

## RECOGNITION POLICIES TOWARD CHINA: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY

Herbert S. Yee

Canada announced in October, 1970, its establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (hereafter referred to as China). Canada was the first country to establish diplomatic relations with China after the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution in that country. Its move was thus significant in breaking the log-jam regarding the recognition<sup>1</sup> of China, and its position to "take note" of China's claim to the territory of Taiwan without specifically endorsing that claim proved a workable formula and was subsequently adopted by some other nations which followed Canada's step. More than fifty nations recognized China during the five-year period after Canada's recognition, leaving the United States as the only major Western power without formal diplomatic relations with China. Close to one hundred countries had diplomatic relations with China (up to July 1, 1975), while only some thirty countries still refused to recognize China and maintained diplomatic relations with the government of the Republic of China in Taiwan (hereafter referred to as Taiwan).

The rush of nations to establish diplomatic relations with China has been in part attributed to China's softening attitude towards external relations after the turmoil of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution. The Chinese government has since become much more diplomatically approachable. More significantly, China is no longer regarded as the "outlaw" of the international community. Its admission to the United Nations in 1971 indicated the acceptance of China by the world community. Finally, President Nixon's trip to China in February, 1972, apparently freed some of the U.S. allies to negotiate diplomatic relations with China. Indeed, some of the U.S. allies such as Japan and West Germany, felt that they had been up-staged, or betrayed, by U.S. overtures to China and that they, therefore, had to re-adjust their policies quickly to a new international environment. Thus, some of the important obstacles inhibiting moves to recognize China were either removed or had subsided by the beginning of the seventies.

It is important also to note that there were positive factors motivating the rush to recognize China stemming from anticipated benefits of recognition. An immediate concern of nations recognizing China appeared to be increasing their share of China's international trade. Canada sent its first trade mission to China in the fall of 1971, less than a year after its recognition of China, and held one of the largest Canadian trade fairs abroad in Peking in August, 1972. Italy followed Canada's example and held a trade fair in Peking two months later. When Japan (September, 1972), West Germany (October, 1972) and

---

<sup>1</sup>The term "recognition" is used interchangeably with the term "diplomatic relations" in this study, although a few countries, such as Israel and the United States, have "recognized" the Peking regime without formal diplomatic relations.

Australia (December, 1972) established diplomatic relations with China, trade agreements were signed simultaneously. Apparently, linkages with China through trade agreements had some influence in the decisions of many governments to establish diplomatic relations with China, but the problem is how to assess the weight of trade considerations amongst the many factors that contributed to the individual decisions of states to establish diplomatic relations with China. To wit: how was a nation's decision to recognize China affected by its decision-making environment?

The purpose of this study is to delineate the groups of nations encountering similar patterns of influence from the environment. This is a qualitative report based on an earlier study.<sup>2</sup> It includes Canada and the subsequent nations which recognized China in the first half of the 1970s. Other countries such as Britain, France and the United States are included for the purpose of comparison. For example, were factors which had important influence on a nation's policy of recognition in the seventies also important in influencing the British (1950) or French (1964) recognition? Are they useful in explaining the current U.S. China policy? There are few, if any, attempts to use a systematic framework to compare policies of different countries toward China. In the concluding chapter of a book edited by himself, Halpern attempts to compare China policies of different countries.<sup>3</sup> However, Halpern does not use any theoretical framework of comparison and is merely concerned with summarizing some of the differences that tend to underlie policies toward China. In effect, this lack of a systematic approach has in part contributed to the disagreement which exists among scholars on the relative significance of various factors in influencing policies of different countries toward China. In an attempt to fill the above gap in the literature, the present study has endeavored a systematic comparison of recognition policies from various countries toward China in the first half of the seventies. It then traces the developments of policies of those countries back to the early fifties. In order to achieve a more systematic consideration of the factors involved in influencing the recognition decisions, the conceptual framework of this study relies heavily on the decision-making approach in the study of foreign policy.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup>An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 18th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, St. Louis, March 16-20, 1977. Any reader who is interested in the methodology of this study may request a copy of the above paper from the author.

<sup>3</sup>A. M. Halpern (ed.), *Policies Toward China: Views From Six Continents* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).

<sup>4</sup>See, for example, Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin (eds.), *Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1962); Michael B. Brecher, Blema Steinberg and Janice M. Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 12 (March, 1969), pp. 75-101; Patrick J. McGowan and Howard B. Shapiro, *The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973); and Stephen J. Andriole, Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Gerald W. Hopple, "A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy Behavior," *International Studies Quarterly* 19 (June, 1975), pp. 160-198.

It adopts Brecher and his associates<sup>5</sup> distinction between external environment and internal environment, or Snyder and his associates<sup>6</sup> internal and external settings. As interactions between nation-states become more complex it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish the impact of the external and internal environments on foreign policy decision-making. The distinction between external and internal environments in this study, therefore, is arbitrary and is so designed as to facilitate the collection of relevant data. The external environment in the present study consists of seven factors: (1) global system, (2) regional system, (3) Asian system, (4) U.S. influence, (5) U.S.S.R. influence, (6) Taiwan influence, and (7) linkages with China. The internal environment also consists of seven factors: (1) public opinion, (2) interest groups, (3) opposition party elites, (4) establishments (military and civilian), (5) foreign policy groups, (6) individual influence of decision-makers, and (7) long-term foreign policy goals.

Most of the factors or variables used in this study should be self-explanatory.<sup>7</sup> It is important, perhaps, to note the difference between the "regional system" variable and the "Asian system" variable. The former is defined as the regional system within a geographic region (with or without contiguous memberships) in which the country making the decision to recognize China is a member; the latter refers to the influence of the regional system of the target state (i.e., China). The distinction between the two regional systems is necessary since the attitudes of those states neighbouring the target state may be widely different from that of those states within the same regional system of the country making the decision.

The primary technique used in this paper was that of consultation with a panel of expert judges. The chosen panelists were highly qualified specialists in the specific country or area studies. The experts were judges of the impact of environmental factors on the policies of recognition in those countries which belonged to their respective areas of expertise. According to a seven-point scale, ranging from very constraining (1) to very facilitating (7) the expert was requested to rate the relative influence of the environmental variables as to how the variables were actually perceived by the decision-makers in facilitating or constraining their country's policy to establish diplomatic relations with China at the time the decision was made and over time (i.e., the twenty-seven year period from the establishment of the regime in Peking in 1949 to July, 1975). The survey was conducted in the summer and autumn of 1975.

Since the purpose of consulting experts was to obtain high quality data regarding a specific country's policy of recognition toward China, the selected experts therefore must have at least some knowledge

---

<sup>5</sup>Brecher et al, *op. cit.*

<sup>6</sup>Snyder et al, *op. cit.*

<sup>7</sup>A detailed explanation of the manner in which these variables have been applied in the present study was given in the author's Ph.D. dissertation, entitled "Decisions to Establish Diplomatic Relations with China: Environmental Variables in Foreign Policy Decision-Making," University of Hawaii, 1976.

in this respect. The criterion for judging the expertise of specialists in this study was based primarily on the manifested knowledge of the specialists as indicated by their publications. Specialists who had published books or articles directly or indirectly related to a country's policy of recognizing China were thus selected regardless whether they were academists, journalists, government officials or ex-officials.<sup>8</sup> In addition, qualified specialists were selected regardless of their nationality and place of residence.

A total of four hundred and twenty-four questionnaires were sent out to specialists on fifty-two nations' foreign policies and politics. After one follow-up mailing, the response rate was 40.4%. A total number of one hundred and fifty-two completed or partially completed questionnaires were received by the researcher.<sup>9</sup> This is not at all a disappointing return rate, if one considers the length (it could take an hour or more to complete the eight-page questionnaire) and the nature of the questionnaire, that is, the fact that it demanded a high degree of expertise.<sup>10</sup> As a result of uneven response rate, some small nations failed to return a single completed questionnaire. The majority of them (forty-two), however, returned at least one completed or partially completed questionnaire. In order to obtain better quality results, only nations with complete information on all variables under consideration were included for further analysis. In addition, nations with information based on opinion from only one expert were excluded. As a result the original sample of forty-two nations was reduced to twenty five (see Table 1). This certainly increases our confidence in the results from the following analysis.

#### **THE GROUPS OF NATIONS ENCOUNTERING SIMILAR PATTERNS OF INFLUENCE FROM EXTERNAL AND DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTS**

Four distinctive clusters of nations were delineated by statistical techniques during the recognition year:<sup>11</sup> (1) developing nations, (2) developed nations, (3) allies of the United States, and (4) a group of nations headed by the United States. It is significant to note that neither Britain nor France formed a unique group different from the other nations, despite the fact that these two nations recognized China more than a decade before the others. This tends to support the temporal validity of the environmental variables, at least from the experts' point of view.

---

<sup>8</sup>For some small nations, however, the author did not succeed to find any specialists whose work was directly or indirectly related to a country's policy of recognizing China. As a result, specialists whose interests were related to a country's domestic politics or other areas were thus selected.

<sup>9</sup>In addition to the completed questionnaires, eighty-seven respondents (20.5%) replied and declined to participate; forty-eight questionnaires (11.3%) were not deliverable; and one hundred and thirty-seven receivers (32.4%) of the questionnaires did not reply.

<sup>10</sup>This is supported by the reasons given by those refusing to answer the questionnaires. Insufficient knowledge was given by close to 60% of the experts as the major reason for not filling out the questionnaire.

**Table 1**  
**Nations Included For Analysis**

<i>Country</i>	<i>Date Diplomatic Relations Established (or resumed) with PRC</i>
Argentina	February 19, 1972
Australia	December 21, 1972
Brazil	August 15, 1974
Britain	January 6, 1950
Burundi	October 13, 1971 (resumed)
Cameroun	March 26, 1971
Canada	October 13, 1970
Chile	December 15, 1970
France	January 27, 1964
Germany (West)	October 11, 1972
Ghana	February 29, 1972 (resumed)
Greece	June 5, 1972
Iran	August 16, 1971
Italy	November 6, 1970
Japan	September 29, 1972
Malaysia	May 31, 1974
New Zealand	December 22, 1972
Nigeria	February 10, 1971
Philippines	June 9, 1975
Sierra Leone	July 29, 1971
Thailand	July 1, 1975
Tunisia	October 8, 1971 (resumed)
Turkey	August 4, 1971
United States	(No formal diplomatic relations)
Zaire	November 24, 1972 (resumed)

Sources: *Jen-Min Jih Pao (The People's Daily)*, September 28, 1974; *Peking Reviews*, 1970-1975; A.M. Halpern (ed.) *Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 496-499.

Analysis on nations over time delineated different patterns of nation grouping. Most significant is the disappearing of the developed-developing dichotomy in the years prior to recognition. This suggests that a distinctive third-world policy toward China emerged only in the seventies. Nation groups in the fifties and sixties are difficult to identify, although regionalism appeared to be one of the characteristics of nation groups. A group of Asian nations consistently formed a distinctive group in the fifties and early sixties. European nations, African nations, and Latin American nations, however, appeared only once as distinctive groups over time. Regionalism was thus not a dominant factor in formulating recognition policies toward China. Instead, unidentified nation groups were increasingly common over time. This tends to reflect the multi-polarity structure of the global system since the early sixties. Table 2 summarizes nation groups delineated over time. It illustrates the lack of any consistent nation groups over time (as indicated by the data for the years of 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965 and 1970). The presence of a significant number of unidentified nation groups suggests that conventional grouping of nations into geographical regions, socio-ecological groups, or organizational alliances are not adequate for grouping nations in the present study.

The results suggest that there were probably more similarities than differences in patterns of influence from the environment among nations. In the year of recognition, the negative U.S. influence and Taiwan influence had become irrelevant for almost all nation groups; the domestic environment was in general favorable toward recognition of China. They were also motivated by positive Chinese attitudes toward diplomatic relations. There were some significant differences, however, which characterized nation groups. For example, the developing nations' (e.g., Brazil, Cameroun, Ghana, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Senegal, Tunisia and Zaire) decisions to recognize China, according to expert opinion, were influenced chiefly by the favorable attitudes in the global system, regional system and the individual influence of decision-makers. The developed nations (e.g., Britain, Canada and France), on the other hand, though equally influenced by the attitudes of their decision-makers, tended to be more concerned about their own long-range foreign policy goals and least affected by conditions in the global and regional settings. This finding could probably be explained by the tendency of developing nations to identify themselves with China as third-world nations and hence anticipated a favorable international condition by establishing diplomatic relations with China.

A distinctive nation group consisting of U.S. allies (Australia, West Germany, Japan, Malaysia and Thailand) also appeared in the year of recognition. Similar to the developing nations, this group of nations were influenced by favorable climate in the international and

---

<sup>11</sup>That is, the specific years in which the individual countries under consideration recognized the People's Republic of China. This covers the period from 1970 to 1975 for all countries, with the exceptions of Britain (1950) and France (1964).

Table 2

**The Groups of Nations Encountering Similar Patterns  
of Influence From Environmental Factors Over Time\***

<i>Recognition Year</i>	1970	1965	1960	1955	1950
1. Developing nations	1. Canada	1. Afro-Asian nations	1. Asian nations	1. Asian nations	1. Asian nations
2. Developed nations	2. U.S. allies	2. Canada	2. Greece	2. Canada	2. Latin American nations
3. U.S. allies	3. European nations		3. African nations		3. Iran
4. United States	4. United States 5. Argentina				4. Turkey

\*Unidentified nation groups are named after the nations that have the most representative characteristics of their respective groups.

regional systems. This could be explained by the U.S. withdrawal from Indo-China and gradual global disengagement from containing Communism. The world was no longer a bipolarity (from the diplomatic point of view) controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union. Close U.S. allies might have conceived diplomatic relations with China as a counterbalance to U.S. and Soviet influence, as suggested by some experts on West German and Japanese recognition policies. The group of U.S. allies is also distinguished by the remarkably favorable domestic attitudes toward the policy of recognition. This suggests that in some of these countries opinion in general regarded the issue of recognizing China as a demonstration of independence from the United States interference in foreign policy decision-making. People in these countries probably hoped that their respective governments could recognize China ahead of the United States. On the other hand, economic interest groups in this nation group, according to expert opinion, were eager to trade with China. They urged their own countries to sign some trade agreements with China before the United States, a potentially strong trade competitor in the China market, and other nations. Indeed, nations from this group (West Germany, Japan and Australia) established diplomatic relations and signed simultaneously trade agreements with China less than a year after Nixon's visit to China.

The last group of nations delineated from the recognition year data is represented by the United States<sup>12</sup> (other members of the group

<sup>12</sup>The United States has not yet "formally" established diplomatic relations with China. The data for the U.S. "recognition" was based on the 1975 data,

include Australia, Britain and Chile<sup>13</sup>). The noted characteristics of this nation group are the exceptionally favorable Soviet factor, the negative Taiwan factor, and the irrelevance of influence from individual decision-makers. This suggests that nations in this group tended to conceive diplomatic relations with China as a counter-balance to the Soviet influence, which was such an important foreign policy goal that it would be pursued regardless of the beliefs or attitudes of persons in power providing that the Taiwan problem could be resolved.

By comparison, a generally cautious attitude prevailed across nations (with the probable exception of the group of nations headed by Canada) in the beginning of the seventies regarding recognition policies toward China. In the 1970 data (see Table 2), the group of nations represented by Canada consists of nations most of which either recognized China in that year or were going to recognize China in the following year (e.g., Chile, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia and Turkey). Thus, its profile is different from other groups by its favorable disposition towards recognition. Decision-makers from this nation group, according to expert opinion, tended to ignore the negative U.S. and Taiwan influences; they tended to identify themselves with their own nations' foreign policy goals (e.g., an independent foreign policy) which were favoring recognition. The group consisting of U.S. allies (Australia, West Germany, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand and Thailand), on the other hand, was constrained in 1970 by the negative external environment and the generally negative or indifferent domestic environment, with the notable exception of the favorable attitudes among the opposition party elites. This suggests that U.S. allies were cautious in approaching China in the late sixties and the beginning of the seventies in order to avoid direct confrontation with the United States, when the latter was still actively involved in the Indo-China. The group of nations represented by Argentina (other members include Chile, Iran and the Philippines) was also cautious in approaching China in light of generally negative or indifferent attitudes in both the external and domestic settings. Compared to the U.S. allies, however, the Argentina group was constrained by an extremely unfavorable regional system; their respective domestic settings including decision-makers and opposition party elites were in general indifferent to the issue of diplomatic recognition of China.

In contrast to the above three nation groups, the group of European nations (West Germany, Greece and Italy) and the group of nations represented by the United States (which includes Cameroun, Senegal and Sierra Leone) encountered a generally indifferent environment in 1970. European nations apparently intended to wait for a more favorable global environment and a change in U.S. China policies. The U.S. group of nations were simply not yet ready to establish diplomatic relations

---

which indicated the latest developments in the Sino-American relations when the research of this project was being conducted.

<sup>13</sup>The reader may note some overlappings of nations in different groups. This could happen when a nation's China policy had had characteristics in common to more than one group of nations in a particular year.

with China; they encountered no negative influence from the environment, and some positive motivations from the environment thus might result in diplomatic relations.

If "caution" was the mood of the late sixties, suspicion of aggressive Chinese intents dominated the international climate in the first half of the sixties (as indicated by the 1965 data). Both the Afro-Asian nations (e.g., Australia, Burundi, Japan, Sierra Leone and Thailand) and the group of nations represented by Canada (other members include Argentina, Chile, Mexico, the Philippines and Senegal) delineated from the data for 1965 were constrained by the negative international setting from recognizing China. The suspicion of Chinese involvement in the Vietnam War and its border dispute with India probably cautioned nations which intended to show friendly gestures to China. There were, however, also significant differences in profile between the two groups of nations. The opposition party elites in the Afro-Asian group favored recognition, but the government bureaucracies and decision-makers were strongly opposed to the policy of recognition. Opposition factions in some of these Afro-Asian nations were apparently inspired by China's revolutionary course or its development model. Decision-makers and the government bureaucracies in the group of nations represented by Canada, however, were indifferent to and hence less inclined to oppose the policy of recognition despite or because of the unfavorable international environment.

The emergence of "Asian nations" (core members of this group consist of Japan, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) as a distinctive group in the fifties was the most outstanding feature of data in the years of 1950, 1955 and 1960. In 1960, its profile was marked by a highly unfavorable international environment and negative attitudes among the government bureaucracies and decision-makers. Nations from the Asian group were particularly concerned about the tension in their regional system, apparently aroused by Chinese endeavours in the Taiwan straits and Tibet. China was generally perceived as an aggressor by decision-makers of its neighbours. The concern about national security (i.e., invasion from China) was real in some of these Asian nations, according to expert opinion. It was thus highly unlikely that the question of recognition would ever be considered during this period of time. The opposition party elites in these nations, however, apparently disagreed with their respective governments' policies of non-recognition and tended to favor recognizing China. The African nations (e.g., Nigeria, Tunisia and Zaire), on the other hand, were less constrained by the regional systems and the domestic environment. The group of nations represented by Greece (other members are Chile, Italy and Turkey) was least affected by the Asian system, but affected greatly by the negative U.S. China policies. Its domestic environment was particularly hostile, more opposed to the policy of recognition than the other two groups. Finally, the influence of the Soviet factor and of Chinese attitudes toward foreign affairs were by and large neutral for all groups of nations in 1960.

From a sample size of seventeen, only two nation groups have been identified in the 1955 data (see Table 2).<sup>14</sup> Similar to the 1960 pattern, the nation group dominated by Asian nations (non-Asian nations in the group consist of Brazil, Italy, Greece and Mexico) encountered an unfavorable international environment and negative attitudes from the government bureaucracies and decision-makers. The Asian regional system, however, was less constraining than in 1960, probably because China's performance at the Bandung Conference had some positive influence on the decision-makers' attitudes among this group of nations. Yet governments from Asian nations hesitated to approach China for diplomatic recognition. The opposition party elites among these nations alone tended to favor a policy of recognition. By comparison, the group of nations represented by Canada (other members include Argentina, Chile, France and Mexico) was even less constrained by the Asian regional system. Compared to the Asian nation group, this Canadian group encountered indifferent attitudes from the domestic setting including the opposition party elites. Decision-makers from the Canadian group were not opposed to nor favoring recognition; their foreign policy goals were also neutral toward recognition. Nevertheless, the two groups of nations were almost equally constrained by the unfavorable global system, regional system, and U.S. policies. The strength of the hostile international climate in constraining recognition policies, the negative U.S. China policies in particular, is demonstrated by an abortive Canadian attempt to recognize the People's Republic in the mid-fifties. When Ottawa appeared to be eager to negotiate with the Peking government on diplomatic relations in the mid-1950s, the Canadian leaders were told very forcibly by the U.S. President and his Secretary of State that they remained opposed both to recognizing the Peking regime and to its admission to the United Nations. This incident probably deterred the Canadian government from taking any initiative to recognize China in the fifties and early sixties. The "Bandung Spirit" apparently had little impact in changing the prevailing attitudes in the global system and U.S. policy toward China.

The same number of nations in the 1955 data formed four groups of nations in the data for 1950. The nation group dominated by Asian nations (France, Italy and Mexico could also be classified under this group) was marked by an extremely unfavorable international environment and a generally negative domestic setting. The notable exceptions were the Soviet Union and opposition party elites factors, both of which had a somewhat favorable influence regarding recognition. Like the Asian group, the group of nations represented by Turkey (which includes West Germany and New Zealand) also encountered an extremely hostile global environment and some pressure from opposition party elites to change from a policy of non-recognition to recognition. Unlike the Asian group, however, the Soviet factor had a

---

<sup>14</sup>The size of the sample in the fifties is considerably smaller than the original sample for the recognition year because most African nations achieved independence only in the sixties and hence were not included in the data for the fifties.

negative effect on the Turkist group's policy of recognition. Because of the close alliance between the Soviet and the Chinese in the early fifties, countries from this group were probably concerned that diplomatic relations with the Peking government would lead to increasing Soviet influence in their respective regions and thus upsetting the balance of power between the two blocs. On the other hand, the Latin American nations (i.e., Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico) encountered unfavorable conditions in both the international and domestic settings, including negative attitudes from the opposition party elites. By contrast, the group of nations represented by Iran (others are Canada, Japan and the Philippines) encountered indifferent attitudes among various domestic sectors. As in the 1955 data, nation groups in the 1950 data were also almost equally constrained by the unfavorable global system, regional systems, and U.S. China policies. A majority of experts cited the Korean War as the most important event which had affected many nations' policies toward China in the early fifties and beyond.

To sum up, there appear to be more similarities than differences in profiles among nation groups over time. Nations were constrained by the unfavorable conditions in the global system, regional systems, and U.S. China policies in the fifties and sixties. The Taiwan factor, with the probable exception of the Asian nation group, was never a serious obstacle to recognition over time. The international climate in the fifties and sixties was largely conditioned by the Korean War, Cold War, and the Indo-China War. It was only in the early seventies, as illustrated by the data in the recognition year and 1970, that nations began to perceive differently influences in the international setting. The influence of the Soviet factor and of linkages with China were remarkably constant among different nation groups over time; their impact was by and large either neutral or favorable to recognition. The domestic factors thus played a key role in distinguishing the profiles among nation groups over time, especially the opposition party elites, government bureaucracies, and decision-makers. In some nation groups such as the Asian nations and U.S. allies, the opposition party elites consistently advocated a policy of recognition while the government bureaucracies and decision-makers were opposed to the change of policy from non-recognition to recognition. By comparison, the domestic environment in some nations such as the European nations in the late sixties and the beginning of the seventies was indifferent with regard to the recognition of China. Finally, the domestic environment in some nation groups, namely, the nation group represented by Greece in the early sixties and the Latin American nations in the early fifties, had a negative impact on their policies regarding recognition.

## CONCLUSION

Based on expert-generated data, the present study has attempted to determine systematically those environmental factors which led Canada in 1970 and the subsequent countries to recognize the Peking Government. It has demonstrated that expert opinions could be

meaningfully used for cross-national analysis of this kind. Results suggested that there were more similarities than differences in policies among nation groups in the fifties and sixties. In the first two decades after the establishment of the Peking regime, many nations were constrained from recognizing China by the unfavorable conditions in the international environment. The domestic environment thus accounted for the differences of China policies among nation groups. This changed, however, significantly in the beginning of the seventies. Nations began to perceive or experience different forces in the international setting. A distinctive Third World China policy emerged; developing nations tended to identify with China as Third World powers. This momentum was re-inforced when domestic pressure mounted in the early seventies amongst U.S. allies demanding early recognition of China (i.e., recognition ahead of the United States as a demonstration of independent foreign policy). To many nations, the beginning of the seventies had marked a new era in their respective policies toward China.