THE EVOLUTION OF POSTWAR JAPAN'S CULTURAL DIPLOMACY: A THEORETICAL INTERPRETATION

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Introduction

Given national interest as a priori, the political, economic, military, and cultural dimensions constitute a nation's foreign policy. These dimensions of national interest are areas which policymakers emphasize when designing and charting the course of a nation's external relations. When taken as identifiable units in the realm of foreign policymaking, each area has its own emphasis: the political diplomacy dimension emphasizes the "political interest" aspect; the economic diplomacy dimension ensures the preservation and expansion of access to trade and natural resources; the military dimension maintains, in less visible fashion, the nation's "security and strategic" well-being; and the human and cultural diplomacy dimension brings into relief the "human side" of foreign relations (see Figure 1).

In practice, however, foreign policy cannot be "departmentalized" as there are varying degrees of superimposition among two or more of the dimensions. Limiting foreign policy to only one or two of these dimensions is nearly impossible. On the other hand, interactions between nations crisscross every level, thus increasing the frequency and intensity of exchanges through the different dimensions, individually and simultaneously altogether. The distinction among dimensions may be even further blurred by the following circumstances: first, an overemphasis on one channel of foreign interaction, for instance, economic relations; second, the absence of a clear definition or the use of broad and vague terms to describe policy goals and purposes. In some cases, general slogans, devoid of specific national policy principles, are difficult to sustain due to lack of long-term vision. And thirdly, the evolution of each policy component creates shifts in policy emphasis. Institutional growth, transition, as well as quantitative and qualitative changes require updated redefinition of foreign policy concepts.

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The subject of analysis of this paper is the "human side" of Japanese foreign policy which is conventionally referred to as cultural diplomacy. For the purpose of establishing a theoretical frame of analysis, the human component must be isolated theoretically and distinguished from other components. There is neither an easy resolution to the issue of essence and concept concerning cultural foreign policy, nor is there an escape from the fact that the term "culture" is often loosely defined in foreign policy activities, making it unlimited in conceptual scope and extremely difficult to measure. But the absence of a clear definition of the cultural aspect of foreign policy does not deny the dimension's existence and significance in the complex foreign policy of modern nations.

To mitigate the problem of conceptual manageability, the discussions focus on that aspect of foreign policy that covers the "human flow" dealing with the receiving and sending (exchange), educating, training and development of people. This is referred to, in this paper, as the human and cultural dimension of foreign policy. The human being is the focal subject in the exchange and cooperation activities, emanating from the foreign policy dimension as contrasted to, and analyzed in conjunction with, the "flows of goods", and the "flows of money" between and among countries.

Japan's diplomacy may emphasize on natural resources as a corollary of economic foreign policy; and on human resources as a sub-part of Bunka Gaijo
The political and security dimensions are other components that make up the whole foreign policy.

International human exchange, in general, and as an aspect of foreign policy, in particular, has been revolutionized by technical progress in the means of transportation and telecommunications that link nations and continents. The technological revolution has shrunk the scale of time and distance, barriers to direct human contacts among peoples in different societies. It is possible for a nation-state, through its policy, to conduct and promote direct human contacts on a large scale beyond geographical and social borders for certain purposes. In this modern age, the deliberate manipulation and control of international human flows has become a potent instrument of foreign policy.

Principles Behind Human and Cultural Foreign Policy: Selected Countries

A thorough comparison of Japan's human and culture-oriented foreign policy with those of other countries is not a main purpose of the following discussion. But a brief overview on how the so-called advanced nations insured their ability to influence world affairs, how they pursued and are pursuing human and cultural exchange to attain foreign policy objectives, however, can help elucidate on the nature of Japanese foreign policy approach in this field.

Needless to say, the historical circumstances and factors vary in each country so that it is of limited usefulness to compare Japan's policy concerning human and cultural exchange with other nations of comparable status. Some relevant points and observations on the human and culture-oriented diplomatic policy of some selected Western democracies, however, can shed light on the peculiarity and characteristics of Japanese human exchange policy. There is no standard for comparison except to see the individuality of each country.

With regards to the cultural dimension of foreign policy, France, Great Britain, West Germany, and the United States of America, among modern nation-states, have clear convictions and philosophical foundations upon which cultural and human exchange-oriented foreign diplomacy are based. In these countries, during the postwar period, the pursuit of human exchange through cultural, educational, technological and intellectual activities continue to manifest the spiritual and philosophical motives, even though they are more strategic.

France is one of the first Western countries to define cultural relations as an important part of her foreign policy and implement it in both pragmatic and philosophical approaches. While it sounds arrogant to say that French culture belongs to the world, the French government's belief in sharing its culture is a belief in universality as a philosophical basis for the nation's cultural diplomacy.
This conviction propels France’s cultural mission in the world; and the goal to promote its prestige and national interest. Moreover, this aspect of foreign policy displays a “sensitivity towards the cultural requirements of other countries at different levels of development” with a sensitivity to local cultures and ways of life. It is also important to note that the centers and institutions under French cultural missions abroad, i.e., the Alliance Francaise, are intended to be “place of exchange.” There is an awareness of the importance of both immediate national goals and the long-term vision. The universal inspiration is a strong selling point of the cultural policy dimension to which the French attach high esteem. The French who just celebrated the 200th anniversary of the Fall of the Bastille claim that they share with the world the three ideals: Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. This is a form of human and cultural contribution that is cherished everywhere as it belongs to all mankind, not only to France.”

The United States of America, after World War II, was one of the Western powers outside Europe that pursued a very active cultural diplomacy based on a strategy and a national ideal. On the aspect of idealism, America’s cultural, information and educational foreign policy programs and activities manifest the nation’s conviction and the practice of the “philosophy which it believes.” A predetermined policy vision that guided human and cultural exchange with other countries was clearly expressed. In particular, America’s “public diplomacy” or exchange of ideas, information, and products of socio-cultural undertakings through exchange of persons was founded on the principle of “the freedom to know” as part of the American way of life. American human and cultural exchange with societies was motivated by a strong desire to project and share (which could also be interpreted as a subtle imposition and exercise of national power) the American way of life and democratic ideals. With a strong belief in this way of life and in world mission, the U.S., through its foreign policy, attempts to share with other countries its national values and socio-cultural aspirations. One example of an American idea that it tries to share with the world is the principle of “government for the people, by the people and of the people” as a philosophy of governance. Needless to say, American influence in foreign countries has not always been palatable. But it is not easy to attribute the US shortcomings to its cultural diplomacy alone.

Great Britain, since the not so distant past, has been one of the cultural contributors to the modern age, through the influence of the English language. The British, in evaluating their own cultural diplomacy, contend that after the French language, the English would become the “instrument of civilized men all over the world.” This perceived mandate of the British empire to carry on the torch passed from France’s linguistic dominance over civilized men, while sounding arrogant, was a self-imposed responsibility, inspired by a strong cultural conviction. The goals of economic and political expansionism, and
world ambition of Great Britain, when it was the “Mistress of the Sea” and during the time when it was said that the “sun never sets in the British Empire,” cannot be completely dissociated from its cultural diplomacy even in postwar years. A long-term vision for human and cultural relations in British foreign policy, however, was clear, and included cultural spirituality beyond mere mercantile goals. Britain’s significance in the world “is not to be measured in terms of penny-pinching housekeeping.” Although the cultural aspect of foreign relations cannot be quantified, there was a deep awareness and belief that culture, especially the English language, was a major export of Britain. This demonstrates the distinction between the measurable economic goals and the “intangibles” of foreign policy. The parliamentary system of government was a political and socio-cultural innovation from the British that is shared by many countries.

West Germany is another country in the free world that emphasizes the cultural side of foreign policy. The “cultural work” is considered by German diplomatic missions as “equally important as political and economic work.” Obviously reflecting on the lessons of history, specifically, apologizing officially for German atrocities during the last war, the safeguarding of world peace and promoting international understanding were a part of German foreign policy design. The principle of West Germany’s promotion of mutual understanding, cooperation and exchange with other peoples of the world is derived from the principle that “the value of what we give is only worth as much as our willingness to take. Thus an open attitude towards others is a principle of our cultural policy abroad.” The German approach to cultural and human exchange as a foreign policy activity was characterized by a two-way flow: German cultural achievements to other countries, and the willingness of the Germans to receive from other cultures.

In the above brief discussion of the underlying principles of human and cultural policies of selected countries, it can be inferred that, in general, a clear philosophy and vision preceded the cultural activities and related foreign policy actions. Foreign policy was anchored to a pre-determined vision.

With regards to long-term vision as backbone of foreign policy, did Japan have a universal principle and philosophy behind its human and cultural exchange foreign policy? While the lack of a clear expression of conviction does not necessarily determine foreign policy philosophy, a clear clarification of the philosophical setting of Japanese human and cultural diplomacy is needed. A respected scholar and authority on Japan has this to say:

“...International understanding is not just a pleasantly innocuous catchphrase for Japanese policy but has become practical necessity... The Japanese are intellectually aware of this situation but they find their own sense of uniqueness difficult to shake off.”
Spiritual Foundation of Japan's Foreign Policy

It is a correct assumption that by constantly and consciously comparing herself with the West, Japan sought to equal but not to be exactly the same as other countries. After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan vigorously pursued a “follow-the-West” policy which gradually developed into a pursuit of “catch-up-with-the-West” aspiration. The “catch-up-with-the-West” idea was different from “doing the same thing as the West.” In Japanese cultural diplomacy, while following the trodden path, i.e., increasing the number of foreign students, intensifying cultural exchange activities and the like, there evolved along the process, a Japanese foreign policy pattern that was a product of Japan's policy milieu.

The Japanese tendency to look up to European countries and America for standard of comparison and for models of human and culture-oriented diplomacy are due to various reasons. One is modern Japan’s limited experience and disposition to outwardly share, for example, cultural heritage, ideas, and such socio-cultural interplay with other societies. The philosophical and spiritual aptitude to reach out to other people has not been a part of Japanese foreign policy propensity. This can be seen as a kind of an under-development in Japanese foreign relations that needs a further stimulation.

Another reason is that, most of the conventions and practices governing international human and cultural exchange in contemporary foreign relations were established by Western countries. In fact, the ideas and concepts of spreading religion, introducing political and economic systems, educational system, philosophical values, culture and human knowledge were part of the strategic and ambitious schemes to spread Western influence to other countries. The traditional way to dominate was the rule of the game which could be achieved by imposing one's own value system in the local milieu. It reached its peak during the era of colonialism.

It has always been the powerful nations that could afford to conduct the exchange of people for the propagation of certain values and systems. Historical facts demonstrate that, in most cases, the adaptation of a national policy to mobilize people, thoughts and ideas beyond national borders was an outgrowth of a nation's power and dominance. Nations possessing or aspiring to achieve world power status somehow had to develop that power. Because contemporary Japan was definitely an admitted member of the powerful and advance nations’ club, she had to compete with other powers in a situation wherein the rules were established by the Western nation-states. As a participant in the foreign affairs game, Japan had to learn the established art of cultural diplomacy or eventually develop her own approach.
Foreign policy is a manifestation of the spiritual beliefs and values of a nation. It is a reflection of a people's attitude, thinking and philosophy, as well as aspirations with regard to themselves and in their relations with other societies. Western countries, in particular, have been strongly guided by their convictions and values in the conduct of foreign relations. Western religious beliefs, ideals, languages, social practices, missionary zeal to 'civilize' fellow human beings, (these were instruments of imperialism and cultural nationalism in the colonial past) were great motivations behind human exchange activities—the establishment of mission schools, the sending of teachers, volunteers, lay missionaries, doctors, and engineers overseas.

Philosophical and spiritual values undoubtedly inspired most Western policies on human and cultural international exchange. If stripped of the narrow economic, political and material motivations, the human exchange activities carry some universal and individual sense of values.

Flows of people and culture during the European colonial years had been in the name of kings and nation-states (material motives) and in the name of God (mostly Christian spiritual motives). Despite the economic and politico-military ambition of the rulers and monarchs under whose names colonial expeditions were organized, some remnants of universality and altruistic objectives can be discerned. Some degree of acceptance by the receiving side of the values and beliefs that were introduced could mean that visions surpassed the racial, national, cultural and social barriers of the nation-state. The proofs of acceptance of the Western spiritual values where human and cultural exchange activities took place were the religious conversion and adaptation of some socio-political systems in many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In these countries, the Christian ideals and Western thoughts took roots and continue to influence cultural, educational and social systems. While there is condemnation of past colonial exploitative policies of the imperialistic West, it is also fair to recognize the philosophical and spiritual contributions of Western cultural diplomacy like the concepts of democracy, freedom, and equality. For instance, in the Philippines, the 1986 February revolution20, partly inspired by "Christian love" for fellow human beings, helped topple dictatorial rule with the least sacrifice in human life. The recent uprising of the Burmese people opposing military rule and state-sponsored suppression of freedom was another instance of culturally influenced idealism. These events illustrate how Western-originated ideals were used to fight social ills, whose origin could be partially traced to Western colonial making. The latest example of the influence of Western thoughts and ideas was the erection of the replica of the Statue of Liberty at the Tiananmen Square in Peking during the May-June 1989 demonstrations by Chinese students and intellectuals. The credits go to the brave people of these countries and not to Western philosophy and thoughts. The point
is that Western thoughts and ideals, even in their symbolic meanings, have universal appeal.

Indeed, many countries, mostly Western ones, condemned the student massacre at Peking's Tiananmen Square for reasons of universal values and principles. Japan's reaction to the incident was rather subdued. Apparently, the Japanese stance was based on its own concept of the issues. In the surface, universal principle as introduced by Western societies made them closer to China through a philosophical sharing. Japan used the situational approach to determine its reaction to the incident involving a moral and philosophical issue. The attitude of the Japanese government toward the situation reflected the kind of beliefs and value system of the Japanese as a country and as a people in general and how far this is shared with the world at large.

There are philosophical thinking and ideas that were "transferred" and shared among societies that do not discriminate against color, creed and cultural setting. As far as universal application is concerned, they are a positive legacy of human and cultural exchange diplomacy that transcend the narrow interests of the nation-states that created and contributed these philosophical ideas. One measure of the greatness of a nation is its spiritual influence as reflected in its foreign relations.

Human and Cultural Exchange: Its Locus in Japan's Foreign Policy

In relation to culture, the human diplomacy dimension can be approached in two ways. One way is to look at international cultural exchanges as an all-embracing field which encompasses human exchanges. The other conceptual view is to limit the scope of cultural exchange as just one avenue among many through which international human exchange is facilitated. In the latter approach, the human component traverses and goes beyond the confines of cultural exchange. To technically avoid the ambiguity of the word 'culture' in Japan's cultural diplomacy, and in order not to confuse the widely accepted term cultural diplomacy (bunka gaiko) with the concept of cultural exchange (bunka koryu), while it is presupposed here that the latter may or may not be involved in foreign policy, the former is always in the context of foreign policy (see Figure 2). In other words, cultural exchange is treated here as just one channel of activity under foreign policy. The channels of international human exchange in Japanese foreign policy are:

1) Cultural exchange
2) Technical cooperation
3) Scientific and educational cooperation
4) Youth and friendship exchange
Human flow is the common denominator of these program areas. The four areas combined make up Japan's international human and cultural foreign policy dimension. This dimension has the same category as the economic, political and military foreign policy dimensions with particular emphasis on human exchange activities.

**Fig. 2. The Program Areas of International Human Exchange**

**Government and Private Sector-Based International Human Exchange**

When international human and cultural exchange is placed within the direct and indirect purview of the state or its authorized agencies, and is therefore a government-based activity, there is no further need to clarify whether or not the activity is part of foreign policy. But how should the type of human exchange that does not fall directly under government jurisdiction be considered? This is a vital question because a high percentage of Japanese international human and cultural exchanges are promoted and conducted under the auspices and sponsorship of private foundations and organizations. In principle, when dealing with foreign policy, cases of purely non-government-based human exchange is deliberately not included unless they fall within the orbit of foreign policy at some later stage in the program evolution process. The government-sponsored exchange is one major type of international exchange. The Japanese private sector, notably the firms and economic organizations that support institutions for international human and cultural exchange, as a whole, play a major role in the expansion, stability and continuity of the policy dimension. The powerful economic and industrial organizations, in their individual as well as collective capacities, influence government actions on policy matters and determine the output and direction of the foreign policy component.
Joint efforts of government and the private sectors invigorate the evolution of Japanese international human and cultural exchange policy. The so-called national interest pursued by the state, and the commercial interest pursued by the private commercial sector, in the final analysis, are not contradictory in essence. They are complementary.  

If distinction is to be made between government and private sector approaches to international human and cultural exchange, the major differences may be found in the manner of implementation, in the scale and scope, time range, the field of emphasis, and in who takes the initiative. Whether the reference to the close relationship of the Japanese government and business sectors is exaggerated or underestimated, the merger of the national interest espoused by the government and the private interests represented by economic and industrial groups is a hard fact. Japan's international human and cultural exchange is a merged area of interests between the government and the private sector bonded by a common process, institutional relations, and general policy orientation. The contemporary trend is towards an even closer coordination between the government and non-government sectors. The need to distinguish the government and the private sector is not an urgent issue in Japanese foreign policy debates. How to get the cooperation of the private sector and Japanese society as a whole, to be more interested in, and open to, international human exchange is perhaps a more pressing concern of Japanese cultural diplomacy. There is an explicit and implicit recognition that government and private sector activities in this policy area complement each other before, now, and in the future.  

Policy Goal and Policy Instrument  

The areas of culture (under cultural exchange), educational and scientific cooperation, technical transfer, and youth and friendship exchange, taken collectively, comprise human and cultural diplomacy with one general goal—the promotion of the national interest. But when general objectives are pursued in details, the issue of goal versus means arises.  

Human and cultural exchange can be conceived as a means or as an objective, or both. As a policy instrument, the Japanese government’s policy guides human flows vis-a-vis other countries, one of the goals of the exchange of people, such as students, technicians, trainees, scholars, artists, athletes, and youth, naturally, is the beneficial effect from such activities. The conduct of exchange programs for public relations and information is a major aim. To promote a good image and favorable attitude toward Japan and the Japanese society is one important foreign policy goal. But if this kind of human and cultural exchange is emphasized too much, it is likened to the beautiful
wrappings for a variety of policy packages. In a broader context, peace, development, friendship, understanding and goodwill can be the end goals and human and cultural exchange activities can be the means.

The mere "flows" of people in desired numbers at desired times through desired avenues serve certain policy purposes. When the policy to cause the "flow of people" is given importance for its visible effects, it can be called, for example, as propaganda. The existence of the propaganda element in any nation's foreign policy cannot be denied. It is a vital part of diplomacy. But when policy visibility becomes the main goal of the activity, its essence can be impaired.

On the other hand, each program area of human exchange has specific goals that are superimposed on the broad goal of human and cultural diplomacy. Each category or area of human exchange has objectives like development of human physical, intellectual, mental, as well as spiritual capabilities and potential through education, training, and information activities. The human being is the ultimate justification of the specific activity. This is the second kind of human exchange that is contrasted to the first type because it treats the human being as ends. People being "exchanged" are not treated merely as policy pawns or tools.

The third use of human exchange, in terms of means and objectives, is the combination of the two. In some actual cases, human exchange activities are carried out more as means for other policy goals than as ends, and in some cases, they are mere supplements for priority policies. The degree of dominance of one over the other varies according to the stage of policy evolution and prevailing factors and circumstances.

In the harsh reality of international relations, it is of secondary importance for foreign policymakers to debate whether to treat international human exchange participants as instruments or as goals, if they consider such a philosophical and moral issue, at all. To seek the ideal is desirable but the choice, fortunately or unfortunately, is the prerogative of the policymakers. It is naive to say that morality and philosophy should have priority over pragmatic benefits, specifically at a development phase when pragmatism dictates policy directions. But as the policy component develops beyond short-term objectives, the aspiration to balance the pragmatic means with the ideal and broader goals may grow stronger. Regardless of whether human exchange is pursued for foreign policy, for the individual participant’s goal, and for stated and unstated goals, the human being becomes the focus of policy programs.

In Japan’s foreign relations, in general, international exchange is an activity that sustains the national well-being. The exchanges are composed of various flows—flows of goods, the flows of money, and flows of information. The
The flow of people is being developed recently in postwar Japanese foreign policy. The gradual transformation of the human dimension is, in one way or another, firmly inter-linked with the other "flows." The emphasis on human exchange was partly due to a search for alternative links because the channels of material economic exchange become congested with and stifled by friction. Japan depends on international trade and commerce and she needs the goodwill and cooperation of other countries to maintain the continuous flows of goods and materials. Japan also has to prevent its isolation from the rest of the world community due to natural, historical, geographical, and socio-cultural barriers. The flow of people is an inevitable consequence of the total flows in contemporary Japanese foreign relations.

Efforts and budgets for the promotion of human and cultural activities are investments that promote other foreign policy interests. The human and cultural dimension and the other pillars of foreign policy, for example, the economic dimension, are intertwined and they reinforced one another interchangeably as means and ends.

The Developing Regions and Human Resources

Development Diplomacy

The goals for human resources development as part of foreign policy have two aspects: the tangible and the intangible. A pragmatic approach gives priority to manpower training and education for economic needs and activities. The tangible objectives are related to the measurable economic activities like increasing industrial production and upgrading the quantity and quality of certain commercial goods and services. In this sense, pragmatism is reinforced by the active participation of economic and industrial organizations whose manpower and technical needs must be met through human resources development programs. Strong commercial motives influence human resources development to focus on the measurable goals and benefits.

Japan's experience in its national development is the best example of human resources development in as far as its foreign cooperation activities are concerned. Okita Saburo, one of the architects of Japanese postwar development stresses the role of human resources as the 'most vital resource' in development. It is in this area that Japan can effectively cooperate in the development of the Third World.

A fundamental question is what emphasis and for whom human resources should be developed? Should the development be for the benefit of certain interest or for society at large? Is human resources development an appendage of purely economic and industrial development? Is it a spill over of economic
material development? Where the real national interest is not limited to narrow economic motives, foreign policymaking cannot afford to ignore the broader perspective of human resources development.

Perhaps, the non-material orientation of human resources development is considered only when the government has the capability and leeway to steer policy direction from the strong domination of purely economic objectives and interest toward a broader orientation.

Contemporary ASEAN-Japan relations typifies Japanese relations with the so-called developing countries or the Third World. In the level of socio-economic and industrial development, the relationship structure is the so-called North-South framework (with the exception of Singapore, which belongs to the newly industrializing economies or NIEs). For the 'South side' countries, in their aspiration and struggle to pursue the urgently-needed developments which can be summed up as national development, the human resources development is a key factor. It is an indispensable element in the process of nation-building. For this reason, effective Japanese assistance and cooperation to the countries in the ASEAN in the field of human resources development can have far-reaching significance.

For Japan, the policy pursuit could provide a valuable opening for opportunity to participate in the ASEAN economic activities. Human resources development is an area that is most probably least controversial as a policy activity. The importance of technology in the ASEAN on one hand, and the experience and capacity of Japan in the field of human resources development, on the other hand, make cooperation a convenient common ground for policy pursuits. Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Japan's announced intention to contribute to the world community, particularly to developing countries, may find fulfillment in a well-planned human resources development diplomacy. It can be further argued that human resources development is a mutual goal where there is convergence of Japan's national interest and the interests of the developing countries. There is mutual stakes in the long-term mutual benefits from the maintenance of technology-based international economic relations, regional and world security, and stable societies brought about by educational, scientific, technical and cultural advancement. The narrow short-term policy goals and activities of developed and the developing countries, however, may not always find convergence.

Diplomacy Based on Strength and/or Weakness

Foreign policy in general entails ideas, conceptions and perceptions of the domestic and external realities and conditions that eventually induce or trigger programs and activities.
Postwar Japanese foreign relations at the beginning, has been premised on the nation's dependence on foreign countries for national survival. The lack of natural resources in the Japanese archipelago is often pointed out as the weakness of the Japanese nation, coupled with the consciousness of being a "small nation." In theory, when such a stance determines the logic and rationale of foreign policy pursuits, external events and developments are often viewed as threats to national interests, a negative perception. Foreign policy does not go farther where it is not challenged directly. The foreign policy choice is either reaction or inaction and seldom for effecting long-term influences or changes. In the extreme, if survival is not threatened, if national interest is not involved, there is no policy, and there is no commitment and interest.

Extending this line of argument to Japanese policy evolution, this may explain the fact that despite the newly-found status as a global economic power, there is slow development of a national policy aptitude to take up, voluntarily, policy initiatives in the international community. A nation that preoccupies itself with excessive safeguards from external changes is less in a position to consider the needs and situation of other nations. Japan first needs to graduate from the principle of self-survival to the consciousness of a Japan preserved by and among the rest of the world.

The time of the "small nation" mentality is over and cannot be an excuse. Japan has now grown into a world power and her existence looms far larger than during the time when it could pursue a policy focusing mainly on economic diplomacy. The survival and well-being of Japan as a world economic power remains basically dependent on foreign trade and economic relations with other countries but the nation's enlarged status implies the inflation of its high vulnerability. The responsibility, expectations, and the requirements for a komusubi (wrestler of the 3rd rank) do not remain unchanged when he reaches the yokozuna (wrestler of the 1st rank) class in the sumo world. The same analogy can be said of Japan today.

Japanese foreign policy is formulated with conscious consideration of two factors: the area of national strength and the area of national weakness. The simultaneous interplay of the nation's strength and weakness determines the ambivalence of complacency or earnestness in certain policy area of activities. If there is a feeling of confidence in the nation's strength, complacency in foreign relations may develop. If there is sense of weakness in the nation's position vis-a-vis the external environment, vigilance and hyper-sensitivity to world developments and events govern the policymaking atmosphere. The strength and/or weakness may be real or perceived.

The scarcity of natural material resources is said to be Japan's Achilles heel. When foreign policy is determined by this weakness, the actions and non-
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actions are cautious responses like walking on thin ice in the international grounds. The nation's foreign diplomacy in the early decades after the war was greatly shaped by a hypersensitive perception of the nation's Achilles heel. Consequently, policy activities were concentrated on its efforts to strengthen itself against the national weakness. This consciousness was heightened by external changes and developments that influenced Japanese foreign policy activities in varying forms and degrees.

The national attitude can be different when the diplomacy is based on a nation's strength. The national strength of Japan is its economic power. There is no argument about this. But looking at the economic quantifiable elements to explain the national strength is certainly an incomplete view. It does not require a complicated analysis to see that the real foundation of the country's economic viability is its highly developed human resources. The literacy rate of the Japanese population on the average is said to be one of the highest in the world. Japanese advanced technology, which is the envy of other countries, is based on, and is maintained by, the highly skilled and well-trained manpower. The nation's confidence, then, lies in its highly developed human skill, literacy, and average quality education. Reliance on economic and technological strength to pursue interactions with foreign countries has become more pronounced. It is logical that if diplomacy is asserted on the basis of national strength, Japanese international diplomacy should find in human and technical resources development an effective instrument. Technology-based human resources development can be Japan's forte in extending cooperation to other countries. Indeed, this is a potent instrument through which the nation can have a leverage vis-a-vis other countries. Being in possession of this advantage, Japan can be in a position to initiate the form, the structure and the mode of interrelationships. Mike Mansfield, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, said:

"Japan's greatest policy instrument is its economic assistance program. The rest of the world associates Japan with economic power, a power it hopes Japan will use wisely."

The keizai taikoku (economic giant) and high technology era may witness the emergence of opportunities for new initiatives in Japanese foreign policy.

Foreign Policy Formation: Stimuli vs. Taisaku and Kosaku

Postwar Japanese human and cultural exchange policy can be best understood by a follow-through of its path of evolution. The starting point is Japan itself, the national character (kunigara) which refers to the sum total of the nation: its people, geography, culture, values, tradition and historical experience.
In this connection, the social structure of Japanese society upon which policy is based is described as elastic and adaptable. Japan is a “society with a flexible frame” but which becomes brittle when pressure is exerted from outside. This is coupled with a kind of social attitude wherein the people “have never developed a sense of participation in the international life based on a clear awareness of their people in the world.” This is a part of the national character which is the given milieu that molds national policy. Domestic and foreign policy activities and programs have had no firm and pre-determined comprehensive foreign policy goal based on a fixed belief and vision. The Japanese “interpret international society in terms of specific external pressure on Japan.” As a consequence of the given conditions determining the course of policy process, foreign policy activities and programs started as particular reactions and adaptation to new changes and development in the policy environment.

Against this background, at the initial stage of foreign policy formation, Japanese participation in international cultural, technical, educational and human exchanges were mere reactive and induced activities. Theoretically, reactions do not necessarily imply policy vision and pre-determined goals.

In the course of time, the reactive activities are gradually adapted into routine activities. At some point in time and stage of the evolution process, the regularized activities become institutionalized and are fitted into the mainstream of foreign policy. In the strictest sense, there is a big conceptual difference between the activities emanating from reaction and activities based on policy vision. The former is an ad hoc action determined by the occurrence of external stimuli, i.e., unpredictable events. On the other hand, activities based on conviction and long-term policy have a definite predictable course and method of action that guide and determine present and future decisions.

The process of policy growth provides a transition from the reactive activities to the regularized or routine activities. When certain temporary reactions are found to be effective in serving the national interest, they become part of the national policy when adapted as such. Normally, a foreign policy has goals which may be long-range, medium range, and short-range. In this context, foreign policy, therefore, follows a planned, long-term vision. There is consistency, continuity and stability. At the initial phase, the idea to engage in human and cultural exchanges were reactions to external stimuli or were intended as urgent countermeasures to perceived crisis and other external threats to Japanese national interests. The Japanese term for this is taisaku (cf. taiou) which means literally, counter-policy. The fundamental characteristic of taisaku is that it is a product of the circumstances surrounding the policy formation such as the presence of an imminent crisis that is actually threatening or is perceived to be heading towards the shores of Japanese interest. Essentially, it cannot exist
without the occurrence of *gaiatsu* (an external pressure), an outside event or development, and other forms of stimuli to be countered. Where there is fire, there is smoke, and when smoke appears, countermeasure is formulated.\(^4^1\)

The risk and shortcoming in this type of approach is that not all fires are preceded by smoke. Regarding the effective reach of this type of foreign policy, it is like a portable searchlight in the dark that responds towards, and focuses only on the changes and movements within monitoring distance around it.

Moreover, *taisaku* being inseparably linked to monitored outside stimuli, should emphasize more the techniques and the process to gain the best advantage possible at the shortest time. It has a passive character which becomes more active and charged as the external pressure becomes more intense. This passivity is due to the watch-and-see posture and it becomes activated by the ‘other’ interacting party.\(^4^2\) The diplomacy has an expression in Japanese which is *ukemi gaiko* (passive diplomacy). Strictly speaking, this label refers more to attitudinal approach of policymakers than a policy classification. The decisions and activities are on a TPO (time, place, and occasion) basis. A *taisaku* may lose steam and cease when the external threat which justified its creation disappears.

Postwar Japanese attitude vis-a-vis foreign countries in general has been characterized more by a perception of threat than as opportunities for interactions. The “black ship of Commodore Perry” still seems to be the symbol of present-day monitoring of events and developments around Japan.

*Taisaku* has a “search light” focus approach in foreign relations including human exchange relations and can imply a kind of insensitive selectiveness to the kind of problem it addresses; and at the same time a “hypersensitive” disposition towards the external environment, foreigners, foreign countries, and foreign things when they are of immediate consequences to the national interest. The policy type thrives on adjustments on a case-to-case basis. It requires endless monitoring of the reaction of the winds of change in different regions of the world. It enhances and supports a wait-and-see attitude concerning the actions and reactions of other countries before taking policy measures.

While Japanese human and culture-oriented policy may develop from mere activity to countermeasure and finally to policy levels, another policy transition could possibly occur, with a slightly different character. It is described as *kosaku* which means strategy. Strategy could be a short-term or long-term type of policy. This strategic approach in Japanese human and cultural policy bloomed during the Japanese military reactions with Southeast Asia in the name of the *Tai-Nampo Bunka Kosaku*. This form of foreign policy is not necessarily peculiar to Japan because many powerful nations, in their own way of promoting their national interests, engage in cultural and human exchange as strategic
their national interests, engage in cultural and human exchange as strategic policy activities. Normally, in international relations, strategic activities are pursued for advantageous position and conditions in a given relationship between interacting nations.

Human and cultural exchange as strategic activities are less dependent on the reciprocity from the targeted country or countries. As such, the process of kosaku policymaking need not be understood by the other side. At the phase when a foreign policy is mainly for strategy, the degree of transparency is low. The role of human and cultural policy to promote understanding is suppressed when it is treated as kosaku.

The Japanese Nariyuki Policy Dynamics

On prewar and wartime manners and attitudes of Japanese dealing with foreign negotiations, the work of Blaker and some scholars give incisive insights and observations. In analyzing foreign policy aspects, it is indeed difficult to say whether the manner of conducting policy is a function of a national character and cultural pattern or the other way around.

The evolution of postwar Japanese foreign policy in general, and its human and cultural dimension, in particular, from taisaku undertakings and finally toward a stabilized initiative-taking policy could best be described by the Japanese term nariyuki gaiko. Literally, nariyuki is derived from two words: naru- “to become” and yuku- “to proceed.” Both combined words refer to evolution and a dynamic process. The nariyuki gaiko term does not refer to a concept of Japanese policymakers. It is not a conscious way, but rather it is an inherent characteristic of approaching issues. It is a descriptive concept of the dynamics in Japanese foreign policy development as applied to the analysis and observation of the growth of specific aspects of Japanese postwar foreign policy. It is a simultaneous occurrence of two processes. In this coined description, it means that the foreign policy is “becoming as it is proceeding and proceeding as it is becoming.” The theoretical essence of this analysis is that Japan’s postwar foreign policy, with specific reference to the human and culture-oriented dimension, has been a policy of accumulated creation derived from, and designed by, the course of events, changes, and developments through policymaking process. It embraces the total process including transition and transformation of the policy in the hardware and software aspects. External

*The word nariyuki is used here as a neutral term for description purposes.
intervention such as events, new developments, foreign pressure and criticisms, etc., are most effective in influencing the course of the open-ended nariyuki policy because of its flexibility. But it is wrong to always presume that when Japanese negotiators give in or change their position unexpectedly, they are showing weakness. The change can be interpreted to mean that it is the nariyuki dynamics that operates. Taisaku and kosaku are portions of policy dynamics.

The absence of a rigid principle or philosophy is, in itself, the principle that governs the policy course of the nariyuki gaiko. The policy philosophy is an emerging one, seldom preceding actions or non-actions. The foreign policy in this situation is a product of the process. A passive posture towards changes and developments in the policy environment (domestic and external) is a marked characteristic. The policy that is born of the nariyuki policy dynamics undergoes a protracted birth. The nariyuki evolution mold hardly takes a definite form and shape over a predictable length of period.

In contrast to the nariyuki evolution, the foreign policy born out of a predetermined policy goal and based on a rigid principle and guiding philosophy is essentially 'complete' conceptually at its inception and formulation stage. The implementation is towards the realization of a more or less pre-conceived scenario of what the desired ideal situation ought to be. The pre-designed and pre-determined foreign policy proceeds on a charted course, less dependent on the policy process. It is not unduly influenced by the contours and terrains of the policy environment. Based on a vision, the policy target is pre-marked and the direction is pre-set. The rigid policy sometimes implies a head-on collision course against the external environment. Policymaking does not follow an attitude of active avoidance of issues but is backed by oftentimes zealous initiatives to influence the outcome of events, to mold and not to be molded. Basically, the policy goal and position do not change according to changes of the weather in the international relations environment because the policy vision prevails in its essence regardless of transition and variations.

One very important visible measure of the growth and development of postwar Japanese human and cultural policy is the institutionalization of its various activities. The institutional expansion is a portion of the nariyuki process continuum of the foreign policy dimension. After the activities that started as reactions become regular undertakings, they are further stabilized structurally with the establishments of agencies, organizations, and bodies supported by the state. The institutionalization phase greatly enhance the administrative aspect of the policy.

Through the policy evolution process, the 'abstract side' of foreign policy programs and activities like the vision, the ideals, and spiritual inspirations are also emerging. The goal, then, is actively guided by a structured concept and
determined path through the established institutions. The cohesiveness and gradual universality of the policy comes with the process.

Finally, the nariyuki evolution, because policy is shaped by the policy milieu, mirrors the short-term thrust of each phase which changes according to time, place and the needs of the country. Each stage of the policy development has its peculiar underpinning and time frame context. If considered in segment, each policy phase in relation to the whole continuum manifests distinct characteristics and orientation.

Thus, applied in the Japanese foreign policymaking in general, and in its human and cultural diplomacy, we can discern a development in the continuum that goes through a transition and then develops from a passive position to a phase of active stance. At the later development stage, Japan starts to take policy initiatives with or without the policy stimuli. A possible development can be a definite policy vision upon which a long-term policy goal can be anchored. Reaching this phase is a part of this Japanese policy evolution. The nariyuki foreign policy evolution is illustrated in Figure 3.

![Figure 3. Evolution of the Nariyuki Diplomacy](image)

Japanese contemporary foreign policy initiatives pivot around the economic fulcrum. The human and cultural diplomacy is still being nurtured and maintained within the economic framework, wherein directions and orientations are strongly determined by the dictates of economic principles. As such, the gradual deviations from the passive policy stance are still mainly related to
the changes and development in the Japanese economy and in the nation's foreign economic relations.

First, Japan's attainment of world economic power status has bestowed upon the nation an intensifying self-confidence. A confident nation theoretically takes the lead in world affairs. National confidence and strength emanating from economic power can reduce the hyper-sensitivity and dependence on external stimuli for foreign policy. The flexing of the economic muscles enhances policy initiatives.

Secondly, the area where Japan could contribute to the global community—technical cooperation activities—is within the industrial and economic sphere. Japan's economic affluence and strength supported by the global system compel her to take on new responsibilities. The growing expectation from Japan's allies and from the developing countries, that Japan should do more to contribute to the maintenance of the international system concerns mostly economic and technical cooperation. Japanese response usually comes in packages of economic, financial and technical assistance offers. The elements of human resources development and technology transfer are components and subjects of economic negotiations. Hence, the incentives of international human and cultural exchange are closely dependent on economic motives.

On the issue of national security, Japan's human and cultural diplomacy can enhance the trust of other nations through closer cooperation and co-habitation. Cultural activities can gradually reduce apprehensions towards Japan and in a world of increasing interactions, in the broad sense, trust from neighboring countries is an important component of national security.

Post-industrial Japan is cognizant of the so-called Era of Culture, or *Bunka no Jidai*, and is slowly developing interest in the non-economic activity dimension. No less than the Japanese Diet and government in the postwar years have actually contributed in legislations and policy evolution of both the concept of *bunka* and *bunka koryu* as one of the pillars of the nation's postwar foreign policy. But this interest may remain an extension of economic power and economic abundance. Economic affluence is expected to spill over to nurture and promote cultural and human exchange with a broader and long-term perspective now and in the future. But whether the economic and industrial field alone is adequate to develop and nurture an enduring policy philosophy remains to be seen. In the meantime, the Japanese *nariyuki* pattern is expected to pervade as long as it serves the goals of Japanese foreign policy.
NOTES


2 The term shigen gaiko emphasizes the diplomacy to maintain the various flows of materials and goods, particularly foods and raw materials during the 1950's. Keizai Gaiko is the broader network to promote this foreign policy emphasis. But the human flow, as seen in the program areas have been interchangeably treated with other dimensions of Japanese diplomacy.


3 The term jinzai gaiko implies that the human being is a type of diplomatic resource.

4 Cultural diplomacy encompasses not only culture but the human beings involved in the policy activities. In this study, it is therefore co-terminus and co-equal to the concept of "human and cultural" diplomacy in this study.


6 Ibid., p.119.

7 Ibid., p.121.

8 Ibid., p.120.


10 Ibid., p.117

11 Ibid., p.124.

12 Ibid., p.123.

13 Ibid., p.124.

14 Ibid., p. 125.
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15 Ibid., p.126.

16 Ibid., p.127.


19 Japan is the only Asian nation that is a member of the Western industrialized countries, or the so-called G-7 with Canada, U.S.A., France, Great Britain, Italy and West Germany as the Western countries. The first summit was held in 1975. Also, Japan is at present the only Asian country to be a member of the OECD.

20 The Filipino February 1986 revolution that toppled the dictatorial rule of President Ferdinand Marcos on February 25, 1986. The role of the Catholic Church (a Western legacy) was reportedly a big factor in the conduct of the peaceful revolution.

21 The student demonstrations that started in June 1988 which led to a change of government leadership and still in the process of transition. "Democracy" was a slogan by the Burmese students.

22 The incident is referred to as the June 1989 Tiananmen Incident where students were massacred. The students demanded for democratization and reforms. The Chinese military’s action of firing and killing students and civilians was condemned by most government from Western camp, causing diplomatic rows with Beijing.

23 The Japanese position was "...rather avoid making a black and white judgment" on the Tiananmen Square incident. See Japan Times June 8, 1989.

24 The term bunka koryu, meaning cultural exchange, has a broader scope as an activity and it can encompass both government or non-government domain. It may or may not be an official state undertaking.

25 There is no distinction of 'government' and 'private' in kokusai koryu. Activities in both sectors can be taken as international exchange activities as long as they involve a foreign entity or entities.


It was implied that the lack of information activities, koho buzoku, regarding Japan caused misunderstanding. See Kokusai Koryu Kikin Hoan Kokkai Shingiroku, 1972, (The Japan Foundation (Kokusai Koryu Kikin Rodo Kumiai, 1983) p.12.

The Japanese terms for these categories of “flows” are: *mono no negare, kane no negare, joho no negare, and hito no negare.*


Japanese term for its policy in cooperation with ASEAN countries is “kunizukuri no tame no hitozukuri” (human resources development for nation-building).

The *shokoku or shigen no nai kuni*, (a small country lacking natural resources). The use of one’s weak position to get concession and understanding in international negotiation.

In the sumo world, the higher the ranking, the higher the responsibility to maintain a certain level of wins in order to maintain the ranking. Yokozuna, the highest ranking, carries with it the heaviest responsibility, *yokozuna toshite no sekinin*.

Mansfield, Mike, Speech delivered before the Asia Affairs Research Council on September 14, 1987.

It is interesting to note that there is no criterion to be called a “taikoku” (giant country) in economic power, etc. The same is true with military power. Despite the fact that Japan’s military power is reportedly in the top rank in the world, no reference to it as a military giant is made.


Ibid., p.101.

Ibid., p.101.
40 Eto, Shinkichi, "Foreign Policy Formation in Japan, "in *The Silent Power, Japan’s Identity and World Role*, (The Simul Press, 1976). p.120-123.

41 The reaction versus external pressure is a counterpolicy or activity for "coping" with what is occurring in the policy environment. The urgency is indicated by the expressions kibishii jokyo (severe situation) and kinkyu taisaku or urgent countermeasure. This is different from policy. The gaiatsu factor in Japanese foreign policy most probably originated from the U.S. wherein Japan made decisions on policy because it was pressured from outside. See also Orr, R., Jr., *Transnational Politics and Japanese Foreign Aid Decision-making: The Role of the U.S.*, (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Tokyo, March 1988). p.168.

42 The term aite shidai or senpo no dekata wo mimamoru are revealing of the nature of the reactive countermeasures.


44 The term as used here does not refer to a foreign policymaker's concept. It is a theoretical tool to analyze Japanese foreign policy dynamics as seen continuity and evolution of the human and cultural dimension.
