East Asian History and Society

Introduction
Lydia N. Yu Jose

The Primate City in Southeast Asia: Conceptual Definitions and Colonial Origins
Robert Reed

The Conversion of the Alani by the Franciscan Missionaries in China in the Fourteenth Century
Frank W. Iklé

Japanese Policy and Indian National Army
Joyce Lebra

Korea, Focus of Russo-Japanese Diplomacy (1898-1903)
I. H. Nish

Yoji Akashi
About the Journal

Asian Studies is a peer-reviewed journal published by the Asian Center, University of the Philippines Diliman. Since 1963, it has promoted original research that helps enhance the understanding of and enliven discussions on issues relevant to Asia.

Editorial Board

• Eduardo C. Tadem (Editor in Chief), Asian Studies, University of the Philippines Diliman
• Michiyo Yoneno-Reyes (Review Section Editor), Asian Studies, University of the Philippines Diliman
• Eduardo T. Gonzalez, Asian and Philippine Studies, University of the Philippines Diliman
• Ricardo T. Jose, History, University of the Philippines Diliman
• Joseph Anthony Lim, Economics, Ateneo de Manila University
• Antoinette R. Raquiza, Asian Studies, University of the Philippines Diliman
• Teresa Encarnacion Tadem, Political Science, University of the Philippines Diliman
• Lily Rose Tope, English and Comparative Literature, University of the Philippines Diliman

Editorial Team

• Janus Isaac V. Nolasco, Managing Editor
• Katrina S. Navallo, Editorial Associate

Editorial Advisory Board

• Patricio N. Abinales, University of Hawaii at Manoa
• Andrew Charles Bernard Aeria, University of Malaysia Sarawak
• Benedict Anderson, Cornell University
• Melani Budianta, University of Indonesia
• Urvashi Butalia, Zubaan Books (An imprint of Kali for Women)
• Vedi Renandi Hadiz, Murdoch University
• Caroline S. Hau, Kyoto University
• Huang Renwei, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences
• Reynaldo C. Ileto, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
• Benedict Tria Kerkvliet, Australian National University & University of Hawaii
• Lau Kin Chi, Lingnan University
• Lee Jung Ok, Daegu Catholic University
• Francis Loh Kok Wah, Universiti Sains Malaysia
• Armando S. Malay, Jr., University of the Philippines Diliman
• Kinhide Mushakoji, Osaka University
• Raul Pertierra, University of the Philippines Diliman
• Somchai Phatharathananunth, Mahasarakham University
• Michael Pinches, University of Western Australia
• Bambang Purwanto, Gadjah Mada University
• Vinod Raina, Jawaharlal Nehru University
• Helen Yu-Rivera, University of the Philippines Diliman
• Harsh Sethi, Seminar Journal (New Delhi)
• Wen Tiejun, Renmin University of China
• Surichai Wun’Gaeo, Chulalongkorn University
The content of *Asian Studies* may not be republished without the written permission of the Asian Center.
East Asian History and Society

i | Introduction
Lydia N. Yu Jose

1 | The Primate City in Southeast Asia: Conceptual Definitions and Colonial Origins (1972)
Robert Reed

38 | The Conversion of the Alani by the Franciscan Missionaries in China in the Fourteenth Century (1967)
Frank W. Iklé

46 | Japanese Policy and Indian National Army (1969)
Joyce Lebra

65 | Korea, Focus of Russo-Japanese Diplomacy (1898-1903) (1966)
I. H. Nish

Yoji Akashi

108 | About the Authors
Introduction

The articles reproduced in this retrospective issue may be grouped into two, according to what possible value they may offer to the reader. The first group consists of studies on East Asian relations from the late nineteenth century to the Second World War. East Asia here is defined as the region comprising China, Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia and the articles in this group are by Ian H. Nish, Joyce Lebra, and Yoji Akashi. East Asia is now the focus of world politics and scholarly interests. A deep understanding of the current situation requires a firm historical background and these works by such respected scholars certainly fulfill that need.

The second group consists of scholarly works that ask theoretically grounded general questions which today are still a challenge to scholars. Robert R. Reed asks what is the role of great cities and why people don’t stay put in the rural areas. Frank W. Iklé asks why people undergo religious conversion. Reed’s and Iklé’s case studies provide examples of how scholars, who take up the challenge, may approach the questions.

Ian H. Nish’s forte is the history of diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Japan, a specialization which, of course, inevitably touches on Japan’s relations with Russia, China, and Korea. The article reproduced here has been expanded into *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance – The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907*. It is common knowledge that Great Britain was the first country to sign a treaty with Japan in 1902 and there is consensus that this treaty emboldened Japan to wage a war against Russia in 1903. The war ended in Japan’s victory and consolidation of its power over Korea, which was officially annexed to Japan in 1910. The signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was preceded by almost five years of informal and official talks between Russia and Japan. The signing was commonly held as a failure of Russia’s diplomatic efforts and the talks that preceded it were a double-cross of Russia by Japan. In the 1960s, the literature on these talks had not been systematically analyzed. Ian Nish was the first to do this, taking advantage of the opening of the archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nish concludes that the informal talks were conducted by a government official in his private capacity and should not therefore be considered as a double-cross. Nonetheless, Nish stresses, the contents of the talks show Japan’s determination to establish its supremacy over Korea.

Joyce Lebra, in this shorter and earlier version of her full-length book on the topic, *Jungle Alliance: Japan and Indian National Army* superbly adds to the pioneering work of K.K. Ghosh, *The Indian National Army* published in 1969, and a much older work by Hugh Toye, *The
Springing Tiger, published in 1959. The invaluable addition is a deeper insight into the complex relationship between the Indian National Army (INA) operating in Southeast Asia and the Japanese decision makers in Tokyo on one hand, the interaction between the Indian independence fighters and the Japanese soldiers on the field, on the other, and still on another, the relationship between the latter and the Japanese decision-makers. Lebra was the first among the scholars on India-Japan relations to use primary Japanese sources, thus giving a balanced view of what, until she wrote, were Indian and British perspectives. Even though India was peripheral to Japan’s war plans during World War II, from the vantage point of Prime Minister Tojo, the Indians should be motivated to take advantage of Japan’s war for the “liberation” of Asia from Western imperialism to expel the British from India. And for this, collaboration between the INA and the Japanese propaganda organization had strategic importance. Was INA a puppet of Japan or was it truly a revolutionary army fighting for Indian independence? After narrating the varying attitudes of INA leaders towards Japan—some were for outright collaboration, others were suspicious of the motives of their fellow Indians for cooperating with Japan, while still others were truly haunted by their former loyalty to the British army, Lebra concludes that the answer is complex and is nuanced by the differing perspectives of the Indian and the Japanese participants.

No doubt, Yoji Akashi is the most prominent Japanese scholar on the Japanese occupation of Malaya. He has written on almost every aspect of the occupation, such as the Japanese policy towards the Chinese in Malaya; Malayan scholars of the Japanese government during the occupation; and “Watanabe Wataru: The Architect of the Malay Military Administration” to mention only a few of the works that span more than five decades. The article in this retrospective issue, one of his earlier works, is on the Japanese policy towards the sultans of Malaya. In this article, Akashi posits that the Japanese Military Administration in Malaya was unprepared to deal with the sultans who, during the British rule, enjoyed political independence and high religious and social status. They also received monetary stipends from the British. The other side of the coin was their lack of preparation to deal with religious matters. The Japanese military administrators were unprepared for the simple reason that no thought was given by the central administration in Tokyo to make such preparation. This is evidenced by the fact that no person who could be in charge of sultans and take care of religious matters accompanied the Twenty-Fifth Army. And yet, if the Japanese wanted to gain the cooperation of the people, they had to work with the sultans. Guided only by the general principle of not drastically changing the way the British treated the sultans, the Japanese military governors interpreted the general principle according to the situation in their area of jurisdiction. Hence, the policy towards
the sultans was uneven—liberal with political privileges and monetary stipend in some, stringent in others. The implementation was vacillating and indecisive while changes were made according to the turns and twists of the war situation. When, by 1944, almost towards the defeat of Japan, a more stable and lenient policy was decided, it was applied not only to the Moslem-Malays but also to all races—especially the Chinese and the Indians in Malaya, and to all religions. Akashi traces such vacillation and indecision to the irreconcilability of the Japanese eagerness to impose their own cultural values—Shinto worship, divinity of the emperor, and the so-called Japanese spirit on the Malays—and their desire to obtain the sultan’s cooperation by granting them their pre-World War II privileges and respectable political, social, and religious status. The dilemma was further complicated by the difficulty of having a policy only for the Muslims in a multiracial and multireligious Malaya.

Robert R. Reed’s main scholarly interest is the development of cities in Southeast Asia. This is an area of intellectual inquiry, which in today’s globalization, localization, environmental degradation, and increased mobility of people, has assumed renewed importance. What is the role of the so-called great cities in national and global development? The article reproduced in this volume is a shorter version of Reed’s doctoral dissertation, although this was not the first of his works on the same topic. His 1967 article on urbanization of the Philippines during the Spanish period preceded it and has been quoted by several scholars in the same academic field, one of them no less than the renowned Daniel Deppes. In the article reproduced here, Reed contends that the political and cultural dominance of primate cities is not a modern phenomenon. As shown in the cases of Manila and Jakarta (Batavia), they were actually colonial creations, although Manila was different from Batavia. The root of the difference was that Spain was different from the other European colonizers in Southeast Asia in that unlike the Dutch, etc., Spain mixed secular and religious motives. To carry out Hispanization and Christianization, Spain embarked on direct rule and establishment of numerous cities and towns in the Philippines. Urbanization proved to be most difficult in the Philippines than in other parts of Southeast Asia because by the sixteenth century, Manila did not have yet any urban center. Other Southeast Asian countries already had well developed coastal towns and sacred cities. Manila and Batavia were fully developed primate cities by the outbreak of World War II; to date, the two cities have remained primate and have retained much of their colonial influences, observes Reed. If the great cities have survived World War II, a great upheaval, would they survive globalization? Would globalization be a force stronger than a world war to dramatically change cities?
The short piece by Frank Iklé is about the general question of religious conversion, a question that until today is very relevant. In the Philippines, for example, what makes those who become Born Again embrace this faith in exchange for their former religion, usually, Roman Catholicism?

Proceeding from the thesis that the spread of Roman Catholicism was mainly due to its association with Roman political power and its perceived possession of higher civilization, Iklé asks why the Franciscan missionary Friar John of Montecorvino succeeded in re-converting the Alanis to Roman Catholicism. The Alanis had been converted to Greek Orthodoxy under the Patriarchate of Nicholas Mysticos, but renounced it in 940. They were transplanted into China and lost the spiritual guidance of the Greek Orthodox Church. Christianity did not appeal to the Chinese because in China, it totally lacked political power and it could not compete with Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism. These three religions were considered as representatives of a higher civilization. However, after earning the good favor of the new emperor of Yuan China, Togham Timur (1333-1368), John of Montecorvino succeeded in winning into the Roman Catholic faith the Alanis in 1318. Iklé admits that credit of course could be given to the personality of John of Montecorvino, but this could not be the only reason. He thus hypothesizes that the success was partly due to the fact that the Alanis had had experience of Christianity—through Greek Orthodoxy and after having been deprived of this spiritual experience in China, they longed for it and found in Roman Catholicism a civilization much higher and more fulfilling than Greek Orthodoxy. One unresolved question which Iklé hopes can be pursued in the future is whether Fr. John went to the Alanis or the Alanis looked for a missionary and found him.

Lydia N. Yu Jose, Ph.D.
Director, Ateneo Center for Asian Studies
School of Social Sciences, Loyola Schools, Ateneo de Manila University

References


Introduction


May 2013
THE PRIMATE CITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS AND COLONIAL ORIGINS*

ROBERT R. REED

Although Southeast Asia remains one of the least urbanized areas of the modern world, the accelerating rate of urban growth in both the mainland and archipelagic realms has recently generated mounting interest in the city and concern for its future among scholars and within national officialdoms of the region. To planners and governmental personnel involved in metropolitan development the urbanization process*

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at a panel seminar on "Future Urban Development in Southeast Asia" held at the Alumni House, University of California, Berkeley, California, on August 7-9, 1972. The Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group (SEADAG) of The Asia Society, New York, sponsored this meeting. I also wish to acknowledge with thanks the helpful comments and suggestions of Professor Paul Wheatley, Department of Geography, University of Chicago, and Professors Clarence J. Glacken, Risa I. Palm, and James J. Parsons, Department of Geography, University of California, Berkeley.


2 Definitions of the urbanization process are many and are usually tailored to reflect research concerns of individual scholars. Yet most deal directly or indirectly with the reordering of a given rural population in towns and cities, as well as with the associated impact upon man and environment. It almost goes without saying that the exact nature of the process of human concentration in larger settlements remains a subject or continuing discussion. The degree of urbanization, on the other hand, usually allowed more precise meaning. Increasingly social scientists use this term to indicate the proportion of a total national or regional population which dwells in towns and cities. Useful commentaries in accessible sources pertaining to these concepts are presented in Lampard, pp. 519-554; Breese, The City in Newly Developing Countries, Pts. 1-3; Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries, chaps. 1-4; Kingsley Davis, "The Urbanization of the Human Population," Scientific American, Vol. 213, No. 3 (September, 1965) pp. 40-53; Kingsley Davis and Hilda H. Golden, "Urbanization and the Development of Pre-Industrial Areas," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 3, No. 1 (October 1954), pp. 6-24; Eric E. Lampard, "Urbanization and Social Change: On Broadening the Scope and Relevance of Urban History," in Oscar Handlin and John Burbard (eds.), The Historian and the City (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1963), pp. 225-247. See also Philip M. Hauser and Leo F. Schmoke (eds.), The Study of Urbanization (New
and associated social, economic and political problems are of immediate and obvious import, for they are faced with the complex task of providing workable solutions to the employment, educational, housing, transportation and recreational needs of the millions who now crowd into the major regional cities and towns. Accordingly there is a little doubt that the ongoing work of all developers and policy makers will be marked by an intensifying sense of urgency as the scale of urban expansion continues to become manifest through proliferation of squatter communities, exceedingly high unemployment and underemployment figures, rising social discontent and general deterioration in the quality of human life.

No less concerned with the matter of city growth in Southeast Asia are a number of Asian, American and European social scientists, who more than a decade ago began to display a growing commitment to the study of non-Western urbanism. In recent publications these scholars, like co-workers in South Asia, Africa, Latin America and East Asia, have expressed considerable discontent with old models fashioned to explain the multifaceted processes of modernization, industrialization and urbanization exclusively in terms of European and North American experience. Predictably some have begun to call for the rejection of the more inflexible constructs, which seem applicable only to Western cities. Though this group of researchers still remains small in number, even now it is clear that through their efforts a fundamental re-examination of established urban theory has been inaugurated. Preliminary investigations by certain of these workers are already bring-
ing into serious question the formerly accepted correlation between industrial development and modern urbanization, the reality or even the heuristic value of the urban-rural continuum, the belief that social disorganization always follows the migration of villagers to cities, and the invariability of the demographic transition in the contemporary


metropolis of the Third World. At the same time other scholars, whose interests focus upon the origin and evolution of urban centers, have contributed significantly to our knowledge of indigenous Southeast Asian urbanism and to our understanding of the role of European colonialism in initiating reorganization of settlement systems throughout the region. Among the critical elements in the latter process was the development within the various Western dependencies of especially large and multi-functional colonial capitals, which today continue to serve as the political, educational, economic and cultural nerve-centers of emergent states. While it is true that nationalists have occasionally called for replacement of the former bastions of imperial rule by new administrative centers, these so-called primate cities presently remain unchallenged as the urban keystones of the most nations in Southeast Asia. Their paramountcy is firmly verifying through far-reaching national influence and steady growth in population.

As might be expected, the subject of metropolitan primacy has not gone unmentioned by students of Southeast Asian urbanism. Through the

---


10 Probably the first Southeast Asian leader to advocate abandonment of an established colonial capital in favor of a new urban site was the revolutionary General Emilio Aguinaldo of the Philippines. In 1913, during a visit to the cool and invigorating hill station of Baguio, he suggested transfer of the seat of insular government to the mountains of Northern Luzon. W. Camerlon Forbes, "Journal of W. Cameron Forbes, First Series, February, 1904 - November, 1913", Vol. 5, pp. 234-236. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
term primate city appeared only rarely in literature published prior to 1960, it became common currency during the past decade. But despite increasing acceptance by social scientists as an important theme worthy of serious investigation, researchers too often remain content to make the seemingly oversize national metropolis a subordinate topic embedded within large urban studies. Consequently they often neglect discussion of the theoretical implications of metropolitan primacy and also ignore its historical dimensions. The pages which follow, therefore, will be devoted to commentary concerning these subjects.

The Nature of Metropolitan Primacy

The concept of metropolitan primacy is not new, for it was first introduced to students of urbanism more than three decades ago. In his seminal statement on this theme the geographer Mark Jefferson drew attention to the fact that the leading city in many nations is not merely dominant in terms of population, but also stands foremost in diversity of functions and degree of effective national influence. To express this condition of supereminence, he introduced the notion of the primate city. While admitting the significance of various combinations of economic, political, physical and cultural factors in the original generation of primacy within national urban systems, Jefferson still firmly contended that

once city is larger than any other in its country, this mere fact gives it an impetus to grow that cannot affect any other city, and it draws away from all of them in character as well as in size... [As a result] it becomes the primate city.


12 The outstanding exception is T. G. McGeen, whose book The Southeast Asian City is organized around the theme of metropolitan primacy. Other scholars have also made contributions through investigations of the origin and growth of individual primate cities. For instance see James L. Cobban, "The City of Java: An Essay in Historical Geography" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Geography, University of California, Berkeley, 1970); Pauline Dublin Milone, "Queen City of the East: The Metamorphosis of a Colonial Capital" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of California, Berkeley, 1966); Reed, "Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines", chaps. 5-7.


15 Ibid., p. 227.
Accordingly metropolitan primacy was envisaged as a continuing condition which generally tends to persist regardless of chance reversals in rates of population growth or even the temporary florescence of secondary urban places. He further argued that the primate city is almost always the national capital, a cultural center, the focus of internal migration, a hub of nationalistic ferment and the multi-functional nucleus of a country’s economy. At the same time, according to Jefferson, the paramount urban place usually embraces at least two times as many residents as the second ranking city in any given state. By examining forty-four of the then leading independent nations of the world, he found strong support for the latter hypothesis. In twenty-eight of the countries, which were located on all of the inhabited continents, the primate cities proved to be more than twice as populous as their nearest urban rivals. Eighteen of these, moreover, had capitals over three times the size of the next largest centers. The available evidence thus indicated that in the 1930’s metropolitan primacy was a comparatively common urban phenomenon.

Though it cannot be denied that Jefferson convincingly demonstrated the widespread occurrence of primate cities in terms of the data in hand, his body of supportive material remains marked by a curious and especially noteworthy omission. Without providing the reader benefit of explanation, he excluded nearly all European dependencies from the investigation. While this gap in information certainly did not negate the essence of his conclusions, it somewhat reduced their immediate impact. If Jefferson had in fact elected to include in the survey the numerous colonies of Africa and Asia, most of which display a high degree of metropolitan primacy, his argument would have been strengthened even further. Despite this undue focus only upon sovereign states extant in 1939, the concept of the primate city ultimately proved of recognizable utility and has been gradually adopted by social scientists.

17 Jefferson, pp. 227-228.
18 The only exceptions were British India and the American dominated Commonwealth of the Philippines. But no explanation for their inclusion in the investigation was offered.
19 The long assumed correlation between a colonial inheritance and metropolitan primacy in the nations of the Third World was recently confirmed by Arnold S. Linsky, “Some Generalizations Concerning Primate Cities”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 55, No. 3 (September, 1965), pp. 506-513.
20 Scholars in a number of disciplines have confirmed the utility of metropolitan primacy as a category of research by relating it to investigations in their several areas of urban specialization. For examples of the interdisciplinary interest in the primate city, consult the following publications which have been selected respectively from the fields of geography, public administration, history, regional planning, and economics: A. James Rose, “Dissent from Down Under: Metropolitan Primacy as the Normal State”, Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 7, No. 1 (May, 1966), pp. 1-27; Aprodicio A. Laquian, The City in Nation-Building (Manila: School of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1960), pp. 2-5; Richard C. Morse, “Recent Research on Latin American Urbanization: A Selective Survey
For almost fifteen years following publication of Jefferson's now widely cited article on great cities, scholars displayed relatively little interest in either the demographic or the functional aspects of metropolitan primacy. Yet by the middle of the 1950's, short commentaries concerning the role of the primate city were beginning to appear within larger urban studies prepared by geographers, historians, sociologists and economists. Although the majority of researchers considered this theme only in a peripheral manner, even their brief discussions began to reflect a growing currency among students of urbanism and urbanization. This continues today. And while metropolitan primacy remains a topic of secondary concern for many researchers, in recent years a number have made it a focus of sustained inquiry. A clear reflection of this quickening interest may be found in new college textbooks for geography and related disciplines, where sections on the primate city now seem to warrant standards inclusion. Nevertheless, one should not assume that scholars are agreed on the precise nature or the manifold implications of metropolitan primacy. Presently all evidence seems to indicate that controversy will continue for some years concerning the political, economic and cultural roles of the primate city.

Questions of Urban Theory and Non-Western Primate Cities

City-size distributions. During the past two decades social scientist have explored four major avenues of inquiry in the continuing investigation of metropolitan primacy. One cluster of researchers has displayed


21 The term "great city" is used frequently as a synonym for primate city.


25 Some of the corollaries to the condition of metropolitan primacy which seem to warrant future investigation are identified in Mehta, pp. 136-147; Linsky, pp. 506-513.
special interest in the various city-size distributions of nations and in their possible connection with comparative economic development. For many years urban geographers and other location theorists assumed that, with few exceptions, only industrially advanced countries display the tendency towards a regular hierarchical arrangement of urban places according to the rank-size rule. 28 In such cases the paramount city in a state is roughly twice as large as centers of the second stratum, three times the population of those at the third level, and so on down. This regularity in the ordering of cities and towns by rank and size was thought to be indicative of considerable socio-economic viability within an integrated national urban system. 27 At the same time early investigators believed that distributions reflective of primacy, in which a single oversized metropolis is markedly larger than cities, towns and villages of lower strata, were almost always associated with countries still in the early stages of economic development. 28 Research carried out during the past fifteen years, however, strongly suggests the invalidity of these notions. While there is little doubt that a high level of urbanization and considerable industrial development are closely related, scholars now generally question the existence of a significant correlation between rank-size distribution of cities and economic advancement, or between the national presence of a primate city and underdevelopment. 29 In fact some of the lesser developed nations, including the larger states of Brazil, China and India, display mark-

28 Mehta, p. 137; Brian J. L. Berry, "City Size Distributions and Economic Development", Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 9, No. 4, Pt. 1 (July, 1961), p. 573. One of the more widely known ideas concerning the distribution of city sizes is that of George F. Zipf, who several decades ago formally set forth the notion of rank-size relationship. Following considerable empirical observation, he argued that in every country there is a tendency for a city of any given rank in a settlement hierarchy to exhibit a population which is in inverse proportion to its position. Accordingly if all urban centers were arranged in descending order by population, we should expect the second city to have half as many people as the largest, while the n-th settlement would embrace 1/n-th the citizenry of the paramount place. Early commentary on rank-size regularity was offered in George K. Zipf, Nationality Unity and Disunity (Bloomington: Principia Press, 1941); Human Behavior and the Principal of Least Effort: An Introduction to Human Ecology (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley Press, Inc., 1949). Empirical evidence concerning this formula has been reviewed in Haggett, pp. 100-108; Walter Isard, Location and Space-Economy: A General Theory Relating to Industrial Location, Market Areas, Land Use, Trade and Urban Structure (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., and The Technology Press of M.I.T., 1956), pp. 55-60; Rutledge Vining, "A Description of Certain Spatial Aspects of an Economic System", Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 3, No. 2 (January, 1955), pp.147-195. For further discussion of the rank-size role and useful references, consult Mehta, pp. 137-138; Berry and Horton, pp. 64-67, 92-93.

27 Berry and Horton, pp. 64-67; Berry, p. 573.


29 Berry, "City Size Distributions and Economic Development", pp. 585-587; Haggett, pp. 103-105; Berry and Horton, pp. 64-75.
edly regular arrangements of urban places. By the same token certain economically advanced countries, such as Sweden, Greece, Austria and Denmark, exhibit a clearly recognizable condition of metropolitan primacy instead of the formerly predicted hierarchical structure. Though these results are seemingly inconclusive, the findings of recent investigations do in fact support several tentative generalizations. Scholars now believe that, regardless of geographical location or stage of economic development, almost all nations large in area or diversified industrially tend towards a rank-size distribution of cities and towns. Metropolitan primacy, on the other hand, is thought to be a feature of the smaller Western states, as well as of small and intermediate-size countries in the Third World.29

In the only serious attempt to test the above hypotheses within the context of Southeast Asia, the geographer Hamzah Sendut clearly demonstrated the regional presence of both rank-size and primate distributions of urban places.31 He found that Indonesia alone displays a truly regular arrangement of cities, though Malaysia also approximates this condition. In marked contrast the nations of Burma, Thailand and the Philippines reveal a distinct primate distribution. For some unexplained reason Hamzah combined the countries of Laos, South Vietnam, Cambodia and North Vietnam to illustrate a rank-size situation in the greater Indochinese realm, while leaving unmentioned the fact that these several states when taken as independent political entities embrace capital cities which show clear-cut patterns of demographic and functional primacy.32 Accordingly the city-size arrangements in Southeast Asia seem to corroborate empirical findings from other parts of the world.33 Most of the small states in this developing region are marked by primate distributions. Only the large and populous nation of Indonesia is characterized by a rank-size arrangement of cities and towns. Thus there is no indication of any connection between relative economic development and city-size distributions within Southeast Asia. Nor does the available evidence suggest that the condition of primacy will necessarily begin to evolve toward a rank-size arrangement with the occurrence of economic progress. This latter question, nevertheless, will probably

29 Berry, “City Size Distributions and Economic Development”, pp. 573-588; Berry and Horton, pp. 64-75.
32 These capital cities are Saigon-Cholon (South Vietnam), Phnom Penh (Cambodia), Vientiane (Laos), and Hanoi (North Vietnam).
33 The most comprehensive study of city-size distributions is Berry’s “City Size Distributions and Economic Development”, pp. 573-588, which contains information concerning thirty-eight countries. A summary of the results of this inquiry is presented in Berry and Horton, pp. 67-75.
demand serious exploration in future years, for such a trend has been identified elsewhere in the world and if discerned in Southeast Asia could undoubtedly have considerable impact upon urban and regional planning decisions in certain nations.\textsuperscript{34}

Notions of parasitic and generative cities. A second and still controversial question associated with the study of metropolitan primacy concerns the role of great cities as "parasitic" or "generative" instruments of authority within the economies of developing countries.\textsuperscript{35} Since the middle of the 1950's many students of urbanism have believed that large capitals in nations of the Third World rarely serve as effective stimulants to economic growth. Instead these supereminent cities are viewed as national parasites or urban magnets which invariably extract considerable quantities of resources from underdeveloped hinterlands and lure more talented individuals to the metropolitan areas from scattered villages. At the same time the non-Western primate cities reputedly fail to provide in return an equitable amount of manufactured goods, organizational guidance and essential services. In a typical statement expressing this viewpoint Eric E. Lampard writes that

the presence of an overly large city in a preindustrial society may act as a curb rather than a stimulus to wider growth. Its growth and maintenance have been somewhat parasitical in the sense that profits of trade, capital accumulated in agricultural and other primacy pursuits have been dissipated in grandiose construction, servicing, and consuming by a "colonial" elite. The labor and enterprise which might otherwise have been invested in some form of manufacture or material processing in the interior are drawn off to the great city by the attractive dazzle of a million lights.\textsuperscript{36}

According to John Friedmann, whose words are especially emphatic, the

primate cities tend to feed upon the rest of the nation. Instead of generating a new socioeconomic order and new wealth. they feast on what may be ex-

\textsuperscript{34} In the aforementioned comparative investigation of city-size distributions (above, n. 33), Berry postulated the development of a trend from the condition of metropolitan primacy to a rank-size ordering of cities as nations experience economic progress. Several subsequent empirical studies designed to test the validity of this notion, however, remain inconclusive. While Berry's model seems to represent accurately the situation in Israel, it cannot be applied in New Zealand. Gwen Bell, "Change in City Size Distribution in Israel" Ekistics, Vol. 13 (1962), p. 103, cited in Berry and Horton, p. 93, n. 15; R. J. Johnston, "On the Progress from Primacy to Rank-Size in an Urban System: The Deviant Case of New Zealand", Area, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1971), pp. 180-184.

\textsuperscript{35} The seminar paper on this subject is "Generative and Parasitic Cities," which was written by Bert F. Hoselitz in the middle of the 1950's and is cited above, n. 22. It has also been reprinted in his Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth, chap. 8. Aprodicio A. Laquian in The City in Nation-Building, p. 4, suggests that urban geographers submitted the notion of "parasitic" cities as part of the original construct concerning metropolitan primacy. In rereading Mark Jefferson's "The Law of the Primate City," however, I found no support for his contention. Nor does Hiselitz credit any other scholar with the concept of urban parasitism.

tracted by the sweat of poor, provincial labor. The reason for this essentially colonial relationship is that any center unopposed on the periphery, by countervailing powers will yield excessive influence in making basic political decisions. The periphery, therefore, is drained, and national progress will fail to occur, except as it accrues to a small elite of urban consumers at the center.\textsuperscript{37}

For almost two decades these impressions have been echoed and re-echoed by other researchers, who feel that the former colonial role of non-Western primate cities as political and economic "head-links"\textsuperscript{38} between the metropolitan powers of Europe and many dispersed dependencies remains intact even today.\textsuperscript{39} Such writers, as one would expect, argue for the immediate implementation of policies geared to the reversal of this presumably parasitic condition, to the creation of economically generative capitals and to the growth of secondary urban places in each developing nation.

Despite the frequent indictment of non-Western primate cities as instruments of economic exploitation throughout the Third World, not all scholars are in full concurrence. Concerning the urban situation in West Africa, Sheldon Gellar offers the following observations:

The growing primacy of the capital city, at the present time, seems to be a step in the right direction since it is preferable to have a primate capital city with some industry than to have no primate city and no industry. Furthermore, the charge that the primate city, by absorbing a disproportionate share of the nation's resources, prevents the emergence of other development poles does not hold true in West Africa. Ghana, Senegal, and the Ivory Coast, where the primate phenomenon is most advanced, are precisely those countries having other important development poles.\textsuperscript{40}

In an even more detailed statement pertaining to metropolitan primacy in Southeast Asia, Donald W. Fryer contends that


in modern times at least, it is not possible seriously to claim that over an appreciable period any great city has been essentially parasitic. The European-created cities may initially have operated to impoverish the indigenous ruling and merchant classes and to lay heavier burdens on the peasants, but the effects of economic growth within the cities themselves and their repercussions on the countryside were such that ultimately these parasitic tendencies were greatly outweighed by new productive ones that did result in an increase in incomes per head. With an increasing urban population a specialized labour force came into being; the demand for food and for export crops increased, which together with improvements in transport did offer new opportunities to indigenous farmers; and the growth of processing industries at ports and the expansion of the production of inanimate energy began to lay the foundations for a higher degree of industrial activity.41

Many other social scientists, who seem to feel that economic growth in the typical developing nation is oftentimes facilitated through the medium of primate cities, have also lent endorsements to the essentials of the foregoing statements.42 Only in the very large urban places, they argue, are political and business authorities able to exploit the economies of scale essential to efficient industrialization.43 Individuals subscribing to this position usually admit the ultimate importance of intermediate-size cities and towns in guaranteeing economic progress on a broad geographical basis, but still believe that general prosperity depends upon the initial achievement of considerable commercial, administrative and industrial momentum in the primate city.44

Though commentary concerning the developmental role of great cities usually revolves around the subject of economic activity, some

41 Fryer, pp. 84-85. For permission to quote this statement I gratefully thank George Philip & Son Limited, London, who are the senior publishers of Emerging Southeast Asia: A Study in Growth and Stagnation, and the author Professor Donald W. Fryer.


43 A summary statement of this position and some useful references are presented in Mehta, pp. 138-140. Consult also Petersen, pp. 33-34; Ullman, pp. 5-8; Fryer, Megalopolis or Tyrannopolis in Southeast Asia?, pp. 4-6.

44 Even those researchers who contend that all primate cities are essentially parasitic in nature, and who advocate programs of urban decentralization in order to foster economic progress oftentimes acknowledge the possibility of persistent dis-economies in developing nations whose indigenous elites fail to fully exploit the commercial, administrative and social facilities available only in major metropolitan centers. For example consult Hauser, "The Social, Economic, and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization", pp. 204-205; Gerald Bree, The Great City and Economic Development in Southeast Asia, SEADAG Paper No. 29 (New York: Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group, The Asia Society, 1968), pp. 5-8 (Mimeoographed).
writers have questioned the validity of a parasitic or generative designation based upon a single criterion. They rightly contend that this is only one of the many functions performed by the primate city, for most ranking urban places serve additionally as national capitals, communications complexes, military headquarters, educational centers and hubs of cultural activities. According to these investigators, truly accurate assessments of the comparative generative and parasitic relationships between the metropolitan nerve-centers and their hinterlands must include full consideration of all function. The balanced evaluation of various urban external relations, rather than concentration upon economic linkages, is thus envisaged by such commentators as the key to a full understanding of the multi-faceted development role of great cities. In light of past controversy regarding the parasitic and generative influences of the primate city, therefore, it seems likely that related questions will command the attention of researchers for some years to come.

Over-urbanization. As in the case of the two foregoing topics corollary to the major theme of metropolitan primacy, the subject of “over-urbanization” remains a focus of continuing interest and debate among students concerned with the development of great cities in Asia and in other parts of the Third World. These individuals generally feel that the non-Western nations of today are over-urbanized because larger proportions of their population live in urban places than their degree of economic development justifies. In the so-called underdeveloped nations, a much smaller proportion of the labor force is engaged in non-agricultural occupations than was the case in the West at comparable levels of urbanization. Furthermore, during the postwar period, the rate of urbanization in the underdeveloped areas has...[proceeded]... more rapidly than the rate of economic development.

In such countries the urban labor force apparently expands both through the internal population growth of cities and the “push” of migrants from

45 The multi-functional role of the primate city is detailed in almost all sustained commentaries on Southern Asian urbanism. For instance see Fryer, Emerging Southeast Asia, Chap. 3; “The Million City in Southeast Asia”, Geographical Review, Vol. 43, No. 4 (October, 1953), pp. 474-494; McGee, The Southeast Asian City, chap. 4-7.

46 Mehta, pp. 138-147; Breese, The Great City and Economic Development in Southeast Asia, pp. 3-8. It worthy of note that Bert F. Hoselitz fully recognized that the primate city could be parasitic or generative in a variety of functions, but elected to confine his discussion only to the economic realm. “Generative and Parasitic Cities”, pp. 278-294.

47 Mehta, pp. 138-147.


especially overcrowded rural situations, rather than through the "pull" of unskilled workers from villages to rapidly industrializing metropolitan centers.\textsuperscript{50} Accordingly major urban places throughout the Third World have come to embrace populations far in excess of employment demands in the combined public and private sectors of their economies. This in turn has produced the serious problems of unemployment, underemployment and social unrest which now plague most primate cities in Asia and other developing regions.\textsuperscript{51} Conditions of over-urbanization among nations thus are usually described in terms of comparative levels of city growth, the distribution of labor between urban and agricultural occupations, poverty, job availability in major cities and relative economic progress.

While scholars are in general agreement concerning the typical occupational and economic elements of over-urbanization, their investigations have failed to produce a satisfactory index for the comparative measurement of this condition over lengthy periods of time and in both Western and non-Western countries. It is certainly true that attempts to find a direct correlation between the degree of industrialization and the degree of urbanization in a number of different regions at given dates in history are useful in identifying exceptional national cases of economic development, stagnation and city growth.\textsuperscript{52} But all efforts to find a clear relationship between these two variables through time and in var-


\textsuperscript{52} Many scholars have devoted themselves to the study of the relationship between industrialization and urbanization in the non-Western world. The more significant publications resulting from this research are cited in Breese, \textit{Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries}, p. 51, n. 15.
ious countries remain inconclusive. Researchers interested in the development of nations in the Third World, in other words, have yet to reach a consensus regarding the statistical dimensions of over-urbanization.\textsuperscript{53}

Regardless of continuing controversy concerning the precise definition of an over-urbanized country, there is little disagreement as to the physical and human results of this phenomenon. Almost without exception scholars seem to feel that everywhere in non-Western primate cities

the most visible consequence of overurbanization and rapid rates of urban growth is the decadence of the urban environment. The physical city is characterized by a large proportion of shanty towns and tenement slums; inadequate urban services, including housing, water supply, sewerage, utilities, and transport; uncontrolled land use; excessive population densities; deficient educational and recreational facilities; and inefficient commercial and marketing services. Rapid urbanization in the underdeveloped areas is accompanied by not a defective, but also by a deteriorating, urban environment.\textsuperscript{54}

It almost goes without saying that the miserable living and working conditions characteristic of the major cities in Asia and other developing countries\textsuperscript{55} have generated mounting pressures for massive social investments in the form of public housing, expanded job opportunities and marked improvements in the urban infrastructure.\textsuperscript{56} Yet even while such needs are being met in some nations on a minimal basis, many planners, involved governmental personnel and interested scholars, are constantly plagued by the belief that the woefully scare resources of most non-Western nations should be expended primarily upon economically generative industrial and agricultural enterprises. The immediate need of

\textsuperscript{53} Sovani, 113-117.

\textsuperscript{54} Hauser, "The Social, Economic, and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization", p. 207. Other scholars have echoed and re-echoed the essence of this statement concerning the deteriorating urban environment of primate cities in the Third World. See, for example, Fryer, Emerging Southeast Asia, pp. 90-98; Breeze, Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries, chap 4; McGee, Southeast Asian City, chaps. 7 to 9.


contemporary urban masses for improved conditions of life, according to these individuals; must be sacrificed to provide sufficient developmental capital for more productive national projects.\(^{57}\) In short, the inadequate physical plant of the primate city, which is to a considerable extent the byproduct of over-urbanization, has created serious secondary problems that will demand the attention of urban and regional planners for decades to come.

_Urban origins and evolution._ Although comparative urban research is fundamental to each of the three foregoing approaches to the investigation of metropolitan primacy, the fourth avenue of inquiry remains much more specific in geographic focus. Its purview concerns the origin and development of primate cities within certain national or regional contexts. Such studies, as one would expect, deal primarily with those unique political, social and historical factors which have tended to condition the evolution of the paramount metropolitan center in a given nation or of several capitals situated within a particular region. Early formal contributions representative of this approach and relevant to Southeast Asia were made in the 1950's by the geographers Donald W. Fryer and Norton S. Ginsburg. In several widely quoted articles these writers concerned themselves with the colonial origins of primate cities within the region, discussed the long-standing role of such centers as generators of change and dealt with their continuing function as critical headlinks between East and West.\(^{58}\) They thus introduced the concepts of metropolitan primacy to students interested in Southeast Asian urbanism.

Responding to themes set forth in the aforementioned articles by Fryer and Ginsburg,\(^{59}\) other schools increasingly came to recognize the great city as a subject worthy of detailed study. Some workers, following the lead of these two geographers, soon began to investigate the growth of primate cities within more or less expansive regional frameworks. Though most of the results of their efforts have been presented in the form of short articles,\(^{60}\) one lengthy and quite comprehensive statement

\(^{57}\) For notes in readily accessible sources concerning the problems of resource allocation in cities of the Third World, consult Hauser, _"The Social, Economic, and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization"_, pp. 208; _Urbanization in Asia and the Far East_, pp. 22-26; McGee, _The Southeast Asia_, pp. 360-363; Ginsburg, _"Planning for the Southeast Asian City"_, pp. 3-8.


\(^{59}\) Both of these geographers have remained interested in the Southeast Asian city. Among their recent formal statements are Fryer, _Emerging Southeast Asia_, chap. 3; _"Cities of Southeast Asia and Their Problems"_, _Focus_, Vol. 22, No. 7 (March, 1972), pp. 1-8; Ginsburg, _"Planning for the Southeast Asian City"_, pp. 1-8; _Urban Geography and Non-Western Areas_, in Philip M. Hauser and Leo F. Schmore (eds.), _The Study of Urbanization_ (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1956), pp. 311-346.

\(^{60}\) For example, see Dwyer, _"The City in the Developing World and the Example of Southeast Asia"_, pp. 353-363; Rhoads Murphey, _"New Capitals of Asia"_,
on metropolitan primacy has also appeared. This, of course, is *The Southeast Asian City*, a book published in the middle of the 1960's in which T. G. McGee offered an interpretation of our then current knowledge of urbanism and the process of urbanization in this region. Other scholars, in marked contrast, have proved especially interested in the development of particular prime cities in Southeast Asia. Among the monographs, articles and dissertations resulting from their investigations are several recent studies that feature substantial sections dealing with the beginnings of metropolitan primacy in individual European dependencies during the period of colonial dominion. In addition to discussions focused upon the economic role and physical form of selected coastal capitals in the region, the authors of these works also include useful statements pertaining to the institutional foundations of nascent prime cities. Through such sustained commentaries on colonial urbanism a clearer image of the processes underlying the origin and evolution of the great city in Southeast Asia has recently begun to crystallize.

In spite of our growing knowledge of both the past and present dimensions of metropolitan primacy, writers often seem less than willing to commit themselves to sustained inquiries concerning the historical roots of this condition in Southeast Asia. It is more than likely that their apparent lack of interest reflects an immediate, and predictable, preoccupation with contemporary developmental problems of the major urban centers in the region. But at the same time one cannot deny

---


62 These include Milone, “Queen City of the East”, chaps. 1-13; Cobb, “The City of Java”, chaps. 1-3; Doeppe, “Spanish Alteration of Indigenous Spatial Patterns on the Central Plain of Luzon”, chaps. 1-2; Reed, “Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines”, chaps. 6-8; “Origins of the Philippine City”, chap. 4.

that an understanding of modern Southeast Asian urbanism remains partly contingent upon the awareness of important social, political, cultural and economic factors which have contributed over the centuries to the processes of city growth and change. Accordingly in the subsequent pages I will discuss briefly the beginnings of metropolitan primacy in this region and the development of major regional centers. Drawing upon the research of scholars who have investigated the emergence of coastal capital in nations of both the peninsular and insular realms, I hope to show that the functional, demographic and cultural supereminence of most primate cities is not a recent phenomenon. On the contrary, their national dominance was firmly established in most cases long before the dawn of the twentieth century.

A Preface to Metropolitan Primacy: The Indigenous City

During the early decades of the sixteenth century, when the Portuguese were attempting to establish their colonial authority in coastal areas to the east of the Andaman Sea,64 the Philippine Archipelago remained the only major sector of Southeast Asia without an indigenous urban tradition. Elsewhere in the region European adventurers found two characteristic types of cities which had existed in certain lowland and littoral locations for more than a millennium. The first was the coastal city-state. These urban places, which were epitomized by the famed emporium of Melaka,65 functioned as scattered commercial nodes in a maritime network with linkages extending far beyond the seas of Southeast Asia. In such port cities prosperity and effective politico-economic power directly reflected the foreign demand for local commodities, the relative productivity of surrounding lands, the number of client villages and the breadth of trade relations.66 As a result, enduring political and commercial policies of the indigenous elite in these centers were generally geared to the maintenance of a flourishing over seas exchange. Because their essential domain was the water, rather than the land, rulers of the ports seldom squandered resources by attempting to extend urban authority to territories beyond the frontiers of comparatively diminutive hinterlands. Instead they usually maintained fleets of trading and piratical vessels which were employed effectively to guarantee the commerce of their cities.67 Predictably these conditions collectively

66 Ibid., pp. 282-328.
gave rise to a proliferation along the coast of both the peninsular and insular realm of city-states that remained small in size, but active in trade. Such indigenous settlements may be indentified appropriately as places of heterogenetic change, for they were cosmopolitan ports through which flowed diverse men, materials and ideas. It was in these centers that the far-ranging Lusitanians and other Western adventurers first began to trade and communicate with the Southeast Asians.

The second type of urban settlement encountered by the early Europeans was the indigenous sacred city. These places, marked contrast to the small coastal city-states, served as capitals of extensive kingdoms, were usually situated inland, profited little from international commerce and sometimes embraced more than one hundred thousand inhabitants. Although they did in fact obtain most of their wealth from taxes levied on agricultural lands and the corvée labors of peasants, the sacred cities should not be envisaged merely as economic mechanisms essential to the redistribution of surpluses extracted from dependent populations. Above all the inland capitals were politico-religious instruments essential to the definition and organization of Southeast Asian agrarian civilizations.

68 Even the famed emporium of Melaka boasted of only six to ten thousand permanent residents on the eve of European intervention in Southeast Asia. Wheatley, The Golden Khersonese, p. 512; McGee, The Southeast Asian City, p. 41.

69 In a very perceptive article published more than two decades ago Robert Redfield and Milton B. Singer presented a useful construct for the ordering of urban centers according to their comparative cultural roles. They drew a fundamental distinction between orthogenetic cities, which tend to carry forward and slowly elaborate an established local tradition, and heterogenetic cities, which provide an environment where old values disintegrate and new modes of thought are developed. According to their scheme the city of heterogenetic change

"is a place of conflict of different traditions, a center of heresy, heterodoxy and dissent, of interruption and destruction of ancient tradition, of rootlessness and anomie. . . [In such urban places] men are concerned with the market, with 'rational organization of production of goods, with expediational relations between buyer and seller, ruler and ruled, and native and foreigner. It is in cities of this kind that priority comes to be given to economic growth."


72 McGee, The Southeast Asian City, pp. 32-33; Reed, "Origins of the Philippine City," pp. 24-25; Clifford Geertz, The Development of the Javanese Economy: A Socio-Cultural Approach (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1956), pp. 51-52. (Mimeographed)
on a broad territorial basis. As repositories of a complex of functionally integrated urban institutions, the forms of which derived in part from India, the sacred cities

were intended as cosmic creations, substantive and symbolic pinnacles of and resplendent thrones for the Great Tradition, enshriners as well as administrators of a relatively homogeneous and particularistic culture to which the market towns and peasant villages of the Little Tradition also belonged. Their planned, monumental urban forms reaffirmed their role as the head pieces of unitary civilizations centered on their own cultural worlds. They were predominantly political and cultural rather than economic phenomena, functioning as microcosms of the national polity, symbols of authority, legitimacy, and power, creators and molders of literate culture, and seats of the dominant ideology. Commercial functions... were for the most part secondary, and were in any case under varying degrees of control or manipulation by the state, whose chief monument was the city itself.

The typical inland capital, therefore, was not merely the chief consumer of agricultural surpluses, the largest population agglomeration and the hub of administrative activity in each state. It also acted as a potent symbol of political and cultural unity in the indigenous kingdom. To the Southeast Asian peasantry and the urban masses alike the sacred city represented a critical magico-religious linkage between the macrocosmic universe and the microcosmic earthly realm. Accordingly the ruling elites planned numerous inland capitals as replicas of the Indian celestial

---

73 Probably the most authoritative statements concerning the role of ceremonial cities in the ancient kingdoms of Southeast Asia, China and other realms are Wheatley, City as Symbol; The Pivot of the Four Quarters. Pt. 2.

74 For detailed commentary and numerous bibliographical notes concerning the transfer of Indian institutions from the subcontinent to Southeast Asia, as well as discussion pertaining to the origins of cities in the latter region, see Reed, "Origins of the Philippine City," chap. 1.

75 The anthropologist Robert Redfield has outlined the essential differences between the urban-based "Great Tradition" and the rural "Little Tradition in the following statement:

"In a civilization there is a great tradition of the reflective few and there is a little tradition of the largely unreflective many. The great tradition is cultivated in schools or temples; the little tradition works itself out and keeps itself going in the lives of the unlettered in the village communities. The tradition of the philosopher, theologian, and literary man is a tradition consciously cultivated and handed down; that of the little people is for the most part taken for granted and not submitted to much scrutiny or considered refinement and improvement."


76 Ibid.


78 Useful commentary concerning the notion of parallelism between the macrocosmos and the microcosmos, as well as discussion pertaining to the symbolic role of the city, palace precincts and the ruler within the traditional kingdoms of Southeast Asia, is presented in Robert Heine-Geldern, "Conceptions of State and Kinship in Southeast Asia", The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 1 (November, 1942), pp. 15-30.
archetype. The layout of the streets, temples, walls, moats and other morphological features often conformed to the heavenly models of Hindu or Buddhist tradition, thereby providing the surrounding populations with material evidence of the critical cosmic role of these urban centers. Thus there is little doubt that such sacred cities were centers of orthogenetic change, for they served by structure and function to perpetuate established civilizations.

Within the hinterland or "effective space" subject to authority emanating from each indigenous city of Southeast Asia the condition of metropolitan primacy apparently proved almost ubiquitous. In the more or less restricted territories of the city-states, of course, there was usually only one significant urban place. Such centers were clearly dominant in terms of size and functional diversity within their small spatial frameworks. Though perhaps less pronounced, metropolitan primacy was equally significant in the extensive agrarian kingdoms of Java and the lowland interiors of the mainland. Probably without exception the sacred cities were paramount in their respective states in population, diversity of functions, administrative influence and effective national power. To a considerable degree, in short, major precolonial urban centers throughout the region seem to have conformed to Jefferson's model of the primate city.

While metropolitan primacy was apparently common in the states of Southeast Asia even before the arrival of the Portuguese early in the sixteenth century, it is not to indigenous urban centers that we must look in an effort to discover the historical antecedents of modern great cities. Though a number of coastal city-states and inland capitals continued to flourish for several centuries following the beginnings of foreign intervention, the advent of the Europeans effectively sealed the ultimate doom of precolonial urbanism. In fact Bangkok among the major metropolitan

---


80 According to the scheme of Redfield and Singer (p. 58), the orthogenetic city is a "place where religious, philosophical and literary specialists reflect, synthesize and create out of the traditional material new arrangements and developments that are felt by the people to be outgrowths of the old." In these urban centers, therefore, cultures are preserved in their basic form and are carried forward by successive generations.

81 The notion of "effective space", or that territory defined and organized in terms of an integrated complex of urban institutions, was first set forth by John Friedman in his "Cities in Social Transformation", Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 4, No. 1 (November, 1961), p. 92.

82 Although demographic information concerning the indigenous kingdoms of Southeast Asia is scanty and difficult to handle, fairly reliable materials pertaining to Burma at the turn of the nineteenth century clearly illustrate the dominance of sacred cities in terms of population. Burney, pp. 333-347.
centers of today may be said to have strong roots in indigenous urban tradition. Accordingly it is within the historical record of colonial urbanism that we must search for clues to the origins and early evolution of the contemporary primate cities of Southeast Asia.

Colonial Urbanism: Nascency

The fall of Melaka to Albuquerque in 1511 signaled the beginning of a sustained Western presence in Southeast Asia, but it was not followed immediately by a period of general European conquest throughout the region. For almost three hundred years in fact, most independent traders, chartered companies and governments confined their interests to matters of trade and wherever possible avoided prolonged conflicts with indigenous states. This situation, as one might expect, was to a considerable extent the result of market conditions then obtaining in pre-industrial Europe. At that time, before the dawn of the nineteenth century, only the wealthy could afford the fine cloths, spices, jewelry, scented woods and other exotic commodities of high value and little bulk that comprised the East-West trade. Yet most of these could be obtained in Asian marketplaces without drastic modifications of traditional commercial patterns or direct manipulation of the means of production.\textsuperscript{83} As long as the demands of metropolitan societies remained restricted to luxuries of guaranteed sale in Europe and ready availability in Southeast Asia, therefore, the pragmatic merchant-adventurers simly did not feel inclined to promote colonial intervention on a broad territorial or formal political basis.

Although it cannot be denied that the Portuguese, Dutch, British and Spaniards sometimes applied force to discipline indigenous rulers who challenged the increasingly monopolistic commercial policies of the Westerners,\textsuperscript{84} they apparently did not relish the use of their small

\textsuperscript{83} Although the Portuguese, Dutch and English failed to inaugurate fundamental changes in the structure of Southeast Asian commerce during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they did introduce centralized military and administrative apparatus to help facilitate their trading operations. This unity of commercial and political organization was new to the region and ultimately proved to be a key instrument in Western control of the regional export economy. As M. A. P. Melink-Roeofsz has pointed out, however, it definitely did not signal the immediate doom of the indigenous Southeast Asian merchant. \textit{Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630} (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), chap. 6 and p. 297.

\textsuperscript{84} While the Europeans did prove willing to use the ultimate sanction of force against Southeast Asians who hindered trading operations, these conflicts were usually short lived. Much more prolonged and costly were the wars among the Western nations, each of which sought to establish its commercial supremacy in the realm east of Melaka. For standard textbook treatment of the ongoing European competition for trade and power, see D. G. E. Hall, \textit{A History of Southeast Asia} (3rd ed. rev.; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1968), Pt. 2; John F. Cady, \textit{Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development} (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964), Pts. 3, 4.
armies and navies. Most company and governmental officials well realized that military operations invariably proved costly in men, money and materials, and oftentimes led to further political and economic involvements. In short, they fully understood the direct relationship between peace and profits. The early European colonists thus refrained from excessive interference in the internal affairs of Southeast Asian states, shied away from exhausting wars and made few significant attempts to modify local cultures. Even when the Dutch Vereenigde Oostindisch Compagnie found it necessary in the seventeenth century to initiate periodic territorial conquests in parts of Indonesia in order to guarantee unhampered trade, the process of expansion proved haphazard and was not conducted according to a systematic plan of colonization. Following each military success, moreover, the V.O.C. usually hesitated to provide conquered peoples with direct administration. Instead the company introduced a system of indirect rule in which tractable native leaders were allowed to govern on a regional basis as long as they maintained the order essential to profitable commerce. These client administrators of Indonesian birth served not only to reduce the administrative responsibilities of the Dutch, but also acted as important buffers between rulers and ruled. Before the dawn of the nineteenth century, in other words, the enlargement of colonial territories was neither a goal of the V.O.C., nor of most other European companies or nations involved in Southeast Asia. This was indeed an era of “pin-prick” imperialism in which the Westerners confined most of their activities to the commercial sphere and avoided restrictive political or cultural entanglements.

Within such a context of limited territorial and administrative involvement the various European nations were not inclined to establish numerous towns and cities. In order to conserve both human and capital resources they maintained only rudimentary systems of colonial settlements, each of which was dominated by a single entrepôt. These so-called “stabilizing points,” the most significant of which were Melaka, Batavia and Manila, served as the primary warehousing areas for goods

87 During the first three centuries of Western involvement in Southeast Asia most European governments were not official participants in the expansion process. In the case of the English, Dutch and others active colonization was effected through the instrument of companies. These, however, were chartered by metropolitan authorities and usually received their support in times of crisis. In the cases of the Portuguese and Spaniards, on the other hand, the monarchies actively participated in colonization. For informative commentary on the chartered companies, see George Cawston, *The Early Chartered Companies* (London: Edward Arnold, 1896).
88 This is McGee’s term. *The Southeast Asian City*, p. 42.
entering into the East-West trade. But at the same time such centers also functioned as military strongholds, critical places of political decisions and outposts of Western culture. They were in fact the multi-functional urban keystones of the embryonic European imperial realms then beginning to crystallize in Southeast Asia.

Markedly subordinate to these emerging colonial capitals in terms of size and functional diversity were numerous far-flung factories, or trading posts. The Europeans apparently established such scattered stations in order to reduce the costs of middlemen, to prevent the hoarding of certain commodities by especially aggressive competitors, to better control quality by dealing more directly with producers and to help assure steady supplies of both raw and fabricated goods. Some of the factories were situated within the walls or on the outskirts of major sacred cities, where the Western merchants became active participants in already flourishing regional markets.⁸⁹ Others consisted of strategically located, though oftentimes isolated, trading posts from which merchants could service relatively extensive territories. Yet both types of factories shared one important feature in common. Operation costs generally remained reasonable, for each outpost required the services of only a handful of adventurous European traders to oversee commercial activities and a small detachment of soldiers to provide some measure of security. By thus limiting the early settlements to widely scattered factories and a single fortified colonial capital, the Westerners avoided excessive operational expenditures and so maximized the profits of their metropolitan sponsors.

Each of the early systems of European colonial settlements in Southeast Asia shared the essentials of the foregoing arrangement, but a truly stable hierarchy of commercial centers developed only in the emerging Dutch empire. While the Portuguese were the first to fashion a widespread network consisting of numerous outlying trading stations and a heavily garrisoned entrepôt, their fortunes declined precipitously following the loss of Melaka to the V.O.C. in 1641.⁹⁰ In the absence of this secure warehousing and administrative center Lusitanian commercial activities became increasingly decentralized, with a resultant dissolution of less profitable factories. By the same token the British failed early in the seventeenth century to effectively fortified entrepôt in Southeast Asia. Though the East India Company did continue to maintain a number of more or less ephemeral factories in the area, with Bencoolen functioning as the regional administrative center, effective


⁹⁰ The rise and fall of the Portuguese commercial empire in Southeast Asia is discussed in Cady, chap. 9; Hall, chap. 13.
imperial authority emanated from the distant Fort St. George in Madras and proved less than convincing beyond the Straits of Melaka. Accordingly the English merchants for almost two centuries remained in a comparatively insecure commercial position in Southeast Asia. The Dutch, on the other hand, enjoyed a far-reaching and continuing presence along the littoral of Indonesia and Malaysia. As a result of effective commercial, military and administrative policies, the V.O.C. not only developed a well integrated entrepôt-factory arrangement, but slowly converted it into a fixed urban system. The only other major sector of Southeast Asia in which this transformation occurred prior to the nineteenth century was the Philippines.

From the earliest years of their imperial adventure in Southeast Asia the Spaniards attempted to carry out a program of colonization which differed significantly from those introduced by Europeans elsewhere in the region. As in the American conquista, they seem to have driven to new lands by a curious mixture of secular and religious motives. Even during the planning period prior to dispatch of the successful Legazpi expedition, metropolitan authorities in Spain and Nueva España envisaged the Philippine enterprise as an integrated effort of merchants, soldiers, bureaucrats and missionaries. To be sure most of the Spaniards, like Europeans in other parts of Southeast Asia, were attracted to the region by promises of gold, silk and spices. But at the same time the Castillan conquistadores, both individually and collectively, secular and priestly, proved firmly committed to the general religious conversation, political subjugation and cultural transformation of all subdued peoples. In pursuit of the goals the Spaniards initiated a program of systematic territorial conquest and direct rule soon after arriving in the Philippines. Their scheme of colonization also included detailed designs for the establishment of numerous towns and cities, which were to secure the archipelago and to provide strategic bases for the Hispanicization and Christianization of Filipinos.

---

91 or useful commentary on Anglo-Dutch conflict in Southeast Asia, see Hall, chaps. 15, 27-29; Cady, chaps. 10, 14.
93 The instructions for colonization given to the Adelantado Legazpi by the royal Audiencia of Nueva España prior to his departure for the Philippines, which clearly reveal the mixture of secular and religious motives underlying Hispanic imperialism, called emphatically for cooperation among all Spaniards participating in conquest and settlement. "Expedition of Miguel Lopez de Legazpi -- 1564-1568", (résumé of contemporaneous documents, 1559-1568), in Emma H. Blair and James A. Robertson (eds.), The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898 (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1903), Vol. 2, pp. 89-100.
Despite the concerted efforts of Spanish civil and religious authorities, the creation of an integrated and stable urban system in the Philippines was not achieved with ease. To a considerable extent the Hispanic developmental program suffered from continuing shortages of financial support, insufficient European personnel and conflict among the rulers over matters of bureaucratic jurisdiction. But by far the most serious obstacle to the foundation and rapid growth of colonial cities and towns was the nature of pre-Hispanic settlement. At the time of the Spanish arrival, the Malay inhabitants of the archipelago were scattered amongst thousands of isolated and fiercely independent barangay, or village communities, throughout the archipelago. These living groups usually consisted of 100 to 400 people who practiced swidden cultivation and occupied between 30 and 100 houses. None of these centers, as I noted in foregoing commentary, had attained urban status prior to colonial contact. Under such circumstances it proved physically impossible for the small corps of several hundred Catholic missionaries to convert and thoroughly indoctrinate the approximately 700,000 Filipinos then occupying the islands. While frustrated with this reality the Spaniards were also repelled by the political and social decentralization of the intensely independent barangay. As proselytizing Christians, heirs to an enduring Mediterranean urban heritage and proud citizens of an expanding imperial realm, they valued traditions of national societal organization and instinctually equated civilization with the city. To the Spaniards, in other words, the politically fragmented Filipinos remained in a state of barbarism. In light of these various circumstances, therefore, the colonial authorities launched a sweeping resettlement program in the Philippines late in the sixteenth century.

The Spaniards failed to congregate the majority of Filipinos into urban settlements of 2,400 to 5,000 people, as called for by certain

---

95 Swidden can be defined minimally as any system of farming in which impermanent fields are tilled for one or more years before being returned to fallow for longer periods of time. This type of agriculture, which is widespread in the tropics and was formerly found also in middle latitudes, usually involves the use of fire in the preparation of farm plots. It is known by numerous vernacular terms in different parts of the world and appears variously in the literature as slash-and-burn agriculture, shifting cultivation and field-forest rotation. Detailed information concerning the swidden eco-system and many references are included in J. E. Spencer, Shifting Cultivation in Southeastern Asia, University of California Publications in Geography, Vol. 19 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966); Harold C. Conklin, Hanunoo Agriculture: A Report on an Integral System of Shifting Cultivation in the Philippines (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. 1957); Clifford Geertz. Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 12-28.

96 Discussion pertaining to the physical and institutional form of the pre-Hispanic barangay is offered in Phelan, chap. 2; Doepers, “Spanish Alteration of Indigenous Spatial Patterns on the Central Plain of Luzon,” chap. 1; Reed, “Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines,” chap. 3. For discussion concerning the question of pre-Hispanic urbanism consult Reed, “Origins of the Philippine City,” pp. 130-150.

97 Phelan, p. 44.
government officials, yet their efforts certainly were not in vain. During the three hundred years of Hispanic rule, the far-reaching Catholic friars succeeded in establishing more than 1,000 permanent towns and cities in the insular lowlands. While the majority of these urban centers embraced fewer than 2,000 inhabitants throughout the Hispanic period, a considerable number became substantial settlements. By the close of the nineteenth century, or the end of the Spanish period, there were in the Philippines more than two hundred places of at least 2,000 individuals, thirty exceeding 5,000 people, nine greater than 10,000 and a colonial capital with some 220,000 residents. Thus the Spaniards solidified their territorial conquest and fostered fundamental social, political and religious changes among the Filipinos through the widespread establishment of permanent cities and towns.

Almost from the beginning of sustained Spanish involvement in the Philippines, Manila ranked as the foremost city in the emerging urban system of the archipelago. Although the Spaniards had first attempted to established their insular capital in the Visayas, they were forced by insufficient food supplies to abandon several early administrative headquarters and to relocate in Central Luzon. The final selection of a site on the shores of Manila Bay proved to be well made, for this strategic location in a wet-rice region helped guarantee adequate provisions for the fledgling colony. Soon after capturing the small Muslim community of Maynila, and in accordance with Hispanic imperial policy, the conquistadores began to convert the indigenous village into a fortified city. From this stronghold, Spanish soldiers and missionaries fanned out to effect the military conquest of much of the archipelago in a matter of years and spiritual submission in decades. Through their efforts Manila was legitimized by the turn of the seventeenth century as the insular center of civil, religious and military authority.

Even before the new Hispanic city had been fully transformed into the administrative nerve-center of the Philippines, its Western citizens were beginning to concern themselves with matters of international commerce. But in marked contrast to the Portuguese and Dutch, the Spaniards did not seriously attempt to make their colonial capital an entrepôt for Southeast Asian commodities. Instead they capitalized upon trad-

---

100 Reed, "Origins of the Philippine City", pp. 201-227, 440-451.
101 Doeppers, "Spanish Alteration of Indigenous Spatial Patterns on the Central Plain of Luzon", chaps. 2-3; Kaye, pp. 171-187; Reed, "Origins of the Philippine City", chap. 4; "Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines", chap. 6, 8.
102 This point might be disputed by some, for the Spaniards certainly did make a concerted attempt to capture a portion of the Maluku spice trade and even main-
itional Sino-Filipino trade relationships and transformed Manila into a commercial center linking Nueva España and China. The rapid florescence of the resultant Pacific exchange was no less than spectacular. Only sixteen years after the founding of Manila, the volume of Chinese luxuries available for transport to America had far outstripped the cargo capacity of all commissioned Spanish vessels in the Philippines. Expansion in trade continued, moreover, and by the end of the sixteenth century the Hispanic colonial capital began to experience its most glorious days. In turn this commercial growth and increasing prosperity was reflected in the population and morphology of the insular capital. From a Malay community of only 2,000 persons, Manila in only two decades became a multi-racial city of more than 40,000 inhabitants. By the same token it was changed from a mere cluster of bamboo- nip a huts into a carefully planned and walled city of substantial stone, brick and tile houses. Although mercantilistic regulations and the general decline of the Spanish empire somewhat restricted the subsequent development of Manila during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, its urban paramountcy within the Philippines proved well founded and remained intact throughout the years of Hispanic rule.

In light of the foregoing commentary it is clear that the nascent primate cities of Manila and Batavia originated under somewhat different colonial conditions. Profiting from experience gained in the Americas, the Spaniards envisaged their Philippine colonial capital as a metropolitan center which would properly service a large territory subject permanently to Hispanic authority. Accordingly even while they pursued the military and religious conquest of the archipelago, the Castilian invaders invested considerable time and money in an attempt to convert Manila into a fortified, planned and imposing city. This early developmental program, of course, was sustained by profits of the prospering galleon trade. Within a matter of decades following the advent of the conquistadores, and almost twenty years before the Dutch founded Batavia, Manila became a flourishing entrepôt handling Chinese commodities and the crown of an embryonic hierarchy of provincial towns and cities, which themselves were developed in terms of a detailed Hispanic urban masterplan. While

---

105 Ibid., pp. 468-476.
comprehensive design was thus the hallmark of colonial urbanism in the Philippines, unplanned change characterized the Dutch urban experience in Indonesia. For almost two centuries the V.O.C. displayed an obvious disdain for burdensome administrative entanglements and an apparent disinterest in the formal acquisition of a sprawling insular colony in Southeast Asia. Yet at the same time the Dutch were committed to expansionist trade policies which resulted in the widespread establishment of factories not only in Southeast Asia, but also at strategic points in South and East Asia. One of the most influential architects of the ambitious V.O.C. program, Jan Pieterszoon Coen, conceived of Batavia as the administrative hub and service center of this developing commercial system. In less than fifty years of colonial involvement, moreover, his vision had become fact.\textsuperscript{108} Although the Dutch subsequently lost many of their outlying Asian trading posts, the aggressive efforts to control and manipulate the international trade of insular Southeast Asia led to increasing political embroilments, sporadic territorial advances and stabilization of an embryonic system of colonial settlements in Indonesia. And by the same token the expansion of Dutch commercial and political power triggered the commensurate growth of Batavia, which was steadily transformed from a single purpose trading base into the multi-functional colonial capital of the largest European colony in Southeast Asia.

Regardless of these differences in colonial context it cannot be denied that even during their periods of genesis and early development both Manila and Batavia displayed certain features which were later to characterize most mature primate cities of the Southeast Asian realm. Firstly, they clearly originated as urban artifacts of foreign creation and continued to serve the needs of Europeans throughout the colonial era. Although each city developed on the site of a precolonial settlement, in neither case did the morphological or institutional forms of the indigenous community remain intact. Both places were in fact Western "replica" cities\textsuperscript{109} fashioned to serve as instruments of foreign authority. Secondly, the port locations of Batavia and Manila emphasized the essential function of the European colonial capitals as commercial and political headlinks between East and West. Their coastal situation also tended to underscore the fundamental role of the major Western administrative centers in the process of systems change in Southeast Asia. While a number of sacred cities remained the nuclei of flourishing indigenous kingdoms for several centuries following the advent of the Europeans, from the earliest years of colonial intervention Westerners resident in the nascent primate cities began to formulate and to implement policies which ultimately opened inland areas throughout the region. Accordingly the

\textsuperscript{108} Milone, pp. 109-116.

\textsuperscript{109} McGee, \textit{The Southeast Asian City}, p. 49.
development of Batavia and Manila marked the beginning of a shift in effective regional authority from indigenous cities in the interior to those located on the coast.\(^{110}\) Thirdly, and corollary to their commercial role, the Hispanic and Dutch colonial capitals acted as magnets which attracted adventurous persons from points throughout the maritime fringe of Asia. Especially numerous were the Chinese, whose energy and diverse skills made them essential members of both urban communities.\(^{111}\) Thus Manila and Batavia not only linked their developing colonial hinterlands to commercial and political systems of international scope, but also served as images of the primate cities which evolved in each Southeast Asian colony during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

*Colonial Urbanism: Florence*

During the waning years of the eighteenth century, the European presence in Southeast Asia could hardly be described as pervasive. It is true that Western merchants were then trading in ports throughout the region, but in more than a few of these places they still found it necessary to conform to rules of the local market. Only in urban centers of the Hispanic Philippines, on Java and in the relatively limited Dutch sectors of the Indonesian outer islands did the commercial institutions prove to be of European derivation. By the same token, before 1800 the Westerners still controlled comparatively little territory in Southeast Asia. Although the Portuguese occupied half of Timor and the British maintained permanent trading settlements at Penang and Bencoolen, these represented mere colonial footholds in a vast of land and water.\(^{112}\) Even in the realms of Spanish and Dutch influence, moreover, territorial conquest proved incomplete. In the outer islands of Indonesia a declining V.O.C. had failed to extend its rather limited coastal holdings into inland areas in more than a few places. At the same time, and despite numerous expeditions of conquest, the Spaniards remained unable to subdue the Muslims of Mindanao and never defeated the proud mountain peoples of Northern Luzon.\(^{113}\) The implications of these conditions in terms of the Southeast Asian city are almost self-evident. Throughout most of the region indigenous urbanism still prevailed, for fixed systems

---


\(^{111}\) Milone, chap. 4; Reed, “Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines”, chap. 6-7.

\(^{112}\) Although conflict in Europe led to the British occupation of a number of Dutch forts and factories late in the eighteenth century, most of these were returned subsequently. Furthermore regional competition between the two powers for Southeast Asian territory was effectively resolved through the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824.

\(^{113}\) The extent of formal European territorial involvement in Southeast Asia at the turn of the eighteenth century is illustrated in the *Atlas of South-East Asia*, with an introduction by D. G. E. Hall (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1964), backpiece.
of colonial settlement existed only in the fully secure Dutch and Spanish territories. This situation, however, was soon to change dramatically as the era of “pin-prick” imperialism drew to a close.

In the early decades of the nineteenth century a second phase of European involvement began to dawn in Southeast Asia. To a great extent this development, which produced profound political, economic and social changes throughout the region, was an outgrowth of the Industrial Revolution. As the nations of the West began to undergo rapid industrialization, they experienced an escalating demand for raw materials and foreign markets. These conditions in turn generated a compelling drive among Europeans for the acquisition of territory in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. This quickening Western quest for overseas dependencies was further fostered by steady improvements in modern communications systems, increasingly sophisticated armaments, more powerful ocean vessels and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which permitted great increases in the volume of East-West maritime trade and shortened significantly the time of transit between the Indian Ocean and the North Atlantic. Accordingly the industrializing nations of Europe for the first time had the machinery to exploit distant resources on a massive scale, the need to create foreign markets and the military strength to assert themselves throughout the world. Furthermore most Westerners remained quite unconcerned with the ethical implications of their colonizing actions. As a result of these various developments, the imperial purpose of the European nations underwent a fundamental transformation during the nineteenth century and produced a scramble for territorial possessions. By the turn of the twentieth century Thailand alone among the major political units of Southeast Asia remained free of foreign dominion.114

Following the acquisition of new dependent territories in the Southeast Asian realm, the British, French, Dutch and Americans each moved quickly to provide a flexible administrative framework which would not only serve to underwrite the order necessary to efficient manipulation of conquered peoples, but also to guarantee produce, profits and markets for distant metropolitan societies. Although it cannot be denied that private Western capital fueled the engine of economic development, at the same time the various colonial governments actively fostered the process of exploitation through a number of enduring policies. These included the provision of easy credit terms for European companies involved in mining or estate agriculture, programs that promoted the influx of immigrant Chinese and Indian laborers, agricultural experimentation designed to improve the production efficiency of plantations and infrastructural advances in the form of new roads, railways, harbor cons-

---

114 Standard historical accounts of the widespread European territorial acquisitions in Southeast Asia during the nineteenth century are presented in Cady, chap. 14-19; Hall, Pt. 3.
truction, irrigation projects and modern communications systems. Predictably in each of these public and private activities colonial towns and cities served as the West's primary instruments of institutional and spatial organization. Yet very few were centers of international significance. Most in fact proved to be smaller places of more or less specialized function. As one would expect, regional administrative centers and military settlement were scattered throughout each colony at strategic locations to assure effective supervision of indigenous peoples. The development of such essentially political places was paralleled also by the proliferation of small ports, mining camps, plantation towns, railway communities and hill stations, all of which served as outlying centers of colonial influence and authority. Yet while the smaller towns and cities undoubtedly acted as significant linkages between rulers and ruled, by far the most important urban elements in the emerging systems of colonial settlement were the coastal capitals. It was primarily through these large centers that the Europeans organized and directed processes which facilitated the conversion of the closed indigenous kingdoms of Southeast Asia into open colonial systems marked by a relatively free exchange of men, materials and ideas.

Though space does not permit detailed discussion of either the institutional or the morphological forms of the Southeast Asian colonial capitals, a short commentary concerning the more important characteristics of these centers should serve to illustrate both their role as multifunctional instruments of change and their very early development as primate cities. In first place, all of these cities--Rangoon, Singapore, Batavia, Bangkok, Saigon-Cholon and Manila--shared tidewater sites where transportation systems serving extensive agricultural hinterlands could be readily linked to international maritime networks. As one would expect, this consideration was paramount in the minds of the Westerners who founded the major urban centers of colonial Southeast Asia. In the words of Rhoads Murphey,

European attention to the maritime fringes of each country was rewarded by the discovery of plentiful opportunities for a commercially minded and vigorously expanding West to establish trade centers on its own models, responding to situational advantages for trade which until then had been largely

113 For a useful and recent overview of the economic geography of Southeast Asia, which includes much commentary concerning the role of Europeans in fostering development, see Fryer, Emerging Southeast Asia, Pt. 1.
117 The repeated mention in commentaries on Southeast Asian urbanism of the riverine or coastal locations of colonial cities serves to underscore their fundamental role as head-links between East and West. Fryer, pp. 475-478; Murphey, "Traditionalism and Colonialism: Changing Urban Roles in Asia", pp. 67-84; McGee, The Southeast Asian City, pp. 55-56.
neglected. It was the seaman and the merchant (usually in the same person) who sought out, from the deck of a ship, the most promising places for the establishment of settlements best calculated to serve the interests of external trade. Those..., which eventually supported the dominant port cities combined maximum access to and from the sea..., with maximum internal access to and from those parts of each country which were actually or potentially (with the help of Western capital and management) productive of goods for export. This was urban development from the point of view of the commercial entrepreneur, in sharp contrast to the urban patterns of the Great Asian Traditions.118

To further exploit the natural locational advantages of the tidewater colonial capitals, the Europeans during the nineteenth century began to invest heavily in modern transportation and communications system designed to link outlying urban places even more closely with the developing coastal centers. A second, and quite obvious, feature of the emerging primate cities in Southeast Asia was a pre-eminent administrative role within the framework of their respective colonies. With only few exceptions, the ranking Western officials in civil government and the military were based in the colonial capitals.119 Though European governmental executives and their immediate staffs in some colonies shifted headquarters to cool mountain hill stations during the dry season,120 the bulk of the imperial bureaucracy always remained in the large coastal cities to carry on the routine affairs of administration. The third, and probably the most far-reaching, characteristic of the colonial capitals was their great diversity of economic functions. Within these urban places were located the head offices of the agency houses, banks, shipping firms, insurance companies and other commercial institutions through which the Westerners organized and supervised developing Southeast Asian economies.121 At the same time the major cities served as processing and warehousing centers for goods leaving and entering the European dependencies. A fourth element shared by the colonial capitals was marked ethnic diversity. Not only did the coastal cities contain

---

118 “Traditionalism and Colonialism: Changing Urban Roles in Asia,” p. 70.

119 The most important exception to the concentration of government functions within the colonial capitals occurred in French Indochina, where the colonial administration was seated in Hanoi, rather than in the larger city of Saigon-Cholon. By the same token in the Netherlands East Indies the key administrative functions were divided between several cities, for the military officialdom was headquartered in Bandung and the governor-general spent much of his time in the hill station in Buitenzorg (Bogor). Pauline Dubline Milone, “Indische Culture, and Its Relationship to Urban Life,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 9, No. 4 (July, 1967), p. 419.


121 A thoroughgoing statement concerning the effective power within the Malayan economy of European firms based in Singapore is offered in J. J. Puthucheary, Ownership and Control in the Malayan Economy (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, Ltd., 1960).
small European communities, but they also embraced very large numbers of Indians and Chinese who had migrated to Southeast Asia because of intense poverty in their homelands. Although some members of the alien Asian communities amassed considerable wealth through skillful commercial dealings and participation in processing industries, most were a part of the vast force of tertiary laborers who served the emerging primate cities.\textsuperscript{122} Finally, the colonial capitals served as the foremost beacons of Western education and culture in their respective dependencies. By the dawn of the twentieth century most of these urban centers were the seats of public and secretarian institutions which provided clerical, technical and higher educational training for aspiring indigenous peoples who wished to qualify as professionals or for positions in government, the imperial military or European companies.\textsuperscript{123} Corollary to progress in education was the development in this century of a Southeast Asian elite whose growing sense of identity ultimately converted the major coastal cities into centers of nationalism.\textsuperscript{124} Thus the colonial capitals acquired a multiplicity of integrated activities during their early decades of existence and soon became the urban "nerve-centers" through which the European dependencies were organized, managed and exploited.

While the emerging cities of Southeast Asia grew in functional diversity, they also expanded dramatically in population. Like Manila and Batavia, those colonial capitals founded during the nineteenth century were located on the sites of comparatively insignificant precolonial towns or villages. But as the developmental roles of the new alien cities began to crystallize, their populations multiplied rapidly. By the dawn of the twentieth century most of the Southern Asian colonial capitals embraced at least 200,000 persons.\textsuperscript{125} Equally impressive is the fact that in the four ensuing decades each of these centers doubled or even tripled its citizenry.\textsuperscript{126} Furthermore, this expansion in the population of the major ports was paralleled by equally significant relative gains over secondary urban places. As early as 1900 the colonial capitals of most Southeast Asian dependencies proved to be at least two times

\textsuperscript{122} McGee, \textit{The Southeast Asian City}, pp. 58-60.

\textsuperscript{123} Following the demise of indigenous urbanism and the decline of the Great Traditions, ambitious Southeast Asians increasingly looked to government, the military and European business as effective avenues of social and economic advancement. In each of these bureaucratic realms success depended to a great extent upon clerical skills and proficiency in the prevailing European language. Thus the newly established schools played an important role in servicing individuals who required a Western type of education.


\textsuperscript{125} The major exception was Batavia, which had only 140,000 inhabitants in the city proper. Murphey, "New Capitals of Asia," p. 227.

\textsuperscript{126} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 226-227.
the size of the cities of second rank. In the decades which followed, moreover, the coastal centers continued to outpace other significant urban places in their rates of population growth. Accordingly metropolitan primacy intensified throughout the region. In terms of population, as well as diversity of functions, therefore, the colonial capitals of Southeast Asia had fully matured as primate cities even before the advent of independence following World War II.

Inherited Primacy: A Concluding Note

Although the primate cities of Southeast Asia were originally established and developed as instruments of imperialism, the expulsion of Western officialdoms from the region in recent decades failed to initiate a decline in either the relative size or in the far-reaching influence of these major coastal centers. The coming of independence in fact brought little opportunity for effective restructuring of the urban and infrastructural systems fashioned during the period of European dominion. In the new countries of Southeast Asia national life had come to focus upon the former colonial capitals to a seemingly irreversible degree. These centers not only retained a complex of economic, cultural and administrative functions created during the days of Western empire, but also served increasingly as the regional loci of intellectual ferment and of nationalism. The various indigenous elites of Southeast Asia, in short, had little feasible alternative except to convert the alien colonial cities into the capitals of their newly emergent states. Accordingly despite periodic calls for urban decentralization in order to foster more uniform development throughout the region, the absolute and relative growth of these primate cities in terms of population and national influence continues unabated. In most Southeast Asian nations metropolitan primacy is thus becoming a permanent condition, and it seems highly unlikely that any but the most drastic remedial measures by public or private authorities could now effect an immediate reversal of this trend.

\(^{127}\) The exception to this pattern occurred in the Netherlands East Indies, where the cities of Batavia and Surabaya were roughly equal in size early in the twentieth century. *Ibid.*, p. 227.


\(^{129}\) For example see Poethig, pp. 15-20.
THE CONVERSION OF THE ALANI BY THE FRANCISCAN MISSIONARIES IN CHINA IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

FRANK W. IKLE

THESE NOTES DEAL WITH ONE PHASE OF THE MISSIONARY activities of the Franciscans in China during the Mongol period, namely, the conversion of the people of the Alani to the Roman church. This particular event was selected in order to raise some questions regarding the general problem of conversion and of the motivations involved in the acceptance of a higher religion.

When describing the conversion of Northern Europe to Christianity after the fall of Rome, most historians tend to agree that Christianity conquered not only because it came as a higher religion, but also because it represented a superior civilization and a superior political power. Christianity in crossing the Alps as a higher religion seemed to offer to the barbarian greater supernatural help, since it was dogmatically formulated, efficiently organized, and spread by the burning missionary zeal of the early Christian Church. Representing the surviving culture of the civilized world, it was offered with authority as a finished system to simple people. Finally, and perhaps most decisively, Christianity came as the representative of Rome, with all the prestige and power of the empire. Christianity north of the Alps appealed first of all to kings, the strong and the free. It seems conversion meant primarily a political decision to the barbarian kings, as in the case of Clovis.

The idea that conversion is primarily due to the impact of a superior civilization and political power is also well supported outside the Roman church. The case of Vladimir and Kievan Russia represents an excellent example. Measured against the importance of Byzantium as a political and cultural power and terminal of the great Dnieper River trade route, Islam, Rome, and Judaism were all rejected in favor of Greek Orthodoxy. This decision involved objective and careful weighing of the alternatives. The Chronicle of Nestor tells of the impression St. Sophia made that "we did not know whether we were on heaven or on earth—such was the splendor."

---

1 Franciscan activities in China are treated at length by K.S. Latourette in his History of Christian Missions in China, as well as by A.C. Moule in Christians in China Before the Year 1552.

2 Superior here is used not as value judgment, but as index of material culture.
This splendor obviously meant more to Vladimir than merely Greek liturgy and ritual.

Another instance is that of the Khazars. This trading state on the lower Volga comprised a mixture of Turks and Hunno-Bulgar tribes and controlled the flow of commerce between the Volga, the Caspian, the Caucasus, and the Near and Middle East. It was exposed to the influence of Islam from the South and that of Christianity from the West. The Khazar Kagan, after lengthy consideration, decided to embrace Judaism, since it appeared as a neutral faith, carrying with it no political threat, as did the other two rival faiths. Here is a case of conversion along political lines, selecting the politically least dangerous of creeds, while yet gaining cultural advantages.

In a study of the work of the Franciscan missionaries in China during the Yuan period, it is clear that the gains of the Roman church were almost exclusively confined to non-Chinese (foreigners such as a few Mongols, Onguts, and above all, those people known as the Alani). To the Chinese, as is well known, Christianity made no appeal, since it furnished neither a more highly developed system of religion (able to replace the Chinese trinity of Confucianism, Buddhism and the Way), nor did it represent a superior civilization. Political power, of course, was totally lacking.

The real success of the Friars remained limited to the mass conversion of the Alani, who, numbering about twenty to thirty thousand, were brought into the Nicæan fold largely through the efforts of John of Montecorvino. What was its appeal, and for what reasons was Christianity accepted by them? What stage of cultural, religious, and social development had been reached so that the Franciscan effort found ready response?

The Alani, an Indo-European tribe, entered the steppes between the Urals and the Caspian from Central Asia, in the wake of the Sarmatian invasions of the 3rd century B.C. There is some belief that they were related to the Yueh-chi, or at least had some connections with them. At first they seem to have occupied the area east of the Sea of Azov, and the Kuban basin; later they are to be found in the foothills of the Northern Caucasus, as mentioned by both Pliny and Seneca.

Some tribes of the Alani joined the Suevii and the Vandals during the time of the great barbarian invasions, and passed with the Vandals through Gaul and Spain into North Africa (419 A.D.). For those Alani who remained in the Caucasus, contacts with the Eastern Empire became increasingly frequent and close. Leo the Isaurian in particular supported them by subsidies, in line with the traditional Byzantine diplomacy. The political and cultural attraction of Constantinople resulted, one is tempted to say almost

---

inevitably, in the coming of Christianity. They were converted to Greek Orthodoxy under the Patriarchate of Nicholas Mysticos (first quarter 10th century). This conversion proved to be short lived, the Alani renouncing Christianity by 940, if Masudi the Arab historian is to be believed. The final conversion to the Greek church took place only as late as the very early part of the 13th century. Christianity then could not have had time to penetrate very deeply before the Alani were forcibly expelled from the Caucasus and transplanted across Asia by the Mongols, thereby losing all connection with the Byzantine state and patriarchate. Between this second conversion and the coming of the Mongols not more than 30 years could have elapsed. The first contacts of the Alani with the Mongols occurred in 1223 when the Mongol expedition of Subotai and Chebe fought its way across the Caucasus to invade the Kipchak territory in Southern Russia, to punish that tribe for its alliance with the Sultan of Khvarezm who had been utterly defeated by the Mongols in 1220. A battle was fought between the Mongols, the Alani and other Caucasian tribes, and the Mongols forced their way through the mountain passes. But the Alani were not decisively conquered until the time of Subotai’s great expedition into the South Russian steppes and Eastern Europe, 1235 to 1252. It seems that the Alani submitted to the overlordship of the Mongols by 1236. The chiefs surrendered to Mangu, and were given titles by the Mongols and ordered to serve with their people as auxiliary troops. About 30,000 mounted horsemen called Asu or A-lan-a-ssu under a chief called Nieh-ku-la (very likely Nicholas) were sent into Central Asia. At first they were stationed at Karakorum, but later they saw service in the role of bodyguards as well as in that of auxiliary troops under Kublai Khan in his conquest of the state of Nanchao in 1253. And subsequently they were employed in the war against Sung China. We possess a number of biographies of Alani chieftains in the Yüan shih; they seemed to have enjoyed privileged positions at the Mongol court, presumably because they had yielded peacefully, and probably also because many Alani were excellent craftsmen, skilled in armor-making, a long established tradition of the Caucasian mountaineers.

Alani princes commanded exclusively Alani troops, which were organized in units of 1,000. The Yüan shih contains a number of references regarding appointments to the rank of chilarchs by Alani chieftains. Marco Polo also referred to the services rendered by them to Kublai Khan. Alani bodyguards are first mentioned in 1237 at Karakorum, and they seemed to be rapidly increasing in numbers thereafter, continuing to exist as late as 1330.

---

4 Masudi as quoted in C. Rambaud, Constantin Porphyrogenete, p. 525.
5 E. Bretschneider, Medieval Researches, p. 294.
7 L. Olschki, Guillaume Boucher, p. 8
While serving the Mongol Khans, the Alani rapidly lost touch with the Greek clergy. Rubruquis, that intrepid traveler, knew the Alani as Aas, or Akas, and noticed that they were Greek Orthodox Christians using Greek books and Greek priests. He stated, however, that at the time of his visit to Karakorum in 1256, the Alani were "Christians of Eastern rites who had not seen the sacrament since their capture." This seems a bit surprising at first, given the well-known fact of the Mongol policy of religious toleration. Although the Mongols supported all religions for political reasons, support was not given in the same degree. The Mongols drew the line at importing priests, or being interested in maintaining religious connections for one of the conquered people, if that people proved to be not more than a small and unimportant minority in the Empire. Assuredly, in the case of the Alani, there did not exist the same political necessity as in case of the Chinese or Persians. On the other hand, the Mongols did show some interest in the Christian West. Although they had requested and facilitated the travel of Franciscans to China, they had done so because they hoped to learn something from them about the European world, and not because they desired to become converts. Christianity could not furnish to them the cultural and political strength which Islam gave to the Ilkhanate, or Buddhism to the Yuan rulers.

But, and this is the most interesting point in the history of the Franciscans in the Far East, their coming did result in the reconversion of the Alani. Friar John of Montecorvino achieved his greatest success in about 1318, when, as the Franciscan source has it: "certain good Christians who are called Alani, receiving pay from the most great king for 20,000 persons, themselves and their families have joined Brother John. And he supports them and preaches." Montecorvino was born in Southern Italy in 1246, and entered the Order of the Minor Friars in 1272. He was active at the court of the Eastern emperor, Michael Paleologus, and was a missionary in Asia Minor and Armenia until 1289 when he returned to Rome with a letter from Argun, the Mongol ruler of the Persian Ilkhanate, to request the pope to send some Catholic missionaries to Kublai Khan. The pope, Nicholas IV, entrusted Montecorvino with this mission and he left Rome in 1289 with letters to Kublai Khan and to Argun, accompanied by one Dominican who died en route, and an Italian merchant, Peter of Lucalongo. Travelling by sea from Persia to India where he stayed well over a year, he reached China in 1294, shortly after the death of Kublai Khan. He won the favor of the new Emperor Timur, after overcoming considerable Nestorian opposition, and in 1300 Montecorvino built a church in Khanbaliq (the city of the Khan), Kublai's new capital city in China on the site of present-day Peking.8

---

8 W. W. Rockhill, William of Rubruquis, p. 213.
9 Letter of Peregrine of Castille, Franciscan Friar, 30 December 1318, given in A.C. Moule, New China Review (December 1920), pp. 538-44.
10 L. Olschki, Marco Polo's Predecessors, p. 74.
THE CONVERSION OF THE ALANI

A letter from Montecorvino dated 8 January 1305, states:

I have built a church in the City of Khanbaliq, where the king has his chief residence. And this I completed six years ago; and I also made a bell tower there, and put three bells in it. (unam ecclesiam edificavi in ciuitate Cambaliech ubi est regis quattuor sex annos complevi, ubi semper campanile et ibi tres campanas posui.)

Until 1306 Montecorvino had the help of only one other Friar, Arnold of Cologne, but the report of his successes, conveyed to Rome by Friar Thomas of Tolentino, created great interest, and Pope Clement V decided to support actively the missionary work at the far corner of the world. Montecorvino was able to be consecrated archbishop (summus archiescopus) with a diocese embracing the bishoprics of Zaiton, Almaliq, Saraia, Tana, Kaffa in the Crimea and Kumuk. He was installed in that position in 1307, and it was this Catholic archbishop who succeeded in the conversion of the Alani to the Roman faith.

The personality of Montecorvino himself must have made a deep and lasting impression upon the Alani chiefs. His knowledge of the "Lingua Tartaricham" (undoubtedly Mongolian rather than Chinese) must have aided his success, but it is also interesting to speculate upon the events which preceded the actual conversion. Did some of the Alani leaders come to see Montecorvino, or did he go out and convert them solely by his own effort? What sort of an appeal was made by him, and what selected from the Christian heritage as being particularly responsive to the needs of this specific group? What was the way in which this selection of elements was presented to them? Even though the Alani may have been ready and eager to accept the Christian doctrine, this conversion is a great tribute to the character and personality of Montecorvino, placing him in the first ranks of great missionaries. His work may well be compared to that of Raymond Lull, the other outstanding missionary of the Avignon papacy who worked among the Saracens.

The letter of the chiefs of the Alani to the pope in 1336 and the letter of the Yuan emperor Togham Timur (1333-1368) to the pope in which he requested him to accept his recommendation of the Alani as the pope's "Christian Sons" give evidence of the esteem in which Montecorvino was held by them, and are witness to the fact that his success was partially due to the nobility of his character:

Let this moreover be known to your Holiness, that for a long time we were instructed in the Catholic faith, and wholesomely governed and very much comforted [sic] by your Legate Brother John, a valiant, holy and capable man,

---

12 F.E.A. Krause, Geschichte Ostrasiens p. 333
who nevertheless died eight years ago. In which years we have been without a governor and without spiritual consolation. . . Wherefore we beseech your Holiness to send us a good, capable and wise legate who may care for our souls; and that he come quickly, because we fare ill without a head, without instruction, and without consolation.  

It appears then that about 20,000 Alani, deprived of contact with the Greek church, turned eagerly to the church of Rome when its representative in China offered them an opportunity to continue in the Christian faith. It is true that this Franciscan success did not last for any length of time. The Alani were soon again deprived of Christian contacts, and were expelled together with the Mongols from China with the fall of the Yuan in 1368. It is probable that the Asiatic Alani were assimilated with the Mongols; a Mongol tribe of the name of Assod, or Asod, which appears for the first time in 1399, may well have constituted the Alani remnant.

The conversion of this people by the Franciscan in 1318 remains as a most interesting problem within the general question of conversion. Here is a people who exchange the Greek church for that of Rome, being at the utmost distance from both, and living in an entirely different cultural and political sphere. The Franciscans did not represent superior political power, nor did they appear in China as bearer of a superior civilization. Why then did this conversion take place?

I think it is possible to suggest at least one reason for the reconversion of the Alani to Roman Catholicism. The Alani had been exposed to the Greek church at one particular stage in their cultural history, and had experienced the civilizing and political advantages which Christianity gave to a people with whom it came into contact. This exposure probably did not have time to penetrate deeply, yet the impression must have been considerable enough to create a feeling of the need for renewed Christian values when the occasion presented itself. For when the Alani were deprived of the spiritual leadership emanating from Byzantium, and were transplanted into China, they sought for and found another Christian creed of a high order among the Franciscans. The short span of time during which the Alani had been subject to Greek Orthodoxy was just long enough to create a new demand for the Christian creed, but not so long as to create a barrier against Catholicism. Significantly enough, the Alani had bypassed the Nestorian Christians who flourished in Karakorum. Nestorianism represented considerable political influence among the Mongols and Onguts, but had itself been corrupted in Central Asia, leaning heavily towards Shamanism.

The salient feature of the reconversion of the Alani by John of Montecorvino was that religion was again accepted to satisfy strictly spiritual

needs; superior culture and political power played little if any role. The Franciscans were successful precisely because the Alani had arrived at a particular stage in their cultural development and found themselves in the very special position of having been transported across Asia and deprived of contact with Byzantium. Christianity, which, if one accepts the general thesis of conversion, had originally been accepted by them for reasons of culture and political considerations, had achieved sufficient penetration among the Alani to create a genuine thirst for its spiritual values.

Certainly the history of the Alani in the years between 1210-1320 is most interesting. They were exposed to a great number of political, social, religious, and cultural influences, ranging from a close relationship with Byzantium through the Mongol conquest to residence in China and the influence of Franciscan missionaries. In conclusion, I think that the study of the work of the Franciscans seems of particular value since it affords insight into the processes by which a religion is accepted. The case of the Alani seems to suggest that Religion is at first accepted in accordance with the previous formula because it brings with it superior civilization and represents political power; however, after a certain period of time these two conditions are considerably less influential, and religion seems to create a genuine appeal along spiritual lines. It seems to me that a study of this kind of a transitional process can be of particular satisfaction to the historian.
JAPANESE POLICY AND THE INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY

JOYCE LEBRA

1. POLICY MAKERS IN TOKYO

Stephen F. Cohen states in an article in Pacific Affairs titled "Subhas Chandra Bose and the Indian National Army," "Little is known about the maneuvering and influence of the Japanese upon the creation and organization of the INA during the period Bose was its Commander."1 This paper attempts to illuminate this phase of Japan's southward push during the Pacific War, focusing on Japanese policy. Actually Mr. Cohen's remarks apply equally well to the first INA commanded by General Mohan Singh. I must at this point acknowledge my debt to Dr. K. K. Ghosh who preceded me in the study of the INA and who since Mr. Cohen wrote has helped to dispel our ignorance.

Japan's wartime aims in India were never as clearly defined as in Southeast Asia. India was not embraced in the grand design for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Greater East Asia would sweep through Southeast Asia westward to the Indo-Burma border. Everywhere in Asia Western colonial rule would be driven out and independence movements encouraged. Asia for Asians became the goal and shibboleth. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere would comprise an economically self-sufficient entity under Japanese tutelage. Both diplomatic and military means would be employed to realize the blueprint. Japan would guide Southeast Asia, but Japanese military administration would respect existing local organization and customs. By late 1941 control of resources necessary for the war effort became a focal point of the plan.2

Still, India bordered the Western perimeter of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. And Japan was at war with the colonial power occupying India; England must be expelled from India. As Japan wished to see England purged from Asia so also Indian nationalists aspired to free India. Japan had to reckon with India for the mutual advantage of both Japan and India.

What agencies or individuals in Tokyo would do the reckoning? The Foreign Ministry was one obvious possibility. Japan had no ambassador in India under England, but there were consuls in major Indian

1 Vol. XXXVI, No. 4, winter 1963-64, pp. 411-429.
cities. In April, 1941, for example, Consul General Okasaki in Calcutta, in a secret communiqué to Foreign Minister Matsuoka, described the independence movement of the Forward Bloc, a radical party in Bengal. Okasaki suggested establishing contact with this left-wing party in India and also with its leader, Subhas Chandra Bose, currently in exile in Berlin. Going even further, Okasaki suggested, “We should secretly transport large quantities of weapons and substantially increase the actual strength of the Forward Block.” While Okasaki felt the movement would burgeon into a genuinely popular revolt, Japan should do her part by establishing contact with Bose and aiding his party. This early Japanese notice of Bose preceded by several months Major Fujiwara’s remarks about Bose to the 8th Section, Second Bureau, IGHQ. But Okasaki’s suggestions were not followed.

From Ambassador General Oshima Hiroshi in Berlin also came communiques regarding the Indian revolutionary Bose and his desire to go to East Asia. By late 1941 Bose had already begun to visit Ambassador Oshima and military attache Yamamoto Bin in Berlin with plans for military cooperation with Japan against England in Asia. The Foreign Ministry, then, learned of the presence of Bose in Berlin and of his political significance from sources both in India and in Germany. The Foreign Ministry, however, refrained from any positive proposal regarding India or Bose during 1941. And when war erupted, the initiative obviously lay with the military rather than the Foreign Ministry.

From within the cabinet Prime Minister Tojo made several declarations of policy toward India in early 1942. These pronouncements were articulated in speeches before the Diet. They represented official policy aims toward India. The statements were made during the four-month interval from January through April, and the timing of the pronouncements suggested that by late March or early April the fundamental lines of Japan’s India policy had already been drawn. Measures were later adopted to implement some of these policy goals. Announcements made by Tojo during 1943 and 1944 were designed to realize earlier decisions.

Major policy decisions on India also emanated from Liaison Conferences and Imperial Conferences. Liaison Conferences included important members of both the cabinet and military high command, including the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff and Vice-Chiefs of Staff. The Liaison Conferences were inaugurated by cabinet order in the late 1937 to provide liaison between the Cabinet and military on crucial policy questions. For a time conferences

---

3 Gaimusho, Indo Mondai [India Problem]. Secret Communiqué from Okasaki to Matsuoka, nos. 11975, 11978, 11979, Apr. 30-31, 1941.

lapsed, but they were resumed in November 1940 and thereafter continued until 1944.\(^5\) A major decision reached at a Liaison Conference was not final until ratified at an Imperial Conference, i.e., the Liaison Conference plus the Emperor and President of the Privy Council. This Imperial ratification in effect made the decision irrevocable.

Still another government agency directly under the Prime Minister's office was concerned with Japanese policy in Asia. This was the Total War Research Institute, created in 1940 to do research on total war and to train officials. This agency was the brain child of two generals: Lt. Gen. Tatsumi Eichi, Section Chief in the European and American Section, IGHQ, and Lt. Gen. Imura Minoru, Chief of Staff of the Kanto Garrison in Manchuria. Gen. Imura was appointed director of the Institute in January 1941 and remained in that post until October of the same year. Gen. Tatsumi, former military attache in London, envisaged an agency on the same pattern as the Royal National War Institute in England. Topics for study by the Institute were selected at the discretion of Gen. Imura, though the choice reflected the concerns of the military which he represented. Imura reported directly to the Prime Minister, at that time Konoe. During August, 1941 (following discussion by the Army and Navy), the Institute held a map maneuver on the problem of what would happen should Japan advance South in search of oil. The study postulated Soviet entry into the war; the conclusion was that Japan's material strength would be deficient, and the cabinet and Planning Board would be impelled to resign. Bureau chiefs of several cabinet ministries participated, and many top-ranking military officers observed the maneuver, including War Minister Tojo.\(^6\)

The Institute also autonomously devised plans for the independence of Asian nations from Western colonial rule and their incorporation into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Total War Research Institute drew up a Draft Plan for the Establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere on January 27, 1942. This plan envisaged a Greater, Smaller and Inner Sphere; India was to be included within the Greater Sphere, or sphere of influence.\(^7\) Policies recommended by the Institute were later implemented by military administration in Southeast Asia, though Imura testified at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal that the military had no special interest in the Institute.\(^8\) There was, however, no separate focus on India in the studies and maneuvers of the Total War Research Institute during 1941.

---

\(^5\) Ike, op. cit., p. xvi.
\(^6\) Correspondence with Lt. Gen. Imura, Aug. 21, 1967, Japan.
\(^7\) International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Exhibit 1336.
\(^8\) International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Exhibit 3030, Imura testimony.

Japanese policy and Indian National Army

East Asia Military was also created during the war to handle problems relating to the rest of Asia; no records of this ministry are extant.

Besides these agencies General Staff Headquarters of course had a direct concern with India policy during the war. Army Chief of General Staff Sugiyama Gen took a special interest in India, derived from his two-year assignment in India as military attaché. Sugiyama, like Tojo and Shigemitsu, developed a special sympathy for Subhas Chandra Bose. Under the Second Bureau (Intelligence) of IGHQ, headed by Lt. Gen. Arisue, was the 8th Section, whose purview included India. The 8th Section was the official repository of intelligence on India. From among staff officers of the 8th Section Major Fujiwara was selected to establish liaison with and encourage the Indian independence movement in Southeast Asia. Fujiwara was dismayed by the lack of information on India available in IGHQ at the time of his assignment in October 1941. Within the 8th Section Lt. Col. Ozeki was assigned to deal with the Fujiwara Kikan and its successor organizations, the Iwakuro Kikan and Hikari Kikan in the field. 8th Section chiefs, for example Col. Nagai Yatsuji, were at times called on to deal with the Indian National Army or with Bose. Civilian specialists on India — on whom there were very few in Japan — were also consulted by the 8th Section during the war.

These were the major official sources in Tokyo from which policy decisions on India emanated during the war. There were others who influenced India policy, several of them private individuals. Notable among these was Toyama Mitsuru, the renowned patriotic society leader, who had contacts with Indian revolutionaries, such as Rash Behari Bose. Toyama advocated Pan-Asianism in all its varieties, starting soon after the turn of the century. He went beyond the ideology of Pan-Asianism to actively protect revolutionaries from all parts of Asia.

Another constant factor affecting Japan’s project was the traditional ideology of the Japanese Army. The Army traditionally was oriented northward, toward Soviet Russia and North China, rather than Southward. The north was always the major legitimate concern of the Army, the direction from which Japan had to be on guard. Assignment of the best officers in the ‘thirties to Manchuria and North China, especially to the Kwantung Army and the Kanto Garrison, reflected this orientation. This was true through most of 1941. “In Manchuria there were many superior officers, but in the South Fujiwara was a single player,” observed Ishikawa Yoshiaki, interpreter for the Kikan throughout the war.9

2. ISSUES AND POLICIES

The first hypothesis to emerge regarding Japanese policy toward India is that Japan at no time planned a major invasion of India or

9 Interview, July 13, 1966, Tokyo.
actual incorporation of India into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, contrary to the suspicions of many Indians in the independence movement. There were, however, several indications of more limited concern with India in late 1941 and early 1942. Decisions reached in Liaison Conferences and speeches in the Diet by Prime Minister Tojo revealed this concern.

On November 15, 1941, an Imperial Conference decision, the “Plan for Acceleration of the End of the War with America,” called among other things for “1) separation of Australia and India from Britain, and 2) stimulation of the Indian independence movement.”

One problem concerning policy toward India was the estimate of the Gaimusho that the Indian National Congress was opposed to Japan. A corollary of this was the postulate that, even if the Indian independence movement should succeed, it would be difficult for Indian revolutionaries to establish a stable, orderly state. Nor would it be possible for Japan to control a nation of four hundred million in addition to her other commitments in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, it lay within the realm of feasibility for Japan to launch a vast propaganda effort to encourage Indian disaffection from Britain.

Tojo declared in the Diet early in 1942 “Within the liberation of India there can be no real mutual prosperity in Greater East Asia,” and further, in April, “It has been decided to strike a decisive blow against British power and military establishment in India.” This constituted a general policy statement rather than a directive to the Operations Bureau of IGHO; Tojo gave no suggestion of its tactical or even strategic implementation. Tojo mentioned India in Diet speeches on January 17, February 12, February 14, March 11-12, and April 4. Repeatedly he called on Indians to take advantage of the war to rise against British power and establish an India for Indians. Tojo also stated he hoped India would cooperate in the “establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” This pronouncement too was never alluded to again, either generally or in further explanation.

At several points it was conceivable that a Japanese invasion of India might have succeeded had it been planned. The optimum time was in the spring and summer of 1942, following Japanese successes in Malaya and Burma, when Japanese air, sea and land power could not have been checked by the British. But Japan passed up the opportunity. Japan made no concerted attempt to establish a base in Ceylon or Calcutta, though Ceylon had been mentioned in Tokyo as a desirable base.

---

10 Ike, op. cit., p. 247.
11 Secret document signed Ott, Tokyo, Jan. 7, 1942. IMFTE Exhibit 1271.
12 Tojo speech in the Diet, early 1942, in the Boeicho Senshishitsu [Defense Agency, War History Library]; Tojo speech on military activities in India; Imperial Conference Decision, Apr. 4, 1942 in Boeicho Senshishitsu.
Two years later, when Japan mounted a military offensive into the borders of India, it was with the limited objective of “securing strategic areas near Imphal and in Northeast India for the defense of Burma.”\textsuperscript{13} An auxiliary objective was to disrupt the air routes between Chungking and India. This was clearly not envisioned as a full-scale invasion of India. India remained a peripheral interest for Japan in terms of 1) the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and 2) the major theaters of the war. Nevertheless, the attention of Tokyo had been drawn to India at the close of 1941, even before the outbreak of war. One of the reasons Tojo took notice was the policy recommendations of the young Major Fujiwara, who had been sent to Bangkok on an intelligence mission late in 1941.

Another major tenet of Japanese policy, this toward the INA, was that Japan would use and support the INA chiefly for propaganda purposes, particularly to foster anti-British sentiment. All major Japanese policy decisions regarding the INA point toward this goal. Beginning with the Fujiwara mission in 1941 (and a brief assignment for Fujiwara in late 1940), and continuing with the expanded propaganda functions of the Kikan under Col. Iwakuro, the major Japanese thrust was to encourage the proliferation of Indian intelligence activities throughout Southeast Asia. Under both Fujiwara, and still more under Iwakuro, training centers and liaison facilities were developed to expand propaganda and sabotage missions behind enemy lines.

Yet another Japanese objective was a corollary to the above, namely: even during the Imphal campaign and the actions in Burma, the Japanese Army was reluctant to see the INA evolve into a large fighting force, partly because of the problems of equipping such an army, partly out of questions about possible actions of such an army once the Indian border was crossed, and partly because of doubts about whether an Indian army would constitute a military asset to Japan. During the Imphal campaign Japan conceived of the INA as a series of guerrilla fighting units and special forces which would perform intelligence functions. Shah Nawaz Khan alleges that General Terauchi, commander of the Southern Army, told Bose unequivocally that Japan did not want large formations of the INA at the front. Shah Nawaz was particularly skeptical of Japanese motives, and charged further not only Japanese inability to supply arms and provisions during military campaigns, but also reluctance.\textsuperscript{14}


Several steps taken by Japan, recounted below, also support the hypothesis that Japan was primarily interested in using the INA for propaganda purposes. These include the Japanese recognition of the Free India Provisional Government, the transfer of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to FIPG, and the sending of a diplomatic representative to the Free India Provisional Government. In all these instances Japan conceded the form but not the substance of Bose’s demands. The concessions were designed to create the impression abroad, and with Bose, that Japan was dealing with a large, independent government and Army.

Another problem which beset Japan’s India policy throughout the war was a time disjunction between three factors: 1) military intelligence in the field and its evaluation and response in Tokyo, 2) policy planning by IGHQ, and 3) tactical implementation of policy at the operational level. Part of this delay was attributable to normal processing of proposals and policies through a bureaucratic establishment, even during wartime. For example, the decision to invite Bose from Berlin to Tokyo to evaluate his utility from the standpoint of Japanese policy was reached on April 17, 1942, jointly by the War, Navy and Foreign Ministries. Bose did not actually reach Tokyo until the end of May, 1943. Apart from normal bureaucratic delays, part of the time lag was created by the German Foreign Ministry’s reluctance to release a potentially valuable bargaining instrument in dealing with the British. Part of the delay was also occasioned by the presence in Tokyo of another Indian revolutionary, Rash Behari Bose, who many felt was the logical leader to work through.

Another case in point was the planning of the offensive into Northeast India and its execution. In the fall of 1942, and even earlier, Tojo and IGHQ contemplated a military thrust into Northeast India, “Operation 21” as it was then called. But in 1942-53 there were too many obstacles to the idea—inadequate supply lines, British deterrent strength in the Akyab sector through early 1943, a shortage of trained Indian troops for a joint Campaign, not to mention events in the Pacific. Consequently, the plan for an Indian offensive was postponed to early 1944. In 1944, however, despite the rationale for the campaign, the above obstacles were even more acute and it was not possible for Japan to succeed.

Regarding this disjunction of time factors, it should be noted that Bose’s role in the timing of most aspects of the Japan–INA cooperation was minimal. The timing of Subhas Chandra Bose’s arrival in East Asia was not of his own choice. For over a year before he arrived in Asia he had been pressing Japanese Ambassador Oshima and Col. Yamamoto, military attaché in Berlin, to arrange his transportation to Asia. Bose

---

was similarly unhappy about the timing of the Imphal campaign, but again his expressions of urgency carried little weight in Tokyo. Bose would have had Japan push across the border soon after his arrival in the summer of 1943. But because of the above reasons and because India remained for Japan a peripheral concern in the deployment of her resources for a total war, other considerations overrode the logic of not postponing the campaign. In other respects, however, Bose did make a difference in Tokyo, particularly with Tojo, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, and Chief of Staff Sugiyama.

To summarize, then, Japan had several objectives in cooperating with the INA: to encourage anti-British sentiment in Southeast Asia, within the British-Indian Army and within India; to develop an intelligence network to implement this aim; to defend Burma and the western border of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and to support and assist the FIPG and INA, within certain limitations, to achieve these aims. These were both political and military objectives. There was a distinction made between the political aims, which fell within the purview of the Second Bureau, Intelligence, and the military problems, which fell within the scope of the First Bureau, Operations, in IGHQ. The first Bureau was the more powerful of the two in any conflict.

3. Policy Implementation and Transportation in the Field

The organization in Southeast Asia for implementing Japanese policy toward the Indian National Army was a liaison agency under the aegis of Southern Army Headquarters. Formed in October, 1941, it predated the formation of the first INA by two months.

On October 1, 1941, Major Fujiwara Iwaichi was sent from the 8th Section, Second Bureau, IGHQ on an intelligence mission to Bangkok, where he contacted the Japanese military attache. Fujiwara's instructions from Chief of Staff General Sugiyama directed him to maintain liaison with the Indian independence movement and with Malayans and Chinese in Thailand and Malaya. Fujiwara was to encourage the cooperation and friendship of all these groups with the Japanese. It was a formidable task for a thirty-three year old major, a staff of five commissioned officers, and a Hindi-speaking interpreter. It called for considerable initiative, imagination and finesse. Fujiwara reported directly to the military attaché in Bangkok, ultimately to the 25th Army and the Southern Army.

Fujiwara began work with groups of Indians in Bangkok. There was already an Indian organization printing and distributing propaganda leaflets among Indian officers and men of the British Indian Army, before the Pacific war broke out. In Fujiwara's early contacts with these Indians, mostly Sikhs, he was impressed by their revolutionary fervor.
for independence from British rule. If all Indians in Southeast Asia felt like the Sikhs in Bangkok, perhaps they could all be united in a single vast movement which could cooperate with the Japanese and at the same time for independence from the British.

Inspiration for the organization of the INA grew out of talks between Fujiwara and two Sikhs: Pritam Singh, a priest and teacher in Bangkok who headed the Indian Independent League (later the IIL), and Mohan Singh, a Captain in the British Indian Army who was one of the first Indians to surrender to the Japanese. The three determined to contact all Indians in the British Indian Army—both POWs and those still in the Army—and persuade them to volunteer for the Indian National Army, which would fight for India’s freedom. This was the bold design which Fujiwara and his staff in the F Kikan worked for in Malaya and Thailand. Other than this work, Fujiwara’s operation also embraced a Sumatra project, a Malay Youth League project, and an overseas Chinese project, all designed to secure good will of local inhabitants toward the Japanese and to encourage independence from colonial rule. Fujiwara worked with energy, enthusiasm, sympathy, and despatch, making friends for Japan wherever he went.

Fujiwara’s encounter in the jungles of Perak state, Malaya, with a trapped battalion of the British Indian Army enabled him to meet Captain Mohan Singh, the ranking Indian officer. Fujiwara and Mohan Singh took an immediate liking to each other. Fujiwara convinced Mohan Singh he would be treated as a friend, not as a prisoner. In conversations with Mohan Singh, Fujiwara pointed to several historic ties between Japan and India and suggested the Pacific War was a chance for Indians to rise and fight for Indian freedom with Japanese help. This was the genesis of the Indian National Army. Mohan Singh was further convinced of Japanese sincerity in conversations with General Yamashita of the 25th Army. Mohan Singh and Fujiwara talked for two days about the form cooperation would take. From Mohan Singh Fujiwara first heard the name of Subhas Chandra Bose, whom Mohan Singh asked the Japanese to bring to Asia from Berlin. By January 1, 1942, Japanese—INA cooperation was assured. Mohan Singh began training propaganda units to work beside those already operating under Pritam Singh’s direction.

On January 8 Fujiwara was visited by Lt. Col. Ozeki from the 8th Section, IGHQ, Tokyo, who had come to discuss with Fujiwara the progress of his mission. To Ozeki Fujiwara made his first proposal regarding Japanese policy toward India and the Indian National Army. It was a bold, broadly conceived plan including the following points: 1) Japanese encouragement of the Indian independence movement to cut India adrift from England, 2) clarification of Japan’s basic policy toward India and the Indian independence movement, 3) a unified policy in
Tokyo toward India, 4) expansion of the work of the Fujiwara Kikan to all areas of Asia, including a direct appeal to India, 5) world-wide scope to Japan's Indian policy, including inviting Bose to Asia, 6) Japanese assistance to both the civilian Indian Independence League and the Indian National Army of ex-POWs, 7) personal proof to Indians in occupied areas of the ideals of the New Order in East Asia, and 8) reorganization and expansion of the Fujiwara Kikan to accomplish these objectives. Through Col. Ozeki Fujiwara's imaginative suggestions came to the attention of IGHQ, which two weeks later sent two generals from IGHQ to visit Fujiwara and inspect the progress of his work on the spot. Fujiwara was elated that his ideas were getting a hearing in Tokyo. In spite of this high level notice of Fujiwara, however, he felt there was always a gap between his views of the INA and the views of Tokyo, even within the 8th Section, his own unit. Nevertheless, Fujiwara explained to Generals Tanaka and Tominaga his plan for the formation of an Indian revolutionary army of one hundred thousand men. He mentioned too the Indian request to bring Subhas Chandra Bose to Asia to unite all Indians there. Clearly an organization of the size of the F Kikan could not implement all Fujiwara's ideas; his staff, now twelve men, was already terribly overworked. But Fujiwara succeeded in making Tokyo take note of India and the INA.

With Japanese success at Singapore on February 15, Fujiwara accepted the surrender of some 50,000 Indian troops. About half of this number was persuaded to volunteer for the INA when Fujiwara and Mohan Singh addressed the assemblage of POWs. Many would not volunteer; they were detained in separate camps, but many of them later joined the INA when Bose arrived in Singapore. Again Tokyo was forced to watch this burgeoning of the INA and Indian independence movement, and to give support. Invitations were sent from Tokyo to the IIL and INA to send representatives to a conference of Indians from Southeast Asia in Tokyo.

In Tokyo in early March Fujiwara visited IGHQ but was dismayed to find that his proposal regarding policy toward India and the INA had been given a much more Machiavellian tinge than he intended. Fujiwara spent three days discussing with IGHQ staff officers the need for genuine sympathy and sincerity in dealing with the Indian independence movement. At the end of the discussions he felt he had made some headway in affecting the thinking in Tokyo, but there was a gap which remained between Fujiwara and IGHQ.

One result of Fujiwara's policy suggestions was that his own mission was ended; the F Kikan was greatly expanded and he himself was

---

transferred to another assignment. But for the duration of the war he kept close track of the INA he had helped create. Fujiwara had proven the wisdom of the Japanese Army policy of entrusting important missions requiring much individual initiative to officers of field grade rank. His mission had proven a success in several other ways. He had established the sincerity and credibility of Japanese aid to the Indian independence movement.

As a consequence of Fujiwara’s mission several developments occurred in Tokyo as well: he had drawn the attention of Tokyo to India and the INA; the INA had been formed with Fujiwara as midwife; IGHQ decided to expand the Kikan to handle the many functions which Fujiwara had suggested; a Liaison Conference on April 17 decided to invite Subhas Chandra Bose to Asia from Berlin to evaluate his usefulness for Japanese purposes. This was an imposing record of achievement for Fujiwara’s five-month mission in Southeast Asia.

With Fujiwara’s successor, Col. Iwakuro and the Iwakuro Kikan, there were several changes in Japanese policy and its implementation. In late March when Iwakuro arrived in Southeast Asia the Kikan was reorganized with some two hundred and fifty members, a far cry from the handful of men with which Fujiwara began the operation six months earlier. Several of the staff were prominent politicians, including two Diet members. A few months later the number of members had risen to five hundred. The Kikan was organized into six departments, with the emphasis on intelligence and political activities. Headquarters was in Bangkok, and the Kikan had branches in Rangoon, Saigon, Singapore, Penang and Hongkong.

Col. Iwakuro was an officer whose principal experience had been in intelligence and special mission projects. He had founded the Army Intelligence School, the Rikugun Nakano Gakko. He had also played an active role in the Japanese-American peace negotiations in Washington during 1941. His political power and reputation in the Army were such that Tojo was anxious not to have Iwakuro remain in Tokyo; this was one of the reasons for Iwakuro’s selection as Fujiwara’s successor in Southeast Asia. And Iwakuro outranked Fujiwara. Clearly IGHQ had accepted at least some of Fujiwara’s suggestions.

Iwakuro was immediately plagued by several problems. One of the most vexing, which Fujiwara had worried about but not able to resolve—was the split between Indian residents in Southeast Asia and the Indian leadership in Tokyo. The mutual suspicion and hostility grew until it caused a crisis in the leadership of the whole independence movement in Southeast Asia. The crisis, personified in a struggle between Rash Behari Bose from Tokyo and Mohan Singh, partly caused the dissolution of the first INA and incarceration of Mohan Singh. Fujiwara was no
more able to avert the crisis than Iwakuro. Iwakuro was working closely with Rash Behari Bose, but Mohan Singh was unwilling to compromise with the Japanese. Since Fujiwara’s replacement by Iwakuro, Mohan Singh had become increasingly suspicious of Japanese motives and sincerity. In Mohan Singh’s eyes Bose was nothing more than a Japanese puppet.

Under Iwakuro the training schools for intelligence activities expanded and turned out graduates, some of whom were sent into India by Iwakuro. Penang was a special center for training in propaganda and espionage. This stress on propaganda and espionage for Japanese objectives was not quite to Fujiwara’s liking; Iwakuro, however, was an expert at it.

Both Fujiwara and Iwakuro had received only very general instructions from Tokyo. This gave them both much room to maneuver but also not as much support as they needed from Tokyo. The most serious problem Iwakuro faced, and one that underlay the others, was the ambiguity of his role and uncertainty in Tokyo itself about how far Japan should go in support of Indian independence. Fujiwara had urged full and sincere support of the movement, but IGHQ had many reservations, some of them based on practical problems of material support. For Iwakuro the limits of Tokyo’s support of the INA-IIIL were not clear. His instructions left him latitude for interpretation and exercise of his own political acumen. Iwakuro was working from an IGHQ attitude of grudging and limited support, but this still left the problem of determining the limits. In general Iwakuro read the mood in Tokyo well. The one point that was clear, about which Tokyo would not quibble, was that the India project was part of a secret war in which the weapons of intelligence and espionage played the key role. Political propaganda and secret diplomacy were an old story to Iwakuro. These were the areas where he had proven his versatile talents, which he made good use of in the Kikan. But the IIIL, INA, and especially Mohan Singh continually plagued Iwakuro with specific requests, constantly pushing the limits of Japan’s willingness or capacity to commit herself. This fundamental problem of defining Japan’s policy limits persisted under Iwakuro and ultimately led to dissolution of the first INA. It was not until the arrival of Subhas Chandra Bose that Tokyo was forced to reevaluate and redefine the limits of its policy toward the Indian independence movement.

With the arrival in Asia of Subhas Chandra Bose in June 1943 Japanese policy toward the INA underwent reevaluation and change. In part the shifts reflected the changed military situation and the planning and execution of the Imphal campaign in particular, and in part the changes resulted from the personal impact of Bose on both Japanese
and Indian leadership. Tojofu who at first refused to meet Bose and was only persuaded to after two weeks by Shigemitsu, became sympathetic to both Bose and the independence movement as a result of the meeting. Bose's charismatic personality also had an impact on Sugiyama and Shigemitsu.

As a result of Bose's arrival in Asia the Kikan was reorganized, first briefly under Col. Yamamoto Bin who had known Bose in Berlin, then under Lt. Gen. Isoda Saburo. Bose's complaints about Yamamoto's lack of understanding were partly responsible for Yamamoto's replacement by Isoda. General Isoda was a higher-ranking officer than either Iwakuro or Yamamoto, reflecting the increased military emphasis put on the work of liaison in 1944. Isoda was also a benign, mild-mannered man, whose appointment was calculated to placate Bose's impatient demands for action in India. But Bose remained dissatisfied at having to deal with the Hikari Kikan, and he would have preferred to deal directly with the Japanese Army and Government.

Another result of Bose's arrival in Asia was to give added impetus to the forces pushing for the Imphal campaign. While there were several military factors behind the rationale of undertaking the Imphal campaign in 1944, the strategists also took into consideration the political factor of the Indian independence movement as well as the crisis in morale in Japan.

During the planning of the Imphal strategy and the waging of the campaign Japanese military objectives regarding the INA were consistent. Japanese commanders, including Terauchi of the Southern Army, Kawabe of the New Burma Area Army and Mutaguchi of the 15th Army all insisted that the INA be used primarily for guerrilla fighting and for special services, i.e., intelligence duty. Bose, on the other hand insisted that the INA be used as a single unit and that the INA unit spearhead the offensive into India. For Bose the first drop of blood shed on Indian soil had to be Indian. A compromise was reached, with the INA remaining ultimately under Japanese command throughout the offensive but fighting in Indian units directly under Indian officers. Throughout 1944 and 1945 Isoda accompanied Bose and assumed charge of liaison between him and the Japanese military command. It was a frustrating job, for Bosse's demands were insatiable. For Bose there was the single goal of liberation of India throughout the combined action of the INA and Japanese forces while for Japan Imphal was a limited holding operation subordinate to the high-priority campaigns in the Pacific. Bose requested increasing support in military supplies, while Japanese capacity to support her campaigns steadily diminished. The two positions could never basically be reconciled, and the differences caused constant daily friction during this military phase of the coopera-
tion. Though some in IGHQ in Tokyo questioned the prospects of the Imphal campaign from the outset, for Bose there could be no hesitation; this was the springboard into India. Once the INA crossed the borders into India, Bose expected all India to rise in revolt against the British.

Bose did not finally turn his back on Japanese aid for the liberation of India until the Japanese surrender in 1945. He turned then toward Soviet Russia and a plan to liberate India from the north with Soviet aid. In pursuit of this goal Bose was flying to Manchuria when his plane crashed on August 18, 1945 in Taiwan, killing him.

The INA in the Imphal campaign had come a long way since the discussions between Fujiwara, Mohan Singh and Pritam Singh in the jungles of central Malaya in late 1941. And Japan had come to view the cooperation with the INA as of considerable political if not military significance. Bose's personal bargaining power with the Japanese was part of the difference. There was sensitivity in Tokyo to Indian opinion, which was regarded as unfavorable toward Japan. Bose's leadership was seen as an entering wedge with Indian opinion. But in general Tokyo's objectives toward India and the INA remained limited. Some form of limited political-military alliance in Southeast Asia was natural and logical, but for IGHQ there were always the requisites of a total war in which Japan's resources had proven insufficient.

It was in part the men in the Kikan, and particularly the ideals of Fujiwara, that determined not only the implementation but also the formulation of Japan's policy toward the INA.

4. PUPPET OR REVOLUTIONARY ARMY?

Was the INA a puppet or a genuine revolutionary army? The question is at least partly subjective. Though the subordination of the INA to Japanese military command is unquestionable, the issue has several other dimensions. Was the INA an independent army in Japanese intent, in international law, and in INA aspiration? This poses some of the implications of the question.

First, the problem of Japanese intent is itself complex. There was no single Japanese view of either India or the INA. Policy was formulated and implemented at several different levels, and at each level it was colored and transformed by the biases, experiences, personalities and political predilections of the men in charge. Japanese policy did not develop as an ideal analytical model on the desk of a single staff officer in Tokyo. There were many agencies and men who, in implementing policy in turn created and transformed it. The Fujiwara Kikan was a case in point. Assigned originally on a small-scale intelligence mission to Bangkok, Fujiwara became the midwife of the INA. His
proposals regarding Japan’s policy toward India and the INA got a hear-
ing eventually by Tojo and Sugiyama. Fujiwara brought India and the
INA to the attention of Tokyo, which had not previously looked much
west of Burma on the map.

Japanese policy also evolved chronologically throughout the war
through the pressure of factors external to the INA. Japanese attitudes
were affected at any given moment by the course of the war and the
dictates of military necessity. The Iwakuro Kikan differed in character
from the Fujiwara Kikan and the Hikari Kikan in turn differed from
the Iwakuro organization. It was not only the men on both sides who
spelled the difference. Fujiwara in 1944 would have been forced to
play his role somewhat differently from the way he played it in late
1941-early 1942, regardless of his idealism and genuine sympathy for
Indian independence.

Second, were the FIPG and INA independent from the standpoint
of international law? Here too the answer is mixed. This question
was a focal point in the court martial of INA officers on charges of
treason in Delhi at the end of the war. If the Free India Provisional
Government and its army were not independent but subordinate to
Japan and the Japanese Army, then the Indians who led and participated
in the FIPG and INA were legally traitors to the British. If, on the
other hand, the FIPG and INA were legally independent of the Ja-
panse, then the officers could not be convicted as traitors, because they
were leaders of an independent government in exile and revolutionary
army. These were the arguments of the prosecution and defense.

Japanese intent as well as Indian aspirations are relevant here.
Three separate Japanese actions toward the FIPG throw some light on
Japan’s wartime objectives regarding the independence of the FIPG.
Two days after the announcement of the formation of the FIPG on Oc-
tober 21, 1943, the Japanese Government proclaimed its recognition of
the nascent Indian government. But this was recognition of a provi-
sional government, which in the opinion of several generals in IGHQ,
did not constitute full recognition.17

A second action immediately followed the first. It was the an-
nouncement by Tojo on November 6, 1943, of the transfer of the Andaman
and Nicobar Islands to the FIPG. The announcement was timed to
coincide with the Greater East Asia Conference in Tokyo. The FIPG
now had a recognized government and territory, at least formally. The
Islands had great political and symbolic significance as former places of
exile for Indian political prisoners of the British. What happened in

17 Gaimusho [Foreign Ministry], Ajiya Kyoku [Asia Office], Subhas Chandra
Bose to Nihon, [Subhas Chandra Bose and Japan], Tokyo, 1956, p. 124.
FIPG, in reality civil and military control of the Islands remained under the Japanese Navy. The impatience of Bose and his commissioner had no effect on the reality of the situation.

A third action was the appointment of a Japanese diplomatic envoy to the FIPG. This was a step much sought by Bose in 1944. He was frustrated at having to deal with all military and political matters through liaison officers of the Hikari Kikan. He preferred to deal directly with the Japanese Government in political matters and with the Japanese Army in military problems. Accordingly, an experienced diplomat, Mr. Hachiya Teruo, was appointed minister to the FIPG in February, 1945. What was the case in actuality? Mr. Hachiya arrived in Rangoon and sought an audience with Bose. Foreign Minister Chatterji asked for Hachiya's credentials, but he had none. He was not a regularly accredited diplomatic envoy any more than the FIPG was a fully recognized government. Bose refused to see Hachiya until such time as he was able to present his credentials. This was the third time the Japanese Government attempted to satisfy the requests of the FIPG by tongue-in-cheek actions which partly in form but not in substance recognized the independent status of the FIPG.

At the INA trial in Delhi after the war several Japanese witnesses were called. Contrary to the above indications of Japanese intent, Japanese witnesses unanimously testified that the INA was an independent military arm of an independent government in exile. The Japanese stand in 1946, however, was a separate phenomenon from Japanese aims during the war. In 1946 Japanese witnesses had no desire to see leaders of the Indian independence movement convicted by British colonial power. Japanese sympathy was still with the INA in the choice between Indian independence fighters and the former common British enemy.

Was the INA then a genuine revolutionary army? This question hinges partly on the subjective emotions of the officers and men of the INA. No one can dispute the character of Bose as a revolutionary in every sense of the word. From early school days he harbored a hatred of British rule which became accentuated rather than softened during his years in British universities. His refusal to accept a post in the ICS which he won through examination was a significant step in the metamorphosis of Bose the revolutionary. For Bose there could be no cooperation with the imperialist power. His conviction that the only way to rid India of British rule was to expel it by force was the decisive step in the formulation of Bose's revolutionary faith. But Indian revolutionary strength had to be supplemented by foreign power, and Bose turned to Italy, Germany, Japan, and finally Soviet Russia in search of outside help. Even Gandhi and Nehru, who broke with Bose earlier over
the issue of the use of violence against the British, conceded during the INA trial that Bose was a true patriot.

Mohan Singh, co-founder with Fujiwara of the first INA in December, 1941, was a revolutionary of a different order. A younger man than Bose, Mohan Singh was a professional soldier in the British-Indian Army. Until his meeting with Fujiwara in the jungles of central Malaya, Mohan Singh had rarely had a political thought. Fujiwara was the catalyst—an effective one—through which Mohan Singh began to articulate his accumulated unconscious hostilities toward the British. Of course independence was preferable to British rule! And here was chance to fight for India rather than for British India! Mohan Singh became a revolutionary under Fujiwara's eyes, a revolutionary unwilling to compromise with the Japanese when other Indians advised caution and moderation. Not even Fujiwara could persuade Mohan Singh to cooperate, and in late December 1942, one year after the creation of the INA, Mohan Singh was jailed by the Japanese, and remained in detention for the remainder of the war.

Here, then, were two Indian revolutionaries of different molds but the same goal. What of the other officers of the INA? Most of them, including even Mohan Singh, felt a conflict of loyalty when first confronted with the prospect of fighting Britain for independence, in cooperation with the Japanese. They were all professional soldiers, many of them from families with traditions of long and loyal service to the British Indian Army. Training and experience could not be disavowed overnight.

There were other reasons the history of revolt within the British Army was brief and unsuccessful. Despite Army policies which discriminated against Indian officers and men, there were also measures regularly employed to discourage possible disaffection, for the loyalty of the Army was the ultimate sanction for British rule in India. Only after the loyalty of the Army and Navy came into serious question in 1946 did the British finally decide to withdraw from India.

In many cases it was several months before Indian officers were able to resolve their emotional conflicts and volunteer their services for the INA. Some felt this was the only way to protect Indian lives and property. Others were convinced by the arrival of Bose in Asia. Once converted, they fought valiantly for Indian independence, and many refused to retreat when ordered to do so during the Imphal campaign. Shah Nawaz Khan and P. K. Sahgal were officers of this caliber. Shah Nawaz was especially apprehensive that the Japanese might come to replace the British in India, and was continually on guard against this eventuality.
There was also some professionalism and even opportunism among some of the officers and men. As volunteers for the INA they received better treatment than as POWs of the Japanese. In Singapore conditions in the barracks and mess were better, and they were still able to fight as INA volunteers. Among these were men who deserted to the British when the odds turned against the INA. The material inducement were attractive, irresistible for many. "They never fought the British in India. Why consider them great patriots just because they joined the Japanese in Southeast Asia?" one Indian critic asks.18

Among the JCO's (Junior Commissioned Officers) the feeling was that they were better patriots than the senior officers. They were more sincere in the fight for Indian freedom than the senior officers, many of whom were closer to the British and had divided loyalties. No doubt junior officers and enlisted men have in every army felt themselves more sincere and hard-fighting than their superiors.

When they fought their way beyond Burma across the border to Imphal, almost to a man the INA was eager to push on homeward. Even in Burma the genuine hope for freedom within the INA ranks impressed some Japanese observers. "There was some professionalism, yes, but everyone in the INA was fighting for freedom for India," one Japanese correspondent in Burma observed.19

These were the motivations of the motley group that was the INA, partly civilian in background, partly military. At the borders of India they all wanted to see India free, but they varied in their willingness to fight and sacrifice for the goal. The answer to the original question is therefore mixed. For many staff officers in IGHQ, particularly in the Operations Bureau, and for some staff officers in the field, the INA was a puppet army to be used for propaganda functions according to Japanese requirements. For others, like Sugiyama and Arisue, the INA was a revolutionary army so far as the Indians were concerned, but it had to be subordinated to Japanese military and political objectives. For still others, mostly young men in the field who were idealists like Fujiwara, the INA was a genuine revolutionary army, which should receive real and sympathetic support from Japan in its fight for independence from British colonial oppression.

And from the Indian standpoint, we have the account of officers and men of the INA. Bose was a revolutionary who stands alone, with the possible exception of Mohan Singh. Many other officers were beset by severe conflicts of loyalty, though once their conflicts were resolved these men fought doggedly for Indian freedom. Most of the INA were men who agreed to volunteer when it was suggested by Fujiwara, partly

19 Interview with Maruyama Shizuo, July 28, 1967, Tokyo.
because their friends were joining and it seemed the thing to do. And some of the men volunteered frankly for reasons of expediency.

The logic of geography in Southeast Asia and the common enemy, Britain, made some form of cooperation between Japan and the Indian independence movement natural. Although Japan's wartime policy toward India and the INA was a peripheral concern, it was one which drew her into ever-increasing involvement. As events of the war continually tested the limits of Japan's objectives, the objectives themselves were affected.

Japan's interest in the Indian independence movement began as a small-scale intelligence mission in Thailand and Malaya, developed into a complex propaganda and espionage network designed to foster anti-British sentiment, and finally burgeoned into limited support of and cooperation with a government in exile and revolutionary army. Despite the military defeat of Japan, and with it the INA, popular support for the INA finally precipitated British withdrawal from India.\(^{20}\)

KOREA, FOCUS OF RUSSO-JAPANESE DIPLOMACY

(1898-1903)

I. H. NISH

THE ABORTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH PRECEDED THE RUSSO-JAPANESE war, began in August 1903. In the previous five years, negotiations of a desultory kind had been going over Manchuria and Korea which have not received a systematic treatment from historians; it is the aim of this paper to examine them.¹

When Russia took a lease of the Liaotung peninsula in March 1898, the world expected Japan, which had formerly occupied it, to protest vehemently. Instead, the Japanese accepted the fait accompli since the Russians had offered them a settlement of the Korean question by way of the Nishi-Rosen agreement which put the interests of the two countries on an equal footing within a nominally independent Korea. When, however, the Russians were attempting in 1899 and 1900 to get a lease at Masampo, which was one of the finest harbors in the Far East (within 160 miles of Japan’s shores), the Japanese opposed them tooth and nail. They were ultimately unsuccessful but they showed that they were determined to protect their position in southern Korea.²

With the outbreak of the Boxer disturbances in May 1900, the Russians were forced to ease out of Korea to concentrate on north China and Manchuria, where they were having trouble safeguarding their railway lines. In these circumstances, Japan took a surprising initiative. The new Japanese Minister to Russia, Komura Jutaro, found Lamsdorf, who became Foreign Mi-

¹The most illuminating works in Russian are still B.A. Romanov, Rossiya v. Man′chzhuриi, 1892-1906 (Leningrad, 1928) and Ocherki diplomaticheskoy istorii Russko-Yapanskoy voiny, 1895-1907 (Moscow, 1947). In English, the standard treatments are in A. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern policy, 1881-1904 (Berkeley, 1958) and (until 1901) W. L. Langer, The diplomacy of imperialism (New York, 1951). One difficulty is that the Russian published material is not sufficient to piece together a satisfactory account of the negotiations; but it is now possible, using Japanese materials, to describe the negotiations which took place and check them against Russian sources. For the last part of this period, this task has been well done in J. A. White, The diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese war (Princeton, 1964).

²In January 1900 Count Muraviev, the Russian foreign minister, circulated a memorandum containing a comprehensive review of foreign policy in which he advised against warlike actions in Korea. But Admiral Tytov, the navy minister, who had criticized the inadequacy of Port Arthur, wrote that it was necessary to acquire Masampo with Kargado island as a “supporting station” in south Korea, in order to maintain Russia’s naval position in the Pacific Ocean and prevent Japan’s predominance there; as the time was not ripe for forcible measures, it should be acquired by diplomacy and purchase. “Tsarskaya diplomatiya o zadachakh Rossii na Vostoke v 1900,” Krasnyy arkhiv, XVIII (1926), 15-16, 20-21. (Quoted hereafter as KA.)

This casts doubt on Malozemoff’s view (op. cit., 122) that “neither an act of aggressive policy nor a secret move to infiltrate into a strategic position” was intended. For further detail on the Masampo incident, I. H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese alliance (London, 1966), chapter 3.
minister in June, to be ready to make a fresh approach. His analysis of the situation on 22 July was that "the situation in Manchuria and the difficulty of protecting the Manchurian railway having made Russia appreciate more fully the weakness of her position in the Far East, she appears to be really anxious to remove, if practicable, every possible cause of conflict with Japan." He reported that it was an opportune moment to come to an understanding with Russia on a safe and permanent basis: since the Russian occupation of Manchuria would become an accomplished fact and the possibility of conflict with Russia would retard Japan's industrial enterprise in Korea, the best course would be to prescribe spheres of influence, that is to say, Japan and Russia should have a free hand in Korea and Manchuria respectively and each should guarantee commercial freedom to the other in its sphere of influence. On 26 July Viscount Aoki, the Japanese Foreign Minister, authorized Komura to go ahead and sent him the draft of a treaty on these lines. Komura seems to have had three interviews with Lamsdorf on the subject but on 4 August he proposed that Japan should defer presenting her draft.

It is not known what it was in the Russian reaction that caused Komura to withhold his overture. Perhaps it was because Kuropatkin, the war minister, had been saying that Russia would not tolerate Japan's supremacy in Korea and would make war on her rather than accept it. In any case, Lamsdorf had told the French on 1 August that he was deeply distrustful of the Japanese who were being tempted by the British to support them. All in all, the auguries were not favorable for a Japanese initiative at that moment. Japan was in a weak bargaining position and, when the government changed in October, no attempt was made to follow it up.

There is no indication that the Russian leaders took the proposal seriously. Lamsdorf was even less inclined to do so when Izvolsky reported that Aoki had told him that Japan was content to observe the existing Nishi-Rosen agreement. Whatever the truth of this report, it played into Russia's hands because the 1898 treaty suited her interests. When Lamsdorf approached Witte on this matter, the Finance Minister was not convinced that there was any need to give up Russia's stake in Korea. On 22 August, Witte wrote to a friend that he was not disposed to accept the bargain proposed by Japan and that Russia should take Manchuria while Japan took Korea. Elsewhere, he warned against Russia occupying Manchuria because it would give the Japanese an excuse to take Korea for themselves. The Russians did not see why, in establishing their position in Manchuria, they should make any concessions to Japan in Korea. So they let the Japanese initiative lapse without achieving any result.8

---

8 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon gaiko bunsho [Japanese diplomatic documents], XXXIII (Tokyo, 1955), No. 522. (Quoted hereafter as NGB.)
5 KA, XVIII (1926), "Pis'ma Witte k Sipyaginu (1900-1)," 39-40; S. Yu. Witte, Vospominanya (Moscow, 1960), i, 184-185.
6 Ministere des affaires etraneres, Documents diplomatiques francais, 1871-1914 (Paris, 1930-1959), 1re serie, XVI (1900), No. 2580 (Quoted hereafter as DDF.)
7 NGB, XXXIII, Nos. 524-529.
To secure the exclusion of Japanese power from Korea, the Russians thought it was in their interest to follow up proposals for Korea neutralization. At the outset of the Boxer troubles, Korea had asked to be placed under the guarantee of the powers. In September, the Korean ministers—at the instance of Russia—suggested making Korea a neutral country but were not taken seriously. On several occasions in November, Izvolsky, the Russian Minister to Japan, spoke to Kato Takaaki, the new Foreign Minister, who agreed to examine any concrete proposal which Russia would put forward. On 7 January 1901 the Russian Minister left an appropriate proposal with Kato. The Russians were told in reply that, in view of their temporary occupation of Manchuria, Japan felt it best to defer the neutralization plan until the situation returned to normal. Izvolsky was gravely disappointed with this reaction since he had been lobbying influential statesmen who had indicated that they were favorably disposed to the proposal. Thus the second proposal for solving the Korean problem did not reach fruition.

The Japanese leaders were suspicious of the various sinister activities in which the Russians were engaged throughout 1901 in Manchuria and at the Chinese court. Some, however, thought that they offered an opportunity for a Russo-Japanese deal over Manchuria and Korea. Inoue Kaoru, one of the Elder Statesmen, was impressed by the fact that Novoye Vremya, a newspaper of wide circulation, was at this time deploring Russia’s undue involvement with the Far East and was advocating reconciliation with Japan. He converted Marquis Ito, the leading Elder Statesman, and Katsura, the Prime Minister, to the view that it was worth taking seriously. It was, therefore, agreed that Ito should extend to Russia the trip which he was already planning to make to the United States and have unofficial discussions there.

On 18 September, Ito set off from Yokohama, accompanied by Tsuzuki Keiroku, the son-in-law of Inoue. Before he left, he met Izvolsky who invited him to go to St. Petersburg—an invitation which Ito was of course delighted to accept. The Ministry of Finance representative in Yokohama, K.A. Alekseyev, made a well-informed report on 14 September that the purpose of

---

9 NGB, XXXIV, Nos. 393, 396.
11 Tokutomi Iichiro, Koshaku Katsura Taro den [Biography of Prince Katsura] (Tokyo, 1917), i, 1061-1062, Inoue to Katsura, 26 August 1901, “Recently there was in the Tokyo Nichi-nichi newspaper an article translated from the Russian newspaper, Novoye Vremya, which stated that the outbreak of war between Russia and Japan would be a disaster for Japan and there is a good opportunity not to be lost for a prominent man to visit Russia and open talks.”
12 Tokutomi, op. cit., i, 1066. I reject the idea expounded in Romanov, “Proiskhozhdenie Anglo-Yaponskogo dogovora 1902,” Istori cheskie zapiski, X (1941), 54, that Ito’s journey had been suggested by Witte’s remarks to Chinda at the beginning of July. Knowing the financial troubles which had afflicted Japan for the past year, Witte hinted that he was always ready to arrange for a loan to Japan in Paris and that Russia and Japan might reach some sort of agreement over Korea and Manchuria. It is clear from Japanese sources that Japan did not think of raising a loan in Russia.
13 Hiratsuka Atsushi (ed.), Ito Hirobumi hiroku [private writings of Ito], (Tokyo, 1928-30), I, 1-58; “Nichi-Ei domei to Nichi-Ro Kyosho” [Anglo-Japanese alliance and Russo-Japanese understanding], No. 3. (Quoted hereafter as IH.) Cl. KA, LXIII, Nakanune, 37; DDF, 2me serie, I (1901), No. 399.
the visit was to "find out how Russia would respond to an offer of alliance with Japan."\textsuperscript{14}

It was 4 November before Ito reached Paris from the United States and in the meantime the situation in Japan had markedly changed. On 21 September Komura took over as Foreign Minister. After his first interview with Komura, Izvolsky concluded rather dubiously that he looked at the question of Russo-Japanese relations with more restraint than his predecessor and "evidently wishes quite sincerely to find ground for closer relations with us."\textsuperscript{15} As against this, the Manchurian question erupted again in mid-October and only subsided with the death of Li Hung-chang. Lamsdorf had occasion to complain of the hostility of the Japanese Press and asked for the threatening movements of the Japanese fleet in Korea waters to be stopped.\textsuperscript{16} In view of the undoubted anti-Russian feeling, it was not surprising that the Japanese cabinet should on 28 November deliberately decide to go ahead with the alliance with Britain. The Japanese had significantly changed their ground since Ito left; but this was because of new steps taken by Russia.

When Ito reached Paris on 4 November, the Franco-Russian allies did not immediately take council about the attitude to be adopted towards him. Presumably this was because they expected that he would be engaged in seeking a loan from the bankers. They were soon enough disabused of any illusion that Ito was travelling for the purpose of raising a loan. In Paris, Delcasse who gave Ito every opportunity to talk finance, had to admit that he "had not made a single allusion to financial assistance of any kind." In St. Petersburg also, Lamsdorf and Witte reported that Ito had not raised the subject of a loan. They were genuinely surprised at this because they had been led to expect that this would be his prime object.\textsuperscript{17}

It was not until 10 November that Delcasse invited Lamsdorf's opinion on Russo-Japanese relations. After taking the Tsar's approval, Lamsdorf prepared a note to serve as an aide-memoire for the interview which Delcasse was due to have with Ito. The sole point of difference, Lamsdorf argued, was over Korea, where the Russian government was ready to enter into an exchange of views with Japan to clarify or extend the agreement of 1898. Russia, which disclaimed any intention of annexing Korea, recognized as natural the commercial and industrial expansion of Japan in Korea but could not allow Korea to become a strategic center for Japan to the detriment of Russian interests; she further proclaimed that she had no intention to annex Manchuria and was ready to have that province evacuated of her troops, provided guarantees were obtained.\textsuperscript{18} This amounted to a brief for Russian Far Eastern policy down to 1903.

On 13 November, Ito visited the Foreign Ministry for discussions with Delcasse. Delcasse claimed that he could see no objection "if Russia and

\textsuperscript{14} Romanov, Ocherki, 145-146. Alekseyev's report is wrongly attributed to September 1902.
\textsuperscript{15} KA, LXII, Nakamune, 37-41; Romanov, Ocherki, 148.
\textsuperscript{16} Japanese ministry of foreign affairs, Komura gaikoshi [History of Komura's foreign policy] (Tokyo, 1953), I, 238. (Quoted hereafter as KG.) Romanov, Rossiya, 322; NGB; XXXIV, Nos. 326, 332.
\textsuperscript{17} DDF I (1901), Nos. 545, 548.
\textsuperscript{18} KA, LXIII, Nakamune, 42-43.
Japan were to join hands and France were to join in a coalition with them, since it would secure absolute supremacy, especially in the Pacific.” Ito admitted that apart from Korea there were no places which were likely to give rise to trouble with Russia and seemed to invite French mediation; he thought the existing agreement was not the last word and Delcassé indicated that Russia was prepared to compromise. At their second meeting the following day, Ito said that he would be more than satisfied if Japan drew together with France in increasing friendship.\(^{19}\)

Before Ito set off for Russia, he met Hayashi—the Japanese Minister to London—who had come to Paris especially to explain the progress which had been made in drawing up the agreement with Britain. The Tokyo government was in a predicament: it had no authority over Ito’s movements and could not be sure that he would comply if he was asked to cancel his trip to Russia. So it suggested that he should set off as soon as possible and confine himself to an informal exchange of views with the Russian leaders. On 26 November, Ito reached St. Petersburg. He had an audience with Nicholas II, two days later, at Tsarskoye-selo palace and received the Gold Cordon of St. Alexander Nevsky.

At a meeting with Lamsdorf on 2 December, Ito said that it was necessary to clear up the misunderstandings which were besetting Russo-Japanese relations. Lamsdorf reminded him that Russia had presented a plan for Korean neutralization in 1900 but Japan had replied that the present agreement was quite satisfactory. Ito observed that this may have been so in January 1901 while the emergency still existed; but the existing agreement should not be thought of as definitive. “If we do not arrive at a more permanent settlement, there is the danger that misunderstandings will constantly recur. Since the Japanese are constantly afraid that Korea will be overrun by Russia, Russia should acknowledge that the Japanese have the greatest interests in Korea.” Lamsdorf, however, advocated a joint policy towards Korea whereby they could act together towards that government. He eventually admitted that Russia would probably not have any objection to ‘delegating’ Korea to Japan if water-tight guarantees were offered against its military use and against communications being interrupted. When he asked whether a small portion on the south coast of Korea could be given to Russia, Ito was not encouraging. Each claimed to be speaking personally; and the interview ended by Ito’s agreeing to draft his proposals in the form of a memorandum.\(^{20}\)

At his interview with Ito on 3 December, Witte claimed that he was not a specialist in foreign affairs but was in agreement with Lamsdorf and the Tsar on the question of the east. In his approach, he was more forthright than Lamsdorf: “Your country has always had considerable interests in Korea, mine has none; we must both agree not to occupy Korea and should not give up the equality between us which is stipulated in the present treaty.”

\(^{19}\) IHH, appendix, Nos. 2, 5. This account corresponds closely to the summary given in DDP, I, Doc. No. 545 (1901), and KA, LXIII, Nakanune, 43-44.

\(^{20}\) IHH, appendix, No. 26; Russian foreign ministry, Obzor snoshenii s Yaponiy Ko- reyskim delam s 1895 g. (St. Petersburg, 1906), 68-70. (Quoted hereafter as Obzor.) According to Obzor, the first Ito-Lamsdorf meeting took place on 17 (30) November 1901, but this is disproved by other accounts.
Ito replied that this would not satisfy Japan which wanted to be supreme in the peninsula but would certainly guarantee that she would never injure Korean Independence or use its territory for military purposes against Russia or place installations on its coastline so as to close the Korean straits. Witte replied that, if Japan gave that threefold guarantee, Russia would not object to whatever else Japan did there and that, if required, Russia too could give guarantees. Although Ito was given every encouragement to air Japan’s financial troubles, he did not admit that they were serious and made no mention of wanting a loan.\footnote{IHFM, appendix, No. 27.}

It will be observed that Witte was inclined to play down Russia’s stake in Korea in a way that Lamsdorf did not and may have been prepared to allow Japan a large say there provided she did not occupy the country and gave the threefold guarantee. He made no request for a station in south Korea, as Lamsdorf did. Neither of them made any mention of Manchuria except to say that Russia would certainly withdraw her troops. B.A. Romanov has criticized Witte for wrecking the discussions by taking the line that Russians wanted complete discretion in Manchuria but would only give Korea to Japan on certain conditions.\footnote{IHFM, Rossiya, 336-337.} The impression left by the Japanese documents is quite the reverse, namely that Witte was more conciliatory than Lamsdorf who took an especially cautious line.

On 4 December, Ito again met Lamsdorf and presented him with the draft of a Russo-Japanese arrangement by which Russia would grant Japan absolute freedom of action in Korea in return for various guarantees. At first glance, Lamsdorf complained that the document set out only Japan’s interests and Russia’s concessions; there would be great criticism in Russia that she would, by signing it, sacrifice her equal rights in Korea under the present treaty; this draft could not form the basis for an arrangement. Ito asked what compensation Russia would demand and Lamsdorf replied that, in return for giving Korea exclusively to Japan, Russia would expect freedom of action in north China, should anything occur. Since this was so vague, Ito asked that a note setting out Russia’s major demands should be sent to him in Berlin. Lamsdorf said that he could not guarantee to answer within a fortnight, since he only saw the Tsar once a week and that on Tuesdays! The statesmen parted under the impression that a basis might be found for a bilateral agreement. Lamsdorf remarked that, while Komura had been minister in Russia, they had unofficially discussed whether Korea might be allotted to Japan and Manchuria, to Russia. While Ito asked for an urgent Russian reply, Lamsdorf seemed to be thinking of continuing the negotiations in Tokyo after Ito’s return there.\footnote{IHFM, appendix, Nos. 30-31; KA, LXIII, Nakanune, 44-45. Malozemoff, op. cit., 171, has thrown doubt on the value of these conversations because of the linguistic difficulties involved; but a comparison of the records indicates that there were few substantial misunderstandings.}
in Korea as the Japanese station there.\textsuperscript{24} Lamsdorf redrafted the proposals in consultation with Witte and Kuropatkin. They set out Russia's demands in Manchuria and also contained some concessions to Japan in Korea. In a letter to Lamsdorf, Witte explained that a war against Japan over distant Korea could not be justified; Russia needed to be free to concentrate on Manchuria.\textsuperscript{25} The Russian reply was sent to Berlin by messenger and reached Ito on 17 December almost a fortnight after he had left St. Petersburg.

Though Russia's belated reply contained concessions, it continued to be based on the principle that both powers had rights in Korea. On most of the terms, there was substantial agreement between the Ito and Lamsdorf drafts. But the Russians had added two clauses:

6. Japan acknowledges Russia's superior rights in that part of the territory of the Chinese Empire adjoining the Russian border and undertakes not to infringe Russia's freedom of action in that area.

7. [On occasions when military assistance proves necessary for suppressing revolts] Japan undertakes not to send forces to Korea beyond the number which the situation dictates and to recall the troops immediately [after] the mission has been achieved and agrees that, having fixed clearly in advance the area of a zone adjoining the Russian frontier, the Japanese army will never cross that boundary.\textsuperscript{26}

Under article 6, Russia was claiming freedom of action in Manchuria, a matter which had not been raised in the conversations, though it is far from clear what Russia's true meaning was. In his accompanying letter, Lamsdorf played down this demand, saying that it only recapitulated the principles already accepted in the Nishi-Rosen memorandum of 1898 and in Komura's offer of 1900. Under article 7, Russia was again raising a new issue: that of a buffer state adjoining the Russian frontier, which was part of the thinking of the Bezobrazov group. The area involved was smaller than the Russian sphere of influence under the 1898 treaty; but it was nonetheless objectionable to the Japanese. The other provision of note was that Japanese troops could only be sent to Korea after Russia had given its approval.

Ito was neither enthusiastic about Lamsdorf's reply nor was he downhearted. He first contacted Tokyo, telling the Prime Minister that, while there were defects in the draft, "such details could all be amended to Japan's satisfaction"; such a favorable opportunity will not occur again in the near future. His was an attitude of restrained optimism. It is wrong for those like Romanov to argue that Ito left Europe with the conviction that it was impossible to talk to Russia.\textsuperscript{27}

On 21 December, the Japanese premier replied thanking Ito effusively for his good offices and professed to be in general accord with his views. But he reminded Ito that Japan had during 1901 given certain guarantees over Manchuria which she could not now neglect, even to obtain recognition of her position in Korea. Russia had asked that her position in Manchuria might be

\begin{footnotes}
\item[24] KA, LXIII, Nakamura, 44, note of Lamsdorf to Tsar, 5 December 1901.
\item[26] IHH, appendix, Nos. 51-52; Obzor, 71-73; KA LXIII, Nakamura, 50-51. Text in Langer, op. cit., 768-769.
\item[27] IHH, appendix, No. 53; Galperin, op. cit., 768-776.
\end{footnotes}
treated on a par with Japan’s in Korea; but Japan could not countenance such a request. “You well know,” Katsura concluded, “that I am not opposed to coming to an understanding with Russia but that in my view it must be reconciled with the obligations which Japan owes to others.” Irritated as Ito was to receive this admonition from Tokyo, he had no alternative but to reply to Lamsdorf rather icily. Writing from Brussels on 23 December, he admitted the conciliatory spirit of the Russian statesmen but saw little prospect of the two countries easily reaching an agreement of any permanence. He was doubtful whether the Russian draft could be used by the Japanese government as a basis for future negotiations, since it did not seem to bestow equal benefits on both parties.

Should the Russians have been more generous in their concessions to Ito? Contemporaries spoke of the “reserve” which Russia had shown towards him, and historians have generally written critically of her fatal miscalculation. On the other hand, the Russians did not know that Japan was conducting secret negotiations with Britain and could not realize the weakness of their position. Moreover, Ito, though an important person in his own right, was known to be out of line with his home government; it would have been incautious to have become entangled in private negotiations with him. There was thus much wisdom in Lamsdorf’s suggestion that discussions should be continued in Tokyo. The Russian response had to be official and to commit the tsarist government in future, whereas Ito’s approach was personal and in no sense carried his government’s authority. Considering the slender authority which Ito possessed, the attitude of the Russian statesmen is fully understandable.

Ito now embarked on the most important part of his planned itinerary: his visit to London, where he found the alliance on the point of being concluded. After his discussions in Russia, Ito’s view was that “even though we join in a defensive alliance with Britain, there will still be room for us simultaneously to come to terms with Russia over Korea.” When he met the Foreign Secretary, Ito drew from him the admission that he “saw no reason why His Majesty’s Government should disapprove” of Japan obtaining Russia’s recognition of her interests in Korea. This remark meant that the Anglo-Japanese agreement which was signed on 30 January 1902, would not be a barrier to continued Russo-Japanese negotiations.

On his way to Naples to join his ship for Japan, Ito spent a while in Paris where he met Kurino Shinichiro, Japan’s Minister to France (1897-1901), who had just been appointed as minister to Russia. While he had been on leave in Japan in October, Kurino had taken the opinion of the Elder

---

28 IHH, appendix, No. 58.
29 IHH, appendix, No. 60; Obzor, 74-75.
30 DDF, II (1920), Doc. No. 84.
31 IHH, appendix, No. 48.
32 G. P. Gooch and H. W. V. Temperley, British documents on origins of the war, 1898-1914 (London, 1926-38), II, No. 120.
33 There is a considerable literature on Kurino and his attitude towards Russia: Shishaku Kurino Shinichiro den [Biography of Viscount Kurino] (Tokyo, 1942); Imai Shoji, “Nichi-Ei domei to Kurino Shinichiro” [Kurino and the Anglo-Japanese alliance], Rekishi kyoiku (February, 1962), 39-44.
Statesman, Inoue, on Japan’s policy to Russia and prepared a memorandum on “settling Russo-Japanese problems in the east” which received the approval of the Premier and Foreign Minister. Kurino claimed that he made it a condition of taking up his new appointment and that he should do everything possible to further the cause of a Russo-Japanese agreement. It was while he was in Paris in January en route for St. Petersburg that he heard from Ito that the British alliance was reaching its final stage and was naturally astonished that a policy so different from his own instructions had been adopted. He also attended the ceremony at the British Embassy in Paris at which Ito became a Knight Grand Cross of the Bath—an honor which was intended, Kurino believed, to soften the Marquis’s feelings towards the alliance. Thinking that he would no longer be able to pursue the special policy in Russia for which he had been sent, Kurino proposed to cancel his journey to Russia and return to Tokyo. But Ito reminded him that he had the emperor’s mandate and could not turn back. Kurino did, however, inquire from Tokyo about his instructions and was told that “the premier and foreign minister desire to come to an arrangement with Russia over Korea; they do not propose to give final orders to conclude an agreement but merely to seek out the basis for such an agreement.” It would appear that in the Tokyo view the alliance with Britain would be merely the prelude to negotiations with Russia. Kurino proceeded to St. Petersburg, disgruntled but determined to work for a direct settlement with Russia. Knowing that the British alliance was in the offing, Kurino made it one of his first acts to insure that the alliance was specially communicated to Lamsdorf with the fullest possible assurance. To this, Tokyo which was trying to avoid anything likely “to irritate the susceptibilities of the Russian government,” readily agreed and an appropriate communication was made.

There can be no doubt that Lamsdorf and Izvolsky were disturbed by the news of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which reflected a failure in their conduct of Russia’s Far Eastern policy. At the same time, Lamsdorf showed remarkable resilience. On 24 February he asked Kurino whether the Japanese government really wished to work for a friendly understanding with Russia to maintain peaceful relations in the Far East and safeguard their mutual interests. And later Lamsdorf inquired whether it was still possible to conclude a separate treaty between their two countries which would not be incompatible with clause IV of the Anglo-Japanese agreement. Kurino assured him that the agreement left all liberty to Japan to enter into a separate arrangement with Russia. Lamsdorf found this hard to believe.

Meanwhile Ito had arrived back in Tokyo towards the end of February and attracted a great deal of speculation. When Izvolsky met Komura on 13 March, he asked him whether the government shared the views which Ito

34 Jma, op. cit., 44.
36 IHH, appendix, No. 71.
37 DDF, II (1902), doc. No. 84.
38 NGB, XXXV, No. 274.
39 KG, I, 297; DDF III, doc. No. 194 (1903).
had expressed in his exchange of views with Lamsdorf. Komura replied that Japan had always wanted an understanding with Russia over Korea and no change had taken place in her attitude. For his part, Ito discovered on his return that people in Tokyo were saying that he had made known to Britain what had transpired in St. Petersburg and had thus expedited the alliance. He, therefore, sent Tsuzuki to assure Izvolsky that this was untrue and that he had not disclosed his Russian conversations in London. The Japanese, whose hand had been so much strengthened by their new association with Britain, were clearly trying to follow up the earlier Ito talks by formal negotiations. These hopes suffered a setback when the Franco-Russian declaration of 16 March was published as a riposte to the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

On 7 July, thinking that the Russian military faction which opposed Witte and Lamsdorf had lost ground and the civilian faction had regained its strength, the Japanese Foreign Minister asked Kurino to inquire on his own responsibility and absolutely secretly whether the time was ripe to begin talks for an understanding. On 23 July Kurino took up the matter privately with Lamsdorf who replied that, since Japan was not prevented by the British alliance from negotiating, Russia was still as willing as before and that they could treat Ito’s views and his own reply as the basis for the negotiations. On 4 August, therefore, Kurino—purely on his own initiative and without the sanction of his government—put forward a set of points as a sketch of the terms of a possible understanding. The so-called “private proposal on the Korean question” ran as follows:

2. Joint guarantee not to use for military or strategic ends any portion of Korean territory.
3. Russia, recognizing the superior interests of Japan in Korea, undertakes not to interfere in the affairs of Korea or in Japan’s actions over the peaceful interests of that country and acknowledges that Japan may exercise the following rights in Korea:
   A. freedom of action in advancing her commercial and industrial interests;
   B. to give advice and help to Korea in fulfilling the obligations of good government;
   C. when rebellion or internal disorder occurs and threatens Japan’s peaceful relations with Korea, to send such troops as are necessary and to withdraw them immediately [after] their duties are completed;
   D. to maintain the guard as well as the police forces already stationed for the protection of telegraph and railway lines.
4. Japan will recognize the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen which was announced by Russia to the Japanese government in 1898 as well as Russia’s freedom of action to protect her rights and interests in Manchuria.

These terms would replace all existing arrangements over Korea. It will be observed that they correspond with Ito’s proposals and that they go beyond

---

40 KG, I, 297-298.
41 Gal’perin, op. cit., 174, quoting foreign ministry archives for 21 March (6 April) 1902.
42 KG, I, 298.
them to meet Russian wishes. When Kurino saw Lamsdorf on 14 September, the Foreign Minister agreed to open talks if they were based on equal rights for Japan and Russia in Korea and Manchuria respectively. Lamsdorf also announced that Russia intended to appoint Roman Rosen again as Minister to Tokyo as a gesture of goodwill.44 Everything was set fair for a fruitful period of negotiation. The situation was the more hopeful when the Russians withdrew in October the first batch of their Manchurian troops in accordance with their treaty with China.

The trouble was that Kurino’s sketch had not been approved by his government. The French Ambassador to Russia suspected that Kurino was negotiating something but felt that he was liable to act and speak on his own authority.45 In Tokyo, the cabinet had in October decided that government action and finance would be needed if Korea was to be developed as a Japanese sphere of influence. It was in these circumstances that Komura on 1 November communicated to Kurino five points to serve as the skeleton of an agreement with Russia although he did not take the approval of the cabinet beforehand. Since there is no sign that they were passed over to Russia, they need not be reproduced here.46 They were, however, more demanding than those mentioned by Kurino and did not contain the “guarantees” which Ito had offered. They also included the additional demand that “Russia will not object to connecting a Korean railway with the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Newchwang Railway.”47 On 20 November Komuro warned Kurino that his earlier “private proposals” had been presented too soon and indicated that they did not correspond on a number of points with Japan’s desires.48 Thus, no appreciable progress took place along this particular line.

This is not to suggest that the Russians were inactive. When Kurino’s proposals were received in August, Lamsdorf admitted that he found them too demanding. They were referred to two diplomats with special experience of the Far East—Rosen and Pavlov. In his memorandum of 24 September, Rosen was critical of the effort which Russia had to make for the peaceful conquest of Manchuria at the expense of European Russia.49 This was tantamount to a criticism of the policy of Witte who had just left to make an extended personal tour of Manchuria during the autumn. On his return, he wrote a long report for the Tsar in which he emphasized that it would be better to compromise with Japan over Korea. He then tackled Rosen’s criticisms of his policy. On 10 January 1903 he prepared a reply to the memoranda of Rosen and Pavlov in which he again argued for an immediate agreement with Japan. It was largely at his instigation that a conference of diplomats to discuss Russia’s Far Eastern policy was convened on 23 January.49

This was the start of a series of conferences in the early months of 1903 where Far Eastern policy was subjected to exhaustive examination by the

44 KG, I, 298.
45 DDF, III (1903), doc. No. 194. For another example of Kurino’s indiscretion, NGB 36/1, Nos. 397-398.
47 KG, I, 300.
48 Rosen, op. cit., 1, 202-207; Romanov, Rossiya, 403, Note 1.
49 Ibid., 1, 208-209; Witte, Vospominaniya, 1, 227; Romanov, Rossiya, 416-420.
incursions into Korea and encourage the break-up of China. Kuropatkin replied that he personally wanted some understanding with Japan over Korea and was opposed to the division of China. He explained that it was necessary for Russia to insure the security of her railways, that their equipment and maintenance costs were heavy and that there were many problems about the withdrawal of her forces which were receiving government consideration. In general, Kuropatkin made it clear that he was not entrusted with a mission to reconcile Russian differences with Japan but only came to give an account of Russia's actions. There was much talk in the world press of a Russo-Japanese secret agreement on Korea and Manchuria being concluded while he was in Tokyo. It was, however, merely wild speculation. He left Tokyo on 16 June on his way to Port Arthur for continued conferences on Russian policy in the East. By judicious bribery of Russian officers there, the Japanese received accurate information about the decisions taken at Port Arthur.

On 23 June, within a week of Kuropatkin's departure, there was a major conference, held in the presence of the Japanese emperor, which was attended by four ministers and five Elder Statesmen. The situation had deteriorated: Russia had failed to evacuate its troops from Manchuria in April and had imposed fresh conditions on China; the Russians had moreover been pushing ahead to occupy Yinnampo (on the Korean side of the Yalu) and undertake timber and cable works in that area. These events were covered in detail in the press; public opinion became electrically anti-Russian. Kuropatkin's visit led the chief of the General Staff, General Oyama, to present a memorandum to the cabinet on 22 June, saying that now was the time to settle the Korean question once and for all while Japan had the strategic advantage. Against this background, the imperial conference passed a lengthy policy resolution. It agreed that negotiations with Russia should be opened up with the object of insuring the security of Korea and the supremacy of Japan's interests there and of keeping Russian activities in Manchuria within the limits of her treaties with China and preventing them from injuring Korean security. Underlying this was the implication that Japan would not permit Russian forces to stay in Manchuria. The focus of Japanese policy, while still concerned with "Korean security," was moving more towards Manchuria. Assuming that this policy was upheld, it did not allow much room for maneuver, once negotiations were begun.

This tougher policy would have been communicated to Russia sooner, had it not been for a cabinet crisis. It arose from the fact that Ito had, at the imperial conference, advocated a milder policy and the cabinet resented his interference. On 25 June, the Premier decided to resign. There followed three weeks of crisis which only ended on 15 July when Katsura resumed the premiership and Ito was placed more out of harm's way. But Japan's approach to Russia was held up and her demands were not conveyed to Lamsdorf until 12 August. It is not necessary to follow through the Russo-Japanese nego-

54 KGB, I, 312, 321.
55 London Standard, 28 July 1903.
56 NGB, XXXVI, No: 804.
57 Ibid., No. 1.
tations. The diplomatic language of Japan's terms was largely unreal because it obscured the fact that Japan was already determined in the last resort to go to war. This paper shows that for more than three years before the official Russo-Japanese negotiations began, the Japanese had been making overtures to Russia over Korea. This fact has not received much attention since the Japanese sources have only recently become available. In essence, it was Japan's purpose to take advantage of Russia's preoccupation with Manchuria, to improve her position in Korea. The stronger Japan grew, the more rigorous her terms became. Initially, she would have been content for Russia to withdraw from Korea. By 1903, when her bargaining power was reinforced by the British alliance, she was resolute enough to call upon Russia to recall the Russian troops from Manchuria.

The policy which Russia adopted towards Japan seems to have been unyielding. Where possible, she avoided discussions of Manchuria and stressed the need for neutralization of Korea by international guarantee. This formula was merely designed to conceal the widely differing views within Russia. Witte cared so little for Korea that he was probably prepared to use it as a pawn in order to further his own objectives in Manchuria. The Tsar and Lambdorf supported him from time to time. But Witte's views were opposed by Kuroptev, Admiral Alekseyev and the group associated with the name of Bezobrazov. Neutralization was a compromise which was put forward to save Russia from making even minor concessions.

These various overtures broke down except at one point. This was during Ito's conversations in St. Petersburg. Ito's parleys have been described as a double-cross to Britain; this is not so because it was the journey of a private person putting forward private views which were not authorized by his government. It has been argued that it was a double-cross to Russia insofar as Ito's presence in London was followed by the signing of the Anglo-Japanese alliance; this, however, is also untrue because the alliance owed nothing to Ito's trip to Britain. It has generally been said that Ito's conversations were a failure and were not pursued. This paper has tried to show that, while they were insignificant in their immediate results, his talks were not allowed to lapse and were taken up spasmodically by his government in the hope of improving Japan's position in Korea.

---

57 Romanov, Ocheeki, 236-237.
58 This is partly accounted for by the fact that the basic Russian documentary source, "Nakanune Russko-Yaponskoi voiny" (KA, LXIII) ends in January, 1902.
JAPANESE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION IN MALAYA—ITS FORMATION AND EVOLUTION IN REFERENCE TO SULTANS, THE ISLAMIC RELIGION, AND THE MOSLEM-MALAYS, 1941-1945

by

YOJI AKASHI

One of the important problems for the Japanese military in the administration of occupied Malaya was the treatment of sultans and of the Islamic religion. Questions confronting the military were: (1) what should be the status of sultans as the heads of the Islamic religion and their political position in relation to the Malays; (2) how much power should they be allowed to retain as spiritual leaders of the sultanates; (3) how should they be persuaded to give up their authority and how induced to cooperate with the Japanese in order to win the confidence of the people of Japan through their prestige and power; and (4) how should the Islamic religion and its related tradition be treated. These questions were vital to the Japanese military if Japan wanted to remain the overlord of Malaya. They were more so as the war protracted, since Japan relied increasingly on Malays for the acquisition of resources vital to her national defense; and sultans offered, at least in the transitional period of the occupation years, a convenient utility value to the military for pacifying and winning the indigenous Malay Muslims. The importance of sultans in Malay society is seen in the following quotation.

The key political relationship of the contemporary Malaysian is with the sultanate. This relationship takes two forms. First, a Malaysian is a citizen of the country by virtue of being a subject of the sultan, and all his prerogatives as a citizen originate from this relationship. This is more than a mere formality since there usually is a strong bond of an earlier feudal relationship. There is a keen popular interest in the pomp and ceremony associated with the sultanate and in the general well-being of the ruler. The second form of the relationship is derived from the role of sultan as the protector of the Moslem establishment in each state. As protector of the state religion the sultan is linked to the Malaysian people of his state through imams, the religious ritual officials in the mosques, and through the kadi, the local Moslem functionaries. This link is not personal, but it is nonetheless of basic importance.¹

This was the basic politico-religious relationship that existed between the sultans and the Malays in traditional Malay society before World War II.

The question of the treatment of the sultanate and religion weighed heavily on the minds of Japanese military planners in their preparations for occupation. But Japan's interest in the Islamic religion was of relatively recent history, dating back to the mid-1920's. Further, this interest was largely confined to the geographical territory of the Middle East almost until the outbreak of the Pacific War. The earliest evidence of the Japanese military's concern for the sultan and Islamic religion in Southeast Asia was seen in a document prepared by a three man study group organized by the First Bureau (Operation) of the Army General Staff. This draft, Principles of the Administration of Occupied Southern Areas, was drawn up in March, 1941. According to this plan, "Malaya is to be placed under Japanese rule [as part of the Japanese Empire] and Malay states are to be guided by a supervisory military administration." "Sultans are to be left alone," it stated, "as the nominal rulers under the supervision of a military government, which shall be replaced by an advisory system once public order has been restored. Strict measures must be taken to respect the freedom of religion and belief as well as customs [in order to win the hearts of the local inhabitants]."

This draft became the basis for Outlines on the Conduct of Military Administration, which was formulated by the Headquarters of the Southern Expeditionary Forces (SEF) on November 3, 1941, and for Principles Governing the Administration of Occupied Southern Areas, which was adopted on December 20, 1941, at the Liaison Conference between the Imperial Headquarters and the Government. The section relative to sultans and religion in the former document was almost a carbon copy of

---

4 The study group was headed by Col. Obata Nobiyoshi, who became chief of staff of the Imperial Guard Division for the occupation of Northern Sumatra in February, 1942. The other two members were Lt. Col. Nishimura Otoji and Lt. Col. Tofuku. Lt. Col. Nishimura drafted the section on Malaya and he became chief of the General Affairs Department, Military Administration in Java, in 1944.

The draft was kept in a locked safe in the First Bureau until the Fall of 1941.

See Introduction to Nampo sakensen ni okeru senryochi tochi yoko au for the document became the reference for the basic instrument of military administration in the Southern region.
the March draft, recognizing the utility value of the sultans for the pacification and restoration of public order as well as for getting popular support of the people. The sultan’s religious position, and the indigenous customs based on religion should be respected for the sake of stabilizing public feeling and of inducing the people to cooperate with Japan’s policy.\(^5\) This position was still immutable in March, 1942, by which time most of the Southeast Asian territories except the Philippines had fallen into Japanese hands, because the higher military circles reaffirmed the policy in March in a top classified position paper, *Fundamental Principle Relative to the Execution of the Military Government of Occupied Areas.*\(^6\) One note of interest in the document is that the military, for the first time, stated succinctly that the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies, and Malaya were to remain the “permanent possessions” of Japan.\(^7\) Such was the official policy of the Imperial General Staff and the Headquarters of the SEF in relation to sultans and religion in Malaya.

Malaya was assigned to the Twenty-Fifth Army under the command of Lt. General Yamashita Tomoyuki. Its military administrative matters were entrusted to Maj. General Manaki Keishin, deputy Chief of Staff of the invading army and concurrently chief of the military administration, but the real command of the administration was wielded by Col. Watanabe Wataru, deputy chief, who was given authority to formulate and execute administrative policies by General Yamashita.\(^8\) Before his departure for Saigon on November 25, Watanabe had conversations with several knowledgeable persons on the sultan question, religion, and nationality. Among them were the Rev. Otani Kozui, the spiritual head of the *Jodo Shin* (True Western Paradise) Sect of Buddhism; Marquis Toku- gawa Yoshichika, a well known tiger hunter in Malaya and a good friend

\(^5\) Japan, Nampogun Soshireihum *Nampo gunsei shikko keikaku (an),* n.p.


\(^7\) This position relative to the Philippines changed in January, 1943, when Premier Tojo announced that the Philippines was to gain independence. An undated Army document, possibly prepared no later than June, 1942, *Gunsei shido hosakku,* stated that the Philippines and Burma would be expected to gain independence in the future.

\(^8\) Interview with Col. Watanabe Wataru, July 9, 1966. Watanabe’s military career was unique in the sense that he never commanded a field army until 1945. Instead, he spent most of the 1930’s in China and in the political arena. He served as chief of the *Tokumu Kikan* (Special Agency) at Peking and Tsinan from 1937 to 1938 and was a political officer attached to the North China Liaison Office of the China Development Board, or *Koain,* from 1939 to early 1941, when he became a member of the Total War Institute. It was in his China years that Watanabe was acquainted with General Yamashita, working with him and becoming his trusted follower. See his unpublished memoirs, *Daitō Senso ni okeru Nampo gunsei no kōto,* in his possession. The memoirs were written in a post war year (1948) based on his diary, *Nichi-Bei-Ei Eenso sanka nishii,* (unpublished) 5 vols, also in his possession.
of the Sultan of Johore;\(^9\) and Nakayama Tadanao, who wrote a treatise, *Policies Sui ted for the Southern Region*, at Watanabe’s request.\(^{10}\)

It is worthwhile to pause briefly to examine Watanabe’s philosophy of military administration,\(^{11}\) because he left an indelible imprint upon the first phase of the administration from February, 1942, to March, 1943. He held the view that it was necessary to “coerce the natives with resolution at the beginning of occupation in order to meet the requirements of military operation.” It was not desirable, he insisted, to commence a military administration with “a claptrap policy by giving them rosy promises and sympathy. That they had been subjugated to British rule for so long was God’s punishment. They must be made to examine themselves and to show their penitence.” He concluded:

The fundamental principle of my policy to indigenous people is to make them aware of their past mistakes; they must atone and cleanse themselves of the past stains. They must be taught to endure hardship together with the rest of the Asiatic peoples for the construction of Greater Asia. This nationality policy was the essence that I derived from ten years of my political experience in China.

It seemed that Watanabe arrived at this conclusion because he had serious misgivings about the outcome of the war for Japan\(^{12}\) and his thought was set on the principle that even a small concession to native autonomy would hamper military operation, particularly in the acquisition of war material and supplies, as it had happened in China. Watanabe must have learned a lesson in north China that the empty promise of autonomy would not only inhibit military operation but also would restrict the freedom of maneuverability in dealing with sultans and the indigenous. Therefore, he was convinced that it was not a good policy to promise natives, in advance, a paradise and a comfortable material life under Japanese rule as long as the war continued.

\(^9\) Interview with Col. Watanabe, July 9, 1966. The Rev. Otani just returned from a trip to Southeast Asia. Marquis Tokugawa had made a number of tiger hunting trips to Malaya. These trips were said to cover up his objective of collecting intelligence for the military. See Nakayama Tadanao, *Namyo ni teikotsuru seiji*, March, 1942, pp. 4-5.

\(^{10}\) The identity of Nakamaya remains obscure. Judging from the context of the treatise, he appeared to be a man of various interests and a man who was well versed in astronomy, geography, and medicine. He had been to China a few times. Watanabe apparently invited Nakayama to become his staff member but Nakayama declined it on the ground that he disliked western oriented bureaucrats and capitallistic industrialists who had been selected by the Army to staff the Malaya Military Administration. Instead, he wrote the treatise and dedicated it to Watanabe. Some of Nakayama’s ideas, i.e., the harsh treatment of the Chinese, may have strengthened Watanabe’s own conviction.


VOLUME 44:2 2008
With this frame of mind, Watanabe found that the *Principle Governing the Military Administration of Occupied Southern Areas* fell short of his expectation. "I could not find in the document," he wrote, "the principle for the construction of the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere, nor the guiding spirit for the administration of Southern region." As for the policy toward sultans, he ridiculed it, saying that a policy to "give them due respect and to use them for achieving our objectives is absurd." ¹³ Dissatisfied with the established policy of the General Staff, he set out to organize his own ideas for the military administration after having consulted with the Rev. Otani, Marquis Tokugawa, and Nakayama mentioned above. The Rev. Otani proposed as a remedial measure to create an "independent Malaya under a constitutional monarchical government" apparently in place of the sultanate. "The monarch was to be nominated by ten electors for the tenure of seven years. The first head of the state, however, was to be named by the Japanese government." ¹⁴ Watanabe declined to incorporate the proposal into the scheme of his plan for the sultans because he and his superiors in the central Army authority were not prepared to go to such an extent in dealing with sultans. And it was incompatible, to say the least, with the established principles set by the Imperial Headquarters-Government conference. Marquis Tokugawa came up with the idea of creating "princely states loyal to Japan, recognizing her suzerainty." "Strategic sultanates such as Johore may be incorporated into the Japanese Empire." Japan, the Marquis recommended, would "conduct foreign relations of those kingdoms and appoint a governor general for a federation of the Malay principalities." Finally, he advised the military to respect the position and prestige of sultans.¹⁶

In the midst of preparations in Tokyo, General Suzuki Sosaku, Chief of Staff of the Twenty-Fifth Army, summoned Watanabe to proceed to Saigon where he arrived in late November. In the words of Watanabe, the training of personnel, indoctrination, and formulation of the military administrative policy had hardly started when the invasion took place in the early morning hours of December 8, 1941.¹⁶ Consequently, the Twenty-Fifth Army was not accompanied with personnel in charge of sultans and religion, in contrast to the Sixteenth Army whose military administration department had organized, prior to the landing of Java in March, 1942, a religious department staffed with a number of Javanese Islamic followers.¹⁷ For one thing, Watanabe did not have sufficient time in which

---


---

VOLUME 44:2 2008
to conceive policies and their ramifications for the vast and complicated operation of their military administration. It is moreover doubtful whether he would have given more thought to the sultan and religious affairs even if he were given time for preparations. My two conversations with Watanabe and reading of his diary and memoirs failed to elicit from him that he had entertained some concrete ideas in dealing with sultans and religion prior to the invasion.

It is necessary here to discuss the sultan operation of the *F Kikan*, a special agency organized to assist the Indian Independent League, since its sultan operation smoothed the way for winning the support of the native Malays to the Japanese side during the Nippon Army's military drive. The *F Kikan* was under the command of the Headquarters of the *Shō* and its sultan operation followed along the line of the Army's central authorities, i.e. sultans were important for the winning of the confidence of the people and for the maintenance of security and peace. Major Fujiwara Iwaichi, the leader of the *F Kikan*, was a romantic idealist. He took a conciliatory policy toward sultans and put Lt. Nakamiya in charge of the Sultan operation. Nakamiya was assisted by Shiba, the former Japanese proprietor of a general store in Alor Star, Kedah, who was said to be on good terms with the Sultan of Kedah. There was one complication for the *F Kikan* in having adopted the conciliatory measure. The *F Kikan* had already solicited assistance for the Malay Operation from remaining members of the *Kesatuan Melayu Muda* (KMM), many of whose leaders had been arrested by the British authorities simultaneous with the outbreak of the war. The KMM was a Malay youth nationalist movement formed by a group of indigenous intellectuals. Members of this group were opposed to the feudal structure of the sultanate and others just wanted changes in the stagnant Malay society. Fearing that the Japanese policy of supporting the two incompatible parties might engender distrust in the sincerity of Japanese intention to liberate the Malays and thus creating an unnecessary friction, Fujiwara conferred with the rank-and-file of the K.M.M. who had joined the *F Kikan* in southern Thailand. He managed on the night of December 4 to win them over to his side, nipping in the bud the danger of a split among the Malays themselves. At this time, the armada of the Nippon Army was sailing southward through the South China Sea approaching landing points in southern Thailand and northern Malaya.

---

The Japanese troops landed at several places a few hours earlier than the Pearl Harbor attack and advanced rapidly southward. On December 14, the Japanese occupied Alor Star and the city's peace was immediately restored. In Alor Star the F Kikan's first opportunity to deal with a sultan presented itself when Lt. Makamiya "rescued" family members of the Sultan of Kedah, who had been hiding to escape from the looting of natives and Japanese soldiers.\(^{22}\) The Sultan's family were brought back to Alor Star from Sungei Patani where they had taken refuge.\(^{23}\) Fujiwara himself disciplined two Japanese soldiers whom he caught looting the property of the Sultan of Kedah.\(^{24}\) These two incidents made a deep impression upon Tengku Rahman, the eldest son of the Sultan of Kedah whom Fujiwara met on December 20 at Kulim. After expressing his gratitude to Fujiwara for having rescued and protected his family, property and natives, Tengku Rahman offered his voluntary service to appeal from the Penang Radio Station to his fellow Malays to assist the Japanese troops.\(^{25}\) It is difficult to probe into his motive as to why he offered his service on his own volition.\(^{26}\) One may surmise that it was a mixture of

\(^{22}\) The detail of the rescue operation is described by Lt. Nakamiya who commanded the operation. See his article, "Sarutan Kyushitsu," in \textit{Nippon no Himitsusen}, a special issue of \textit{Shukan Yomiuri} (December 1956), pp. 81-84. For Tengku Abdul Rahman's account of the escape and rescue operation, see Harry Miller, \textit{Prince and Premier: A Biography of Tengku Abdul Rahman} (London: George G. Harrap & Co., 1959), pp. 59-63. Rahman's version did not mention his encounter with Nakamiya and subsequent negotiations with Nakamiya and Shiba, at the end of which he succeeded in persuading court advisors and agreed to cooperate with the Japanese military.

\(^{23}\) Fujiwara's version on this score differed from Harry Miller's. According to Miller as told by Tengku Rahman, the family of the Sultan of Kedah fled Alor Star by the urging of the highest Malay authorities in Alor Star.

\(^{24}\) Abdul Rahman, who felt that his father should stay in the capital for the sake of maintaining the morale of his subject, "kidnapped" his father who was on his way to Penang. The young prince then secluded his father in the village of Siddim, where he remained until the Sultan was brought to Kulim on December 10. Then "he signed an agreement with the Japanese Governor." Harry Miller, \textit{Prince and Premier: A Biography of Tengku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj First Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya.} (London: George G. Harrap & Co.), pp. 59-63.

\(^{25}\) Fujiwara reported the incident to a superior officer of the two looting soldiers. The officer told Fujiwara later that the two soldiers had committed suicide to atone for their unbecoming and dishonorable conduct. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 124.

\(^{26}\) Fujiwara told me in an interview that this stern and immediate discipline made a lasting impression on Tengku Rahman, who is today the Prime Minister of Malaysia. Interview with Fujiwara, August 17, 1966.

Prince Tengku Rahman cooperated with the Japanese during the occupation years. He became a District Officer in Kedah. He also became well acquainted with Kubata Shun, Governor of Perak (March 1942—April 1943). Rahman invited Kubata to Malaya in 1960 as his personal guest, and he also held a reception for Japanese who had participated in the Malayan Military Administration, when he made a state visit to Japan in 1963. Interview with Kubata Shun, August 30, 1966.


\(^{28}\) There is no mention of Tengku Rahman's offer in \textit{Prince and Premier}. The author attempted to see Prime Minister Rahman in August, 1968 but was not able to see him for clarifying the point.
his political acumen and patriotism to his own people. For, in the first place, the Japanese were not his enemies but they were ready, Fujiwara in particular, to accept any indigenous leader as one of them in order to expedite the military operations. Abdul Rahman was, it seems, just as in a good bargaining position as the Japanese in extracting a concession from the Japanese, namely the protection of property and lives. He had seen the destruction of the war during his journey from Kulim to Alor Star and must have been convinced that his first duty as a senior royal member of the Sultanate was to guarantee the safety of property and lives of his peoples. Under the circumstances, cooperation with the Japanese was the only recourse to achieve this end. It was not so much a case of collaboration as it was of political expediency combined with patriotism to his people. Abdul Rahman was not certainly a willing tool of the Japanese overlord during the occupation years. His speech urging his countrymen to cooperate with the Japanese and to fight against the British, according to Fujiwara, was one of the decisive factors in winning the indigenous inhabitants in Malaya and Sumatra to the Japanese side during the Malayan operation.  

As F Kikan members were getting support from natives and Indians, Col. Watanabe accompanied by his hastily organized administrative personnel of sixty officers and civilians joined Yamashita's headquarters at the front. Soon after the fall of Taiping on December 23, he drew up plans for military administration at Taiping. In making plans, he was assisted by Takase Toru with whom he had become acquainted in Tokyo.  

Takase, who had worked for the Tokumu Kikan in Hankow, China, became an indispensable member of Watanabe's staff and in fact, Watanabe called him his "chief of staff." So came into being what may be called the Watanabe-Takase team for military administration, which lasted until October, 1942.  

Meanwhile, the meager knowledge of the staff of the Twenty-Fifth Army and of the Headquarters of the SEF about the actual situation of Malaya under wartime conditions and the sultans' ability to restore order proved to be far from adequate and impractical. On December 31,  

27 Ibid., p. 152.  
28 Watanabe Memoirs, p. 25; Interview with Takase Toru, August 30, 1966.  
Takase was introduced to Watanabe through Lt. Col. Tsuji Masanobu, a staff officer in charge of operation, Twenty-Fifth Army. Takase was not a novice in Malayan affairs. During 1940, he was in Malaya for the investigation of overseas Chinese affairs. The result of his intelligence work was a report on the Chinese in Malaya, which was submitted to and approved by the Army Chief of Staff. He was prominent in coercing the Chinese to "donate" fifty million yen to the Japanese military as a token of their atonement of their past sins in resisting the Japanese. Chin Kee Onn, Malaya Upside Down (Singapore: Jitts & Co., 1946), pp. 72-73.  
29 Interview with Watanabe, July 9, 1966.  
30 Interview with Mahaki Keishin, July 10, 1966.
General Tsukada Osamu, Chief of Staff of the SEF, sent a cable to the Vice Minister of the Army, observing the lack of the political leadership of sultans. He requested the Vice Minister to arrange the recruitment of more administrative personnel both civilian and military.\textsuperscript{31} In order to press the demand, the Headquarters of the SEF dispatched Col. Watanabe to Tokyo. During his stay in Tokyo, Watanabe conferred with the central Army authorities on short and long term problems of military administration. One of the urgent questions he discussed was the question of the sultans. Watanabe was dissatisfied with the political ineptitude of sultans, and he wanted someone who could persuade them to relinquish their political power to the Japanese military.\textsuperscript{32} As pointed out earlier, the general principle governing the treatment of a sultan was to leave him as the nominal religious head of his state, somewhat comparable to the British practice with the sultans in pre-war years and to the Japanese dealing with the Emperor of Manchukuo.\textsuperscript{33} But Watanabe had wanted to strip sultans of all their political power, reducing them to the status of newly acquired subjects (Shimph no tami) of the Japanese Empire. To fulfill this objective, Watanabe requested on December 23 that Col. Ishii Akiho appropriate one million yen as discretionary funds (kimitsuhi); that is, at about the same time he and Takase were plotting the scheme of military administration at Taiping. Col. Ishii turned down the demand.\textsuperscript{34}

Failing to obtain the funds for the political purpose, Watanabe modified his position. \textit{Principles Governing the Military Administration of the Twenty-Fifth Army,}\textsuperscript{35} a document that he had been working on since December 23 and that was approved by Generals Yamashita and Manaki on February 8,\textsuperscript{36} declared: “For the time being, the sultans who do not resist shall be allowed to maintain their political and social status. They are to be supervised, however, by a Japanese advisor and their police power is to be exercised in conjunction with a Japanese police inspector.” He was still opposed to using the political power of sultans


\textsuperscript{32} Kushida Masao, Kushida Nikki, (Unpublished) January 18, 1942. This diary is in the possession of Col. Kushida. He was a staff officer at the Army General Staff in charge of the mobilization of materials and in 1943 he was a staff officer in charge of military operations attached to the Headquarters of the SEF.

\textsuperscript{33} Ishii Akiho, Nampo gunsei Nikki (Unpublished), pp. 151-152. Hereafter Ishii Nikki. This memoir was written in 1957 based on his unpublished diary. The Nikki is in the possession of the Historical Section of the Defense Agency, Japan.

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Ibid}. In my interview with Watanabe on July 9, 1966, he denied that he requested the funds.


\textsuperscript{36} Watanabe Memoirs, pp. 25, 43.
for winning the confidence of the people, for the policy nowhere mentioned the established principle. On the question of religion and customs, Watanabe conformed with the directive of the higher Army circles in “respecting and protecting them in order to put the people’s mind at rest and to induce them to cooperate with the Japanese.”

Once the Malay Military Administration (MMA) rolled on its wheels, it planned to induce sultans to surrender their autonomous power to the Japanese. Preparations seemed to have begun in mid May when General Suzuki made a trip visiting sultans for the purpose of acquainting himself with the present status of sultans and of getting information for their future treatment. Two weeks after his return to Singapore, Marquis Tokugawa, who had been appointed to the position of supreme advisor to the Twenty-Fifth Army responsible for sultan affairs, went to Tokyo at the request of the Malay military authorities. He talked with General Sugiyama, Army Chief of Staff, about the question of how to deal with sultans. Tokugawa proposed that sultans must be coaxed to give up their autonomy and to become new subjects of the Empire but their lives and property must be guaranteed, and they might be given some honorable position. Although the sultans’ religious position must be respected, he said, they should not be regarded as heads of autonomous principalities. It was advisable, Tokugawa suggested, to re-educate the Malays along this line of policy, inculcating the Japanese spirit into their minds. They must be made to realize that they would be a united people under the Emperor of Japan.

General Sugiyama must have approved Tokugawa’s proposal in principle, for in July the Military Administration Department of the Tomi Group Army, i.e. Twenty-Fifth Army, prepared a document concerning the Disposition of Sultans. The policy contained essentially the ideas of Tokugawa which he had proposed to the Army Supreme Command, but Watanabe’s hand in it was evident. The objective of the policy, it stated, was to remove sultans as heads of autonomous states. But, in the view of practical politics, it was not wise “to dispose of them abruptly by force; hence, special plans shall be formulated on the basis of which the heads of autonomous areas shall be induced to surrender voluntarily.

37 Tomi Shudan Shireibu, Senji geppo, May, 1942. Marked “Military Secret”. Mimeo. Sultans were invited to meet with dignitaries of the Tomi Group Army on April 11-13. There was no written record of the meeting. It was presumably calculated to impress them with Japanese dignitaries and to ask them to help organize an impressive celebration for the Japanese Emperor’s birthday on April 29. 
38 Tokugawa was appointed to the post in March. The appointment must have been made in response to Col. Watanabe’s request made earlier. Cf. Interview with Kushida Masao, August 8, 1966.
39 Kushida Nikki, June 2, 1942.
their political privileges.” In short, the Japanese military wanted them to relinquish their political prerogatives to the Japanese Emperor as the Tokugawa Shogunate had surrendered its power to the Throne at the Meiji Restoration in 1868, since Malaya had become “an integral territory of Japan when it came under Japanese occupation.” To fulfill these objectives, no coercive measures must be taken against sultans for submission. Instead, the goal would be realized by re-educating them that “the future of a Malaya under Japanese sovereignty shall be a united land and people under benevolent Imperial rule, and (by convincing) them gradually of the concept of Hakkoichiu, the rule of all peoples under one sovereign.” The Military Administration must make clear to sultans that it would not “permit their existence” in Malaya unless they would cooperate, and the military authorities should induce them to undertake voluntarily the positive implementation of the following:

(1) To offer their titles, lands, and peoples to His Imperial Majesty through the Japanese military commanders;

(2) Voluntarily to set an example for the people by swearing loyalty as Japanese subjects.

Only then, would sultans be granted status as religious leaders “under the concept of the unity of religion and government . . . .” They were also guaranteed income with the assurance of financial inheritance for their descendants, “necessary to the maintenance of their name and position” at a minimum level. In addition, “a specific annuity shall be distributed to the heads of autonomous areas from local administrative funds, thus ensuring direct contact with the administration of Malaya. This will not only give them the satisfaction of enjoying a special position but will also enable their utilization for civil administrative purposes.” As a means to implement these policies, negotiations with sultans should proceed on an individual basis, and in a later stage an influential sultan like the Sultan of Johore should be induced to “assume a major role in gradually bringing about the collective support of all the heads of autonomous areas.” These plans must be approved by “the top military and Central authorities prior to the full implementation . . . .” The M.M.A., however, went ahead implementing the policy; Marquis Tokugawa succeeded in persuading the sultans to relinquish their autonomous authority to the Japanese.41 It appears that he pacified them with a largess of money.42

41 Ishii Nikki, p. 151.
42 Kushida Nikki, June 2, 1942. For instance, Marquis Tokugawa disclosed that as of the end of May, 1942, the Sultan of Johore had been paid 48,000 yen, the Sultan of Kelantan 12,000 yen, the Sultan of Trengganu 10,000 yen, the Sultan of Kedah 30,000 yen, the Sultan of Perak 40,000 yen and the Sultan of Pahang, 14,000 yen.
It was shortly thereafter that the Army held a conference of executive administrators of military government in Tokyo on July 14. In his speech to the assembled administrators, War Minister Tojo Hideki touched upon the treatment of sultans, saying in effect that the policy was to give them titles and honors in order to reap fruit. In other words, Tojo did not want to deal with sultans as harshly as the M.M.A. of the Tomi Group Army. Tojo’s message was conveyed to Lt. General Kuroda Shigenori, who was slated to become the Director General of Military Administration and concurrently Chief of Staff of the SEF. Tojo picked the right man at the right moment to transmit his message to military administrators in the Southern region, for Kuroda was generally regarded as Tojo’s protege, and he liked to meddle with politics more than attend to military matters. In his first speech as the Director General, Kuroda cautioned extreme measures against sultans saying that:

... in general it is deemed suitable that they be granted status, name, and stipend for their religious functions but that their political authority be nullified. However, changes from past treatment should be carried out gradually. Especially where stipends are generally concerned, consideration shall be given so that there will be no obstacle to the maintenance of their previous standard of living and care should be taken that such practices as the detailed examination of their use of allotted sums be avoided.

And on religion and customs, he reiterated the established principles of noninterference. Specifically, he instructed them to use extreme circumspection not to impose Buddhism or other religions or Japanese morality and customs, and not to change names hastily or to institute public holidays. Nowhere was it mentioned that sultans be asked “to offer their titles, lands, and peoples to His Imperial Majesty” and be told that their existence would not be permitted, as stated in the Disposition of Sultans.

It is not difficult to find the reason why the Army High Command had been compelled to modify its position. First, the deterioration of the

43 Kushida Nikki, July 14, 1942.
45 Lt. General Inada was a deputy Chief of Staff of the Tomi Group Army from March to June, 1943. The Inada Nikki was edited in 1958 in the form of memoirs based on his diary. It is in the possession of the Historical Section, Japan Defense Agency.
About a week earlier, General Imamura Hitoshi of the Sixteenth Army in Java issued an order to the Sultan of Soerakarta allowing him to retain his prerogatives that he had enjoyed and his administrative machinery, although he was required to disband his own army. Waseda Okuma Kenkyujo, Indonesiya ni okeri Nippon no gunsei, pp. 146-148.
47 Cf. Col. Watanabe, in his speech delivered at the Governors' Conference of July 20-31, stressed the policy of non-interference in religion but of promoting the culture of the natives by establishing research institutes and museums. Syonan Times, August 2, 1942.
war situation partially accounted for the change; in June the Japanese Navy met a disastrous defeat at the Battle of Midway and the Allied Forces had gradually recovered from the initial setbacks and were beginning to prepare a counter-offensive in the Pacific. Second, the pacification campaign of guerrillas had been running into difficulty and the Malay People’s Anti-Japanese Army had been harassing the Japanese in Malaya.\textsuperscript{47} Finally, the indigenous people were beginning to complain of economic difficulties, spiraling inflation, and scarcity of daily necessities.\textsuperscript{48} It had become more and more difficult for the military to win the confidence of the people in support of Japanese objectives.

The war situation made it necessary for the Military Administration authorities to pay more attention to the problem of gaining popularity among the people.\textsuperscript{49} To demonstrate Japanese sympathy and respect for indigenous customs, the M.M.A. acknowledged an anticipated decline in working efficiency of Muslims employed by Japanese government agencies during the fasting month of Hari Raya beginning on September 11. Col. Watanabe \textsuperscript{50} also issued a directive to governors and mayors asking them to pay Muslim employees wages for the month of October, together with a bonus, before October 10, since October 12-13 were their religious holidays.\textsuperscript{51} To follow up the policy, Watanabe cabled to governors and mayors directing them to communicate a message of felicitation for Hari Raya Besar from the Director of the M.M.A. to all Muslims who had fallen in battle for the Japanese and asked them to cooperate with the Imperial Army for the construction of Greater Asia.\textsuperscript{52} Reaction of the indigenous people was favorable to such conciliatory policy, even discounting a diplomatic nicety. “I am grateful,” said the Sultan of Perak, Abdul Aziz, “for the freedom allowed by Nippon Government in the matter of religion. I am inclined to say the Nippon Government must took [sic] a great deal of interest in the fasting month of Hari Raya.” The Sultan also commended the Governor of Perak, Kubota Shun, for having taken a keen interest in religion by attending the mosque. He was very happy with the Nippon Administration, the Sultan added, because he had no


\textsuperscript{48} For economic conditions and the people’s reactions, see Tomi Shudan’s monthly and ten-day reports.

\textsuperscript{49} Ishii Nikki, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{50} Watanabe became chief of the General Affairs Department in April. In that capacity he was the executive director of the Military Administration for Malaya and Sumatra.

\textsuperscript{51} Tomi Shudan Shireibu, \textit{Senji geppo}, October, 1942; Watanabe Umeo and Nagaya Yuji, \textit{Shukyo shukan seisaku} (1944), pp. 12, 21. Marked “Secret.” Mimeo. This study was prepared by the Research Department for the M.M.A.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 13.

VOLUME 44:2 2008
fear of religious interference. And he "had always found Nippon officials easily approachable and eager to be helpful." The statement does not tell his latent displeasure with Japan's religious policy, as it will be discussed. And Kubota resigned his post in April, 1943, in disagreement with the M.M.A.’s policy.

Sultans did not fare well with the Administration, despite the prudent measures advised by Tokyo in August. As was pointed out, Marquis Tokugawa had induced the sultans to surrender their political authority and, to some extent, religious authority to the Japanese, and Japanese governors had been exercising power in the sultans’ stead. Also Takase, Watanabe’s brain trust, was very much in favor of such disposition, and he reported his support for the policy at a meeting with Col. Kushida when he returned to Tokyo after having finished his tour of duty. Sunada Shigemasu, supreme advisor to the Headquarters of the SEF, likewise had an unkind word for Malay sultans with the exception of the Sultan of Kedah, saying that "they alienated themselves from the masses, and the people were resentful of having paid heavy taxes to sultans." Whatever the feeling of the Social Administration toward sultans, the Army Supreme Command in Tokyo recognized the importance of sultans as a matter of military necessity, especially in view of the coming invasion of India which was being planned. Earlier in August, the Army General Staff prepared a draft for the guidance of policy toward nationalities in Great Asia, apparently to be used for a coming conference of Directors of Military Administration, which was held on October 5 in Tokyo. Although this document did not mention specifically what sultan policy was to be pursued, it stated implicitly the need to treat sultans with circumspection.

Subsequently, the Army High Command directed military commanders and directors of military administration to be more generous toward sultans. On November 9, Lt. General Saito Yaeita, Commander-in-Chief of the Tomi Group Army, ordered that no hasty change be made in dealing with sultans in consideration of Japan’s policy toward India, and that sultans be accorded religious position and honors and provided

58 *Syonen Times*, October 20, 1942; Interview with Kubota, August 30, 1966.
54 Interview with Kubota, August 30, 1966.
55 Ishii Nikki, pp. 13, 152.
56 Kushida Nikki, October 21, 1942.
57 Ibid., October 27, 1942. Sunada was not the only one who possessed this opinion. Lt. Col. Otani Keiširō, a military police officer and chief of the Police Department of the M.M.A. recalled that sultans were unpopular among natives. He reached this conclusion after having talked with representatives of the old and young Malay people. See his unpublished memoirs, *Dai 25 gun marei, Sunatora gunsei no ichi kosatsu*, pp. 84-85. Hereafter, *Dai 25 gun gunsei*.
59 Ishii Nikki, p. 107; Osaka Mainichi (Osaka), October 10, 1942.
with stipends. Maj. General Nishioeda Hitoshi, a new Director of the M.M.A., at the conference of governors of Malaya and Sumatra held at Shonan on November 27, reiterated the points that General Saito had made three weeks before. Nishioeda's instructions were more specifically to the point. Opening his speech with the remark that he was conveying directives given to him at the October meeting of directors, Nishioeda gave the governors an order “to utilize (sultans) to the fullest advantage. Since our dealing with sultans will affect profoundly the decision of five hundred Maharajas of India (whether to take our side or to remain loyal to the British should Japan invade India), we must treat them with utmost circumspection and must not be stingy in giving them honors and stipends.” Col. Watanabe, who had not seen the point of using sultans for achieving his own objectives of military administration, was reconciled conditionally with the view of the High Command. “Sultans,” he told the governors in the same conference, “must be utilized for inducing the natives to cooperate with the military. They shall also be given stipends equal to the sums they received (from the British) in pre-war years, but the stipends and treatment must be differentiated according to the extent of their cooperation. The policy shall be determined on the basis of how useful they prove to us.”

It is patent that the policy for the sultan had measurably changed as a result of the worsening of war conditions and of the impending military invasion into India. A tangible evidence in the transformation of the M.M.A.'s sultan operation can be observed in a gradual increase of stipends.

According to the budget for the first quarter of 1942 (April to June), the M.M.A. appropriated 90,000 yen for sultans as a special allowance. But this sum was never spent for an unexplainable reason, as evidenced by the balance sheet of expenditures that appeared in the budget table for the second quarter of 1942 (July to September), for which period the Administration also recorded 90,000 yen as having been spent. It presumably did not give 90,000 yen in the first quarter because...

---

62 Ibid.
According to Otani Keijuro, sultans were invited in April and August, 1942, by Generals Yamashita and Saito, Yamashita's successor, and were given 10,000 yen each time. There is no record of the monetary gift given to the sultans in April. The 10,000 yen given in August could be the 90,000 yen that appeared on the itemized expenditure for the second quarter period of 1942. Otani, Gai 25 gun gunset, pp. 90-91.
of its chastising policy toward sultans, as reflected by Watanabe’s attitude toward them. Also the sultans’ monthly allowance paid by the M.M.A. was sharply reduced. A detailed study of stipends is made available by the Research Department of the M.M.A. conducted in March and May, 1944. This study covers only the three sultanates of Pahang, Selangor, and Perak, but it is sufficient to reveal a change in the policy of the Administration.65

The Sultan of Pahang was paid the monthly allowance of 4,000 yen first in April and thereafter until December, 1942, in addition to other expenses. Altogether the Administration gave 78,551 yen for that year, or 28 per cent of what the British had appropriated for the 1942 fiscal year. After January, 1943, the Sultan received 8,000 yen every month until March, 1944. He got 196,785 yen including other allowances in 1943, or 65 per cent of the 1942 level. Only in 1944 did the allowance (301,533 yen) almost match the amount paid by the British (303,012 yen); but in the actual monetary value, it must be said that the 1944 figure was far less because of a rampaging inflation. The Sultan of Selangor received 1,000 yen in March, and 10,000 yen for April, May and June. The sum was raised in July to 15,000, and he received in addition 15,000 yen as a supplement. Beginning in April, 1943, the Japanese paid 25,000 monthly. His total receipt for 1942 was 196,960 yen, 46 per cent of what he used to receive under British rule; for 1943 (332,800 yen), it was 78 per cent; and in 1944 (530,124 yen) it exceeded the allowance he received from the British (427,416 yen). The Sultan of Perak fared no better in 1942. His monthly income, beginning in April until November, was 2,000 yen, which was only sixt of what the British paid in 1941. His allowance, however, increased to 6,250 yen in December, or about a half of what he used to receive. Only in April, 1943, his allowance equalled with the pre-war monthly figure. His total receipt for 1942 was 165,122 yen, or 33 per cent of what the British appropriated for 1942 (498,806 yen); for 1943, it was 66 per cent; and 85 per cent for 1944.66

65 Yamashita Kakutarō and Itagaki Yoichi, “Pahan, Serangoru shu ryōshū shu hukoku,” Chosabuku no. 1 (May 1, 1944); Itagaki Yoichi, “Pera Dokojijo ni tsuite,” Chosabuku, no. 4 (June 20, 1944).

66 The authors of these studies used the dollar monetary unit but this writer prefers to use the yen unit. However, the dollar and the yen were on par during the occupation years.

67 According to the 1944 budget, sultans were paid allowance comparable to pre-war figure. The Sultan of Johore received 430,000 yen; the Sultan of Negri Sembilan, 304,000 yen; the Sultan of Perak, 455,000 yen; the Sultan of Pahang, 304,000 yen; and the Sultan of Selangor, 378,000 yen. In addition, the military paid 170,000 yen for the construction of a residence for a sultan. The 1944 budget for sultans was an increase of 400,000 yen over the previous year’s budget. Mar ei Gunseikanbu, [Showa], 19 nen gussei kaitou yosan, setsuneisho, n.p. Marked. “Top Secret.” Meimo.

In the case of Negri Sembilan, it was corroborated by an interview with Hatta Saburo, August 6, 1966. Hatta was the Governor of Negri Sembilan from March, 1942 to the end of the war.

VOLUME 44:2  2008
From this study, Watanabe's instruction in November, 1942, that sultans be remunerated with a sum equal to that they received before the war was not fulfilled in 1943. It is plain that the M.M.A. did not peculiarly treat the sultans well in 1942 and 1943, though some improvement was made in the latter year. The evidence leaves some room to raise doubt if the M.M.A. had attempted to coerce them to cooperate with the Japanese, using the allowance as an inducement to achieve the objective. The disparity of the annuity, as seen in the three examples, also suggests that the Administration was not about to restore the pension and other allowance unconditionally to the pre-war level. It did not follow the British practice of paying sultans in accordance with their importance and prestige. It is recalled that Watanabe said in November that his Administration would treat sultans individually in the payment of allowances, depending upon the degree of their cooperation. This policy became official when his office prepared the basic and most important document relating to nationality policy, Reference Material and the Explanation for Nationality Policy, on November 28, 1942. “Sultans shall be utilized,” it said, “in such a way as to be the central driving force for reconstruction and the leaders for inspiring an Asian consciousness. Those sultans who are proved to be less useful to us and less enthusiastic shall be treated coldly and ignored as a warning to others.” Therefore, an increase in remuneration was conditional on good conduct, although the High Command said nothing about it in an earlier instruction. Watanabe's sultan policy was one of carrot-and-stick; a conciliatory sultan was given a better treatment at the expense of a recalcitrant sultan. A somewhat more generous pension given to the Sultan of Selangor than to the Sultan of Pahang could be explained in this light. The sultan of Selangor was installed in his position by the Japanese military, therefore, he was more friendly to Nippon officials. The Sultan

67 Cf. Interview with Sukegawa Seiji, July 22, 1966. Sukegawa was a reserve Maj. General and the Governor of Kedah from March, 1942, to August, 1943, when the state was incorporated into Thai territory. He told me that he cut the sultan’s allowance in half, as directed by the Administration, though it was “a little bit cruel thing to do.”


69 For sultans in Sumatra, the policy specified the educational support to be given for their children in order to train them to become administrators and to use them for future guidance of the people. Generally, the Administration seemed to have a better opinion of sultans of Sumatra and the Sumatrans of the Minangkabau region and the Acehnese. The Aceh Moslem Association for the Development of Asia organized on March 20, 1943. Cf. Sunada's report in Kushida Nikki October 27, 1942.

of Perak was at least acquiescent, if not hostile, to the Japanese authorities, partly due to his role as the spokesman of the sultan, as evidenced by his remark at the time when the Administration issued orders to governors, directing them to treat Islamic religious holidays with a special consideration and by his active cooperation with the Japanese.\textsuperscript{71} On the other hand, the Sultan of Pahang was known to have been a man of strong character and individuality, harboring ill-feelings toward the Japanese overlord. Reportedly he rebelled against the Japanese in the summer of 1945 and "... narrowly escaped capture by the Japanese when cooperating with our (Allied) forces ..." \textsuperscript{72}

It is in this context that we can understand why the Vice Minister of War sent an urgent telegram on December 4 to the Director of the Military Administration of the Tomi Group Army at Shonan. Reminding him of "the importance of the policy for the rulers of princely States in India" in connection with the about-to-be taken India Operation, the Vice Minister said:

For the administration of occupied Southern areas, it is extremely important to win the confidence of the peoples under our control in order to execute the war. High government officials have reiterated the need to utilize existing administrative organizations, to exercise circumspection in dealing with customs, religion, and sultans, so that they are not changed and interfered with without good reason. Nevertheless, it is reported lately that contrary to the policy of the Center, sultans' allowances such as administrative subsidy and remuneration that they received prior to the war have been reduced sharply, or changes in the treatment of sultans have been made in such a way as to damage their honor. Under the present condition, it is all the more vital to win the hearts of the indigenous peoples. The treatment of sultans must be accompanied with special circumspection. Not only hasty changes should not be introduced but the policy of giving more honors should be pursued with greater efforts—the policy based upon an over-view that will yield real results in the long run. Accordingly, you are requested to report back to me the present condition of sultans with respect to their political, religious, social status, and allowances as compared with those in pre-war years.\textsuperscript{73}

The Vice Minister's memorandum was in effect a concession to sultans, who had been demanding the restoration of power as the supreme authority of the Islamic religion they had enjoyed, however nominally and formally, under British rule.\textsuperscript{74} Consequently, the M.M.A. invited representatives of sultans in Malaya and Sumatra to Shonan to hold a

\textsuperscript{71} See footnote 49.
\textsuperscript{72} MacMichael, Report On A Mission To Malaya, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{73} Doko (Sarutan) no toriatsukai ni kansuru ken, Riku A Mitsu Dai Nikki, vol. 64, 1942, no. 13, Reel 119, F 31973, Army and Navy Archives.
\textsuperscript{74} Itagaki, Chosabuho no. 4 (June 20, 1944).
meeting on January 20-21. The purpose of the conference was to ask them "to do everything to facilitate the permeation of the Military Administration into the States as widely as possible and to get . . . (the) people to unite together with a common aim so as to stabilize their feelings. . . ." Both Generals Nishioeda and Saito, the Director of the M.M.A. and the Commander-in-Chief of the Tomi Group Army respectively, addressed the representatives, enjoining them to have "faith in the Great Nippon" and to "lead the people to submit with heart and body to the policy of the Military Administration." In return for their cooperation, the Administration officially reaffirmed the position and honor of sultans as the supreme heads of the Islamic religion, and their rights to the ownership of private property, and, for the first time, the Administration pledged that it would pay the sultans the same sum of allowances and pensions as they had received in pre-war years. As it was discussed, not all sultans during 1943 received the annuity comparable to the amount they received from the British and only in 1944 did they get the amount of remuneration equivalent to the pre-war level. The Administration's promise for the payment moreover, did not mean that sultans would be fully compensated in cash, but rather the balance of the annuity would be supplemented by the sultan's rights to own property. This point was made clear in a speech of General Nishioeda when he said: "[since] . . . the people are still suffering from the horrors of war and, as a fine gesture on your part to share love and sorrows with Nippon, your remuneration will be on a lesser scale than before . . . . Of course, we will acknowledge you as owners of properties which you possessed and in view of this we trust that you will not feel the reduction to your income." At the conclusion of the conference, Marshal Terauchi Hisachi, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the SEF, received the sultans and gave a Japanese sword to each of the eleven sultans. This was a shrewd step to impress them with their importance and dignity. Later, they contributed 60,000 yen to the military for the erection of a memorial for war dead.

Thus, it took nearly one year to establish a definite policy for the sultan. Throughout 1942, opinions among the High Command in Tokyo, Headquarters of the SEF, the M.M.A., and provincial governments on the disposition and treatment were not always in agreement. The Gen-

---


76 Interview with Tanabe Toshio, July 20, 1966; Interview with Maruyama Shizuo, August 5, 1966; Interview with Kushida Masao, August 8, 1966; Interview with Kubota Shun, August 30, 1966.

Lt. Col. Tanabe was chief of the Planning Section of the M.M.A. from March 1942, to March, 1943. Maruyama was an Asahi Shinbun correspondent covering Malaya and Burma during the war.
eral Staff and the SEF were inclined to be a little more lenient than the M.M.A. The former group saw the utility value in sultans for achieving the objectives of occupation. The latter, represented by Watanabe, while reluctantly accepting the usefulness of sultans, insisted that they must first be chastened and must atone for the parasitic way of the past life. It did not see any need to pamper them with a preferential treatment and only after they proved themselves useful was Watanabe prepared to grant some benefit while maintaining the attitude of sternness. There was a dichotomy of the view throughout 1942. Watanabe’s view retreated in the face of the deterioration of the war situation, which forced the High Command to re-examine its policy for indigenous peoples in the Southern region.  

Once principles for the sultan operation became official, the M.M.A. adopted gradually a positive attitude in relation to sultans and to religion, although troubles did develop when the policy was put into effect, as will be discussed. The change in the policy became more facile with the reorganization of the M.M.A. and the transfer of personnel at the top hierarchy in March and April, 1943. The Tomi Group Army moved to Sumatra, and the Oka Group Army assumed the responsibility of Malaya under the direct command of the SEF. Also, Watanabe was replaced by Maj. General Fujimura Masuzo in March. Fujimura was not a political-military officer as his predecessor was, and he appeared to get along better with civilians.

With the end of what might be called the Watanabe gunsei era and the reorganization, a new Administration took a more constructive but cautious step in support of the Islamic religion. One of the notable events in its religious program was the convening of a conference of representatives of Mohammedans of Malaya and Sumatra, held at Shonan on April 5-6. Ostensibly, the conference was made to appear to have been voluntarily organized by Mohammedans themselves, but it was planned

[77] Premier Tojo already made public in his State of the Union message in January, 1943, that Japan planned to give independence to the Philippines and Burma. The Army drafted Principles for the Administration of Southern Occupied Areas, promulgated in February. This new Principles, for instance, stressed the need to place able local inhabitants “in the right places for the satisfactory operation of the Administration” and “to enlist the aid of overseas Chinese” for reconstruction. The Chinese had been most ill-treated by the Administration. The new policy promised protection for their rights and interests. See Syonan Shinbun, February 3, 1943; Ishii Nikki, p. 131; Lt. Kato Akihiko, “Nampo gunsei wo genchi ni miru,” Nanyo (February, 1943), vol. XXIX, no. 2, pp. 13-14.

[78] Watanabe Nishi, October 15, 1942; Watanabe Memoirs, pp. 70-80; Interview with Watanabe, July 9, 1966; Interview with Ogita Tamotsu, August 2, 1966. Watanabe criticized the sectionalism of the bureaucrats surrounding Otsuka Isei, a supreme advisor, and the bureaucrats resented the arrogance of the Watanabe-Takase faction. Watanabe’s diary (January 21, 1943) shows his growing disgust with his job. Anticipating his transfer, he had sent home his hand-picked staff. Ogita was chief of the Finance Department of the Shonan City Municipality from 1942 to 1944.
and sponsored by the Planning and Education sections of the M.M.A.\textsuperscript{79} The purpose of the meeting was to win the confidence of the people through Muslim leaders, to inject the Japanese view of the world into the people’s minds, and to unite all religious groups, including Mohammedans, Christians, Buddhists and Hindus.\textsuperscript{80} Delegates were received in a pompous ceremony and entertained lavishly by dignitaries of the Administration. Maj. General Isoya Goro, a new Director of the Administration, delivered an opening message to the Moslems, emphasizing Japan’s respect for local religions, customs and cultural heritage and asking them to “share the burden of the war to its end and share difficulties of food shortage and daily necessities.” To demonstrate Japan’s interest in the desire of the Muslim faithful for making a pilgrimage to Mecca, Isoya indicated that the Japanese government was trying to communicate with the Holy Land so that Muslims in Asian countries could fulfill their religious duty.\textsuperscript{81} Marquis Tokugawa, chairman of the conference, assured delegates of the freedom of worship and laid stress upon their commitment to “live and die together” with Japan.\textsuperscript{82} After paying a tribute to native Muslims who had died for Japan, several Muslims were commended and awarded with citation and gifts for their meritorious conduct in cooperating with the Japanese. The conference closed with a declaration:

We strongly believe that Dai Toa Senso is a holy war for the freedom of our peoples who have been oppressed and exploited by the British, Americans, and Dutch, and for the establishment of a new Asia.

We, the Muslim people, hereby declare that we will unite with all our strength and power to serve Dai Nippon in fulfilling the aim of this holy war.\textsuperscript{83}

Following the conclusion of the meeting, each day a reception was given by Marquis Tokugawa and Odachi Shigeo, the mayor of Shonan. The conference appeared to be a resounding success in impressing natives with Japan’s genuine interest in religion and with an easy access to Japanese dignitaries. The Conference evoked many favorable comments from participants and religious leaders of communities. One representative was reported to have said that he was greatly impressed by the fact that he was privileged to be able to attend the reception together with Japanese high officials, for natives were never invited to such a party under the colonial rule of the British and the Dutch.\textsuperscript{84} Syed Ibrahim bin Omar

\textsuperscript{79} Watanabe and Nagaya, \textit{Shukyo shukan seisaku}, pp. 24-25.
\textsuperscript{80} The M.M.A. had treated various religions separately. The attempted unity of these religious groups appeared to have been patterned after the Japanese example at home.
\textsuperscript{82} Marei Gunseikanbu, \textit{Marei, Sumatora doko kaido}.
\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Syonian Sinbun}, April 6, 1943.
\textsuperscript{84} Watanabe and Nagaya, \textit{Shukyo shukan seisaku}, p. 25; Cf. Interview with Kubota, August 30, 1966.
Alsagoff, president of the All-Malaya Muslim Missionary Society of Shonan, said: "Muslims here are very grateful for the encouragement given to them by the Nippon Government in all matters relating to religion." 85 A number of meetings to report on the Conference were held throughout Malaya and Sumatra. In Medan, Sumatra, ten thousand persons were reported to have attended such local meetings, and Muslims in Shonan were preparing a mass thanksgiving demonstration on the Emperor's birthday. 86

The successful conference of April encouraged officials. Some of them were prepared to take a more positive stride in reaching the hearts of the people by giving native Muslims some voice in their politico-religious affairs, in conformity with *Fundamental Guiding Policy for Political Strategy in Greater Asia*, which was adopted by the Government of Japan on May 31 soon after Premier Tojo returned from his trip to the Philippines. 87 Sometime in the summer of 1943, the Hikari Kikan, the special agency working with the Japanese sponsored Indian National Army, requested the headquarters of the SEF to draw up a plan to give a limited politico-religious power to Muslims, obviously intended to strengthen propaganda activities of the Hikari Kikan for the war of the liberation of India which was being planned. Marquis Tokugawa, who was responsible for persuading sultans to relinquish their authority to the military, drafted a plan, which envisioned the creation of a supreme Islamic religious council for Malaya. The council was an advisory body to help the M.M.A. maintain security, deal with human affairs of the Muslims, restore Moslem organizations that had been destroyed in the war, and formulate policy for the pilgrimage to Mecca. 88 The draft did not say explicitly that the Muslims would be granted some political power, but it was drawn with the idea that they would be given some degree of political freedom, because in the Islamic religion the exercise of religious authority could not be separated from secular power, and because Tokugawa had clearly calculated the political mileage such a religious council would produce for Japan among the Muslims when the Japanese-Indian armies were thrusting into the Burma-Indian territory. The proposal, however, was turned down for the time being without an explanation. 89 One can only speculate that the military might have been afraid of being

85 *Syonan Shinbun*, April 9, 1943.
86 Watanabe and Nagaya, *Shukyo shukan seisaku*, p. 25.
too partial to the Moslem-Malays and that a grant of political power, even if it was implicit, to the Muslims exclusively would open up a whole complex problem of the nationality question. The military had not been prepared to deal with the problem. The point is corroborated by the decisions that had been made by the Army authorities and the M.M.A. in June and July. Premier Tojo had already enunciated that Japan would permit natives to participate in local councils and directed on June 8 the chiefs of the general affairs department of military administration to prepare the ground. Subsequently, in July, General Fujimura told governors and mayors as well as chiefs of the general affairs department of states in Malaya to plan for the participation of natives in a consultative council.\textsuperscript{90}

As it was put into practice, the Japanese granted the political privilege to all racial and religious groups. It is plain that the military was obliged to modify its policy toward various racial groups in Malaya, particularly the Chinese and Indians, in view of the critical war situation. Since the summer of 1943, there had been a definite shift in the attitude of the military toward the Moslem-Malays in relation to the ethnic Chinese,\textsuperscript{91} because the military had realized that the Malayan economy would grind to a halt without the Chinese business cooperation. It seems that this change may have something to do with the decision of the military of not having granted a special, even though limited, political privilege to the Moslem-Malays alone. Only after the decision had been made that all racial and religious groups were allowed to participate in the forthcoming consultative conference, the M.M.A. authorized on September 14 the establishment of a religious committee which included Malays, Chinese, Indians and Eurasians representing various religious groups, but it was geographically limited to the Shonan district,\textsuperscript{92} an organization far from what Marquis Tokugawa conceived at first.

Not only was the military hesitating to take a decisive step in dealing with the Muslims because of its fear of opening the Pandora’s box of native nationalism, but also it was over-zealous in imposing Japanese customs and morality. The military required natives to bow their heads to the


\textsuperscript{91} For instance, the M.M.A. lifted in April, 1943, the ban on the Chinese remittance to China which had been suspended since the beginning of the occupation. General Fujimura instructed governors and mayors to take more positive measures to promote Chinese activities at the Conference of Governors and Mayors in May, 1943. In July, at the Conference of Provincial Administrators, General Isoya repeated to them the essentially same theme Fujimura had told the governors, but Isoya stressed that he was conveying Premier Tojo’s directive. See Marei Gunseikanbu, Senji geppo, April 19, 1943; Marei kakushu (shi) chokan kaigi kankei shorui toji, May, 1943; Marei Gunseikanbu Marei kakushu (shi) chiho chokan kaigi shorui toji, July 11, 1943.

\textsuperscript{92} Watanabe and Nagaya, Shukyo shukan seisaku, p. 29.
Japanese and to the direction of the East, where Japan was situated, to pay their homage to His Majesty and to pay a visit to the Shonan Shrine, a shinto shrine for the war dead, and they taught them the divinity of the Emperor and the _Hakkoichiu_ (Universal Brotherhood). Moslem-Malays resented these imposed practices and indoctrination as they were incompatible with the monotheistic Moslem religion. In other instances, the Japanese intervened in sultans' religious administrative affairs, despite their declared policy of non-interference. Professor Itagaki, who made a field study of sultans for the M.M.A., concluded that repeated Japanese enunciations for the respect of the sultans' religious position were "merely declarative" and hollow, and the Japanese policy flouted the principle of non-intervention. Serious problems that were creating a chasm between the M.M.A. and sultans were, Itagaki observed, an insufficient attention given to the Islamic education and an interference in the religious prerogatives of sultans. In Pahang and Selangor, the sultans and Kadzis, as well as people in general, were reportedly dissatisfied with the Japanese because of their inadequate financial aid given to religious schools and their lack of interest in the curriculum. In both states, the Islamic education had been slighted and the Sultans were said to have been providing, out of their own pockets, money to run Arabic schools for the training of Islamic religious functionaries. Another thorn in the flesh that irked the Sultan of Perak was that the M.M.A. forced him to relinquish his prerogatives of appointing kadis and assistant kadis to the Japanese government. Only after several petitions did the governor restore the Sultan's former authority on February 28, 1944. The Sultan of Perak, together with other sultans, also demanded the re-opening of the Chief Ulama Council, the central executive body for religion and customs, whose functions had been suspended by the military since the beginning of the occupation. Kawamura Naooka, the governor of Perak, finally agreed to remove the ban on the Council on April 4, 1944, thus setting a precedent for other sultanes.

---

Many Japanese were so ignorant of the religious customs of the Islamic religion that _Shonan Hokokai_, a society formed by Japanese for the promotion of solidarity, issued pamphlets telling them "don'ts" of Moslem customs.
65 Yamashita and Itagaki, _Chosabuho_ no. 1 (May 1, 1944), n.p. The religious education policy varied from one state to another. In Perak, Arabic schools had been operating and a course in the Koran had been taught since October 16, 1942, at government expense. Also the Sultan of Perak enjoyed his prerogative to issue the license to religious functionaries as he did in pre-war years. Security conscious Perak allowed Roman Catholics to hold a preaching service, even though other states prohibited this on the ground of security.
66 Itagaki, _Chosabuho_, no. 4, (June 20, 1944), n.p.
67 Ibid.
From the preceding study, it is patent that the M.M.A.'s policy was vacillating and hesitating in giving political and religious power to sultans and Muslims. On the other hand, the Japanese were too eager to make the natives conform with the Japanese way and its religious and moral precepts and doctrine, and not infrequently they infringed upon the sultans' religious position making their own policy of non-interference a lip-service. It is also evident that there was no uniform policy; the policy differed from one state to the other. By all indications the sultan policy in Perak was more progressive, while that in other sultan states administered by military-governors appeared to be regressive.\textsuperscript{98} The lack of a central policy led to contradictions between declarative statements and deed. This stemmed from the expediency and haphazardness with which the M.M.A. dealt with sultans and religion and from the absence of a clear-cut statement on the ultimate disposition of sultans. The central Army authorities laid out general principles for the M.M.A., which in turn authorized local governors to execute the policy within the framework of utilizing sultans for winning Islamic support. The result was a highly individualistic policy of reflecting the governor's own character and background. Military-governors tended to be unpopular among sultans. This uncoordinated policy gradually improved contributing to the emergence of a more rational policy for sultans and the Islamic religion. The turning point seems to be the establishment of consultative organs in states and cities, which was announced on October 2, 1943.\textsuperscript{99} The Japanese appointed sultans as vice-chairmen of their respective state councils. However nominal their position in the council,\textsuperscript{100} the Japanese formally gave the sultans a specific position adding prestige to the council. They were also prepared to accord honors in recognition of the sultans' dignity in order to induce them to work wholeheartedly with the Military Administration and to lead Moslem inhabitants in their states. In this new-look policy, Tokugawa became the spokesman for the sultans, and the M.M.A. relied increasingly on his advice. He and General Fujimura who became the Director of the M.M.A. in August, 1943, had been convinced that the Moslem-Malays could not be won without the sultans' 

\textsuperscript{98} Interview with Tokugawa, August 30, 1966. Friction between a sultan and a governor occurred more often in a state where the governor was a military officer.

\textsuperscript{99} Syonan Shinbun, October 3, 1943.

\textsuperscript{100} Itagaki Yoichi, "Malay Nationalism no tenkai," Hitotsubashi Ronso XXVII, no. 2 (February, 1952), p. 144.

The Consultative Council was a disappointment for the sultans and Malays. The council was not the restoration of the former State Council, a legislative body in which the sultan was the chairman and presided over the meeting. Also laws enacted by the State Council were promulgated in the name of the sultan. In the new councils, Chinese were given a larger proportion in representation in Shoran, Malacca, and Penang and, even in the sultanates, the ratio of representation was not particularly favorable for the Malays in comparison with the Chinese and Indians.
cooperation. Tokugawa was now in favor of preferential treatment of sultans by giving them "a membership status in the Japanese Imperial family," as were the Emperor of Manchukou and a former member of the Korean court, and by awarding them princely titles and medals, as were former daimyos of the Tokugawa period after the Meiji Restoration had been completed. Accordingly, the Japanese government conferred decorations upon the sultans in recognition of their past contributions to the M.M.A.

The M.M.A. meanwhile had accelerated the study of the Islamic religion and customs of the indigenous people by creating a study group on nationality to investigate their religions, customs, education, and administration. The military had been persuaded that native customs and manners detrimental to military administrative objectives could only be corrected through education, not through coercive measures and frontal attack. The change in the attitude of the military was evident in an instruction given in January, 1944, by the Headquarters of the SEF to directors of military administration. "... sultans and influential religious leaders," it said, "must be re-educated in such a manner as to change voluntarily their customs and religious precepts, and habits of the Moslem-Malays such as disinclination to savings, [which were incompatible with administrative objectives], must be rectified through the education of children."

The education meant a training in the Japanese language and in the Japanese spirit through language teaching, in military service, and in labor service. The M.M.A. directed to redouble efforts to strengthen Japanese language training and created the Volunteer’s Army and Corps for the Malay youths as well as the Labor Service Corps for Islamic men and women in December, 1943. The military assigned sultans a role to play

---

101 Interview with Tokugawa, August 30, 1966; Interview with Fujimura Masuzo, July 11, 1966.
102 Otani, Dai 25 gun gunse, pp. 88-90; Interview with Tokugawa, August 30, 1966.
103 Marei Gunseikanbu, Senji geppo, October, 1943.
105 The Volunteer’s Army was created at the suggestion of General Inada, Deputy Chief of Staff of the SEF, and at the encouragement of Premier Tojo. Inada Nikki II, p. 410; Imaoka Yutaka, Nansai homen Rikugun sakusenshi, pp. 147-148. (Unpublished). Col. Imaoka was a senior staff officer of the SEF from 1943 to 1945.

On December 12, 1943, Col. Okubo Koichi, chief of the Propaganda Department of the SEF, admonished the Malays for being lazy and exhorted them to lead an industrious life and to grow more foodstuffs. His speech laid the groundwork for the formation of the Labor Service Corps. Later in January, 1944, the M.M.A. announced the recruitment of women into the labor force. One writer said that this policy of recruiting Moslem women into the labor force from the secluded life customary for them contributed in part to the breakdown of the Moslem feudal custom of excluding the women. Lee Tin Hui, "Singapore Under the Japanese 1942-1945," Journal of the South Seas Society XVII (April, 1961).
in these tasks. In a meeting with General Doihara Kenji, Commander-in-Chief of the Seventh Area Army, on April 15, 1944, Doihara asked the sultans “to devote their efforts to waging this war till victory.” In reply, the Sultan of Perak representing his colleagues read resolutions. “The sultans, each as the leader of his respective province,” he declared, would “henceforth strive doubly hard for the realization of a completely self-sufficient Malai.” “The sultans having been fully cognizant that the true objective of Nippon in the War of Greater East Asia lies in the establishment of an Asia for Asiatics,” he continued, “have agreed also among themselves to do their utmost in leading inhabitants in their respective provinces to cooperate and collaborate fully with Nippon in the war until final victory is achieved.” They agreed further that “youth be spiritually and morally trained and be imbued with the spirit of self-sacrifice and devotion to duty for the good of the entire community as a whole.”

The military had succeeded in inducing the sultans to subscribe to the Japanese way and to throw their support behind the “war of emancipation of all Asia” and “the establishment of the New Order in Great East Asia.”

In this context we can better appreciate why the M.M.A. had offered to sultans beginning in 1944, an increment in allowances and pensions equal to the pre-war level, commensurate with their positions and contributions. The Administration not only rewarded the sultans with the largesse but also it authorized in the summer of 1944 the establishment of a religious administrative organization to enhance their religious position. The new Religious Council was created to correct shortcomings of the Religious Committee for the Shonan district formed in September, 1943. Beginning in August, religious councils were created in Perak (August 12), Johore (September 21), Negri Sembilan (September 23), Selangor (September 24), Pahang (October 7); and Shonan, Penang, and Malacca all in October. As a result, the organization of Mohammadan law, Mohammedan religious courts, religious education and religious charity were considered improved, and the sultans regained some religious and political authority. At the same time, the Administration started the re-training of Islamic religious functionaries at a Japanese training school, patterned after the re-educational program of the Islamic kiais which had been underway in Java.

Part I, pp. 68-69. Hereafter JSSS. Cf. Syonan Times, October 31, 1942. The Governor of Kedah, Sukeyama Seiji, urged as early as in October, 1942, that the Moslem women be emancipated.

106 Syonan Sinbun, December 9, 1943.
107 Watanabe and Nagaya, Shukyo shukan seisaku, pp. 8, 34. For the Religious Council, see footnote 82.
109 Watanabe and Nagaya, Shukyo shukan seisaku, pp. 8, 35; Waseda Okuma Senkaku, Indonehiya ni okei Nippon no gunsei, pp. 234-235.
The innovation in the policy culminated in the convening of a three-day Malay Conference of Religious Councils at Kuala Kangsar on December 13, presided over by the Sultan of Perak. High priests and representatives from Perak, Johore, Selangor, Pahang, Negri Sembilan, Shonan, Malacca, and Penang attended the meeting and discussed Moslem customs, administration, and religious courts. The conference was fruitful and the representatives freely debated and reached decisions without interference from the M.M.A. It was also a "singularly significant event" for the Religious Councils, because no similar meeting was ever held under British rule.\textsuperscript{111} Summing up the importance of the gathering, Professor Itagaki said that with the convocation of the conference, "... the minimum step was taken by the Japanese Military Administration to appease sultans, who had been deprived of all political rights as rulers since the suspension of the State Councils ..." \textsuperscript{112} For the rest of the war years, the Administration's policy for sultans and religion remained substantially unchanged, while it gave more attention to the Malay youth nationalist movement of Ibrahim bin Jaacob, reviving it into the KRIS (Kesatuan Ra'ayat Indonesia Semenanjong)\textsuperscript{113} Movement.

In the earlier stages of the occupation, Japan had every intention of retaining Malaya as part of the Empire. Therefore, the M.M.A. deprived sultans of their political authority and banned the activity of the nationalist Malay Youth Movement. The deteriorating war situation compelled the military to modify the original plans for Malaya. The worsening war condition and the reversion of the northern four provinces to Thailand in August, 1943, created an acute food shortage and manpower problem disenchanting the indigenous people with the Japanese. Winning the minds of the Moslem-Malays through sultans and religion became essential for the military. The sultans must be satisfied not only with the assurance of the minimum level of livelihood, but also with a grant of politico-religious authority. Islam is a religion in which the realms of religion and politics make little distinction; politics and religion are one and inseparable. The military therefore had to be cautious in the treatment of sultans and religion, treading on the thin ice of a potentially dangerous question that might confront the military with Malay nationalism.

\textsuperscript{111} Itagaki, \textit{Hitotsubashi Ronso}, p. 145; Syonan Sinbun, December 27, 1944; Fujimura Masuzo, \textit{Marei gunsei gaiyo}, n.p. This was prepared by the Historical Research Section of the First Repatriation Ministry (formerly War Ministry) in 1946 on the basis of Fujimura's recollection.

\textsuperscript{112} Itagaki, \textit{Some Aspects of the Japanese Policy for Malaya Under the Japanese}.

\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Ibid.}. The KRIS Movement was a political organization preparatory to the independence of the Malays and for the unification of Malaya and Indonesia. Interview with Itagaki Yoichi, June 26, 1966; Interview with Kushida, August 8, 1966. Kushida said that the military was prepared to give the Malays independence at an indefinite future date.
To compound the difficulty, Malaya is a multi-racial and a multi-religious society. In the early stages of the occupation, the M.M.A. seemed to regard “the Malays as the rightful owners of Malaya” and the Chinese and Indians as subordinate races. Nevertheless, the M.M.A. was obliged to re-evaluate its policy toward the Chinese and Indians for economic and political considerations. The preferential treatment of the Malays and Islam must be carefully weighted against the adverse reactions from Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists it could possibly generate. The Administration therefore ought to “avoid an undisguised partiality to any one of the races and religions,” the Headquarters of the SEF warned in 1944, lest it would create communalism. In dealing with sultans and the Moslem-Malays, the Japanese faced another problem. Many Moslem-Malays harbored latent ill-feelings against sultans. according to reports of the Japanese military police. On the basis of intelligence information from the military police and his conversations with young and old indigenous people, Col. Otani maintained that they were unhappy with the favoritism given to sultans by the M.M.A., complaining that “the military was not after all our friend.”

The dilemma that the Administration faced was its own making, largely the consequence of ill-preparedness and expediency and of the unforeseen development of the war which forced the military to improvise the policy to appease the people and the sultans. The seeming conciliatory policy toward them and their religion in the later stages of the occupation did not appear to have emanated from Japanese sympathy for them but from the bankruptcy of the policy. More fundamentally, the failure of the military in reaching a consensus on the ultimate disposition of Malaya was the root of all ills. The higher military authorities could not agree upon the principal question of whether Malaya be given independence and the M.M.A. was unable to formulate a suitable policy for the sultanate, the indigenous Malays, and the Islamic religion. The result was the pursuit of a policy without direction with the consequence that the M.M.A., though it took more positive steps in the last phase of the war, was never able to formulate an imaginative plan beyond

---

115 Japan. Sambo Honbu, Dai 14-ka, Daitoa minzokushido yoko (an), August 6, 1942; Somubu Somuka, Minzoku taisaku sanko shiryou oyobi setsumei, November 28, 1942.
118 Otani, Dai 25 gun gunsei, p. 92.
the framework of “using sultans and religion” for winning the minds of the Malays. It may be an exaggeration to say that the M.M.A. “did nothing for the sultans and the Islamic religion,”\textsuperscript{120} as Marquis Tokugawa reminisces; its record “can not be complimented as being a success,”\textsuperscript{121} as Col. Otani concludes. Very few people disagree with Otani’s conclusion.

\textsuperscript{120} Interview with Tokugawa, August 30, 1966.
\textsuperscript{121} Otani, *Dai 25 gun gunsei*, p. 130.
About the Authors

**Robert Reed** is Associate Professor Emeritus at the University of California Berkeley. He obtained his B.A. at Dartmouth College in 1962, his M.A. in 1965, and Ph.D. in 1971 at the University of California, Berkeley, where he taught at the Department of Geography. Apart from his teaching duties, he also served as Chair of the Center for Southeast Asia Studies and Chair of the Group in Asian Studies. He studied at the University of the Philippines from 1962–63 as Rotary Foundation Fellow. His research interests include urbanization, religion, and cultural geography in the Philippines. Reed published several articles and chapters of books, including *Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines: A Study of the Impact of Church and State (1967)* and Colonial Manila: The Context of Hispanic Urbanism and Process of Morphogenesis (1978).

**Frank William Iklé** obtained his Ph.D. from the University of California Berkeley, and is now Professor Emeritus at the University of New Mexico. His research interests cover Japanese and East Asian History, among others. Iklé is well-known for his monograph, *German-Japanese Relations: 1936-1940*, published in 1956 and for the two-volume *A History of Asia*, co-authored with Woodbridge Bingham and Hilary Conroy in 1964.

**Joyce Lebra** is Professor Emerita of Japanese and Indian History at the University of Colorado. She took her B.A. and M.A. in Asian Studies at the University of Minnesota. She received her doctorate in history of Japan from Harvard/Radcliffe. She authored 12 books, including *Japanese Trained Armies in Southeast Asia (2010)*, Jungle Alliance: Japan and the Indian National Army (1971) and *Women in Changing Japan* (1978).


Call for Papers

Asian Studies is a peer-reviewed journal published twice a year by the Asian Center, University of the Philippines Diliman. Since 1963, it has offered a critical and multidisciplinary forum where scholars, practitioners, researchers, and activists on Asia can explore various issues that impact Asian societies and their peoples.

The journal accepts original contributions in the form of:
- Research articles on the social sciences, humanities, and/or culture
- Commentaries and documents
- Reviews (books, e-media, events, etc.)
- Literary writings (poetry and short fiction)
- Travel narratives

Consult submission and content guidelines at: asj.upd.edu.ph/submissions

Send all manuscripts to the editor in chief: upasianstudies@gmail.com.

Enjoy open access to all available issues of Asian Studies from 1963 to present. Please visit: asj.upd.edu.ph.