IS GLOBALIZATION A THREAT TO THE NATIONALIST IMAGINATION IN THE PHILIPPINES?

Eduardo T. Gonzalez**

Since the Philippines just celebrated its centennial of independence, it is perhaps worth remembering that it was a pair of human inventions, revolution¹ and nationalism, that gave birth to the Filipino nation. Of this pair, nationalism—largely a New World invention transmitted to Filipino patriots through European contacts—was the driving force in the struggle for national identity.

In the course of a hundred years, nationalism became a conscious, self-protective policy,² intimately linked to the preservation of a national consciousness. Current political contests and governance structures in the Philippines bear the imprint of this national consciousness.

Although it was left to the native Filipino elite to authenticate the nation’s historical experience and engage in the intellectual task of imagining the nation³ as a large community, the nationalist agenda has provided Filipinos of various social classes and ethnic backgrounds with a positive sense of collective identity and belonging. In the postwar period, the discourse on national development centered on the role of the state as the legitimator of nationalist strivings.

Today, in the wake of globalization and economic integration, there are signs that nation-ness⁴ and the nation-state’s domestic power are being seriously eroded. The “apparent” trend is toward convergence rather than differentiation of nation-states⁵ as the globalized economy forces all governments to adopt similar neoliberal policies.

* This paper is published with the permission of the Institute for Popular Democratcy.

** Eduardo T. Gonzalez is a Fellow at the Institute for Popular Democracy and the Philippine Center for Policy Studies, both in Quezon City.
In a manner of speaking, nationalism has lost its importance as the centripetal force of Philippine history, because markets and commodities now determine the outcomes of national decisions.\textsuperscript{6}

This paper argues that, on the contrary, it is the relative weaknesses of domestic cultural institutions in the Philippines rather than the generalized strength of globalization pressures that gnaw at the gains of the nationalist project. Any substantial weakening in nationalist strivings owe at least as much to local cultural foundations as to global processes.

How is culture defined? This paper de-emphasizes the anthropological explication—the aggregate of social customs, symbols and myths. The reason is that it carries the implicit assumption that every anthropological formation is equally significant in its own right, leaving only a mélange of societal differences. It is essentially a denial of any typical model or standard in the emergence of the nation-state. Nor does it give a sharp image of the “specificity of the complex formed by a society’s original thought.” Following Perry Anderson (1992a), the definition of culture here is drawn from political sociology: a force arising from a sustained and continuing social and political self-formation by society, furnishing the concepts and analytic framework with which to interpret collective experience—including the basic imagining of humanity in society—and forming the indispensable premises of public action and civic responses.

**History and National Consciousness**

The present conjuncture—globalism in the lead—was neither constructed nor anticipated by the nationalist project. Yet nationalism has, of late, often been presented as its antithesis. In the wake of the seemingly unstoppable advance of globalization, is the nationalist project dead? Is Filipino nationalism in a tailspin, going into a deep intellectual slump, forfeiting its ardent activism and, instead, residually turning into the repressed personal principle of left-wing groups?

To look for answers to the present crisis, a good starting point is any observed “asymmetries” in Philippine history—features which challenge common sense and so seem to call for clarification. These historical moments undergird the present dilemma of Philippine nationalism. The beginnings of the present
crisis lie in a distinct sequence of historical events that shaped the prior evolution of the Filipino nation. Although simplified and imprecise, the explanations that follow should provide some basis for an understanding of how the crisis can be confronted and eventually resolved.

"The Empire Strikes Back"

Of all Asian nations, the Philippines has had a shorter historical narrative because of the accident of geography: it was not in the main route of old expanding empires and kingdoms on which the imagined national communities of other Asian countries were founded. The islands' sociocultural configuration was determined by this compelling void.

Historical episodes which fail to arise can sometimes be more consequential than those that do. Until the 16th century, no significant cultural forces and traditions reached the archipelago on any exceptional scale. Empires came and left impressive architectural imprints, but in the archipelago, indigenous ways of life went on largely unaffected by external influences.7 This was a spectacular fault, judging by the writings of Corpuz (1989), Evangelista (1998) and Benedict Anderson (1997).

No comparable historical force in Southeast Asia could be more catalytic than the arrival of Indian empire-builders in preconquest times, remaking tiny coastal principalities into enormous Hindu-Buddhist political states. Large-scale incursions produced the Indianized states of Shri-Vijaya, Angkor, Mataram, Majapahit, among others. For well over several centuries, the islands now known as the Philippines were solitarily excused from the cultural predominance of these old empires, simply because they were far from the principal trading routes from India (through the Malacca Straits, for instance).

The arrival of Islam in the southern islands in the thirteenth century seemed to herald the ascendancy of a major cultural force that could break the simple neolithic character of life in the archipelago. Indeed, Islam became firmly rooted in Sulu, expanded to Mindanao, and gained footholds in Luzon. But its general advance was later checked and reversed, snapped off before it had time to develop fully. In the end, Islam remained strong only in parts of Mindanao and some bordering islands.
The centralized nature of the Hindu-Buddhist states also intensified the "bypassing" of the Philippines. These precursors of nation-states were configured into concentric circles, in which the power of the sovereign ruler waned the farther the subject territories were from the epicenters. The Philippines was too remote from any central point. As a result, Indianization came late to its shores. The succeeding generations of Indianized Southeast Asians which introduced Indian influences—enduring traces are Sanskrit words in Filipino dialects—could not overcome the weaknesses inherent in the lateness of cultural formation. The influences, according to Evangelista, were too feeble to provide a take-off for a deeper political formation.⁹

The climax of several centuries of extensive cross-cultural accommodations in Southeast Asia was the consolidation of Hindu-Buddhist influence in the mainland (Vietnam, having endured centuries of Chinese-Confucian-domination, was the exception) and Islamic power in the islands south and southwest of the Philippines. Their absence in the Philippine islands naturally left lasting contours. Cervantes speaks of the unrelieved indigenous ways that continued until the Spanish conquest. Even if the hundreds of barangays¹⁰ proved responsive to developments elsewhere (they sporadically accommodated small-scale Chinese, Indian and Islamic influences), the fact is that, as a whole, the archipelago failed to be sociologically deepened by the arrival of a new historical force. Against these Hindu and Islamic paradigms, the limits and deficiencies of early Philippine experience become apparent. The permanent injury, according to Evangelista, seems to be the enduring cultural fragmentation of Philippine society.

The preconquest times were an era of great social synthesis: in that lay the far-reaching consequences of the old empires. The Hindu and Islamic formations, with their shared religious and cultural identities, were huge organic holisms, complex imagined communities at different levels—religion, politics, social life, art, law, economic activity and so on. The cultures that the empires built—the material production and the production of meaning, following Gramsci¹¹—were totalizing experiences, the articulation of the social whole itself. They brought into existence great traditions, institutional continuity and the "sociological" breadth of empire. The empires promulgated global laws, set up socially transcendent standards, were experts in statecraft, erected imposing monuments and left enduring chronicles.

Simultaneously, they marginalized whatever they failed to take over. Because these cultures were of imposing proportions, local particularities, such
as those which transpired in the archipelago, seemed to correspond only to uncomplicated, circumscribed social action. Any premodern “identity” that emerged out of these circumstances that was established outside broader institutions, which could “connect” inhabitants across wide social and geographical spaces was, as suggested by Breuilly (1996), inescapably incomplete, discontinuous and elusive. The disjuncture between national structures and local sources of action observed by Perttierra (1990) might have originated from the immutable absence of a binding “global” cultural tradition. Perttierra argues that the Philippine state is organizationally weak to enforce its own formal structures on the routines of village life. These local routines evolved from notions of kinship, locality and association, and on which are implanted the “practical consciousness” of most Filipinos. They have remained impervious to national “machination” to this day, thus retaining their relative autonomy from the nation-state. Today, national culture remains a sui generis construction.

In the absence of a prodigious cultural formation that embraces large dimensions of social existence, the predicament faced by nationalism today may be seen as occasioned in part by a national failure to create a broader synthesis of common experience (tradition, culture, ethnicity) that gives national identity a solid footing and simultaneously, to produce the categories necessary to integrate newer frameworks (for example, globalization) within this congruity. A country crippled by such weaknesses is a “fuzzy state”—to use Kajiwara’s (1995) term—which is unable to constitute itself into a nation-state in its full-fledged sense.

**An Underdeveloped Nationalism?**

Because of the less “ancient” institutional foundations of the Philippines, it had less of a distinct cultural and social discipline that could offer tough resistance or barrier to colonialism. Paradoxically, Filipino nationalism, which was itself largely a response to colonialism, developed in the context of this framework of fragility.

It can be said that the relatively more recent exposure of the Philippines to outside historical forces was, for all practical purposes, singularly western (first, Iberian, then American). It was Spanish colonization which secured the incorporation of thousands of local communities in the islands into a more centralized political set-up, with a single system of law and government (Evangelista, 1998). To be exact, colonialism was founded on the ruins of the old barangay structure (Corpuz, 1989). The difference between pré-Spanish
Philippines and the states of Burma, Siam, Khmer, Vietnam or Java was that these kingdoms had sizable military and bureaucratic power; by contrast, relatively little force was needed for the conquest and consolidation of dispersed coastal communities in the Philippine archipelago (Anderson, 1996). The American occupation left unaltered this evolved political construction, but introduced the civil service, public schooling, and the democratic franchise through direct political representation in the colonial government.

Nationalism arose in opposition to colonial rule and domination, albeit slowly. Conceivably, the battle against colonialism did not run straight away along the lines of nationalism, much like what was suggested by Fanon (1969). In the case of colonial Philippines, it was built on the aspirations of the ilustrados, the wealthy and European-educated mestizos whose lack of political power circumscribed their further ascent in late nineteenth-century Spanish-ruled Philippine society.

The idea of nation-ness was, by the 1890s, clearly politically viable, as the ilustrados figured out through their journeys in Europe, and through what Anderson (1991) describes as “the circumambience of travel confined to what would become the (Filipino) nation-state.” It was through these “pilgrimages,” helped a lot by an enormous increase in physical mobility (by way of steamships and railways), that the nation-state was experienced by the ilustrados.

Europe was not an accidental sanctuary in which the soon-to-be ilustrados sought shelter. For them, hamstrung by the Church which opposed any liberal forays, it was a conscious choice. From Europe, they drew upon the ideas of Liberalism and the Enlightenment with which they could critique the ancien regime back home. But enlightenment ideas alone could not be decisive in creating a new consciousness. It was European print-capitalism, by its dissemination of new “models” of the nation-state, which enormously helped the ilustrados in shaping the new imagined national community.

Nineteenth-century journeymen who wished to fan the flames of national sentiment, according to Anderson (1991), “were able to work from visible models provided by their distant and, after the convulsions of the French Revolution, not so distant predecessors.” Nation became “something capable of being consciously aspired to from early on, rather than a slowly sharpening frame of vision” and “available for pirating by widely different, and sometimes unexpected, hands.” The French Revolution itself, Anderson suggests, was a chaotic, puzzling
concatenation of events. Yet in the hands of print merchants, it became a model to be emulated.\textsuperscript{14} Nationalism was thus a “derivative discourse” predicated on an identity with “Enlightened” modernity.

These archetypes of nation-ness, articulated through the Propaganda Movement, were of central political importance. They sowed the seeds of a national Filipino consciousness, and paved the ground for the revolution against both Spain and the United States, in spite of the ilustrados themselves (who insisted on political reform within the framework of continued Spanish sovereignty). It is no accident that the ilustrados were the first Filipino “globalizers”: the propagandists’ ideology of nationalism and concept of nacion were “imported” from the European tradition of liberalism (Evangelista, 1998) and, one may add, “pirated” from western nation-state models.

By now, it should be apparent that although Filipino nationalism was the product of a momentous nineteenth-century political conjuncture, it lacked much of a cultural dimension. The answer to the question of why the country produced the earliest revolution in Asia (when culture was least formed and available) is precisely that: no old, all-embracing cultural formation hindered colonial progression nor saddled the development of political responses to it (that is, nationalism and revolution).

The first revolution in Asia was sufficiently ahead of its time because there were no cultural elements which were unassimilable to it. During the late years of Spanish colonialism, there emerged an insurgent body of thought which was unrivaled by any competing model. The absence of any residual cultural enterprise assured its ascent and guaranteed that the revolution would not overshoot the political intentions of its initiators.

By contrast, neighboring countries took considerable time to rethink society as a whole, as the imagined community had long been “etched in stone” (e.g. Borobudur, Angkor Wat). Once culturally ascendant elements had come together, these political formations were, of course, unfriendly to any form of thought that might put the social system in question. Colonialism itself never seriously ruffled their social structures. In many cases, colonialism co-existed with and, in some cases, embraced old cultural elements if it could not subjugate them.\textsuperscript{15} There was no indefeasible need for western rulers to supersede the existing cultural order.

The “nationalist” classes in these countries were thus initially unable to “introduce” a countervailing body of thought to oppose colonialism, especially if
it encouraged destabilizing upheavals. The global influences of western Europe were initially alien to these societies. In fact, western ideas (and thus, nationalism) made advances and shaped critical discourse only after the heroic energies of the early historical phase had faded.

When the “pilgrims” in some of the neighboring countries eventually scored their triumphs, they were a generation behind the Filipino forerunners. For many of these nation-states, the end of the road was the same: revolution. But to succeed, the nationalist drive had to reach a “maturation,” which meant painstakingly combining contradictory elements: modern political skills with reflective customs, explosive upheavals and a tranquil harmony of tradition, lively social progressiveness and deeply-rooted cultural conservatism. All these took long periods to resolve.

This suggests that neither culture nor politics alone will be decisive in the long run; that the strength of enduring nationalist projects is to bring cultural adaptiveness and political innovation together. National imagining works best when there is an intimate association, or indeed a sameness, between the cultural articulators of nationality and the elite at the epicenter of nationalist politics (Breuilly, 1996). The reason why some political formations with global cultures did not go the full route to revolution—Burma and Indonesia, for example—is the absence of half of the dyad: intrepid political entrepreneurs capable of articulating political interests in divergent cultural and institutional surroundings.

But political invention sans culture, even if it comes “too early,” can reap short-run political changes. The “youth” and impulsive nature of the Philippine revolt more than made up for its deficiencies; it did not have to “ripen” like the revolutions in China, Indochina and India. The cultural crevice had made the young Filipino ilustrados free from any inhibiting cultural constraints; they could only be rebellious and not deferential, impatient and not circumspect. Anderson (1991) may as well have been describing the 1896 period when he points out that there were no “monarchical residues” which had underpinned the imagined “national traditions” of Khmer, Burmese and Indonesians: “the mestizos had no Angkor, Pagan or Borobudur at their service.”

The tell-tale sign was the youthfulness of the Filipino nationalists when they made their mark: Jose Rizal was at the forefront of the secret reform society La Liga Filipina at 30, Andres Bonifacio led the Katipunan uprising at 29, Emilio
Aguinaldo became president of the short-lived Philippine Republic at 29. Audacity made them skillful at improvisation, whether it involved ideas, battlefield maneuvers, organization or adaptations. By contrast, their near contemporaries, Gandhi in India, Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam and Mao Zedong in China, were victorious in their countries when they were well past their midlife, after tortuous and protracted struggles. They were seasoned, hardened veterans. All belonged to the “last wave” of nationalists.

The victories of 1896-1898 were the last goodwill granted by history to an emerging Filipino society. The revolution’s good fortune was that it was able to prevail despite having very little in the way of strong cultural antecedents. Yet in the final analysis, the misfortune of the Philippine revolution was that it was both half-grown and premature: its vigor and insurgency coincided with the least availability of an imposing culture. Its precipitate-ness was a measure of its own boundaries: its components could not hang together. Consequently, it suffered the fate of a precursor. Equipped with more culture, it would no doubt still be vanquished, but its struggles would have produced an enduring tradition, capable of securing the future. The sure outcome was that the historical experience afterwards was not cumulative, and had little role in later developments. The nationalist movement, after its repression and mutilation, was to fall prey to American pragmatism.

**Finding a Pragmatic Middle Course**

With the revolutionary momentum stalled at the turn of the century, American political culture saturated Philippine society, in the process giving nationalism its extant characteristic style of compromise and accommodation.

What the revolutionaries could not do—the political unification of the islands—the American colonizers achieved by disabling all adversaries, often in grimly methodical fashion. They were immensely aided by the revolution’s fractious nature: the self-importance shown by the initiators—eight, mostly Tagalog, provinces in Luzon, the defiance of a breakaway Negros Republic, and the unwillingness of the Muslim southwest to join the struggle. In any case, had American troops not subjugated all regions, including the Muslim areas, the archipelago would probably have splintered into several “republics,” not unlike the “caudillo-ridden states” in nineteenth-century Latin America (Anderson, 1996).
The re-stabilization that followed, brought on by *ilustrado* complicity as much as by American pacification, produced new pilgrimages. The newly-established public school system, which was made accessible to everyone, offered a major route. With English as the medium of instruction and eventually the colonial *lingua franca*, a new generation of English-speaking, politically acculturated native cadre came into being. A universal education standardized through American textbooks and teaching manuals, in itself, produced an autonomous ensemble of experience. As Evangelista suggests, “America won the battle of the mind as the educational system produced Filipinos whose thinking processes were inextricably linked to the English language and, together with it, the institutions connected with the Americans.”

This central mechanism of assimilation was complemented by a massive recruitment into the civil service and the private sector. New recruits filled various tiers of the colony’s bureaucracy and commercial enterprises. It was the interlacing of educational and administrative pilgrimages which furnished what Anderson termed “the territorial base for new ‘imagined communities’ in which natives could come to see themselves as ‘nationals.’”

Above all, an enlarged political franchise granted by the Americans provided clear lenses into which larger forces came into focus. Political life in the regions underwent a permanent permutation. The Americans crushed the political barriers erected by erstwhile Spanish authorities, producing a fluctuating order, out of which newly-established political parties could take turn. The regional ruling blocs, which tended to go their separate ways in the remaining days of the revolution, began to stockpile their strength to secure incorporation into the political system.

Anderson (1996) provides the details. In lieu of absolutistic territorial bureaucracy, the Americans saw the practicality of a national system of political representation. They established provincial and municipal elective offices. There, in the regions, the *mestizos* used their *cacique*-based ascendancy to build and consolidate local political fiefdoms, which were largely insulated by linguistic heterogeneity. But it was a key American institutional innovation—a national bicameral legislature, created in stepwise fashion—which produced a highly visible national oligarchic class. While their economic footing rested in *hacienda* agriculture (friar lands auctioned by the Americans fell into their hands), the regional elites exploited political representation in Congress with considerable
skill, assuring them "guaranteed access to national-level political power." There, they enacted laws that enhanced their economic interests, and practiced rent-seeking, with the acquiescence of the American administrators.

Next to the revolution, the American occupation was probably the most self-conscious (though not the most ardently impressionable) historical period. In the context where the conspicuous function of the American period (first by pacification, then by administrative rule) was to unify the nation and its concealed function (by the subordination of the people to the ruling blocs) was to stratify it, a general internalization of an acclimatized American political culture occurred. The normative patterns of pragmatism that it engendered were its lasting imprint on the national consciousness.

The end result was the momentous rise of a truly hegemonic class. The ruling elite became dominant over the rest of the population, not simply because they possessed wealth and the means of violence (they were also warlords), but—in Gramsci's sense—because it now had a broader authority whose utmost resource was cultural. Perry Anderson (1992a) elucidates: "(Hegemony) is an imperative order that not merely sets external limits to the aims and actions of the subordinated bloc, but shapes its internal vision of itself and the world, imposing contingent historical facts as the necessary coordinates of social life itself. The hegemonic class is the primary determinant of consciousness, character and customs throughout the society." As hegemonic class, the ruling elite sought to reconstruct society in their own likeness, re-inventing the economic system, political institutions and cultural values. Culture and power converged, each one underwriting the other.

Within this saturating setup, nation-ness not only became congruent with the fixed political, educational, and administrative boundaries of the colonial order. The hegemonic class also gave nationalism its ideological horizons and its characteristic style and visceral sensibility—distilled from American "hard-nosed" approaches of resolving social and political problems in a way which suited existing conditions and glossed over institutional rules or traditions. There was ample elbow-room for experiment since there was no imposing culture to override, and thus there was no danger of any existing cultural fabric to be destroyed. It was rather much of American practical culture intertwined with the residues of Latin traits (derived from the Spanish period) that became the hegemonic norm—a diffused montage of undistinguished social predilections functioning as an overall order. Expressed as the "mainstream Filipino society's imagined communion with the American dream," to appropriate from Malay (1998), this hegemonic culture persists to this day, and is a reality yet to be outlived.
The cultural shortfall is thus suffered without relief—from the earliest gap of a global culture in the sixteenth century to the fragility of Filipino identity in the twentieth century. This is not to suggest that it was the only lack to be overcome. As Hroch (1996) argues, any classic nationalist movement must satisfy three key demands, which tally with the “felt deficits” of national existence: (1) civil rights and political self-determination, initially in the form of autonomy and ultimately (usually quite late, as an express demand) of independence; (2) a complete social structure that includes educated elites, an officialdom, an entrepreneurial class, and organized laboring classes; and (3) a national culture that is used in education, administration and economic life.

Thus, a global culture is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. Indeed, in spite of a weak cultural touchstone, the nationalist project plowed on, able to exploit a deep crisis in the social and political order and the collapse of its legitimacy. Historical circumstances, however, limited the choices for Filipino nationalists to one, advancing self-determination and two, constructing a new hegemonic order. But following Hroch, the trajectory of the nationalist movement is only consumed when all three demands are fulfilled. A national culture, and the “complex contents” mediated through it, is the missing piece in the nationalist puzzle.

Globalization and the Nation-State

The preceding discussion is a precursory effort to chronicle the historical anomalies that led to the present trajectory of nationalism in the Philippines. The following discussion attempts to consider how globalization can be seen against the backdrop of these idiosyncratic patterns. Philippine history, fortunately, has provided some of the principal strands against which the globalizing tendency of the Philippine economy can be charted as it makes more progress.

Economic Nationalism

In the postcolonial era, the principal concern of the mestizo class had been to build a strong and wealthy nation-state. The interweaving of landed,
commercial and industrial capital during the American regime put the elite in a unique position to fortify its political dominance and adopt an industrial policy to achieve this goal. The postwar economy became a catalyst of change, as the nascent industrial magnates—a chip off the mestizo bloc—assisted by the country’s economic planners, embarked on an inward-looking industrialization strategy. This pattern favored substitution of domestic products for imports.

In the postwar economic boom, the inward-looking development strategy seemed to have paid off because the effect was a dramatic quickening of the whole economy. By the end of the fifties, it reached its high noon, with growth rates that were second only to the Asian region’s economic giant, Japan. Yet amidst the optimism of the times, in the era of the supremacy of import-substitution (IS), there were forebodings of failure: the industries were too sheltered to venture on their own in the world export market, and were too capital-intensive for a labor-surplus country like the Philippines. At the same time, growth was occurring without equity, leaving the entire quasi-feudal social structure intact. With record-high poverty levels in the nation, the expansion of the domestic market—a prerequisite for an inward-oriented-development—was out of the question.

Today, nothing is more familiar than the symptoms of economic decline: stagnant industries, shrinking markets, unemployment—lack of labor intensity, poor savings rate, investments falling short and few technological innovations. Once established, the IS structures became, by degrees, handicaps contending with more liberalized forms of the economy. The circumstances which determined the unique good fortune of the ruling bloc appeared to have turned against it. The triumphant postwar entrepreneurs have since been on the defensive.

What went wrong? It turned out that the industrial policy of the Philippines then was outrageously misplaced. Here, the experience of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in selecting export winners is instructive. They advocated growth in the external sector as the engine for advancing development. Anticipating the limitations of an inward-oriented economic strategy, and the opportunities presented by a shift to an export-oriented strategy, these nations put in place highly-coordinated investment strategies that invited both government action and market-friendly approaches. Politically powerful bureaucracies and major industrial groupings (e.g. Japan’s keiretsu) worked in tandem to create strategic interventions—subsidies and special incentives—which were aimed at targeted sectors and industries. They were classic examples of “developmental states” promoting statist industrial policy (Lim, 1998). As Amsden (1991) spells out, subsidy-financed incentives were allocated on the basis of a reciprocity rule:
subsidies were traded for concrete performance standards with respect to output, exports and research and development. Subsidies were given based on discipline and performance. Government leveraged the market, not by getting the prices right, but by getting the wrong prices right—"correcting" prices to give the right incentives to the appropriate economic sector.

No such thing happened in the Philippines. If strategic government intervention was the right thing to do, why did not the nation pursue it? Instead, a policy of protecting inefficient industries continued, even when serious challenges to its efficacy had been raised. The key to an explanation of this glaring economic policy flaw lies in a noneconomic element: the influence of the prevailing hegemonic culture. Under a hegemonic structure of power, cultural forms are acutely important over the long haul, even if economic power has the immediate striking capability (Anderson, 1992a).

To begin with, nation-ness and nationalism are neutral with respect to economic strategy. All that is needed for the sense of nation, the imagined community, to endure and be identified with, is a deep, horizontal comradeship\textsuperscript{20} (Anderson, 1991). As long as this condition is met, an outward-looking economy can be considered as much nationalist as an inward-oriented economy, or their combination. Yet what happened was that a particular economic approach became inextricably wedded to a particular nationalist line. The cultural terms in which the postwar nationalist struggle was conducted became largely related to the economy, the major beneficiaries of which were the industrialists. The industrial class flaunted protectionism as an articulated ideology with universal claims.

An inward-looking development strategy became the sudden, transcendent synopsis of national aspirations and was deemed the equivalent of the consolidation of the long-term gains of nationalism. It took over the task of collective integration. While the deeper effort was towards demonstrating the superiority of the new economic force, the ideological pressure fell more heavily on the established bonds of Filipino nationalism. In arguing for nationalist industrialization, for example, proponents like Lichauco (1988) candidly admit that the instruments of protection, like controls,\textsuperscript{21} "catalyzed national sentiment not only for industrialization but also for an industrialization controlled by Filipinos." From this angle, nationalism was not only held up as the ransom of an inward-looking economy; it was also appropriated as the instrument for its legitimation. Nationalism, in the end, became a ubiquitous rationale of the workings of the economy.
This was the real, negative achievement of economic nationalism. Unable to draw vigor from an absent "global" cultural tradition, it assembled, instead, a powerful "national" ideological framework consistent with the "insular" striving of the hegemonic class. Insularity found expression in an inward-oriented economy, which, in normal times, insensibly ignored serious breaches in economic decision-making and, at moments of crisis, recklessly offered more of the same prescriptions. An unresponsiveness to labor-intensive, export-oriented approaches was the logical outcome of decades of this "nationalist" mystification. Note that the Filipino working class, while defending and improving its own position through both industrial arbitration and uprisings directed against industrialists, and despite episodes of harsh repression, were unquestioning adherents of protectionism and inward economic focus. The workers never challenged the domestic ascendancy of economic nationalism.

The choice of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea as counterpoints to the Philippines is more than coincidental. In each of these nations, a deeply-rooted social consciousness derived from imposing religious cultures generated the political will capable of transcending the limitations of the import-substituting pattern of growth. The hegemonic classes in these places chose a carefully-calibrated balance between an inward-looking approach and an outward-looking strategy as their "mode of insertion" into the world. Export-orientation complemented, then succeeded, import-substitution. Culture, rather than economic instrumentalism, became the ideological driving force for solving problems. Much like the old Southeast Asian kingdoms, their strength lies in ancient cultures that were forged for several centuries. By contrast, the very weakness of the Philippine state lies in a hegemonic culture organized around an absent core.

At the heart of Japan’s spectacular postwar record were peculiar forms of Confucian and Taoist ideology. Adopted from China, they were transformed into a remarkably nationalistic Japanese Confucianism and Shintoism, and were used in Japan’s development (Morishima, 1988). As was also the case later in South Korea and Taiwan, Confucianism in Japan instilled social discipline (out of loyalty to the state) and called for sacrifice and total devotion to duty. Shintoism served as the catalyst to promote nationalism.

Such traits had their impact on whatever the state decided as its national policy. If western technology needed to be imported, according to Morishima, the foreign elements were reconfigured to suit the local culture. The best approach seemed to be a combination of western technique with indigenous culture, or rather, modernization without culturally westernizing (Mazrui, 1998). After the Meiji restoration in 1868, the first Japanese industrial miracle occurred (1868-
1945), and Japan developed into a dominant industrial power, while keeping itself culturally authentic. A blend of western innovation and local authenticity also marked the economic ascent of the other Asian luminaries, Taiwan, South Korea and Hongkong, according to Mazrui. They linked imported techniques to their own methods of social standardization and cultural permutation.

In the process of adaptation, the Japanese adjusted the original (foreign) scales to their own cultural stature. That gave Japan the edge in versatile "reconversions" in a variety of products and technological processes that remain world-class, despite the current difficulties of the Japanese economy. Morishima points out that adaptation "emphasized Shinto elements in times of national crisis and Confucian elements after drastic changes in political regimes." This "submerged nationalism" is very greatly internalized and is exemplified by an ideologically entrenched state of mind and character, an imperceptible national sentiment (Kajiwara, 1995). It is a grand culture which lays deep in the psyche of the Japanese, Taiwanese and Koreans, and which slithers into their daily duties and performances. A culture-bound social discipline can be easily transformed into institutional discipline within the economy. It is easy to see why a performance-based and discipline-oriented economic strategy—regardless of its orientation—would easily pass the test of state decision-making. Unmistakably, culture is a key element in the Asian miracle, even if peremptorily dismissed by Western economists (Linda Lim, 1998).

End of State History?

The fragmented and incomplete character of the domestic culture suggests that it has not been effective in reinforcing the policy decisions of the state. It is clear at this particular moment in history that it is the state itself, rather than culture, which is the principal guarantor of nation-ness. It is no accident that the discourse on national development is currently focused on the role of the state as the validator of the nationalist enterprise.

In recent years, remarkable changes have taken place in a variety of state settings: exceptional openness in trade, investment and finance (macroeconomic regulation, the reduction of social programs (social provision), tarification, loosening of currency controls (foreign exchange regulation), and so on. These deflections from protectionism are seen as the obligatory alignment of the nation-
state to a new historical situation: globalization. Globalization, however, is not an idiosyncratic tendency, but requires the adoption of undifferentiated financial, economic and social regimes across nations. Pressures for conformity derive from the fact that global competition enforces a form of economic homogenization: there have to be broadly comparable conditions for international capital to locate anywhere. That means that barriers to trade, provisions of infrastructure, levels of taxes and wages, as well as of skills and technology cannot vary much among developing nations (De Dios, 1998).

Each state, moreover, has to give basing rights to global, itinerant forces—transnational markets and multinational corporations. These two aspects, the supposed dissolution of national distinctions, and the ambulant character of transnational firms (basing is always accompanied by the threat of exit) have created widely-held perceptions that globalization has weakened the nation-state (Weiss, 1997; Sathyamurthy, 1998, Chea, 1998). The adoption of the same neoliberal policies, Weiss points out, is widely seen to limit the ability of nation-states to make independent policy choices, while the footloose nature of investments has been assumed to be the most serious challenge confronting “territorially constituted forms of governance.”

For Habermas (1996), as global economic forces advance, uncoupled from any political frame, nation-states are less and less able to control national economies as stocks of their own: the scope for effective governmental intervention has shrunk. In the developing world, so weak is the nation-state, Sathyamurthy argues, that it has lost leverage over the political and economic means to generate the resources needed to address the grievances of those sections of society which are forced to bear the brunt of globalization. As a result, it is unable to face up to democratic pressures that are brought to bear upon it by the same groups.

Such powerlessness, according to Weiss, is often invoked to project “the end of state history.” Globalization itself is buttressed by the same philosophical leitmotif: that history has reached its end point with the triumph of neoliberalism. With the defeat of socialism in Eastern Europe, the victory of competitive markets under liberal capitalism is viewed as having been won in all battlegrounds, including those of Asia, with the postwar success of Japan and the late-breaking developments in the newly-industrializing economies of South Korea and Japan. The end of history is the exhaustion of any viable alternative to the OECD culture. In the words of Perry Anderson (1992b), “For all its vast—definitive—benefits to humanity, the end of history risks being a ‘very sad time,’ as the epoch of high endeavors and heroic struggles become a thing of the past.” Parenthetically, this “blurring” of national boundaries is approvingly viewed in many circles as a
progressive triumph over fractious structures—the bringing together of unviable political formations (Nairn, 1998).

Yet the new global intrusions represent only added governance stumbling blocks to already weak national capacities: "Globalists tend to exaggerate state powers in the past in order to claim feebleness in the present. There is little compelling evidence that the state has ever had the sorts of powers that allegedly it has been forced to relinquish" (Weiss, 1997). This frailty, of course, does not represent the endpoint for the nation-state, and neither is it a zero juncture. At best, it suggests that it is not the state alone which can secure the future of any economic strategy in any particular setting. It is also in many ways its cultural disposition which can do so.

A weak state with a strong cultural kernel can at least depend on the cumulative wisdom of new, collective historical experiences as a source of much of its energies. A weak state with a weak culture magnifies its inability to "get its act together." The weakness of the Philippine state ricochets back to the weakness of its cultural foundations. Anything global can be painlessly imported and dominate the insular setting; foreign influences can be easily consonant with local norms. But to the degree that the hegemonic culture remains unsteady and ill-assembled, to that same degree would global measures remain an ad hoc set of practices that shun synthesizing impulses. That is the price of a missing center.

**Nationalism: Bridging the Cultural Gap**

Where then does this leave the nation-state? Is its role that of catching up with global forces, to which the future now seems to belong? Will nationalism die with the nation-state? History offers two possible outcomes. These scenarios, described below, are the prototypical choices for the future.

The first possibility is along the lines suggested by Hirst and Thompson, examined in Weiss (1997). Here, the nation-state delegates its traditional authority as an economic manager, either to supranational sovereignties (such as the IMF) or to subnational bodies (such as the domestic private sector), or both. Since the power is entrusted, the nation-state formally retains it: "Its territorial centrality and constitutional legitimacy assure the nation-state a distinctive and continuing role in an internationalized world economy, even as conventional sovereignty
and economic capacities lessen” (Weiss, 1997). In effect, the state acts as a legitimator of decisions and actions initiated and endorsed elsewhere.

But as Weiss points out, this “shedding and shifting” of traditional responsibilities do not preserve authority if the state were no longer the locus of action and policy execution. In this case, devolution seems to be just a convenient administrative device to ceremoniously prop up the nation-state in the face of the loss of substance and authority. The dilemma faced by the Asian states in the global capital markets suffices to show the difficulties with this setup, where the state merely promulgates the policies, but leaves execution to global parties.

If there is one truly important factor which has created uneasiness among developing nation-states, it is the whims of the international financial market. Global capital transactions have reached breathtaking dimensions, dodging national economic planning frameworks, although they hardly augment the capital stock of developing countries. It is these spectacular (and one may add, predatory) cross-border flows which have increased the vulnerability of national currencies to speculation, and which precipitated the Asian financial crisis that now threatens the viability of the region’s “tiger” economies.

Unsurprisingly, this “casino” capitalism (as Weiss calls it), where portfolio money changes hands at the click of a computer key, was permitted by national governments themselves, the outcome of market-friendly policies linked to the deregulation of portfolio investment. In one plausible explanation, governments liberalized the markets in the wrong way, encouraging volatile short-term inflows while keeping restrictions on long-term capital inflows (Sachs, 1999). As a result, all countries, especially those in Asia, seemed unable to hold back the harmful effects of financial market liberalization. Once lenders (with their herd behavior) sniffed trouble (e.g. overvalued and faltering currencies, declining exports), they relocated elsewhere. Weak states, such as the Philippines, were suddenly confronted with huge financial outflows and grim prospects of an economic downturn.

In a paradigm of circumscribed state powers, the contradictions of globalization do not resolve, but augment, the difficulties of nationalism. If national actors and institutions no longer structure economic space, the tension between the global and the national is exacerbated. In the past, the import-substituting strategy brought about an institutional concurrence between nationalism and political economy, in the absence of any center around which “national” elements could come together. Because of the instrumentalist nature of economic policy-
making, any decrease in the worthiness of a specific policy instrument (such as IS) automatically reduced state authority and influence. A rupture in the national consensus naturally compromised the means by which the Philippine state ideologically reproduced itself.

A new convergence toward globalization pits the global market and the nation-state against each other. For globalizers, nationalism itself is a symptom of nations trapped in history. Nationalism is seen as the key factor responsible for past economic misadventures, even if, as Nairn (1998) points out, blaming catastrophes on nationalism alone is as much use as blaming a violent storm on the weather. Globalizers want to dissolve a host of older tendencies (such as IS), in a way meant to be final. To be sure, almost no one wanted to risk a return to a regime of protection, an idea whose time has indeed passed. With the descent of protectionism, however, nationalism has lost an accessory and its own moorings.

A reduced role for the Philippine state, in the wake of the continuing Asian crisis, could set off deeper popular unrest, broader ideological strains, and more adverse strategic consequences for nation-ness (already without much cultural substructure). In other Asian countries, age-old attitudes and reflexes could at least mount a survival-battle against any diminution of the established national consensus. In the Philippines, cramped state authority will not result in a violent upheaval but in an advancing entropy. Already, with globalization and the nation-state seen as direct opposites, old nationalist inclinations will be demobilized, or at least, attempts will be made so that they become an inoffensive part of the overall scene, leaving only innocuous tread marks of absorption within Philippine society.

In contrast to other Asian nations, the allure of the western ideal remains unchallenged among Filipinos (Malay, 1998), well-off or ordinary. A hegemonic culture shaped during the American period underlies this pro-western affinity. It is no surprise—and empirical evidence strongly suggests—that the Philippines is more accommodating of globalizing tendencies than other Asian nations, including the newly-industrializing economies.

The contention that opening up the Philippine economy will produce a culture that is fast-paced, detached, competitive, consumerist and easily absorptive of foreign cultures (to the degree that culture is embedded in the products, technology and firm organization of economically dominant systems) (Lim, 1998) may seem moot since the very instruments that could provide a counterpoint—
education and values—have been set up to accommodate them. An active cultural core enables a country to indigenize globalization, making it adjust to local circumstances. A missing center permits a country to assimilate globalization with only minor modification.

Over a period of time, reduced state authority might indeed lead to the passing away of state history.

There is another possibility, suggested by Weiss herself, which is that of increasing the adaptive ability of the state. This involves, for a weak state such as the Philippines, joining power coalitions "upwards," through regional and international alliances, and building alliances "downwards," with the domestic business sector and civil society. This prototype suggests that developmental states can still rule, even if they are grounded in a fluid global system that is beyond their control. These new coalitions should be viewed as gambits for augmenting rather than sloughing off state power (Weiss, 1997).

At first blush, this sounds strangely like the first paradigm, since the nation-state must relate with the same cast of international and local actors. But the similarity ends there: adaptation does not involve surrendering state authority to these players. The point is, the strength of the nation-state—its ability to regulate markets—need not fluctuate with the vagaries of macroeconomic management. Indeed, this capacity increases in times of distress. As Wurfel (1998) suggests, neoliberal policies could once more be altered by "international consensus or accumulation of national decisions," pointing out that awareness of the dangers of globalization is the unexpected blessing of the Asian crisis.

The most successful nation-states, according to Weiss, would be those that can supplement their traditional power resources with new cross-border cooperative arrangements, rather than meekly submitting to multilateral bodies, such as the IMF and the World Bank. The collaborative model already exists in East Asia, in the form of business-government tie-ups and regional agreements that boost intraregional trade and encourage the growth of regional production networks. This model has given some states (e.g. Singapore and Taiwan) reach and breadth within the global economy. They have exploited the opportunities of international economic change rather than simply yielded to its pressures.

Not all states are equal. The strong ones, such as the East Asian trio (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) and the newer NICs, are in a superior position to influence the direction of particular strategic coalitions (e.g. ASEAN, APEC,
BIMP-EAGA) while remaining substantially independent from the globalizing elements of the coalition. Weiss calls them "catalytic" states because of their ability to expedite, rather than fall victim to, globalization. Here, strong state capacity—staunch control over the levers of the economy and healthy domestic linkages and, one may add, a forceful culture—is a requisite for accommodating global initiatives. Catalytic states drive the process of regional integration by providing incentives, technological infusions, investment guarantees and human resource development across national networks of trade and investment (Weiss, 1997).

Weak states cannot be catalysts, but they can seek sponsorship by catalytic states of major regional initiatives or join them in pushing for basic resource-sharing arrangements. Examples of the former are Malaysia's taking the first steps toward a dollar-free trading system that utilizes only ASEAN currencies, and an East Asian economic grouping that excludes western countries. Japan's proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund to finance new infusions of capital for the region is an example of the latter. All of these did not take off because of the strong opposition of the United States. An Asian initiative without a central role by the US will not prosper (Wade, 1998).

Closer to home, fragile states can join together in microregional, transboundary initiatives, such as the East ASEAN Growth Area (linking adjacent economic and environmental spaces in relatively backward—but potentially significant—parts of the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei and Malaysia). Here, governments facilitate cross-border flows of resources and peoples without the assistance of catalytic states. At home, weaker developing countries, such as the Philippines, can create "national institutional frameworks which enmesh business in support relationships with trade associations, training and financial institutions, and national and local governments." Of prime importance, according to Weiss, is the alliance between government and the private sector because it supports the nation's innovation system. But whether the key to a successful public-private partnership—as suggested by Weiss—is still a coordinated industrial strategy that permits policy-makers to direct the country's resources toward higher value-added operations (which propelled Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to economic superstardom in East Asia) is a matter for individual countries to consider. As many economists have demonstrated, statist industrial policy, to the degree that it inextricably wedd big business to government, can induce moral hazard in the form of crony capitalism and overleverage (Lim, 1998). Perhaps, industrial
learning and capacity-building can be “sheltered” if narrowly-focused, temporary and performance-based. The important thing is to avoid needless distortions and costs while advocating quick learning and productivity increases (Oyejide, 1998).

If deputizing state powers virtually erases national differences, enhancing the adaptive skills of nation-states would highlight country distinctions at the national and regional levels. Since state decision-making would, in this case, be held accountable for results that promote the national interest, the nationalist imagination is not necessarily compromised. National actions can still increase the tension between the forces of nationalism and the forces of globalization, but over a period of time, the state itself would need historically-framed national institutions to increase its adaptability. Thus, the role of nationalism is cut out for it under an adaptive state.

The more adaptable countries naturally have the edge, but increased social divisions and disparities can also result from globalizing initiatives, and can undermine the solidarity upon which nationalism is built (De Dios, 1998). Globalization has been, in many ways, “disharmonic, asymmetric and inequitable within individual countries and between countries, obviously with different levels of intensity and with different effects” (Cardero-Garcia, 1998). The central case against globalization is social polarization. In Brazilian President Henrique Cardoso’s terms, it is a homogenizing structure that has appeared “more concerned with the freedom of flows than with the reduction of inequalities” (UNDP, 1996).

In the Philippines, the inequalities engendered by globalization are easily seen in labor dislocation in industries (Lim, 1998), sluggish work opportunities, discriminatory employment and precarious employment; and labor market exclusions among women, the youth and rural poor (Gonzalez, 1998). In light of the misfortunes of various groups, neoliberal unity, the assumed wider identity, has clearly foundered in the wake of the Asian crisis. The outcomes in the Philippines, which is not as deeply and adversely affected as its Asian neighbors, illustrate the point: aggravated poverty, the blocking of all routes for safety nets, reduced housing assistance, less classrooms and instructional materials, and reduction in public health programs (Lim, 1998).

Revisiting social provision and ending the social polarization in each nation-state are important keys to the renewal of nationalism and the solidarity upon which it is founded. Anti-poverty initiatives, to the extent that they unify and deepen fellowship across classes, are an extension of nationalism. If formal civil rights conceal socially structured inequities, the nationalist project can muster support from broad, excluded groups. Nationalism could unite such groups into
a coalition which could transform "identity" longings into a political program of action. Such comradeship in some way prefigures a new, equitable cultural collectivity, able to subvert the hegemonic culture in a historical context of global cooperation and competition. "Only in struggle does the nation cease to be an informal, contestable, and taken-for-granted frame of reference, and become a community which seizes hold of the imagination." At its best, imagined nationhood in all its coarseness has been the admission ticket of the poor classes into history (Balakrishnan, 1996).

Cardero-Garcia, in fact, suggests that the pace of globalization be tempered to permit inclusion of social groups that have lagged behind. She argues for mechanisms to prevent exclusion, such as (1) measures relating to human development, such as education; (2) decentralization, innovative forms of citizen participation, and greater coordination between various sectoral agencies and programs; and (3) state actions that strengthen the system for administering justice, improve the allocation of social expenditures and devise policies which put a brake on destabilization and the financial fragility of the economy.

But the void at the center of the culture remains to be filled. As Anderson (1992a) argues, "the rationale of every nationalism is cultural difference." The nationalist project should address the cultural deficit and should exist within a framework of stable and unquestioned cultural values. Yet, the development of culture is still some way off. Its achievement will require a feat of long-run social transformation without any prior instance.28

Paradoxically, the future of the national culture might rest on the universalization of local culture itself. In mapping out the new cultural boundaries, it is useful to appropriate Nadine Gordimer's (1998) idea of cultural globalization:

Culture as a sociological force is not achievable in isolation by any one country anymore. Although culture should surface in home countries earnestly from the people's social and political narratives, the compelling need is to make cultural heritage understood and appreciated all over the world—precisely to enrich and protect it. Its distinction, and strength, is that it has no market value; it is a "trade" foremost in intangibles: "the 'rate of exchange' is the expansion of ideas (and) possibilities ... as coming from the life and spirit of the Other, the unknown country and society." Cultural globalization is the ethic of reciprocal social enrichment without consideration for material profit.
Just as there are two possibilities for the nation-state, there are likewise two plausible directions for the development of a local globalized culture. The first prospect emphasizes the unity, the oneness of cultural idiom. At first glance, this does have broad appeal, since, borrowing from Gordimer, it can be linked to “the attempt to heal the peoples of the world in their wounding division and the manifestations of xenophobia that underlie conflict”—a seemingly genuine unifier, prying loose state barriers and making culture accessible to all. It also implies avoiding value judgments of what is high culture or low culture among those achieved by nations. But similar to the dissolution of national sovereignty as an option for the nation-state, this one makes globalization of culture—to borrow from Mowlana (1998) this time—as a product of deliberate human choice by a powerful group of nations, transnational corporations and international organizations which have stakes in the process. Here the question of language—the means of many cultural activities—becomes crucial.

Institutional accounts, historical narratives and intellectual debate depend on language (exceptionally, in some local cultures, the exchange of ideas and insight might come without the need for words and in the revelation of indigenous cultural forms). The clear and present danger, Gordimer warns, is that only a short list of self-styled world languages will become decisive in the attempt to globalize culture—“a subconscious lapse into the very state which the concept of freeing culture seeks to end: a value decision that high culture, true culture resides within those international ‘families’ allied by language affiliations (Romance languages, for example), shared frontiers decided after old wars, political alignments and realignments, ideological loyalties.” For the Philippines and other developing nations, this puts cultural development back to ground zero, since as former colonies they have been long accustomed to the imperatives of the languages of western colonizers. There is no gain as long as the impulse toward globalization arises out of the old conditioning of western cultural domination.

To prevent another failed One World, Gordimer recommends a more even-handed, broadly conceived, cultural globalization, unfettered by any hierarchy of languages directing it. The second possibility closely hews to this more equitable arrangement, by valuing the differences, bringing diversity into play across national frontiers and “disproving the long-held sovereignty of national and political divisions over the development of the human potential.” The effort must, of course, begin at home: the restoration of dying indigenous cultures. Yet, as Gordimer herself asks, how in national specificity does each nation-state go about moving beyond itself to procreate a globalized culture that will benefit self? Here, the effort must expand to neighboring grounds.
Recall how the Philippine archipelago was the example, the epitome of cultural isolation because of a freak historical fate of being cut off from the main routes of the empires. The first action, therefore, has to be one of inviting the Philippines' Asian counterparts to bring their culture to the country, and to take up return visits to theirs—a creativity of Asian selfhood, in Gordimer's terms. Filipino cultural connections were, and still are, with Europe and North America almost exclusively. Moving out of the suffocating confines of North-South culture, inestimable though it remains, and into a South-South cultural collective is an idea whose time has come. The Philippines can gain from cultural exchanges and recover affinities with the rest of Asia to which it belongs, not least in the presence of the descendants of the great empires, who still partake of the elements of their great cultures. Following Nairn (1996), an Asian community, with all its faults, may be a step in the right direction, because it would champion the cause of multiculturalism—a synergy of "local cultural solidarities" and not a "congerie of irritable narcissisms," as Anderson (1996) would express it.

According to Gordimer, cultural practitioners on both sides of the border must be offered the opportunity to nurture one another's skills and extend the scope of creative heterogeneity and innovation. Government and business—partners from the other side of the globalization process, international trade—must subsidize creative diversity in order to raise cultural globalization to new heights. The major challenge is the development of a "cultural capital" necessary to close the huge cultural gap.

At this juncture, what is of paramount importance is a nationalism that would represent neither an impossible avoidance of globalism, nor an uncritical adaptation of it. The etymology of globalization—glocalization (global + local): a global outlook adapted to local conditions (Gordimer, 1998)—suggests it. If nationalism was the source of age-old resistance to global incursions, it could also be the wellspring of adaptability.

It would be a globalism turned on its head. The homogenizing tendencies of globalization can be turned against the globalizers which first proclaimed them, founding a culture directed to diversity. To be somewhat Hegelian about it (in terms similar to those expressed by Anderson [1992b]), cultural globalization could create a national "positivity," contrasted with the idea of nation as "negativity" of history, whose final moment is the abolition of the nation-state, and thus history itself. The reality of any cultural movement involves an interplay—a little positivity, the nation rising equal to other nations projecting universal
change; a little negativity, the nation struggling against its own dissolution. It would be against the purely global, since the looseness of Filipino national culture would limit its economic-political range and inhibit the rise of a more specific character. The hunger for a staunch, distinct and authentic “identity” should not be stifled by globalization. But it would also be against the purely national, since the intention is to universalize. As Gordimer explains, globalization is a dialectical, not a linear concept; “global” implies this shape of wholeness, “at once setting forth and receiving in one continuous movement” in a “frontierless territory of creativity.”

That would mark the beginnings of state history: an incipient chronicle of state that would eventually be equipped culturally to face both global and domestic challenges. To once more turn to history is, in the words of Ohiorhenuan (1998), to recognize that development requires a unique combination of circumstances and to make sure there is space for each developing country to discover its own exceptionality.

***********

Notes

1The Filipinos were the first people in Asia to wage a nationalistic revolution against western colonialism.

2Nationalism, in this sense, corresponds to the definition offered by Hroch (1996): an outlook that gives an unrestricted preference for the values of the nation over all other values and interests.

3Following Anderson (1991), the nation is defined as an imagined political community that is exclusive, limited, sovereign and deserving of sacrifice. All communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact are imagined.

4Nation-ness generates a deep-seated but often unexpressed sense of belonging, of being “at home” (Verdery, 1996).

5Entities called “nations” have the right to, and ought to, form inscribed boundaries—territorial states—of the kind that have become standard since the
French Revolution (Hobsbawm, 1996). The formation of the “state” only ensued after the imagined community crystallized around shared histories, cultures and languages. The state became a secular source of *legitimation* founded on an abstract pattern of *social integration* (Habermas, 1996).

It is argued that, worldwide, there is no better proof of its being passé than the current glut of writings and analysis on nationalism—national culture produces its most sophisticated works in its twilight, something like Minerva’s owl taking flight only at dusk (Hobsbawm, 1996).

The culture of native settlement did not arise until the 16th century. By then, in other Southeast Asian lands, empires had aged or vanished.

Evangelista (1998) cites the characteristics of neolithic culture that persisted in the Philippines at the time the old empires were being formed: *sawah* agriculture, use of metals and navigational skills; socially, a matriarchal configuration of authority, with cultural advances in painting and native orchestral music.

The nation-state was not yet an idea whose time had come during this period. The catchment areas of the empires were not synonymous to national-political boundaries. Premodern notions of political power, according to Breuilly (1996), involved bundles of privileges accorded to different cultural elites and territories. Sovereign states in tightly bounded territorial expanses surfaced much later.

In the 14th century, the major political units in the islands were the *barangays*, which were organized based on nets of kinship.

Cited in Ordoñez (1996).

This does not suggest that *within the empires* culture was experienced across different social groups in equal measure. Although there was an attempt to share, rather than exhaust, the “high culture” that was practiced—Islam by imposing it among the lower classes; Hinduism by encouraging lower castes to assume as many of its characteristics as possible—in reality, “the full-time specialists (*e.g.* the shamans—*author’s note*) dedicated to perpetuating and exemplifying superior norms” transmitted them only to learned people, or those with stature. There was a marked disparity between “high” and “low” cultures,
the latter being “the daily interchange between kinsmen, neighbors, masters, and disciples” which was “uncodified, not frozen in script, without a rigid formalized set of rules” (Gellner, 1996).

13Jose Rizal’s _Noli Me Tangere_ and _El Filibusterismo_, for example, unleashed searing attacks against clerical abuses, clearly influenced by European liberalism and the Enlightenment idea of disentangling economic and political functions from religious obligations. In Europe, the Church ceded its “public” functions to parliament and the bureaucracy, paving the way for a division of labor, in which “public” became associated with the state and “private” with “civil society” (Breuilly, 1996).

14The American Revolution and “creole nationalisms” in Latin America also supplied “imagined realities,” such as nation-states, republican institutions, common citizenships, popular sovereignty, national flags and anthems, etc. and the overthrow of their conceptual antitheses: dynastic empires, monarchical institutions, absolutisms, subjecthoods, inherited nobilities and serfdoms (Anderson, 1991).

15Unlike the early kingdoms, colonial society was, by nature, “instrumentalist” and “analytical,” involving totally different sets of determinations which could not provide a “synthetic” articulation of the social whole.

16For others, like Thailand, neither invasion nor revolution occurred. Their social structures were untouched by discontinuities; their nation-ness is peculiarly defined by cultural continuity and coherence, which seems so natural to these Asian nations.

17Anti-colonial nationalism in Asian states with global cultural traditions progressed by accepting and imitating western superiority in statecraft, economy, science and technology (materiality) but preserving religious culture (spirituality). Colonial rulers were kept out of the “inner” domain of national culture, which rejected European conventions as inappropriate. Thus, while European influences molded anti-colonial nationalism, its arrival in late colonial Asia, and afterward, need not be interpreted as a roadblock to authentic self-governed, autonomous development among Asian communities, even if they were ruled by self-seeking, and collaborationist “nationalists” (Chatterjee, 1996).

18The elite’s earlier conversion to Christianity and its willing surrender to Spanish colonialism overdetermined its acquiescence to Americanization, according to Malay (1998).
The Philippines is the only country in Asia with a unique geo-cultural placement: geographically part of Asia but culturally tied to the United States and Spain. There is no other Asian nation-state where western influence dominates so completely.

Variegated folk cultures, such as the indigenous communal cultures in the Cordillera nations, underlie this fellowship across communities. As Pawid (1995) points out, for indigenous groups, "there is no hesitation to identify their citizenship as 'Filipino.' They participate in national politics and governance, even learning its intricacies and intrigues, despite their unique 'otherness.'"

Filipino control—the market as a component of the national patrimony—is supposed to be a big factor behind the success of "nationalist economics." The net effect of nationalism thus seems to be to vaccinate the domestic economy against any alien virus (forgetting that many of the IS industries which were established were subsidiaries of US corporations). There is interestingly what Malay (1998) calls a leitmotif of betrayal: any curtailment of Philippine sovereignty (e.g. foreign investments, ascendancy of the west) is perceived as curtailment of nation-ness.

Within this triumphant framework suggested by Francis Fukuyama, historical residues might still remain, but they would no longer be a major threat. Significantly, nationalisms "without distinctive social content or universal claim" are identified as one of the remnants. In Fukuyama's framework, nationalism receives no conceptual or empirical trustworthiness. But that is another story. See Anderson (1992b), chapter on "The Ends of History."

It was Cournot who has long prefigured the end of history in his Posthistoire: the social order would approximate to the regularity and predictability of a natural system, as economic principles became the dominant force shaping collective life, popular consumption increased, and politics lost ground to administration (Anderson, 1992a).

This has its own downside, however. The repression of one identity format, Nairn warns, is often achieved by a fanatical espousal of another—such as the Pan-Asian nationalism indicated by Vatikiotis (1998), where discontent over economic homogenization across Asia is breeding widespread resentment of anything western. If the imagined community is rooted in an idealized past...
time, the resistance would necessarily be emotionally violent, and could give birth to ethnonationalists (like Polpot), according to Nairn.

Trend-driven mass culture (rock or pop music, junk food, “rebellious” youth fashions, sports or recreational activities), which is the staple of the lower classes as much as of the wealthy, is part of the hegemonic culture. Attempts to “recuperate” it in protest literature, songs, street theater and the like have not really “subverted” the hegemonic culture (Malay, 1998).

A word of caution is needed even while accepting this argument. Krugman (1994) zeroed in on “crony capitalism,” or government cozying up to big business, as the principal contributor to moral hazard (it is argued that lenders lent appreciably more than otherwise because they believed they would be covered by implicit government guarantees). As Wade (1998) sarcastically notes, the perception shifted from miracle Asia to “Asian crony capitalism” almost overnight. Krugman was especially hard on guanxi (Chinese for relationships), which, in his view, produced bad investments in both the public and private sectors. But guanxi, according to Woo-Cumings (1998), is not necessarily a prima facie evidence of bad corporate governance. Western discourse on East Asia has tended to miss two key points: (1) it was from a particular historic practice that East Asian business evolved, “where what appears irrational from a western standpoint may be an effective local adaptation in the interests of wealth accumulation”; and (2) practices that might have been counted upon to eventually die out instead endured because everything seemed to work, in a situation of an astoundingly swift growth: “Rapid growth was less the solvent of outdated practice than it was its preservative.” Woo-Cumings cites the case of diasporic overseas Chinese firms, which evolved out of “culturally embedded networks” as the most flexible units in the world today—thriving as easily in articulated civil societies like Canada and the US, as in societies crippled by the weakness of civil society, such as India and the Philippines. Globalization has made the Chinese firm—a premodern corporate governance form—into the most highly adaptable, multicultural, postmodern—firm, able to steer in any economic seas.

This, despite the fact that the imagined community itself can exist even in the presence of actual inequality and exploitation (Anderson, 1991).

This should not be taken as equivalent to a game of catch-up, where there are early starters and late arrivals. What it does is to give undue importance to a country’s relative position in a supposed time-bound sequence of cultural development; its aftermath is an inflexible convergence of all nation-states toward a common standard (Nairn, 1996).
Bibliography


