CHANG HSUEH-LIANG ON THE SIAN INCIDENT*

by Jiu-Hwa Lo Upshur

Introduction

Forty years have elapsed since the Sian Incident, December 12-25, 1936. The event refers to the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and General Yang Hu-cheng. Sian, the site of the incident, was the headquarters of the anti-Communist campaign in Shensi province. Chang was the commander-in-chief of the anti-Communist campaign and his Manchurian or Northeastern troops formed the nucleus of the command. Yang, commander of the Northwestern army, was Pacification Commissioner of Shensi. He also had the task of assisting Chang.

Since the summer of 1936, the Manchurian troops had been reluctant to fight their designated enemies. They were weary with the seemingly endless civil wars and their feelings were shared by others in China. Since 1931, Japan had been relentlessly advancing against China, and with increasing success. More Chinese were concluding that it was time to stop civil wars, unite all Chinese and resist Japan.

*Translation based on an article by Chang Hsueh-liang originally titled "Sian shi-pien chang-hui-lu, che yao" (A Penitent's Account of the Sian Incident, Summary), Hsi Wang (The Hope Magazine), No. 1, July 1, 1964, pp. 12-16, Taiwan.
The students spearheaded this movement, which became known as the National Salvation Movement. These students found their most ardent supporters in Chang Hsueh-liang and the Manchurian army. They gravitated towards Sian, as did other so-called "anti-civil war, pro-united front" elements.

But Chiang Kai-shek maintained that it was necessary to eliminate the Communists first and only then would China resist Japan. Consequently, Nanking continued its appeasement policy towards Japan while waging war against the Chinese Communists. During the latter part of 1936, Chiang had begun to send his own crack units to combat in Shensi to bolster the faltering efforts of the Manchurian army.

On December 9, 1936, Chiang arrived in Sian, personally to supervise another anti-Communist push. He was deaf to Chang's advice to stop the civil war. Feeling greatly frustrated and also slighted, Chang and Yang decided to kidnap Chiang. In Chinese terms, this was called a "ping chien", the detention of a ruler to force advice upon him. It occurred at dawn on December 12, 1936, when Chiang and his entire entourage were made captives. Most of them remained prisoners until December 25, when as the finale to a fortnight of bizarre events, Chiang was freed, as were his staff, and were flown back to Nanking, accompanied by Chang. Chang went on his own volition, indeed on his insistence, to do penance for his actions. A court martial subsequently sentenced him to ten years imprisonment. Almost immediately, Chiang granted Chang a special pardon but has kept him in protective custody ever since.

The passage of time and other circumstances have removed some of the principals from the living. Among the main participants in the Sian negotiations, five have died. William Henry Donald, the Australian advisor to Chiang, and erstwhile advisor to Chang also, died during the war. He did not publish any notes or memoirs on the incident. Yang Hu-cheng was shot by Kuomintang authorities and in 1949, prior to the Communist victory, T.V. Soong and, more recently, Chiang Kai-shek and Chou En-lai have died. Chou, who represented the Chinese Communist Party in the Sian negotiations, never gave his version of the proceedings. Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang published their official accounts of the events almost immediately afterwards. But what about Chang Hsueh-liang? Except for some communiques issued in his name between December 12-15, 1936, outsiders, for decades, were unable to learn anything directly from him. Some of his former subordinates have later rendered their accounts of what took place in Sian. But these were, at best, peripheral views.

On July 1, 1964, a magazine on Taiwan called Hsi Wang published Chang Hsueh-liang's account entitled "A Penitent's Account of the Sian Incident—Summary". The account is important for two reasons. Aside from it shedding light on his personality, conflicts and motives, it also revealed some new material on the background of the incident and the course it took. He also talked about some of the complex personal relationships prevailing at that time—his seemingly filial re-
gard for Chiang; mutual mistrust between him and Yang Hu-cheng; and his fascination with and admiration of Chou En-lai, especially for the latter's skill as a negotiator.

Obviously, Chang did not tell the entire story. He did not mention the contents or substance of the negotiations and did not hint at any concessions and agreements with the Communist Party, either verbal or otherwise, as conditions for Chiang's release. Below is a summary of a 'summary', with much of the author's moralizing and repetitions omitted. The account sheds some light on an interesting man and his role in an important event in recent Chinese history.

A Penitent's Account of the Sian Incident-Summary
by
Chang Hsueh-liang

One of my strongest feelings has been bitter hatred for the Japanese for their aggressions against China. As a child, I witnessed their brutality in Manchuria. As I grew older and became more aware of nationhood . . . the violent end of my father [at Japanese hands] and the brutal September 18th Incident filled me with deep and boundless hatred. Realization of my lack of power and China's weakness led me to think more and more of national matters.

I was compelled to work on projects for which I felt no commitment. My aim in returning to China [in 1934] was to do the preparatory work for a future war with Japan. . . . My initial with upon arrival in Shanghai was to be appointed as the chief of the Generalissimo's aide-de-camp corps. My reasons were as follows: I had never worked in a subordinate position to anyone and I wished to learn by working under Chiang Kung.1 I also hoped that by working under him, we would be able to establish a deeper mutual understanding. In addition, I wished to establish more frequent contact with my colleagues in the central government so that in the event of war with Japan, we would be able to co-operate more fully. . . . On my return to China [I also desired], first of all, to disassociate myself with the army and not resume command of the Manchuria troops, so as to sever my private and emotional ties with them. Nor did I wish to participate in any further civil wars. But in the end, my wishes were frustrated.

Chiang Kung gave me two choices: to direct a campaign against the bandit forces of Liu Kuei-tang or to fight the Communists along the border areas of the three provinces.2 I wished neither. But because of my affection for him [Chiang] and my sense of obedience to a superior, I unhesitatingly accepted the more difficult campaign against the Communists. . . . Later, when Chiang Kung ordered me to be in charge of reorganizing the troops, I felt excited as this seemed exactly to coincide with my wishes to prepare for war against Japan. But the appointment did not materialize, which for me was a major blow. When the Communists fled to Shensi, I hoped that my task was at end. I wished to proceed to Hupei for the training of my troops. But order came for me to go to Shensi. . . . I indicated to Chiang
Kung my wish to go overseas again; but upon further thought, I decided to go as ordered, as I had come to realize Shensi’s potential as a bastion against Japan. I was also swayed by the thought that there were but a few thousand Communist troops under their Shensi leader, Liu Tze-tan, and by the fact that the government leader in Shensi was an old friend, who had indicated his welcome to me already...

After my arrival in Shensi, I built hospitals, planned to construct a plant for manufacturing hospital supplies, bought land at Pingliang, and began major building projects, as living quarters for families of the military and a new campus for the Northeastern University. I also organized training schools. I did not ask the government for funds for any of these projects, for they were part of my private plans for future resistance against Japan. My original plan was quickly to deal with the Liu Tze-tan bandit group. But unexpectedly, the whole body of Szechwan Communists began to arrive in Shensi. This was my second disappointment.

I remember one morning in Nanking. During our motor car trip to attend the graduation ceremony at the Military Police Headquarters, I began to tell Chiang Kung about the feelers I have had from the Communists which indicated their willingness to surrender. I wished also to take the opportunity to tell of my meetings with Chou En-lai; but, at that point, we arrived. That evening I intended to take up the subject again. But Chiang Kung had already become angered with me over the question of appropriations for the Northeastern Army, had reprimanded me and indicated that I should hasten back to my post. So I did not dare persist and, thus, missed an opportunity. Later, I met Chiang Kung at Loyang together with Mr. Yen Pai-chuan [Hsi-shan]. I had hoped for another opportunity to present my case. But, after inspecting the troops, Chiang Kung had made a speech in which he bitterly castigated the Communists as the greatest traitors and excoriated those who advocated co-operation with them as worse than Yin Ju-keng [the East Hopei quisling leader]. With this dash of cold water, I concluded that my pleas were hopeless. Bitterly disappointed, I returned to my room and wept.

In the period after the Fifth Party Congress [November 1935], what I saw and heard during my stay in Nanking contributed greatly to my emotional turmoil. As I recall them today, they were briefly as follows:

1. The ridicule and admonition of friends.
2. The angry disapproval of the young radical comrades who deplored my associations with the so-called pro-Japanese groups.
3. The actions and statements of Sun Feng-min, who had attempted to assassinate Wang [Ching-wei].
4. The bickerings within the Party, mainly for selfish, rarely for public purposes.
5. My supposition that many of the comrades in responsible positions within the central government were not enthusiastic about opposing Japan, but
were secretly pro-Japanese. It seemed to me that those who were truly dedicated to opposing Japan were either appointed to positions outside Nanking or were not in power at all.

6. I interpreted Wang Chao-ming's [Ching-wei] announced principles of simultaneously negotiating with and resisting Japan as directed against his domestic enemies rather than the external foe.

I returned to Shensi immediately after hearing of the failure of our campaign in the northern part of that province. First to be destroyed [by the Communists] was the 110th Division. Next, the 109th Division was annihilated. Its commander, Niu Yuan-feng, refused to surrender and died. Both commanders were outstanding officers of the Northeastern Army. . . These two bitter defeats redoubled my feelings of misery and bitterness. They reinforced my old conviction of the wastefulness of sacrificing the best officer material in civil wars. Nor did I, as a result, underestimate the fighting abilities of the Communists. From that point, my mind was turned to the strategy of using peaceful methods to solve the Communist problem.

Upon my return to Shensi, I convened a conference. In order to spur on my units to greater efforts, I threatened . . . to resign my command. To my surprise, they . . . became hostile. One group reacted thus: "We, Northeasterners, abandoned our native land and followed you into the Great Walls. In our hearts we all wish one day to return together. Now in times of extreme difficulty, how can you become so heartless as to abandon us to our fates?" Another group said: "You have forgotten your duty to avenge your father and have lost heart on the great anti-Japanese mission. In your blind obedience to superior, you only seek to preserve your personal position. The foremost mission of the Northeastern Army is to fight Japan. But you do not care about the welfare of the Northeastern Army and are heedless about sacrificing them and forcing them to certain destruction."

At about the same time, the Communists began a major propaganda campaign to stop the civil war and to promote united efforts to resist Japan. Their propaganda became increasingly attractive to me and to most of the Northeastern Army, at least to the younger elements in it. Further offensives against the Communists were unsuccessful. I began to ask myself the reasons for the failure and to ask the opinions of like-minded people. I received advice to get in touch with the Communists, to co-operate with Yang Hu-cheng, to stop the anti-Communist campaign and to preserve my real strength and to seek a joint anti-Japanese effort. I cannot shirk responsibility and lay blame on others, for though many of these suggestions came from others, they were also the advice I sought to hear.

Since at that time I did not know the real motives of the Communists, it was necessary to establish contact with them in order to find out their intentions. Since I have had no personal dealings with the Communists, I sent a member of my staff to see Li Tu again and make inquiries. In response, Li sent a represen-
tative to see me. His name was Liu Ting and he said that he had joined the Communist party, been arrested and then released on bond. He said that he was not a pleni-potentiary delegate, but that he could get in touch with responsible persons in the Communist party in Shanghai. Through his introduction, the Communist leaders indicated their willingness to talk to me in person, but said that they dared not come to Sian. Instead I went to Shanghai and met a man at a Western style restaurant at a suburb to the west of the city (he did not tell me his name, but according to Liu, he was probably Pan Han-nien). Our conversation never reached the key issue, probably because of my patronizing attitude, and also his hedging.

The Communists returned most of my officers whom they had taken prisoner. Their declared reason was that they regarded the Northeastern Army as "fellow travellers", since both sides were primarily interested in resisting Japan. Then Wang I-che [one of Chang's top aides] telegraphed me to say that the Communists had sent to his headquarters a representative who requested to see me personally. I flew to Louchuan and met that man. He called himself Li K'e-ning. I did not know then what position he held in the Communist party. The main conditions he raised during our discussions were substantially the same as those raised by the Communist party later. My reply to him was that if his side were sincere, we would be able to accept their terms. But I expressed doubt as to his position and whether he could speak for his party, and asked to see a leader, either Mao Tse-tung or Chou En-lai. He replied that the conditions he raised were all agreed to by the whole leadership and that if I were sincere, he could arrange to have Mao or Chou come to see me. Immediately after our meeting, he returned north and obtained the reply that Chou-En-lai was willing to accompany him on the next meeting, and requested an appointment of location and date. I replied with no hesitation, invited Chou to come, and ordered division commander Chou Fu-chen to take charge of the reception.

One night I met Chou En-lai at a Catholic church in Yenan and we talked for two or three hours. I told Chou that the central government was taking active steps in preparing to resist Japan and that Chiang Kung was truly a patriot. We had a prolonged debate. Chou inquired about the Three Principles of Hirota. I replied that Chiang Kung would never accede to them. Chou conceded that Chiang Kung was a patriot and that in order to resist Japan, it was necessary to rally to his leadership. But he expressed doubts about [Chiang's] associates, and vehemently contended that if the central government were really bent on resisting Japan, then why did they persist in trying to destroy the Communist party, the one group that had unequivocally demonstrated its hatred for Japan and its unyielding determination to resist her? He added that, in order to resist Japan, the Communist party had decided to return to its former relationship with the Kuomintang and accept Chiang Kung's leadership. He proceeded to propose the following conditions, roughly as follows:

1. Communist armed units to be reorganized and trained in preparation for resisting Japan.
2. Guarantee of non-fraudulence, no confiscation of weapons.
3. Communist units in Kiangsi, Hainan and Ta Pieh Shan and other locations to be granted the same conditions of reorganization.

4. Abolition of the title of Red Army in return for the same pay and treatment as the national army.

5. Communist party to be forbidden to function in the military.

6. Communist party to cease all class struggles.

7. Release of all Communist political prisoners. Communist party to be allowed freedom to pursue its activities except those of opposing the government and attacking the leader.

8. Non-military [Communist] party members to be allowed to reside in north Shensi.

9. After victory against Japan, the Communist party to be allowed to become a lawful political party as they are in such democracies as Britain and the United States.

Chou further proposed that if I still had doubts regarding their sincerity and honesty, he was willing to submit to surveillance. Whereupon, impulsively, I accepted his statements, and added that both on personal and national scores, I would be second to none in coming forth to resist Japan. But since I had superior authorities, I could not make independent decisions. However, I pledged to do my utmost to persuade Chiang Kung to accept these conditions. We, then, made promises not to go back on our words.

After this meeting with Chou En-lai, I felt elated, thinking that, henceforth, the nation would enjoy internal peace so that all energies can be directed to resisting Japan. When I recollect these events today, I realize how pitifully naive I was then. As a fervent nationalist, I bitterly resented being the victim of aggression. I was unwilling to accept Japanese oppression, just as I had been unwilling to submit to Russian oppression. Without weighing my strength, I had moved to recover our rights in Manchuria from the Russians [in 1929]. As later events proved, those Communists... whom I regarded as patriots against Japan were, in reality and as Chiang Kung had already recognized, “first rate traitors”...

After my return to Shensi from Loyang, I replied to the Communists that, at present, I was unable to present my plans for a ceasefire to Chiang Kung. After mutual consultations, we agreed on a temporary and partial ceasefire and resolved that I would assume responsibility to explain the situation to Chiang Kung at a later date. The Communists sent Yeh Chien-ying to see me. He brought with him plans for a mutual cessation of hostilities and a letter from Mao Tse-tung in which he pledged to cooperate with me under the urgent cause of resisting Japan, and to put his troops under my directions. I requested that they withdraw further north, so that the two sides are physically separated, to allow me time for the maturing
of my plans. They indicated their need for padded winter clothing and other supplies. From my personal funds, I gave them a large sum of money with which to buy the supplies. Thereupon, the Communists evacuated Wayaop'u and marched north in three columns. Around that time, the Communist party established an office in Sian, as did the Salvation League and Student Association. I also gave some of my private funds to support the strike of workers in Japanese owned mills in Shanghai.

All sorts of unfortunate incidents added fuel to the burning embers. Some of the events which caused static among my troops were: First, our requests to Nanking for pensions for widows and orphans, for supplies and for permission to recruit were all rejected. Second, no Northeastern units were included in the relief army for Suiyuan to aid General Fu Tso-yi's resistance against Japanese and puppet troops. My feelings of dissatisfaction with certain comrades in the central government strengthened my anger and suspicions, and my conviction that I must realize the dreams that were shaping in my mind.

I pursued my goal in the following manner. First, I implored Chiang Kung to adopt what I regarded as my brilliant strategy. I pleaded for the acceptance of the Communist party by the Kuomintang as in the days under the Tsungli Sun Yat-sen. I believed that this would stimulate the government to renew itself and to create a new image before the people. I also promoted the idea that civil wars should stop and that all should unite to resist Japan. I was convinced of the purity and righteousness of my ideals, and this made me determined to realize my goals regardless of the sacrifice. At that juncture, I had formed no plans to resort to kidnapping tactics.

In all honesty, it must be said that, in the Sian Incident, Yang Hu-cheng's role was a subordinate one, and that he became implicated in it because of me. But this is not to say that he played no part in its formative stages. Right after the 110th Division met with disaster, plans were drawn up for renewed campaign to surround the Communists. In this scheme, Yang was entrusted with the campaign along the Ichuan front. He vented his disgruntled feelings to me on this assignment. He said that he was receiving neither funds nor succor, and termed the extermination campaign a "life sentence". He added that since even the numerous central units and best Northeastern units were unable to exterminate the Communists, what could be expected of his meager forces? Although, I comforted him with kind words, I indicated that, though sympathetic, I was unable to help him. But, in order to encourage him, I gave him aid to the sum of one hundred thousand yuan. Later, after the defeat of the 109th Division, I also indicated to him my weariness with the extermination business. Just as we were establishing some rapport, a pamphlet appeared, titled Huo lu. It advocated cooperation between Northeastern and Northwestern peoples for the purpose of resisting Japan. (This pamphlet was authored by Kao Tsung-min.) Although at this time, I had not told Yang Hu-cheng of my plans of collusion with the Communists, he, at a certain point, became aware of them. As to the real nature of Yang's relationship with the Communist
party and how he came to collaborate with them, I remain ignorant of the details. (At that time, on Yang's staff was a Wang Ping-nan whom I now know to have been a Communist.) Yang was deeply sympathetic to the goals of stopping civil wars, and unity to oppose Japan. He spurred me on to tender this advice to Chiang Kung...

I was disheartened and disappointed when I returned from Loyang. I told Yang of my doubts that Chiang Kung would accept our views and of my dissatisfaction with him. I also asked Yang whether he had any good plans for stopping the civil war and converting Chiang Kung to our views... Yang asked me in return whether I was really determined to resist Japan. Upon my oath of sincerity, Yang offered that since Chiang Kung was coming to Sian, we could kidnap him, thus, forcing him to adopt our policy. I was startled by the suggestion, and reflecting, did not reply. He began to betray fear, whereupon I assured him as follows: "Fear not, because I do not betray my friends to obtain gains and rewards... but as for your plan, I do not think I can comply." He retorted by taunting me and said: "You are emotional and think of private obligations at the expense of public ones." I then said: "Let me consider and think things over. But do not worry, as I absolutely will not tell anyone of your thoughts." When Chiang Kung came to Sian from Loyang, I followed him in and out, as I feared that others might mutiny. Little did I know that I was ultimately the criminal one.

While Chiang Kung was staying at Hua Ching Ch'ih [outside Sian], I had two talks with him, both of which, but especially the one on December 9th, left me emotionally upset. In addition, Chiang Kung had convened several general officers' meetings, to all of which Yang Hu-cheng and I had been excluded. This caused fear in both Yang and me, and I was especially suspicious and fearful lest Chiang Kung no longer held me in esteem and trust. So Yang and I began to consult and conspire to seize him, in order to force him to accept our plans. At this time, we did not seek the advice of, nor did we consult the Communists, and besides Yang, only a few people knew of our plans. It was after the incident had begun that I asked Chou En-lai to come [to Sian]. My main purpose in wanting to consult him in working out a joint plan was due to my realization of the inability of mine and Yang's subordinates, and because of Nanking's course of action. 8

When Chou and his staff arrived at Sian, he told me that they were extremely surprised when they heard of the Sian Incident. He said that the Communists were split into two camps on this issue — the more radical group, and Yeh Chien-ying was among them, advocated a course of action unfavorable to Chiang Kung. Another group, which included Chou, advocated a peaceful solution and personal support for Chiang Kung. He reaffirmed support to our agreement at Yenan, that in case there was no hope of a peaceful settlement [with Nanking], the Communist pledged not to be neutral, but to share our fate, arm their men and obey my overall command. Thus he [Chou] joined our already established council. The slogan then current in Sian, "Three-in-One", referred to unity between the Northeastern Army, the Northwestern Army and the Communists. After discussions, it was decided to hold firm to our eight demands. This was not a propaganda ploy. All we
wanted was that government acceded to our sincere demands. The only point added to our plan was that we would continue under Chiang Kung's leadership. There are records of my speech to the entire staff or the Northwest Bandit Extermination Headquarters and to the public meeting at Hsiching Park which will corroborate my statement here. Also there must be now in Taiwan some of those then in Sian who, unless they have ulterior motives, will bear witness to me, that in my public statements, I advocated giving our support to Chiang Kung as our leader.

Speaking of the Sian events, my heart is filled with regrets. Before the Incident, I did not consult the Communists. When I observed the scene after the Incident began, I felt immensely saddened and remorseful. The incompetence of my staff filled me with bitterness. The indiscipline of Yang's units gave me much disquiet. I regretted my own careless speech and realized our unworthiness vis-a-vis the immense task of resisting Japan and saving our nation. I felt agitated, did not know what to do and had no one to consult. I established two committees and wired Chou En-lai asking him to come to Sian immediately to help find a solution. Two or three days later, Chou and two others came. One of those in Chou's party was Po Ku. The other one I do not recall... Chou became respected as the mastermind of events in Sian...

When the time came to discuss Chiang Kung's departure from Sian, Yang Hu-cheng and I began to disagree. I reprimanded Yang and reminded him that our original motive was to sacrifice all to persuade Chiang Kung to lead us against Japan. I said that since we have read his diary and have satisfied ourselves on his determination to resist Japan, and also since he has permitted us to present our other views before the central government, our goals have been achieved. Thus we ought not to shrink from danger or death. I added that, if personal factors were so important to him, he should not have joined the movement in the first place. I became so agitated and abusive that I nearly split with Yang. It was Chou En-lai who broke the impasse. He asked me to take a brief rest and permit him to talk things over. Ultimately, he convinced Yang. To me, since our anti-Japanese goals have been satisfied, other considerations were minor and should not be permitted to cause delays. I also felt that nothing should be allowed to cause backsliding from our initial commitment... So I fought for my point of view. My situation, at that point, was extremely difficult. On the one hand, I did my utmost to insure the security of Chiang Kung. But he refused to dissemble and persisted in his determination to die if necessary. He reprimanded us and sternly refused to accept any requests under duress, no matter how legitimate. He also refused any discussions with us. This was my situation vis-a-vis Chiang Kung. I was also concerned with convincing my subordinates and persuading them not to expand the incident. Then there was Chiang Kung's attitude toward me, which was an extremely ambivalent one. On the one hand, he hated me as the bitterest enemy; but it was also clear that he was torn by feelings of love and protectiveness towards me, as though I were his own kin. The complexities of the situation were truly unprecedented...
was filled with fears and worries, yet I was reckless and self-possessed in action and mindless of consequences. I lacked any deep research and accurate knowledge of the Communists... And what were my strong points? I was strong in being obsessively worried, very angry, pleasure loving, fearful and suspicious. By natural disposition, I was bold but indiscreet, self-centered, conceited and immature. In the last analysis, these defects in my personality are the root causes of the Sian Incident.

FOOTNOTES

1 Chiang Kai-shek is referred to as Chiang Kung, an address of respect.

2 The three provinces referred to are Kiangsi, Fukien and Kwangtung, although Chang does not mention them by name.

3 Chang must be referring to the entrance to northern Shensi of the remnant Communist troops at the end of the Long March. The choice of northern Shensi by the Chinese Communist Party was partly predicated by the existence of local Communist guerrilla troops.

4 It is not clear whether Chang is referring to the meeting with Chou En-lai mentioned later in the text as there is no clear time sequence followed.

5 Li Tu was a Manchurian officer and former subordinate of Chang. When Chang was still in Hupeih on anti-Communist campaign, he had sent Li and two other Manchurian officers, in a scheme of Li's instigation, to attempt to enter northern Manchuria from the U.S.S.R.. The aim of this mission was to rally former Manchurian units in northern Manchuria to undertake guerrilla warfare against Japan, and also to establish contact with Communist guerrilla units already active in the area. The scheme failed and the three men went no further than Germany. Chang does not explain whether Li had already developed contacts with the Chinese Communist Party prior to his attempted return to Manchuria.

6 Yenan was under Chang's control at the time.

7 The title translates as The Path to Life.

8 On December 16, 1936, the Nanking government announced the launching of a punitive expedition against Chang and Yang and entrusted its direction to general Ho Ying-ch'in.

Chinese names and terms used:

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