by the problem of intransigence among its local leaders that the PNI and the other parties also faced, the NU leadership reneged on its initial decision to support a return to the 1945 Constitution.\(^10\) By siding with the Masjumi on the Islamic state issue, the NU made it impossible for the Constituent Assembly to adopt the 1945 Constitution. On July 5, 1959, the 1945 Constitution was declared in effect by Presidential decree.\(^11\)

The PNI gave full support to the return to the 1945 Constitution.\(^12\) Its leaders worked hard in the Constituent Assembly to work out a compromise on the Islamic state issue with the NU.\(^13\) On June 16, 1958, Soewirjo sent a telegram to President Sukarno urging him to promulgate the 1945 Constitution by decree.\(^14\) The considerable increase in formal powers that devolved on Sukarno with the proclamation of the 1945 Constitution at first seemed no different from the proposal that the PNI had made as early as 1957 that Sukarno take formal leadership of the cabinet. They had opposed the Dewan Nasional proposals not so much because it gave Sukarno too much

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\(^8\) DPD PNI Djawa Tengah, *Empat Windu PNI*, op. cit., pp. 251-253; see also the report on this meeting in *Pemuda*, November 4, 1958; the PNI reply to the *Pemuda* report is in “Waspada Terhadap Surat Kabar Pemuda”, Propaganda Department, DPP PNI, mimeographed, dated November 10, 1958, 2 pages.


\(^11\) “PNI Mendukung Keputusan Presiden Kembali Ke-UUD-1945”, February 21, 1959, printed, 1 page; instruction to local PNI units to organize support for the return to the 1945 Constitution, No. 038 Penprop/DP/59, March 18, 1959, mimeographed, 1 page; “Pendjelasan Kembali Ke UUD 45,” dated June 2, 1959, No. 539/Sek/137/Penprop/59, mimeographed, 1 page; DPP PNI instruction to local party units to organize rallies to “greet the Presidential Decree with joy!”, dated July 8, 1959, No. 29/1959, mimeographed, 1 page.


\(^14\) “Nota Penprop”, no number, dated June 18, 1959, mimeographed, 1 page, reproduces the contents of the PNI telegram.
power but because it left them so little, PNI leaders continued to be confident of Sukarno’s loyalty to the party. What they did not realize was that Sukarno was loyal not to the PNI per se as much as to a conception he had of what the PNI should be. By opposing Sukarno’s political initiatives, they increased his dissatisfaction with the party and convinced him of the need for it to change drastically. Of more immediate significance to the situation in 1959, their failure to support Sukarno served to weaken him in his relationship with Army leaders.

The PNI relationship to the Army during this period was characterized by a great degree of ambivalence. In early 1957 they had agreed to support the declaration of martial law because they saw the national army leadership as a useful ally against dissident regional officers and against their traditional rivals, the Masjumi and the PSI. They also saw the Army as a whole as the country’s best defense against the danger of a Communist takeover. Rather than joining the attempt of Sukarno’s supporters to revive the Kongress Rakjat in 1958, they ordered local party branches to join the Army-led FNPIB instead.\(^{15}\)

By the time PNI leaders realized their mistake, it was too late to stop the Army drive to power or even to defend themselves against Army attacks. After the declaration of martial law in March 1957, the Army began to move into those areas of the local bureaucracy and the government controlled sectors of the economy that used to be under party influence.\(^{16}\) With considerable hypocrisy, the Army also launched an anti-corruption drive in mid-1957 that was directed primarily at political party leaders. Although they were never tried. PNI leaders such as Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo,\(^{17}\) Dr. Ong Eng Die, Dr. A. K. Gani and Sudiro were arrested, interrogated and kept under detention for several months. The Army leadership also went to great lengths to destroy or at least to weaken party influence in the bureaucracy. At a meeting of Army territorial commanders in April 1957, it was suggested that government employees should be prohibited from becoming party members. After another military commanders conference in August 1958, the Army chief-of-staff, General Nasution ordered all government personnel offices to compile reports on the party affiliation of all high ranking civil servants both in Djakarta and in the provinces.\(^{18}\)

By working through the Prime Minister, Djuanda, and with their remaining power in the Kabinet Karya, the parties successfully resisted these early Army efforts to destroy their power in the bureaucracy. In mid-1958, they

\(^{15}\) DPP PNI instruction to local party units, No. 18/Pol/58, dated June 3, 1958, mimeographed, 1 page.
\(^{16}\) A letter of the first vice-chairman of the PNI in Bali to the PDI branch in Badung explained how the Army took over control from the PNI of the distribution of fuel oil, gasoline, coffee, and hogs after the declaration of martial law. Letter No. 328/Pol. 1958, dated December 23, 1958, typescript, 1 page.
\(^{17}\) Iskaq was later tried in 1960.
also began a campaign against an extension of martial law. They argued that martial law had been abused by local military commanders to repress legal political activity and in many instances to enrich themselves. While the parties recognized the need for an extension of martial law in rebel areas, they urged that it be terminated in secure areas especially in Java.

At first it looked as if there was a chance that the parties would be successful in their campaign. Early in 1958, Djuanda had said that martial law might be lifted in a few places as security improved. President Sukarno had joined in the growing criticism of Army corruption. Even the military itself was not united on this issue for the Sukarno-influenced Air Force leadership had joined the parties in urging martial law termination except in a few areas.  

In spite of all this effort, martial law was extended for the whole country by an act of parliament, with the support of the four major parties, on December 15, 1958. There were several reasons for this turnabout. For Prime Minister Djuanda and the cabinet, there was the fact that central government control over the regions, especially in former rebel areas remained tenuous and wholly dependent upon the loyalty of local Army commanders. For the political parties, in particular for the PNI and the NU, there was the threat of prosecution for those party leaders who had been arrested for corruption the year before. Underlying all these considerations was the threat of a coup.

Occurring as it did at the time when the National Council proposals on Guided Democracy were being hotly contested, the debate on the martial law powers of the army eventually changed into a discussion of Army representation in parliament and other governmental institutions. In 1958, the PNI and the other political parties had refused to accept Army demands for formal representation in parliament and in the cabinet. They had insisted that Army officers could be appointed to the cabinet only on condition that they first resign their commissions. They had also rejected the proposal for appointed military representatives in parliament. After they lost the battle for the extension of martial law, however, the parties were forced to change their position. What may eventually have convinced the PNI and the other parties to allow some form of official military representation in the government was the hope that in doing so they could forestall the more serious threat of a military takeover.  


PNI leaders were particularly concerned about the use and abuse of Army power because several of their colleagues including Iskaq, Ong Eng Die, Sudiro, Dr. A.K. Gani were under detention at this time. See Djuanda’s statement to the DPR, Risalah Perundangan 1958, pp. 5183-5184.

20 Daniel Lev, The Transition…., op. cit.
In much the same way as their miscalculation of President Sukarno's intentions, the PNI leadership also misjudged the extent to which Army power threatened their own. The battles they fought against the efforts of Sukarno and the Army leadership to extend their power at the expense of the parties were essentially rearguard actions. In spite of the PNI leaders' use of the slogans of Guided Democracy, their actions showed an inability to relate meaningfully to the emerging Guided Democracy system. They knew that the old parliamentary system was dead but they still clung to the ideas and political forms that should properly have been abandoned together with that system.

The PNI leadership's lack of political imagination was best revealed in the only PNI attempt at taking a political initiative during the whole 1958 to 1959 period. On November 25, 1958, Soewirjo announced the formation of the Front Pantja Sila. In his explanation of the purpose of the new organization, Soewirjo said that "the acceptance of Pantja Sila by the majority of Indonesians has been proven by the failure of various attempts to get Indonesia to join either one of the two competing blocs in international politics. [?] This national consensus must be given concrete form through the formation of an organization that would include all parties, functional groups and individuals who possess the Pantja Sila spirit." He then went on to say that the new organization would contribute to political stability, make cabinet formation easier by preventing political horsetrading and finally, become a base for implementing Guided Democracy.

After an initial flurry of activity, the Front Pantja Sila died without leaving the merest trace of political impact. President Sukarno and the Army, seeing it as an effort to head off their own proposals for a national front, refused to provide assistance. At first, the PKI said that it would support the Front Pantja Sila since it supported Pantja Sila in the Konstituante. The PNI rebuffed this offer of support by saying that "... PKI support of Pantja Sila is only a matter of tactics and not of principle and thus we cannot expect much from PKI support." For the NU leadership, the proposal looked like a gross effort to pressure it into accepting Pantja Sila in the Konstituante debates. Although the PNI denied that the underlying purpose of the Front Pantja Sila was to advance its own interests, the reason why it failed was because the political groups who could have

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21) Suluh Indonesia, November 26, 1958.
22) The Front Pantja Sila itself was never created but several para-military groups were set up by PNI ormas under slightly different names and often outside of the control of the party. In East Java, for example, a group called Barisan Partisan Pantja Sila was established by PDI leaders. Afraid that the organization would be taken over by Pemuda Bakti (the PKI youth organization) people, the East Java PNI leadership ordered the PDI to disband the organization. Letter from the DPD PNI Djawa Timur to DPD PDI Djawa Timur, dated December 23, 1958, No. 340/Sek/Org/58, mimeographed, 1 page.
helped it were convinced, and correctly so, that the PNI wanted to control the organization and monopolize whatever benefit derived from it.

An examination of the whole episode is useful for our purposes only because it illustrates so well the political bankruptcy of the PNI leadership at this time. The ideas and the political concerns underlying the Front Pantja Sila conception were those of late 1957 and early 1958. It had originally been proposed by Soewirjo at the April 1958 meeting of the BPK. It expressed two basic PNI concerns. Because of its still vivid shock at PKI election victories in 1957 and at the same time its fear of Masjumi association with regional dissidence, the PNI wanted to create a centrist organization that would isolate these two parties at the opposite political extremes. Apart from the PNI and its affiliated organizations, which was to have formed its core and provide leadership, the Front Pantja Sila was originally expected to draw “Nationalist Islamic parties” and the remnants of the small nationalist parties such as the PIR and the Parindra. At the time the Front Pantja Sila idea was formulated in April 1958, it was expected to contribute to PNI efforts to mobilize all its resources in its drive to regain a position of dominance in the cabinet.

As the June 1958 reshuffle of the cabinet showed, the PNI did not anymore have the political power necessary to secure dominance in the cabinet. The political center that the PNI tried to find did not exist anymore, or at least not in the way the PNI conceived of it. The PNI alone, its own leaders must have known, did not have sufficient power to draw allies willing to do its bidding. Instead of isolating the Masjumi and the PKI, the PNI found it had isolated itself.

More than anything else, the PNI attempt to form the Front Pantja Sila in November 1958 showed the failure of the PNI leadership to see the extent to which the conditions for political action and the major participants in the whole political system had changed in the seven months that had passed since the Front Pantja Sila idea was devised. Because of this failure, the PNI leadership’s identification of where political danger lay was misplaced. The right wing as represented by the Masjumi, the PSI and the regional Army leaders was, at least for the moment, politically dead. In November 1958, political initiatives on the left were being made not by the PKI but by President Sukarno and his supporters. The PKI electoral threat had been precluded by the cabinet decision in September to postpone the elections scheduled for 1959; a decision, it should be noted, that was fully supported by the PNI.25

25 For an excellent discussion of the making of this important decision, see Daniel Lev, op. cit., 164-172; on the PNI position, see “Laporan Umum DPP PNI Kepada Kongres Ke IX”, July 1960, pp. 25-26.
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL BASES
OF PARTY POWER

In the year that elapsed between August 1958 and the proclamation of the 1945 Constitution in July, 1959, the parties successfully resisted the more radical proposals of the Army leadership and the supporters of President Sukarno in the National Council. The PNI for one felt reasonably secure in the thought that the compromise that had been reached would assure it a place in the new government. What the PNI had not counted on was that the February 1959 compromise merely marked a temporary pause in the Army-Sukarno anti-party campaign. In the year after the proclamation of the 1945 Constitution in July 1959, the Army and President Sukarno methodically demolished all remaining institutional bases of party power.

They started with the cabinet because it had been the most important rallying point in the parties’ resistance to their plans in the preceding year. The cabinet (Kabinet Kerdja) that was announced on July 9, 1959 was dominated largely by Sukarno’s personal followers and by military officers. It was an explicitly non-party cabinet and the few party men who were in it were asked to resign from their parties. Many of these men undoubtedly continued to maintain informal contacts with their parties but the crucial point that needs to be made about them is that none of them were major party leaders.26

The PNI was not altogether excluded from the cabinet. Of the 31 members of the cabinet, there were five PNI members:27

M. Notohamiprodjo — Minister of Finance
Ahem Erningradja — Minister of Labor
Dr. Suharto — Minister of People’s Industries
Mr. Sadjarwo — Minister of Agrarian Affairs
Roeslan Abdulgani — Minister Ex Officio (Vice-Chairman of the Dewan Pertimbangan Agung [DPA — High Advisory Board])

More than anything else, the selection of these men reveals President Sukarno’s attitude towards the PNI. Party leaders had been correct in thinking that Sukarno retained a good deal of loyalty towards the PNI, but it was a selective loyalty, one based on his conception of what the PNI should be rather than to its present leadership. Because he was dissatisfied with the leadership of the PNI at the time, he did not include any of them or their associates in the cabinet. But he did not want the party

27 The foreign minister, Subandrio had been a member of the PNI since 1957 but just before the Kabinet Kerdja was formed, he resigned and never had anything to do with the PNI again. Mr. Sadjarwo also resigned but he continued to be active in the party informally in the years to come. Ahem resigned his membership in the PNI BPK but never formally resigned from the party. The same was true of Notohamiprodjo, Ruslan, and Dr. Soeharto.
destroyed altogether. Dr. Soeharto and Notohamiprodjo had been among the more important fund raisers of the PNI since the early fifties. Their appointment to economic ministries assured the PNI some degree of influence in the government without which they could not have raised funds for party activities.

Even if President Sukarno did not want the party destroyed, he did want it to change. He wanted it to support his leftist policies and also to pay more emphasis to mass organization. Ahem Erningpradja, and more important, Ruslan Abdulgani, had been among the more important members of the National Council. They had tried in vain to persuade the DPP-PNI to support President Sukarno and his initiatives more actively. Ahem was at this time also chairman of the PNI affiliated labor federation, KBKI. Mr. Sadjarwo had been elected Second Deputy chairman of the Petani only a few months before. M. Notohamiprodjo had been continuously national treasurer of the Petani since 1952. In the coming years, these were the men whom President Sukarno was to use to prod the PNI towards a leftist direction.

Publicly, the reaction of the DPP was one of polite acquiescence. On July 13, it released a statement applauding the speed with which the cabinet was formed. The PNI, the statement said, would do all it could to assist the cabinet by assuming an attitude of "constructive criticism."28 Internally, DPP members seethed with frustration. In his report to the BPK meeting in September 1959, Mr. Hardi said: "As one of the largest parties in the country, the PNI felt [after the proclamation of the 1945 constitution] that it should prepare to assist the President in taking the necessary steps to implement his decree both in forming a new cabinet and in formulating a political program. It was because of this that the PNI did not hesitate to support the return of the Kabinet Karya's mandate." "... The whole Front Marhaenis waited with bated breath for the decision of the President. [But] the PNI, at this time was forced to keep its own counsel, because it was not asked,—because Chairman Soewirjo's efforts to meet with the President were blocked, because even those Marhaenist friends who were closest to Bung Karno were isolated... When the core cabinet29 was announced on July 9, we were surprised, but we were even more surprised when the rest of the cabinet membership was announced."

Hardi then went on to criticize the cabinet by saying that it was too large and that there were ministers whose functions seemed to overlap. He also said that there was an implicit danger in the fact that the military men in the cabinet, by not resigning their commissions, would be subject to conflicting pressures from the cabinet and from their superior officers.

28 Suatu Indonesia, July 13, 1959.
29 The Kabinet Kerdja was divided into a core group of coordinator ministers which was announced prior to the larger group of junior ministers.
With what now seems like wishful thinking, he ended his speech by saying that the PNI would do all it could to force a reshuffle of the cabinet.  

The DPP did not have much time to recover from its shock over the formation of the Kabinet Kerdja. On July 27, 1959, the Army finally succeeded in the effort it had started in 1957 to destroy party power in the bureaucracy. On that day, Presidential Regulation No. 2/1959 was announced prohibiting all upper level civil servants (FI rank and above) from party membership. The consequences of this ruling for the PNI were disastrous. As an internal memorandum circulated in the PNI Central Headquarters put it: “This regulation is going to have serious effects on PNI affairs given the fact that most of our local branches are led by civil servants from the pamong pradja, government teachers and local offices of the Ministry of Information.”

The DPP report to the Ninth PNI Congress in 1960 was even more explicit. It said: “This ruling was clearly meant to primarily hit the PNI because it is in fact true that most PNI cadres are civil servants in contrast to the other parties such as the PKI, the NU or the Masjumi.... This ruling has forced many members to withdraw from their positions in the leadership of local party branches, in the process paralyzing party activity in many places.”

The DPP predictably opposed this ruling, but it could not really do very much about it. Publicly it freed all those affected by the ruling from party membership. Internally, it urged these people to join existing PNI affiliated organizations. In mid-August, it freed these organizations from all ties with the party.

In September, the anti-party forces again renewed their attacks. This time the target was party influence in local governments. On September 9, 1959, Presidential Decision No. 6 was announced, in effect revoking the arrangements that had been in operation since the passage of the Local Autonomy Law in 1957. Under the law, substantial decentralization had been achieved, with regional chief executives now elected by and under the supervision of local legislative councils. Because they controlled these councils, this had greatly increased party influence in local governments at the expense of the pamong pradja corps of local administrators controlled by

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30 Hardi’s report to the BPK meeting in September 1959, untitled, mimeographed, 13 pages; an altered version of this speech can be found in Mr. Hardi, “Partai dan Parlemen”, *PNI dan Perdjoangannja* (Djakarta: Sulindo, 1960), pp. 77-110.


32 Laporan Umum DPP PNI Kepada Kongres PNI Ke IX, op. cit., p. 60. A few examples should suffice to illustrate this point: in Central Java, the PNI Provincial Committee Chairman Hadisoebeno was forced to resign his position; in West Java, the chairman of the Provincial Party Committee; Dudi Sumuwidjaja and five other key members of the committee were forced to resign. *Suluh Indonesia*, May 26, 1960.


34 *Instruksi Intern*, No. 30/1959, dated August 1, 1959, mimeographed, 1 page.

35 *Keputusan DPP PNI No. 67/59*, dated August 19, 1959, mimeographed, 1 page.
the central government. Presidential Decision No. 6 in effect repealed the Local Autonomy Law of 1957 and returned to the pre-1957 situation of strong central government control over local affairs through the pamong pradja.\(^{38}\)

Again, the target here seems to have been primarily the PNI. In most places in the Outer Islands, the 1957 Local Autonomy Law had never been implemented and the Army had largely taken control starting with the proclamation of martial law in March 1957 and even more so after the PRRI-Permesta rebellion. On Java, where security conditions were better than in the Outer Islands, Army inroads into local civilian affairs had been blocked by the parties. In spite of its losses in the 1957 local elections, the PNI had managed to gain a fairly strong position in local governments in Java through judicious alliances with the NU and the Masjumi. In Central Java, for example, the PNI managed to get Hadisoebeno elected as kepala daerah of the province and 17 other members elected kepala daerah by local DPRD’s in second level districts.\(^{37}\) This was no mean achievement given that the PNI was only second to the PKI in the provincial DPRD and that, out of 35 second level districts in the province, it had an absolute majority in only one DPRD and had to work with the NU and the Masjumi in the others.\(^{38}\) In West Java, where the PNI came in third behind the Masjumi and the PKI in the local elections, it had 9 second level district kepala daerah, only one less than the Masjumi.\(^{39}\)

The DPP response to Presidential Decision 6 was initially cautious. Although a Suluh Indonesia editorial\(^{40}\) condemned the new ruling as “undemocratic” only a few days after it was publicized, the DPP did not make an official statement until the following month. At the BPK meeting on September 18-19, 1959, representatives of PNI provincial committees attacked the ruling and the whole BPK then ordered the DPP to work for its annulment.\(^{41}\) On October 15, 1959, the DPP released a statement

\(^{37}\) There were PNI bupati’s in kabupatens: Kendal (Salatoen), Pati (Palal Pranoto), Rembang (Islam Soebroto), Kota Pekalongan (Iskandar Said), Kabupaten Pekalongan (Rachmad), Tegal (Prodjosumarto), Brebes (Slamet), Purwokerto (Soebagio), Bandjarnegara (Soemarto), Purbolinggo (Khotjosukarto), Purworedjo (Pamudji), Wonosobo (Rapingum), Kebumen, (Prodjosudarpo), Temanggung (Soedarso), Magelang (Sugeng Sumodigla), Wonogiri (Purwojanarto), Slagen (Soeprapto), DPD PNI Djawa tengah, “Daftar Nama Nama Anggota PNI Jang Duduk Sebagai Kepala Kaerah, Ketua DPRD dan DPD Propinsi, Kabupaten, Kota Seluruh Djawa Tengah,” dated January 10, 1958, mimeographed, 2 pages.
\(^{39}\) The PNI bupati’s were in Kotapradja Bandung (R. Prijatnakusumah), kabupatens Garut (Enoch Kartanegara), Tjiamis (Sulaeman Effendi), Sumedang (Antam Sastradipura), Kuningan (Saleh Albasjah), Lebak (Iko Djatmika), Purwakarta (Gandawidjaja). Suluh Indonesia, December 14, 1957.
\(^{40}\) Suluh Indonesia, “Logis dan Logika”, September 14, 1959.
\(^{41}\) “Keputusan Keputusan Sidang BPK PNI Ke III”, mimeographed, p. 2.
calling for the revision of the ruling.42 The statement used a line which was
to be repeated many times over the next few months, that is, that the
PNI recognized the need for changes in order to "retool" local governments
to fit with the new Guided Democracy system, but: (1) these changes
should be approved by the parliament, and (2) "... the principle of democracy
should not be abandoned and totally subjected to 'guidance'". The concrete
proposals for revision made by the PNI, however, did not really go very
much beyond the terms set by Presidential Decision 6. It mainly called for
revisions that would allow local executive and legislative councils to retain
some degree of power vis-a-vis the central government appointed kepala
daerah. The statement also asked that kepala daerah and members of the
executive council not be classified as civil servants so that they could still
legally become party members.

Although a few minor changes were made in Presidential Decision
6, PNI opposition was largely futile. The DPP finally ordered local branches
to, in effect, "make the best of it" and try to secure as many positions
for ex-party members as possible by cooperating with the central govern-
ment.43 As it turned out later, the PNI in fact retained most of the kepala
daerah positions it had in 1958 and 1959. What made this possible was
President Sukarno's concern that Army officers and Army influenced politicians
such as the Minister of the Interior and former IPKI member Ipik Gandamana
not be allowed to control local administration completely. To do this he
needed party affiliated pamong pradja officials.

Throughout the Guided Democracy period, decisions on most adminis-
trative matters continued to be made by central government appointed officials
with the local executive and legislative councils providing some degree of
popular or at least party support. As long as martial law was in effect,44
local Army commanders continued to hold considerable power for initiating
government action or vetoing kepala daerah decision. But as long as the
parties retained a foothold in the civilian bureaucracy, local Army officers
especially in Java did not often manage to control local affairs in the way
they wanted.

Starting on June 3, 1959, when the Army imposed a ban on all political
activity,45 PNI activities both in Djakarta and in the provinces was subject
to Army restriction. Permission from the local Army commander had to
be acquired before meetings could be held and reports had to be sub-

42 "Pendapat PNI Sekitar Perpres 6/59", mimeographed, 4 pages; "Pendjelasan
Pendapat PNI Sekitar Perpres No. 6/59", dated October 29, 1959, mimeographed, 3 pages.
43 Instruksi DPP PNI No. DP/31/1959, October 2, 1959, mimeographed, 2 pages;
"Menghadapi Kemungkinan Pentjalonan Kepala Daerah Untuk Kedua Kalinja", Pedoman
Pusat No. 8/1959, dated December 7, 1959, mimeographed, 1 page.
44 Martial Law was extended by Presidential Decree on December 16, 1959.
45 The original reason for the ban had been to lessen the tension created by the
Konstituante debates on the UUD-45 but once it was in effect the Army refused to
give up these powers and used them in its anti-party campaign.
mitted subsequently. All public meetings were prohibited and even closed party conferences were sometimes disallowed for arbitrary reasons. Although the ban on political activity remained, the situation improved a bit for the parties after the promulgation of Presidential Decision No. 7/1959 (Penpress 7/59) on December 31, 1959. The Penpress 7/59 established the rules for the “simplification” of the party system. It required all parties to formally acknowledge acceptance of the 1945 constitution, the five principles of Pantja Sila, and the Manifesto Politik (Manipol). It also required all parties to say in party constitutions that in pursuing their goals they would take the “... peaceful and democratic road.” It empowered the President to “... supervise and order the examination of party finances including their property and businesses.” After consulting with the Supreme Court, the President was empowered to prohibit and/or ban those parties (1) “... whose goals are contradictory to those of the state, (2) who are engaged in rebellion either because its leaders are involved or because of assistance clearly provided to rebels; unless such a party formally condemn the activities of these members. (3) who cannot fulfill the qualifications required by this law.” Apart from ideological requirements, Penpress 7/59 also required that all parties must have had provincial and branch units in at least one fourth of all first and second level districts before July 5, 1959. In a later ruling, this qualification was specified such that only parties with at least 150,000 members before July 5, 1959 would be allowed. It also required all parties to submit lists of all affiliated organizations plus lists of all members at least once every six months!

A PNI Central Headquarters analysis of Penpress 7/1959 sent to local units said that the PNI welcomes the new ruling because in having firmly established the legal basis of parties, it had served to lessen the force of the anti-party campaign. The document also said that the DPP has asked the government to clarify several sections of the law especially that on party finances which it said was too vague and could be used to harass the parties.

After being in mortal fear for their existence for several months, the parties heaved a collective sigh of relief with the promulgation of Penpress 7/1959. In January and February 1960, party leaders again began to speak out openly on political issues. Party newspapers came out with editorials criticizing government policy. Suluh Indonesia even wrote about the possi-

46 "Tentang Sjarat Sjarat Penjederhanaan Kepartaian" Penetapan Presiden No. 7/1959, mimeographed, two pages, copies furnished by the DPP PNI to its local units.
47 The Manifesto Politik was based on President Sukarno’s August 17, 1959 speech which established the ideological goals for Guided Democracy.
48 This was obviously included specifically for the Masjumi and the PSI some of whose leaders joined the FRRI-Fermesta rebellion.
49 "Mengenai Pengawasan Partai Partai", Peraturan Presiden No. 13/60, copied by the by the PNI Central headquarters for distribution to local party units, mimeographed, 3 pages.
51 Suluh Indonesia, February 10, 1960.
bility of a cabinet reshuffle. Still smarting from the government’s frequent use of Presidential decrees, the parties banded together to prevent the passage of the 1960 national budget, the first major item of legislation submitted to parliament since the proclamation of the 1945 constitution in July 1959.

The parties’ holiday from the anti-party movement was shortlived. On March 5, 1960, the government announced the dissolution of parliament. With that one final stroke, the anti-party forces had eliminated the only remaining institutional prop of party power.

Again the PNI and the other parties could do nothing but seeth in anger and frustration. A Suluh Indonesia editorial said rather meekly that the move was “unfair.” A Central Headquarters letter explaining the situation to local PNI units, made the rather reasonable point that since there had only been one occasion in the past 15 years when a budget was not submitted to parliament the year after it was in effect, the parliament’s failure to approve the 1960 budget was not really sufficient reason to disband it. Furthermore, the letter said, the dissolution of parliament is illegal.

At the end of the month, a new parliament, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat-Gotong Rojong (DPR-GR) was announced. It had 283 members, 129 of them representing the political parties, and 154 the various functional groups. At first glance it would seem as if the battle for 50% functional group representation in late 1958 had finally been won by the anti-party groups. In fact, the reverse was true. With the exception of the 34 representatives from the Armed Forces, the majority of the functional group representatives were from organizations closely affiliated with the political parties. Although formally, party representation was decreased, almost all of the remaining members of party fractions in the old parliament with the exception of the members of the Masjumi, the PSI and a few small parties were included in the new parliament as functional group representatives. Of the 57 members of the PNI fraction in the old parliament, 44 were included in the DPR-GR as party representatives and the remaining 13 as functional group representatives. Twenty-three other representatives

53 The parties attacked the 1960 budget for justifiable reasons. It proposed expenditures of Rp. 46 billion, more than double the Rp. 22 billion in revenues collected in 1959. Together with the budget, the government also proposed sharp increases in taxes and a considerable number of new ones. The parties were willing to approve an increase up to between Rp. 33 to Rp. 36 billion but they were unwilling to approve many of the tax proposals. Apart from this understandable unwillingness to raise new taxes, the parties were also concerned that even if the new taxes were approved, much of it would not be collected thus resulting in a gigantic deficit. From hindsight we know that in this case the parties were quite right. For the PNI position on the budget, see the speeches in the DPR by Dr. Isa (pp. 166-193) and Suwono (pp. 194-213) in PNI Dari Perdjoangannja, op. cit.
54 Penpres 3/1960, see Suluh Indonesia, March 7, 1960.
55 Suluh Indonesia, March 10, 1960.
from PNI affiliated ormas were included to give the PNI a total of 80 members in the DPR-GR. Thus the PNI had in fact proportionately increased its representation in the DPR-GR over that of the old DPR. Similar gains were also made by the NU and the PKI.

For the PKI, the increase in the representation of leaders from its mass organizations had very little influence on internal party life since there was very little that divided PKI ormas and party leaders either ideologically or otherwise. The same thing could be said of the NU since most of its functional group representatives were in the alim ulama category, a group from whom most of its leaders came. For the PNI, on the other hand, the increased representation of its ormas, especially those from the youth and worker categories, was to have profound consequences for its development because it was precisely these leaders who were to lead in the task of changing the PNI in the years to come.

On the whole the new DPR-GR included many more men whose political viewpoints were close to that of the President's on the radical nationalist left. The exclusion of the Masjumi and the PSI deprived the Outer Island followers of the Masjumi and the pro-Western, conservative groups in the country as a whole of the leadership these two parties used to provide.

In April and May, 1960, the Masjumi and the PSI, together with the IPKI and the two Christian parties, led in the formation of the Liga Demokrasi, an organization that opposed the DPR-GR. During these two months several branches of the new organization were set up in the provinces and it seemed for a while as if it would gather enough support to become a significant political force. Part of the reason for this was that President Sukarno was out of the country. The other reason was Army support. The DPR-GR must really have displeased the Army for not only were the parties spared, the Army backed IPKI was denied representation and its own 15 representatives compared to the PNI's 80, for example, was miniscule.

Several important PNI national and provincial leaders initially supported the Liga Demokrasi. Its goals and overall political orientation was certainly quite close to that of a large segment of the PNI leadership. A few top PNI leaders including Hardi, Hadisoebeno, Wilopo, Sartono and Iskaq Tjakroadisurjo had refused to join the DPR-GR. Many PNI leaders including Soewirjo, however, refused to work with the Masjumi and more important, argued that joining the Liga would make the President angry. The compromise between these two opinions was that the PNI should assume a neutral attitude towards the Liga. Thus on April 28, 1960, the DPP sent instructions to local branches saying that members should not get involved in the Liga but should not attack it either. The instruction also inadvertently

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hinted at differences on this issue by warning that “... certain elements may use this issue to split the PNI.”

Suluh Indonesia denied reports that PNI leaders were involved in the Liga but refused to condemn it, saying that every one is free to oppose the DPR-GR. On May 24, Liga leaders accompanied by Wilopo and Hardi went to see Soewirjo at his house. Although no report was made of the results of this meeting, the meeting itself was publicized the following day in Suluh Indonesia. Two days later, a group of young PNI ormas leaders went to see Soewirjo at his house and demanded that Soewirjo sign a statement they had written declaring full support of the DPR-GR and President Sukarno’s policies and condemning the Liga Demokrasi. On May 28, Suluh Indonesia published this statement signed by Soewirjo and the leaders of the KBKI, Petani, PDI, WDI and the GMNI.

After President Sukarno returned from abroad in June, 1960, the Liga Demokrasi quickly faded from the political scene. Its importance lay largely in the fact that it was the last major effort of conservative elements in the political parties including those in the PNI to oppose President Sukarno and his policies openly. The conflict between conservative leaders and elements from the PNI ormas on the Liga was one of the opening skirmishes in a battle between the two groups that was to dominate PNI development in the next five years.

Although conservative elements retained important positions in the PNI leadership both in Djakarta and in the provinces until as late as August 1965, the decline of their power as a group can be marked as having started in mid-1960. From 1956 until 1960, they dominated PNI leadership both on the national and the provincial level. The decline of PNI power during this period was partly the result of forces beyond their control. The PNI did not have sufficient power on its own to deal effectively with the problems of economic deterioration, the regional challenge and an Army leadership hungry for power. They could have joined and led in alliances on either the political right or the left. President Sukarno had urged them to form a leftist alliance with the PKI but their fear of Communism had precluded this. They were in fact more comfortable with conservative elements in the Masjumi and the PSI leadership but in the end, the cultural and ethnic forces that divided the parties was more powerful than the values their leaders shared as members of the elite. Sitting paralyzed on the political middle-ground, they allowed the party’s institutional bases of power to be slowly taken away from them. They fought, but not really hard enough.

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59 DPP PNI, “Pendjelasan Dan Instruksi Sekitar Liga Demokrasi”, dated April 28, 1960, mimeographed, 1 page, Soewirjo’s speech at the ninth PNI Congress in September 1960 was even more explicit on this point. He said that the DPP had “... refused to accept an invitation to join the Liga Demokrasi... and here I am proud to say that in spite of differences among various leaders [on this issue] no one violated party discipline and thus we were not split,” Soewirjo, “Penegasan Garis Perdebatan”, mimeographed, p. 13.

60 Suluh Indonesia, May 25, 1960.
THE RISE OF THE PNI ORMAS

Throughout the period from 1950 to 1955, the PNI ormas played a minor role in party life. It was only towards the latter part of the election campaign period that party leaders began to pay more attention to these organizations. The considerable effort given towards building up the KBKI was based on the calculation that in order to gain electoral support in urban and plantation areas, the party would have to gain more influence among workers. A more important reason had to do with the party’s need for activists, for people who could perform the hard and constant task of organizing for the election campaign. Since most of the party leaders at the branch and sub-branch level were government officials and/or teachers with their own jobs to perform. much of the work necessary to man offices and prepare for rallies for the campaign was done by young, unpaid activists from the ormas, in particular those from the PDI.

After the elections, the more important leaders of the ormas activists naturally wanted seats in the Parliament, the Constituent Assembly or the local legislative councils. Many more wanted a share in patronage and other party spoils. Though a few ormas leaders got what they wanted especially in Central Java where the available positions were relatively plentiful, most of these activists were frustrated in their ambitions. A large number of these activists felt cheated for where they had done most of the hard work for the campaign, the fruits of their labor went instead to those elements in the bureaucracy and wealthy financiers of the party who occupied most of the leadership positions in the PNI by 1955 and 1956. Thus many of the activists either withdrew from the party, stopped being active, or openly criticized party leaders and/or provoked splits in local party units. The consequence of all this was the disastrous PNI performance in the 1957 elections.

After these elections, the Central Headquarters tried to bring the ormas under closer party control. In September 1957, two new regulations were passed, for the first time setting guidelines for party relations with the ormas.61 Pedoman Pusat No. 1 (Central Directive 1) classified affiliated organizations into three different categories and established conditions for the recognition of these organizations including also conditions for the-with- (1) The Organisasi bahagian,62 to be led directly by the party, were to assist in implementing the party program by performing functions in specified areas of activity; (2) The organisasi seasas63 “... are mass organizations based on Marhaenism, led by PNI cadres with both PNI and non-PNI

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62 Lit. “component organizations”.
63 Lit. “organizations with the same ideology.”
members and contributing to the party struggle by working in specified sectors of the population;” (3) The organisasi simpatisan\textsuperscript{64} “. . . are organizations who side with (bersimpati) the PNI and assist its struggle in specified fields of activity.” The conditions established for recognition were of a general nature and were largely centered on “. . . proven loyalty to the PNI and proof of activity in support of the party struggle.” What was unique about this regulation was that in contrast to parties such as the PKI which continued to maintain the fiction of separation between party and affiliated mass organizations, the PNI now required formal and written recognition.

Pedoman No. 1 also established the strict ruling that under no circumstances were informal conflicts to be allowed to be carried out in public. Conflicts between party and affiliated ormas units were to be settled by consultation in the next highest level of the party and the concerned ormas, with the DPP PNI as the final arbiter. Special attention was given to this because so many of the problems faced by local PNI units had to do with conflicts between ormas and PNI leaders. On October 20, 1954, a joint party ormas instruction was sent to all local party and ormas units which made this point and urged the expulsion of those members who carried out factional quarrels in public.\textsuperscript{65}

Under these new regulations, party relations with organisasi bahagian were to be determined by the party leadership at each level. Relations with organisasi simpatisan was made the special responsibility of the organization departments of each party unit. Relations with the organisasi seasas was governed by a separate regulation, Pedoman Pusat No. 2 which specified the creation of a new governing body, the Front Marhaenis at all levels of party and ormas organization. Front Marhaenis units were to be headed by a party representative with representatives from the other five organisasi seasas as rotating vice-chairmen and another party representative as general secretary. All three types of ormas were to be unified under a Komando Aksi Massa Marhaen (KAMM—Action Command of the Marhaen Masses) operating at all levels of party and ormas organization.

Pedomat Pusat No. 1 and 2 were followed in April 1958 with Peraturan Pusat No. 6/1958 (Central Regulation) which specified the conditions for disciplinary action.\textsuperscript{66} Peraturan Pusat No. 6/1958 said that: (1) The suspension of a member by the party must be followed by similar action in the ormas of which he is a member and vice versa; (2) the expulsion of a member by the party must be followed by his expulsion from the ormas of which he is a member; on the other hand, (3) the expulsion of a member by the ormas must be followed by his suspension from the party with a final decision in the case to be made by the next higher party unit.

\textsuperscript{64} Lit. “fraternal organizations.”
\textsuperscript{65} Instruksi Bersama No. 1/FM/1957, printed, 1 page.
DESTRUCTION OF INDONESIAN POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM

In a letter to provincial party committees in September, 1957, the recognized ormas were listed as follows:67

A. Organisasi Bahagian (1) The Barisan Tunas was intended to be an organization for “... sports, cultural development and civil training” of children of party and ormas members between the ages of six and sixteen.68 Although extensive plans were made for this organization, it was in fact set up in only a few party branches. (2) The Badan Musyawarah Seksi (BMSS—Consultation Body of Sections [of the Party in government offices] was set up in late 1957 and was meant to organize PNI members in government offices in Djakarta. Part of the impetus for setting up the BMSS was as a reaction to the army demand that civil servants be prohibited from party membership. When the army finally succeeded in securing this prohibition in July 1959, the BMSS was disbanded.

B. Organisasi Simpatikan (1) The Ikatan Pamong Rakjat Indonesia (IPRIN) was an organization of local government employees. It was founded on June 25, 1955 in Purworedjo by leaders of the Central Java PNI. It was formed in response to increasing PKI domination of the non-party Persatuan Pamong Desa Indonesia (PPDI). In the years after 1955 it was in fact quite successful in drawing members away from the PPDI at least in Central Java.70 Until the sixties when IPRIN expanded to other areas, most of the support came from Central Java where the PNI was very strong in local government offices.71 IPRIN was one of the first of several organizations later formed specifically to compete with parallel PKI dominated organizations. The PPDI and other organizations such as the SOBSI and BTI had originally been non-party organizations but because PKI cadres were generally better trained and much more active, they soon dominated the leadership of these organizations.

(2) The Ikatan Guru Nasional (IGN—National Teachers Association) was also established by the PNI Central Java at its provincial conference in Pati, on April 28, 1955.72 Within a few years, it managed to establish branches in almost all kabupaten seats and in North Sumatra. Its first chairman was Hadisenoarto, then at the Second IGN Congress in Purworedjo in January, 1958, he was replaced by Rh. Koesnan. The name of the organization was also changed at that time to Ikatan Guru Marhaenis (IGM).

71 In West Java, for example, IPRIN had only one branch in September 1958. Laporan Departemen Organisasi Kepada Konperensi PNI Djawa Barat, September 28, 1958, mimeographed, p. 2. On the IPRIN as a whole, see PB IPRIN, “Risalah Singkat Perkembangan IPRIN”, *Suara IPRIN*, No. 1, August 1963, pp. 1-6.
72 *Laporan DPD PNI Djawa Tengah* (Semarang: Perwakilan Tanah Air Coy., 1956, p. 8.
The most active IGM branches were in Central and East Java and in Bali. Progress was slower in West Java where the influence of Subiadinata, the long time chairman of the national teachers’ union PGRI was strong. Although Subiadinata was a PNI member and the PGRI national leadership was dominated by PNI members through most of the ‘fifties, PNI members in the PGRI resented the creation of the IGM. In contrast to the IPRIN, the impetus for the creation of the IGM seems to have been less PKI competition than the wish of PNI leaders, many of whom were themselves teachers, to create an organization that could be used directly for PNI purposes. The IGM, working together with the Education Department of the PNI Central Headquarters, organized conferences of PNI educators in 1956 and then again in 1958 to discuss and formulate Marhaenist principles of education. The IGM was also active in setting up PNI schools organized through the *Jajasan Pendidikan Marhaenis*. In Central Java alone, the PNI had 97 schools in 1959, most of them at the high school level. 73

C. The *Organisasi Seazas* (1) KBKI—Of the five organisasi seazas recognized by the PNI at this time, it was the KBKI that made the greatest progress. In 1954, the KBKI claimed 61,000 members. By the time the first meeting of the *Dewan Pimpinan Sentral* (Central Leadership Council) was held in July 1956, the KBKI claimed it had 500,000 members organized through 13 provincial offices, 81 town branches, and 372 office or factory sections. 74 In 1958, Ahem claimed that the KBKI now had 1,001,775 members. 75 Although effort was made at organizing members along craft or industry lines, most of the KBKI members during this period were organized in small enterprise sections within a territorial KBKI branch. Among the larger industry unions were the plantation workers union, the Department of Public Works union, and the sugar workers union. Effort was also made at breaking into the SOBSI’s near monopoly of transport workers unions.

Part of the reason for the KBKI’s rapid growth at this time in comparison to the other PNI ormas was that it provided direct services to its workers apart from serving as a source of political support for the party. It was certainly active in looking after the interests of its members as were other existing labor federations. Although the PKI’s SOBSI continued to be the largest federation in the country, the KBKI grew much faster at this time than the SOBSI or any of the other major federations. As the Masjumi and the PSI grew increasingly isolated politically after mid-1957 more and more of the affiliated unions in the SBII and the KBSI moved into the KBKI. Another advantage that the KBKI had over the other federations was the PNI’s superior influence in the government, especially in the Labor

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73 Laporan DPD Djawa Tengah, Triwulan I, 1959, mimeographed, pp. 12-13; much of the information here on the IGM have been culled from the IGM magazine, *Suluh Pendidikan*.
74 Laporan Umum DPS KBKI Pada Sidang Pleno Ke I di Bandung, July 17-20, 1956, mimeographed, p. 4.
75 *Suluh Indonesia*, May 12, 1958.
Ministry. Because a system of compulsory arbitration had been in effect since 1951, political influence was a vital factor in the unions' effort to defend their workers interests. The success of KBKI efforts in 1956 to secure a reconsideration of the government arbitration board's decision on plantation workers wages in kind through pressure on the PNI Minister of Labor Sabillal Rasjad is a good case in point.

As PNI influence in the government slowly declined after mid-1957, the KBKI at times found itself at a disadvantage. When Dutch enterprises were seized in December 1957, it was the KBKI section in the Dutch shipping firm, KPM, that started things by seizing the main offices of the firm. In the next few days other unions followed by seizing Dutch commercial, industrial and plantation enterprises. But for a whole year after these seizures it was the Army that assumed control over these enterprises. Although these enterprises were formally returned to civilian control after November, 1958, the Army had gained sufficient foothold in the management of these enterprises that they remained thereafter a veritable Army preserve.

This development had profound consequences for Indonesian labor organizations because with the substantial powers accruing to the Army under martial law, plus the operation of a strike ban on "vital enterprises" since mid-1957, organizational work among the large numbers of workers in these enterprises especially in the plantations was severely restricted. For the KBKI, the Army takeover of these enterprises had especially bitter consequences. Because the Dutch managed to remove most of the KPM ships and those that remained were returned by the government, the KPM workers were left without a company to work with. In mid-1958, these workers were attached to the government owned shipping firm PELNI. When this happened, most of the company houses occupied by KBKI members in the KPM were seized for Army use.

These developments served to create tension between the KBKI and the PNI leadership because KBKI leaders felt that PNI members in the cabinet, in particular the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Hardi, had not worked hard enough to defend KBKI interests. KBKI leaders also felt that the cabinet's decision to return remaining KPM ships, a decision supported by Mr. Hardi, served to negate KBKI initiative in seizing the KPM main offices.

After the appointment of Ahem to the position of Minister of Labor in the Kabinet Kerdja in July 1959, the situation began to improve for the KBKI and the next couple of years were again marked by sustained KBKI

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78 Letter from KBKI Seksi Pelni Pusat to DPS KBKI, May 7, 1958, No. 22/Sekr/5/58, typescript, 2 pages.
growth. Through Ahem’s influence, many KBKI leaders were given positions in local Ministry of Labor offices. The patronage and generalized influence in the field of labor relations which this gave the KBKI enabled it not only to make gains in competition with other labor federations but also to become more independent of the PNI.

(2) The Petani—The PNI peasant organization, Petani remained the weakest of the PNI ormas throughout this period. At its fourth Congress in Jogjakarta on February 23-25, 1956, it claimed to have 134 branches. Most of these branches, however, were paper organizations which were no more than appendages to local party branches, most of them in Central and East Java, and in North and South Sumatra. At the fourth Congress, Bambang Murtioso, the young leader of Petani in South Sumatra, delivered a speech attacking the Petani national leadership for not doing anything about improving local Petani organizations. Bambang Murtioso could do this because the Petani in South Sumatra was at this time the most active provincial Petani organization. South Sumatra’s 32 branches represented the largest provincial delegation at the Congress. When the elections for the national Petani leadership were held, however, the incumbent chairman, Manuaba managed to win reelection with the support of Javanese branches. The South Sumatra Petani secured the election of Sjaharuddin St. Pamuntjak as Second Deputy Chairman and Bambang Murtioso as Secretary-General.80

Because Manuaba was subsequently elected secretary-general of the party and a number of other members of the Petani Central Leadership were either too busy or apathetic, Bambang Murtioso had effective control over Petani central headquarters after the congress. By working through a central headquarters staff independent of the DPP Petani, Bambang Murtioso managed to improve local Petani organizations such that by December 1958, he could claim that Petani had 1,500,000 members.81 In spite of Central Headquarters efforts, however, local Petani branches remained tied to party branches for outside of a handful of full-time workers in Djakarta and some of the larger provincial offices, Petani did not have its own cadre of local organizers.

During this period, most of its activities were oriented towards assisting the party and providing it with a base of popular support. Its service activities took the form of mediating between its members and local government officials and securing government assistance whenever available. Some of the more active branches organized farmers cooperatives.

The Fifth Petani Congress was held at Malang on April 19-26, 1959. Party leaders who considered Bambang Murtioso an upstart succeeded in removing him from the key position of secretary general and instead kicked

81 Suluh Indonesia, December 17, 1958.
him up to the more prestigious but less powerful position of First Deputy Chairman. Largely to prevent Bambang Murtioso from taking the position, Manuaba was reelected general chairman. Although party leaders succeeded in doing this, the overall political orientation of the DPP Petani was changed in a direction farther to the left than that of the national PNI leadership. The Second Deputy Chairman, Sadjarwo was a close supporter of President Sukarno’s political views and had been Minister of Agriculture since April 1957. The Third Deputy Chairman, Asjro Effendy, was from the left-wing Petani organization in North Sumatra. The new secretary-general, Surachman, was from the Jogjakarta Petani and was, even at this time, already known for his leftist views. He subsequently became secretary-general of the party.\(^{82}\)

Thus by 1960, the Petani leadership at least in Djakarta, had moved away from the conservative national PNI leadership in much the same way as the KBKI, and for roughly similar reasons. With the encouragement of both President Sukarno and the Army, and especially after Sadjarwo’s appointment as Minister of Agriculture, the *Petani* began to assert a position independent of that of the PNI national leadership.

(3) *Pemuda Demokrat Indonesia*—In much the same manner as the *Petani*, the PDI was at first subject to strong influence from the party. At the Seventh PDI congress in Malang, on October 23-28, 1956, for example, Asnawi Said, who had been PDI national chairman since August 1954, was removed from the PDI leadership. The DPP PNI wanted Asnawi removed from the PDI leadership because of his refusal to vacate his seat in the Konstituante as ordered by the party. Elected in his place was a leader considered more amenable to party control, Ischak Sudjodiputro. Because he was busy as an official at the Ministry of Information and as member of the Konstituante, Ischak never really managed to gain effective control over the PDI central headquarters. In the period from 1956 to 1960, the most important PDI leaders were S. M. Thaher, the first deputy chairman; Hikmatullah, the secretary-general, and Suwardi, the deputy Secretary-general.\(^{83}\)

At the time of the Seventh PDI congress in 1956, the leadership claimed there were 179 PDI branches.\(^{84}\) In May 1957, Ischak said that the PDI

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\(^{82}\) On the Congress, see Ibid, April 30, 1959; Interview with Semanhadi, a member of the DPP Petani, Djakarta, April 4, 1969. The DPP Petani was made up of the following: Chairman, Manuaba, First Deputy Chairman, Bambang Murtioso, Second Deputy Chairman, Mr. Sadjarwo, Third Deputy Chairman, Asjro Effendy, Secretary General, Surachman, Sekretaris, Soenarto, Ketua Departemen Organisasi, Surachman, Ketua Departemen Penerangan, Bambang Murtioso, Ketua Departemen Agraria, Sadjarwo, Ketua Departemen Pendidikan Sosial, Amung Amran, Ketua Departemen Ekonomi, Notohamiprodjo, Ketua Departemen Pembelaan, Semanhadi.

Decision of the first five members as formateurs, Keputusan Rapat Ke I, Dewan Harian, June 4, 1959, 1 page, mimeographed.

\(^{83}\) Suwardi had started out in 1956 as chairman of the DPP PDI, Departemen Organisasi. In November 1958, he replaced M. Noerdin as Deputy Secretary General. Interview with Sufjar Rasmitaputra, PDI secretary general in 1960, Djakarta, January 11, 1969.

\(^{84}\) *Suku Indonesia*, October 25, 1956.
had 500,000 members all over the country. The distribution of the branches largely followed that of the party. At the 1956 Congress, for example, Central Java PDI was represented by 43 branches, South Sumatra by 42, East Java, 32, and West Java, 24. The South Sumatra PDI, under the leadership of Nawawi Saleh who was elected Second Deputy Chairman at the 1956 Congress, was quite strong and well organized at this time. Because Nawawi Saleh became so deeply involved in internecine quarrels within the South Sumatra PNI in 1957 and 1958, the PDI there also fell apart. By the time of the Eight PDI Congress in 1960, the South Sumatra PDI had fallen from being the second largest to only the fifth largest provincial PDI unit. Based on the number of votes allowed at the Congress, the four largest provincial PDI units were Central Java with 660 votes; East Java, 563; West Java, 320, and North Sumatra with 216 votes.

(4) GMNI—The Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia (GMNI), the PNI affiliated university student organization was founded on March 22, 1954 as a result of the fusion of three university student organizations, the Gerakan Mahasiswa Merdeka in Djakarta, the Gerakan Mahasiswa Demokrat (Djakarta), and the Gerakan Mahasiswa Marhaenisa (Surabaja). The first GMNI national chairman elected at the first GMNI Congress in November 1954, was M. Hadipraborto.

Although local chapters were active in organizing lectures, seminars and other student centered activities, the GMNI national leadership was largely inactive. This was partly because Hadipraborto had left the country to study abroad in 1955 and the rest of the members of the GMNI national leadership were studying in different places. In October 1957, a new leadership was elected at the second GMNI Congress in Bandung. The national chairman and deputy chairman elected at that time, respectively Bambang Kusnohadi and Sitamto Dirdjosuparto were to remain in these positions until 1966. At that Congress there were 13 GMNI branches present; in 1958, with the addition of 3 more branches, the GMNI claimed 8,000 members. The biggest at that time were, in order, Jogjakarta, Bandung and Surabaja.

As a small and relatively new organization, the GMNI played an even smaller role within the PNI than the other PNI ormas. When the GMNI opposed the formation of the Front Pantja Sila at a meeting of PNI ormas leaders with the DPP PNI in mid-1958, party leaders brushed aside their

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86 Suluh Indonesia, October 25, 1956.
87 “Pembagian Suara Tjabang,” no date, mimeographed, 2 pages.
89 Suluh Indonesia, November 23, 1954.
90 Interview with Wuhjo Martosugito, member of the GMNI Presidium in 1962, Jogjakarta, February 8, 1969.
91 Suluh Indonesia, November 30, 1957.
92 Ibid., November 4, 1958.
objections and went ahead with their plans.\textsuperscript{93} GMNI leaders had opposed the Front Pantja Sila plan because they felt that it did not establish a clear-cut ideological position. They argued further that DPP PNI policies did not directly confront President Sukarno's challenge for a total restructuring of political institutions and a redirection of national politics as a whole towards a leftist course. In January 1959, the GMNI shocked the PNI leadership when it came out with a statement fully supporting the National Council proposals on Guided Democracy which the PNI had opposed.\textsuperscript{94}

In making this decision, the GMNI was influenced by National Council Vice Chairman Ruslan Abdulgani who had agreed formally to become GMNI patron (pelindung) in May 1958 and had periodically been meeting with national GMNI leaders since early that year.\textsuperscript{95} A more important reason was the fact that the GMNI leadership was much farther left ideologically than the PNI leadership. At the GMNI national conference at Kaliurang (Jogjakarta) on February 18-21, 1959, the GMNI national leadership presented a proposal for a set of ideological guidelines for the Marhaenist struggle which was approved and later forwarded to the party. That statement will be reproduced extensively below because it is the first of several GMNI proposals which were to become increasingly influential in the determination of the PNI's own ideological position. The statement, entitled "Beberapa Thesis Pedoman Garis Perdjoangan"\textsuperscript{96} (Some Theses as Guidelines for Struggle) said: "The goals of the Indonesian revolution are the establishment of a true and full independence and the achievement of Indonesian socialism. In the revolution, we recognize two types of persons and groups, a person or group that is actively for the revolution and a counter-revolutionary. The revolution does not recognize a dual personality, for commitment to the revolution is total and absolute. It does not recognize compromise for it is compromise which obstructs and eventually causes the failure of the Revolution."

Thus we must consciously and firmly separate the revolutionary from the counter-revolutionary types. A politics of isolation, of separating counter-revolutionaries from the masses is an absolute necessity."

Included in the counter-revolutionary groups, the statement said, are: "... reactionary capitalists, because their interests put them in alliance with imperialist capital and therefore against the masses; landlords and other feudal elements, political adventurers; conservative-orthodox-doctrinaire-formalist types because they often fail to take advantage of situations which would advance the revolution; the federalists because their ranks are fertile ground for the imperialists effort to divide the forces of the revolution; the comprador-

\textsuperscript{93} Laporan Dewan Pimpinan GMNI Pada Konperensi GMNI di Kaliurang, Jogjakarta, February 18-21, 1959, mimeographed, p. 3-4.
\textsuperscript{94} No title, dated January 23, 1959, No. 95016/DPP/59, mimeographed.
\textsuperscript{95} Laporan Sekretaris Djendral DPP GMNI Dalam Konperensi Ke II DPP GMNI Pleno, 25-26 Mei, 1958, mimeographed, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{96} Dated February 18, 1959, mimeographed, 4 pages.
internationalist types who would put Indonesia under the influence of another country and thus would make us lose our national identity."

The Marhaenist forces for the revolution must be taken from the following groups: "(1) Labor youth, because the combination of youths' dynamic idealism and the political consciousness of the worker arising from the fact that he suffers most under capitalism makes labor youth the most radical element in the population; (2) The peasantry is also an important revolutionary element for aside from comprising the largest segment of the population, the peasantry are also oppressed by landlords and usurers and thus cannot be other than revolutionary. Because of the present structure of rural society, however, which is still irrational-religious and conservative, peasants tend sometimes to be insufficiently radical. (3) The Armed Forces, because it was born during the revolutionary period is also one of the progressive elements especially if they adhere to the principles of the Sapta Marga. (4) All other segments of the population who are poor such as indigent intellectuals..."

"In order to succeed in our struggle, the leadership of the Marhaenist forces must include only those who truly understand the dynamics of the revolution... It must exclude conservative-orthodox-doctrinaire-formalist elements who are not capable of using revolutionary theory in an active and dynamic manner. The presence of leaders with varying political orientations in our struggle will only create conditions for compromise... The absolute condition for developing good leadership is the training of sufficient numbers of cadres."

"Although control over governmental institutions is important, a major part of our energies must be devoted to work among the masses in order to prevent isolation from them... We must always keep in mind the fact that ours is a socialist and therefore, a leftist movement... We must always take the initiative in movements that will benefit the masses so that we can gain their confidence and thus determine the political direction of mass action."

Although many of the leaders in the other PNI ormas shared the GMNI's ideas, they were much more discreet in expressing them. In January 1958 and then again, in August 1958, for example, the PDI leadership submitted two secret memoranda to the DPP urging it to take "...serious and firm steps to correct the deterioration of the party organization in the provinces." These two documents urged that the PNI establish a more consistent political line and cease to take steps on the basis of personal considerations excused under such phrases as "the situation forces this decision upon us" or "so-called practical politics." "Liberalization" in the interpretation of Marhaenisme, these documents said, has brought about a situation where there are now three distinct groups within the PNI leadership: a Marhaenist group which is socialist [in orientation]; a bureaucratic and feudalist group, and a capitalist group. Although the last two groups are still a minority within the party, the liberal nature of leadership selection which allows these groups to use
their money and patronage resources has made it possible for them to dominate party leadership. Because of their dominance, the party struggle has ceased to be characterized by radical and revolutionary qualities and instead has become moderate and opportunistic. To correct these tendencies, the existing liberal process of leadership selection must be replaced by a process with central guidance in order to prevent feudalist and capitalist elements from dominating party leadership in the future.  

In 1957 and early 1958, ormas leaders' efforts to bring about changes within the PNI was carried out within the format of the party reform movement led by Sarmidi. Although they agreed with the criticism Partindo leaders leveled at the PNI, they refused to join Partindo partly because they suspected the motives of some of the leaders and also because they felt that their ideals would be better served by continuing the effort to change the party from within. The failure of their efforts in 1957 and 1958 can partly be ascribed to the fact that the ormas were so poorly represented in PNI leadership councils. In the DPP PNI, for example, there were no ormas leaders represented. The only two former ormas leaders in the DPP, Subagio Reksodipuro and Mhd. Isnaeni who were PDI leaders in the fifties, were closely associated with conservative elements. There were only ten ormas representatives in the 82 man BPK.  

Another reason why ormas leaders' efforts at party reform failed was because from 1956 to 1958, they continued to be dependent upon the party for their finances and for the patronage and generalized influence in the government which was necessary for their organizational efforts. In 1956, for example, the larger part of the KBKI Central Headquarters budget was paid for by a Rp. 20,000 a month grant from the DPP PNI. Ormas dependence upon party resources was alleviated somewhat in late 1957 and 1958 through their participation in the various Army-functional group cooperation bodies and the FNPB. More importantly, the appointment of Ahem Erningpradja, Sadjarwo, Ruslan Abdulgani and Notohamiprodjo as ministers in the Kabinet Kerdja provided the PNI ormas with a new source of power and influence in the central government that did not have to be acquired through the party.  

The growing strength of the ormas vis-a-vis the party was graphically illustrated in March 1960 when several of the more radical ormas leaders, among them Surachman (Petani), Bachtier Salim Haloho (KBKI), Suwardi (PDI), and Sutamto Dirdjosuparto (GMNI) were appointed to the new

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97 Laporan Umum DPP PDI Pada Kongres PDI Ke VIII/Tjipajung/12 Desember 1959-3 Januari 1960, typescript, pp. 8-10.
98 The only ormas leader I know of who joined the Partindo in 1958 was Sukarma who was chairman of the Djakarta PDI and a member of the DPP Pleno PDI.
100 One of the things these ministers did was to provide ormas leaders with jobs in their ministries which gave them a regular salary but lots of time for ormas tasks.
parliament in spite of the fact that they were not included in the list submitted by the DPP PNI.\textsuperscript{101} Although the PNI was allowed to place some party men in the DPR-GR as functional group representatives, the four major PNI ormas were allotted twenty-three seats in the DPR-GR. This was an important gain for the ormas leaders because while ten ormas men were elected to parliament in 1956, most of them were older men whose careers and political viewpoints did not differ much from those of the conservative party leadership.

Ormas gains at this point were given added weight by the decline in the fortunes of conservative PNI leaders. Their exclusion from the \textit{Kabinet Kerdja} and the prohibition on party membership for upper level civil servants put the party leadership at a disadvantage in their relations with the party ormas. The latter rule in fact worked directly in the ormas’ favor in that in an effort to circumvent its effects, the party subsequently urged affected members to join the ormas.\textsuperscript{102} Ormas efforts at resisting the intervention of conservative party leaders in their affairs was greatly aided by the DPP PNI decision in mid-August 1959 to free the ormas from all formal ties with the party.\textsuperscript{103}

These developments within the PNI came at a time when President Sukarno and the Army leadership were encouraging the growth of functional groups as alternative participatory institutions. More specifically, President Sukarno worked to increase the power of the PNI ormas because he was dissatisfied with the conservative party leadership. In return, ormas leaders worked actively to force a change in PNI policy. When the more conservative leaders in the DPP PNI flirted with the possibility of joining or at least assisting the \textit{Liga Demokrasi} in May, 1960, for example, ormas leaders such as A. M. Datuk (KBKI), Bambang Kusnohadi (GMNI), Hikmatullah (PDI) and Surachman (Petani) forced the vacillating Soewirjo into signing a statement condemning the \textit{Liga}.\textsuperscript{104} In the months before the PNI Ninth Congress, ormas leaders busied themselves with preparations for securing a change in the party leadership at the Congress. For this purpose, they prepared a pamphlet attacking the policies of the 1956 to 1960 PNI leadership to be distributed at the time of the Congress. This pamphlet, entitled \textit{Appeal Djuli 1960} but generally referred to as the \textit{Buku Merah} (Red Book)\textsuperscript{105} because of its red cover and because conservative leaders wanted to discredit it as being Communist inspired, continued

\textsuperscript{101} Hardi, “Kebulatan Organisasi Pangkal Kemenangan” \textit{Suluh Indonesia}, October 7, 1960. This article complained about the fact that the DPP PNI list was not followed for ormas representatives appointed by Sukarno; see also “Pendjelasan Mengenai Sikap Partai Terhadap Beberapa Peristiwa Aktual Ditanah Air Dewasa Ini,” dated April 20, 1960 mimeographed, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{102} Instruksi DPP No. 33/1959, dated November 7, 1959, mimeographed, 1 page.

\textsuperscript{103} Keputusan DPP No. 67/1959, August 19, 1959, mimeographed, 1 page.


\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Appeal Djuli 1960}, op. cit.
where the reform movement of Sarmidi and the Partindo left off, — but with a difference. In a sense the formation of the Partindo marked the end of one phase in the party reform movement. The Partindo leaders' criticism of the PNI and its leaders was not much different from those made for example by the GMNI and the PDI, but by forming a new party and more important, failing to draw sufficient support, Partindo leaders brought reform within the PNI to a dead end. The *Buku Merah* was important because with the *Liga Demokrasi* incident, it marked the first time that the leaders of the major PNI ormas (excluding the WDI) had gotten together to make their influence felt within the party.

The *Buku Merah* repeated the now familiar list of reasons for the decline in party fortunes that Sarmidi had first identified back in late 1956. It described particular instances of DPP miscalculation in the past four years. It faulted the DPP for not having followed up its formal support of Sukarno's *konsepsi* with concrete actions to build up revolutionary forces. It attacked the DPP for allowing relations with the President to deteriorate. It singled out Mr. Hardi for attack for having failed to support KBKI interests in the nationalized shipping firms, KPM and PELNI.

In contrast to Sarmidi and the Partindo leaders, the *Buku Merah* accompanied its criticism with concrete proposals for change. To reverse the liberalization in the interpretation of Marhaenisme, it proposed that President Sukarno's writings be formally adopted as sources of party ideology until such time as a new formulation could be prepared. It urged the inclusion of more ormas representatives in national and local leadership bodies of the party. Most important of all, it established criteria for the selection of new party leaders. It said that as a rule party leaders must be either from the peasant or from the working classes. Landlords and big businessmen (pedagang besar) must be excluded altogether from the party leadership. It said that though big businessmen who do not exploit their workers are still necessary in the pre-socialist phase of economic development, they must not be allowed to lead the party because there is a basic contradiction between their interests and life styles and the party's socialist goals.

Although the *Buku Merah* was never formally discussed, it was in fact one of the main issues at the Ninth PNI Congress in July 1960.

**The Ninth Party Congress**

In his opening speech on the first day of the Congress on July 25, 1960 in the city of Solo in Central Java, Soewirjo had the rather unpleasant task of having to review the disastrous events of the past four years. The overall tone of his speech was that of helpless frustration. The PNI, he said, had supported the Guided Democracy conception but with the

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understanding that "... the focus would be on democracy and not on guidance." He said that the formation of a non-party cabinet, the regulation prohibiting higher civil servants from being party members, the various cabinet decisions on local government and economic policy made without consulting parliament and finally the dissolution of parliament itself are all dangerous precedents that violate the 1945 Constitution. But beyond listing this litany of complaints, Soewirjo did not offer much else in his speech. He did not suggest any explanations of why these misfortunes had hit the PNI. Nor did he look for reasons or causes for the party's decline from within the party itself. And most important of all, he did not offer any ideas for new party strategies, for rebuilding from the disasters of the past.

The report of the Secretary-General, Manuaba was not much better.\textsuperscript{107} It had a clear tone of apology and self-justification. It rationalized the decline of the party in the past four years as being the result of "... events beyond our control," of "... limited resources available to the DPP." In order to assure the survival of the party, Manuaba said, the DPP had to make decisions on the basis of "practical considerations." If there is fault to be found in the past four years, the Congress should look for it, he said, not just in the DPP but also in the local party leadership, and in fact, in all the millions of party members!

The sessions of the Congress and the BPK meeting prior to it that discussed Soewirjo's speech and the Secretary-General's report were tense and long drawn out. Delegates from several party branches and national party leaders such as Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo bitterly criticized the DPP for capitulating to pressure from Sukarno and the Army. The DPP, they said, should have refused to participate in the DPR-GR; they should have organized opposition to the anti-party attack not only in Djakarta but also in the provinces.\textsuperscript{108} On the other side of the political spectrum, leftist party leaders and ormas representatives in the BPK, took up the issues raised by the Buku Merah.\textsuperscript{109} The DPP response given by Mr. Hardi took the now familiar line that the DPP had in fact resisted Army-Sukarno pressures but with events largely out of the party's control, the DPP had to make compromises necessary to assure the party's survival. If the DPP had been

\textsuperscript{107} Laporan Pimpinan Partai, mimeographed, 68 pages.
\textsuperscript{108} Risalah Lengkap Sidang BKP PNI, mimeographed, pp. 5-7; Risalah Lengkap Kongres KE IX PNI, Sidang Ke 1, pp. 5-6; Sidang Ke II, pp. 18-19; at the BPK meeting and the congress Iskaq reiterated the critique he had made in an analysis of the party situation that he made the preceding May in, Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo, "Pendirian Mr. Iskaq Terhadap Belled Dewan Pimpinan PNI Dalam Menghadapi Situasi Dewasa Ini," mimeographed. 13 pages, dated May 21, 1960.
\textsuperscript{109} Copies of the Buku Merah were given to a few DPP PNI members including Soewirjo and to a few branch delegates but before the bulk of them could be distributed, a decision was made, probably at the urging of Ali, that it should not be formally presented to the Congress. This was after the BPK meeting immediately preceding the Congress during which the major compromises on the new leadership and other Congress decisions had already been made. Interview with Karna Radjasa, a young PNI leader in Djakarta and Ali's son, Djakarta, January 13, 1969.
hard-headed, he said, "...we would not have been allowed to hold this BPK meeting or this Congress."

In the end, because most party leaders recognized that the kind of resistance Iskaq and others suggested was not really possible given the party's weakness, and on the other hand, because they were not willing to accept the drastic changes in party ideology and leadership called for in the *Buku Merah*, a compromise was reached on the major issues requiring the Congress' decision. The major components of this compromise were reached at the BPK meeting even before the Congress opened.

The most important item in the compromise was on the composition of the DPP. When the elections were held on the last day of the Congress, Ali Sastroamidjojo was nominated by nine provincial party committees, Soewirjo by two, and Dr. A. K. Gani by one. The results of the elections showed Ali with 721 votes, Soewirjo with 421 and Dr. Gani with 56. The elections for first and second deputy chairman and for treasurer were fairly tame. Soewirjo was elected First Deputy Chairman and Dr. Isa, Second Deputy Chairman with little opposition. S. Hadikusumo was chosen DPP treasurer by acclamation. The election for Secretary-General was hotly contested with Hardi (440 votes) winning over Sudiro (413 votes) by a mere 27 votes and Osa Maliki coming in a strong third with 346 votes.

The election of Ali was a crucial element in the compromise reached at the BPK meeting. Although Ali had been a close ally of the Sidik faction at the time of the first cabinet he headed in 1953, he had participated in the making of the decision to abandon Sidik's strategy when the PNI decided to work with the Masjumi in the Second Ali cabinet in 1956. His candidacy had been promoted by ormas leaders because they realized that they did not have enough influence in the party's local organizations to get one of them elected. With his record as a leader in the pre-war nationalist movement and as Prime Minister in two cabinets, Ali had just the right amount of responsibility and prominence to win the votes of party branch leaders. His absence from the country as Indonesia's ambassador to the UN from mid-1957 until early 1960 had insulated him from the conflicts within the party leadership during that time and of equal importance dissociated him from the failures of that leadership.

110 Risalah Lengkap Sidang BPK, op. cit., p. 6.
111 Because the nomination process like the actual voting was secret, it is impossible to determine exactly which provincial committees voted for who, but from interviews and analysis of the leadership of these provincial committees, the two who nominated Soewirjo were probably Central Java and East Java, South Sumatra for Dr. A. K. Gani and the rest for Ali.
112 In separate ballots, the results were, for First Deputy Chairman: Soewirjo, 1016 votes, Hardi, 52 votes, Dr. Isa, 29; for Second Deputy Chairman, Isa, 928, Hardi, 52. Risalah Lengkap Kongress Ke IX PNI, Sidang Ke III, pp. 39-40.
113 Ali was the only PNI leader who was praised in the Buku Merah, (p. 11). In the special issue of *Suara Marhaen* for the Congress, Vol. II, No. 40, 15 July 1960, articles by ormas leaders such as Surachman (Petani) and Soetarjo (GMNI) were similarly full of praise for Ali.
Ali had prepared well for his candidacy. He had secured the support of the ormas leaders by promising to change PNI policy and to implement party reform but he was also careful not to be too closely associated with their ideas that he would gain the enmity of party leaders who saw the young ormas leaders as disloyal upstarts. In the two months before the Congress, Ali went on an extensive tour of party branches all over the country to talk to local party leaders. At the BPK meeting and the early sessions of the Congress, he presented himself as a forward looking leader willing to face Guided Democracy and its new institutions with vigor, and implicitly, not with the tired, defeated and self-justificatory attitude of Soe-wirjo. Where Soe-wirjo and other leaders from the old DPP continued to warn against the dangers of Communism, Ali said that the PNI should not be afraid of the PKI. Instead the PNI should compete with the PKI for mass allegiance by improving the work of the PNI ormas. The PNI leadership should work to improve relations with the President, but the party can succeed in doing this, he said, only after Sukarno is convinced that the PNI on its own can regain its strength.

Ali's candidacy did not go unopposed. At a conference held two weeks before the Congress, the powerful Central Java Committee under Hadisoebeno's leadership decided to work for Soe-wirjo's reelection. But at the Congress itself, Hadisoebeno could not control the branches under his committee. A similar situation applied to the East Java PNI whose provincial leaders opposed Ali but many of whose branches defected to the Ali camp. In West Java, Ali had the support of Osa Maliki who managed to neutralize the influence of pro-Soe-wirjo leaders such as Wilopo and Subagio Reksodipoero. By picking up substantial numbers of votes in these three areas, plus the solid support of provincial committees such as Jogjakarta and

114 For reports on these trips, see Suluh Indonesia, May 20, 1960; June 20, 1960, June 30, 1960.
116 Hadisoebeno's position in the Central Java PNI had been weakened by the controversy over his candidacy for kepala daerah of the province. For this purpose, he had to resign his membership in the party in October 30, 1959. (“Penjeraahan Pimpinan DD PNI”. Letter from Hadisoebeno to Ketua II Indardjo, dated 31, October 1959). He was then replaced as Chairman of the Central Java PNI by Soetjipto. (Surat Pengesahan No. DP/110/Org/025/60, DPP PNI decision dated February 19, 1960, mimeographed, 1 page): When Hadisoebeno was not picked as Kepala daerah, party branches who supported him succeeded in bringing him back in as chairman at the Central Java PNI conference in July 9-10, 1960. This angered those branches who supported Soetjipto with the result that Central Java branches did not vote together at the Ninth Congress. Subsequent to the Congress, Soetjipto resigned from the DPD PNI Central Java. (Letter from Soetjipto to DPD PNI Central Java, dated August 26, 1960, typescript, 2 pages); on this whole controversy, see also Pemuda, November 14, 1959; Sin Min, November 3, 1959.
117 The East Java Provincial Committee was dominated at this time by conservative leaders such as Miarso and Sundoro SH. Interview with Karna Radjasa, January 13, 1969,
North Sumatra, Ali won a personal mandate which made his position in the new DPP quite powerful.

Apart from electing a new DPP, the Congress also approved substantial changes in party organization. The organizational changes made at the Eighth party Congress in 1956 which had given the provincial party committees substantial powers was reversed, with the new DPP now provided with powers to implement "guided democracy" within the party. Among the more important of these changes were: (1) At the 1956 Congress, the whole fifteen man DPP had been elected. Under the new rules, the formateur system used before 1956 was returned. The five men elected at the Congress were empowered to select fifteen other members for an enlarged twenty man DPP. The DPP was also empowered to add any number of other DPP members as it saw fit. (2) The 1956 to 1960 BPK was made up of the fifteen elected members of the DPP plus fifteen other men elected by the Congress, plus ten ormas representatives plus 42 representatives from the provincial party committees for a total of 82 members. Under the new rules, the BPK was to be made up of the twenty members of the DPP, plus ten ormas representatives, plus the provincial party committee representatives, plus twenty other members to be selected by the DPP. (3) The power of the three large Javanese provincial committees was cut down with the total number of votes for each branch at a Congress now limited to ten instead of the old fifteen and the smaller provincial party committees in the Outer Islands now given greater representation in the BPK. (4) The ormas were for the first time to have five representatives in the new 20 man DPP.

The return to a centralized allocation of powers was important to PNI development after 1960 because the pressures pushing the PNI towards the left were strongest in Djakarta, where among others, President Sukarno's influence was most strongly felt. It was also in Djakarta, in the national headquarters of the PNI ormas, where the most radical ormas leaders were. In the next few years, these leaders availed of the increased powers of PNI central bodies to push more conservative provincial organizations towards the left.

Among the other more important decisions of the Ninth PNI Congress were those that: (1) urged that there be no compromise with remaining PRRI-Permeesta rebels. This decision placed the PNI squarely on Sukarno's side in his conflict with national Army leaders who wanted to negotiate a settlement with rebel leaders. (2) urged the passage of a law on "simplification" of ormas and an increase in the minimum membership requirements for approved political parties. This last was directed partly at smaller parties such as the Partindo; (3) urged the formation of the MPRS and

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118 Interview with Ali Sastroamidjojo, Djakarta, January 10, 1969.
the implementation of the government’s promise that elections would be held by 1962; (4) formally invested Sukarno with the title Bapak Marhaenisme (Father of Marhaenism).

In his speech to the Congress, Sukarno seemed genuinely pleased with this title. In that speech, he urged the PNI not to have a phobia against Communism (Komunisto phobie). PNI leaders, he said, should pay attention to the similarities between Communism and Marhaenism while keeping differences in mind. He repeated his admonition that the PNI should be a party of the left and not of the middle.

The results of the Ninth PNI congress represented a substantial gain for leftist elements in the PNI leadership. By cooperating with other party leaders associated with the old Sidik faction such as H. Hadikusumo, and Ali, the young ormas leaders gained a foothold in the national party leadership. But the leftist coalition did not win total victory. With the election of Soewirjo as First Deputy Chairman and automatically chairman of the DPP organization department and Hardi in the key position of secretary-general, conservative elements continued to have powerful representatives at the topmost level of the party leadership. Although there was a surface image of unity in the new leadership, conflict between the two factions began right after the Congress when the five formateurs deliberated on the composition of the DPP Pleno (full DPP). Still smarting from the attacks on him made by the Buku Merah, Hardi concentrated on preventing the more radical leaders of the ormas from being included in the DPP. Thus although the KBKI nominated A. M. Datuk, Hardi succeeded in persuading the other formateurs to instead pick Kamil Prawirasona. With the exception of Bambang Kusnohadi, who represented the GMNI, the leaders of the Buku Merah group were passed over for the less radical ormas leaders. Because of conflicts among the five formateurs over ormas and other representatives, it was not until almost a month and a half after the Congress that the composition of the full DPP was announced.

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120 Ibid, pp. 34-35.
123 Gusti Gde Subamia was born in Tabanan, Bali on May 4, 1921. He worked in various places and in various positions in the government administration in Bali both before the war and during the occupation. Together with men such as Merta, he helped to organize the Partai Rakjat Indonesia in Bali in 1946. From 1947 until 1949 he was jailed by the Dutch. In 1949 he helped set up the Partai Gerakan Nasional Indonesia which merged with the PNI in 1950. In the early fifties he was active in the leadership of the PNI Bali and was also a member of the Bali Executive Council (DPD), and the Bali DPRD. In 1956 he became a member of parliament. He became deputy chairman of the PNI fraction in Parliament in 1959. Parlaungan, op. cit., pp. 100-110.
124 Steven Latulhamallo was born in Maluku in 1920. He finished schooling from MULO in Ambon then the Berdrifsambenaars Cursus PTT Bandung. He worked at various minor positions in the government both before the war and during the occupation. He was sekretaris daerah Maluku Tengah since 1952. He was also active in the PNI Maluku as secretary of the provincial PNI committee. In August 1960 he became a
The members of the new DPP were as follows:

**Chairman** — Ali Sastroamidjojo  
**First Deputy Chairman** — Suwirjo  
**Second Deputy Chairman** — M. Isa  
**Secretary-General** — Hardi  
**Treasurer** — S. Hadikusumo

member of parliament replacing Dudi Sumawidjaja. PNI Central Headquarters Files; also *Suluh Indonesia*, August 16, 1960.

Bambang Kusnohadi was born in Blora (East Java) on September 24, 1931. In the mid-fifties he was a student at the Airlangga University in Surabaja where he got a Sardjana Muda degree. He subsequently transferred to the Law Faculty of the University of Indonesia in Djakarta. He was elected Chairman of the GMNI in 1957 and chairman of the PPMI in 1960. Interview January 8, 1969.

Mursid Idris was born on January 4, 1913 in Balai Karangan, West Kalimantan. He finished schooling at the HIK Bandung in 1935. He worked as a teacher in various places through most of the Dutch and Occupation periods. In 1942 he was chairman of the Parindra branch in Bireun (Atjeh). He became a member of the PNI branch in Singkawang in 1952, then was appointed a member of the Party Council in 1954. In 1956 he was elected a member of the DPR. Parlaungan, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-73.

Gulmat Siregar grl. Tenggu Tuan OlwanPinanjung was born on February 7, 1913 in Nagaseribu-Fadang Bolak-Tapanuli Selatan Sumatra Utara. He graduated from Canisius College (RK AMS). He held various administrative positions during both the Dutch and the Occupation periods. In 1946 and 1947 he was kepala Djawatan Kemakmuran in Pakenbaru. In 1948 until 1950 he was vice chairman of the Sumatra Tengah legislative council in Bukittinggi. From 1950 to 1956 he was a member of the Sumatra Tengah Executive Council. He was made a member of the PNI National Party Council in 1954, he was First Deputy Chairman of the PNI Sumatra Tengah. In 1956 he became a member of the Konstituante. Kempen Files.

Selamat Ginting was born on April 23, 1923 in Kuta Bangun Kabupaten Karo, North Sumatra. He studied economics at a private university in Djakarta but did not receive a degree. He was a prominent guerrilla leader in North Sumatra during the Revolution. He was chairman of the PNI Tanah Karo branch in the early fifties then became chairman of the PNI North Sumatra in 1956. He also became a member of Parliament in 1956. *Suara Marhaen*, VI: 6, June 15, 1956, p. 17.

Njonja Sumari was born on July 9, 1913 in Brebes, (Central Java). She graduated from the Van Deventerschool in Semarang. In the pre-war period she worked as a teacher. She was active in the Indonesia Muda. During the Revolution she was chairman of the Perwari Branch in Brebes. In 1953 she was a member of the Central Java Provincial PNI Committee Leadership Council. She was elected a member of the national Parliament in 1956. Parlaungan, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-100.


Semanhadi Sastrowardjo was born in Pasuruan on May 14, 1917. He was educated in the Taman Siswa school system. Before the war he worked at the Topografische-Dienst, Samarinda. During the Japanese occupation he worked as reporter in Malang and Pasuruan. During the revolution he worked in the management of a government plantation in Pasuruan and in the Textile mill of the government. From 1950 to 1952 he was head of the Ministry of Information office in Pasuruan. From 1953 to 1956 he was a member of the Pasuruan DPD (Executive Council), after which he resigned to become a member of Parliament. He was active in the Indonesia Muda and later in the Gerindo. He was a Sarbupri leader during the Revolution and was later active in establishing both the KKBK and the Petani branches in Pasuruan. *Suara Marhaen*, VII-16-17, November 1, 1957, p. 17.

Drs. Zaini Mansur was born in Palembang in 1929. He received a Doctorandus degree from the Economics Faculty of the University of Indonesia in 1957. He founded the Pemuda Demokrat in Palembang in 1947, then became chairman of the Djakarta PDI in 1954 while he was student at the University of Indonesia. He was also active in the GMNI from 1954 to 1957. He was elected national chairman of the Pemuda Demokrat in 1960. PNI Central Headquarters files.

I unfortunately do not have biographical information on Kamil Prawiriasoma.
Members representing:

- Sulawesi — Manai Sophiaan
- Maluku — Steven Latuihamallo
- Nusatenggara — I. G. G. Subamia
- Kalimantan — Mursid Idris
- Djawa Timur — Moh. Isnaeni
- Djawa Tengah — Sarino Mangunpranoto
- Djawa Barat — Osa Maliki
- Sumatra Tengah — Gulmat Siregar
- Sumatra Utara — Selamat Ginting
- KBKI — Kamil Prawirasoma
- Petani — Semanhadi Sastrowidjojo
- WDI — Njonja Sumari
- PDI — Drs. Zaini Mansur
- GMNI — Bambang Kusnohadi

Although conservative elements led by the Secretary-General, Hardi, retained a foothold in the national leadership, on the whole the DPP was dominated by leftist, or at least, pro-Ali men. In the next couple of years, Ali and his allies worked to increase their hold over the party not only at the level of national leadership organs but also in the provinces. This was no easy task because provincial level party committees in particular, the powerful committees on Java, remained in the hands of conservatives. Furthermore, the number of cadres available to Ali and his allies remained distressingly small.

In his effort to bring the PNI in line with Sukarno’s Guided Democracy policies, Ali increasingly depended on the leaders of the PNI ormas. These men had been among the earliest supporters of Guided Democracy. But here again, much work needed to be done for the ormas remained relatively weak,— their provincial organizations were still greatly influenced by conservative party leaders, their trained organizers were few. The period from 1960 to 1963 was thus marked by the effort of Ali and his allies in the ormas to break out of this situation—to improve ormas organization, to replace conservative local party leaders, to train the cadres necessary for this task.