

HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE CONCEPT, ISSUES AND PROPOSALS ON AN INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE PHILIPPINES: 1955-1988

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"It is pathetic that for over a decade our domestic policy has been subordinated to our foreign policy, or what passes for that, in our dealings with other countries. It is only in the sense that our external policy is the product of foreign interference that it may be called foreign. . . . And this is the sort of foreign policy to which our domestic policy has been subordinated. And because of that and in that sense alone, our domestic policy has become foreign too. . . .

"We must reverse this course—if the nation is to survive—by subordinating the foreign to the domestic policy, by freeing ourselves from dictation, by maintaining trade relations with any country irrespective of ideologies, political institution and of government. . . ."

Claro M. Recto, 1956

"In less than a decade, we have completely reversed the entire framework of our foreign relations, and today we are truly master of our foreign policy. . . .

"Today, we can indeed say that we claim no entities with any nation of the world, that we believe in the benefits of contact with all nations, regardless of ideology or social system; and that we identify with hopes of all nations which, like our own, seek to share progress. And this policy is the net result of an independence in this country."

President Marcos, 1976

". . . The paramount consideration of foreign policy is the welfare of our people. This is the unchanging constant and the guiding star which provides the light and inspiration as we travel the tortuous path of self-reliance in foreign policy. The important thing is that it is high time we embark on the journey of shaping an independent foreign policy."

Leticia Ramos Shahani, 1987

More than four decades since our independence in 1946 and almost three decades after Senator Claro M. Recto's death, the problem of achieving an independent foreign policy (IFP) still haunts Philippine foreign relations. Past and present government officials still reiterate the need for an IFP despite the fact that it is only logi-

cal for an independent state to conduct an IFP. Yet, like a condemned man claiming innocence, we have always echoed this never-ending song of pursuing an IFP. Oftentimes, we encounter proposals for "new" foreign policy directions, that is, breaking of the special ties with the United States, emphasis on regionalism, non-alignment, solidarity with other Third World countries, diversification of our ties, and economic diplomacy.¹ Ironically, despite all the proposals and previous attempts for an IFP it is an unstated assumption behind the 1987 Constitutional provision (and in this study) that Philippine foreign policy is far from being independent.

It is a fact that the weight of considered opinion in and outside the government is that Philippine foreign policy has been dependent on the United States. For example, despite nearly four decades, American presence is still very visible. The United States Embassy in the Philippines is the largest U.S. embassy in the world. It is more like a federal building in an American city than a conventional diplomatic post. Moreover because Manila has long been a comfortable regional headquarters for almost every U.S. agency, from the U.S.A.I.D. to the Department of Defense, extraordinarily huge U.S. facilities are the rule rather than the exception in the Philippines. The United States ambassador has the privilege of going directly to the Philippine president without using proper diplomatic channels. Perhaps the most enduring aspect of our "special relations" is reflected in the Filipinos' view that the United States has almost magical power as either a benefactor or an exploiter. In fact, it is still a popular mentality among Filipinos to ascribe to America a nearly limitless capacity to shape, resolve, for good or for evil Philippine destiny.

This paper attempts to define the concept of an independent foreign policy and its historical experience in the Philippine context. The paper discusses the various issues related with the concept and goal of an IFP and the proposals raised for its realization. This paper seeks possible answers to the question of why this goal has been elusive so far.

The Concept of an Independent Foreign Policy

In psychological terms, independence is a feeling of self-sufficiency. A definition follows:

An independent foreign policy means that we should be in control of foreign relations and we should not allow others to meddle in our

affairs in such a way as to influence and be detrimental to the welfare of the country.²

Another definition given by historian Renato Constantino states that it is foreign policy that is independent of the impositions of other countries and should be guided only by the interest of one's people.³ He further expounded the concept, by stating that:

True foreign policy is an independent undertaking. Its determination must be independent of the impositions of other countries and should be guided only by the interests of one's own people. This is so because the interests of the world community of states, or better still, the people of the world, who coincide with the best interests of a country's people. The only sound basis for foreign policy is independence.⁴

Senator Shahani defines the concept as the:

. . . means that we choose our friends and allies in an interdependent world; that choice should be made by the Filipino people and their leaders themselves and not imposed by outside forces; neither should that choice be the result of the deliberate interference in our internal affairs by another power.⁵

All those definitions point to an ability of the state to control its own external transaction free from external constraints. This ability based on the fact that every state, whether comparatively insulated from or highly interdependent with others, is above all concerned to preserve the right and ability to make and implement its own decisions on external matters affecting it. It arises from the desire of every state to look after its own interest and make its own decision arising from the fact that interest of different states and groups differ from (or may even clash with) its own.

IFP refers to general principles with which a state is autonomously guided in its reaction to international developments. It is phrased in terms of goals, and decisions and actions independently formulated in pursuit of such goals. An IFP should be conceptualized and operationalized into a formalized decision or policy process which must include three elements of clarification and guidance for anyone concerned with its implementation:⁶

- (1) formulation of objectives in the most precise terms possible;
- (2) the nature of action to be undertaken, stated with sufficient clarity to guide and direct the state's officials;
- (3) and the forms and perhaps the amounts of national power to be applied in the pursuit of the objective.

Moreover, a commitment to pursue an IFP should be reflected in the country's commitment of resources, the assumption of a risk, or both. This cost/risk factor in policy-making should be borne in mind because pursuance of an IFP has a price. Often the most excoriating problem in policy determination is the decision about how much effort and resources should be given to pursue an objective in view of competing claims of other goals and limitations in the state's resources.

And finally an analysis of a country's ability to conduct an IFP necessitates an analysis of the state itself. The precondition of IFP is in fact an independent state. Hence the first question is "are we capable of acting as an independent state or not?" Before one can answer this question it is first necessary to discuss what an independent (and dependent) state is.

One can look into international law for a definition of independence. J. L. Brierly, wrote:

The proper usage of term, "independence" is to denote the status of a state which controls its own external relations without dictations from other states... Independence, does not mean freedom from law but merely freedom from control by the other state.⁷

Since independence is defined here in terms of control, then presumably a state in some degree controlled by another state might be said to be dependent upon the controlling state, hence incapable of an IFP. Moreover, a study of diplomatic history would show that the degree of dependence or independence of several countries have varied in direct proportion to the degree of control exercised by the dominant state. "Dependencies" had varying degree of control over their own affairs and were treated accordingly.⁸ Some were treated like overseas territories (like the Philippines during the early 1920s or currently like Puerto Rico) or were treated legally as part of the mother-country (like Indo-China under France). Others were treated as "lease areas," colonial protectorates, and trust territories (like several Pacific islands). Others were held in form of a suzerainty or plain protectorate (like Egypt under the British). Finally, there were spheres of influence (like the countries in the Warsaw Pact or the Western European countries during the early post-war period). Nominally, these areas were independent, but the term means:

A state without establishing its jurisdiction... signifies that it regards certain territory as clearly closed to the ambitions of other

powers. . . The mere assertion of sphere of influence gives the influencing state no right over the territory and is politically not a legal act; but in practice the claim is often protected by treaties with the states most likely to be affected.⁹ (This is perhaps exemplified by the Philippines with its defense pacts with the U.S.).

In actual reality there are degrees of independence and dependence. As one author notes:

At one end of this conceptual continuum could be placed those states that are totally dependent on other states, while at the opposite extreme could be placed those that are totally independent from other states. In between, a great variety of possible positions would exist. Indeed, one might rank order to all of the geographical entities of the world along this *de facto* dependence-independence continuum.¹⁰

Hence no state in this either extreme. . . No matter how dependent a state may be, it will never be completely subservient to the dominant power. Similarly, it can be said that no state has ever totally been independent. That is, no state has ever complete control over all the decisions that affect their external affairs. Some states may be politically independent yet dependent on other states for its economic needs (like Singapore with ASEAN countries). Conversely, some states may be economically independent yet has to depend on other countries for military or political support (as in the case of Japan with the U.S.).

Independence in an Interdependent World

Interdependence is not merely a catchy notion of modern world; it is a hard reality of the contemporary international system. In fact there are many scholars who have questioned the relevance of the nation-state. They argued that technological revolution has rendered the state obsolete, that nation-states are becoming "penetrated" and permeated by systematic foreign intrusion, and the enormous growth of multinational corporations mark the end of the state.

The expansion of the global economy has been instrumental in overcoming the isolation of the continents and countries and in establishing a world market, the international monetary system, and setting up the rules of international trade and monetary exchange.

Consequently, world trade has been converted from an exclusive club of major exporting nations into a real global activity with

more than 100 participating countries. The world exports are rising faster than the growth rates of either production or average GNP. This means that national economies are increasingly dependent on foreign sources of raw materials, market for their products, foreign financing for investment as well as modern technology. The 1973 energy crisis made it clear that economic dependence is no longer the prerogative of developing countries. Interdependence is a fact of the current international system. Interdependence among nations has become pervasive that economic and financial disorder in a certain portion of the globe affect almost all nations.

Interdependence among the countries of the world have become pervasive that no country has total autonomy. Even powerful countries often become mutually dependent or have become involved in alliance and commitments with other less powerful countries. Less powerful states have formed blocs and regional organizations, and entered into bilateral relations and other forms of international commitments to generate values that they cannot themselves generate. The manifestation of a country's independence in this interdependent world is reflected in the ability of a country to determine—on the basis of its own perceived interest—which commitments it honors, gives priority, maintains and which it will break. Thus, for each country, independence in an interdependent world refers to the ability to make decisions affecting their own country and implement it with little or without regard to the desires or wishes of foreign countries. This is a function of a state power relationship with other countries of the world. Hence independence in the real world is both relative and contextual. This power-relationship is clearly observed by Martin Singer who wrote:

To the degree that the power of a state increases, its relative independence vis-a-vis other states is also likely to increase... To the degree that power of a state declines, its relative independence vis-a-vis other states is also likely to decline. To the degree that power of some other states increases more rapidly than the power of one's own, that other state's independence—relative to one's own—is likely to increase as well.¹¹

Given the relative independence of states in contemporary world we can say an IFP itself is relative and is largely dependent on the state's ability to assert itself in the international arena. IFP is largely dependent on the state's power and statecraft. A strong and determined state is most likely capable of asserting an IFP at the expense of another state. While a weak state most likely is

incapable of asserting an IFP and mostly likely will be a victim of another country's assertive IFP.

Issues and Proposals for an Independent Foreign Policy: 1930-1988
The Forging of the "Special Relations"

The pursuit of an independent foreign policy began as early as the 1930s when President Manuel Quezon and his advisers, worried about the ability of the future republic to stand on its own feet, opted for a self-reliant economy and defense institution. Realizing the problem of economic dependency of the Philippines on the U.S., President Quezon made arrangement with the American Government to ensure means of economic adjustment for the Philippines after its independence. Moreover, it was the general policy of the Commonwealth officials to pursue a program for the development of a strong military force which was intended to reduce reliance on American assistance. President Quezon objected to the retention of military bases by the United States as stipulated in the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act of 1933. After the rejection of that act by the Philippine Legislature, and the U.S. government as a response to Quezon's demands, the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 was passed. That independence act, which was accepted by the Filipinos, reduced the number of American military bases. Under that law, the Americans were to retain only stations and fueling stations.¹²

The pursuit of an IFP ended during and after the Second World War. This was a result of (a) the trauma of the Filipinos after the war which led to their post-war insecurity, and (b) the interest of the United States to maintain a strong military position in Southeast Asia. Consequently, this necessitated the exchange of sovereign control over military bases by the Filipinos for protection and military support which they desired. So it was only logical that after achieving independence, the Philippines soon adopted the friends, perceptions of threat and major foreign policy tenets of the United States especially during the height of the Cold War. The Philippines supported U.S. war efforts in Korea and later signed a formal defense agreement with Washington. American military bases on Philippine soil grew, and military aid flowed into the Philippines. America's enemies were the Philippines' enemies and indeed it was not until the 1960s that the relations between Manila and the socialist states began to develop. America's friends often became friends of the Philippines as well. A historian provides a lucid

description of foreign policy behavior of the Philippines during that time:

In obedience to U.S. foreign affairs dictation, the Philippines anti-communist behavior has at times gone to ridiculous lengths. For twenty years Filipino delegates to the United Nations were under orders not even to speak to the delegates of the People's Republic of Poland beside whom they sat in alphabetical arrangement. Philippine Foreign Affairs Office memoranda forbade Filipino diplomats to attend social or ceremonial functions held by socialist officials in the U.N. or socialist embassies around the world. . .

. . . The Cold War inhibition has not been confined to relations with socialist countries. It has affected relations with the large number of "Third World" non-aligned countries, in particular those identified with the anti-colonial position. Neutralism or non-alignment has been looked upon by Filipino leaders imitating U.S. State department attitudes as but one step removed from communism itself. . . Philippine diplomatic relations were formed on with the major Western nations with embassies and ministries in Washington, London, Paris, Rome but this Asian nation had no ministers in New Delhi, Karachi, Rangoon, Hanoi, Djakarta, Bangkok or Singapore. . .¹³

Hence the close military and economic relationship forged with the United States tied Filipino foreign policy in South East Asia to the policies of the United States.

Given their dependent foreign policy, when Filipinos spoke in world forums they often enunciated a strong anti-communist, pro-Western foreign policy line which came to contrast sharply with the neutralist political philosophies which began to flourish among scores of other new African and Asian states. Consequently, Filipinos were viewed with contempt by other Asians and derisive comments against the Filipinos were heard in the corridors of international conferences about the little brown Americans. Staunch neutralist countries with whom the Philippines would interact in Bandung in 1955 had difficulty either understanding or appreciating the seemingly schizophrenic nature of the Filipino nation trying to portray itself as a regional bridge with Western philosophy and culture.¹⁴

It was only during the mid-1950s when the Philippine foreign policy slowly swung from the U.S. and oriented towards other Asian states free from American guidelines. However the networks of pacts and bonds with America, and its dependence on Washington for trade, investment and assistance would act as chains that kept

the Philippines economically and politically dependent to the United States. Assessing Philippine foreign policy during that time, Milton Meyer wrote:

A chief concern of all administrations was the nature of its ties with the United States. Toward its former governing nation, the Philippines stressed the past relationship and wartime experience of mutual suffering for a common cause. Liberals and Nacionalistas sought enhancement of the welfare of their American programs of trade and aid. Politicians in the Philippines were accepted as they were in the good graces of the United States; few critics of American leadership could rise to a position of national leadership.¹⁵

Recto's Proposals for an Independent Foreign Policy

During the decade preceding the June 12, 1946 Philippine independence, there was very little negative reaction to the Philippine dependent foreign policy (except perhaps from the Huks and the Democratic Alliance). There were a number of reasons for this lack of opposition. The Philippines was still in the process of rebuilding from the ravages of war and the domestic threat from the Hukbalahap was prominent at that time. Nevertheless, there were voices which were beginning to question the Philippines' dependent relations with the United States. Prominent among them was Senator Claro M. Recto, who began to point the difference between formal independence which had been achieved and the many *de facto* ways in which the Philippines remained dependent with the United States.¹⁶

Claro M. Recto delivered his major address on the subject of foreign policy entitled "Our Asian Foreign Policy." The speech contained the primary stage of the ideals which he later developed in his campaign for an IFP: the danger of dependence on the United States, the return to Asia and the bases as magnets of aggression.¹⁷ Recto advanced the thesis that the Philippines could not always rely on the United States and deplored the fact that Philippine foreign policy had hitherto placed too much faith in America. He then urged that the Philippine government should direct its foreign policy towards the Asian nations.¹⁸

During the 1950s, Senator Recto continued to deliver speeches and write articles on foreign policy. His recurring theme was the necessity for formal guarantees that the United States would automatically come to Philippine defense should our commitment to her involve us in another war. Failing this, he was for prudent

neutrality.¹⁹ A corollary theme was his belief that if we behave with dignity and asserted our sovereignty, we would be better treated by the United States.²⁰ Later in the mid-1950s Recto delivered several speeches which provide a coherent set of proposals for an independent foreign policy. Among the issues and proposals he touched were:²¹

(1) *The "special relations."* Recto tried to enumerate Filipinos' unrealistic assumption on Philippine-American relations. He noted that sentimentalism and emotionalism should not be allowed to play in the consideration of matters affecting international relations since altruism among nations is a myth. Rather as a realist, he asserted that national interest should be the determining factor in the conduct of foreign relations. Recto advanced the proposition that in a "world where the nation-state system still prevails every state takes care of its own national interests, and it is the responsibility of the government to determine what those interests are, especially those of lasting nature, and to adopt and carry out the necessary policies towards safeguarding them, sacrificing if necessary, the more transitory interests... in the same way that the good strategist forgoes a battle to win [a] war."

(2) *Solidarity with Asian states.* Recto asserted the need for Asian solidarity. In 1949, he deplored the fact that Philippine foreign policy obediently followed American lead, "not a word of recognition, not a gesture of comradeship, has been extended to the revolutions of Indonesia and Vietnam." Then in the mid-1950s, Recto enthusiastically supported Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Leon Maria Guerrero's call for "Asia for Asians." Recto envisioned Asia to be the birthplace of a new civilization and he wanted the Philippines to "shelter the embryo of this new civilization."

(3) *The U.S. bases as magnet of attacks.* In the late 1950s, Recto asserted that the Philippines would be a target of nuclear attack due to the presence of the U.S. bases in the country. However, viewing the problem realistically, Recto did not call for their removal. Rather, he noted that something could be done "to salvage what we lost of our sovereignty." He suggested that the Philippines could still assert sovereignty by standing firm on the issue of jurisdiction, reduction of 99-year lease, and the insertion of a provision in the agreement for its termination before the end of stipulated term.

(4) *The need for self-reliance.* Recto advanced the concept of physical and psychological self-reliance in international affairs as corollary to his demand for independence particularly in the conduct of foreign affairs. Recto analyzed what he called the Filipinos "lingering colonial complex."

Recto observed that our dependence in foreign affairs is not only in the realm of politics or economics, but also psychological. In view of this, he advocated the need for economic, political as well as psychological self-reliance.

(5) *The need for a strong and credible state.* Recto also emphasized the need for a strong and credible state as a "minimum requirement" for an IFP. According to him the irreducible minimum requirement for foreign policy is a legitimate government that believes in the reality of our independence, an efficient government that will know how to lead us along a course of self-help and self-reliance, an honest government whose credit will not be questioned by the world.²²

(6) *Neutrality and non-alignment.* Recto also advanced the call for neutrality or non-alignment as a fallback position if the United States would fail to provide formal security guarantee to the Philippines. He also wanted the Philippines to have a separate foreign policy from that of the United States. He asserted the Philippines must act independently and prudently as befits a small and weak nation. Moreover, he called for the Philippines to maintain trade relations with any country irrespective of its ideology, political institutions, and form of government, whenever such relationship would prove beneficial to the country.

Recto's proposals for an IFP stemmed from his own concern for national survival.²³ All his foreign policy speeches and public statement attest to this concern. Recto articulated the view that given the nature of international politics small nations like ours cannot be too careful in its international dealings.²⁴ It must be wary of every one, friend or would-be friend, and foe alike. He also expounded the primacy of national interest as the cornerstone of a country's foreign policy. And finally, according to him, no other country would really look after our own interest for us—this is something each country does for itself as best as it can.²⁵ However, Recto's proposals for an IFP was still ahead of the nation at that time. It would not be until the next decade when his ideas for an IFP became more acceptable to the people.

Attempts at Regionalism

Throughout the 1950s, Philippine foreign policy was characterized by firm pro-American and anti-communist posture, a policy which was further reinforced by the indigenous communist rebellion. However, underlying this dominant policy were sentiments and attempts to reduce the multi-faceted dependence on the United States

by casting the lot of the Philippines with Asia through regional organizations.

An early attempt to steer Philippine foreign policy away from that of the Americans was made by Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations, Carlos P. Romulo. Reflecting his country's ambivalence of being caught between the lash of the Asianists and the Americanists, Romulo suggested there exist in his country two matrices of time: Eastern and Western. Attempting to meet the persistent criticism of Recto and other Asianists, Romulo urged that the wave of the future world would be increasing interactions between Filipinos and their neighbors.²⁶ In probably the first call by a senior Filipino official for a regional organization not primarily aimed at fighting communism, Romulo floated a proposal of an Asian grouping to be formed for mutual help and consultation, one neither subservient nor condescending on communism but not stridently anti-communism.²⁷

The following year a conference for a regional consultative body was held in Baguio. However, the body failed to take off the ground. Australia, India, and Indonesia were cool toward the formation of a permanent organization proposed by the Philippines.²⁸ The self-perceived image of the Philippines as the catalyst for regional cooperation was severely deflated, for Manila was still thought of by other Asians as perhaps the most colonized society of the region, one which had been unable to break away from the cultural, political and economic ties with the United States.²⁹

The next call for a more independent foreign policy came from Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Leon Maria Guerrero, who urged that the government should be not only Nacionalista, but also Nationalist.³⁰ Moreover, Guerrero urged that the Philippines should concentrate its relations with Asia and coined the term "Asia for Asians." Recto applauded and added that the Philippines could no longer gain self-respect if the Filipinos persisted in ignoring that the Philippines' future was linked to Asia. But Washington was visibly upset, and not long thereafter Secretary John Foster Dulles called the slogan communist propaganda, and suggested that it ran counter to American policies.³¹ Possibly in an effort to avoid offending the Americans, President Magsaysay came out openly to stop the use of the slogan during his Washington Day Speech at Clark Air Base.

The Garcia and Macapagal administrations were marked by a more serious attempt to conduct a more independent foreign policy by focusing on regionalism. President Garcia took the lead in the organization of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) while President Macapagal advocated the establishment of a confederation among the three Malay countries—Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia—named MAPHILINDO. However, both their Asian policies were without flesh and, after encountering setbacks, were returned to “America First Orientation.” This failure stemmed from the fact that both presidents (like their predecessors) strongly shared the U.S. anti-communism.

During Garcia’s time Philippine interaction with its Asian neighbors was essentially circumscribed by lines of division between communist and non-communist states. President Macapagal even refused the entry of a Yugoslavian basketball team. Later, when his foreign secretary advocated a review of Philippine relations with the socialist bloc, he had him fired. This anti-communist attitude hindered the prospect of the Philippines playing an active Asian role.

Philippine attempt to foster regionalism in the 1950s was intended to disengage the Philippines from active involvement in Cold-War politics, to lessen dependence on the United States and bring the Philippines closer to its Asian neighbors, as well as to open new areas of cooperation with them. However, it cannot be denied that the pursuit of “special relations” with the United States hampered the development of close ties between the Philippines and the neighboring countries. The terms of the treaties undoubtedly compromised the image of the country as an independent Asian nation. Moreover, the Philippines’ predominant consideration of ideological complexion of her Asian neighbors as the guide for diplomatic relations with them further hindered Philippine attempts on regionalism. For example, the Philippines perceived Cambodia (under Sihanouk), Burma and Indonesia (under Sukarno), as anti-American/pro-communist states and ruled out close ties with them. As one scholar wrote:

But the Philippines was not destined to become the rallying point. It did not fit in with Sukarno’s club of militant neutralist states. Nor was Manila within even light years of spectrum of North Vietnamese ideology. The country had not developed the need or skill in neutralist balancing acts which had been perfected by Burma and Cambodia. Neither had the Philippines shared a common colonizer

or religion with a single neighbor. So by the end of the 1950s, despite some brave efforts at self-praise, the Philippines was plainly not in the inner circle of regional cooperation or regional identity. It was still after a decade and a half of sovereignty, the loner of Southeast Asia.³²

Issues and Proposals for an Independent Foreign Policy in the 1960s

The subservient attitude toward the dependent foreign relations of the 1950s gave way to a marked contrast with the protest movement of the 1960s. While the 1950s was characterized by the slow response to Senator Claro M. Recto's criticism of Filipino-American relations and Philippine foreign policy: specifically, American infringement on Philippine sovereignty, official Filipino dependency on American support and neglect of Filipino relations with other Asian nations. However, Recto's proposals for an IFP found its adherents in the 1960s.

The 1960s saw drastic changes in the nationalist outlook of many leaders, businessmen and intellectuals. This change was a result of numerous internal developments. One was the rise of economic nationalism, particularly as this was fueled by the frustration of Filipino businessmen who could not compete with the American firms. Another was the occurrence of several incidents inside American military bases which dramatized the problems of jurisdiction over offense committed against Filipinos within the bases, as well as the consequence of American presence in the country. A third was the irritating denigration of Filipino nationalism by Asians because of their misinterpretation of what appeared to be abnormally close relations with the United States. The Philippine decision to send troops in Vietnam was another reason.

These developments provided new insights to a growing number of Filipinos who were critical of post-Philippine foreign policy: that self-interest, not sentiment governed the actions of the United States in the Philippines; that national interest of the Filipinos had best been protected and promoted by the Filipinos themselves rather than entrusted to the benevolence of the "special ties." Consequently, many Filipinos began to call for a disengagement from some of its ties with the United States, a return-to-Asia policy, as well as exploration of closer relations with European countries.³³

Hence the once minority position of Recto gained wider acceptance among the Filipinos. Prominent among them were the so-called

“ideological nationalists.” They were persons who assumed the role of vanguards and guardians of the nationalist cause in the 1960s.³⁴ They advocated the nationalization of the economy and education, the removal of the U.S. bases, greater emphasis on industrialization, agrarian reform and an independent but active foreign policy. This sector was composed of various groups and individuals, among them were: Jose P. Laurel, Lorenzo Tañada, numerous columnists, writers, professors and the Kabataang Makabayan, Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism, peasant and labor organizations and to a certain degree reformist groups like the Christian Social Movement.³⁵

In their proposals for a “nationalist” foreign policy, these groups agreed in a policy of non-alignment. In the field of foreign relations there was a common desire to be identified with the so-called “Third World.”³⁶ There was also a common demand for the establishment of trade and diplomatic relations between the Philippines and the socialist countries. All were extremely critical of the relationship between the Philippines and the United States.³⁷

President Marcos' Attempts at an Independent Foreign Policy: Issues and Actions (1965-1979)

This internal upheaval coincided with the changes in the international system when the bi-polar world order was being transformed into a multi-polar one. This change occurred due to the weakening of the two global powers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the Sino-Soviet Conflict, the rise of Japan and the European Economic Community as economic blocs. This resulted in the realignment of power characterized by shifting of alliances (as in the case of China and the Soviet Union) and greater autonomy by client states from their patron state (as in case of Japan and EEC towards the United States).

Responding to these global changes, President Marcos in 1969 devised an innovative approach to Philippine diplomacy which they called ‘New Development Diplomacy.’ Based on the Filipino people’s sense of their national identity and the ideals of the United Nations, it was designed to cater to the needs of economic and social development and reduce the excessive reliance of the Philippines to the United States.³⁷ The foundation of this New Development Diplomacy was the need to assume a firmer posture toward the United States.³⁸ Hence, on January 1969, then Secretary Romulo an-

nounced the Philippine government's re-examination of all aspects of relations with the United States. And in an unprecedented move, the Philippine government initiated steps to open relations with the socialist bloc, which was a break in the Cold War oriented policy of the post-war republic.³⁹

The declaration of martial law in 1972 provided President Marcos the opportunity to direct Philippine foreign policy away from the Cold War orientation to his visions of Development Diplomacy. Martial law gave President Marcos much needed room to maneuver in defining the interests and carrying out the new diplomatic initiatives of the Philippines. President Marcos foreign policy program was clearly enunciated in an article, which appeared in December 1972 in the *Fookien Times*, stating the New Society's four major foreign policy directions:⁴⁰

- a) The effort to place our relations with the United States, particularly in the areas of security, trade and investments on the basis of national dignity, independence and mutual advantage;
- b) The search for viable and beneficial relationship with as wide a range of countries as possible—not to play off one against another, a sterile exercise that can only lead to a dead-end—but to maximize both our contribution to the world and the benefits that we hope to derive from external relations. We hope to broaden our commerce and our contract to embrace all nations, having realized that placing restrictions on ourselves for political and ideological reasons has only narrowed our diplomatic and economic options, weakened our international position and harmed no one but ourselves. Accordingly, we have dismantled all political barriers to trade with communist countries;
- c) The emphasis on solidarity with our neighbors, a solidarity that is based on our common interests, our common problems and our common aspirations. The focus of this effort is on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations which has registered significant advances not only in terms of concrete projects, but more importantly in terms of frequent contacts, the developing habit of mutual consultations, and deeper understanding among the nations of the area;
- d) The necessity to develop a certain level of self-reliance. This is the fourth element in current orientation of our foreign relations—the development of a national self-reliance which is based on economic progress and political stability. This foreign policy consideration gives added urgency not only to our efforts to strengthen the armed

forces but to the more fundamental task of modernizing our agriculture and building our industry, reforming our institutions and reshaping our society.

These foreign policy directions contained the basic proposals of Claro M. Recto such as realism in Philippine-United States relations, regionalism, non-alignment and the development of self-reliance. Given the enormous wealth accumulated by the President during his authoritarian rule and the decline of the United States as an Asian power after her defeat in Vietnam, President Marcos was able to implement these proposals. Thus he was able to conduct Philippine diplomacy relatively independent compared to previous administrations. In fact the early part of martial law was marked with numerous diplomatic initiatives aimed at projecting an IFP by attempting to cut the special relations with the United States both physically and psychologically. Among those diplomatic initiatives were:

- (a) intensified Philippine participation in the affairs of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations;
- (b) an active search for new friends and markets among the socialist countries of Eastern Europe;
- (c) more frequent consultations with Third World countries on problems of mutual interest;
- (d) the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s;
- (e) the termination of the Laurel-Langley Agreement in 1974;
- (f) and the renewed demand for greater Filipino control over the U.S. military facilities.

Perhaps the clearest indications of an attempt of independence from the United States were the change in Philippine voting pattern in the United Nations, Marcos bid to become a spokesman for the Third World in 1976, and Philippine application for membership in the Non-Aligned Nations.⁴¹ However, despite the posture of independence, President Marcos still viewed the American connection as a necessity. As one American scholar noted:

Under martial law President Marcos exhibited the same tendencies and attitudes toward the United States that he had displayed in the first blush of Development Diplomacy. His statements and actions, together with resulting political and psychological climate in the Philippines, had a profound effect on Washington. Although President Marcos listed Asia and the rest of the world first in his guidelines for policy, he recognized the supreme importance of a continuing re-

lationship with the United States especially after the fall of Vietnam.⁴¹

A careful analysis of his statements during the mid-1970s suggest a shrewd balance between demanding concessions (presumably to satisfy nationalist opinion and to obtain military assistance to deal with internal dissent) and reaffirming the need for continued U.S. support and presence in the Philippines.⁴² In fact, it was perceived that President Marcos' rhetorics against the bases and on neutrality was a manifestation of his concern about the reliability of an American defense commitment and about obtaining rental payments to offset a balance of payment deficit brought by the rise of oil prices, a lessening for demand for Philippine products on world market, the costly Muslim rebellion in the south and the growing threat of internal subversion.⁴³

Hence during the later 1970s, Philippine foreign policy was geared toward pressing the United States for concessions on the bases and for the first time insisted on linking the bases to U.S. security assistance, as the U.S. agreed to do so with both Spain and Turkey. Negotiations between the Ford Administration and the Philippine government resulted in an agreement in principle that the United States would provide \$1 Billion over five years. However, an early disclosure of this agreement by U.S. officials led to the suspension of talks and no agreement was reached before the Ford Administration left office.

The negotiations were renewed in 1978 and were concluded in 1979. In this agreement, President Carter wrote to President Marcos stating that his administration would make its "best effort" to provide \$500 Million in military and economic assistance to the Philippines during the period 1980-1984, as well as to continue regular economic development programs at previous levels. However, the 1970 agreement reaffirmed the right of the U.S. forces to have unhampered use of the bases, which the U.S. government considered essential if the bases were to retain its strategic value to them. Hence, some of the nationalist groups argued that the unhampered use not only contradicted Philippine sovereignty but could also involve the Philippines in a war without consent.

The Malaise of Domestic Weakness

The 1980s marked the decline of Philippine diplomatic initiatives that reached its height during the mid-1970s and this was

largely a result of the regime's growing internal weakness. Strongly affected by the oil price increases and the global recession of the 1980s, the Philippines reported a record trade deficit, and a record negative current account balance of U.S. \$1.1 Billion. As a result of these internal problems, President Marcos found it necessary to maintain his major diplomatic thrust toward the United States. This was necessary because the United States was the main supporter of the regime through its sale and grant of military hardware, its dominant role in the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), its commitment of U.S. troops for civic action programs and by actions of U.S.-based multinational corporations.

This had become more necessary after the Aquino assassination and the ensuing domestic crisis which forced Marcos to focus on the relations with the United States, at the expense of other foreign policy goals. The importance of U.S. assistance to President Marcos was shown in 1984 when his regime was at the weakest because of debt moratorium and protracted negotiations with the IMF. The United States accelerated the disbursement of U.S. \$50 Million for an Economic Support Fund for fiscal year 1984.⁴⁴ To finance agricultural trade, the U.S. provided a U.S. \$225 Million in credit.⁴⁵ While the Export-Import Bank granted \$200 Million in insurance guarantees program to ensure credit for trade in industrial commodities.⁴⁶

As a consequence of his dependence to the United States, President Marcos found himself vulnerable to American diplomatic pressures. In its effort to pressure Marcos, the U.S. government decided to adopt a low-key approach, commonly referred to as 'quiet diplomacy.'⁴⁷ This consisted of occasional regular visits by U.S. administration officials, close embassy contacts and one-on-one meeting between President Marcos and Stephen Bosworth. President Marcos tried to resist U.S. pressure by initiating diplomatic moves toward the Soviet Union in an effort to play the Soviet card. However, internal weakness prevented any possible attempt to pit one superpower against another. Finally, the most publicized call was that of Senator Paul Laxalt, who delivered a letter from President Reagan which contains a blunt warning to President Marcos. This led to a series of events which ultimately led to the downfall of Marcos and ascendancy into power by Corazon Aquino.

The Marcos period was marked by the development of an IFP incomparable to any previous attempts. He was able to direct Philippine foreign affairs away from American influence by intensifying relations with ASEAN, and establishing relations with the Socialist and Third World countries. He also attempted to minimize Philippine economic dependence to the U.S. by dealing with Japan and the EEC, and finally he was able to gain concessions from the United States by using the bases as leverage in the negotiations. Hence in the early period of martial law, he was able to direct Philippine foreign relations relatively free from external constraints. However, internal weakness overtook him in the 1980s and this proved fatal in his attempt to pursue an IFP in the last years of his regime.

Current Issues and Proposals for an Independent Foreign Policy

In its first years the Aquino government has averted civil war; it has slowed the country's economic decline; it has received substantial infusion of emergency assistance and debt moratorium; and it has written and ratified a new Constitution. The greatest achievement of the government has been the maintenance of civilian rule despite several attempts by elements within the Armed Forces of the Philippines to stage a coup. Moreover, the government has also succeeded in re-establishing democratic institutions like a bicameral Congress and an independent Supreme Court.

While the new government's main priority was its survival and economic recovery, it has nevertheless attempted to concern itself with an IFP. This was reflected in a speech delivered by Vice-President and then Foreign Secretary Salvador Laurel at the Philippine Council of Foreign Relations, when he outlined these concerns:⁴⁸

- (1) A policy of genuine independence in foreign policy,
- (2) Support of alternatives for keeping peace; the United Nations and its ASEAN, the group of Non-Aligned states and others;
- (3) Observance of prudence in the conduct of its foreign relations;
- (4) To enhance economic relations;
- (5) Special attention on relations with two principal economic partners: the United States and Japan;
- (6) A similar review of Philippine relations with other countries of Asia and the Pacific, with Australia, Canada and

- New Zealand, Western Europe and Scandinavia, Latin America and Africa, and the Socialist states;
- (7) Strengthening of links with developing countries of the Third World.

There were also symbolic gestures of IFP as shown when the Philippines issued a statement, along with other ASEAN countries, to deplore the U.S. bombing of Tripoli in 1986. Then in the United Nations, the Philippines voted in favor of the General Assembly's decision upholding the decision of the International Court of Justice for the U.S. to desist in supporting the Contras in Nicaragua. There were also several instances of the Philippines opposing the United States position in various issues like Apartheid and in UNGA sessions at the U.N.⁴⁹ Aside from these actions, the Philippines tried to project a more ASEAN-oriented diplomacy when the president visited two ASEAN capitals as her first state visit and oriented Philippine diplomacy to play a more active role in ASEAN cooperations.

But the most important and visible manifestation of an attempt toward the pursuance of an IFP was the vocal upsurge focused on the Philippine-U.S. relations specifically in its most visible manifestation, the U.S. bases. This upsurge stemmed from the fact that during the Marcos period, the bases in the Philippines came to symbolize American support for Marcos. In the minds of many Filipinos, the assistance associated with the bases agreement provided Marcos with logistics and financial aid to maintain his authoritarian regime. It is not surprising, therefore, that groups opposed to Marcos have been clamoring for the removal of the bases. It should be noted that Corazon Aquino and several other personalities signed a program in December 1984 calling for the removal of the bases. After February 1986, many of these opposition personalities and groups now have come to power and are very critical of the bases.

While President Aquino's view regarding the bases has somehow been modified, the President struggled to balance her view about the bases with the views of many of her moderately anti-bases supporters. This balancing act is perhaps shown in her decision to keep her options open to keep the bases until 1991, after which she will decide among her options.

Strong resentment against the bases is shown by the fact that anyone who makes overt identification with the bases or the United

States becomes a political liability or a stigma. This is shown by the fact that then Defense Secretary Rafael Ilete, who is regarded as a supporter of the bases, asked Congress for means to build up an indigenous defense capability in preparation for the removal of American presence. Another effort to show solidarity with this new nationalist sentiment was when President Aquino demanded that the United States respect Philippine sovereignty and independence. In an answer to a question on whether she would respond to American pressure she said "I think the only pressure that affects me is the pressure from the people themselves."⁵⁰

This upsurge against the United States and the call for an IFP is not only focused against the bases but also in related issues like nuclear weapons, neutrality and non-alignment. The most prominent action against the alleged presence of nuclear weapons in the bases is the pending anti-nuclear bill in the Congress. The call for neutrality and non-alignment was raised no less by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Raul Manglapus. After his appointment as foreign secretary in 1987, he claimed that neutrality was the ultimate objective of his country's foreign policy which would entail withdrawal of the foreign military bases.⁵¹ He added the statement that the balance of power in Southeast Asia need not necessarily mean an American presence in the Philippines. He also claimed that the anti-nuclear clauses would be written into any treaty concluded by the Philippines and the United States relating to the continuation of the military bases as a reflection of the anti-nuclear provision of the Constitution.

However, despite the upsurge of nationalist sentiment against the United States and the call for an IFP, the government (except through rhetorics and vague pronouncements) has found it difficult to make any decisive move regarding the issue nor initiate any new diplomatic initiatives that could endanger its relations with the United States. This might be due to the fact that the Philippine foreign debt of \$27.5 billion has affected Philippine foreign policy initiatives.

The country's debt strategy entails repayment of loans made during the Marcos period. This resulted to a huge cash outflow that negated any future economic growth much less recovery. In 1987, service payments to commercial banks amounted to \$2 billion.⁵² By 1992, the Philippines is expected to pay some \$3.7 billion.⁵³ The government's desperate need for new money to service the debt

and finance economic recovery program would force it to compromise its independent posture. This is due to the fact that Manila has to depend on the United States, and Washington might force it to toe a line which could eventually lead to an extension of the lease on the bases. This is very possible since the debt strategy has compelled the government to seek assistance from the United States and Japan. In fact, the government is hoping that Washington will come up with a \$5 billion mini-Marshall Plan to rescue the Philippines from the debt crisis. Moreover, internal problems like the insurgency, Muslim rebellion, the rightist threat and the problems of economic development would surely affect the country's ability to pursue an IFP since the government is far more concerned with its domestic problems, and most likely would have to depend on the United States for military and economic assistance.

CONCLUSION

A view of the past and current proposals for an IFP would show that most of the proposals deal with the following recurring themes:

1) *Greater independence from the United States.* A continuing theme in the process of achieving an IFP is the need to end the Philippine-American "special relations." Philippine-American relations during the four decades of independence has been colored by the euphemistic and emotion-laden phrase "special relations." However, by force of circumstances, these relations are slowly giving way to the less emotional and more realistic ties based on "realpolitik." This is due to the fact that Philippine nationalism has grown assertive through the years. This is shown by the fact that during the first decade of independence, the predominant ideal of a Filipino nationalist was one who was friendly to the United States since a close tie with the United States was viewed as a guarantee to security and a promise to bring American economic assistance. However, gradually through the years, this outlook has changed. From the moderate nationalism of the Filipino First Policy Movement which was generally pro-establishment (conservative businessmen were eager to seize economic advantage from Filipino consumers) to the present anti-establishment nationalist who must also be anti-American or "anti-imperialist." Oftentimes, these nationalists have taken positions against all vestiges and institutions of our colonial past from our educational system to the military bases.

Yet underlying this predominant anti-American sentiment is the lingering belief that the Americans have an obligation

to assist the Philippines in its financial problems. Consequently this resulted in an ambiguous situation wherein on one hand, the Filipinos are demanding the need for a relationship based on realpolitik on the grounds that as a mature and independent country, the Philippines must be given an equal treatment. On the other hand, the Filipinos have insinuated that they are entitled to special treatment due to the historic "special relations"—a very common situation seen from visa application to bases negotiations. Hence, while Philippine-American relations (from economic to security) has been condemned as exploitative to the Filipinos and has been scorned as being a hindrance to the attainment of true independence, it has also been viewed as a means to seek special favors that are conceived to be rightfully due to the Philippines. This is shown by the pecuniary attitude towards the American military facilities. While the United States military bases have been viewed as a derogation of our sovereignty and independence, they have also been seen and used in getting assistance and economic concession from the United States. Indeed, the long process of attaining greater independence from the United States would not be merely limited in the economic and political realm, it must also include the psychological realm.

2) *Emphasis on regionalism* to lessen dependence on the United States. Ever since President Quirino's proposal for a Pacific pact to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Philippines has looked upon regionalism not only as an instrument of anti-communism but also a hedge against overdependence to the United States. The Philippines has viewed regionalism as a possible way of avoiding wasteful rivalry for foreign capital among Asian countries, and an instrument of pooling the region's technical and material resources so as to develop her economy. This would strengthen her bargaining position and lessen her need for U.S. assistance and investments. Moreover, the Philippines has viewed regionalism as a key to a viable regional security system (like ZOPFAN), which would negate the need for U.S. military bases, military assistance, or any other special relations with the United States.

3) *Non-alignment and neutralism with respect to the superpower rivalry*. Many of the Third World countries confronted with the realities of the international system have sought non-alignment as a rational choice. Hence non-alignment—literally, not taking sides—has almost always appealed to the weaker members of the bi-polar international system. By taking a middle position several new countries have maximized its appeal to both the Soviet Union and the United States. The two competing powers were made to act as if they were suitors seeking to win the same woman. By occasionally hinting for a commitment, a Third World country gains a leverage as each suitor was compelled to show its serious intentions usually

with large amounts of economic and military assistance. The further a state moved away from the West, the more eagerly the East would offer its assistance. In this situation, the weaker states usually find themselves the objects of superpower competition but not victims of superpower proxy conflicts.

Non-alignment had already been raised from the time of Recto and applied by President Marcos in the 1970s when he opened relations with the socialist bloc and sought to be identified with the Third World and the Non-Aligned Movement. Currently, the desire to be identified with the non-aligned countries is shown by the reiteration and identification of the Philippines with the ideals of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971. However, the Philippines' dependence on the United States for economic assistance, trade and investment as well as the presence of the American military facilities in the country poise a formidable obstacle to the practical application of this proposal.

4) *The need for self-determination and self-reliance.* Another recurring proposal is that we, as a people should learn the hard lesson that we cannot look to anyone else but to ourselves for the protection and promotion of our national interest. Before a country could implement a truly independent foreign policy, it is imperative that it should have developed a certain level of self-reliance. The development of national self-reliance could only be possible if the country has reached an advanced level of economic development and political stability. Moreover, it should have also formed an efficient and strong armed forces and diplomatic corps. These domestic prerequisites are crucial if a country is to have the freedom to choose and to determine when to accommodate or compete with another country, with whom to enter into an alliance or to be aligned at, and what position to take on international issues affecting its interest. This proposal for national self-reliance has already been raised from the time of Manuel Quezon during the Commonwealth period down to the present.

The recurrence of these proposals and the continuing call for an IFP perhaps imply that these issues have not been satisfactorily attended to in the past nor in the present. Maybe our expectations regarding these issues have been beyond what we could bring into reality, or we do not have the capacity to implement these proposals.

We have tried to seek closer relations with ASEAN in an effort to seek solutions to our economic and security dependence on the United States. Regional cooperation is viewed as a way out of our problems. However, as the experience of ASEAN shows, regionalism does not necessarily lead to more security, more peace,

more prosperity and less dependence from the United States. While it can ameliorate some of them, regionalism can not solve all our problems. The ideals of a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality and the intensification of ASEAN economic relations are yet to be realized.

Cooperation without underlying political commitment to create genuine regional institutions is inevitably limited and tenuous. Only agreement in which all members benefit immediately usually succeeds. In addition, cooperation is unlikely if it threatens existing bilateral aid and trade arrangements, if it appears to impede national development plans, and if it endangers national elites or threatens to diminish their status.⁵⁴

Another example of our attempt to cut our dependence from the United States was our identification with the Third World movement in the mid-1970s. One aim is to avail of the various economic benefit we can derive from Third World cooperation. The sad fact, however, is that the Third World has nothing or little to share except sympathy and much poverty. The largest source of assistance, investment and trade is still with the developed countries. On the issue of non-alignment, despite strong anti-bases and neutralist sentiment in the country, the government is still uncertain about the retention of the bases after 1991. This uncertain position stems from the fact that the Philippine government is well aware of the fact that the U.S. facilities bring much needed support and revenue to the country and that, at least for the near future, the Philippines cannot readily replace them as a source of income and support.

We have to accept the fact that IFP is built brick by brick, from day to day, through prudent, consistent and dedicated effort by the people and the government. The state must steer firmly to the main purpose of an IFP which is the enhancement of national interest through the interaction with other countries free from the constraints of an external power.

Foreign policy is not a separate part of the total politico-economic scene of underdevelopment, in spite of what some people may want us to believe. Therefore such relevant model must be related to the problem of political stability and consequently to the problem of development to show that foreign policy is in fact a useful instrument in the preservation of a regime and/or state which is ultimately the bearer of the burden of development.⁵⁵

Finally, an important factor in the pursuance of an IFP is the acceptance or assumption of a risk and a cost. In this aspect, we need to bear in mind that pursuance of an IFP has a price. And we have to face the excruciating fact in our decision to pursue an IFP how much effort and resources must be made in the pursuance of the objectives in view of our limited resources. In context, we have to raise the following questions:

- 1) Are we willing to bear the dire consequences if the United States military bases are removed from the country?
- 2) Are we ready to forfeit the numerous assistance provided to us by the members of the Western Alliance (Japan, United States, EEC and South Korea) for the sake of a non-aligned foreign policy?
- 3) Are we prepared to subordinate personal and sectoral interests to the supreme task of building the foundations of national self-reliance?
- 4) Are we willing to face the risk of closer political and economic relations with the socialist bloc for the sake of a non-aligned foreign policy?
- 5) Is it feasible to sacrifice short-term national interests for the sake of long-term regional objectives?
- 6) And finally, as a small and relatively weak nation, are we prepared to venture and face the exigencies of the international system on our own?

NOTES

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³ Renato Constantino, "A Critique on Philippine Foreign Policy," *Sunday Globe* (3 April), p. 9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁵ See Leticia Shahani, "Towards an Independent Foreign Policy," *Foreign Relations Journal* (October 1987), pp. 151-163.

⁶ See Charlie O. Lerch, *Concept of International Politics* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood-Cliffs, 1970).

⁷ Marshall R. Singer, *Weak States in World of Powers* (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 36.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

¹² See David Laird, *The Philippines in South East Asia: Transaction, Interactions and Conflicts* (Michigan: University Microfilms, 1975), p. 24.

¹³ See William Pomeroy, *An American Made Tragedy* (New York: International Publishers, 1976).

¹⁴ Laird, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

¹⁵ Milton Meyer, *A Diplomatic History of the Philippines* (University of Hawaii, 1965), p. 275.

¹⁶ See Salvador P. Lopez, "The Foreign Policy of the Republic of the Philippines," in *Government and Politics*, edited by Raul S. Guzman et al. (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 244-245.

¹⁷ Renato Constantino, *Continuing Past* (Quezon City: The Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1984), p. 272.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 272.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 273.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 273.

²¹ See Claro M. Recto's speeches on foreign policy in Renato Constantino (ed.), *Recto Reader* (Manila: Recto Memorial Foundation, 1983).

²² *Ibid.*, p. 69.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Laird, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

³¹ See Meyer, *op. cit.*

³² Laird, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

³³ O. D. Corpus, *The Philippines* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965), pp. 72-73.

³⁴ Jose Abueva, "Nationalism and Development in Filipino Politics," in *Nationalism and Emerging Ideologies* (Manila: Modern Book Company, 1975),

³⁵ See Noe Baga, "A Comparison of Six Emerging Ideologies," in *Nationalism and Emerging Ideologies* (Manila: Modern Book Company, 1975), p. 27.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ See Claude A. Buss, *The United States and the Philippines: A Background for Policy* (Washington: AEI-Hoover Policy Studies, 1977), pp. 51-52.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

⁴⁰ See Eduardo Z. Romualdez, "The Philippines and the United States—Shifting Perception in a Changing World," in *Fookien Times* (1973), p. 55.

⁴¹ Buss, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

⁴² Lela G. Noble, "The National Interest and the National Image," *Asian Survey* (July 1975), pp. 83-85.

⁴³ See Robert L. Youngblood, "Philippine-American Relations Under the New Society," *Pacific Affairs* (Spring 1977), pp. 51-58.

⁴⁴ Gary Hawes, "United States Support for Marcos Administration and the Pressure that Made Change," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* (June 1986), p. 33.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁴⁷ Bernardo Villegas, "The Philippines in 1985," *Asian Survey* (February 1986), pp. 134-135.

⁴⁸ See Laurel, *op. cit.*

⁴⁹ See Jose D. Ingles, "A New and Independent Foreign Policy," speech delivered at the 40th General Commencement Exercises of the Manuel S. Enverga University Foundation, 4 April 1987.

⁵⁰ Leszek Buznski, "The Philippines, ASEAN and the Future of the American Bases," *The World Today* (May 1988), p. 83.

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⁵² Mathews R. George, "Aquino Debt Crunch," *South* (May 1988), p. 83.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁵⁴ Robert L. Rothstein, *The Weak in the World of Strong* (Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 101.

⁵⁵ See Elipidio R. Sta. Romana, "A Framework for Philippine Foreign Policy: Some Suggestions," *Asian Studies* (1981), pp. 83-108.