The role of ideology in the planning and executing of public policy can hardly be said to have been accorded serious treatment in the current literature of public administration. This is perhaps surprising in an age like the present when ideology has come to be widely accepted as an all-permeating social phenomenon. Indeed, in the arena of political life where power decisions are made affecting nearly all aspects of human existence, the impact of ideological forces should most obviously be appreciated and its presence should most easily be determined. In practice, however, ideology has commonly been treated as mere spiritual baggage which particular historical times inevitably carry with them rather than a force of its own, directly affecting and shaping the political and administrative development of a nation.

It is the purpose of this study to show that ideology plays, or can play, a more positive role in the conduct of public affairs than it is normally believed to play. It is submitted that the ideological factor in public decision making cannot be underrated, that ideology frequently makes all the difference in bringing about particular courses of administrative action. Indonesia in the early 19th century appears to be a good illustration of this proposed thesis. Thus, although the social
and economic conditions and problems during this period remained essentially unchanged, such conditions and problems, one shall see presently, came to be interpreted at different times, in ideologically different ways, and produced different sets of administrative measures on the part of the colonial authorities. The ideological variable must, then, be regarded as having profoundly affected the Indonesian situation.

More specifically, to trace the ideological variable in concrete situations, this paper focuses on the late 18th and the early 19th century colonial administration in Indonesia — then the East Indies, a period associated with the advent of liberalism. The major attempts during this period to implant liberal doctrines and practices on the Indonesian soil will be described and the impact of such attempts both on government administration and on Indonesians themselves will be critically assessed. Special attention will be paid to famous liberal reforms undertaken by Sir Stamford Raffles during the British interregnum in Indonesia in the early 1820's.

The Indonesian experience during this period appears to be particularly enlightening to students of doctrinaire thought. It reveals the ideological ethics on the part of early 19th century, public administrators with a great deal of clarity and openness. This should, then, allow the reader to make certain generalizations about the validity of the original thesis or to establish the hypothesized interplay of ideological thought and public administration. For the purpose of this study, "ideology" is meant to suggest a position that claims monopoly of truth with regard to the interpretation of social reality, however distorting of actual facts such interpretation may be.

*Colonial mercantilism and feudalism*

The pre-19th century period of the Dutch rule in Indonesia was essentially mercantilist and feudal in character, reflecting the forms of belief that were dominant in Western Europe, including the mother-country Holland, at that time. As far as the Dutch owners of the East Indian Company themselves perceived it, their Asian enterprise was strictly a trading venture. This was indeed reflected in the Company's organizational structure. Thus, all the European officers of the Company in East India below the Governor-General's position were ranked in accordance with their status as mercantile employees from Upper Merchants, Merchants, Junior Merchants to Book Keepers or Assistants, on the lowest level. The company's conception of sovereignty was a very limited conception. This was confined to the Company's own settlements, to a few territories under its direct ownership and to factories which it owned. As Kielstra has put it, "its the Company's polar star was profit and its lodestone greed." Only gradually and "inevitably", like the British in India, did the Company find itself drawn into the mainstream of Indonesian politics, becoming an arbi-
trator or "superpower" in Indonesia's political life. Still, even during the 18th century, its authority was formal rather than systematic, its position being akin to one of a paramount chief than an absolute ruler.

The Dutch rule did little to tamper with the prevailing "feudal" social arrangements and values. Its control over Java and other East Indian possessions was essentially indirect. The Dutch preferred to leave the native aristocrats or princes alone. This was done not out of deference for domestic sensibilities, but because this was judged to serve best Dutch commercial interest. In this way, they were absolved from the necessity of having to look after internal order and security of vast territories, which they, at any rate, were hardly in a position, particularly financially, to afford. The life of the ordinary people during this period was relatively unaffected by the presence of the Dutch. In short, Dutch penetration in Indonesia was rather limited in scope; it took place only in areas where Dutch mercantile interest would be more directly affected. Still, when a mercantile interest was at stake, such penetration was not always insignificant.

The implied acceptance of traditional feudal values by the Dutch was manifested not only in their policy of non-interference with the extant social and political arrangements, but, more positively, in their sharing in the native feudal economic game. Here, the immediate goal was to secure a sound source of revenue for the big merchants sitting in Amsterdam; the means was to utilize the prevailing feudal economic system. Specifically, the original source of profit from the Company's trading activity was increasingly replaced by revenue derived from feudal-like tributary arrangements. In Furnivall's words, "when the merchant adventurer became a merchant prince, trade gave way to tribute as the main source of revenue."

The quasi-feudal economic policy of the Dutch took the form of the so-called Forced Deliveries and Contingencies. The origin of these two was the treaties which the Dutch concluded, under duress, with various Indonesian rulers, their primary purpose being to provide for themselves a steady supply of provisions, particularly for exports, and to control production by preventing adverse competition, in effect, to create a national monopoly.

Under this policy, some sultans obliged themselves, for example, to deliver all the pepper cultivated in their territory at a fixed price per pound or to supply so many measures of rice annually at marked-up price. Or the regents in the Preanger region were expected to supply free of cost certain quantities of pepper, indigo and cotton yarn. In Furnivall's description, "In theory Forced Deliveries were trading contracts exceptionally favourable to the purchaser; payments in kind, made under compulsion, but nominally on an economic basis, tribute disguised as trade. Contingencies were tributes undisguised, except that the pay-
ments were made in kind and not in cash. In practice, however, there was no distinction between these two sources of revenue, which together formed the bulk of the Company's income.4

The new dependence of the Company on tributes in kind for its local necessities as well as foreign trading and the Company's insistence on a monopoly of trade made, of course, inevitable some form of more direct interference with economic activities in territories under its influence. This then resulted in a policy of regulation of production, involving both the encouragement of, and limitation on, production in the case of certain products. An example of this policy was the strict control exercised, as early as the seventeenth century, over the production of spices, a practice sometimes accompanied by the most ruthless methods of destruction of unwanted export products; and later, the control and encouragement of such products as teak, indigo, coffee and rice for meeting the Company's trading requirements. One of the characteristic features of this "policing" system was the Company's institution of overseers, colloquially known as coffee-sergeants.

The Indonesian archipelago was thus increasingly drawn into the net of the Dutch mercantile interest and native social and economic institutions were exploited to serve such interest. Based on the classical mercantile theory then dominant, a state economic monopoly was formed to provide a protective wall against potential competing economic interests, whether originating within or without the country. The Company's goal was simply to buy Indonesian products at the lowest possible price and then to sell them in Holland at the highest commercial figure which, because of its monopolistic position could involve a profit of an hundred percent or more. At the same time, the peasants in Indonesia were ordered, through their feudal chiefs, to produce certain required crops for the export market which they were allowed to sell only to the Company itself. Imports from overseas were scaled down to a minimum on the theory that they would represent an outflow of profit and, hence, the Company's loss.

The advent of liberalism

The French Revolution in the latter part of the 18th century shook the prevailing feudal and mercantile social order in Western Europe with subsequent reverberations in the Far East, including Indonesia. It also marked the ascendancy of a new set of ideas and principles, under the general name of liberalism, that came to dominate nineteenth century Western Europe and, later, many other parts of the world.

The new liberal ideas did much to reorient man's thought in a new direction, away from the dominant mercantile and feudal outlook and values. These
Ideas were based on a peculiar assumption about the nature of man, and social life. In brief, the liberal outlook was founded on the idea of the rational man who was an economic man. There was said to be a law underlying human conduct, parallel to the Newtonian physical laws, which states that man's actions are motivated by self-interest, and that such self-interest expresses itself in essentially economic terms. But, by self-interest, the classical liberals like Adam Smith did not really mean the selfish interest of individual men. Rather, they conceived of self-interest in terms of the social consequences of man's actions, man as acting essentially in an enlightened, reasonable manner. Viewed in such a way, self-interest was not conceived as socially harmful; on the contrary, it was conceived as having socially beneficial effects.

Believing that the division of labor is one of the natural and fundamental principles of social life, these early liberals saw different interests as expressing different dispositions and gifts of individual men. Hence, they contended, if every man freely pursues his natural gift, the best social results will be accomplished, the various human interests and gifts simply complementing one another. Adam Smith even optimistically predicted that a "natural harmony of self-interests" would follow, which presumably meant a perfectly rational and harmonious society. In a somewhat mystical way, he discerned, behind the unhindered pursuit of individual self-interest, the working of an "Invisible Hand"—Divine Providence which in the end was working for the good of all men.

From this psycho-philosophic argument, the classical liberal thinkers drew then a conclusion that was most favorable to capitalist development (as some people see it, giving a divine sanction to capitalism itself as a "natural", providential system), namely, that all government interference with the "natural" economic laws (of supply and demand) is harmful to man and that man is the best judge of his own self-interest. Thus, there should be optimal freedom, particularly in the economic sphere, and minimal government action. The less government, the better. At best, government is a useful or necessary evil, but an evil nevertheless.

More fully, the new liberal outlook had a profound impact on all areas of man's social existence. On the spiritual side, it involved the optimistic idea of human progress, of the basic rationality of man and the possibility of perfection of human society as a consequence of man's overcoming his current state of ignorance. On the political side, it involved the ideas of human liberty, the essential equality of man and of responsible government. Lastly, on the economic side, it involved the advocacy of unrestricted competition, free trade, removal of all protective barriers as well as non-interference by governments, particularly in the economic pursuits of man.

It was these new ideas that came to increasingly penetrate into Indonesia in the last decade of the 18th century and to assume considerable influence on
the shaping of administrative policies in the country in the early years of the 19th century. Such ideas, incidentally, were coming from all sides and were a consequence of many influences. Among such influences, perhaps, the most potent was the Revolution in France and the subsequent ascendancy of Bonapartism which hastened to destroy the traditional, social and political order in the European continent.

The introduction of liberal thought into the Dutch colonial establishment in East India did not, of course, mean ready or early acceptance of such thought by the ruling colonial classes. On the contrary, the new liberal ideas appear to have been generally unwelcomed both by traditional rulers and by the old-time Dutch administrators, who were just learning to gradually accommodate themselves to the new liberal mood. It is significant that liberal administrative reforms, when they finally did come, were introduced by new-comers or "outsiders" to the Indonesian political scene like Daendels and Raffles.

Van Hogendorp and early reformist thought

The need for taking a more radical step in the direction of administrative reforms in the East Indian colony was increasingly recognized, especially after Holland had been drawn into the French revolutionary alliance and later succumbed to Bonaparte's imperialist designs. The matter that, however, remained to be resolved was the form which a new, liberal and revolution inspired administration should take.

Two documents, both appearing in 1799, were to exert a considerable influence on the subsequent shaping of Dutch colonial policies. One of these documents — an undisguisedly liberal, if not revolutionary tract — came from the pen of Van Hogendorp, and was based on his experience as the governor of Java's northeastern coastal region. The other — a more cautious document — was a report prepared by the Committee for East Indian Affairs of the new Batavian Republic in Holland.

Van Hogendorp's report contained a violent condemnation of the native feudal absolutist practice (rather than of colonialism) as viewed from the new liberal position, and a proposed program of action that was to introduce a backward colonial country to the new liberal era. His anti-feudal sentiment is well worth recording, particularly some observations which were to affect Raffles in his later administrative policies and perceptions. These passages were later incorporated by Raffles in his History of Java.5
"The government [of Java] is in principle, a pure unmixed despotism; but there are customs of the country of which the people are very tenacious, and which the sovereign seldom invades. His subjects have no rights of liberty of person or property: his breath can raise the humblest individual from the dust to the highest distinction... There is no hereditary rank, nothing to oppose his will." (p. 267)

"... every chief, of whatever rank, has an almost absolute power over those below him. The only exception to this, and the only part of the Javan constitution which wears the appearance of liberty, is the mode of appointing the heads of villages; these are elected by the people." (p. 269)

"The first principles of the feudal system, which form the basis of the whole edifice, are: that the land is the property of the sovereign; that the inhabitants are his slaves; and can therefore possess no property, all that they have and all that they obtain belonging to the sovereign... and that the will of the prince is the supreme law." (p. 270)

"These Regents, although very proud, are, with very few exceptions, ignorant and idle persons, who give themselves little concern about their lands and their people; of whom, indeed, they frequently know nothing, but only endeavor to squeeze and extort from them as much as possible... to satisfy the cupidity of government and of their immediate superiors."(p. 272).

Van Hogendorp's administrative proposals were intended to inject a new life both into colonial administration and colonial economy. His remedy to the existing ills in running the colony was the orthodox remedy of the classical liberal school, consisting of the trinity of self interest, private property and free competition. All these, according to Van Hogendorp, were to be encouraged for the ultimate advancement of the welfare of all Indonesians. More specifically, Van Hogendorp's proposals were comprised mainly of five principles of social-administrative reform: property in land, freedom of person, freedom of trade, abolition of forced and personal services and an impartial, and, as far as possible, an inexpensive administration of justice.6

It is significant that Van Hogendorp rejected the argument of certain traditionalists or conservatives like Nederburgh against the grant of liberty to the native population. For Nederburgh, the people of Java could never progress on their own "because of their laziness which makes them unfit for any labor except for that which is needed to produce the most necessary foodstuffs."7 It was Van Hogendorp's contention that the Indonesians were not totally different from the European stock, presumably having identical motivation, namely, self-interest. If only properly stimulated, such motivation could well act as a spur to industry and general development among them.

The report of the Committee, although also liberal in leanings, was a much more sober document, in the sense that it did not lose sight of the basic political realities. Thus, the Committee, while paying compliment to the liberal virtue of liberty, on the one hand, took a rather conservative stand, on the other. It is obvious that as far as the new bourgeois masters in Holland were concerned, the principle of universal liberty was not to be permitted to endanger their self-interest. In ef-
fect, as Vlekke has pointed out, “a complete break in the development of political institutions in the Indies was prohibited.”8 The administration was to remain firmly in the hands of the old, now “reformed”, administrative establishment and the colonial minority in Indonesia had little reason to fear that the “revolutionary” government in the mother country would substantially alter their traditional economic colonial practice.9 So much was made clear in the following portion of the mentioned report:

“We persist in the opinion we have always held that the doctrines of liberty and equality... cannot be transferred to nor applied to the East Indian possessions of the State as long as the security of these possessions depends on the existing and necessary subordination of the Indonesians and as long as the introduction can not take place without exposing these possessions to a confusion the effect of which can not be imagined.”10

The delicate liberal problem concerning the abolition of slavery was treated with similar caution and ultimate inaction. Thus, while the Committee expressed its compassion for “the miserable fate of the slaves, men and women, born free like us and the rest of mankind,” it declared, at the same time, that the abolition of slavery would have to wait “until a higher order of general civilization will permit the amelioration of their fate under the cooperation of all European nations that have overseas possession.”11

**Daendels**

Despite the official takeover of the defunct East India Company by the state on the first day of the 19th century and a bagful of pious “revolutionary” intentions by the new republic regime in Holland for the overseas possession in the East, things in East India itself remained essentially unaltered. The old-time policy of exclusive monopoly at home and vigorous trading abroad were still regarded as the lifeblood of Dutch Asian colonial interest. A first deliberate attempt to change the cozy status quo in the direction of the new liberal, or at least Bonapartist, thinking took place only after the arrival in Java, in 1808, of a new Governor-General by the name of Herman Willem Daendels.

Daendels, a military man with an iron will, harbored no opposition and was determined to turn the Eastern possessions in his charge into an orderly and efficiently run realm. Known as the “Thundering Marshall”, Daendels is said to have started as a revolutionary, democratic patriot in his younger years and ended up as a law and order man of the Bonapartist kind, being, in fact, a general in Bonaparte’s army. For him, for his French master and model, national power and interest were the primary concerns of government to which liberty, however, precious, must then be subordinated. Furnished with extensive extraordinary powers
and separated from the Dutch homeland not only by great distance, but also by the British blockade, Daendels established himself as a virtual dictator in Dutch Indian possessions. Like Bonaparte, he displayed an obsession for a "rational" government or efficiently functioning public administration. Accordingly, soon after his arrival, he set out to introduce certain reforms which were intended to alter radically the traditional social and political arrangements in the country.

Daendels' first concern was to centralize and streamline government administration in accordance with the Napoleonic concepts of a highly centralized government introduced in Bonaparte's France. This was then accompanied by a corresponding reduction of the power of traditional rulers. His reforms in the direction of governmental centralization involved such measures as the extension of the real power of the governor-general, uniting all kinds of powers—political, administrative, financial and military—in his sole hands. Following also the French pattern of administrative division, he then divided the country into five prefectures and thirty-eight regencies and instituted a military ranking for all government officials. Regulations were also scrupulously defined for native government officials, their duties and powers being specified. These, incidentally, were to be appointed by the Dutch colonial authority as low as the village headman level. To eliminate inefficiency and corruption, he then instituted a new system of government salaries at a fixed and adequate rate as well as a new career promotion system.

Daendels' curtailment of the traditional rulers' powers was drastic in intent, if not in execution. It involved the effective reduction of power and prestige of the native rulers from their former semi-autonomous status to mere "servants of the king" or government. They were to be provided with a rank of lieutenant-colonel in a Dutch-Napoleonic bureaucracy and were to be fully subordinated to the prefect whose orders they were to carry out "without the slightest variation," but in their own fashion, which presumably allowed them to remain" at the head of [public] affairs. As Clive Day has described it, "They were to stand no longer in the relation of contract with the government but subject to it." At the same time, the authority of colonial officials was to be enhanced at the rulers' expense to make it "conformable with the dignity and conducive to the interests" of the state, and, perhaps to assert Daendels' basic republican sentiment, by increasing outward or symbolic trappings associated with their position. From now on, the residents were to be called ministers and would assume the symbols of royalty, such as the right to carry the golden parasol and to leave their heads uncovered in the presence of the native princes.

Another reform initiated by Daendels was the reform of judiciary adminis-
tration. The principal feature of this reform was the principle of separating
courts for different uses, which became part of the subsequent East Indian Legal
system. Another reform concerned the fiscal policy or administration of the
government. At first, Daendels was playing with the radical ideas of fiscal reforms
along Van Hogendorp's line, such as the introduction of a land tax of one-fifth
of the gross produce. However, he had to abandon such ideas for practical reasons.
With nearly all overseas trading cut off by the British blockade, profit dwindling
to virtual zero, the treasury empty and a considerable army and administrative
apparatus to maintain, he was hardly in a position to institute such major fiscal
reforms. For the same reason, he was compelled to fall back on the traditional
sources of revenue, forced deliveries and forced labor, claiming that "until the
Javanese has made further progress toward civilization... his work under compul-
sion must take the place of regular taxes."^ To raise the necessary revenue, Daen-
dels even resorted to the expediency of selling, on a large scale, "government
domains" to the highest bidder, including European planters.

Viewed from an ideological perspective, Daendels' reforming policies,
however radical, were vastly short of Van Hogendorp's liberal program and were
probably more destructive than constructive in character. In other words, Daen-
dels was more successful in damaging the prevailing social system than in provid-
ing a viable liberal alternative. Still, it seems that much of the later, more self-
conscious liberal ethos which is usually associated with the governorship of
Stamford Raffles owes a great deal to Daendels' original reformist zeal. As Fur-
nivall has expressed it, "Perhaps... it was his [Raffles] chief good fortune that
Daendels has already, blazed a track along the path of reform; as Raffles himself
recognized, a much more regular, active, pure and efficient administration was
established by Marshall Daendels than ever existed before."16

Viewed from the perspective of their effect on the native population,
Daendels' policies brought about a revival of the old mercantile methods of
exploitation as well as the beginning of a new hostility incurred by Daendels' insensitivity, if not ruthlessness, in his treatment of Javanese aristocrats. Still, in practice, his reforms did perhaps less harm than our written record indicates, for,
to a large extent, they were but paper reforms, not seeing the day of actual real-
ization.17 This was due to lack of time and to the unsettled conditions then, with Java suffering the fate of a virtual military siege of what remained of the
former mighty Dutch Eastern possessions. Daendels' governorship, a relatively short
term, lasted until 1811, and could not have been a happy experience in the
annals of Indonesia's social and political life.

*Stamford Raffles, the catalyzing agent toward liberalism*

Compared with the measured liberalism of his liberal-minded predecessors
and contemporaries in Indonesia — with the sole possible exception of Van Hogendorp — the liberalism of Raffles, who became the new Governor General during the British interregnum in Indonesia, appears to be a near reckless and a highly ideologically committed affair. For Raffles, mercantilism and feudalism were, on the whole, evil systems. The rightness of the liberal cause was assumed by him to be indubitable, and so logically unassailable.

In his person, Raffles personified the temper of the classical liberal age, when man's rationality, self-interest and economic forces of supply and demand were considered the supreme arbiters of human progress. Raffles was essentially a self-made man, a non-aristocrat, who believed that human initiative combined with liberty could lead the enterprising man to achieve recognition and mankind toward the exciting path of human progress. Living under the spell of humanitarian and liberty-loving 18th century French and English philosophers, he followed their path in seeking to liberate man from what he considered the prevailing state of human ignorance and superstition and in working for the abolition of human slavery, confident that a world of human perfection on earth was within man's power to attain.

Raffles commenced his public career at the close of the famous parliamentary trial of Warren Hastings, an event, as Bastin has noted, which was not only the high water mark of the state's intervention in Indian affairs, but which also made the British nation familiar with the doctrine of the trusteeship of government. At this early stage of Raffles' career, he was also fortunate enough to acquire Lord Minto, a leading Whig politician and Governor-General of India at that time, as his mentor and protector in the turbulent arena of British colonial political life. All these early experiences must have made a decisive impression on the highly perceptive and intelligent Raffles. This, perhaps, explains his natural humanitarian and liberal inclinations.

As a one-time Governor-General of Indonesia, Raffles can perhaps be regarded as the catalyzing agent who turned the Indonesian polity in the direction of Western liberalism. As such, he, perhaps, merits a place in Indonesian history as a great innovator and a propagator of liberalism. Raffles was, of course, not alone in this respect, for, history shows that he had been preceded by others, like Van Hogendorp, or Daendels, in his fashion, as well as inspired by Minto and ably supported by certain sympathetic Dutch administrators like Muntighe. Still, even the Dutch scholars, who often regard Raffles' role in modern Indonesian history to be vastly overestimated and Daendels' role underestimated, do not deny Raffles' great contribution, particularly in public administration. Perhaps the most balanced assessment of Raffles' contribution as an innovator in the modern Indonesian political and administrative scene was presented by Furnivall. While acknowledging the crucial influence on Raffles by other earlier liberal thinkers and administrators like Lord Minto and Van Hogendorp (which,
incidentally, Raffles himself freely acknowledged), Furnivall insists that "These considerations... while explaining Raffles' achievement detract nothing from his greatness; it was one element of his [Raffles'] greatness that he could grasp his position, recognize his opportunity and seize it."20

Raffles' liberalism

Raffles' liberalism affected many aspects of Indonesian colonial society. In the first place, the object of his liberalism-inspired wrath was the monopolistic and feudal systems which he condemned for humanitarian reasons as being productively wasteful. Not mincing words about the evil of such systems, he wrote: "Of monopoly may be said as of slavery, that it is twice cursed, that its effects are not less ruinous to those who impose it than to those who are subject to it... Commerce, like Liberty, is a jealous power and refuses her blessing to all who restrain her course."21

For Raffles, monopoly, with its forced delivery and service system, has a dehumanizing effect on the human personality, for it is based on the repression of man's liberty by preventing man to pursue his self-interest. It is also an economically wasteful and expensive system not only because it discourages man's own productive efforts, but also tends to add greatly to the cost of production in many respects. In Raffles' words, "the revenue of the state must... suffer by the number of the intermediate hands through whom it is collected, by the expense of subordinate officers in charge of the produce, by wastage of the produce itself and by the irregularities and temptations to which the system gives rise."22

To highlight the exploitative character of this oppressive system, Raffles drew a careful distinction between "the privileged classes on the one side," among whom he discovered only "violence, deceit and gross sensuality" and "the mass of the people", whom he identified with "all that is simple, natural and ingenuous."23 Elsewhere, Raffles quoted with apparent approval the liberal findings of a Dutch commissioner who condemned, in 1812, "all the vexations and oppressions which fall to the lot of the common people" (meaning the various feudal duties and exactions) and who expressed the quasi-revolutionary sentiment that "It is therefore more than time and highly necessary, that an end be put to this monstrous system of government. [Adding that] Humanity looks forward with pleasure to this step... the change that must be entire and radical."24 Here, Raffles appears to have had in mind the liberal principle of fundamental law binding the government and the subjects, which makes its imperative for the government to always act for the welfare of the people. By their exploitative policies, the Javan aristocrats apparently failed to perform their duty as the governing element, acting selfishly and disregarding the true interests of the Indonesian common man.
Raffles' own formula for bringing Indonesia on the path of social sanity and prosperity was the familiar formula of the liberal economy consisting of free trade, personal initiative, private property and other like virtues. In his own words, greater welfare of the people was to be achieved by introducing "an improved system of political economy throughout the Island, with the intention of ameliorating the condition of all its inhabitants, by affording that protection to individual industry, which will ensure to every class of society the equitable and undisturbed enjoyment of the fruits of labour." Here his model was the British practice in India. As he saw it, through his ideology-tinted glasses, the Indian peasant was a free man, who owned or leased his land, grew what crops he liked, was able to sell in an open market at prevailing prices and could appeal to properly constituted courts for remedy in case of unjust treatment. He was not compelled to do forced labor. His taxes were fair and collected directly by government officials. A salaried bureaucracy was then part of the system to see to it that every man's interest was fairly treated. Thus did Raffles envisage a system for the future of the Indonesian society.

Raffles was hopeful that the desired transformation of Indonesian would take place under the aegis of the British lion. He felt strongly that the British sense of justice and compassion was an asset that would help greatly to bring the country into the fold of liberal and organized nations. But other, more prudential, considerations were not absent from his thought altogether. He was also convinced that British rule in Indonesia would be best for Britain's long-term commercial interest as well; hence his relentless zeal in pursuing his liberal program, despite the uncertainty of Indonesia remaining in British hands for long.

It may also be added that Raffles' liberalism was essentially a moral affair, inspired by a sense of injustice and the urge to have rightness prevail. He viewed man's enlightenment, in the liberal sense, as the ultimate goal to strive for; and, in this regard, civilized nations should give a hand to the uncivilized man to bring him out of the age of darkness and barbarity. As he grandly put it, "it would have been unworthy of the British character to have remained quiet spectators to abuses, and to have admitted the continuance of feudal barbarism;" further adding that his liberalist goal is "to release several millions of my fellow creatures from a state of bondage and arbitrary oppression." It is evident that for Raffles, unlike the many so-called liberal administrators of the period, the interest of the colony was not merely to exist for the benefit of the mother country because what was at stake was humanity itself.

Indonesians, like other subject peoples, that is, should be governed for their own prosperity and should be allowed to share the universal fruits of liberty and of responsible government. Viewed from this perspective, the British presence in Indonesia was regarded by Raffles in terms of a moral duty to be discharged or
in the nature of civilizing mission. Indeed, this was perhaps one of the earliest attempts to put in practice the Kiplingesque principle of the “White’s Man’s Burden” in the British Southeast Asian dependencies.\footnote{31}

**Raffles’ administrative reforms**

Raffles’ vision of a new liberal society for Indonesia could not have materialized without a program of radical reforms in the structure of the prevailing social and political institutions. This realization led Raffles to embark on a number of ambitious reforms that were of far-reaching importance. Among these, one of greatest importance was his reforms of the government administrative apparatus.

Raffles’ administrative reforms followed roughly the course of Marshall Daendels, aiming to “rationalize” or “bureaucratize” the machinery of the state so as to increase its efficiency and its reliability. As with Daendels, this involved abolishing traditional centers of social authority or integrating such centers into the bureaucratic apparatus of the state. The number of regencies was increased and the new term “resident” was substituted for the former “prefect”. But the most important feature of the new system was the radical reduction of the regents’ actual power. This was in keeping with Raffles’ general distaste for the aristocratic class which he considered oppressive, socially unproductive and even wasteful. Under the new arrangement, regents were merely government district officials in charge of policing (i.e., law and order maintenance) functions. They were also excluded from other important functions, such as the lucrative revenue collection. Thus they became in effect, agents of government interest, mere servants to the king. This devaluation of the aristocrats was then justified by Raffles by the absence of a hereditary aristocracy in Indonesian culture. As the liberal findings of the MacKenzie Commissioners, in 1812, indicated, the native aristocrats neither had proprietary rights to their lands nor hereditary privileges in their offices.\footnote{30}

Another significant aspect of Raffles’ administrative reforms was the granting of certain administrative powers to village headmen, particularly in matters of revenue policy. Under the new administration, the village was to be treated as the basic social unit, and a direct contact between the government and the village was to be established by way of the village chiefs. In this way, the authority of the aristocrats was further undermined, and the whole government structure was democratized. Raffles justification here was the alleged native tradition of popular elections of village headmen. This allowed him to think of the new administrative arrangements as being truly reflective of the real interest of the Indonesian people. He perceived his hierarchy of government as operating from the bottom upward, as opposed to the previous Dutch administration which
functioned from the top downward and was clearly autocratic and illiberal. All in all, Raffles' administrative reforms, as Vlekke contends, tended to substitute a European for an Asian form of administration.\textsuperscript{31} Although Vlekke's contention may well be contested, the novelty of Raffles' administrative scheme must clearly be recognized.

\textit{Raffles' revenue policy}

Raffles' other great reform took place in the area of state revenue. Raffles was aware that the final proof of the success of his Indonesian liberal experiment was the financial viability of the colony under his administration. At the least, the country should prove itself to be financially self-supporting. The colony's revenue was also of considerable personal importance to Raffles, for he hoped that, with the country's economic prosperity, the anticipated transfer of Indonesia to the Dutch could well be delayed, if not abandoned altogether. It was this ambition to succeed combined with his firm belief in the soundness of liberal fiscal remedies that made Raffles take considerable risks and to radically alter the prevailing revenue system, a step which has rightly been described by Vlekke as "a leap into the dark."\textsuperscript{32}

The core of Raffles' revenue system was a modern type of land-tax on all land cultivators. This tax was intended to replace all traditional duties and tributes, including corvée labor. In addition, there was to be a capitation tax imposed on non-cultivators. The various inter-regional taxes were then to be abolished to open the way to unrestricted commerce. The all-inclusive land tax was considerably lower than the traditional obligations combined; it was equivalent to about two-thirds of the annual gross rice produce of the soil. Its actual amount depended, however, on the fertility of the soil, which was to be surveyed and classified for the purpose of collection. A significant feature of this system was that the tax was to be collected in cash or alternatively in kind (rice only), at comparable value and at a price fixed by the government.

In Raffles' opinion, this method of taxation would be most beneficial both to the people and the government treasury. As he conceived it, this would act as an incentive for the individual farmer to increase his production, for over the amount payable in tax, he could augment his output for sale and earn more profit for himself. With the available cash and the increased circulation of money, commerce should then be stimulated to bring about the general welfare of the colony. It is obvious that Raffles did not subscribe to the belief of the conservative party in the inherent laziness of the natives. Like a true liberal, he believed that universal self-interest is the most potent spur to human welfare.
Raffles' scheme of public revenue went, however, even beyond the aspects of tax collection and cash economy. Raffles clearly perceived a relationship between economic incentives and the institution of property. His financial scheme involved not merely the freedom of cultivating and trading, but also the encouragement of independent farmers, securely established in the possession of lands which would actually belong to them. It was his contention that a class of healthy farmers because of insecurity of property tenure, was largely wanting in Indonesia. "Situated as the Javanese peasantry are," he wrote for instance, "there is but little inducement to invest capital in agriculture, and much labour must be unprofitably wasted; as property is insecure, there can be no desire for accumulation."33 Accordingly, the next step he proposed was to open the way to private ownership of land. This step was then officially taken by the declaration that all lands are a public patrimony. Raffles justified this measure by references to the traditional Javan practice of unlimited sovereignty to the rulers and by drawing a parallel between Javan and Indian native cultural values. Thus, native traditions were conveniently invoked to give a moral sanction to this so eminently liberal measure.

As Raffles' administration progressed, ideological considerations appear to have increasingly become of greater importance. Thus, the original scheme which involved an intermediate system of village settlements was soon abandoned as giving excessive power to village chiefs, as lending itself to corruption and, therefore, as being contrary to the liberal principle of good government. In its place, Raffles promulgated a policy of direct individual settlements.34 He was convinced that a policy which entails the ideas of proceeding "at once to the root" and of establishing a direct "connection with the peasantry."35 was absolutely necessary if his liberal program of private ownership was to be meaningfully accomplished.

Raffles' revenue policy may be said to be original at least in three principal aspects. The first is the absence of the aristocrats or regents, who were excluded from managing the financial affairs of the state and who were treated, in matters of land, like all other prospective landowners. The second is the idea of a direct contact between the peasants and the government in matters pertaining to taxation and land property. As Day has put it, "It was the adoption by Raffles of this principle of direct contact with the individuals among the people, without the intervention of more or less independent native officials, which stamped his policy as original and marked him out as the leader in the new school of colonial governors."36 The third innovative aspect of Raffles' scheme was its overall dynamic character. As Furnivall has pointed out, Raffles' scheme was unlike both in substance and in method37 to say, Van Hogendorp's superficial although similar scheme. Van Hogendorp's aim was to increase the revenue of the state so as to augment the power of the state. He also proposed to collect his taxes in kind. Raffles' aim, on the other hand, was to encourage trade, not the power of the state \textit{per se}. He was also anxious to introduce the use of money; hence, he insisted
on the payment of taxes in cash. Thus, Van Hogendorp's policies appear still essentially protectionist in spirit, while Raffles' appear expansionist and dynamic from the economic point of view. Like a true liberal, Raffles conceived a money economy as the key both to the economic and, ultimately, social success of the Indonesian society. 38

_Raffles' other liberal policies_

At least three other policies can perhaps be cited among Raffles' memorable liberalist experiments. The first was Raffles' policy to liberate overseas trade. This was in addition to the liberation of domestic trading. This policy entailed the characteristically liberalist idea of open-door policy in economic matters, abandoning national monopolistic practice and encouraging the pursuit of free competition in the international economic market. Dutch monopoly in Indonesia was abolished and other countries were permitted to do their trading in Indonesian ports, to invest and establish factories, and, in general, to carry on business activities on equal footing with the dominant colonial power.

The other two policies reflected the typical liberalist humanitarian sentiment. The first of these involved the traditional preoccupation with personal justice. This manifested itself in the overhauling of the entire colonial system of justice. Here, the aim was to expedite the procedures of justice as well as to eradicate certain barbaric customs, such as tortures or mutilations (e.g., chopping off fingers or a foot as a penalty). The British jury system was adopted, at least, in matters of criminal jurisdiction.

The third policy concerned the traditional liberalist obsession with human enslavement. Raffles, following the anti-slavery crusade of Bishop Wilberforce in England, aimed at the complete emancipation of all enslaved creatures. Despite Raffles' enthusiasm for the liberation scheme, the policy was, however, shelved on orders from higher quarters who, although not unsympathetic, advised a gradual approach and caution.

_Criticism of Raffles' native reforms_

Raffles' vision of a liberal and prosperous Indonesia was indeed a remarkable conception with important implications on the social and political life of the native population. Raffles' reforms effectively led to the abandonment of the Dutch practice of indirect rule of the natives and challenged the dominant feudal and mercantilist social arrangements. The impact of these reforms could have been revolutionary, had they really worked out in the way they were intended to work. The practice did not follow, however, the theory, as so often is the case with reforms. In sum, although Raffles attempted to convince the world that his liberal
experiment in Indonesia was a considerable success, particularly on the govern­
ment revenue side, in retrospect, his reforms appear to have been highly inade­
quate in execution, unworkable in practice and, on the whole, harmful to the in­
terest of the native population.

Raffles' land-tax system is a good example of the inadequacy of his whole liberal­
ism-insp.ired revenue scheme. One of the weaknesses of the system was, for example, the lack of a proper administrative apparatus to deal with revenue collection, particularly in cash. Another was the absence of an adequate and survey to classify the land. For lack of time, this highly technical task was frequently entrusted to village headmen who would, of course, tend to manipulate the revenue scheme to the advantage of their own. In this way, according to Bastin, "all the salutary regulations of the Government have at once been frustrated." The effectiveness of this system was further frustrated by the absence of uniform application. Thus certain regions were exempted, and even worse, because of the desperate need of revenue, Raffles, like Daendels before him would periodically allow the practice of alienating government land with villages on it, so in effect, re-introducing feudalism through the backdoor.

The system has also been assailed as failing to attain socially salutary results, which Raffles optimistically trusted they would. In the first place, the new method of taxation did not make much psychological difference to the peasant. It simply meant paying a high tribute to someone other than the old authority, this time, a more impersonal and, perhaps, a harsher one. Secondly, this method did not provide the intended incentive value, for the new burden was, in a way, harder to meet than the old feudal obligation. While under the new scheme the peasant paid only in terms of money or rice; under the old system, there had been more flexibility, for he could diversify his obligations. Thirdly, there was little incentive to sell for free market. Prices were low then and the main profit went to the middle man. This made it unprofitable for the peasant to extend his effort beyond the normal family needs (plus tax). Finally, as tax payments were fixed, the peasant could not always meet his obligations, for reasons of poor harvest or other personal emergencies. More often than not, he had to borrow, usually from a money lender or a middle man. So, in many instances, he was forced to fall into the hands of the middle men, frequently losing his land and becoming land­less. Hence, the peasant was placed in the position of a man who is given freedom, but is deprived of the chance to enjoy it.

Raffles' "land reform", scheme, aimed at creating private land ownership, has also been subject to vehement criticism. It has been assailed as pre-mature, ill-prepared, ill-organized and, ultimately, unrealistic under the prevailing circumstances. By the mere stroke of a bureaucratic pen, so to speak, the enthusiastic and ideology-fired Raffles wanted to introduce the Western concept of private ownership, disregarding centuries-old traditions and practice. This, moreover, was effected in the absence of an adequate technical staff, the implementation of the
scheme being left to village headmen who were expected to keep records and issue receipts. Unfortunately for Raffles' "land reform," practically no farmer, including the headmen, could read and write! Hence, such an elaborate scheme as this could hardly succeed with the limited resources at Raffles' disposal. There is, then, much justification in Day's ironic remark that "The individual settlement existed only in name," but not in fact.

Raffles' scheme has also been found vulnerable in the area of administrative-bureaucratic reforms. Some of its features, like the jury system, patterned on the English practice, proved unworkable in practice. Other reforms, aimed at a more rationalized and democratized administration, had to be modified under the subsequent Dutch administration. Thus, by his "devolution" of authority, Raffles, it seems, did not make his administrative apparatus stronger and more responsive to the people, as he had intended, but only succeeded in making it relatively weaker and less effective. He only weakened the old bureaucratic apparatus based on the aristocracy without, at the same time, strengthening the local administrative authority. Local headmen were simply not a convincing alternative as the link between the people and the state. Another undesirable effect of Raffles' scheme was that the headmen, by their close identification with governmental authority, now appear to have lost much of the respect traditionally accorded to them by the villagers.

Criticism of Raffles' native reforms should not, however, be allowed to overshadow those aspects of his reforms that proved to be truly valuable and of enduring significance in the conduct of public administration in Indonesia. Granted that Raffles' original claim that his policies would free Indonesians from the "sway of their chiefs" can hardly be substantiated, still many of Raffles' reforms appear to have been vindicated by their results. It is, for instance, significant that most of Raffles' reforms were taken over by subsequent Dutch administrators, particularly in the administrative and judicial systems. Even his system of revenue administration remained relatively unchanged and, eventually, it was vindicated by the subsequent increase in the yield of land revenue, which, as Furnivall has wisely remarked, "showed that the expectations which Raffles had based on it were not wrong, but merely too optimistic."

At any rate, Raffles, reforms were not allowed sufficient time to be implemented during Raffles' period of governorship. Hence, Raffles' lasting achievement was, perhaps, not his scheme of reforms as such, but the novelty of his approach to government administration. He is said to have made a new start in colonial administration, discarding the old ideologies or attitudes. As Vlekke has put it, "the British interlude in Java's history had cleared away a great deal of the old dust gathered in the days of the Dutch Company, and Raffles was the man who had opened windows and doors so that the wind could blow through the old house." For the present purpose, it is significant to note that the instrument by which Raffles proposed to change the future of colonial Indonesia was essentially
ideological, a liberal formula for universal human prosperity.

**Ideology, its reality and impact**

This brief review of the early period of liberalism in Indonesian history indicates a high level of ideological commitment on the part of those who were responsible for the administration of the country; and, from this period to the present, ideological considerations appear to be everpresent throughout the entire course of modern Indonesian history.

In the early 19th century, Indonesia tended to ideologically follow a liberal course; however, she reversed her thinking in the 1830's, in favor of the more "traditional", more "conservative" conceptions, reminiscent of the former feudal and protectionist, pre-liberal age. This new mood in the administration of colonial Indonesia was simply reflective of a similar trend in European Holland and was associated with the policies of the Dutch Governor-General Van den Bosch. It is usually referred to as the "Culture System". In the 1870's, the ideological pendulum swung, again, in the liberal direction, when High Liberalism or liberalism marked by strong imperialist interests became dominant in the advanced countries of Western Europe. Its colonial variety, the "Plantation System," took over as the leading system in the late 19th century Dutch administration in Indonesia. The so-called "Ethical Policy" of the early 20th century was another ideologically-colored trend in the Dutch colonial administration, this time leaning toward a more humanitarian direction. The most popular ideological line ever maintained in the history of modern Indonesia, however, prevailed during Indonesia's post-independence era. This ideological line, which was associated with the "Guided Democracy" of President Sukarno, assumed a highly anti-imperialist and intensely nationalist form.

The consistency with which prevalent ideological doctrines continually shaped events in Indonesian modern history should allow one to make certain generalizations about the relationship between ideology and public administration or administrators, particularly during the era covered in the present study, and to assess the validity of the original thesis, that ideology plays, or can play, a more positive role in the conduct of public affairs.

The first generalization that the present study suggests is that the ideological factor is more than mere rhetorical appendage used by politicians or social reformers to justify or embellish their actions in political life. Ideology appears to exert a genuine influence and can be a potent political force in its own right, for it tends to turn the minds of its advocates constantly in one direction and to make them see social reality in terms of certain pre-determined goals.
One can hardly help feeling that administrators like Raffles perceived the issues of social life not as these actually were, but as they wished to see them. This has, indeed, been a major criticism of Raffles, who, his critics charge, perceived Indonesia through the distorting lenses of his experience in colonial India because it was convenient for him to do so, for ideological reasons. We have noted that Raffles was anxious to establish, for Indonesia, the principle of universal ownership of land by the state, to destroy the traditional powers of the aristocrats and to open the way to private ownership and enterprise. India appeared to him to provide a model which could be usefully followed. Yet the relevance of the Indian model to Indonesian conditions has widely been questioned. As Bastin has suggested, the system which Raffles instituted "was erected on the false principle of individual proprietorship, and was in direct opposition to the communal land tenure rights which existed in most parts of Java." Similarly, Raffles' opinion about the highly democratic character of native village administration in Indonesia appears to be a considerable exaggeration of the real situation; an exaggeration which proved, however, to be useful for the ideological-political purpose at hand. It is evident that, in the absence of his peculiar ideological bias, the policies of Raffles would, most likely, have been very different from what they were in fact. His radical "leap into the dark" would have probably never occurred, especially at such a short notice and during such politically unsettled times.

The second generalization that can, perhaps, be made on the basis of the previous argument is that the impact of thought and policies inspired by an ideology, in this case, liberalism, may be lasting. It may also be true that the reforms of the liberal administrators mentioned in this study were mostly paper reforms, hardly affecting the life of the common Javanese man, and that the impact of Western influences on the native culture should, perhaps, not be exaggerated. Still, it may be contended that these reforms affected the social fabric of Indonesia in a more lasting manner, at least in the long run, initiating in Legge's expression, "some important changes . . . to occur beneath the surface."

In particular, these reforms vastly weakened the dominant "feudal" system prevalent in colonial Indonesia and provided a certain alternative to it. Moreover, it led to the introduction of a new European-type system of public administration with definite regulations and routinized procedures, thus, modifying the existing administrative system to a considerable extent. Furthermore, these reforms, by departing from economic protectionism, opened Indonesia to the world in a more direct way, and so helped to stimulate — at least in certain quarters — new interests and attitudes which, in turn, encouraged more dynamic social responses. In short, the impact of such reforms was increasingly felt, as these were gradually absorbed into the mainstream of Indonesian modern social and political experience.

The third and last generalization that may be made concerns the impact of
the early ideology-inspired reforms in Indonesia on the welfare of Indonesians themselves and on the subsequent social development in Indonesia. This begs the question whether Raffles' liberal policies set in motion some attitudes or released some energies that were likely to advance Indonesian society to a more "civilized" state and more satisfactory social conditions.

The answer to such a crucial question, it shall presently be seen is, perhaps, not very encouraging. In the first place, it is evident that the early liberal policies in Indonesia were inspired not so much by native interests, but by the commercial and security interests of European powers. As Zainu'ddin has expressed it, "they [the colonial powers] would do what they could for the welfare of the indigenous people but when this welfare conflicted, as it often did, with the successful exploitation of the colony's products, the latter remained their prime concern." Even Raffles' liberalism, whatever Raffles himself might have said, had to be constantly tampered so as not to offend the commercial sensibilities of the Liberal gentlemen in Leadenhall Street in the City of London, for whom maximal economic profit combined with humanitarianism was the ideal objective, but under less ideal conditions, economic consideration would have priority over all other considerations.

In the second place, the impact of liberalism on the native population was essentially of the passive kind. Liberalism failed to have the desirable dynamizing effect liberal administrators like Raffles had hoped for. The liberal spirit was effectively confined to the ruling European classes, the native population being relatively unaffected by it, safe as mere passive participants in it or "victims" of it.

Lastly, the liberal experiment in Indonesia may be said to have set in motion certain forces that had far-reaching and, on the whole, adverse effects on Indonesia's social and economic life, which are felt even today. It has been contended that this experiment was partly responsible for initiating a trend in the Indonesian economy toward the so-called "dual economy," which has paralyzed Indonesia's social and economic development ever since. This trend refers to the tendency of the Indonesian economy to focus all developmental efforts on exportation to the neglect of the local agrarian sector. This has led to a European-centered economy based on export-oriented agricultural products on the one side, and a backward, subsistence agricultural economy, characterized by arrested, "involutional" (in Geertz's words) development, on the other side.

New administrative commitment

At this point, the relevance of our argument to more recent developments in administrative theory and practices, particularly in former colonial countries, may finally be raised. Is it possible to draw a convincing parallel between ideology-impregnated policies of 19th century colonial Indonesia and policies as conducted in contemporary developing states?
Contemporary bureaucracy with its self-effacing profile and its claim to be merely an impartial instrument for certain pre-determined ends formulated by decision-makers appears to belie such a possibility. This is the view that follows positive social science, associated with ethical neutrality or freedom from all evaluative elements, which the developing countries have usually accepted as an unquestioned, and, presumably, beneficial, part of their colonial heritage.

At present, the validity of the positivist model of administration has increasingly been questioned. The criticism has focused on the failure of the model to appreciate adequately the increased role of public bureaucracy in the national development of emerging countries, and on the rise of what may be viewed as a new "bureaucratic philosophy", passing under the name of "developmentalism."

The role of the state in the new developing nations has vastly expanded mainly as a consequence of the new preoccupation of these states with rapid economic growth. With this arose a demand for more active participation of public bureaucrats in the process of national planning, and even decision-making. Hence, the bureaucrat's work has come to be perceived more like a managerial job that has nothing to do with regular and routine administrative procedures, but rather with solving the unusual, unprogrammed management experience. Suddenly, he is expected to become a reforming innovator, planner, enterpreneur and executive of economic policy, with all such qualities combined in his person. This transforms the traditional, rather unexciting instrumental, role of public administrators to a role where they are expected to pass value judgments in matters of public policy, and, effectively, to participate in the shaping, as well as implementation, of such policy.

The rise of developmentalism has had, perhaps, even more shattering effects on the plausibility of the value-free model of administration. For instance, the neat dichotomy of politics versus administration disappeared when the technocrat-bureaucrat was assigned almost complete charge of planning the present and the future of the developing nations, often in the absence of countervailing powers, and in alliance with a sympathetic authoritarian government. Thus, it seems that the essentially bureaucratic idea of "mere efficiency" and "administrative impartiality," associated traditionally with the means of public policy, had become elevated to the arbitration of desirable social policy, of the ultimate ends of social life. This step in overwhelming the advocacy of a particular type of development has, incidentally, led to charges that the bureaucrats, with their confidence to know best what is good for the people and their being ill-disposed to opposing positions, have themselves advocated what may be regarded as their own ideology, namely, of development.

Viewed from this perspective, the undisguised ideological ethos of 19th century administrators in colonial Indonesia and the attitudes of modern public
bureaucrats may have much in common, differing only in degree or style rather than in substance. It must also be granted that the administrator during Indonesia’s liberal era was less “objective” and certainly more openly ideologically committed, hence, as a rule, more explicitly concerned with such universal issues as human justice, public duty and the moral improvement of man. Obviously, for him, ideological commitment was no mere smokescreen behind which to hide an essential poverty of ideas, as his contemporary counterpart may be doing. Rather, such commitment was a moral creed which contained a definite salvationist message.

It is in this aspect that the administrator of today appears to be severely wanting. In his preoccupation with administrative efficiency, he might have forgotten that administration is more than a mere conveyor belt in the process of policy implementation, but rather, to use Goulet’s expression, “a fertilizer that can help or that can destroy.”

This contention, if valid, implies a severely restricted vision on part of modern administrators of what their tasks are all about. Their explicit commitment to a definite moral, if not salvationist, position would, it seems, do much to bring into closer proximity the desired ends of, and the means utilized in, public policy, which should then make administrative actions more reflective of actual human needs and aspirations.

FOOTNOTES

1Quoted in Furnivall, p. 34.

2Dutch interference with trading in the Empire of Mataram and Javanese harbor principalities is said to have choked off promising trade flourishing there, so economically ruining the Empire and destroying the trading class. See Legge, pp. 66-67.

3Furnivall, p. 37


5History of Java


7Quoted in Nusantara, p. 225.

8Nusantara, p. 224.

9This was indeed the fear expressed by the essentially conservative Dutch leaders in Java, that the new democratic mood at home might prove completely destructive of the Dutch Indonesian vested economic interest. Hence their concealed warning in a letter of September 5, 1976, sent to their home government. They wrote that they “can hardly imagine in what was a revolution based upon the system of liberty and rights of the people could be introduced
into this country without destroying its value for the home country," (Nusantara, p. 223.)

10Quoted in Nusantara, p. 224.

11Ibid.

12Furnival, p. 65.


14Furnival, p. 65.

15Quoted in Ibid.

16Quoted in Ibid.

17As one skeptical writer has put it, "The only thing lacking is the proof that these wholesome regulations [for reforming the administration] were actually carried out. They were only a platform of principles." (Day, p. 156.)

18Bastin, Introduction, p. xii.

19They have never forgiven Raffles' references, in his History of Java, to the "oppressive and cruel" character of the Dutch colonial system. Hence their frequent attempt to lessen Raffles' position in Indonesian history. A good example here is Vlekke's attempt to ascribe Raffles' success in history books partly to Raffles' superb literary style. According to Vlekke, through his writings Raffles created an historical legend about his administration in Java, for "he wrote so well... that a century after his death people continue to judge Raffles by his words instead of by his deeds, his little publicity tricks [Vlekke adds] tend to irritate the historian." (The Story of the Dutch East Indies, pp. 140-141.)

20Furnivall, p. 69.

21Quoted in Ibid.

22Quoted in Day, p. 172.

23History of Java, I, p. 276, Bastin p. 44.

24Ibid., p. 304.

25Quoted in Furnivall, p. 69.

26Collins, p. 71.

27Indeed it was widely anticipated that Indonesia would soon be returned to Holland as part of the post-Napoleonic settlement. The British authorities were not keen on retaining the colony, regarding it as a financially losing proposition.
28Quoted in Fisher, p. 31.

29Ibid.

30Bastin, p. 32.

31The Story of the Dutch East Indies, p. 144.

32Ibid., p. 145.

33Quoted in Fisher, p. 30.

34On the original scheme, government lands were let to village chiefs who then would re-let them to individual cultivators. Raffles came to see such a method as potentially harmful to peasants and oppressive to their interest, contending that "such a plan of settlement will leave the bulk of the people entirely at the mercy of... chiefs, who... would certainly... possess an ability of injury and oppression, against which the ruling power would have left itself no adequate means of prevention or redress." (Quoted in Day, p. 179.).

35Ibid.

36Ibid., p. 181.

37See Furnivall, p. 72.

38See Bastin, p. 21.

39Raffles, for instance, attached, to his History of Java, a government official statement of the colony's revenue to show the relative increase in government revenue during the period of his governorship.

40Bastin, p. 57.

41As Werthein has put it in another context, "replacement of institutionalized bondage/like feudalism/by a formal freedom of contract does not necessarily mean an improvement of the worker's position." (W.F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition; The Hague, W. van Hoeve, 1964; p. 257.)

42Day, p. 186

43Furnivall, p. 77

44The Story of the Dutch East Indies, p. 146.

45Bastin, p. 57.

46Indeed scholars like Lauer, Smail and Benda deny that Western influences have affected Indonesian social life in any more fundamental sense. As Benda has put it, "the changing
pattern of colonial policy [in Indonesia] was by and large irrelevant to Javanese social dynamics", or elsewhere, the degree and extent of the Westernization of Indonesian social, political and ideological evaluation have vastly been exaggerated." (Harry Benda, "Decolonization in Indonesia: The Problem of Continuity and Change," American Historical Review, July 1965, pp. 1066 and 1071.) This position, incidentally, appears contrary to present-day trends in Indonesian scholarship, which tends to regard the relevance of the colonial experience to contemporary social and political life in Indonesia as more direct and crucial. For a brief account of the controversy on the methodology of Indonesian history see Legge, Ch. 4.

47Legge, 74.

48Zainu'ddin, pp. 118-119.

49See Legge on the theory of Dualism, pp. 96-102. In justice to the liberal era covered in this study it may be added that the origin of dualism in Indonesia is usually ascribed to Van den Bosch's conservative policies; still some such tendency appears to have been present in the liberal formula of development as well. By "involutional" change or development, Geertz has in mind the tendency in the rural economy to expand in an inward rather than a more dynamic outward direction. Changes take place within an essentially traditional framework, consisting merely of ever-more intensive exploitation of land, of baroque-like elaborations in the use of land to keep up with increased pressures for new products.

50See Clifford Geertz, Agrarian Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California, 1963).


52Denis A. Goulet, "Development for What?," Comparative Political Studies, July 1968, p. 295.

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