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CONTENTS

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GREAT POWER INFLUENCE AMONG SOUTHEAST ASIAN STATES: A QUANTITATIVE MEASUREMENT

LLEWELLYN D. HOWELL, JR.

INFLUENCE OF THE "GREAT POWERS" IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IS CERTAINLY not a new subject. The impact of bi-polar, tri-polar, and now perhaps quadri-polar worlds on the ancient yet now "developing" states of Southeast Asia is a topic of perpetual discussion and comment. Most of these works see the Great Power-Southeast Asian nation relationship as one of actor and acted-upon, the influence and the influenced.[1] A few have attempted to see the Southeast Asian nation-state as an independent entity with manipulative ability of its own,[2] but such cases are rare.

The purpose of this paper is to examine this relationship between the states of Southeast Asia and two of the Great Powers, Japan and the United States. Instead of assuming an influencer-influenced relationship, it will attempt to utilize a perspective in which it is at least given that Southeast Asian nations can and do make foreign policy choices with respect to larger powers, even if that choice is one of granting one Great Power or another an opportunity to increase its economic presence in Southeast Asia. It also will employ a quantitative method of analysis in an effort to render the study subject to replication and base its conclusions in readily available data.

HYPOTHESIS

The specific objective of this study is to examine the contentions by Vandenbosch and Butwell[3] that two trends are evident in the patterns of associations of Southeast Asian states with states outside the area: the first of these is a "movement away from political intimacy with one or more

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[1] See for example: Robert E. Osgood, George R. Packard III, and John H. Badgley, *Japan and the United States in Asia,* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968; Eugene R. Black, *Alternative in Southeast Asia,* New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Pub., 1969; Oliver E. Clubb, Jr., *The United States and the Sino-Soviet Bloc in Southeast Asia,* Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1962; William Henderson, ed., *Southeast Asia: Problems of United States Policy,* Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1963; Lyman M. Tondel, Jr., ed., *The Southeast Asia Crisis,* Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Pub., Inc., 1966; and Bernard K. Gordon, *The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia,* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966, and *Toward Disengagement in Asia,* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969.

[2] One good, if overly historical, example is Roger Smith's *Cambodia's Foreign Policy,* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965.

[3] Amry Vandenbosch and Richard Butwell, *The Changing Face of Southeast Asia,* Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1966, pp. 320-321.

Western nations;" the other trend is a "steady movement in the direction of greater interaction (not necessarily closer cooperation) among the several Southeast Asian countries and between each of them and the major Asian and Pacific states of China, India, Japan, and Australia."

These authors have argued that among the Southeast Asian states, although the Philippines and Malaysia remain close to their former American and British rulers, only Thailand—which was never colonized—seems to have a more intimate relationship with a Western power (the U.S.) than it possessed in the European era.[4] They add that even though South Vietnam's military dependence on the U.S. has increased since 1960, American influence has never equaled that once commanded by the French, and there are indications that the Vietnamese remain opposed to such influence despite the scope and importance of American aid.

Vandenbosch and Butwell thus contend that there has been a sharp decline in Western influence generally in Southeast Asia since the Second World War, particularly since 1960, and that increasingly foreign policies are being shaped "with major attention focused upon the interests and intentions of the countries in, and geographically closest to, Southeast Asia."[5]

In the last decades the four great powers which have conspicuously attempted to exert their influence in Southeast Asia have been the United States, Japan, China, and to a limited extent, the Soviet Union. Following from the contentions made above, it might be hypothesized that, among these, the influence of the United States has declined since World War II while that of Japan—which is geographically proximate—has risen. Considering the comparative position of these two states in 1946, substantiation of such a hypothesis would not be particularly surprising. It remains however to demonstrate this empirically and make some measure of the extent of change.

Two concepts are being employed in each of these propositions: level of influence and time. Time is easy enough to operationalize, utilizing annual data figures (or bi-annual as in this paper) to plot yearly or bi-yearly changes. Level of influence presents a somewhat more difficult problem. Selection of an indicator for an abstract concept such as influence must meet several criteria of judgment which aim at being value free and replicable. A useful indicator is (1) subject to quantitative measurement; (2) systematic, that is, "it must represent an appropriate sample of the universe of observable facts from which it was drawn (or, in some cases, it may comprise the universe itself);" (3) the indicator and the data gathering procedure must be explicit, orderly and repeatable—i.e., objective and therefore reliable; and (4) "if there are several possible indicators available

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 32.
[5] *Ibid.*

to him, the researcher should choose those that will give him the greatest amount of useful information most efficiently." [6]

There exists also the problem of validity of the indicator, or whether or not the indicator is actually reflective of the concept it is supposed to be measuring, and that of functional equivalence of the data for each of the countries under examination. Each of these criteria must be considered and balanced in indicator selection. In dealing with many of the developing states, indicators which satisfy all of these criteria are often hard to come by.

In this study the method of analysis also plays a part in determining the selection of the indicator. Chosen here is the transaction flow model originally developed by I. Richard Savage and Karl Deutsch and further elaborated by Steven J. Brams.[7] Arguing that flows of messages provide the basis upon which decision-makers fashion images of other countries, Brams has examined three different kinds of transaction flows that involve the transfer of some information from one country to another. These are diplomatic exchanges, trade, and shared memberships in inter-governmental organizations.[8]

Of the three, Brams considers trade to be the best barometer or indicator of changing political relations between two countries, seemingly being more susceptible to private likes and dislikes. He states that "a country will rarely sever diplomatic relations with another, or pullout of an IGO, except under conditions of extreme provocation, but deteriorating political relations between two countries will usually dry up their trade in a hurry." [9] Alker and Puchala have also argued the validity of using an economic indicator leading to conclusions about political relationships between states. They note that "economics may or may not cause particular political relationships; but economic indicators may in either case help us describe the directions in which these relationships are moving." [10] They add that the expectations that patterns of international trade will usually serve as valid and reliable indices of stability and change in an international political climate are dependent on the validity of theories of international community formation which in turn point to the importance of communication and interaction in the integration process, citing Deutsch (1957) and Etzioni (1963).Since the concern of this paper is primarily with examination and comparison of relationships between states and not simply with indicators of those relationships, the assumption is made on the basis of the above

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[6] Richard L. Merrit, *Systematic Approaches to Comparative Politics,* Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1970, pp. 13-14.

[7] Stevens J. Brams, "Transaction Flows in the International System," *American Political Science Review,* Vol. LX, No. 4, December 1966, pp. 880-898.

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 881.

[9] *Ibid.,* p. 887.

[10] Hayward Alker, Jr. and Donald Puchala, "Trends in Economic Partnership: The North Atlantic Area, 1928-1963," in J. David Singer, ed. *Quantitative International Politics,* New York: The Free Press, 1968, p.288.

noted transaction-flow studies that trade will be a useful indicator, i.e., that it is a valid measure of changes in a political (foreign policy) relationship between two states.[11]

Validity criteria are the most difficult to meet among the criteria for indicators mentioned above. Otherwise trade (1) is subject to quantitative measurement, (2) is systematic in its representation of the universe (in this case), and (3) is subject to the objective and reliable data gathering procedures. With regard to the latter and to the other criteria listed earlier, trade—as well as being a reliable indicator of political relationships generally—is one of the better indicators that can be selected for Southeast Asia. Such possible indicators as investment patterns, verbal communications, and elite and mass attitudes and practices regarding the relationship in question are often subject to erratic collection methods (or no methods) in Southeast Asia or are subject to difficulties such as different collection methods for different countries. Trade data is even better than many other economic statistics from Southeast Asian states since trade is a well defined area for data collection and is subject to established customs regulations for nearly all countries in the area with fairly accurate records being kept for government tax purposes.[12] Moreover, in using trade data, figures for the two countries involved in bilateral trade can be compared and their accuracy assessed. A study of the accuracy of Southeast Asian trade data has led Naya and Morgan to the conclusion that although there are some errors in Southeast Asia trade data, this is not a hindrance for limited research purposes. Thus, I would contend that trade data meets criteria (4) regarding indicators, which provides that the researcher should choose those which give the greatest amount of useful information most efficiently. Trade data in general seems to be most useful and for Southeast Asia specifically is most efficient and reliable.

The question of functional equivalence of the data for all of the countries under examination is not one which can be resolved within the limits of this study. While such an analysis of the data certainly deserves further consideration, equivalence will have to be assumed for the purposes of this paper.

Thus, given the utilization of the transaction flow model and the obvious requirement of a transaction as an indicator, time and trade flows become

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[11] For a brief but useful summarization of the use of "economic instruments of policy" which elucidates the interaction of political and economic policy, see K. J. Holsti, *International Politics,* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. pp. 279-309.

[12] Seiji Naya and Theodore Morgan, "The Accuracy of International Trade Data: The Case of the Southeast Asian Countries," *SEADAG Papers,* Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group, The Asia Society, New York: 1968. Accuracy may be considerably less when dealing strictly with trade between Southeast Asian nations in that considerable trade in the form of smuggling still seems to exist in some areas.

the indicators which assist in the operationalization of the hypothesis.[13] This does not mean, however, that other indicators could not or should not be used in measuring the direction and depth of political intimacy between Southeast Asian nations and outside powers. Multiple indicators are unquestionably advantageous when they are available.[14] Much empirical data dealing with the international relations of Southeast Asia remains ungathered, though, resulting in a limited scope for indicator selection. Of the few that are available, trade appears to be both the most valid for a study of political relations and the most complete. In order to pursue an empirical analysis of Southeast Asia's international relations, trade flows are consequently used with the hope that more and possibly better indicators will be employed in the future.

METHODOLOGY

The hypothesis has therefore been modified to read as follows: that *since World War II American influence in Southeast Asia has fallen while that of Japan has risen.* This hypothesis actually contains two parts, one concerning American influence, the other Japanese influence. Both will be tested and compared. Since data for North Vietnam is not available, North Vietnam is excluded from the analysis. Nine countries remain which constitute the region for the purposes of this study: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Burma, the Philippines, Thailand, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

The trade data is taken from the UN-IBRD *Direction of International Trade* for the period up to 1958 and from the International Monetary Fund's *Direction of Trade Annual* for the more recent years. Since both sets of data originate with the IMF, it is assumed that they are equivalent.

As in the case of the Alker-Puchala analysis of the North Atlantic area, a number of assumptions are made in the use of a transaction flow model. These include: (1) the principal actors are autonomous enough to be able to initiate or to refuse transactions. This is particularly important in the case of the Southeast Asian countries and may be subject to refutation by those advocates of economic imperialism hypothesis. While there may be some substance to such contentions, the fact that Malaysia and Singapore conduct large amounts of trade with China as well as the United States, and that Indonesia has conducted such trade with China in the past, leads one to believe that the international trade of Southeast Asian countries is at least not controlled completely by the United States. There may be

[13] John E. Mueller provides a short analysis on the uses of aggregate data in research of this sort in Mueller, ed. *Approaches to Measurement in International Relations: A Non-Evangelical Survey,* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969, pp. 171-179. See also his "Introduction, or What's in a Number?", pp. 1-3 and "Systematic History," pp. 5-14 in the same volume.

[14] See Joseph S. Nye, "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement," *International Organization,* Vol. XXII, No. 4, 1968, pp. 859, 860-874.

greater or lesser degrees of control over Southeast Asian trade by the major powers in different countries. But since this cannot be accurately calculated and some or most trade seems to be independently initiated, the autonomy assumption is made. (2) It is secondly assumed that by using a thirty-year span of time (as in the case here) anomalies such as explosive expansion of communications or transactions immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities will be eliminated from consideration in the relationship trends. (3) Lastly, it is assumed that the trends derived from this analysis can be substantiated through the use of accurate and valid indicators in a replication of this study. Replication using the same indicators is, of course, an expected part of the validation procedure of any empirically based study. No exception should be made in this case.

Since it would be expected that nations which have greater capability for trade (i.e. with larger GNP's or export-import capacities or demands) would actually have more trade, we must control for the total values of trade in the countries involved in our analysis. This is accomplished by translating data into percentages of world trade rather than using absolute figures. The implications of such a process will be noted in a moment. For the time being, the reasoning behind such a choice can be demonstrated in an example. Although forty million US dollars worth of trade amounted to almost the entirety of Laos' trade in 1966, forty million accounts for less than two percent of Singapore's trade for the same year. If we look only at absolute amounts, forty million dollars in trade would be equally important for both countries. If we look at percentage, however, it can be noted that this amount is much more important to Laos than to Singapore. Percentages, then, provide a means of assessing importance to the total economy.

The transaction flow model postulates that the level of trade between two countries is an indicator of the "salience" of the two countries toward each other. The extent of the salience is measured by formulating a "null hypothesis" regarding the level of trade between the two states and then measuring the extent of nonrandom trading relationships between the states under consideration. The null hypothesis posts a level of trade between the two countries which would reflect a completely random distribution of trade according to the trading capacity of each state, with such capacity being measured by the total value of world trade for each country. That is, if Country A commands ten percent of the world's exports as its imports, we could expect in a random distribution of trade that Country A would likewise receive ten percent of the exports of any Country B as its imports. Trade is obviously not random. Choices are made, for various reasons, regarding the direction and intensity of trade by each country. Given the arguments above, we are assuming that such choices—the "non-randomness"—are an indication of a positive or negative political relationship. If Country C conducted all of its trade with Japan, for example, this would be taken

as an indication of a highly positive political relationship. The random figure serves as a "baseline" against which to compare actual exchanges "in order to determine those cases where there is a greater-than-expected exchange" of trade and "presumably, a heightened awareness of a country's decision-makers for the affairs of another country." [15]

The deviation from the null hypothesis is formulated by calculating the relative acceptance (RA) of Country j for the trade of Country i as the difference between the actual (A) and expected (E) exchanges, divided by the expected exchange:[16]

$$RA_{ij} = \frac{A_{ij} - E_{ij}}{E_{ij}} \qquad \text{where} -1 > RA_{ij} > \infty$$

Actual and expected levels of trade are operationalized for the Southeast Asian states in the following manner: 1) *Expected level:* since both imports and exports to a foreign state can come under the restrictions of promotions of a national government, the expected level of trade must include both expected imports and exports. The proportion of each over which either country exercises initiating or inhibiting influences is not determinable. The gross figures must therefore be used. In that we are concerned with both imports and exports, a total trade figure is used to represent the flow of transactions between each pair of states (the U.S. and each Southeast Asian country, and Japan and each country).[17]

As stated above, I am assuming that the Southeast Asian state is in each case not only autonomous in initiating and refusing transactions but also has exercised that autonomy and therefore consents to the particular level of trade between itself and the U.S. or Japan. The expected level of trade in a null model would therefore be equal to that *percentage* of world trade in which the trading partner participates. That is, if the U.S. participated in 20% of total world trade, one would expect that it would also be the recipient of 20% of Indonesia's trade unless the government of Indonesia chose otherwise. Since the governments of the Southeast Asian states *do* choose otherwise, this expected figure is not usually matched by the actual percentage of the country's trade dealt to the major power.

The expected percentage, then, is calculated by simply dividing the major power's (MP) total trade (exports plus imports) by the total world trade for each calendar year. The expected percentage is thus equal to those world trade percentages given in Appendix IV.

2) The *Actual level* of trade between the states is calculated by dividing the total trade with the major power of each Southeast Asian state

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[15] Brams, *op. cit.*, p. 883.

[16] *Ibid.* See pp. 883-887 for some of the more sensitive implications involved in the utilization of this model and formulation.

[17] For a variation on the calculation of expected levels, see Alker and Puchala, *op. cit.*, pp. 291-293, as derived from the Savage-Deutch scheme.

(SEAS) by the total trade of the Southeast Asian state with all countries, for each calendar year. (See Appendices V and VI).

$$\text{Expected } (E_{ij}) = \frac{\text{Total trade of the major power}}{\text{Total world trade}}$$

$$\text{Actual } (A_{ij}) = \frac{\text{Total trade between SEAS and MP}}{\text{Total trade of SEAS}}$$

Using these basic formulations, the Relative Acceptance of major power trade is calculated for each Southeast Asian state over the period 1938-1968, with RA figures being derived for alternative years over that period. Several qualifications in use of the RA figure should be noted before proceeding to the analysis section of the paper. First, it should be recognized that there are other factors than political which hinder international trade, restricting the flow of transactions. In the case of trade, transportation costs and geographic distance play a large part. As Alker and Puchala argue, though, such factors as ethnic, cultural, or linguistic similarity, traditional affinities, and formal international political linkages and commitments similarly enter into the determination of trade flow direction and volume, in addition to purely economic determinants.[18] It may be possible to control for some of these variables but since most (perhaps all) of the factors listed above are also characteristics of political relationships between states, they remain in the model as a part of the economic indicator which represents that political salience we are intending to examine.

A second qualification is to note that since the measure of RA extends from -1 to infinity, symmetrical distance from a graphic zero line is not necessarily comparable. Trade levels may be only 100% below expectation, but they may also be 200% or 900% greater than expected. A level of 90% below expectation may thus be as significant as a level of 200% above expectation, depending on the circumstances for the particular country.

A final qualification deals with the varying size of the economy being considered. It is much easier to double the trade volume if its value is only $1 million than it is if that figure is $100 million, and likewise in having either figure. Fluctuations are likely to appear much larger in the countries with smaller trade volumes. Brams considers this to be a bias against the large nations, making it more difficult to analyze deviations in trade value. I consider it to be more of a bias against the smaller states, since minor changes in the absolute sense appear much larger than actual alterations in the political climate might call for. In either case, the reader should be aware of the difficulties in comparing the RA's of large and small economies.

[18] Alker and Puchala, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

	1938	1948	1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968
INDONESIA	+.96	+9.22	+2.03	+1.34	+4.19	+2.50	+1.36	+2.93	+3.29	+3.26	+4.06	+3.96
MALAYSIA	+.60	− .18	+ .08	+ .85	+ .79	+1.23	+3.22	+3.48	+3.04	+2.50	+2.39	+1.91
SINGAPORE							+ .49	+ .26	+ .45	+ .68	+ .67	+ .56
BURMA	−.40	− .13	+6.97	+4.65	+9.30	+5.54	+4.49	+3.94	+2.98	+2.46	+2.81	+2.48
PHILIPPINES	+.75	+ .78	+2.57	+3.27	+3.50	+5.15	+5.72	+7.31	+6.30	+5.17	+6.31	+5.40
THAILAND	+.92	+ .53	+9.62	+6.87	+8.73	+4.07	+4.60	+5.81	+5.07	+5.56	+4.16	+3.77
S. VIETNAM	−.03	0.00	− .23	+ .17	+1.63	+6.53	+4.30	+5.27	+4.50	+1.86	+5.67	+6.10
CAMBODIA						+4.34	+1.83	+3.16	+2.38	+1.28	+1.39	+1.21
LAOS						+1.35	+ .93	+4.70	+1.10	− .10	+ .61	+1.00
N. VIETNAM												

Salience: States of Southeast Asia → Japan

TABLE I

	1938	1948	1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968
INDONESIA	+ .04	-- .07	+ .11	+ .40	+ .09	+ .27	+ .24	+ .15	+ .08	− .02	+ .02	+ .65
MALAYSIA	+ .20	− .40	− .46	— .30	− .57	− .56	— .53	— .55	− .40	− .52	— .53	— .27
SINGAPORE							— .81	— .87	− .85	− .84	— .85	— .71
BURMA	− .93	− .93	— .97	— .88	− .90	− .90	— .85	— .89	− .90	− .81	— .59	— .67
PHILIPPINES	+3.94	+2.15	+2.85	+2.98	+3.27	+2.70	+2.81	+1.81	+1.92	+1.65	+1.24	+1.66
THAILAND	− .84	− .32	+ .15	+ .60	+ .13	+ .41	+ .11	− .24	− .38	− .51	— .41	— .04
S. VIETNAM	− .55	− .72	— .60	—. 42	+ .12	+ .60	+ .90	− .05	+ .90	+1.24	+2.61	+2.69
CAMBODIA							− .09	− .55	− .44	− .76	— .91	— .87
LAOS							− .38	− .50	− .21	− .61	+ .27	— .11
N. VIETNAM												

Salience: States of Southeast Asia → United States

TABLE II

ANALYSIS

Listed in Tables I and II are the Relative Acceptance scores for each of the Southeast Asian countries with Japan and then each with the United States. In order to facilitate the analysis and examine the data for support or non-support of the paper's hypothesis, the RA scores for each Southeast Asian country are placed on separate graphs with Relative Acceptance of Japan and the United States compared over the thirty-year period on each. Considering the limitation of fine distinction that accompanies parsimony,[19] the level of analysis in interpreting each graph will remain broad and more concerned with the general trends indicated than with specific and minor differences in RA scores.

Looking at the graphs, it may first be noted that, in all cases the level of RA scores for Japan is higher than those for the United States for most if not all of the period since World War II. Only in the cases of the Philippines does the RA line for the U.S. appear above that of Japan for any part of the three decade period. This would lead us to the first possible conclusion, that American influence has not necessarily been higher than that of Japan in the post-World War II period, despite remembrances of the Japanese occupation during the war and the ill effects suffered by many members of the Southeast Asian populace during the period. This would tend to confirm the results of another study by this author employing the transaction flow model with a slightly different operationalization which dealt with the Relative Acceptance of Japan alone since World War II.[20] Even though considerable static follows the Japanese throughout Asia today, little of that criticism appears to sway governments or business leaders when it comes to the selection of trading partners. As can be noted from an examination of Appendices I and II, Japan, with a lower total world trade volume, also surpassed the United States (as of 1968) in absolute trade value with all Southeast Asian countries except South Vietnam, Laos, and the Philippines, all countries with relatively close military ties with the U.S. In the case of the Philippines, Japan has surpassed the absolute level of 1970 trade held by the U.S. according to preliminary figures. Laos has a low volume of trade, with the figures for the U.S. and Japan not being dissimilar. Even in the case of South Vietnam Japan seems to be rapidly approaching the absolute level of trade maintained by the U.S., South Vietnam's closest ally. Thus, Japan not only seems to have exceeded the U.S. in acceptance among Southeast Asian states as indicated by RA scores, but conducts a higher absolute level of trade with most Southeast Asian countries as well.

Our specific hypothesis deals with the direction of change in RA levels rather than with simple comparisons of the entire period. Dealing directly

[19] As in the case of the "Expected Level" calculations.

[20] Llewellyn D. Howell, Jr., "Some Implications of Trade Flow Patterns in Japan-Southeast Asian Relations Since World War II," (unpublished paper, Cornell University-Southeast Asia Program, May 1969).

with the contentions of that hypothesis, then, I will make a brief note of the trends indicated for each country in the region before concluding with a summary for the region as a whole.

Burma, while maintaining a far higher level of salience toward Japan than toward the United States, has dropped significantly in its Relative Acceptance of Japan since 1954 (from +9.30 to +2.48) while that of the U.S. has risen slightly (−.90 to −.67 in the same period). The considerable gap between the acceptance scores in 1968 for Japan and the U.S. indicates, though, that Japan remains the favored partner. Japan's decline may, in fact, be primarily a function of Burma's declining over-all trade rather than an alienation of Japan specifically. In general, we must note that the RA toward Japan has dropped while that toward the U.S. has risen slightly.

For Cambodia, the RA scores over the 30-year period run gradually parallel for the U.S. and Japan, with those of the U.S. being significantly lower on the scale than those of Japan. As was the case with Burma, the RA scores for Cambodia (excluding the "Indochina" portion of the graph) lie entirely below the zero line which indicates the expected trade level, while those for Japan, even in decline remain more than 100% above the expected level. In this instance neither power seems to be gaining on the other, although Japan remains far ahead of the U.S. in both RA and absolute levels. It will be important to note whether or not changes occur in Cambodian-American RA scores in future analyses, considering the 1970 overthrow of the government of Sihanouk and its replacement by a government which leans more toward U.S. policies in the area. A notable rise in Cambodia's RA toward the U.S. will help confirm the validity of the salience measure used here.

The Japanese RA has climbed considerably since 1958 for Indonesia while that of the U.S., barely above the zero level, declined between 1956 and 1966. The trends during this period would lend support to the general hypothesis of this paper. It is interesting to note, however, that since the departure of Sukarno in 1966, the RA for the U.S. has suddenly risen to its highest level since 1938. In that same period between 1966 and 1968 the RA for Japan declined slightly, although not significantly.

Laos, independent only since 1954, as with Cambodia and Vietnam, has shown considerable fluctuation in its RA scores. Since Laos is the smallest trader in Southeast Asia, (almost entirely imports), we might expect random fluctuations to show up in apparently more significant fashion, giving a somewhat distorted picture of the results. As can be noted from Appendix III, the very high saliency level toward Japan in 1960 is a combined result of a drop in Laos' total world trade and a slight rise in its trade with Japan. The absolute figures do not indicate the wide variation shown in the graph. The case of Laos seems to be an exceptional one and should

be regarded with some reservations. With or without the 1960 "peak" the general trends are, however, a decline in RA scores for Japan and a rise in those indicating saliency toward the U.S. This is contrary to the hypothesis but supportive of general knowledge on American-Laotian relations in recent years.

Data for Malaysia and Singapore should perhaps be reviewed together since the two countries have been combined for a substantial period and the data are, in fact, not separated prior to 1956.[21] First, it is readily noted that whether separated or united, the two countries have shown positive saliency toward Japan and negative saliency toward the U.S. for most of the thirty-year period. In both cases where divisions occur, Malaysia—within the just-mentioned bounds—shows a higher salience toward both Japan and the U.S. than does Singapore. For either country, RA scores for the U.S. show little variation over the period since World War II, remaining perpetually below expectations. Malaysia's RA scores for Japan, while remaining highly positive, have declined steadily since 1960. Those of Singapore have been fairly stable although much lower than those of Malaysia.

The Philippines, a former colony of the United States, and still considered a close ally of the U.S., shows the clearest trends in its saliency levels: in full support of the paper's hypothesis, the RA scores of the U.S. have steadily declined since World War II, whereas those of Japan have steadily risen. As of 1952, Japan had already achieved a higher ranking than the U.S. on the saliency scale, and generally has continued to expand its lead over the U.S. since 1954.

Thailand, noted earlier as a close military ally of the U.S. in recent years, surprisingly shows a fairly steady decline in its salience toward the U.S. since 1952. The RA scores for Japan are similarly in decline over that period but the absolute level of Japan's trade during the period increases regularly. Overt indications are of a saliency decline for both, however.

South Vietnam, an exceptional case for a number of reasons is the only Southeast Asian country which shows a rising, positive saliency toward the U.S. As a country greatly dependent on the U.S. military aid in the period since 1954 (the first positive year indicated on the graph), such a rise is not unexpected. What may be unexpected is that the saliency toward Japan has been and remains higher than that towards the U.S. throughout the period and has gained on that of the U.S. considerably since 1964, the years of most concentrated U.S. aid to South Vietnam.

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[21] Separate data for 1964, when Singapore was joined politically (and statistically) with Malaysia, are drawn from a study by Dr. Josefa M. Saniel. See her paper "Japan's Thrust in Southeast Asia in the Sixties," read at the Seminar on "Southeast Asia in the Modern World" sponsored by the Institut fur Asienkunde, Hamburg, Germany, April 13-17, 1970. This paper provides a thorough analysis of Japan's economic reach into Southeast Asia.

Summary and Conclusions

A classification scheme which provides for a summary analysis of trends for each state may be constructed as follows. Each country appears in the six cells below twice, once to indicate saliency toward Japan (the name not underlined), and once to indicate saliency toward the U.S. (with the name underlined and in capitals). The diagramatic analysis would most readily give support to the paper's hypothesis if the states underlined fell to the left part of the scheme while those not underlined were located toward the right.

Table III

Comparative Saliency

NATURE OF SALIENCY	DIRECTION OF CHANGE: DECLINING	NO BASIC CHANGE	RISING
POSITIVE	Cambodia Burma Thailand PHILIPPINES	South Vietnam Laos	Philippines Indonesia MALAYSIA SINGAPORE SOUTH VIETNAM INDONESIA LAOS
NEGATIVE	THAILAND CAMBODIA	Malaysia Singapore	BURMA

The hypothesis is not fully supported in this instance, although some substantiating evidence is provided. While only three states fall in the "declining" category with regard to the U.S., three also indicate declining salience levels toward Japan. But each of the three in Japan's "declining" group are also still positive in their saliency while two of those in the U.S. "declining" group are negative. In other words, *while both have apparently suffered some losses in Relative Acceptance among Southeast Asian states, Japan appears to remain ahead of the U.S. within the category in its acceptance by those states involved.*

In the "rising" salience category, each major power appears to be gaining acceptance from four Southeast Asian states, although not the same four. All but one of the countries in the category are in the rising and positive cell, Burma (with a still strongly negative saliency toward the U.S.) being the only exception. Referring to the graphs, it can be added again, however, that *for each country which has indicated a rising salience toward the U.S., the salience toward Japan remains at a higher—although possibly static or declining—level.* Even here, then, the United States is in a position of being forced to play "catch up" behind Japan rather than vice-versa.

Most noticeable in the scheme is the relative placement of Southeast Asian states in the positive and negative categories. *All countries in the region exhibit a positive salience toward Japan while only four (three of which are directly dependent on American military aid and support at present) exhibit a positive RA with respect to the U.S.* The fourth country, Indonesia, has recently (since 1966) increased greatly its trading volume and acceptance of investment from both the U.S. and Japan, with Japan still leading the U.S. in both relative and absolute levels of trade with that state.

The Relative Acceptance of the two major powers, leaving aside the aspect of change for the moment, is perhaps most striking in its import when displayed in two simple categories:

States with higher RAs toward the U.S. in 1968	*States with higher RAs toward Japan in 1968*
NONE	Burma Cambodia Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Philippines Thailand South Vietnam Laos

Notable among the list of high RAs toward Japan are U.S. allies Thailand, South Vietnam and the Philippines. While trade data does not include the considerable amounts of monetary and material support sent to these countries through the U.S. military, and therefore does not reflect "dependence" on such aid, the trading patterns still reflect some choice of trading partners for the products that are desired or are to be sent abroad as exports. Regarding the military aid dependency, then, it might be said that some U.S. allies in Southeast Asia demonstrate a higher Relative Acceptance of Japan than of the U.S. *despite* U.S. military aid.

Looking at the broad hypothesis around which this study is centered, it would have to be concluded that, in a qualified sense, the hypothesis is borne out in empirical analysis. Particularly considering the low RAs de-

monstrated toward Japan in the years immediately after World War II (when Japan's total trade volume was low), Japan has achieved very high levels of acceptance since the war, while the U.S. has done so only in isolated instances and under somewhat unusual circumstances. This conclusion is offered in a qualified sense only, because it would not appear that an assumption which underlines the hypothesis is that Southeast Asian salience toward the U.S. was at some time high while that toward Japan was low. The latter was the case in the immediate years after the Second World War, but—as can be seen from the graphs—the former was true only in the case of the one-time American colony, the Philippines. In most instances, therefore, salience toward the U.S. has never exceeded that toward Japan and consequently makes it difficult for salience toward the U.S. to fall still further while that toward Japan rises above its already high level.

In conclusion, it is suggested that a replication of this study might more profitably be centered on a slightly altered hypothesis, one concerned not with ascendancy or decline in Relative Acceptance, but rather with level alone. Since the same general trends should appear in a replication, changes in saliency will still appear, should that be the researcher's interest. Changes do not seem, though, to be of particularly great importance—certainly not as important as absolute level alone where Japan clearly predominates when using an economic indicator. Should that conclusion remain suspect, it is an obvious next step in an empirical analysis of interstate relations to move to use of diffferent or multiple indicators, should they be available.[22]

The purpose of this study has been to make an application of empirical analysis to the study of Southeast Asian international relations. The emphasis has been on method and analytical technique but descriptive statements regarding relations between states have resulted from use of the method and have been presented as well. It is likely that there will be disagreements with both method and conclusion, and some of these may be justified. It is my intent, however, that even in such possible disagreement a step be taken away from the impressionistic, normative, and prescriptive pronouncements that have dominated foreign policy studies on Southeast Asia in the past several decades. Hopefully, that intent as well as the furtherance of the understanding of Southeast Asian international relations have been served by this study.

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22 ". . . independent tests should be used to corroborate influences based largely on economic transactions. The use of multiple indicators of intense, enduring, and rewarding relationships helps prevent the deification of any imperfect indicator." Alker and Puchala, *op. cit.*, p. 289.


BURMA
Saliency toward the U.S. and Japan 1938-1968
+ 10
+ 9
+ 8
+ 7
+ 6
+ 5
+ 4
+ 3
+ 2
+ 1
0
− 1
1938 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70
Japan
U.S.



* Data until 1954 for Japan and until 1956 for the U.S. is that of Indochina trade.


INDONESIA
Saliency toward the U.S. and Japan 1938-1968
+ 10
+ 9
+ 8
+ 7
+ 6
+ 5
+ 4
+ 3
+ 2
+ 1
0
− 1
1938 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70
Japan
U.S.



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

* Data until 1956 is for Malaya and Singapore combined.


PHILIPPINES
Saliency toward the U.S. and Japan 1938-1968
+ 10
+ 9
+ 8
+ 7
+ 6
+ 5
+ 4
+ 3
+ 2
+ 1
0
− 1
1938 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70
Japan
U.S.



* Data until 1956 is for Singapore and Malaya combined.



* Data until 1954 for Japan and until 1956 for the U.S. is that of Indochina trade.


THAILAND
Saliency toward the U.S. and Japan 1938-1968
+ 10
+ 9
+ 8
+ 7
+ 6
+ 5
+ 4
+ 3
+ 2
+ 1
0
− 1
1938 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70
Japan
U.S.

APPENDIX I

DIRECTION OF TRADE

imports c.i.f (nearest million U.S. $)
exports f.o.b

Imports from and Exports to the U.S.

	1938	1948	1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968
INDONESIA	28	92	78	132	71	140	61	86	120	74	60	169
	69	87	156	277	167	191	173	216	135	170	179	175
MALAYSIA							8	18	32	34*	46	54
SINGAPORE	9	82	20	36	30	46	93	156	188	149	177	240
	112	269	310	382	169	226	28	42	51	45	51	102
							33	19	15	12	15	29
BURMA	2	5	1	6	5	5	7	8	7	16	24	12
	0	2	1	3	1	2	1	1	1	1	3	1
PHILIPPINES	86	468	235	283	326	318	292	298	268	372	348	436
	94	228	236	236	263	257	274	307	327	388	398	436
THAILAND	3	16	25	58	43	51	52	65	71	84	128	186
	0	53	75	99	55	97	57	56	39	25	76	81
S. VIETNAM							62	53	105	134	311	271
				Indochina			5	5	3	2	2	2
CAMBODIA	3	14	9	38	51	74	7	7	10	3	2	2
	7	3	11	14	22	21	9	7	5	4	1	2
LAOS							2	1	4	7	9	8
							0	0	0	0	1	0

Sources: 1938-1956 *Direction of International Trade*
1958-1968 *Direction of Trade* (*Annual*)
* From Saniel. See ff. 21.

APPENDIX II

DIRECTION OF TRADE

imports c.i.f (nearest million U.S. $)
exports f.o.b

Imports from and Exports to Japan

	1938	1948	1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968
INDONESIA	30	57	46	60	120	76	49	110	115	121	119	147
	25	12	13	28	60	89	36	70	91	128	175	252
SINGAPORE							14	34	43	59*	95	105
	7	6	18	64	48	79	159	269	261	256	301	343
MALAYSIA	43	11	43	78	83	169	77	87	105	114	138	209
							13	14	23	27	49	62
BURMA	5	1	16	21	46	36	46	64	53	55	47	39
	2	1	18	30	63	42	12	13	16	17	15	12
PHILIPPINES	9	4	18	20	31	56	90	155	120	181	278	411
	10	10	23	51	67	117	100	159	184	225	325	398
THAILAND	11	5	43	36	65	61	84	118	139	213	301	366
	1	0	44	62	69	35	22	72	72	131	141	147
S. VIETNAM						53	40	62	60	34	138	199
				Indochina		0	1	5	4	7	6	3
CAMBODIA	1	0	2	9	13	10	8	14	16	11	12	20
	6	2	2	5	15	4	1	8	3	6	8	7
LAOS						2	1	2	2	1	3	7
						0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Sources: 1938-1956 *Direction of International Trade*
1958-1968 *Direction of Trade* (*Annual*)
* From Saniel. See ff. 21.

APPENDIX III

TOTAL TRADE FOR ALL STATES

imports c.i.f (nearest million U.S. $)
exports f.o.b

	1938	1948	1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968
INDONESIA	248	465	440	948	629	856	544	578	647	691	583	662*
	380	395	800	934	867	882	791	841	682	724	679	689
MALAYSIA							725	905	1008	1069	1144	1205
	315	1298	1607	1915	1573	2045	811	1189	1068	1117	1387	1390
SINGAPORE	334	1320	2009	1943	1569	2058	1222	1332	1318	1136	1328	1661
							1026	1136	1116	906	1102	1271
BURMA	78	180	111	192	204	198	204	260	219	272	157	139
	178	229	158	264	251	246	195	226	265	237	193	111
PHILIPPINES	132	666	384	484	545	597	559	604	587	868	957	1280
	116	327	337	352	396	437	493	560	563	767	838	848
THAILAND	57	144	209	304	312	365	393	453	541	680	1166	1150
	89	223	304	329	283	334	309	408	462	593	694	658
S. VIETNAM						218	232	240	264	298	444	466
						45	55	86	57	48	24	12
CAMBODIA	57	188	210	450	351	57	76	95	102	82	111	116
	96	92	79	116	97	37	53	70	54	96	67	89
LAOS						35	26	12	24	26	43	55
						1	1	1	1	1	1	4
JAPAN	1070	684	974	2028	2399	3230	3033	4491	5637	7938	9524	12989
	1109	258	820	1273	1629	2501	2877	4055	4916	6674	9777	12973
U.S.	3230	10990	8962	10850	10396	12803	13340	22520	24040	27760	27720	33066
	3960	15810	10281	15054	14986	18952	17738	26220	27650	34340	39980	34199
WORLD	25400	63400	58000**	86500	88000	108100	113100	135500	149800	181900	215300	224400
	23500	57300	55400**	80000	85500	103100	107300	128000	141400	172400	203600	212100

* estimated from partial data
** Soviet bloc excluded

APPENDIX IV

Percent of Total World Trade

U.S. and Japan

	1938	1948	1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968
UNITED STATES	14.70	22.27	16.96	15.55	14.62	15.03	14.10	18.49	17.75	17.52	18.54	15.41
JAPAN	4.45	0.78	1.58	1.98	2.32	2.71	2.68	3.24	3.62	4.12	4.60	5.94

APPENDIX V

ACTUAL PERCENT OF S. E. ASIA'S TRADE (WITH JAPAN)

	1938	1948	1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968
INDONESIA	8.71	7.97	4.79	4.63	12.03	9.48	6.34	12.72	15.53	17.59	23.59	29.48*
MALAYSIA	7.15	0.64	1.70	3.67	4.16	6.04	11.30	14.50	14.61	14.41	15.61	17.26
SINGAPORE							4.00	4.07	5.24	6.90	7.69	9.24
BURMA	2.69	0.68	12.60	11.18	23.89	17.72	14.71	16.00	14.40	14.24	17.54	20.68
PHILIPPINES	7.78	1.39	5.64	8.45	10.44	16.66	18.00	26.93	26.44	25.40	33.61	38.02
THAILAND	8.56	1.19	16.78	15.59	22.57	13.73	15.02	22.05	21.96	27.03	23.75	28.34
SOUTH VIETNAM						20.41	14.21	20.33	19.90	11.79	30.70	42.19
CAMBODIA	4.31	0.78	1.21	2.31	6.11	14.46	7.59	13.51	12.24	9.38	11.01	13.12
LAOS						6.38	5.18	18.46	7.60	3.70	7.40	11.86

* from derived data

APPENDIX VI

ACTUAL PERCENT OF S. E. ASIA'S TRADE (WITH THE U.S.)

	1938	1948	1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968
INDONESIA	15.36	20.77	18.83	21.73	15.90	19.04	17.55	21.28	19.20	17.18	18.93	25.44*
MALAYSIA	17.63	13.40	9.11	10.83	6.33	6.62	6.60	8.31	10.59	8.37	8.78	11.31
SINGAPORE							2.66	2.47	2.71	2.79	2.71	4.43
BURMA	0.97	1.51	0.59	1.90	1.47	1.50	2.10	2.01	1.81	3.37	7.54	5.16
PHILIPPINES	72.58	70.07	65.31	62.50	62.50	55.60	53.75	51.96	51.78	46.46	41.55	40.98
THAILAND	2.39	15.22	19.49	24.72	16.47	21.15	15.59	13.99	10.97	8.51	10.97	14.77
SOUTH VIETNAM							26.75	17.57	33.70	39.33	67.00	56.92
CAMBODIA	6.66	6.28	6.81	9.09	16.36	24.09	12.79	8.30	9.87	4.04	1.68	1.90
LAOS							8.80	9.23	14.00	28.14	23.63	13.66

* from derived data

NEHRU'S RESPONSE TO SOCIALISM (IN PRE-INDEPENDENCE INDIA)

ARUN COOMER BOSE

NEHRU THE MAN HAS BEWITCHED MANY, AND HAS BEWILDERED, PERhaps, more. Such a complex character and developing mind, naturally, defies definition, and both his contemporaries and posterity find it difficult to place his views and policies under conventional labels. His was, in fact, a prismatic personality that shone in different hues according to the onlooker's angle of vision.

A wealthy aristocrat by birth, Nehru was by temperament and training an individualist, a liberal, and a humanist. Well-read and widely-travelled, he was always open to new ideas and arguments, but was incapable of accepting anything blind-folded as a dogma. Proud and fearless, he was ever sensitive to the woes of the oppressed and the depressed, and his kind courageous nature rebelled at the sight of injustice and tyranny, anywhere and in any form. Such a sensitive soul was sure to respond to the impact of socialism, which by common consent is one of the reigning ideologies of this age.

Even in his student days in England, he had been "vaguely attracted to the Fabians and Socialistic ideas", and back in India he was considerably influenced by the teaching of Swami Vivekananda.[1] But, for years, these were just faint feelings, and he admits, "In 1920 I was totally ignorant of labour conditions in factories and fields, and my political outlook was entirely bourgeois." [2] However, the resounding echoes of the Bolshevik Revolution, the impact of Gandhi's unique personality and methods, his first direct contact, in 1920-21, with the peasants of his home province - their problems and pathos—and last but not the least, his presence at the Conference of Oppressed Nationalities at Brussels and visit to Soviet Russia, in 1927, brought in him profound changes.[3] What had long been for him idle attractions or sublime sentiments now got transmuted into a positive urge to find the way to and strive for social justice and equity.

The Russians under the communists seemed to him to have found the way out and were in earnest to reach the goal. He was immensely impressed

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[1] J. Nehru, *Autobiography*, (Bombay, 1962), p. 25. Also S.N. Mukherjee (ed.) *St. Anthony's Papers*, No. 18, (Oxford, 1966), p. 99, f.n. 1.

[2] *Autobiography, op. cit.*, p. 49.

[3] "My outlook was wider, and nationalism by itself seemed to me definitely a narrow and insufficient creed . . . . Without social freedom and a socialistic structure of society and State, neither the country nor the individual could develop much." Dorothy Norman, *Nehru the First Sixty Years*, vol. 1, (Bombay, 1965)—(hereafter referred to as Dorothy Norman)—, p. 138.

with their achievements, and wrote to his daughter, Indira, "The second wonder that the Soviets performed was to transform great parts of the area out of all recognition by prodigious schemes of planning. . . . The most notable advances have been in education and in industry."[4] He was equally impressed with the writings of Marx, which guided the leaders of Soviet Russia. He was absolutely sincere when he said of Marx that "he seems to me to have possessed quite an extra-ordinary degree of insight into social phenomena, and this insight was apparently due to the scientific method he adopted."[5] "So", he admits, "I turned inevitably with goodwill towards communism, for whatever its faults, it was at least not hypocritical and not imperialistic . . . . These attracted me as also the changes taking place in Russia."[6]

With his progressive and scientific outlook he could never believe, like Gandhi, that the evils of Western industrial society originated in industrialism. To him these social evils were the "necessary consequence of industrial development on capitalist lines."[7] Besides, he believed with Marx that capitalism would soon collapse in the industrially advanced West,[8] and asserted that "it is obvious that if capitalism collapses in Europe and America it cannot survive in Asia."[9] Naturally, he wanted India to learn the lesson of history in time, and to plan for future industrial progress on socialistic lines. It was under his presidentship that the U.P. Congress Committee took the lead, in April 1928, by recommending that "it is essential to make revolutionary changes in the present social and economic structure of the society and to remove the gross inequalities."[10] Then in the late autumn of that year Nehru, Subhas Chandra Bose, and Srinivas Iyengar organized the Independence for India League within the Congress. One of the primary objectives of this League was the reconstruction of the Indian society on the basis of social and economic equality.

His election as president of the Congress at Lahore, in 1929, in preference to Patel, fifteen years his senior and then the widely-acclaimed hero of the Bardoli peasant movement, speaks of his growing influence over the younger generation, who increasingly believed in complete independence and socialism. From the presidential chair he declared, "I must frankly confess that I am a socialist. . . . Our economic programme must therefore be based on a human outlook, and must not sacrifice man to money. If an industry cannot be run without starving its workers then the industry must be closed down. If the workers on the land have not enough to eat then the intermediaries, who deprive them of their full share, must go."[11]

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[4] J. Nehru, *Glimpses of World History*, (London, 1949), p. 686.
[5] *Autobiography, op. cit.*, p. 591.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 163.
[7] Dorothy Norman, pp. 156-57.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 262-63.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 314.
[10] J. Nehru, *Recent Essays and Writings*, (Allahabad, 1937), p. 33.
[11] Dorothy Norman, p. 205.

Two years later, it was mainly at his initiative that the famous resolution regarding fundamental rights was accepted by the Congress at its Karachi session. In fact, he was in those years the virtual knight errant of socialism, and more than anyone he made it popular and respectable in India through his pen and speeches. Writing about these years, he says "Everywhere I spoke on political independence and social freedom, and made the former a step towards the attainment of the latter. I wanted to spread the ideology of socialism, especially, among Congress workers and the intelligentsia." [12]

Still, despite all his enthusiasm for Marxism and the communist experiment in Soviet Russia, he could not join hands with the communists, the only well-knit group of socialists in India till the early thirties. He admired their ardour for progress and equality, and valued their influence in fighting many of the age-old evils of the custom-bound Indian society. But he was too much of a free thinker and a democrat to be one of them. When he said, "Marx may be wrong in some of his statements",[13] he only revealed the intellectual attitude that was to remain a characteristic of his all his life. He would not accept anything for granted, nor could he follow anyone uncritically. He was only too candid when he wrote to Subhas Chandra Bose on 3 April 1939, "I suppose I am temperamentally and by training an individualist, and intellectually a socialist. . . . I hope socialism does not kill or suppress individuality."[14] Indeed, one may well claim that it was his hope that socialism would liberate the individual that made him a socialist. He wrote in February 1939, "I do not see why under socialism there should not be a great deal of freedom for the individual; indeed far greater freedom than the present system gives. He can have freedom of conscience and mind, freedom of enterprise, and even the possession of private property on a restricted scale. Above all, he will have the freedom, which comes from economic security, which only a small number possess today." [15] To such an apostle of freedom socialism without the spirit of democracy was equivalent to tyranny. In fact, he had been exposed to many diverse influences–of Western humanism, Marx, Gandhi, and Tagore, to name a few—and he absorbed from each of them the elements he valued. Naturally, he could not accept Marxism as a dogma or the dictates of the Communist International as sacrosanct. He wrote about himself, in 1938, "My roots are still perhaps partly in the 19th century, and I have been too much influenced by the humanist liberal tradition to get out of it. . . . I dislike dogmatism, and the treatment of Karl Marx's writings or any other book as revealed scripture, which cannot be challenged, and the regimentation and heresy-hunts, which seem to be a feature of modern communism.

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[12] *Autobiography, op. cit.*, p. 182.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 591.
[14] J. Nehru, *A Bunch of Old Letters,* (Bombay, 1960), p. 363.
[15] N. B. Sen, *Wit and Wisdom of Jawaharlal Nehru,* (New Delhi, 1960), p. 552.

I dislike also much that has happened in Russia and especially the excessive use of violence in normal times." [16]

Naturally, he disliked many of the attitudes and assumptions of the communists, and admits, "Communists often irritated me by their dictatorial ways, their aggressive and rather vulgar methods, their habit of denouncing everybody, who did not agree with them."[17] He was particularly bitter with the Indian communists for, what seemed to him, their dogmatic attitude and open criticism of the national leadership. According to him, "One of the reasons for the weakness in the numbers as well as influence of the communists in India is that, instead of spreading a scientific knowledge of communism and trying to convert people's minds to it, they have largely concentrated on abuse of others." [18]

According to him the communists, unlike Gandhi and many other Congress leaders, "have little knowledge of or contact with rural areas", and were incapable of applying their ideology to Indian problems. By concentrating almost exclusively on the numerically insignificant urban proletariat, and antagonising many others with their methods and pronouncements, the communists, he felt, were merely engaged in a copy-book imitation of what was being done in the West.[19] But an imitation of the West, he believed, would not serve much purpose. After all, "in India nationalism and rural economy were the dominating consideration, and European socialism seldom deals with these." [20] In fact, he heartily disliked the ideological rigidity of the Indian communists and their subservience to the Communist International.

In the meantime, the love-hate response of some young intellectual nationalists to communism had led to the creation of the Congress Socialist Party in May 1934. These Congress members felt attracted towards Marxism and the developments in Soviet Russia, and "felt that the Civil Disobedience Movements failed because of inadequate mass response." [21] The Congress, they thought, had failed to enthuse the masses in the name of freedom and democracy, which meant little to them." [22] They would have normally joined the communists. But the latter, though they swore by the "masses" and "revolution", had not joined the Civil Disobedience Movements, and were openly critical of the existing national leadership.[23] Besides, they accepted

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16 *Autobiography, op. cit.,* p. 591.
17 *Ibid.,* p. 163.
18 *Ibid.,* p. 366.
19 *Ibid.,* p. 407.
20 Dorothy Norman, pp. 282-83.
21 *The Indian Annual Register,* 1936, vol. ii, p. 310.
22 Narendra Dev, *Socialism and National Revolution,* (Bombay, 1946), p. 8.
23 The Sixth World Congress of the Communist International adopted an ultra-leftist policy. The *International Press Correspondence* of 9-1-1930 advised the Indian Communists, "The National Congress actually retards the revolutionary movement... sever your contact with the National Congress and the League of Independence." However, the *Communist International* admitted on 1-6-1932 that the biggest mistake of the Indian Communists had been that they "stood aside from the mass movement of the people against British Imperialism." G.D. Overstreet and N. Windmiller, *Communism in India,* (Berkeley, 1960), pp. 82-83.

foreign control and guidance. Naturally, these Congress Socialists could not join the communists, and formed their own group within the Congress to transform it from within and "to put a more dynamic programme before the country".

Although almost everyone expected that Nehru would find these socialists congenial to his taste, he never formally joined them. The latter, however, looked upon him as their friend, philosopher, and guide,[24] and "His clear enumeration of socialist ideas in *Whither India* was a model for many of them." [25] Nehru, in his turn, had genuine respect and affection for some of them, and needed their support in his struggle with the Right-oriented Old Guard which controlled the Congress. He included three socialists in his working committee, when he was elected the Congress President at Lucknow in April 1936, and he welcomed the communists within the Congress after the Communist International had accepted Georgii Dmitrov's thesis on Anti-Fascist Popular Fronts with all liberal democratic forces. From the presidential chair at Lucknow he declared, "The Congress must be not only for the masses, as it claims to be, but of the masses." He invited M.N. Roy (the celebrated revolutionary and former Comintern leader), after his release from jail, to attend the Congress session at Faizpur, in December 1936, and gave him the status and importance of a very respectable delegate. He, in fact, valued the views and influence of some of these Left-wing leaders, and sought to give the Congress a socialistic orientation by inducting them into positions of power within it.

But most of these Congress Socialists, he felt, were as dogmatic in their approach as the communists, and he did not believe that ideological rigidity was of much use.[26] He had revealed his flexible attitude when he said in his presidential address at Lucknow, on 14 April 1936, "I imagine that every country will fashion it [socialism] after its own way and fit in with its national genius." In his message to the Congress Socialists on 20 December 1936 he said, "It is right that we should understand the theory underlying this approach. This helps to clarify our minds and give purpose to our activities. But two aspects of this question fill my own mind. One is how to apply this approach to Indian conditions. The other is how to speak of socialism in the language of India. I think it is often forgotten that if we are to be understood we must speak the language of the country." [27] But none knew rural India or spoke its language better than old Gandhi, and the only way, Nehru knew, to be politically effective was

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[24] *Socialism and National Revolution, op. cit.*, pp. 3, 29.

[25] Michael Brecher, *Nehru A Political Biography*, (London, 1959), p. 217.

[26] At their second annual conference at Berut in January 1936 the Congress Socialists issued the following statement, "Marxism alone can guide the anti-imperialist forces to their ultimate destiny. Party members must, therefore, fully understand the technique of revolution, the theory and practice of class struggle, the nature of the state and the processes leading to the socialist society." P.L. Lakhanpal, *History of the Congress Socialist Party*, (Lahore, 1946), p. 144.

[27] P. Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress*, vol. ii, (Bombay, 1947), p. 7.

to be with him and then, if possible, to influence him. The socialist leader, Narendra Dev, himself admitted, "Most of us are only intellectual socialists." [28] Naturally, Nehru's attitude towards them, in the words of another socialist leader, Sampurnanand, "was one of amused contempt."[29]

Besides, he never liked the idea of forming groups and factions within the Congress, which in his opinion was then the only fit instrument capable of organising the masses both against imperialism as well as for socialism. That is why he had said in his presidential address to the All India Trade Union Congress at Nagpur in 1929," . . . bourgeois as the outlook of the National Congress was, it did represent the only effective revolutionary force in the country. As such, labour ought to help it, and co-operate with and influence it."[30] Surveying the political situation in 1933, he wrote, "To desert the Congress seemed to me to cut oneself adrift from the vital urge of the nation, to blunt the most powerful weapon we had, and perhaps to waste energy in ineffective adventurism." [31] He believed that the only beneficiary of any split within the Congress would be the British imperialism. So he said after the Congress session at Lucknow in 1936, "To talk of splits and the like is an absurdity. There can be no division in our ranks, when the call of independence came to all of us." Three years later, during the crisis that convulsed the Congress after its session at Tripuri, he wrote Subhas Chandra Bose, "I feel it would be injurious in the interest of India and our cause for me or you to create this definite split."[32]

These only prove the obvious that Nehru was first a nationalist and then a socialist. He knew perfectly well that the socialism of his dream could never be practised in India unless she was free, and unity was the precondition of her freedom.[33] But that unity of action, he knew, could be achieved only through the Congress under Gandhi's leadership, though he sincerely believed that the Congress "is a bourgeois movement. . . . and its objective so far has been not a change of the social order, but political independence." [34] Still he wrote, what he obviously hoped, ". . . gradually the lower middle class began to dominate the Congress, and later the peasantry made their influence felt." [35] With such a view of things, he considered it wiser to work through an organized mass party to educate his people about socialism than to join any breakaway faction.[36] While the communists and many Socialists considered it proper to expose the policies of the Congress and to oppose those, if necessary, Nehru thought it wiser

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[28] *Socialism and National Revolution, op. cit.,* p. 23.
[29] Sampurnanand, *Memories and Reflections,* (Bombay, 1960), pp. 72,80-81.
[30] Dorothy Norman, p. 176.
[31] *Ibid.,* p. 280.
[32] *A Bunch of Old Letters, op. cit.,* p. 351.
[33] "But before socialism comes or can even be attempted, there must be the power to shape our destiny; there must be political independence." Dorothy Norman, p. 451.
[34] *Autobiography, op. cit.,* p.365.
[35] *Ibid.,* p. 416.
[36] Dorothy Norman, p. 333.

to be in the Congress, and to influence and to reform it slowly from within. Regarding their differences, Namboodripad writes, "The essence of that conflict [between Nehru and the socialists] consisted in their different approaches to the question of the political instrument through which the struggle for socialism is to be conducted." [37]

Some events in the year 1936, however, had dampened his enthusiasm for socialism and had convinced him of the need for a better understanding with Gandhi and the Right-wing old guard of the Congress that controlled the organization. The latter were alarmed at his pronouncements on socialism, and were bent upon reducing him to virtual impotence, though he was the Congress President that year. Ten out of fourteen members of the Congress Working Committee belonged to the old guard, and they opposed him on almost every issue. Nehru wrote to Sayed Mahmud of his predicament, on 5 May 1936, "I was completely isolated and there was not a single member to support me."[38] Then came the showdown at the end of June, when six members of the working committee, headed by Rajendra Prasad, Patel, and Rajagopalacharia, tendered their resignation with, at least, the tacit approval of Gandhi.[39] Nehru, too, in despair decided to resign. The crisis, however, was smoothed over by Gandhi, and all concerned withdrew their resignation. While trying to assuage Nehru's hurt feeling, he told him in plain language, "If they are guilty of intolerance, you have more than your share of it. The country should not be made to suffer for your mutual intolerance." [40] But what is more significant was Gandhi's reminder that "you are in office by their unanimous choice, but you are not in power yet." [41] The whole affair convinced Nehru that it was not yet possible for him to carry Gandhi and most Congress leaders with him in his quest for socialism, and that it was only with the former's blessings that he could still be the second-in-command of the national movement. Loss of Gandhi's confidence, he knew, would soon drive him into political wilderness. Having felt the chill discomfort of political isolation, Nehru buried his ideological hatchet and drew closer to Gandhi. The latter, as if in reward, again placed on his head the crown of presidentship of the Congress session at Faizpur in December 1936. There his presidential address was in sharp contrast with the one he had delivered at Lucknow only a few months ago. Now he emphasised, "Congress must be the basis and pivot of united action."

Besides, Nehru must have instinctively felt that membership of any group or sub-group would, in the long run, adversely affect his chance of playing the role of an all-India leader. It has to be admitted that, despite his strong passion and known prejudices, he succeeded remarkably in raising

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[37] E.M.S. Namboodripad, *Economics and Politics of the Socialist Pattern*, (New Delhi, 1966), p. 56.

[38] As cited in Michael Brecher, *op. cit.*, p. 223, f. n. 3.

[39] Rajendra Prasad's letter to Nehru from Gandhi's *asram* at Wardha, dated 29-6-1936, cited in *A Bunch of Old Letters, op. cit.*, pp. 182-85.

[40] Gandhi to Nehru on 8-7-1936, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 191-92.

[41] Gandhi to Nehru on 15-7-1936, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 196-98.

himself above narrow communal, regional, or factional strifes. Next to the great Gandhi he was the Congress in the eyes of the world. To quote Frank Moraes, the eminent author and journalist, "*Hamlet* without the Prince is not more inconceivable than Congress without Nehru."[42] None except Gandhi was more popular; few, if any, were equally acceptable to different groups of interest and shades of view. This nationalist par excellence was on the one hand a zealous campaigner for a Brave New World and on the other the trusted political heir of the Mahatma himself. He was the link between many opposing interests and viewpoints. The Gandhite and the communist, the rabid nationalist and the social reformist, all could find in him an area of agreement, and place in him a certain amount of confidence. This was because his ideals were primarily human and his approach essentially liberal. If his liberalism mellowed his zest for socialism and rendered its contours indistinct, it also enabled him to make his version of liberal socialism acceptable to millions of Indian intelligentsia and Congress workers. The liberalism he personified is now almost a thing of the past, but socialism in India which is a living and growing force, owes more to this liberal crusader for a better world than to anyone else. Considering his approach and achievements, some look upon him as the first of India's socialists, while to many others he was the last of the liberals.

42 P.D. Tandon (ed.), *Nehru Your Neighbour,* (Calcutta, 1946), p. 25.

THE INDEPENDENCE MISSION 1919: INDEPENDENCE LIES AHEAD

HONESTO A. VILLANUEVA *

THE FILIPINOS HAD COOPERATED WHOLEHEARTEDLY IN THE WAR efforts of the United States in the First World War. Independence agitation was suspended temporarily. But when hostilities ended, the silence that they had imposed upon themselves became useless. Once again the demand for liberty and independence took a new form of vigor with the creation of a Commission of Independence on November 7, 1918 by the Philippine Legislature. The duty of the Commission was to study and make recommendations as to the proper steps to be taken to secure independence from the United States.[1]

The Filipino people understood the then prevailing trend of international politics and the principle of self-determination which was popular during the Wilson administration. The Philippine Legislature therefore sent a special independence mission to Washington, D.C.[2] Governor General Harrison informed the War Department that the Philippine Legislature in their joint resolution on November 11, 1918, authorized the sending of a Commission to the United States composed of the President of the Senate, the Secretary of Commerce and Communication, Senators and Representatives and a small group of businessmen. The resolution reads: "The special task of the Commission during its stay in the United States will be to endeavor by every means in its power to advance the excellent relations and mutual confidence now existing between the Americans and the Filipino people and to encourage the further development of the commercial relations between both countries on a broad liberal and permanent foundation." . . . The Governor General further requested: "Please give me your views on the subject. I am advised also that the Commission will hope to take up with the President if agreeable to him, the question of fixing a date for Philippine independence with which idea I am in full accord." [3]

In a short cablegram from Manila, November 13, 1918, Harrison stated: "the Commission authorized by the Philippine Legislature as reported in my telegram of November 11th will start for the United States

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[1] "Delegations of Filipinos to the United States," BIA, File No. 26480/97.

[2] Grayson Kirk, *Philippine Independence Motives, Problems and Prospects,* 48.

[3] Harrison to the Secretary of War Baker, November 11, 1918, "Delegations of Filipinos to the United States," BIA, File No. with 26480/after 20.

in a few days, and I have requested the Commanding General and he has given his consent that the Commission go on transport Sherman here about November 20th. May I ask whether this may have the approval of the department?" [4]

An immediate reply of the Secretary of War, was requested to the cablegram dated November 13. The Reply was: "Confidential. Referring to telegram from your office of the 13th instant, Secretary of War requests that the Commission defer sailing until he can confer with the President." [5]

A further cablegram on November 15, was sent to Harrison. This communication gave the Manila Office a further explanation of the possible postponement of the sending a Commission of independence at this period when the President of the United States was so crowded with matters pertaining to the armistice which had just been signed.

On the 15th of November, a "confidential" cable was sent to the Governor-General by the Secretary of War. It reads: "Referring to telegram from your office of the 14th instant, Secretary of War finds the President so surrounded and immersed with problem arising with close of war and with peace conference that he finds himself in embarrassing position through the necessity of being unable to give to the Philippine Committee the necessary time for discussion and consideration of their affairs. The Secretary, while not desiring to be ungracious or inhospitable or not out of harmony with the purpose of the visit, is taking further advantage of the loyalty and support of the Filipino peoples, with the expectation that they will give this additional evidence of their belief that their interests are safe in the hands of the President, by expressing the hope that the Committee defer its visit until conditions are more favorable." [6]

At the moment when the Filipinos, through their Legislature, decided to send an independence mission, Governor-General Harrison sent to the President of the United States his most faithful confidential letter that embodied his views with respect to the question of definitely settling the independence issue. Since he had not been asked to express his opinion on the subject, the Governor-General wrote an official letter marked "confidential" and made a further remark saying, "I trust that you will not think it officious on my part to offer my views in advance of their being asked for." [7]

This letter is worth quoting to show that Harrison had certified that the Filipinos had now fulfilled the requirements for independence as set by the Jones Law in 1916.

"My dear Mr. President: The Philippine Legislature has just authorized by joint resolution the sending of a commission of Filipinos to the

[4] *Ibid.*
[5] Baker to Harrison, November 14, 1918, *Ibid.*
[6] *Ibid.*
[7] Harrison to Wilson, November 13, 1918, BIA, File No. .... pt. 2, 364/342.

United States for the purpose of advancing the excellent relations and mutual confidence now existing between the American and the Filipino peoples and to encourage the further development of the commercial relations between both countries. This commission is headed by the President of the Senate, Honorable Manuel L. Quezon and includes some of the leading men in public life and commerce. I am advised that, if considered convenient by you, they will take up with you the question of definitely settling the independence of the Philippines, and as I am not to be in Washington at the time of their expected conference with you, I take the liberty of submitting to you my views on that subject.

"Upon the passage by Congress of the Act of August 26, 1916, known as the Jones Law, the Filipino people set to work to establish here the form of government authorized by that law in accordance with the requirements of the preamble of which it was declared to be the intention of the United States to give the Filipinos their independence when a stable government shall have been established. Two sessions of the new Legislature organized pursuant to that Act have passed, and a third one is now in session; for more than two years past the executive offices, known as the Cabinet, have been in operation under Filipino direction, with the exception of the Department of Public Instruction, of which under the law the Vice Governor, who is an American, is in charge. Filipinization of the service generally has taken place very rapidly, especially since the passage in 1915 of the Osmeña Retirement Act, under which many Americans left the service under favorable financial consideration, and also as a result of the demand for many of our active younger Americans for the military service of the United States during the war. Today and for some time past the government may be said to be a Filipino government, with the exception of the positions of Governor General, Vice Governor, and a majority of the Supreme Court, the bulk of the Americans remaining in the service otherwise being in the teaching profession, either in the public schools or in the University, or in scientific and technical positions. The forty-five provinces are almost entirely under Filipino Governors and provincial boards, and so are the eight hundred municipalities, as they have been nearly from the beginning of the establishment of municipal governments in the Islands under the American system. It is, therefore, in my opinion entirely proper to state that the stable government now existing in the Philippine Islands is for the most part a stable government of Filipinos by Filipinos, and I believe that the time has come when the people of the Islands are prepared to qualify for independence under the terms prescribed in the preamble of the Jones Law.

"For the past two years or more comparatively little has been heard from the Filipinos as to their aspirations for independence, but this in no way indicates a lessening of their ambition and desires in that respect; it is rather due, first, to the absorption they have felt in the establishment

and working out of the nearly autonomous form of government authorized by the Jones Law and, secondly and above all from a sincere and universal desire on the part of the Filipino people and their leaders not to raise any question which might be misconstrued as embarrassing to the United States when our country was at war. It was no doubt moreover felt that even though our country was not so engaged, the existence of the war in which almost all the nations of the world were involved was a time inopportune for a comparatively small country to ask for its independence. The recent indications of the speedy termination of the war, followed by the news today that a general armistice has been concluded, has inspired the Philippine Legislature to believe that they would now be relieved of any reproach if they raise the question of independence. I have advised the people here on several occasions that the very essence of the war was the right of small nations to independent existence, free from aggression by the governments of larger countries; your wonderful addresses on the causes of the war, which have been published all over the world, have made that issue clear to every one, and the Filipinos have been correspondingly encouraged as to their own chances for the future. It has seemed to me that your tremendous influence in the council of peace will be felt even more decisively as to the rights and status of the subject people who are now ruled by alien monarchs, if our own Philippine question is definitely settled by Congressional enactment.

"The steady evolution of ability for self-government in the Philippines which is so marked in the eyes of all observers here, has no doubt passed almost unnoticed by the rest of the world when events of such tremendous importance were engaging the attention of all great countries. To those of us, however, who have been at work here in the Philippines it is intensely gratifying to see the undoubted ability which the Filipinos have displayed in executive office as well as in their legislative and judicial duties. The habit of executive decision has grown very firmly in those who have been entrusted with the exercise of those duties, and considering the very complex and varied questions which have come before this country during recent years, the generally high average of successful handling of public questions by the Filipinos themselves is deserving of universal commendation. Most of the doubts and fears expressed by critics of our progressive concessions to the Filipinos have been relegated to the past, and while it would be difficult to assert that any government ever set up by man is perfectly satisfactory in every respect, I will be glad to have the operations and achievements of the Filipinos in public office subjected to the most severe scrutiny without any fear of the judgment of any impartial observer as to their general integrity, patriotism, self-control and wisdom in the disposition of public matters. From a close association with the Filipinos and their representative men over a period of more than five years, I have no hesitation now in stating that I consider the Filipino

people capable of conducting an independent government and that I believe that the concession to them of independence would best promote their own happiness and welfare.

"It has been very gratifying to us here to have you make public recognition from time to time of the loyalty of the Filipinos to the American cause during the war; that loyalty is deep, genuine and universal in the Philippines. It is based upon the recognition of what the United States had done specifically for the Philippine people and, also, upon an appreciation of what the United States is fighting for in this war as expressed on many public occasions by yourself. I think that in their offer and organization of a division for the military service, in their loan of a destroyer and a submarine to our Navy, in their response to liberty loans and Red Cross appeals, the Filipinos have made visible demonstration of their attitude towards our country. It is reserved perhaps to those of us who had the privilege of serving here with them in the Philippines to know how deep seated, sincere and spontaneous their gratitude to us and their loyalty to our flag really is.

"I hope it may be possible for you to receive the commission sent to our country by the Philippine Legislature and that they may be accorded the privilege of discussing with you the independence question; I trust, also, that it may seem to you wise to submit that question to Congress now for final determination for I hope and believe that our Congress, in accordance with the promise made in 1916, should and will now definitely settle the independence of the Philippines. If it should seem wise to Congress also to grant to the new Philippine Government something in the nature of the Platt amendment, I feel confident that the rights and interests of the inhabitants themselves will appear secure beyond question in the eyes of all the outside world." [8]

This famous confidential letter embodied Harrison's true belief that the Filipinos should be free. From a close association with the Filipinos and their representatives for a period of five years, Harrison had no hesitation in saying that the Filipino people were a people capable of self-government and that independence would best promote their own happiness and welfare. He hoped that the United States Congress would consider a new Philippine Government something akin to that of the Republic of Cuba as American protectorate.

Harrison further communicated with the War Department explaining the main purpose of the Independence Mission under consideration. On November 19, he cabled Secretary of War Baker, stating that both houses of the Legislature, wished him to transmit at their request the following message: "The main purpose of the Philippine Mission was to secure from the United States the final adjustment of matters affecting our national independence. This mission could have been sent some time ago but the

[8] *Ibid.*

war in which America was engaged and this noble issue in which we have given our unqualified indorsement did not permit us to take such a step. The hostilities having ended with the victory of American arms and ideals, our duty called upon us to act, hence, the Joint Resolution unanimously passed by the Philippine Legislature providing that a special mission be sent to the United States. The Filipino people, which demand of its representatives these final steps, is earnestly desirous to establish its own independent government, not alone as the only fitting culmination of its efforts on behalf of its ideals of liberty and democracy, but also as a practical corollary of the principles of self-government enunciated and reiterated by the President of the United States in his war message. The mission is now organized and has decided to sail on the Manoa due in San Francisco about the seventh of next month. This is publicly known and it has received the cordial approval of the whole country. In view, however, of the suggestions of the War Department transmitted to us by the Governor-General four days ago . . . we are ready to defer to his wishes by postponing for the time being the trip of the Mission. We are mindful of the grave responsibility we are assuming before the Filipino people in delaying the execution of a demand in which we are involved its most vital interests, but we take this step after full deliberation, without misgivings, because of our firm conviction that the President already has a plan that will satisfy the National aspirations of the Filipino people, which we have on repeated occasions presented to the Government of the United States, and that the execution of such plan in so far as the Government of the United States is concerned is assured, during the present administration. In view of these facts and so that we may submit the point of view of the Filipino people, would the President allow us to hope that he will find opportunity to confer and deliberate with the Filipino Mission as to details, as soon as it may be compatible with the most pressing war matters of the Government of the United States. As authorized spokesmen of our people we would not properly express its feelings if we did not take advantage of this opportunity to say that the Filipino people is profoundly grateful to the United States for her encouraging promises of independence, and for the assurances now reiterated all confirming our faith that the interests of the Filipino people are safe in the hands of President Wilson." [9]

With the postponement of the projected departure of the Philippine Mission for the United States, the War Department in a cablegram to Manila, January 29, 1919 informed the Governor-General that the Mission

[9] Harrison to the Secretary of War, November 19, 1918, BIA, File No. Copy, pt. 2, copy 364/342-A; See also BIA, File No. with 26480/after 29; BIA, File No. 36480/14½. This confidential memorandum for the Governor-General was submitted by a joint statement of Osmeña and Quezon, Manila, November 19, 1918. Memo for the Governor, BIA, File No. 26480/14.

may be able to take the next available transport sailing from Manila. The instruction stated that a rush answer should be made.[10]

Senate President Manuel L. Quezon who was then in New York with his secretaries cabled Osmeña on January 31, 1919 with reference to the sailing of the Philippine Mission which by then had been approved by the War Department. He asked Osmeña that the Mission should all go to the United States in one transport. The reason for all of them to go in one group was to avoid issuing any statement to the Press until the Mission has seen the President. This can be best accomplished to bring the Mission on the transport because it would stop only in Guam, Honolulu and San Francisco where he would then meet them. "There should be the understanding that no one is to say anything except the head of the Mission," said Senate President Quezon, "and he can only give to the Press the resolution verbatim of the Philippine Legislature authorizing the trip of the Mission until after the conference with the President, in which case, the head of the Mission may say what the President authorized to say. If for lack of comfort on the transport some prefer merchant vessels tell them there are no accommodation for all and they should come together. You assure them of the courteous treatment by the officers of the transport." [11]

Manuel L. Quezon also mentioned the members of the Mission like: Rafael Palma, Dionicio Jakosalem, Senator Liongson, Senator Singson, Senator Gabaldon (if he wishes), Ramon Fernandez, Mauro Prieto, Tomas Earnshaw, Juan Allegre, Pablo Ocampo, Gabriel La O, Quintin Paredes (atty. general), Aldanese, collector of customs, Maximo Kalaw (Secretary), Arsenio Luz, Alejandro Roces, Francisco Varona, Pedro Gil and Evangelista for the labor man. He had the complete hand to select the members of the Mission.

Vice-Governor General Yeater in his cable to the Secretary of War on February 15, 1919, informed him that the Commission sailed for San Francisco, on February 14, with the names mentioned above as well as others. The complete list of the Commission was not published until three days before its departure. Added to the names mentioned above as selected by Quezon were those of Representative Rafael Alunan, Gregorio Nieva, Jose Reyes, Delfin Mahinay, Ceferino de Leon, Jorge Bocobo, Conrado Benitez, Enrique Altevas, Jose A. Santos, and Camilo Osias.

An impressive farewell demonstration was held by the people to honor the Mission. On the morning of their departure, the Malecom Drive was filled by multitudes, and the military authorities temporarily suspended the order against public entry into the area between Malecom and the military pier where the transport Sherman was anchored. It was noteworthy that

[10] Delegations of Filipinos to the United States, BIA, File No. with 26480/after 29.

[11] Quezon to Osmeña, January 31, 1919, BIA, File No. with 26480/after 29. These names above were enumerated by Quezon in his letter to Osmeña, dated January 30, 1919, writing from Hotel Belmont, New York. See BIA, File No. 26480/22.

no public manifestation was requested, and there was sufficient time for an organized effort in that respect. However, the general public gathered spontaneously in an orderly manner at the pier without any previous planning. The demonstration was considered at that time as the greater show of mass-support for Philippine Independence. The members of the Mission declined all invitations to social functions, except the one for banquet tendered by the Chamber of Commerce on the eve of their departure.[12]

On this occasion Secretary Rafael Palma, temporary head of the Commission, expressed in forceful logic the desired expansion of commercial relations between America and the Philippines, and the preservation and cultivation of the friendly ties binding the two peoples. The Speaker also said that there was a great field for the investment of American capital and he also expressed himself cordially the loyalty of the Filipinos to the United States during the world war, the resulting ovation was such that it touched the hearts of every American present. The language of the Speaker was as follows:

"The world has contemplated the moving spectacle of the American flag waving free and *undisputed* over these remote islands not by the aggressive imposition of material force which *barely expressed* but through the sincere and spontaneous esteem of the determined and united support of the entire Philippine people." [13]

Vice-Governor-General Yeater said in turn: "The members undertaking the Commission have shown exceptional discretion. They have not only renounced all banquets, public or political, tendered, but also, in spite of the insistence of newspapermen, in no instance gave out any information, whatever, of the political objects of the mission. To present properly the facts of the matter, I should say too that the people here hope that this mission will accomplish a final arrangement for the independence of the Islands to some concrete form and this impression is brought to me by those who come from the province, and has been clearly stated in private conversation with the most influential person who resort to the Ayuntamiento and by those who came to the pier to wish success to the voyagers. . . . I can say that there is planted deep in the hearts of Filipinos a feeling of confidence in the generosity, justice and altruism of the American people and that they feel sure that those leaving on this expedition will effect a satisfactory adjustment of the future status of these Islands."[14]

Such was the true picture of the departure of the Independence Mission as described by Vice-Governor General Yeater, that the people were hopeful of the happy return of the Commission to bring home a new order of government in this far-flung colony of the United States. The way to

[12] Yeater to the Secretary of War (Baker), February 15, 1919, BIA, File No. 26480/28.
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *Ibid.*

independence was now clear. The Filipinos expected that independence was near at hand.

The mission arrived in Washington, D.C. on the 3rd of April 1919 when President Wilson was still in Paris. This mission was provided with "A Declaration of Purposes" for guidance. This declaration pointed out that the Filipinos "do not need to repeat the declaration regarding the national aspirations of the Filipino people. Such declarations have been made from time to time in the most frank and solemn manner by the constitutional representatives of the Philippine nation and a matter of permanent record in public documents covering more than a decade of persistent efforts particularly during the last three years. America, on her part, has been sufficiently explicit in her purpose from the beginning of her occupation of the Philippines. . . .

"In submitting the Philippine question to the government and people of the United States, whether directly or otherwise, the Independence Commission will find it unnecessary to refer to the natural acerbity of the situation, or to the anxiety of our people which two decades of occupation have served to accentuate. The steadfastness of our position is not due to the sentimental nature, but of the justice of our cause, sanctified by the 'Laws of God and Nature' not only, best admitted in the promises solemnly made by the United States and accepted by the Philippines." [15]

The Declaration of Purposes recited the policies of the Republican Party and finally on March 4, 1913, a change of administration from Republican to Democratic took place. Harrison told the Filipinos of the message of President Wilson informing them of the policy of giving the Filipinos a greater participation in the government and every step taken towards ultimate independence. The Jones Law was finally signed on August 29, 1916, which promised the independence of the Philippines. It further cited the development of education, sanitation, public works, transportation, agriculture, commerce and industry; the establishment of the Civil Service and the independent Judiciary. Finally, the Commission was to be guided now with only one goal: *Independence;* and one instruction: *to get it.*[16]

There was also a further instruction to the Philippine Mission dated March 17, 1919 asking it to convey to the Government of the United

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[15] "Resolution on March 8, 1919 of the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines, in Joint Session Assembled, Adopting a Declaration of Purposes for Guidance of the Independence Commission." BIA, File No... pt. 2, copy 364/348; See also "Declaration of Purposes" Publications of the Independence Mission, Bulletin No. I, (March 1919).

[16] *Ibid.* This "Declaration of Purposes" was carefully drafted and contained a resume of all the facts and principles supporting the aspirations of the Philippine Islands for independence, the Legislature expressed in such deep statement the deep everlasting gratitude of the Filipino people to the American people for their altruism and generosity and for having assisted the Filipinos reaching at their present prosperity and preparedness for assuming the full responsibilities of free government. The Filipinos during this period were so sure of themselves of American goodness and altruism leading them towards the goals of independence, but did they know that they were being "hood-winked" by Americian business interests of Wall Street?

States the assurance of goodwill, friendship, and gratitude of the Filipino people and to submit the question of independence with a view of final settlement. It called the attention of the Government of the United States to the summary of facts and propositions contained in the "Declaration of Purposes" approved by the Philippine Legislature on March 8, 1919. This instruction further asked the Mission to have a frank exchange of views with the officials in Washington in order to achieve promptly a definite adjustment of details and the civilization and execution of the independence plans in accordance with the principles already established and agreed upon with the United States.

Since the world war was now over and the victorious nation was busily engaged in applying the principles that emerged triumphant from the conflict, the mission was also instructed to submit the independence question to the United States, or even to any other competent world tribunal for settlement. The Filipinos were even willing to discuss the terms of independence and the scope of the covenants necessary to guarantee the safety and stability of the new state and to establish and maintain such external relations, especially with America, as may be equitable and beneficial and as the circumstances may demand. The Commission had in mind that the Philippines should join a concert of powers to guarantee the independence of weak powers. The commission members further instructed, that if independence was granted to make the country a safe place where law and order, justice and liberty prevail; where Americans and foreigners as well as nationals may live peacefully in the pursuit of happiness and prosperity and in the enjoyment of their property as well as of their rights and their liberty.[17]

On April 4, 1919, Manuel L. Quezon, Chairman of the Independence Commission made his remarks, addressed to the Secretary of War. He said:

"The Philippine Legislature at the behest of the Filipino people sent this Mission to the United States bearing the message of good will, gratitude, and respect from all the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands. As chairman of this Mission, I deem it a great honor to convey the message to the Government and people of the American Republic.

"The Philippine Mission, Mr. Secretary, is here charged with a high and solemn obligation. It is enjoined with a noble and sacred trust. It is instructed to present the great cause so essential and necessary to the happiness and existence of the entire Filipino people. I refer to our national birthright to be free and independent. We, therefore, formally submit hereby the vital and urgent question of Philippine Independence to you, and through you, to the Government of the United States in the confident hope that it shall merit a just, righteous, and final settlement.

"Independence is the great national ideal of the Filipino people. The members of the Philippine Mission here, representing all elements of Phil-

[17] Instruction from the Philippine Commission to the Philippine Mission, March 17, 1919, BIA, File No. pt. 2, with 364/348.

ilippine life, are and all, ready to testify to the absolute truth of this assertion. We believe that this is the proper time to present the question, looking to a favorable and decisive action, because of the declared and uniform policy of America to withdraw her sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize our independence as soon as a stable government in the Philippines managed and supported by the people themselves, and that it can and will be maintained under an independent Philippine government, the testimony of your own official representatives, Governor-General Harrison and Acting Governor-General Yeater, will bear out. The fulfillment of this solemn promise you owe to yourselves, to us, and to humanity at large.

"We also find inspiration and justification for our decision to appeal at this time to the government and people of the United States for the granting of our independence in the declaration of principles for the preservation of which America in the recent World War held life and property cheap. America fought 'for the liberty, the self-government, and the undictated development of all peoples,' and cheerfully assumed her full share in the war 'for the liberation of peoples everywhere.' The American people were willing to dedicate their lives and their fortunes, everything that they were and everything that they had, for the things you have always carried nearest your hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own Government, *for the rights and liberties of small nations.*' Mr. Secretary, may I be permitted to recall at this juncture that in fighting for so high and noble ideals the Filipino people have stood by you during the critical years of the gigantic struggle and, to a man, were ready, nay anxious, to shed their blood, side by side with your own soldiers?

"I beg leave to place in your hands, Mr. Secretary, a document I have with me. It contains instructions of the Philippine Legislature to the Independence Commission to present the question of independence to the United States, and amply sets forth our bases for appealing for independent national existence. Mr. Secretary, will it be necessary to repeat what we have always been pleased to recognize that, with the helping hand of the United States, the Philippines saw prosperity and progress unprecedented? Through the joint labor of Americans and Filipinos, the history of your occupation of the Islands is replete with achievements great, and results splendid. You have truly treated us as no nation has ever before treated another under its sway. And yet you—and none better than you—will understand why, even under such conditions, our people still crave independence, that they, too, may be sovereign masters of their own destinies.

"Sir, when our national independence shall be granted us, the world will know that the people of America are indeed 'bearers of the good will, the protection, and the richest blessings of a liberating rather than a con-

quering nation,' and that it was *our* liberty, not *your* power, *our* welfare not *your* gain you sought to enhance in the Philippines." [18]

After Quezon's speech, the Secretary of War delivered to the Mission his following rejoinder. He said: "Senator, Mr. Governor-General and gentlemen of the Philippine Delegation: My first duty is to convey to you an expression of the President's regret at his absence from Washington at the time of your visit. When it was first suggested that the mission should come to the United States, the President foresaw his absence and caused me to suggest the visit be deferred in the hope that he might be personally here when the mission came and have the opportunity to meet you and hear your views, and express his own. It has turned out, however, that his engagements in Europe required his return there, and so he is unable to be in Washington now to receive you. He left a letter addressed to me which he asked me to read to you." [19]

The letter reads: "Dear Mr. Secretary; Will you please express to the gentlemen of the Commission representing the Philippine Legislature my regret that I shall be unable to see them personally on their arrival in Washington, as well as my hope that their mission will be a source of satisfaction to them and that it will result in bringing about the desirable ends set forth in the Joint Resolution of the Legislature approving the sending of the Commission to the United States.

"I have been deeply gratified with the constant support and encouragement received from the Filipino people and from the Philippine Legislature in the trying period through which we are passing. The people of the United States have, with reason, taken the deepest pride in the loyalty and support of the Filipino people.

"Though unable to meet the Commission, the Filipino people shall not be absent from my thought. Not the least important labor of the conference which now requires my attendance is that of making the pathway of the weaker people of the world less perilous—a labor which should be, and doubtless is, of deep and abiding interest to the Filipino people.

"I am sorry that I cannot look into the faces of the gentlemen of this Mission from the Philippine Islands and tell them all that I have in my mind and heart as I think of the patient labor, *with the end almost in sight,* undertaken by the American and Filipino people for their permanent benefit. I know, however, that your sentiments are mine in this regard and that you will translate truly to them my own feelings."[20]

This was one of the last letters of President Woodrow Wilson to the people of the Philippines and the Philippine Legislature. He foresaw that

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[18] Address of Manuel L. Quezon to the Secretary of War, April 4, 1919 in the War Department. The Secretary was in on the whole affair, See BIA, File No. pt. 3, Copy 3, Copy 364-348; also see Quezon Papers, Box 43 (Manila).

[19] Quezon to Osmeña, April 4, 1919, copy of cable, BIA, File No. pt. 2, 364/348.

[20] Wilson to Baker, March 3, 1919, BIA, File No. pt. 2, with 364/348. The underscoring is mine.

independence of a dependent people like the Filipinos was almost in sight. But he did not see the day of their independence. Harrison did see the day of independence that they sponsored in the realm and power of the Democratic party. However, Harrison attended the inauguration of the Republic of the Philippines in July 1946.

The Filipino Mission sent a letter of response to President Wilson who was then in Paris. This letter was very commendable to a great statesman and a friend of Filipino independence. Manuel L. Quezon sent this message to Wilson in the name of the Philippine Independence Mission. It reads:

"President Woodrow Wilson, Paris: The Philippine Mission in Washington, bearing a message of good will, respect and gratitude from all the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands to the Government and people of the United States, regret their inability to convey this message to you in person, but are happy and gratified at the reassuring statements you left in the hands of the Secretary of War which were delivered to them on the occasion of their official visit to the Secretary of War.

"The Filipino people are gratefully conscious of what you have done and are doing in their behalf and of your efforts to secure for them as for the rest of mankind, the blessings of Liberty, Justice and Democracy. The avowed policy of the United States to grant the Philippine independence which has brought about friendly and affectionate relations between the Americans and Filipino people and won for the United States the unqualified support and loyal cooperation of the Philippines during the war is not only a positive evidence of the faith of the American people in the principle of self-government, but it is also an object lesson of the world.

"In the name of the Filipino people as well as in our own, we beg to express to you our cordial and respectful greetings wishing you success in the noble task you have before you in helping to bring about a just and lasting peace to the world based upon the right of every people, whether great or small, to have an independent existence and enjoy free and unhampered self-development.

"It will be a pleasure to the Mission to communicate to the people of the Philippine Islands your message as transmitted by the Secretary of War and your own feeling and translated by him, which we are sure, will instill in them fresh hope and will evoke in their hearts feeling of deep gratitude." [21]

On April 18, 1919, Quezon sent Osmeña a summary of the achievements of the Independence Mission. He made the opening statement that "In every respect the Mission had made good. The American people know now, and have learned with undisguised gratification, pride and appreciation of the friendly sentiments of the Filipino people toward them. They are fully informed of the evidence we have given especially during the war, and

[21] Quezon to Wilson, April 5, 1919, BIA, File No. pt. 3, 364/349-A; also see Quezon Papers (Manila).

the sincerity of these sentiments and nothing we could have said or done would have had so wholesome an effect upon the public opinion to prepare it for sympathetic hearing of our plea." [22]

Quezon went further to say that the interests of commercial organizations have been aroused. These commercial groups even went out of their way to entertain these missions.

As far as the independence question was concerned, the mission upon its arrival in Washington sought an official visit to and was received by the Secretary of War. The President being in Paris, the Secretary of War received the Mission accompanied by the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, the Governor-General of the Philippines, and the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, General McIntyre.

Soon after greetings were exchanged Quezon discussed the purpose of the Mission and delivered to the Secretary the "Joint Resolution of the Philippine Legislature and the Instructions of the Philippine Independence Commission" and the Secretary received it. Later, Secretary Baker read to them the message of the President already referred to.

President Manuel L. Quezon of the Philippine Senate informed Osmeña that the Mission was able to obtain a frank and explicit declaration of the stand of the administration on the question of independence. The administration did not only confirm this policy of ultimate independence but it went further—it admitted that all was ready for the granting of independence. "This fact alone" said Quezon, "would justify the trip of the Mission to secure a formal recognition on the part of the authorities in Washington that condition in the Philippines are ripe for the granting of independence."[23]

The Chairman of the Mission was so convinced of the total affectionate effects of having succeded in awakening the interests of the American people with respect to the Filipino problems and consequently, the consideration of Congress of the Philippines would have been postponed. The Philippine Legislature had done well in sending the Mission at this very time. Quezon was very optimistic of the goodness of our relations with the ruling country. It seemed to him that independence was so near, that independence lies clear ahead as envisioned by President Wilson. But both men were wrong. They relied too much on their optimism. The Republican Party was then in the helm of power again and it was next to impossible to convince them that a stable government had been established in so short a period after the Jones Law was enacted. The Republicans reverted once again to their earlier slogan that Filipinos were incapable of ruling themselves or incapable of self-government.[24] It had so succeeded that independence was postponed until a later period in 1946.

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[22] Quezon to Osmeña, April 18, 1919, Quezon Papers (Manila).

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] *Supra*: Chapters V and VI. These Chapters V and VI are in my prepared manuscript ready for publication—"The Foundations of Filipino-American Relations 1898-1921" University of the Philippines (1971).

It seems as if the Anti-Imperialist League was altogether not very pleased with the Filipinos creating a Commission of Independence to go to America and work for independence after they had sensed the result of the election of November 1918 in the United States. The Filipinos had in a few days after the election passed a new "Resolve," and stated that their only object was to foster friendly commercial relations with possible investors, to be sought diligently, and as a clan always unfriendly to independence, to receive of course assurance that there would be now no "political agitation." The Filipinos therefore had executed a "volti-face", says Mr. Erving Winslow, the Secretary of the Anti-Imperialist League in Boston. Winslow further said: "Careful language is used because of the desire for independence cannot be swallowed whole at once, but the promoters are to be assured that the whole independence question is to be put in 'cold storage'. Before this resolve was passed we were asked to help! Probably now, since nothing is left but the name and every new investor will drive a nail into the coffin of liberty, we shall not be expected to do so. Had we not better make terms to hold our peace for the sake of a few 'ground floor' shares in the 'Rizal Oil Co.,' E. Aguinaldo, Chairman of Directorate."[25] The Anti-Imperialist League now felt that the Independence Commission had turned about face to the good old noble movement to be free from the hands of the big business interests in America or rather in Wall Street.

While the Mission was in Washington, Secretary of War and Mrs. Baker gave them a reception on Saturday, April 6. To this reception prominent guests were invited to meet the members of the Mission such as the prominent members of the Cabinet, generals and other army officers, members of the Senate and House of Representatives and other personages in the social and political circles of Washington. On Friday, April 5, the Mission tendered a luncheon in honor of the Secretary. Mr. Quezon acted as a toastmaster and in proposing to the health of the Secretary of War, spoke of the purposes of the Mission and the gratification of the Mission at the encouraging words of both the President and the Secretary of War. Mr. Baker answered, reiterating his former declarations officially made to the Mission. Other speakers were Mr. Mondell, the future majority leader of the House of Representatives; Senator Hitchcock, Secretary Palma, Mr. Osias and Mr. Abad Santos. Both Representative Mondell and Senator Hitchcock spoke in support of the realization of Filipino ideals. Palma discussed the stability of the Government, Osias of the progress of education and Abad Santos of the desires of the young generation of Filipinos to see the Philippines independent.

On the night of April 7, a banquet was given by the Committee on Entertainments in honor of the Mission. On behalf of the Committee, those present were Mr. Fairchild, an American business tycoon in the Philippines, Lowenstein, and Pardee of Wall Street who had big business interests in

[25] Winslow to Baker, March 14, 1918, BIA, File No. 26480/38.

the Philippines. Mr. Fairchild acted as toastmaster. The speech of welcome was made by Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison, and Manuel L. Quezon, Chairman of the Mission, gave the response. Other speakers were Dionicio Jakosalem, Philippine Secretary of Commerce and Communication, who spoke of the commercial progress of the Philippines, Mr. Camilo Osias, of the economic side of education, and Dean Bocobo, of the aspirations of the Filipino people. On the part of the Americans, the speakers were Representative Towner, Chairman on the Committee on Insular Affairs, followed by ex-Representative Miller and ex-Representative Cooper. Cooper once again recited Rizal's *Last Thoughts.*

The Mission had received many courtesies of the War Department since their arrival. Mrs. Harrison, the mother of Governor-General Harrison gave a reception to the Mission. Mrs. Harrison was a novelist and a writer of Virginia and considered very wealthy and prominent in Washington circles. The Mission was understood to have visited the tombs of Washington, William Atkinson Jones who had just recently passed away, and Theodore Roosevelt who died that February 1919.

The newspapers of the United States according to Quezon's observation were commenting on the visit of the Philippine Independence Mission favorably and from every side they heard reports that the Mission was producing very good effects upon public opinion. The letter of the President and the remarks of the Secretary of War to the Mission were indorsed by many important papers.[26]

Later on June 2, 1919, the Philippine Independence Mission was given an open hearing by the Joint Committees of the Senate and House Representatives, and the Chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs, Hon. Horace M. Towner, who presided over the meeting. In the open hearing he (Towner) asked Senator Harding, Chairman of the Senate Committee to preside, but the latter declined. In the opening remarks, the chairman of the Committee told the Mission that they should be frank to say what they desired to say. The joint hearing wanted to be given information regarding the existing conditions in the Philippines. They wanted to know further the progress the Filipinos had achieved. They wanted to know in the way of Legislation that would affect their interests, not only politically but economically and socially; or anything that they would make for the betterment of the people. One of the most important statements made by Mr. Towner was "You understand without my telling you, that there is an insistent demand for very pressing and very important legislation, and unless you press your demand it is not likely that they will receive consideration." [27]

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[26] Quezon to Osmeña, April 8, 1919, BIA, File No. 26480/62. The marginal note says: "Costly: Send an open message and get on the wire as soon as possible 4/9/1919."

[27] *Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate and the Committee on Insular Affairs House of Representatives,* held jointly. (Washington Government Printing Office, 1919) 4-5.

Towner went further by saying: "We want to know what you want, what you desire. The people of the United States haven't anything but the most kindly feeling and cordial wishes for your success, and if we can help you in any way we want to do it. We want to be in a position to at least consider what you think ought to be done, and we want you to feel perfectly free, as I said before, to make your statements in your own way, without any reservation, without any hesitancy, with no feeling that you are asking a favor, but with the consciousness that you are here by right and that we would give you a fair and impartial hearing upon not only this occasion but upon all others." These words of Congressman Towner were so full of wisdom and frankness to the Filipino Mission, that they were encouraged very much by American altruism and fairness.

Hence Manuel L. Quezon, the Chairman of the Philippine Mission of Independence was quick to say in these hearings, and with great counsel that: "So large and representative a body has come to you charged by our people with the noble and sacred Mission of pleading for the national independence of the Philippine Islands. The Filipinos feel that the time has come when steps should be taken immediately by the Government of the United States for the recognition of the sovereignty of the Filipino people over their own country. It is, I think, the first time in the history of the world where a country under the sovereignty of another seeks its separation from the latter not on the ground of grievances or abuses that call for redress but rather on the ground that the work of the ruling country has been so well and nobly performed that it is no longer necessary she should still direct the destinies of her colony; and so the colony, with love and gratitude for the governing country, seeks her separation. We have nothing but words of praise and appreciation for the work so well performed by the United States, and yet you will readily understand why nothing short of independence would ever fully satisfy our people. The granting of our national freedom at this time is in accordance with the avowed policy of the United States with regard to the Philippine Islands." [28]

Quezon further traced the policies of the American Presidents from Mckinley to Wilson. Mckinley enunciated that the main purpose of the United States in the Philippine Islands was to help the Filipinos develop an autonomous government so that their independence will be recognized as soon as they could show that they were able to manage their own affairs. Their various declarations all moved towards the development of good government and eventual independence. Finally the Act of Congress, approved by President Wilson on August 29, 1916, made the formal declaration to give the Filipinos their independence as soon as a stable government was established. This was an act for the avowed purpose to finalize their independence.

[28] *Ibid.*, 6.

After making an extended remark, Mr. Towner, the Chairman of the occasion, asked Quezon if he would allow him to be interrupted. He asked Quezon if the Philippine Legislature had adopted a memorial or petition which they would desire to present to Congress. "Yes," replied Quezon and that he would be pleased to submit the Resolution passed by the Philippine Legislature and the "Instruction of Purposes" submitted to them by the Philippine Commission of Independence.[29] These two documents were ordered to be printed in the Congressional Record.

Senator Harding, Chairman of Senate Committee on the Philippines, asked Quezon if he wanted the Committee to construe that the purport of his appeal was to have a complete severance of relations without any provision for a protectorate or anything of that sort. Quezon replied that the Philippine Legislature had not instructed them on that matter. He asserted that the future relations between the two countries would be discussed by their representatives after a congressional legislation has been enacted to recognize Philippine independence. "However" Quezon said: "It might anticipate the assertion that the people of the Philippines are prepared to have the independence of the country recognized by the United States without any protectorate; but if it should be deemed preferable by the United States that some kind of political relationship should exist, we would be willing to accept that. In other words, we shall take independence of the Philippines with or without any protection." [30]

Senator Harding countered, "the point I am trying to get at is, you are voicing the aspirations of the Filipinos; what is your judgment about that? Do you want to be wholly severed from any connection with the United States in your independence?" Quezon interposed, "Are you asking me my preference or my judgment, Senator?" Senator Harding, replied, "I am asking for your expression or your judgment." Quezon answered: "Perhaps, it might be to the interest of both the United States and the Philippines that some kind of understanding should exist whereby after independence of the islands has been recognized that there shall be some kind of connection between the two countries. But that is merely secondary consideration. . . the most essential thing is that independence of the Philippines be recognized —either absolute independence or independence under the protectorate of the United States."

Senator Harding again said: "Which would your Commission prefer?" "I think", said Quezon, "that the independence of the Philippines under the League is what at the present time appeals to everybody in the Philippines. But if there be no league the Filipinos would like to see the independence of the Philippines recognized and guaranteed by international agreement among the great powers, but if that should not be possible, they want independence anyway."

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[29] *Ibid.*, 8.
[30] *Ibid.*, 9.

One of the last questions of Senator Harding to Quezon was: "Based on your experience as a Delegate in Congress, would you advocate an earnest consideration of this question (Philippine Independence) while the world—and the Senate in particular—are engaged in discussing the League of Nations *is definitely disposed of?"*

Quezon replied that from the standpoint of the Filipinos that was the appropriate time and that was the way the Filipinos looked upon the matter. Then he told Senator Harding that in his long experience in Congress he realized the difficulties of the problem. Again he told Senator Harding that if he is questioned as to the wisdom of immediate independence, as a Filipino, he would immediately ask for it. Because, according to him, European affairs, were in no way related to the immediate recognition of Philippine independence, for this was a matter that was decidedly for the United States Congress to consider. And if there was going to be a League of Nations, he would like that the Philippines be made a member under United States sponsorship. He further answered Harding by saying: "I don't really see any reason for waiting. I think that one joint resolution could grant Philippine Independence and do it in 24 hours if Congress felt like doing it." [31] Here Quezon presented vigorous plan for independence and answered the questions asked by senators and representatives who were very much interested in the elucidations of the different phases of the Philippine problems. Senator Chamberlain asked Quezon: "What would then happen to the Philippines if within 60 days we absolutely severed relations with the Philippine Islands and recognized their independence? What would happen then?" Quezon replied that all we have to do was to elect the successor of the Governor-General. Chamberlain countered, "You have the machinery in all the provinces. No matter what their language or racial condition is? You think you have the machinery ready to set in motion? Quezon answered, "Yes sir, absolutely. All we need—and we can readily do it in 60 days." [32]

Representative Towner countered: "Mr. Quezon," he said, "Let me call your attention to the fact that if you are an independent country you will have to organize an independent government. You have none now, you have no constitution; you have the Organic Act of the United States, but you have no constitution of the Philippine Islands. It would be necessary for you to present the constitution for consideration of your own people and probably for the consideration of Congress." [33] Quezon replied, "I am answering the Senator's practical question."

Senator Nolan, also made this remark, "If I understand you right, your idea is that if we try to apply the principle of self-determination as a practical proposition to all the rest of the world, we ought to be in a position now to apply it to our own territory."[34] Quezon replied: "Exactly".

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[31] *Ibid.*, 11.
[32] *Ibid.*
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] *Ibid.*, 14.

Then Senator Phelan of California also said: "And your desire is to have your independence within a reasonable time now, in order that you might make that application for membership in the League of Nations!" "Yes sir," said Quezon. Phelan again said: "Well, you are more familiar than we are with the conditions in Asia. Do you mean to say that you have no fear of outside aggression in the event you are without protection of the United States or the League of Nations?" "We have no fear of outside aggression," said Quezon. "But if there is aggression," said Phelan, "Are you in a position to resist it?" Quezon replied, "I don't mean to say that. It would be too much for a Filipino to say that the Philippine Islands could withstand an attack from a first class power." Phelan said: "Well, it is not good international manner to attack people, but they insinuate themselves by zones of influence. You see that every day in Asia now".[35] Quezon seemed to have been struck by this question because he knew that he feared Japan some years before and that he hesitated and confided before to McIntyre in 1913 and 1914 that independence should not be granted for some generations to come.[36]

Senator Phelan and Quezon also talked about the Japanese in the Philippines. Quezon revealed that the Japanese were migrating to the Philippines and that the Filipinos cannot prevent that, if the Japanese wanted to. "That would be the easiest way of conquest, wouldn't it?" "But Senator", said Quezon, "you are not giving us protection today against that system of conquest. The Japanese are going to the Philippine Islands and taking land there." "The Japanese are?" asked Phelan. And yet Filipinos can not possess land in Japan.

Other members of the Philippine Mission like Palma made their remarks in their open hearings. Palma gave an account in the hearing of the splendid progress made in the Philippine autonomous government and demonstrated its stability. Vicente Singson Encarnacion spoke of the great economic development of the Philippines. Tirona dwelt on the unanimous desire of the Filipinos to be independent as shown by the attitude of the two political parties in the Philippines. Camilo Osias, the assistant director of education, spoke of the magnificent achievements of the people and the government along educational lines. The speeches made during these long series of hearings of the Committee made good impressions.[37]

Before and after the appearance of the Philippine Independence Mission in the United States, many believed that the Philippine independence question was nearing solution. The remarks of the Chairman of the Joint

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[35] *Ibid.*

[36] Supra, Chapter VIII, See manuscript prepared by me ready for publication—"The Foundations of Filipino-American Relations 1898-1921" Univ. of the Philippines (1971).

[37] Wolcutt (Assistant Chief, Bureau of Insular Affairs) to Yeater, June 3, 1919, BIA, File No. pt. 3, 364/after 354.

Committees, the honorable Horace M. Towner, was enlightening, especially when he told the Mission, "You understand, without my telling you, that there is an insistent demand for every pressing and very important legislation, and unless you press your demand it is not likely that they will receive consideration and we want to know what you want and what you desire." These words were received by the Filipinos with hopes that Philippine independence was near at hand. It seemed as if the solemn covenant expressed by the author of the Jones Law was about to be fulfilled. The Philippine Legislature and the Governor-General made their declarations that the Filipinos had organized a complete administrative machinery as an instrument of a stable government.

Immediately after the Committee Hearings, Representative Mason of Illinois introduced in the House of Representatives House Bill, H.R. 5719 providing for independence during the first session of the 66th Congress on June 3, 1919. This bill was referred to the Committee on Insular Affairs.[38] It was ordered printed but the bill was not acted upon.

Another attempt to grant the independence to the Philippines under the Wilson Administration was again planned. Representative Hon. Finis J. Garrett, a high ranking Democrat of Texas wrote Secretary of War Baker of his aim to introduce a bill touching on the Philippine question and what form the bill should be presented. However, he felt that it was wise to defer the filing of the measure until a conference with the Secretary of War was held or until the final form of the bill was submitted to the President upon his return from Paris. In his personal letter to Baker, Representative Garrett confided that he being a ranking Democrat member of the Committee on Insular Affairs, any measure that he may introduce would be construed as, in a sense, a party expression on the question of freeing the Filipinos.[39]

The Secretary's response to Garrett's letter regarding independence was even more encouraging because it included a fixed date for complete separation. He believed that a resolution should be passed by Congress to give the Filipinos a complete assurance of their freedom. However, he hesitated to press on an immediate resolution until the return of the President and thought he should first confer with him. "Off hand," said the Secretary, "I should say that the thing to do would be to fix a definite date in the future at which independence should be declared, and if I were writing the resolution at this minute I would say that it should be on the anniversary of the battle of Manila falling on the year 1925, and the people of the Philippine Islands . . . in the meantime should select a popular constitutional convention and formulate and adopt a constitution, subject to the approval of the President of the United States, (it may be, however, that the President had entirely different idea on this subject as the result of his

[38] *Congress Record,* 66th Congress, 1st Session, 1007-1098; Supra; Footnote 27.
[39] Garrett to Baker, June 6, 1919, BIA, File No. 364/379.

conferences abroad), and I would suggest that you and I take the matter with him on his return which cannot in any case be long delayed." [40]

This plan of the Secretary of War Baker and Garrett seemed to indicate that a resolution fixing the final date of separation from the United States would soon be forthcoming. Unfortunately the President came home with grave problems such as the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations which occupied his thoughts so much and which perhaps contributed to his sickness that ultimately carried him into his grave. Confronted as he was with these world problems, the President was too occupied to immediately consider the question of Philippine independence. It was very difficult to ascertain as to whether or not Secretary Baker took up the matter of Philippine independence with the President after the latter returned from Paris.

In any case, the Filipinos' claim of their right of independence was weakened. But the Filipinos were not a people to be discouraged. They knew that God's will and the rule of justice would prevail at the end. Their Resident Commissioners in Washington and their spokesmen wrote President Wilson and reminded him that they were entitled to be free by right of the law previously stated. Commissioner Jaime C. de Veyra and Isauro Gabaldon wrote the President through his secretary, Mr. Tumulty: "We have made attempts to lay before you our desire, which is also that of the Filipino people, that the independence of the Philippines be considered as one of the problems to be recommended by you in your coming message to the Congress of the United States. We have thought this matter seriously and maturely and we respectfully submit for your action.

"Since last year, your Representative in the Philippines, the Governor-General, has declared that the condition imposed by the Congress of the United States to the Filipino people, of maintaining a stable government, has been fulfilled. . . . There is, therefore, sufficient evidence to recommend to the Congress an immediate action."[41]

It is very difficult to ascertain whether this letter had any influence in Woodrow Wilson's decision of sending his message to Congress on December 7, 1920, recommending independence.

With the Republican Party in complete power in 1920, Representative King, on 3rd Session of the 66th Congress, introduced a House bill, H.R. 1448, to provide for the independence of the Philippines. On December 6, 1920, this bill was referred to the Committee on Insular Affairs. This bill authorized the President of the United States to issue a proclamation to the effect that on a day to be designated by him, the Government of the Philippine Islands may convene a constitutional convention which shall be elected by the qualified electors of the Islands for the

[40] Baker to Garrett, June 8, 1919, BIA, File No. 364/379.

[41] De Veyra and Gabaldon to Wilson, Nov. 30, 1920, Wilson Papers VI, Case File 44. LC.

purpose of drafting and approving a political constitution for the Filipino people—a constitution that was to be ratified by the electors and approved by the Governor-General.

The bill further provided that the Governor-General shall so certify to the President of the United States who shall declare by proclamation the withdrawal and surrender of all rights of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control, and sovereignty then existing and exercised by the United States in and over the territory and people of the Philippine Islands and the full recognition of the independence of the Philippine Islands as a separate and self-governing nation.[42] Unfortunately, Congress did not make a move to consider the bill.

A similar bill was introduced in the Senate by Senator King of Utah during the 3rd Session of the 66th Congress, 1920.[43] This bill provided for the withdrawal of the United States from the Philippines ten years after the passage of the bill. It provided that the Filipinos were to adopt a republican form of government and to create the necessary political machinery of government to take over the duties and responsibilities of an independent states.[44] This bill was not also acted upon.

President Wilson remembering the pledge made or embodied in the Jones bill that he signed on August 29, 1916, now sent his fateful message to the 66th Congress' 3rd session, which read as follows: "Allow me to call your attention to the fact that the people of the Philippine Islands have succeeded in maintaining a stable government since the last action of Congress in their behalf, and thus fulfilled condition set by the Congress as precedent to a consideration of granting independence to the Islands. I respectfully recommend that this condition preceded having been fulfilled, it is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to the people of these Islands by granting them the independence which they honorably covet." [45]

This message had been awaited by the Filipino people and a great many of the leading Democrats of the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States. The President had unqualifiedly stated that the Filipinos had satisfied the requirements of the Jones Law and so therefore, they were entitled to be free and sovereign. But Congress was faced by many problems. The President was also weakened by the sickness he had incurred in September 1919 in his campaign in the West with reference to the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations. He was too incapacitated to marshall his Democrat supporters to push the necessary resolution to free the Philippines. The Republicans in Congress

[42] A copy of this bill, see BIA, File no. Copy pt. 3, 364/384.

[43] *Congressional Record,* 66th Congress, 3rd Session, 10.

[44] This bill introduced by Senator King provided for the Philippine Independence during the next ten years after the passage of the bill.

[45] *Congressional Record,* 66th Congress, 3rd Session, 26; See also Extract of the Message sent to Harrison December 8, 1920, BIA, File No. pt. 3, with 364/383.

were against the granting of independence. They repeated their old slogans that Filipinos were not fit to govern themselves and if they were allowed to go free, the Islands will be at the mercy of world powers; anarchy would set in and the Filipinos will be killing one another. So therefore, they could not be left to themselves; the U.S. was committed to help and guide them. These were the campaign slogans of the Republicans that they had succeeded in promoting for two decades. But independence for the Filipinos that Wilson and Harrison had supported and worked for was finally achieved in 1946. Therefore their work was not in vain. Time marches on and so human freedom cannot be denied.

Governor-General Harrison having received the message of Wilson on December 8, 1920, sent his hearty appreciation to the President upon his recommendation to Congress for Philippine independence [46] on December 24, 1920. The President was also informed by Secretary of War Baker of a cablegram he received from Harrison on December 22, a resolution passed by the Philippine Legislature on December 16, 1920. The Resolution reads: "The Filipino people have received with the deepest satisfaction and gratitude that part of the message of the President of the United States to Congress which has reference to the granting of Philippine independence to the people of the Philippines; in view of the fact that a stable government has already been organized in the same. Upon reiterating our faith in the magnanimity and justice of the American people, we, the Constitutional representatives of the Philippine people, believe it to be our duty to state on this solemn occasion that the fulfillment of the promise made to our country and expressly embodied in our present organic law by determining in a definite manner the cessation of a condition of dependence will usher in an era of lasting friendship and confidence, which, through a spiritual union between America and the Philippines, will promote and strengthen the permanent interests of both peoples. . . . We trust that this recommendation of the President. . . . pregnant with the spirit of the glorious traditions of the great Republic, will find an echo in the generous hearts of the representatives of the American Nation, who will thus give to the world an incontrovertible proof of their determination to carry out the principle, so stoutly sustained during the recent war, of establishing the relations between the peoples, be they great or small or new and firm bases of liberty, justice and democracy."[47]

On December 16, 1920 Congressman James A. Frear made a forceful speech in the House of Representatives with reference to the Philippine problem that the United States should carry out their promise of independence.[48]

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[46] Harrison to Wilson, December 13, 1920, Wilson Papers, VI, Case File 44, LC.

[47] Harrison to Wilson, December 22, 1920, BIA, File No. 364/388-A.

[48] *Congressional Record,* 66th Congress, 3rd Session, December 16, 1920, pp. 440-447.

Later he wrote a letter to the Secretary of War which was sent to the White House touching on the Philippine case. In this brief statement he said that Dewey, Mckinley, Taft and Wilson were quoted in favor of withdrawing American sovereignty and granting Philippine independence. But although Congress by legislative enactment has promised to carry out that pledge, it has failed to do so. General Sherwood, the oldest member of Congress, frequently cited for bravery during the Civil War, strikes the right note in his question, "Why do we not grant independence to the Philippines?"

Mr. Frear said further, "Congress professes a deep interest in Ireland and one branch has resolved that she should be given a government of her choice—yet Congress ignores the claim of the Philippines." Mr. Frear further declared that an effort should be made to right the wrong by arousing those who believe in the square deal for these Islands advocated by McKinley, Taft, Roosevelt and Wilson. He cited many authorities and arguments to prove the Filipinos have met every test and were entitled to a fulfillment of American pledge to the Filipinos. Among these authorities he mentioned were members of the 66th Congress who were willing to let the Filipinos go free. Such names were Joseph W. Fardney, William R. Green, Nicholas Longworth, Willis C. Haroley, Allen C. Hawley, Ira C. Cepley, Luther W. Mott, George M. Young, James A. Frear, Jolen R. Tilson, Landley H. Halley, Charles B. Timberlake, George M. Bowers, Henry W. Watson, Claude Kitchen, Henry T. Rainey, Cordell Hull (later Secretary of State under FDR), John N. Garner (later Vice-President under FDR), James W. Collier, Clement C. Dickinson, William A. Oldfield, Charles R. Crisp, John F. Casew and Whitwell Martin.[49]

Such was a group of influential Congressmen, who were willing to let the Philippines go, but the opponents of Philippine independence dominated the United States Congress and it was totally impossible to grant the Philippines her freedom. The Philippine problem became a political football between the Democrats and Republicans. This problem was so unfortunate for the Republicans, who took the reign of powers after 1921, could not believe that the Filipinos were capable of self-government. They thought that independence should be postponed for generations to come. They succeded in the postponement of independence for over two decades until they were freed in 1946 under the administration of the party that pledged for the Philippine independence. The Filipinos were now free to manage their own affairs that they wanted so much. Nothing matters to them except independence. They did not hesitate to accept the independence regardless of its consequences.

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[49] Frear to the President, January 10, 1921, BIA, No. with 364/386.

REFLEXIONS ON THE MIGRATION THEORY VIS-A-VIS THE COMING OF INDIAN INFLUENCES IN THE PHILIPPINES

JUAN R. FRANCISCO

ONE OF THE IMPORTANT PROBLEMS RELEVANT TO THE APPLICATION of the theory of migration on the peopling of the Philippines is the coming of Indian influences into the Islands. This theory has been taken by many a writer [1] as a historical fact. But on examination of the view, there seems to appear questions that would render it doubtful in the light of the developments during the time that this suggested migration occurred.

The purposes of this essay are two-fold—one, to articulate in a single work my views on the theory as expressed in a number of essays published in many journals; and two, to re-examine the same in the light of the new insights that accumulated during extensive field researches conducted by fellow workers and by me with the past decade or so.

The late Professor H. Otley Beyer laid the foundation of this view when writing on Philippines-Indian contacts in ancient as well as in modern times in 1948. He wrote:

> The first ship-using folk to trade with the East-Indies and the Philippines, within historic times, were probably the coastal peoples of India—whose daring voyages for trade and adventure into the eastern islands are frequently mentioned in the Jataka tales and some of the other epic and narrative poetry of the early Buddhist period (at least several centuries B.C.).
>
> The first *Indian immigrants* into this region seem to have been chiefly of the old Vedic faith, mixed with primitive nature and sun worship; although Buddhistic ideas became dominant in the early centuries of the Christian era. Indian traders and colonizers of these types seems to have entered the Philippines chiefly through eastern and northern Borneo, and continued to drift in—in competition with the Arab, Indo-Malayan, and Indo-China traders and settlers—down at least until the Chinese traders and settlers began to dominate, from about the 12th or 13th century onward.
>
> A second wave of Indian influences, this time of a Brahmanic character, came into the Philippines from Java and Borneo during the period of Majapahit Contact, in the 14th century . . . .[2]

In more specific terms, Beyer re-constructs the framework of his view, in 1952, and writes that:

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[1] E.g., V. A. Makarenko, "Some Data on South Indian Cultural Influences in South East Asia," *Tamil Culture* (Journal of the Academy of Tamil Culture), vol. XI, no. 1 (January-March, 1964), pp. 58-91 and many others.

[2] H. Otley Beyer, "Early History of Philippine Relations with Foreign Countries, Especially China," Historical Introduction to E. Arsenio Manuel, *Chinese Elements in the Tagalog Language* (Manila: Filipiniana Publications, 1948), p. 8.

> Sixth and last of the pre-historic migrations, occuring between 300 and 200 B.C., brought from the south our most numerous and advanced pre-historic people—the Iron Age group usually known as Malays. They filtered in fleets of dug out boats, up from the west coast of Borneo into Luzon via Palawan and Mindoro, and in another ocean pathway through the Celebes Strait to Mindanao and the Visayas. In addition to advanced, irrigated agriculture, these migrants brought four new industries. (1) the smelting, forging and manufacture of tools, weapons, utensils and ornaments of iron and other metals; (2) the manufacture of a great variety of turned and decorated pottery; (3) the art of weaving cloth on a handloom, and (4) the manufacture of beads, bracelets and other ornaments of green and blue glass. These crafts seem to have spread from there to Indo-China and Southern Malaysia, finally reaching the Philippines by way of Borneo and Celebes.[3]

Earlier in 1928, however, while writing on his finds in Novaliches, Rizal, Beyer appeared to be more certain of the Indian in the Philippines as coming via the migration route,

> When we learnt that all his material was not Chinese we looked around for its nearest relatives elsewhere, and found them in the Indian Peninsula.... All the Iron Age material is very much like that found in South India, Eastern Java, Northern Borneo, and in some parts of the Malay peninsula....While the prehistoric glass beads and bracelets found in India are of different colours, only two colours of beads are found here—green and blue—this supports my view that the motherland of this culture is India.[4]

On the date of this migration of Indian to the Philippines, Beyer expresses a relative certainty of this movement.

> It is not thought that any of these early Indians voyages reached as far as the Philippines before or about the 2nd or 3rd century B.C., where the 1st Iron Age culture seems to have been introduced from some South Indian source. From that time on, however—and especially after the 2nd century A.D., Indian penetration seems to have slowly percolated into the Islands in a fairly continuous flow.[5]

In support of his view of a Tamil influence upon Philippine culture, particularly systems of writing, V.A. Makarenko uses the wave of migrations theory as seen in the Beyer postulations.[6] These Tamils according to the view of Makarenko were part of the sixth wave that came to the Philippines bringing with them this culture tool—the syllabic systems of writing. These Tamils, of course, were those that first settled in the Malay Peninsula, and who came with Malays who constituted this sixth wave of immigrants.[7]

In another work, much earlier than that by Makarenko, the argument to explain the introduction of ancient systems of writing in the Philippines

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[3] H. Otley Beyer and Jaime C. de Veyra, *Philippine Saga* (Manila: Capitol Publishing House, 1952), p. 2.

[4] H. Otley Beyer, "A Prehistoric Iron Age in the Philippines," *Philippine Magazine,* October, 1928.

[5] H. Otley Beyer, *Early History of Philippine Relations with Foreign Countries, Especially China.* (Manila: National Printing Co., 1948), p. 9. (Xerox Copy).

[6] Makarenko, *op. cit.*

[7] *Ibid.,* pp. 86-87.

was presented by Fletcher Gardner.[7a] Gardner is even more direct in his reference relative to the people who introduced the ancient scripts of the Filipinos were those who came from the time of Asoka, the famous emperor who ruled the Northeastern part of India—in the areas covered by the present Bihar, Bengal and Orissa in the 3rd century, B.C. And these came in the manner similar to that which was described by Beyer (and amplified by Makarenko).

The theory, as expounded by Beyer in another of his works, accepted by local writers for want of alternatives,[8] elaborated in more specific terms vis-a-vis South Indian Tamil presence in the area by Makarenko and argued in very expansive terms relative to the introduction of ancient Philippine scripts from the Asoka times of Gardner, has spawned some questions which are significant in the full understanding of the theory. These questions were more or less raised in a critique (of the theory) by F. Landa Jocano. He writes that Beyer's "scheme[9] of the waves of migration appears very impressive [and] assume[s], a semblance of verified facts."[10] The implication of this is that somehow the view is very much overdrawn and the conclusions therefrom very tenuous. I shall have occasion to refer to this in further detail later in this essay.

In more precise terms, the questions raised by Jocano may be cited *in extenso,* which in the light of the subject of the present essay are as relevant as they are in the context by Beyer's schemata of the peopling of the Philippines.

> How big was one wave of migration so as to establish large identifiable community and population patterns in a frontier, rain-forested area like the Philippines during pre-historic time? Did they carry along with them the necessary equipment so as not to adjust any more to the ecological givens of the new land, thus meeting effectively the requirements of the technology necessary

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[7a] See Fletcher Gardner, *Philippine India Studies,* San Antonio, Texas: Witte Memorial Museum, 1943. Also Gardner and Ildefonso Maliwanag, *Indic Writings of the Mindoro-Palawan Axis.* San Antonio, Texas: Witte Memorial Museum, 1939-1941. 3 volumes. (Microfilm). For a full critique of Gardner's writing see my *Philippine Palaeography,* 1969 (Revised 1966 Mss.), pp. 20-28.

[8] Pedrito Reyes, cited in Makarenko, *ibid.*

[9] Beyer's scheme as summarized by Jocano "Beyer's Theory on Filipino Pre-History and Culture: An Alternative Approach to the Problems," in M.D. Zamora, Editor, *Studies in Philippine Anthropology* [Quezon City: Alemars-Phoenix, 1967], p. 131 is cited here for easy reference:

> "The early sea-migrants came from South China, arriving in Northern Luzon during the periodic time-sequence, ranging from 5000 to 500 B.C. The Second "wave" came via south-central Luzon between 1500 [and] 500 B.C., coming from Indo-China. There were the supposedly rice-terrace building people, the descendants from whom now allegedly represent 18 per cent of the contemporary population. Between 800 [and] 500 B.C. another group of people came from Indo-China, crossed the China Sea and reached the Philippines by way of Southern Luzon. This was followed, sometime between 200 [and] 300 B.C., by the so-called iron-culture bearing people. This group came from Java and Sumatra. Then between 300 [and] 700 A.D. another group, the jar-burial people, came from South China and arrived in the Philippines by way of the Batanese group."

[10] *Ibid.*

> for the reproduction of the home-culture here? If they did not, which was likely, then the reproduction of the home-culture in the Philippines must have yielded to the pressures of the new environment. What culture complex, in other words, which we encounter here in the Philippines, was then the highly modified local developments rather than the "carry-over" from the mainland as averred? [11]

Jocano further emphasizes the point by writing that Beyer's "correlation has been based on typological comparisons of insufficient archeological materials. . . it is being unrealistic to assert that the characteristics of such a migrating people would still be present and definable today after several thousands of years of racial and cultural developments." [12]

Implications that may be drawn from the question raised by Jocano are inevitable. Migration, or wave of migration, as the term implies involves a pre-knowledge of the locus a people moves into. Such a fore-knowledge would further imply that the immigrants would have to carry with them the most important tools of their culture to be able to survive in a "frontier, rain-forested area like the Philippines." At the same time such a group of people would be culturally and even racially homogenous. In such a case, the Indians (as Beyer thought of them to be, or Dravidians, particularly the Tamils, as Makarenko had shown or the Asoka immigrants as Gardner has argued who immigrated to the Philippines, must have brought with them all that they could carry—their culture, tools, e.g., language, writing, rituals, etc. If these Indian groups were culturally and racially homogenous, they would have preserved much of what is now found in India-South India for that matter, for it was certainly the Coromandel coast from which these immigrants embarked for new lands.

Indeed, since South India and the Philippines possess comparatively similar climactic conditions, the culture that the Indians could have brought with them in the long years of their movement into the Philippines would still be flourishing until today, if not merely surviving in the remote areas of the Islands, considering the fact that it (the Culture) was transplanted in an ecologically non-hostile region.

Moreover, on this basis of what Beyer argues that "Indians traders and *colonizers*. . . seem to have entered the Philippines. . . . until about the 12th or 13th century. . . ." (see fn. no. 2), similar questions may be raised. The most important, however, would be—since the Indians did not only come to the Philippines as traders but also as colonizers (and colonization may also presage immigration), why do we not find similar intensive influence of Indian culture in the Philippines? Some Indian scholars, like R.C. Majumdar,[12a] have called the Indian presence in Southeast Asia

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[11] *Ibid.*

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 133.

[12a] R.C. Majumdar, *Ancient Indian Colonies in the Far East* (Calcutta: Modern Publishing Syndicate, 1927, 1938), 2 volumes: I. Champa; II.

as the result of extensive colonization. But why not the Philippines also, which is indeed a part and parcel of this region, racially and culturally?

Examining all the evidences of Indian cultural influences in the Philippines—language, literature, art, writing, religion, to mention a few [13]—it becomes superfluous to argue for the full saturation of Philippine culture with Indian elements. Evidences to support the migration wave theory in these cultural aspects are extremely isolated in the whole context of Philippine life. For if there were actually immigration—even as Makarenko argued that the immigrants were "primarily the Tamils from Malaya and adjacent territories and from Indonesia," to support his view of long standing Tamil movements vis-a-vis the introduction of writing in the Islands—from India to the Philippines via the intervening areas, one would expect the most important aspects of Indian culture to be wholly preserved, and to function in the spirit and substance of that culture these immigrants brought with them for their motherland.

In more precise terms, a cursory examination of each of these evidences may be made to give better perspective of the problem as discussed above. These will in one way or another bring to light the salient features of these influences in terms of the data so far used to support the immigration view.

The most extensive evidences of Indian influences in the Philippines are Sanskrit elements in the languages of the country. These have persisted since their introduction in the Philippines between the 10th and 15th centuries,[14] and have been fully assimilated into these speech systems. They are, however, still recognizable through their forms in the Indonesian and Malay languages, which have been very profoundly Sanskritized.

There are about 336 words in Philippine languages which are recognizably probable Sanskrit in origin. But on further studies there are about less than 50% of these which have definitive provenance in Sanskrit.[15]

Much of the Sanskrit (or Indian) substratum of Philippine folk literature heritage could be discerned in motifs and perhaps themes. But very

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[13] The subject has been dealt with in various papers by me, some of which I cite here for easier reference: Juan R. Francisco, "Sanskrit in Philippine Languages," *Adyar Literary Bulletin* (Madras, India), vol. XXIV, nos. 3-4, December 1960, pp. 153-172; "A Note on Agusan Image," *Philippine Studies,* vol. XI, no. 3, June 1963, pp. 390-400; "A Buddhist Image from Karitunan Site, Batangas Province," *Science Review,* vol. IV, No. 7, July 1963, pp. 7-11; *Indian Influence and Literature,* Quezon City, University of the Philippines, 1964; "Notes on the Probable Tamil Words in Philippine Languages," *Proceedings,* vol. II, International Conference-Seminar on Tamil Research, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1968, etc.

[14] Juan R. Francisco, "On the Date of the Coming of Indian Influences in the Philippines," *Philippine Historical Review,* vol. I, no. 1 (1965), pp. 136-152.

[15] I am indebted to William Henry Scott for giving actual statistical count of Sanskrit words in Philippine Languages based on my work *Indian Influences in the Philippines* (1964). He wrote—"Some 150 separate Sanskrit words are identified as the origin of Philippine terms, 64% of which appear in Tagalog, 36% in Bisaya and 28% in both Ilocano [sic] and Sulu. Although a different [sic] 28%" See his *Pre-historic Source Materials for the Study of Philippine History* (Manila: UST Press, 1968), pp. 52-53. Also see my "Further Notes on Pardo de Tavera's EL SANSCRITO EN LA LENGUA TAGALOG," *Asian Studies,* vol. VI no. 2 (August 1968), pp. 223-234.

few are the actual adaptation of the Indians' whole tales or epic studies. I am still in the process of assessing these influences in the folk epics of the Muslim peoples of the Philippines who may have been the most deeply Indianized groups before Islam was accepted by them as a religion. In the August 1969 issue of this journal, I published a brief study on a Maranaw prose tale which tells in miniature the lives of Rama, Sita, and Ravana.[16]

In the field of art, there are only a few pieces which show definitive Indian styles. But these have their development in the intervening areas, particularly Siam and Java, where Indian art flourished to rival its development even in the mainland. Since there are few of these pieces, it would not be superfluous to enumerate them here. There is the now famous Agusan image, which was originally identified as Saiva in orientation by Beyer, but which I identified as a Buddhist Tara on the basis of a re-study of the image. A clay medallion or votive stamp on whose obverse face is an image of the Avalokitesvara Padmapani in bas relief. It stands in the classic Indian pose known as *tribhanga*, "three bends," and appear to hold a *padma*, "lotus" in his right hand. This object was discovered in Calatagan, Batangas, associated with 14th-15th century Chinese porcelain wares which were dug from an ancient graveyard of the same age.

From Mactan are the Lokesvara statue and a statue of the elephant-faced god, Ganesha. These two are known only through photographs published by H. Otley Beyer. The latest addition to these Indian-oriented statues is the golden *garuda* pendant, found in Brookes Point, Palawan. Like the clay medallion, it is now deposited in the National Museum of the Philippines.[17]

Apart from these statues, there are other art objects like glass beads of various colors which Beyer identified to be of Indian provenance.[18]

Related to the expected development of the statues mentioned above in their function in the society would be their connection to the religious practices of the people who own these objects. However, there seems to be no evidence of the statues' direct relevance to the belief systems of the early Filipinos. If Beyer's reference to the Agusan Image as a "sacred heirloom" [19] were to be interpreted as an object of veneration by the Manobos [sic], still it cannot be established that it has any active function, in the belief systems of the ethnic groups from whom they were collected. In fact, except the Garuda image, which was bought from a family in Brookes Point, all the other images were excavated from archeological sites.

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[16] Juan R. Francisco, "Maharadia Lawana," *Asian Studies*, vol. VII, no. 2 (August 1969).

[17] Detailed description of these art objects may be found in my "Notes on the Indo-Philippine Images," in M.D. Zamora, Editor, *Studies in Philippine Anthropology* (Quezon City: Phoenix-Alemar's, 1967), pp. 117-127.

[18] See fn. no. 4 above.

[19] H. Otley Beyer, "Outline Review of Philippine Archeology by Islands and Provinces," *The Philippine Journal of Science*, vol. LXVII, nos. 3-4 (July-August 1947), p. 302.

The ancient syllabic writings of the Islands are believed to have their ancestry in the South Indian Pallava Grantha script. But their development into what they were (and still are as they are being used by the Tagbanuwa of Palawan and Mangyan of Southern Oriental Mindoro) can only be understood in terms of their intermediate forms in Sumatra.[20] But, the very "primitive" forms of these scripts do not necessarily speak of their having fully developed in the context of their having represented in sophisticated symbolic forms the phonology of the Philippine languages.

Looking at all these evidences of Indian influence in the Philippines, as they are brought to bear upon the conditions—demographic, climatological and ecological—in the Islands at the time, it is hardly possible to accept the view that these elements of culture were brought by Indian immigrants, according to Beyer. That these immigrants did not come to the Islands in one single movement, but in waves, as Bayer argued, furthermore there would have been evidences of a full development of Indian culture in the Philippines.

If this view that the Indian influences in the Philippines were brought here by waves of immigration can not be accepted in the light of the existing facts brought about by advances in research, then what could be the alternative or alternatives to explain the presence of these cultural elements recognizably Indian in orientation, if not in origins?

There are two possible alternatives to this view. The first alternative uses for its proofs those that Beyer himself had used to argue for his view. On re-examining all these evidences, particularly the Novaliches finds, R.B. Dixon concluded that all artifacts found in the (Novaliches) sites [as well as others], were brought over as a result of a "long standing trade between the Philippines and India, particularly the South, even prior to the historic South Indian Chera, Chola and Pandyan kingdoms, whose history goes to the beginnings of the Christian Era or before."[21] This argument seems to fit this alternative view, but apparently it has an inherent weakness. For, if the Novaliches finds were to bear upon this alternative as proofs on which Dixon based his view, i.e., "while the pre-historic glass beads and bracelets found in Indian era, of some fifteen colors only two colors of beads are found here—green and blue—this supports my view that the motherland of this culture is India," [22] the following question may be raised: Why are there only *two colors of beads* found here, if there were a *long standing trade between the Philippines and India?* Considering the span of time the Chera, the Pandyan and the Chola ruled South India, there is a range be-

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[20] Juan R. Francisco, *Philippine Palaeography,* 1969 (Revised 1966 Mss.). In preparation for the press as Monograph No. 5 of the U.P. Asian Center.

[21] R.B. Dixon, "Recent Archeological Discoveries in the Philippines and their bearing on the Pre-history of Eastern Asia," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* (Philadelphia 1930), vol. LXIX, no. 4, pp. 225-229.

[22] See fn. no. 4, above.

tween the early 2nd and the late 12th centuries A.D.[23] Dixon even goes further back in time "to the beginnings of the Christian Era or before." Hence, there would not had been just two colors of beads that were traded during this great span of time.

Corollary to this "long standing trade" is the view that this was not one way in direction. Rather, there were also Indonesians and Malays who plied the Bengal Bay in ancient times, and necessarily they were also the inevitable agents of culture movements. It is also possible—and probable—that this two-way direction of the trade between the Southeast Asian insular and peninsular regions and India may have also precipitated the introduction into India of Indonesian or Malay cultural elements; and these elements may have undergone a process of Indianization; then re-exported back in Indian clothing. The Philippines appeared to have been a very passive participant in this two-way traffic of goods—both material and non-material—because it was not in the direct route of that traffic.[24] Hence, the Indian aspect of its culture has been the result of a long and unconscious percolation from India through Indonesia and Malaya, a process which is the next point to be discussed in the alternative to the theory of immigration.

The second alternative view utilizes the same materials in support of it. All the Indian elements—from linguistic to literary, artistic, archeological and palaeographic—are relatively not as extensive to allow drawing the conclusion that India indeed participated directly in the peopling and/or enriching the cultures of the Philippines via the immigration movement. Unlike the Javanese, the Balinese or even the Malay, the Philippines can not compare with these peoples in the extent of the Indian overlay in their cultural orientations.

Indian cultural elements as they are now discernible in the fabric of Philippine culture can only be explained in terms of the intermediary of the Javanese and/or Malay who first received these Indian elements. The Javanese and/or Malay sojourn of these Indian aspects of the culture underwent modifications to suit the character and nature of the host culture. These finally reached the Philippines by the process of culture drift or stimulus diffusion. Of course, the process did not take place within a few years—say one decade or one score—but more likely centuries of slow and perhaps even "painful" percolation. This rather slow drift and stimulus diffusion may have been aggravated by the fact of history that at the period of this movement, the height of Indian influence in Java and Malaya and Sumatra has already reached its peak and it was on a steady decline. Even this slow process of movement was further checked by the very successful inroads of Islam, which was to become the most important single factor that finally stopped the influence of Indian elements into the Philippines.

[23] See K.A. Nilakantha Sastri, *History of South India* (Madras: University, 1958) for the dates of these dynasties—Chera, C.A.D. 130-210 (pp. 112-119); Pandya, A.D. 520-920 (p. 165); and Chola, c. A.D. 846-1173; (p. 210).

[24] See my *Indian Influences in the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1964), p. 267.

PRELIMINARY NOTES ON THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE PALA'WAN, PALAWAN ISLAND, PHILIPPINES

YASUSHI KIKUCHI

I. INTRODUCTION

The data on which this essay is based were obtained from among the sub-grouping of the Pala'wan, a mountain people, who live largely within the south portion of Palawan province. The Pala'wan are a large pagan group which is still unstudied. They have been chosen for field work because aspects of their social structure show considerable variation, as does Batangan [Mindoro Mangyan group] social structure, from the usual bilateral kinship organization found elsewhere in the Philippines.

The Pala'wan practice shifting cultivation and belong to the proto-Malaysian grouping. Their culture is very similar to that of the Tagbanwa who are located in central Palawan and are also shifting cultivators.

At present, some of the Pala'wan people are associating with the Christian group at Quezon, who are mostly Bisayan. This town (Quezon) has rapidly developed since 1960. Most of the Christians are farmers, with a few fishermen and owners of *sari-sari* stores. The Pala'wans call all the Christians Bisayan and in return the Christians also call them Pala'wans.

Matri-uxorilocality is the pattern found among the Pala'wan similar to the Tagbanwa and to the Manubo in Mindanao; however, the Pala'wan, even in the same linguistic groupings, employ many variations of the residential type. For example, in the central area there is the "unilocal, square house residence" where each room has its hearth and all relatives live together, and the "tree long house". The Tag'bae group employs a matri-uxorilocal type.

It is the primary purpose of this paper to study the problems relative to Pala'wan social organization with reference to cognatic kinship structure, which is found throughout the Philippines.

II. THE LOCAL GROUP

The Pala'wan are divided into lowlanders and highlanders. The highlanders are located in the higher mountains and still retain their original culture. The lowlanders associate with the Christians physically and culturally. This paper is concerned with the highlanders; the writer worked in the area in December 1966 and in August 1969. This group, the Tag'bae, is near Quezon and has had contact with Christians recently. It is one of the

sublocal groups and is divided into eight(8) residential units: the unit under consideration being the *Pinag-uringan* locality. The people here live in the mountains with an altitude of about 800 meters. This unit consists of five (5) households; households number three(3) and five (5) are compounded households and the others are nuclear families.

As among the Batangan of Mindoro, the primary food staples are the sweet potato and upland rice. This group grows more rice than the Batangan, however, and has comparatively more contact with the Christian world. Some of them are converted Protestants with high school education and are working in municipal offices. The Pala'wan are not as exclusive as the Batangan, but according to my informant, *Kodli*, they still use poison (*dit'a*) on strangers, especially the Christian outsiders. This poison is used on the dart (*boslog*) of the blowgun (*su'blak*).

Although there are widespread similarities between the Pala'wan and the Tagbanwa, the writer is here concerned with two problems unique to the Pala'wan: (1) the emergence of an axial family line in relationship to the family line of the heads (*panglima*) and of the folk-medicine man (*mag'urowan*) of the local group; and (2) the social mechanism for inheriting paraphernalia.

III. Kinship and Marriage System

The smallest unit of the residential grouping is the natal household. In the Pinag-uringan area, as noted there are five households, and two of them are compounded. The traditional house in this area usually has no windows. It is square and built independently. The exit is located towards the east (*salatan*), as is the fireplace (*apoy*) in the corner. The roof is covered with cogon thatch and the walls are made of coconut tree fronds. In this area, however, household no. 2 is an imitation of the Christian house and has two windows, a terrace, and a kitchen with the hearth separated from the bedroom.

As noted, in this area there are two compounded households in which more than one family live and share one hearth (household no. 5) or have individual hearth for each nuclear family (household no. 3).

The compounded households are formed on the basis of either consanguineal or affinal relationships. For example, the compounded household no. 3 is composed of a father and his daughter and son-in-law and his granddaughter; that of household no. 5, a father and his unmarried daughters, his married other daughter and son-in-law and his grandchildren. Household may be described as a partial compound household, for a couple lives there with the wife's unmarried sister.

The relationship in the Pala'wan family emphasises the sibling link as do the majority of Filipino families. The father is the head of the family as in all Philippine society, but there is among the sibling group a social order based upon birth. This is shown by the prescribed patterns of inter-

personal relationships. Thus among siblings the eldest always teaches the younger how to behave to the parents, and in the case of girls they are taught how to take care of the household while the parents are away.

If a child does not obey the father's order he may punish him by beating the buttocks with his bare hand. According to Kodli, my informant, they never beat their children with anything else for fear of actually hurting them. If a grown child is very bad, the father talks with him using reason and if the advice is not immediately heeded the father leaves him alone to think things over. This isolation is also a kind of punishment. These people consider a child to be good if he has loyalty to his parents and if he respects older persons.

In this society there is no special secret group for the youth or adults as in most of the other societies in the Philippines.

The basic kinship, social, ritual and economic unit of Pala'wan society is the household which consists of the two-generation elementary family; the father, mother and unmarried children. This is also the characteristic household unit. Kinship is reckoned with both the paternal and the maternal kin, yielding a bilateral type of social structure. Through the head of the household (the father or the eldest male in the family), loyalty is kept to the group or area to which the family head belongs. Since he is the center of the household, all family members keep their loyalty to the old man (*panglima*-judge) of the group directly through him, and in this way all families can maintain peaceful relations and exist in an atmosphere without strain. There is in Pala'wan society not only deep respect for "elders" but a patterned hierarchy of relationships between siblings and group members.

Recently this area has had much contact with the Christian people in Quezon regarding trade and labor. Also, their agricultural fields (*uma*) are becoming limited because Christians are occupying the land as private property [as in other areas in the Philippines]. Normally, the fields are shifted every year. Now the Tag'bae are being pushed to higher land which is not so suitable for *uma*. As a result of the pressure, the household as an economic unit has become more important. At the same time a cash economy is coming into the group. With these phenomena and with association with Christians in general, their economic condition and social atmosphere is changing. They are beginning to seek cash more and more which they get from selling their products or by earning wages. This condition is causing them to compete with each other for wealth. It means that they are tempted to have more material wealth: clothes, shoes, slippers, etc.

As noted earlier, loyalty to the *panglima* keeps them peaceful without conflict, and under him they keep the balance of *uma* activities. Thus, in sharing the *uma,* and in exchanging the labor if some members want wider lands than the others, the other members can complain to the *pang-*

lima directly, or if a member does not return the labor debt, the *panglima* convinces him to do so. The *panglima* here is a sort of social or functional intermediary. Also, the shared *uma* land is being parceled out to members of the group by the *panglima,* and in the distribution he considers the desires of members, and also the number of individuals in the household.

Marriage (rápat)—The Case of Household No. 1

The husband, Ambing, is about twenty years old, and his wife, Mandarina, is also about twenty. They have not yet had a child, and Mandarina's unmarried sister lives with them.

About one year ago, Ambing was still single and looking for a wife. Mandarina was the wife of *Lipa't.* Ambing started to court her and after a month of courting she accepted his advances. Lipa't of course, became angry with Ambing and appealed to the *panglima* to settle the case. Ambing's parents did not agree with their behavior and marriage, but Ambing and Mandarina eagerly wanted to wed. The *panglima,* in this case, allowed them to marry without a formal ceremony because it was an immoral marriage, and Ambing paid one hundred-eighty (180) pesos to Lipa't and Mandarina had to leave her son to Lipa't.

This is an unusual case. Usually parental arrangement is employed, or that of free choice. In the case of marriage, the *panglima* is a middle man, like a counsellor. At the ceremony he will part a new couple's hair which means "swearing a union," and all relatives and friends of both sides will drink rice wine (*ta'pa'd*).

Divorce (butas)

Generally, a divorce will occur when either a husband or wife is immoral. In this case if their parents are still alive, they need the agreement to divorce from their parents.

The Case of Household No. 2

Guatu' took the wife of *Bangul.* According to my informant, Bangul's wife actually had started to court Guatu' and as a result they became close. In this case the *panglima* settled the problem. Finally the two men agreed to exchange their wives, and Guatu' paid ninety (90) pesos to his first wife as a penalty. Bangul's wife had to leave her two children because of her immortality, and Guatu's wife got married to Bangul, being with two children. After the second marriage, Guatu' still has the obligation to support his two children.

Adopted Child (anak)

If a couple has no child, they usually adopt one. But they adopt a child only from among their relatives, either from the husband's or wife's side, and not from others. Their reason for this is that if they adopt a child from

those who are not relatives, they may lose the child when there is a quarrel. When they adopt a child, they pay a certain amount to the actual parents. They pay forty persos for a male and eighty pesos for a female in general, because of matri-uxorilocality. When they adopt a girl, their adopted daughter's husband will come to live with them and help them, so a girl is more valuable than a boy.

Incest Taboo

They strictly observe a taboo against marriage through the second cousin relationship, and also the nephew, niece, uncle and aunt. Recently they have relaxed the prohibition on second-cousin marriage due to the agreement of all *panglimas* and the parents of the parties concerned.

IV. RITUAL KINSHIP—BLOOD BROTHERHOOD PACT (VILA-VILA)

According to E.E. Evans-Pritchard, "blood brotherhood is a pact or alliance formed between persons by a ritual act in which each swallows the blood of the other."

We can consider, generally, that the blood pact is a ritual extension of kinship — the duties and obligations are those of a "brother-in-law which provides security for traders and travellers who are always fearful of poisoning" (Dr. R.B. Fox).

Blood is often exchanged solely for trading purposes and social security. When a man goes to a place outside his own area, his "blood brother" there, if he had one in the vicinity, is responsible for his safety. Here the blood pack takes the place of blood relationships as the traveller's passport.

The Pala'wan call a blood brother, *vila-vila.* The formal blood pact is always with a drink-fest. For instance, when two men make their blood pact they will drink Pala'wan native wine (*tinapey*) at the same time with the witnesses consisting of two or three *panglima* from their respective *sitios* (area division), and after that they may exchange either their clothes or pants. The drinking of *tinapey* will go on until morning. After this ceremony they will call each other *vi'la,* or *si vila.*

The fundamental basis of kinship is a sentiment expressing and unifying itself in social obligations but the fundamental basis of blood-brotherhood is a contract. The writer believes that obligations towards blood brotherhood are more directly binding than a man's obligations towards his actual brother because he is bound to his blood brother not just because he has drunk his *vi'la's* blood but because his blood brother's blood is a concrete magical substance impregnated with a spell embodying a "conditional curse."*

* If the terms of the agreement are not followed the blood brother will suffer illness, death, or some other misfortunes.

V. Rule of Residence and Partition of Families

Recently the Tag'bae Pala'wan have not been changing their residential place. They almost entirely settle in one place for residence. Even though a death occurs in the settlement they do not transfer to another place as do the Batangan in Mindoro.

According to their genealogy it is obvious that they employ the matri-uxorilocal pattern. This matri-uxorilocality is followed strictly. A new couple should stay at the wife's parents' house or in the area of the wife's parents.

As far as the writer knows, in cognatic society the conjugal ties are very tenuous. This means that the unit composed of a husband and wife is characteristically unstable. For example, if the husband of a man's sister dies, the brother should take care of his sister's family; or if his brother dies and his brother's wife has no male relatives he should take care of her family. In Pala'wan society (as in other Philippine societies) the birth of a child activates a four-generation bilateral kinship structure and strengthens the family ties. This kinship structure centers on the child, for the child is an equal blood relation of both his mother's and his father's relatives, while his parents stand in a relatively delicate affinal relationship to each other's relatives. In short, the birth of a child formalizes the bilateral family.

As in the cases of households nos. 1 and 2, the couple should stay in the group area of the wife even after the wife's parents die. If a husband wants to live or to cultivate land in any other place, he needs the permission of his parents-in-law, or of his wife. All the members of this area, through their spouses are affiliated with each other either consanguineally or affinally.

VI. Kinship Terminology

The Pala'wan kinship system is fundamentally connected with the personal kindred and the family including affines, as in the Batangan system (Muratake and Kikuchi, 1968).

Among sub-local groups there is variation in kinship terms but principally all Pala'wan kinship systems are organized bilaterally and generationally, behavior and obligations towards relatives extending outward from Ego and his siblings, without definite range. The terminology employed is similar to the Batangan system and fits into the Eskimo type, as noted, discussed by Spier (1925) and Murdock (1949).

In the grandparental generation, the term *opo* is used for the parents of both father and mother without a sex distinction.* *Opo* is extended generationally to siblings and cousins of grandparents, and at the same time to old persons in general as a title of respect.

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* Among the Batangan a sex distinction is employed, *fufuama* (male) and *fufuina* (female).

In the parental generation the terms *ama* (father) and *ina* (mother) are used. The parents' brothers and sisters are distinguished from them by separate terms; *maman* (uncle) and *minan* (aunt). Furthermore, these latter terms are extended to the parents' cousins and their spouses.

In Ego's generation there are several terms distinguishing siblings by birth order: *wo'ka* for siblings older than Ego, and *ari* for siblings younger.* All of the sibling terms are used without regard to sex. Cousins are classed together with one term, *og'sa,* which is used for both sexes. This term is also used for both parallel and cross cousins and is extended out because in social interaction there is the need for distinguishing cousins.

In the first descending generation the term for child is *yogang,* being used by parents for their own children. The term used for all other children of this generation is *anak* which is extended out as far as social interaction makes it necessary. None of the terms in this generation is distinguished by sex.

In the second descending generation the term for grandchild is *opo,* and as in the first descending generation there is no sex distinction.

In affinal relationship terms, the mother- and the father-in-law are both called *pa:ngiganan.*

The term for Ego's sister's spouse as well as his spouse's sister is *i'pag.* The term for Ego's brother's spouse as well as his spouse's brother's spouse is *bayaw* while the term for his spouse's brother and her brother-in-law is the same, *biras.*

The term for child-in-law is *nampil* for both sexes.

In daily life among relatives by marriage consanguineal terms are used vocatively.

The term for "family" is *sankakubuwan* but this can also include everyone in one house, or the "house-mate." The Tag'bae Pala'wan distinguish a vertical descent line, *turoinopo,* and a horizontal relatedness, *mag'og'sa,* similar to the Tagalog *lahi* (vertical) and *lipi* (horizontal). However, there is a general term for all relatives, ascendants and descendants, which is *kakanpugan,* and similar to the Tagalog, *angkan.* The term for Ego's ascendants is *kagurang-gurangan* (male and female) and the term includes dead relatives; the term for Ego's descendants is *kamangayagangan* which does not include sick relatives for they "might die" and become ascendants.

Ego recognizes a vertical descent line on both his father's and mother's side, which means that he has two *turoinopo.* A very important aspect of Ego's recognition of his *kakanpugan* and his *kamangayagangan* is that he recognizes only consanguineal kinsmen as belonging to the groups.

Among Pala'wan groups there is variation in kinship terminology—for instance, the *Bungalun* group makes a distinction in the term of cousin: first cousin, *agsa',* second cousin, *adua',* third cousin, *uri'danan.* They also

* Among the Batangan, there are individual terms from first-born to fourth-born, with all siblings from the fifth-born being called by a collective term.

distinguish sex among spouses, the wife calls her husband *waló,* and the husband calls his wife, *oi'*. Among offspring sex is distinguished as for male child, *oten,* and female child, *aendaen.*

VII. Inheritance and Succession; Ceremony

The Tag'bae Pala'wans do not have as much property as do the Batangans, but they have a few items which we can consider as their property. These are jars, gongs, pigs, houses, and knowledge of agriculture, hunting and healing. They have no land in the sense of individual ownership but lands which they utilize and work on as a social group; these areas are used from generation to generation which means that all descendants who live in these areas have the potential right to cultivate the land there (Robin Fox, 1967).

Jars and Gongs

This area has only one jar (*siburan*) and no gong (*agong*). According to the informant, these items are not possessed by every family.

The Case of Household No. 1

This household possesses one *siburan,* which belongs to the wife, Mandarina. It came from her dead parents, and according to her, her mother got it from Mandarina's grandmother. The owner's right to the *siburan* belongs to Mandarina, even now that she is married to Ambing. When she divorced her former husband, he could not do anything regarding her *siburan.*

In the Tag'bae group, the *siburan* and *agong* are used for their ritual ceremony, especially for the drink-fest, as among the Tagbanwa (Robert Fox, 1954). Principally, these are inherited by all siblings, but actually it is usually the females who inherit them because of matri-uxorilocality. Since all males leave their families after marriage, naturally the female will take care of the properties, and she possesses the owner's right. All her brothers, however, possess the potential right. This means that the properties can be alternated among siblings who want to use them.

An alternative case is that when the owner (mother, wife, sister or daughter) dies, the properties may be buried with her. Or occasionally, the properties will be sold and the cash will be divided equally. The house also belongs automatically to the female sibling.

In the case of only one son, he can inherit everything and the patri-virilocal pattern is employed.

Agricultural and Hunting Knowledge

Usually agricultural knowledge is learned by all male and female children, but only male children learn about hunting—either from their

fathers or from the old men in the community. The knowledge concerning the use of the blow gun is also taught only to male children and in the same manner.

Folk-medicine Man (*mag'urowan*)

There is no medicine man in the Pinag-uringan area, but in the nearby *Silidinlóman* area lives a *mag-urowan* who is a sixty-year-old man. According to his memory, his father and grandfather were also *mag-urowan.*

He, *A'gka,* has no child; therefore as his successor he adopted a male child from his wife's sister's son, *Basul.* As previously noted, they usually prefer to adopt a girl, but in the case of A'gka, he adopted a male child. This adoption makes evident the fact that the title of the folk-medicine man is inherited strictly by the male line. The title is important not only to himself but to his family.

In case he has only a daughter, his son-in-law (the daughter's husband) can be a successor. In A'gka's family, the adopted son should stay in the parent's house—patrilocality. At the same time, the property inheritance is in accordance with the practice followed in the case of only one male child.

Midwife (*mongonp'ot*)

The *mongonp'ot* or midwife is a female. In the Tag'bae group, there is a *mongonp'ot* named *Singsing* who lives in the *Pinagbrayan* area. According to Singsing, her mother was also a *mongonp'ot.* She has three daughters, and the eldest daughter will be the formal successor but the other daughters are potential successors.

During childbirth, the pregnant woman's husband is usually an assistant, (*maninik'gu*). He may actually stay with her or stay outside, and while the wife is delivering he may attend to the discharge that comes out of the birth canal and falls through the slats in the flooring, covering it with banana leaves and disposing of it in the forest. Usually, if the *mongonp'ot* has a sister or daughter, she will be an assistant, trained by the *mongonp'ot* herself. From this information the writer considers the title of *mongonp'ot* to be inherited by the female line.

Life Ceremonies

(a) Birth (*kaul*)

When a baby is born, the parents hold a ceremony as soon as possible, especially in the case of a first child. The family which had the child will invite all relatives and friends and feed them as much as they can afford. The invited people will bring gifts in the form of food, such as rice, chicken or pig.

(b) Menstruation (*pa'gdugwan*)

This is the most important ceremony for a girl. When a daughter begins her menstruation, the parents will announce the fact to the group "now we will have the celebration which is connected with the first menstruation of our daughter."

There is no special food nor prohibited food. All people in the group may attend the affair with some gifts, usually in the form of food. There are no special gifts. This is a sort of initiation.

(c) Marriage (*rápat*) (see Section III)

(d) Funeral Ceremony (*kumot*)

When a person dies, the old people in the group will sing poems for twenty-four hours, which mean (freely translated) "I call you today to come, to come. Here is the food that I have prepared for you until the next harvest. I promise to pray for your life." This poem will also be chanted for the harvest ceremony (*samaya*) with rice wine being also used. After the period of singing or chanting is over, all men will bury the dead person with his personal items (those he used during his life), and the women will assist except for the burial itself.

They believe that a dead person will become a *kuludua*—a spirit. They do not appear to be afraid of death and the *kuludua,* as evidenced by the fact that they do not change residence as do other Pala'wan groups.

VIII. Summary

In the Philippines, there is generally speaking, no corporative group-community. As Kroeber noted (1919), the people live in scattered villages which are found in both the upland rice cultivating areas and the wet rice cultivating areas.

In the Tag'bae group there is a sort of "head man" titled, *panglima.* The eldest man among them is often the *panglima,* and in this area, household no. 3 is the residence of the *panglima, Kiki.* In considering the function of the *panglima,* the writer considers the most important one to be that of consultation during important life problems. For example, recently their barter activities are increasing remarkably with the Christians. Sometimes they have no agreement in bartering and in this case Kiki will be a middle man; he is also the one who will appear to the municipal court in situations where the group cannot handle the problem themselves. As noted before, regarding marriage, divorce or quarrelling, Kiki will be consulted or will advise.

Problems are becoming more complicated than before because there are not only private but also social ones between the Pala'wan and the Christians. This is why the role of *panglima* Kiki is becoming an important

part of the social structure with its function. At present, this status is not inherited by a particular family line as it is among the Batangans (Muratake and Kikuchi, 1958).

The families of the medicine man and of the midwife inherit their titles from generation to generation similar to the *ite* system in Japan (Nakane, 1967).

Generally, in bilateral society the family ties are very tenuous. This is the reason why locality is very strict, since there is no social, political and economic organization which covers the entire society. This society is similar to the bilateral type—Eskimo type, so called by Murdock (1960).

There are, however, big differences in the residential rule and the incest taboo. The Pala'wan employ matri-uxorilocal pattern strictly and the incest taboo is extended to the second cousin. The cognatic society like that of the Pala'wan can be understood well through studies of the ritual or cult system and the cosmological point of view, as Iban society.

The emergence of an axial family among the Pala'wan may be observed through a more intensive study of agricultural ceremony, and the systems of other cults or rituals.

APPENDIX I

The Pala'wan Kinship Terminology (Tag'bae Group)
Pinag-uringan area. Consanguineal System



APPENDIX II

The Pala'wan Kinship Terminology (Tag'bae Group)
Pinag-uringan area. Affinal System



APPENDIX III

Genealogy of Pinag-uringan area (Tag'bae Group)
Pala'wan, at Quezon in Palawan Island.



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SOCIALISM IN CONFUCIANISM

P. CHAO

CONFUCIUS (551-479 B.C.) WAS BORN INTO A CHINA WHEN IT WAS torn by political upheaval and cultural anarchy. It was an age when a subjective or arbitrary sophistry akin to that in the Greek tradition infringed upon the traditions of China and plunged her into a welter of civil strife. Political contenders were buttressed by preachers of new ideas and panaceas. It was then that Confucius made a defense against these sophistic innovations by reasserting and reviving older principles and practices. The teachings of Confucius, the master, were carried on at least by three schools, but the teachings of all three were written down in their collective works: *Motzu, Meng tzu* and *Hsün tzu.* Among these three only Meng tzu-Mencius (372-289 B.C.) was regarded as Confucian orthodox and listed as the thirteenth and last item in the Confucianist canon around 1100 A.D. Meng tzu records chiefly the travels and verbose teachings of Confucius and provides evidence of the polemical ideas among the various schools of Confucius' adherents.

Confucius was recognized as the first ancestor of the religious and literary tradition of China. He had no counterpart in the Western as well as in other oriental traditions. However, the Chinese have never worshipped Confucius nor prayed to him as a god. China has always been a class society where the upper classes are conscious of a natural obligation towards their social inferiors, and the inferiors look up to their superiors for exemplary conduct and right action. Thus by imitation and by a societal osmosis the high moral standards of Confucianism were transmitted down to China's masses. Though China has been a class society socialism abounds in Confucian teachings. Again, though modern socialism originated in Europe, it also germinated in ancient China. We need not take pains in pointing out socialism in the teachings of Confucius and Mencius. These teachings inspired a great number of modern reformers with utopian thought. It stands to reason that social conditions and circumstances in Europe gave rise to the prominence of socialism; nevertheless with the help of Western missionaries Europe soon came to know more about China and Confucianism. The waves of humanism and rationalism which swept Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries seem to have been derived to a certain extent from this new knowledge and have paved the way for socialism.

I shall endeavour in this paper to investigate the extent to which socialism has been preached in Confucianism and to compare Confucianism with Platonism on socialism. I am aware that for those who are well-versed in Chinese classics, such as *Lun yü—The Analects of Confucius* and *Meng*

tzu—Mencius, there may be dispute on this subject, particularly with respect to socialism found in "Ching-tien", the Well-Field System. I shall attempt to point out the presence of socialism in Confucian teachings and restrict the sources of my investigation chiefly to *Lun-yü* and *Meng tzu*.

First let us define what is meant by the term "socialism". The term "socialism" was first adopted in 1872 in the *Owenite Co-operative Magazine* to designate tendencies opposed to liberal individualism. George Bernard Shaw understands "socialism" to mean "the complete discarding of the institution of private property . . . and the division of the resultant public income equally and indiscriminately among the entire population". The "sum unique" of Platonic socialism is its regulative principle. It is socialism which disregards the selfish interests of individuals and endeavours to establish justice by organizing society in variegated groups. Othmar Spann, who views popular socialism as an inconsistent medley of collectivism and liberalism has attempted to refurbish such aristocratic socialism in a system called "universalism".

Communistic socialism purports to be the ideal of absolute equality and seeks to express the *volonté de tous*. Its ideal can be couched in the maxim, probably of stoic origin: *"from each according to his capacities, to each according to his needs"*. However, the ideal of Socialism is not a mechanical equality of all members of society but rather a potential equality—in the maxim of Saint Simon's followers: "from each according to his capacity, to each according to his merit", has as its quintessence not common ownership but the elimination of all unearned increment or profit. We now enter into investigation to what extent Confucianism has a bearing on socialism.

1. Equal Educational Opportunity

In the Chinese hierarchical society, as Confucius suggested, members of the ruling class were to be selected on the basis of individual merit. For it was Confucius' belief that political and social disorder arose from the top stratum of society. As it is read in the *Lun Yü*, the ruler and his officials are likened to the wind and the commoners to the grass. When the wind blows, the grass bends. When "chün-tzu", the morally and intellectually superior man serves in government, peace and social order will ensue. But how should we distinguish the intellectually and morally superior man from the mediocre? Confucius took for granted that men are not born equal in intelligence and capacity. However, Confucius proposed equal opportunity of education to both the high and the low. He said: "In education there should be no class distinctions".[1] The Confucian idea purports that education is based on a Grand Union without distinction of the rich and the poor, the high and the low or the wise and the stupid. Whoever is disposed to

[1] *Lun yü Chu su*—The Analects of Confucius, "Wei Ling Kung", Book XV, Ch. 38 in *Ssu pu pei yao* (ed.).

learn will always be welcome. Here again, Confucius sought to make education universal and popular. Mencius, the foremost exponent of Confucius' orthodox doctrine, argued that it is incumbent on the state to provide schools at various levels for the education of the people. We must remember that in his life-time when education had been a prerogative of the hereditary feudal nobility, Confucius who made every effort to implement his doctrine by offering equal instruction to all his disciples regardless of their social origin, should indeed receive credit for his initiative with regard to intellectual emancipation and common education. Thus when Confucius and his followers sought to uphold the feudal system they actually heralded a new social order, based not on hereditary status, but on individual merit. In other words, while lending support to a hierarchical society, they procured means to deal a blow at its inherent injustice and bring about social equity chiefly through education. Confucianism on education can therefore be thought of as a precursor of modern socialism.

Likewise, in conformity with Confucian doctrine Mo-tzu offered similar teachings. He said:

> In administering the government, the ancient sage-kings ranked the morally excellent high and exalted the virtuous. If capable, even a farmer or artisan would be employed—commissioned with high rank, remunerated with liberal emoluments, trusted with important charges, and empowered to issue final orders . . . Ranks should be standardized according to virtue, tasks assigned according to office, and rewards given according to labour spent. When emoluments are distributed in proportion to achievements, officials cannot be in constant honour, and people in eternal humility.[2]

This clearly shows that the existence of a hierarchical society, with its discrimination between the ruling and ruled, can be justified by the principle that status and emoluments should be based on achievement and virtue.

In contrast with Confucianism Plato's view of human nature is in opposition to egalitarianism. Men are innately unequal and thus must be classified in a hierarchy of innate ability and merit. This being true, men must all be equally subject to the control of a complex and authoritarian constitution. With regard to education Plato insisted that reason, the noblest part of man, should be the ruling faculty, and that only by intensive training through education can man attain the higher levels of experience to the benefit of a state or society. This group of citizens on a par with Confucius' "chün-tzu" are rulers and guardians of the welfare of all.[3] They are lovers of wisdom and philosophy and regard flabbiness of character and selfishness as unbecoming to them.[4] They show utter repugnance to whatever runs counter to the best interests of the state.[5] On the other hand, in opposition

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[2] *Motzu,* Vol. II, Ch. 2 "Shang Hsien", in *Ssu pu pei yao* (ed.) pp. 2a and 2b.

[3] Plato, *Statesman,* translated by Benjamin Jowett (London: Oxford University Press, 1892), 297.

[4] Plato, *The Republic,* translated by Benjamin Jowett (London: Oxford University Press, 1892), 398 E, 412.

[5] Plato, *The Republic,* 412.

to Confucius' universal education Plato subscribed to the opinion that the common people have no access to the advantage of a special education. For in accordance with the aristocratic strain in Plato's social philosophy it is of no avail to offer a higher education to that proportion of the people who are mentally incapable of profiting by education.

2. Division of Labour

Although Confucius proposed that in education there should be no class distinctions, the Confucian school believed that human beings were different in intelligence and ability. Thus people in a society could not all be assigned the same roles and bear the same responsibilities. Social organization requires a division of labour and the assignment of different kinds of work to people according to their capacity. There are two types of work, the mental and the physical. Farmers, artisans, and merchants are engaged in the second type. It was incumbent upon them to produce goods and render services. Another group included scholars and officials whose function was to study and to acquire virtue. This class is characterized as the "great man", in contrast to another class, the "small man". The former class not only was superior but was entitled to be served and supported by the latter. This shows a relationship of subordination and superordination. It is read in *Kuo Yü*: "The commoners, the artisans and merchants, each attend to their profession to support the superiors".[6] Moreover, the division of labour was also politically oriented. Mental labour was concerned with governing, whereas physical labour is manual. The point has been emphatically described in *Ch'un-ch'iu Tso chuan*: "It is a rule of the former kings that superior men should labour with their minds and smaller men labour with their strength".[7] In like manner Mencius said:

> Some labour with their minds, and some labour with their strength. Those who labour with their minds govern others; those who labour with their strength are governed by others. Those who are governed by others support them: those who govern others are supported by them. This is a principle universally recognized.[8]

Since the work of chün-tzu was considered to contribute more to society and to accept greater responsibility than a member of another class, he deserve more rewards and better material comforts.

In the *Republic* Plato explained that the division of labour was essential to the existence of a society. Increasing size of a community requires division of labour. The fundamental division involves three classes, the rulers-guardians, tantamount to Confucius' "chün-tzu", the soldiers and the farmers-

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[6] *Kuo-yü,* Ch. I, p. 16a in *Ssu pu pei yao* (ed.).
[7] *Tso chuan Chu-su,* Ch. 30, p. 16a in *Ssu pu pei yao* (ed.).
[8] *Mencius,* "T'ang Wan Kung", Vol. V, Part I, p. 11a in *Ssu pu Ts'ng kan* (ed.). (Shanghai, 1942).

artisans (Confucius' small men).[9] Justice lies in the harmonious co-operation of these three groups, each performing its proper role. Nevertheless, the guardians, the ruling class or "best men" seek righteousness and must prove that the ruling interest of their lives is to be the highest interest of the state. For it was Plato's insistence that only the guardians, presumably the true philosophers, are fit to rule. Only the man who gains an insight into the nature and function of a state and who strives to bring the actual state into conformity with the ideal, can be entrusted with civil power.

3. Confucian Ideal Grand Union

Confucian socialism amounts to Grand Union. Such a society has been clearly described in *Li Ki* as follows:

> When the Grand Union was pursued, a public and common spirit ruled all under the sky; they chose men of talents, virtue and ability; their words were sincere, and what they cultivated was harmony. Thus men did not love their parents only and treated as children only their own sons. A competent provision was secured for the aged till their death, employment for the able-bodied, and the means of growing up to the young. They showed kindness, compassion to the widows, orphans, childless men, and those who were disabled by disease so that they were all sufficiently maintained. Males had their proper works, and females had their homes... (They laboured) with their strength, disliking that it should not be exerted, but not exerting it (only) with a view to their own advantage. In this way (selfish) schemings were repressed and found no development. Robber, filchers and rebellious traitors did not show themselves, and hence the outdoors remained open, and were not shut. This was (the period of) what we call the Grand Union.[10]

These texts lay bare socialism in Confucianism. The statement "they chose men of talents, virtue and ability" implies the democratic foundation. Sincere words and the cultivated harmony put much emphasis upon sincerity and peace. That men did not love their parents only nor cherished as children only their own sons has lucidly reflected universal love. The idea that the aged were provided with necessities of life until death, employment was procured for the able-bodied and the means secured for bringing up the young amounts to the realization of social security and welfare, and shows kindness and compassion to widows, orphans and childless men. The equality of the sexes has been urged by what is said in *Li Ki* "Males had their proper works and females their homes". In such a social order selfishness can be abolished, and robbers, filchers and rebellious traitors will not develop to the effect that outdoors remain open. This is a society of Grand Union. In fact, what Confucius called the Grand Union is equivalent to democracy and socialism, and a counterpart of what Plato taught about the

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[9] Plato, *The Republic,* translated by Benjamin Jowett, third edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1892), 369 B.

[10] *Li Ki* (Book of Rites), "The Li Yun", Ch. IX, in *Ssu pu pei yao* (ed.), Vol. XXI, p. 2a.

discarding of the selfish interests of individuals and the establishment of justice in a state.

4. Confucian Foreign Policy

Confucian foreign policy is also imbued with socialism. In *Lun-Yü* he said:

> Rulers of states and chiefs of families are not troubled lest their people should be few, but are troubled lest they should not keep their several places; that they are not troubled with fears of poverty, but are troubled with fears of a want of contented repose among the people in their several places. For when the people keep their several places, there will be no poverty; when harmony prevails, there will be no scarcity of people; and when there is such a contented repose, there will be no rebellious upsettings.[11]

This Confucian equalization of rich and poor is, what socialist states have nowadays, predicated on equal distribution. Socialists have considered an unequal distribution to be the gravest evil, whence all social turbulent phenomena have taken root. Confucius foresaw in ancient times such social ills and did not spare himself to urge upon the states the need of an equal distribution. As for those people who were unsubmissive, Confucius insisted that all the influence of civil virtue shall be cultivated to attract them; and when they have been so attracted, they must be made contented and tranquil.

Confucius' theory of equalizing poor and rich has reflected what modern socialism has emphasized on the question of distribution. Socialism has conceded an unequal distribution to be the most serious flaw in modern world and to entail social disorder, which was foreseen by Confucius in ancient times. As for his foreign policy, Confucius, in dealing with unsubmissive remote people, advocated the cultivation of civil culture and virtue. Such a point of view is obviously in opposition to jingoism and colonialism, but in accord with orthodox socialism and peaceful foreign policy. It seems that although the Confucius' thought is trite in the modern world, it was workable in the ancient and feudalistic society two thousand years ago.

MENCIUS' DOCTRINE ON SOCIALISM

Mencius, the staunch follower of Confucius carried further the latter's socialistic ideas. Mencius was almost contemporaneous with Plato. Both of them put forward similar ideas of socialism though they appeared in two different words. Mencius' thought is more progressive than Confucius', and was not simply an advocate of the greater importance of people than that of rulers. His economic thought is rife with ideas of socialism. He said:

> I would ask you, in the remoter districts, observing the nine-squares division, to reserve one division to be cultivated on the system of mutual aid, and, in the more central parts of kingdom, to make the people pay for themselves a tenth part of their produce... A square "li" covers nine squares of land,

[11] *Lun yü Chu su*, "Ke She", Book XVI, Ch. I, p. 1b in *Ssu pu pei yao* (ed.).

> which nine squares contain nine hundred "mow". The central square is the public field, and eight families, each having its private hundred "mow", cultivate in common the public field. And not till public work is finished, may they presume to attend to their private affairs.[12]

The well-field system or "ching-t'ien" of Mencius was laid out like the character "#" or well for his eight families' fields and a ninth, the common field. In the *Chou-li* (Book of Chou) nine "fu"—cultivators comprise a "ching" or well and "kou", drains, four feet wide and deep marked off one "ching", well from another; a square often "ching" by ten was a "ch'eng" and between "ch'eng" there were "hsu", ditches, eight feet wide and deep.[13] For some the well-field system was the basis for socialism; for others, it became a form of which the content was a trans-national universal stage. However, on the basis of a modern translation of Mencius' text, the well-field system has been thought of as the socialistic goal of men or feudalism.

Among Confucius' followers one group adhered to socialist outer commitment to strive for perfect government, a commitment concurrent with the monarch's interest in restraining private aggrandizement in land, and the other group subscribed to the inner commitment to morality in an egalitarian spirit from such hierarchically ordered possessors as the bureaucrats themselves.[14] In *Shih-ching* (Book of Poems) the well-field system is described as follows: "Rain (was petitioned) on our public field and then on our private field.[15] We see this as a symbol of the relation of the empire to the family. Ku Yen-wu said: "The Sage-kings knowing the primacy of the empire, yet knew, too, that man's original nature had a private impulse".[16] The kings sympathized with conferred lands in the well-field system and so joined communal and private in the empire. Around the turn of the twentieth century (1858-1927) K'ang Yu-wei, in his preface tribute to Confucius, held that Confucius had devised the well-field system in which land was allotted to every man and thus slavery in ancient China was abolished.[17] Likewise in 1899 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (1873-1928) said: "China's ancient well-field system stands on the same plane as modern socialism". T'ang Ssu-t'ung was of the same opinion and wrote: "With the well-field system or ching-t'ien the government of the world can be made one, that is, "ching-t'ien" makes the rich and the poor equals".[18]

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[12] *Mencius,* "T'ang Wan Kung", Part I, Vol. V, in *Ssu pu Ts'ung kan,* Vol. XIV, pp. 7a-8a.

[13] *Chou li* (Book of Chou), t'se 6, Ch. 12 in *Ssu pu Ts'ung kan* (ed.), p. 18b.

[14] Joseph R. Levenson, "Ill Wind in the Well-field: The Erosion of the Confucian Ground of Controversy" in *The Confucian Persuasion,* ed. by Arthur F. Wright (Standford University Press, 1960), p. 270.

[15] *Shih-ching* (Book of Poem), Ch. 21 "Fu t'ien chih shih" in *Mo shih Chu-su,* Vol. XIV in *Ssu pu pei yao* ed., p. 10a.

[16] Ku Yen-wu, *Jih Chih lu—Record of Knowledge Day by Day* (Shanghai, 1933), I, Ch. 3, p. 12.

[17] L. C. Thompson, trans. *Ta T'ung shu—The One World Philosophy of K'ang Yu-wei* (London, 1958), pp. 137, 211.

[18] T'ang Ssu-t'ung, "Jen Hsüeh"—*Study of Benevolence in T'ang Ssu-t'ung Chuan Chi*—Collected Works of T'ang Ssu-t'ung (Peking, 1954), p. 69.

The well-field system of Mencius excels the well-field system described in *Chou-li* on the ground that land was owned by the kingdom and was apportioned to every man to cultivate. This is unlike the private ownership of land by the state or aristocrat in which people were allotted land, yet they were rendered slave peasant.

2. The Economic System of Husbandry

In presenting further description of socialism Mencius stated:

> Let mulberry trees be planted about the homesteads with their five mow, and persons of fifty years may be clothed with silk. In keeping fowls, pigs, dogs and swine, let not their times of breeding be neglected, and persons of seventy years may eat flesh. Let there not be taken away the time that is proper for the cultivation of the farm with its hundred mow, and the family of several mouths that is supported by it shall not suffer from hunger.... It never has been that the ruler of a state, where such results were seen—persons of seventy wearing silk and eating flesh, and the black-haired people suffering neither from hunger nor cold,—did not attain to the imperial dignity.[19]

This passage laid bare the higher principles which completed royal government. After the due regulation of husbandry and provision for the certain livelihood of other people, there must come the business of education. The schools aimed at the practice of archery, as a trial of virtue and skill. It refers to the inculcation of human relations by the institution of schools. Thus Confucius said: "The means of education should be provided for all, the poor as well as the rich".[20] When this principle was put into practice, one is bound to become a regnant emperor. Such a description of the social and economic system has brought out socialism in clear relief.

Likewise, Plato was convinced that the good state is a rational state, and that the good ruler (wise princes called by Mencius) is the man who knows precisely the plan of life which will bring about happiness to his people. Like a doctor looking after our bodily health and attending us when we are ill, the ruler must direct our whole life, plan our existence, and order our thoughts and emotions. He must not be beguiled by our complaints or tempted by our bribes. He must care so much about the plan which he knows to be our welfare that he can overlook the distress and pain we shall suffer, just as the doctor must neglect our suffering if he is to save our life.[21]

Elsewhere Mencius wrote: "There must be in the territory of T'ang men of a superior grade, and there must be in it countrymen. If there were not men of a superior grade, there would be none to rule the countrymen. If there were no countrymen, there would be none to support the men of

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[19] *Mencius*, "Hwuy of Leang", Part I, Ch. 3, Book 1 in *Ssu pu pei yao* ed., p. 4b-5a.

[20] *Lun yü Chu-su*, "Wei Ling King", Book XV, Ch. 38 in *Ssu pu pei yao* (ed.).

[21] R.H.S. Crossman, "Plato and the Perfect State", in *Plato: Totalitarian or Democrat*. Essays Selected and Introduced by Thomas L. Thorson (N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 33.

superior grade".[22] Plato expounded similar ideas, when he held that the civilians and the vast majority of the population, the peasants and artisans are engaged in the production and distribution of wealth. Their function is to provide the material foundation of social welfare and their happiness is to enjoy the just fruits of their labours under a stable government. The gentlemen, on the other hand, unsullied by trade and menial labours of agriculture and craftsmanship, serve as public administrators and must rule in Plato's state.[23] Here again, in the *Republic* Plato drew a blueprint of a Utopia and had convinced himself of a possible enjoyment of a blissful life here. From this motive he embarked on describing how to apply rational principles to social organization so that an ideal society would come true. He insisted that the public administration shall be committed to philosophers on the ground that by dint competence which the higher education brought about they were capable of leading society to reach its happy goal. In this state work is to be distributed to each according to his ability; education and support of children must be provided by the state. Women and men should work abreast and bear responsibility towards the state. However, unlike Mencius, Plato upheld communism: "From each according to his ability and to each according to his needs", and the community of wives and children. In this state there is neither dictator or tyranny nor a noticeable hiatus of poor and rich. Apart from Plato's fallacious communistic ideas, what is defective is the existence of slavery.

As for the division of labour Mencius has succinctly expressed the same ideas as Confucius' and said: "Greater men have their proper business, and little men have their proper business.... In the case of any single individual, whatever articles he can acquire are ready to his hand, being produced by the various handicraftsmen".[24] In like manner, Plato recognized the need for correlating the different types of occupation.[25] The common people are engaged in the occupations as skilled artisans, industrial and agricultural workers. The soldiers are bound to maintain order at home and repel invaders, and the guardians rule the state.[26] This principle of division of labour and co-operation has laid the foundation of socialism and has been equally adopted by both Confucius and Plato. Whereas Plato built an ideal commonwealth, Confucius established the Grand Union.

One may be eager to know what has become actually of Confucianism in Communist China. Confucius asserted a "benevolent government" using moral virtues and the dictates of propriety as the criteria for judging people. The practice of the dictates of propriety redounds to respect for others

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22 *Mencius,* "T'ang Wan Kung", Part I, Vol. V, in *Ssu pu Ts'ung kan* (ed.,) p. 18b.
23 R.H.S. Crossman, "Plato and the Perfect State", *op. cit.,* p. 34.
24 *Mencius,* "T'ang Wan Kung", Part I, Vol. V, in *Ssu pu Ts'ung kan* (ed.), p. 11a.
25 *The Republic* by Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett, third edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1892), 370 B.
26 Plato, *Statesman,* translated by B. Jowett (London: Oxford University Press, 1892), 303.

and the treatment of people on an equal footing. On the other hand, the more the countries are on an unequal footing, the more there will be the hostility towards one another. In fact, what Confucius meant by "benevolence" had all the people in mind, that is to say, "benevolence" means "love of people"—a recognition of man's right to survive. Whereas Confucius' "love of people" subjectively imparts loving the ruling classes, objectively it means love of the masses and benevolence with all the people. In the *People's Daily*—Jen Min Jih Pao—we read that "Forum on Confucius" was held and assailed Confucius and Confucian scholars whose crimes included "fanatical exaltation of Confucius as a scholar and teacher", "acclamation of the Confucian principles of 'benevolent government' and 'rule of moral virtues." [27] According to the declaration of the Communist Party in the Forum, for more than two thousand years China's reactionary ruling class adored Confucius as a "holy man" and took advantage of Confucian concepts to subject labouring people under the yoke. Confucian ideas therefore became heavy spiritual fetters imposed on the working people. Today in the socialist new China, the people have made a clean sweep of Confucian concepts and capitalist and revisionist ideas which serve to exploit the proletariat. As the vanguard for destroying Confucian ideas *Red Guard* has made the following comments:

1. Those people who have worshipped Confucius as a paragon of virtue had glorified him to the point of hysterical frenzy want to establish the absolute authority of Confucius in the hope of unifying the thought, language and feelings of 700 million people under the auspices of Confucian ideas. They use every conceivable means of disparaging and attacking Mao Tze-tung's thought. Under no circumstances should this be tolerated. We will certainly shatter Confucian thought and establish instead the absolute authority of Mao Tze-tung's thought.

2. It is only the dictatorship of the proletariat that can offer democracy to the people and impose dictatorship over all reactionaries. The reactionaries denounce us as not being "benevolent". That they want a "benevolent" government from us means doing away with proletarian dictatorship. If their schemes and plots are met with success, our Party and our country will be brought to ruin and the revolution will be a failure.

3. The relationships between slave-owners and slaves, between landlords and peasants and between capitalists and workers are those of exploiters and the exploited. The struggle between them is a life-and-death and implacable struggle devoid of the idea of "loving one another". In a Socialist society in which class struggle still exists, the principal reason why these monsters and demons have publicly propagated the idea of "loving one another" is to blur the class boundary and disown class struggle.

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[27] "The Forum on Confucius", in *Jen Min Jih Pao*—The People's Daily, January 10, 1967, p. 4. The report "The Forum on Confucius" is published in *The People's Daily* in Chinese and here translated into English.

These comments have made it clear that in the great proletarian cultural revolution nowadays one of the Communist paramount tasks is to putrefy the rigid feudal corpse of Confucius and obliterate all of the reactionary Confucian ideas and tenets.

CONCLUSION

The multifarious social and political ideas of Confucius and his followers appear in the *Book of Odes,* the *Book of History,* the *Book of Change* and the *Book of Rites* which became the "Old Testament' of Confucianism.[28] The *Analects of Confucius* or the Sayings of Confucius, the *Book of Mencius,* the *Book of Filial Piety,* the *Doctrine of the Mean* and the *Great Learning*[29] which formed the "New Testament" contain the verbose Confucian tenets. In their political thought Confucius and Mencius were socialistically inclined. Both laid down principles of humanitarianism and benevolent rule by the wisest members of society. Mencius stressed the importance of taking heed of the voices of the people. He devoted much attention to the problem of land distribution, conservation and of hunting through closed seasons in terms of economic life. He maintained that poverty entails crime and that responsibility for such crime rests with the ruler. Confucius, on the other hand, was in favour of government granaries, aid to transportation and state relief for orphans and the aged, widows and widowers, apart from private charities.

The government should make as its objective not the pleasure of the rulers but the happiness of its subjects. To this end Confucius advocated such measures as reduction of taxation, mitigation of severe punishment and abstention from needless wars. It is Confucius' belief that the state should be a wholly cooperative enterprise. The right to govern depended upon the ability to make the government well-organized and the people contented. This in turn depends upon the possession of virtue and ability which can develop by dint of education. Like Plato, Confucius did not advocate advanced education for all but believed that some education must be offered even to the humblest citizens for two reasons: (1) Since ability does not depend on birth, only a greater opportunity of education can enable the most capable to develop themselves for their own good as well as that of society. (2) Since the state is a co-operative enterprise, it is in dire need of enlightened citizens to serve it effectively.

The administration was conducted by ministers regardless of rank; they were selected not because of their ancestry but of their personal qualities so that a man of very humble origin could be elevated to wield the foremost

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[28] *The Book of Odes* (Shih Ching), *The Book of History* (Shih shu), *The Book of Change* (I Ching), and *The Book of Rites* (I Li).

[29] *The Analects of Confucius* (Lun Yu), *The Book of Mencius* (Meng Tze), *The Book of Filial Piety* (Hsiao Ching), *the Doctrine of the Mean* (Chung yung), *The Great Learning* (Ta hsiao).

power over the entire empire. However, considering that men have by nature been endowed with different degrees of intelligence and capacities, there ought to be social classes: scholars and officials labouring with their minds rightly deserve the service of those who are engaged in manual labour. This constitutes the division of labour and the principle of subordination and superordination in society. Confucius was of the belief that in case the rulers and their subjects discharge consciously their duty towards one another and enjoy bliss, the Grand Union would take shape in action.

THE GENESIS OF THE DMK

Y. M. MARICAN *

THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO DESCRIBE AND EXPLAIN THE genesis of the *Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam*[1] which came into existence on September 17, 1949. Here we will focus mainly on political developments and socio-economic conditions in Tamil Nadu [2] from the middle of the last century till 1949. Specifically, the period under consideration involves an investigation of the emergence and evolution of the Non-Brahmin political movement and Dravidian separatism.

The Non-Brahmin political movement in Tamil Nadu represented essentially a strong reaction to the Brahmin dominance of the administrative, cultural, educational, political, and religious spheres. The domination and power enjoyed by the Brahmins was far out of proportion to their numerical strength. The basic objective of the Non-Brahmin political movement in the initial stages was to eradicate the "imbalance". In the later stages, particularly when the dynamic E. V. Ramasamy Naicker (hereafter referred to as Periyar)[3] assumed the leadership of the movement, more radical postures and policies were adopted and the achievement of an independent sovereign federal republic of Dravidanadu consisting of the present Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Mysore became the principal objective of the movement.

Let us examine the extent of Brahmin dominance in some detail. In the field of education, their superiority was clearly established well before the present century and the level of literacy among them was proportionately much higher than among the Non-Brahmins in the Madras Presidency.[4] One manifestation of this was the high educational "output" of that community. For example, although the Brahmin community constituted only about three per cent of the population, they formed the majority of the college educated in the Madras Presidency in the late 19th century. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 clearly illustrate this.

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1 The *Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam*, or the Dravida Progressive Federation, will hereafter be referred to as the DMK. These initials are commonly used to refer to the party.

2 After the DMK came into power in Madras State, the name of the latter was changed to Tamil Nadu.

3 E.V. Ramasamy Naicker was given the title "Periyar" (Elder) by the Tamil Nadu Women's Conference on November, 13, 1938. See R. Bhanskaran, *Sociology of Politics: Tradition and Politics in India* (London: Asia Publishing House, 1967), p. 46.

4 Eugene F. Irschick, *Politics and Social Conflict in South India* (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 13-14.

TABLE 1.1—STUDENTS IN ARTS COLLEGES IN MADRAS PRESIDENCY ACCORDING TO COMMUNITY IN 1890-1891

Community	*%*
Brahmins	69
Other Hindus	21
Indian Christians	8
Muslims	1
Anglo-Indians & Europeans	1
Total	100

(N=3,194)

Source: Table compiled from data provided by Mohan Ram, *Hindi Against India* (New Delhi: Rachna Prakashan, 1968), p. 70.

TABLE 1.2—GRADUATES FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS ACCORDING TO COMMUNITY FROM 1858 TO 1894

Community	*%*
Brahmins	69
Other Hindus	19
Indian Christians	8
Eurasians & Europeans	3
Muslims	1
Total	100

(N=3,483)

Source: University of Madras Calendar for 1893-4, Vol. 1, pp. 405-19.

Thus the total number of Brahmin students graduating from the University of Madras exceeded the sum total of graduating students from all other communities. The high percentage of Brahmin graduates was reflected in the composition of the government bureaucracy where the Brahmin community was highly over-represented. This was partly because, as the preceding statistics show, there were more college educated Brahmins than Non-Brahmins and this enabled the former to fill a sizeable portion of the posts in the government bureaucracy; also, because of their high educational qualifications, the Brahmins occupied about forty per cent of the "higher" posts open to Indians. Tables 1.3 and 1.4 illustrate the extent of Brahmin over-representation in the government bureaucracy.

TABLE 1.3—PERCENTAGE OF PUBLIC SERVICE POSTS HELD BY BRAHMINS, OTHER HINDUS, MUSLIMS, AND OTHERS IN 1872, 1881, AND 1886

	1872	*1881*	*1886*
Brahmins	28	30	19
Other Hindus	49	48	55

Muslims	14	13	17
Others	9	9	9
Total	100	100	100
	(N=25,662)	(N=24,231)	(N=47,412)

Source: Table compiled from data provided in *Madras Educational Proceedings,* Volume 3045, No. 386.

TABLE 1.4—PERCENTAGE OF PUBLIC SERVICE POSTS HELD BY BRAHMINS, OTHER HINDUS, MUSLIMS, AND OTHERS ACCORDING TO SALARY LEVELS IN 1886

Community	% of total population	% of appointments paying more than Rs. 10 per month	% of appointments paying Rs. 10 and below per month
Brahmins	4	42	4
Other Hindus	88	37	68
Muslims	6	6	24
Others	2	16	4
Total	100	101*	100
		(N=28,750)	(N=18,662)

* Round-off error

Source: Table compiled from data provided in the *Madras Educational Proceedings,* Volume 3045, No. 386.

Looking at the percentage of Other Hindus employed in the civil bureaucracy in the years 1872, 1881, and 1886, it is obvious that their representation is far below their numerical strength. Also, the table showing appointments paying ten rupees and below demands attention. The "Other Hindus" took up about sixty-eight per cent of the inferior appointments. The greater part of the inferior appointments was divided between the Muslims and the Non-Brahmin Hindus in the ratio of nearly one to three. In contrast, the Brahmins took up only four per cent of the inferior appointments.

H. E. Stokes, and Acting Secretary in the Government of Madras, made the following comment with regard to Brahmin over-representation in the government bureaucracy. He wrote in 1886:

> The Government is unable to regard this increasing share of administration in the hands of a single class with entire approval. In certain departments (Settlement, Registration, Education, and Revenue), the Brahmins must be considered excessive. The Government, however, is most unwilling by these observations, to create the impression that they are hostile to the admission of Brahmins into the public service. The large share of public employment which that class had obtained is beyond doubt due to its own energy and ability, and it is impossible to ignore manifest superiority in considering the recruiting of the public service.[5]

[5] *Madras Educational Proceedings,* Vol. 3045, No. 386, G.O., 27 July 1887.

The over-representation of Brahmins in the government bureaucracy continued without arousing serious and organized political opposition from the Non-Brahmin community till the early part of this century. According to Irschick, in 1912, out of the total 140 Deputy Collectors, 77 (55%) were Brahmins, and out of the total 128 District *munsifs,* 93 (72.6%) were Brahmins.[6]

In examining further this aspect of Brahmin dominance, we find that the political sphere was no exception. Their domination of the government bureaucracy gave them immense political influence and they were an important force in Madras politics partly because they formed the largest compact homogeneous group in the Legislative Council. According to Sir Alexander Cardew, a Madras civilian,

> ever since 1893 Brahmin lawyers were the dominant element in the Legislative Council. Between 1893 and 1909 there were six official members of whom four were Brahmins and two were non-Brahmins. The same phenomenon persisted between 1909 and 1920 when the Morley-Minto Council functioned. Nine Indians were official members of whom eight were Brahmins. One-fifth of the total membership belonged to the Brahmins.[7]

The dominance of Madras politics by Brahmins was also reflected in the composition of the Madras Standing Congress Committee which was formed in 1888 to manage Congress affairs in South India. The Committee elected for 1890 had 12 Brahmins out of a total of 42.[8] In September 1896, the Madras Standing Congress Committee was dissolved and its duties were transferred to the Madras Mahajana Sabha.[9]

The Brahmins were also preponderant in the committee of the Madras Mahajana Sabha, the most important political body in the region, which was founded in 1884 and affiliated to the Congress since the latter's formation in 1885. In 1885, 10 out of 29 members of the committee of the Madras Mahajana Sabha were Brahmins. In 1901, 18 out of 31 members of the committee were Brahmins, while in 1909 the figure was 19 out of 31.[10]

It is useful to examine briefly how this situation of Brahmin dominance came about. Under the caste system, the Brahmins were the highest and most sacred of the castes. Their religious superiority and economic power derived from landownership established the Brahmins at the apex of the societal pyramid.[11] Through strict observation of a set of rules, the Brahmins maintained their "religious purity". These rules prevented the free inter-

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[6] Irschick, *op. cit.,* p. 14.

[7] S.N. Balasundaram, "The Dravidian (Non-Brahmin) Movement in Madras," in Iqbal Narain, ed., *State Politics in India* (Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1967), p. 167. fn. 1.

[8] *Hindu,* January 25, 1890.

[9] *Hindu,* November 28, 1896.

[10] *Madras Almanac,* 1886, pp. 928-29; *Annual Report of the Madras Mahajana Sabha, for 1899 and 1900* (Madras, n.d.); and *Proceedings of the Madras Mahajana 1907-12,* MMS Office, Mount Road, Madras.

[11] For an interpretation of the way the South Indian Brahmin has maintained his social control over the other castes, see B.N. Nair, *The Dynamic Brahmin* (Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1959).

mingling of the Brahmins with the other caste groups because it was feared that this would "pollute" the "purity" of the Brahmins. Thus, caste affiliations fixed the parameters of their socialization process which further reinforced the rigid social hierarchy and resulted in each caste group evolving its own peculiar life styles. This social set-up was to have important cultural, economic, and political consequences later.

The Brahmin intellectual and cultural activity centered partly around the learning and mastery of the Vedic religious scripts (for example, the *Rigvedas*). This intellectual tradition enabled the Brahmins to assume a major portion of the appointments in the various levels of administration. Thus, the Brahmin dominance of the civil bureaucracy had existed since pre-British times and also before competitive examinations were introduced in 1858 by the British to break the stranglehold of the Mahratta Brahmins in the district administration of South India.

When British rule and English education were introduced, the Brahmins realized the potential advantage which a command of western education would give them, and here, their literary tradition gave them the initial advantage in adapting themselves to western education. The rapid expansion of western education in the Madras Presidency during the 1880's provided the Brahmins with greater opportunities to master the "master's" language.

> Thus at the time when the Congress movement was getting underway, Madras offered greater provision for collegiate instruction than did Bengal despite the earlier lead of the latter Presidency in the field of higher education. Madras could claim over half of the aided colleges that arose in British India between 1881 and 1885, together with the largest share of peninsula-wide increase in collegiate instruction.[12]

Table 1.5 illustrates the lead which the Madras Presidency had in collegiate instruction.

TABLE 1.5—ARTS COLLEGES IN INDIA ACCORDING TO PROVINCES IN 1882

PROVINCE	%
1. Madras	39
2. Bengal	34
3. North-West Frontier (modern Uttar Pradesh)	14
4. Bombay	9
5. Punjab	3
Total	99*
	(N=64)

* Round-off error

Source: Table compiled from data provided by Ram, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

[12] B.T. McCully, *English Education & the Origins of Indian Nationalism* (Gloucester, Mass: Peter Smith, 1966), p. 160.

This lead, in terms of more colleges, which the Madras Presidency had in the educational field is partly explained by the greater concentration of the educational activities of Christian missionaries in this Presidency than in the other areas. For example, in 1852, Madras had 1,185 mission schools with 38,055 students while Bombay and Bengal together had 472 mission schools with an enrolment of 26,791.[13] A sizeable proportion of students in colleges and schools consisted of Brahmin students and Non-Brahmin (Hindu) representation was far below their numerical strength. Also, although the Non-Brahmin Hindu community constituted about eighty-eight per cent of the population, the percentage of Non-Brahmin Hindus graduating from the University of Madras from 1858 to 1894 was only 19. These can be seen in Tables 1.1 and 1.2.

As far as Non-Brahmin Hindus were concerned, the small number of college educated members from their community meant few important jobs in the government bureaucracy for them which in turn meant less political influence and patronage. The under-representation of Non-Brahmin Hindus in educational institutions is probably explained by a combination of economic, cultural, and sociological factors.

A general concern for Brahmin preponderance in the government bureaucracy was first expressed by British officials. After examining in detail the actual proportion of appointments held by the various communities, Stokes came to the following conclusion. In 1886, at a time when the Congress was emerging as a political force demanding equality of treatment for Indians in the Indian Civil Service, Stokes wrote:

> It is obviously inexpedient to permit any single class to monopolize the whole patronage of Government. An increase in the proportion of appointments held by the great non-Brahmin portion of the community would, therefore, be a ground for satisfaction.[14]

By this time, British officials in Madras were conceding that competition for administrative positions had not proved a success in so far as satisfying the claims of the major social groups in the region. However, only the Muslims had articulated their dissatisfaction with the competitive system, and argued for proportionate representation in the government bureaucracy. Mir Shujaat Ali Khan, a statutory civilian in the Madras Government, testified before the Public Service Commission in 1887:

> It is further of great importance politically that the sects forming the population of a province should be sufficiently represented in its administration with due regard, of course, to efficiency.[15]

During the 1890s, the Madras Government began to correct the "imbalance" by modifying competition for the posts of Deputy Collectors.

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[13] Mohan Ram, *Hindi Against India* (New Delhi: Rachna Prakashan, 1968), p. 70.

[14] *Madras Educational Proceedings,* Vol. 3045, No. 386, G.O., July 27, 1887.

[15] See *Proceedings of the Public Service Commission,* Vol. 5, Section 2, Evidence of Mir Shujaat Ali, p. 32.

The continued dominance of the Brahmins in the various spheres into the early decades of the present century aroused the jealousy and hatred of the Non-Brahmin community who increasingly became conscious of their political and economic inferiority. Also, the ritual arrogance and discrimination pursued by the Brahmins of South India hurt Non-Brahmin sensibilities and contributed to the emergence of a general climate of animosity toward the Brahmins.[16] The preoccupation of Brahmins with ritual and social purity offended Non-Brahmin's self-respect at a time when western education and the new professions were creating avenues for social mobility while the Congress and other organizations were proclaiming the ideal of equality. It is perhaps worth labouring the point in the South than in other parts of India, and Non-Brahmins who had visited Bombay and/or Bengal were struck at the lack of concern for such taboos in these places.[17] Not surprisingly then caste rivalries intruded more overtly in the politics of South India than anywhere else.

Among the Non-Brahmin community, there gradually emerged a "counter-elite" (consisting principally of politically articulate, urban-based intellectuals) who were cognizant of the plight of their community and were motivated towards redressing their grievances. According to Hardgrave, the Non-Brahmin elites were aware of the vital role of education as the base of the Brahmins' virtual monopoly of the government bureaucracy, and they attempted to uplift their communities first through education.[18]

The Dravidian Association

One of the first Non-Brahmin institutions to be established in this century in Tamil Nadu was "The Dravidian Association," which was inaugurated in 1912. The Raja of Panagal, Dr. T.M. Nair, and C. Nadesa Mudaliar were elected President, Vice-President, and Secretary respectively, of the Association.

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[16] A correspondent, signing himself as "X", wrote to the *Hindu* of September 7, 1905, complaining that in Tinnevely Brahmins would not allow Sudras who were vegetarians by birth to draw water from their wells, nor allow them to live in their midst. He described the treatment of the lower castes as "shameful" and called for the ending of the caste system: "If the higher castes heedless of the warnings of history maintain absurd privileges and thus cause heartburning and hatred among the lower castes, then India will as now remain divided."

[17] Minachiayya, in a letter to the editor of the *Hindu* published on 28 November 1901, wrote that in Bombay rules about inter-caste dining were ignored so long as food was cooked by servants belonging to higher castes. Many Congressmen from the South who attended sessions in Bombay had this experience, but this was not the case in South India where inter-caste dining restrictions were still rigorously observed. Many Non-Brahmins viewed such restrictions with "bitterness".

[18] Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., *The Dravidian Movement* (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1965), p. 12. In June 1916, a hostel for Non-Brahmin students was established in Madras City. The rationale for setting up this hostel was that Non-Brahmin students were unable to secure proper hostel accommodations in Madras City because of caste discrimination. The establishment of this hostel provided a meeting ground for Non-Brahmin students. It was founded by C. Nadesa Mudaliar who was then a medical student in Madras and also the Secretary of the Madras Dravidian Association.

The Dravidian Association did not adopt an anti-colonial posture like the Indian National Congress. On the contrary, the leaders of the Association thought that Non-Brahmin interests would be best served if they co-operated with the British rulers and operated within the colonial framework. In this manner, they hoped to gain concessions for the Non-Brahmins from the British. Their political objective, according to Hardgrave, was "to safeguard the political, social, and economic interests of the Dravidian people" and "its [the Association's] declared aspiration was the establishment of a Dravidian State under the British Raj-a government of, by, and for the non-Brahmin."[19] However, the Association proved to be a political failure. It did not succeed in mobilizing the great mass of the Non-Brahmins to its cause. Also, elite rivalry within the Association, particularly between the two prominent Non-Brahmin politicians, Sir P. Thiagaraya Chetty and Dr. T.M. Nair, further undermined the effectiveness of the Association.

The South India People's Association

Following the failure of the Dravidian Association, a joint stock company called "The South Indian People's Association, Ltd.," was formed for the purpose of publishing newspapers to voice Non-Brahmin grievances. Sir P. Thiagaraya Chetty was elected the Secretary of the Association. The Association started publishing newspapers in both English and Dravidian languages. The three prominent newspapers were: *Justice* (English); *Dravidian* (Tamil); and *Aanthira Prakasini* (Telugu). The *Justice* was the official organ of the Association and the inaugural edition appeared on February 26, 1917.

The Non-Brahmin Manifesto

In 1916, Sir P. Thiagaraya Chetty, Secretary of the South India People's Association, issued the famous "Non-Brahmin Manifesto". It represented an important ideological statement of the Non-Brahmin elite. It led to the founding of, and provided the ideological basis for, a political party, the South India Liberal Federation, in August 1917. The manifesto analyzed the problems of the Non-Brahmin community, suggested possible solutions, and emphasized the urgent need for Non-Brahmins to organize themselves to make their voices heard.[20]

The manifesto contained three essential points. Firstly, it highlighted the over-representation of Brahmins in educational institutions, government bureaucracy, and Legislative Councils. In an attempt to redress this imbalance, the manifesto demanded reserved seats for Non-Brahmins in the legislative council as the first step.

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[19] *Loc. cit.*

[20] Published in the *Hindu,* December 20, 1916.

Secondly, it called for the "re-discovery of the non-Brahmin's self-respect".[21] This later found organizational expression in the Self-Respect Movement.

Thirdly, it opposed the Brahmin demand for Home Rule. The Non-Brahmin elites thought that, under the prevailing circumstances, the removal of British power would mean Brahmin political dominance over them. As a result, the manifesto argued for continued British rule. The manifesto declared:

> We are not in favour of any measure which, in operation, is designed, or tends completely, to determine the influence and authority of the British Rulers, who alone in the present circumstances of India are able to hold the scales even between creed and class and to develop that sense of unity and national solidarity without which India will continue to be a congeries of mutually exclusive and warring groups without a common purpose and a common patriotism.[22]

The "pro-British rule" attitude of these Non-Brahmin elites led many nationalists and leaders of the Congress movement (many of whom in Madras were Brahmins) to assert that the Non-Brahmin movement was really a British idea to counteract the agitation for self-government and to consolidate and perpetuate British colonialism, and that therefore, these Non-Brahmin elites were really "puppets" of the British colonialists.

The Justice Party

After the issuing of the "Non-Brahmin Manifesto", a decision was taken to form a political party which would be principally concerned with the safeguarding and advancement of the political interests of the Non-Brahmin community. This led to the founding, in August 1917, of the South India Liberal Federation, which was to function alongside the South India Peoples' Association. The defeat of a Non-Brahmin candidate in the provincial elections in Madras, which were held under the Morley-Minto scheme of 1909, because the Brahmins in that constituency had not supported him is believed to be the immediate reason for the founding of the South India Liberal Federation.[23] Although the official name of the party was the South India Liberal Federation, the party was popularly referred to as "The Justice Party" because of the popularity of its official organ, the *Justice*.

The Justice Party was fairly successful in its attempts to advance the political and socio-economic interests of the Non-Brahmin community. It also succeeded in checking the Brahmin dominance of the political system to a great extent. It achieved these by capturing political power in the elections held under the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme of 1919 and introducing statutory measures that curbed Brahmin influence and advanced Non-Brahmin interests.

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[21] Ram, *op.* cit., p. 72.
[22] *Hindu,* December 20, 1916.
[23] Bhaskaran, *op. cit.,* p. 43.

Under the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, the first legislative council elections were held on November 20, 1920. In that election, the Justice Party was returned with a big majority because the Congress had boycotted the elections.[24] The Justice Party formed the first cabinet in the Madras Presidency. In the second elections in 1923, the Swarajist wing of the Congress participated because it wanted to destroy the Constitution "from within", but the Justice Party, once again emerged victorious in the elections. In the third elections held in 1926, the Swarajists defeated the Justice Party but they refused to form a ministry. As a result, an Independent cabinet led by Dr. P. Subbarayan was formed. The Congress, under Gandhi's leadership, again boycotted the fourth council elections, held in 1930, and this resulted in the Justice Party making a clean sweep at the polls. However, by 1934, the Congress had withdrawn its boycott of council elections, and in the 1934 council elections, it routed the Justice Party by winning every seat it contested. From then onwards, the Justice Party rapidly declined as a significant electoral force because of a number of factors. Firstly, it was overshadowed by the Congress party with its dynamic leadership and all-India nationalist appeal. Secondly, the Justice Party's elitist character (consisting mainly of princes, *zamindars,* and wealthy upper caste Non-Brahmin intellectuals) and the failure to develop a mass base affected it adversely. Thirdly, elite rivalry within the party further undermined its effectiveness.

One of the major political gains of the Justice Party was that it, like the Muslim League, agitated for, and succeeded in obtaining, separate electorates for Non-Brahmins. The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms which were embodied in the Government of India Act of 1919 provided for the reservation of seats for Non-Brahmins in the provincial legislative council. Of the total 98 elected seats, 28 were to be reserved for Non-Brahmins. According to Mohan Ram,

> there is an interesting difference in principle between the award of separate electorates for the non-Brahmins and the others. Muslims, Europeans, Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians were minorities in relation to the Hindu majority and were given separate electorates to safeguard their minority interests. But non-Brahmins were a majority *vis-a-vis* the Brahmins. It was extraordinary, the extension of protection to the majority against the minority.[25]

According to Balasundaram,

> [T]he system of separate electorates strengthened the non-Brahmin complex—a peculiar parallel to the separatist trends that emanated from similar provisions for Muslims.[26]

The Justice Party's demand for the establishment of quotas which would increase Non-Brahmin representation in the bureaucracy was also accepted

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[24] The boycott of the legislative council elections was part of the "Non-cooperation" campaign of the All-India Congress Party against British rule in India. See B.R. Nanda, *Mahatma Gandhi: A Biography* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958).

[25] Ram, *op.* cit., p. 73.

[26] Balasundaram, *op. cit.*. p. 168.

and implemented by the government. In 1922, the Madras government issued an order regulating public service appointments on a communal basis. It prescribed the following ratio for different communities:[27]

1.	Non-Brahmins	5
2.	Brahmins	2
3.	Muslims	2
4.	Anglo-Indians, Christians, including Europeans	2
5.	Others, including the depressed classes	2
		13

According to Balasundaram, "the communal G.O., . . . made the Brahmins in Tamilnad look like Jews of mediaeval Europe."[28]

"Suya Mariyaathai Yiyakkam" and Periyar

While the Justice Party was exerting political pressure at the governmental level, there was another dynamic Non-Brahmin movement making its impact felt strongly at the mass level. This was the famous *Suya Mariyaathai Yiyakkam* or the Self-Respect Movement founded by Periyar in 1926. A general understanding of the political socialization, orientations, and ideological convictions of Periyar is necessary for understanding both the Self-Respect Movement and the later transformation of the Non-Brahmin movement from an elitist to a mass based movement. However, such a comprehensive analysis is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, only the more important aspects of Periyar's political life will be examined.

Periyar was born on September 17, 1879 at Erode in Madras State, as the second son of a fairly rich and pious contractor. His schooling was limited to primary education, and he married at the young age of thirteen. When he was nineteen years old, he became a *sanyaasi* and travelled to many parts of India, particularly the centres of Hindu pilgrimage. During these visits, he was well exposed to the various aspects of Hindu ritual practices and social customs in other parts of India. As a consequence of these, a radical transformation in the religious views and social and political attitudes of Periyar took place. He was thoroughly disillusioned with the superstitious religious beliefs, the activities of Brahmin priests, and many other acts carried out in the name of religion. He interpreted these acts as attempts by a few to fool and exploit the masses. He remarked:

> There are temples in India whose annual incomes run into crores, and they are wasted on useless rituals and for the special benefit and aggrandisement of a few exploiters. . . . If the money and energy spent on superstitious beliefs had

[27] *Loc. cit.* The error of addition in the original has been corrected.
[28] *Loc. cit.*

> been diverted to popular education, should we have the lowest percentage literacy in this holy land of ours? The ultimate source of our illiteracy, poverty, and disease, is superstition.[29]

On returning to Erode, Periyar involved himself actively in politics with a strong commitment to bringing about a more rational and just society.

Periyar's strong opposition to the caste system, particularly the Brahmin high caste, and his support for widow re-marriage made him the arch enemy of the Brahmins in general. However, his popularity among the Non-Brahmin community increased and he was elected the Chairman of the Erode Municipal Council in 1918.

In 1919, Periyar joined the Congress Party and in the following year, he participated in the famous "Non-Cooperation" movement and was jailed twice. He campaigned vigorously for prohibition and demonstrated in front of toddy shops, and also urged the people to use *khadi*. His popularity within the Congress increased and he was elected Secretary of the Tamil Nadu Congress Committee.

During the next few years, the tempo of Periyar's political activity further increased but many of his actions and proposals aroused the anger and opposition of the Brahmin leadership of the Congress. Firstly, his *satyagraha* at Vaikom (Travancore State) for the Harijan (untouchable) right to enter Hindu temples aroused Brahmin opposition. In recognition of this act, Periyar is still referred to as the "Hero of Vaikom."

Secondly, Periyar ridiculed the "classics" of Hinduism as fairy tales and pointed out that they were absolutely irrelevant in the modern context. He remarked:

> The miraculous incidents with which the puranas are replete, are, as you all know, beyond human comprehension and utterly devoid of reality and practicality, and therefore outside the range of repetition in the modern age.[30]

Periyar went beyond his verbal attacks of the Hindu religious "classics". In 1922, he suggested the burning of *Manu* and the *Ramayana* to the Congress Party.[31] This greatly aroused Brahmin antipathy towards Periyar.

Periyar, then Secretary of the Congress Party, despite strong Brahmin opposition, contested for the presidentship of the Tamil Nadu Congress Committee. Periyar succeeded in defeating the other contender (a Brahmin) by a narrow margin but before he could assume office, a Brahmin leader successfully moved a motion of no-confidence in Periyar. One of Periyar's supporters later charged that the no-confidence motion was introduced "only because he [Periyar] is not a Brahman."[32]

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[29] E.V.R. Periyar, *Social Reform or Social Revolution?* (Madras: Viduthalai Publications, 1965), pp. 16-17. Translated by A.M. Dharmalingam.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[31] Bhaskaran, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

[32] Quoted in Selig S. Harrison, *India: The Most Dangerous Decades* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 122.

Despite the successful no-confidence vote against him, Periyar did not leave the Congress Party and began championing Dravidian causes within the Congress. Periyar argued that the Congress Party should urge the government to enforce the principle of communal representation in order to uplift the Dravidian peoples. To this effect, he introduced resolutions at the Congress conferences at Tirunelveli (1220), at Thanjavur (1921), at Thiruppur (1922), at Salem (1923), and at Thiruvannamalai (1924). Although Periyar's resolutions had the support of a significant number of the rank-and-file, it did not win the approval of the leadership of the party and as a result, they were not passed. The final confrontation came at the Congress conference at Conjeevaram in November 1925 when Periyar's resolution was again defeated. Periyar was so thoroughly disillussioned with the Congress and he resigned in the same year. He attacked the Congress party as an organization that was dominated by, and served the interests of, Brahmins and argued that Dravidians could not secure any benefits through that organizaion. He pledged to bring about the destruction of the Congress.[33]

In 1926, Periyar started the Self-Respect Movement. Some Non-Brahmin elites participated in the movement and played an important role in spreading the creed of the movement. On February 17-18, 1929, the first Self-Respect Youth Association was started, and C.N. Annadurai, a Pachaiyappa College student, took an active part in the various debates and activities organized by this youth body.

The general objective of the Self-Respect Movement was to strive for equal rights and opportunities for everyone in the political, economic, social, and other spheres of life.[34] Specifically, the members of the movement were committed to putting an end to the social system based on the caste system, superstitious religious beliefs and practices, and the exploitation of the masses by the Brahmin priests. The Self-Respectors also denounced child marriage and enforced widowhood. Periyar left no one in doubt that the Self-Respect Movement was essentially anti-Brahmin and the priest who "presided" at religious ceremonies was a principal target of ridicule and denunciation. The following Tamil papers, *Kudiyarasu* (Republic), *Paguthariyu* (Rationalism), *Viduthalai* (Liberation), and *Puratchi* (Revolt), played an important role in spreading the "ideology" of the Self-Respect Movement.

Periyar's religio-political thinking during this period was greatly influenced by the ideas of Robert Ingersoll and Periyar translated many of Ingersoll's writings into Tamil. Mohan Ram has interpreted the Self-Respect Movement as follows:

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[33] A. Maraimalaiyaan, *Pararingar Annavin Peruvazhvu* (Great Scholar Anna's Great Life) (Madras: Vaanathi Pathippagam, 1969), p. 83. C.N. Annadurai is popularly referred to as "Anna" (Elder Brother).

[34] See *Memorandum and Articles of Association of The Periyar Self-Respect Propaganda Institution* (Tiruchi: The Noble Press, n.d.).

> It was the rationalism of the Robert Ingersoll type in revolt against the thraldom of ritualistic religion in general and the caste system which Hinduism had sanctified, in particular.[35]

The Self-Respect Movement did not succeed in securing the support of many Non-Brahmin intellectuals partly because of its vague atheistic orientation. However, the support it obtained from the lower caste groups, particularly the Harijans, was tremendous and beyond expectations, and generally, it contributed to the broadening of the politically relevant strata of the population.

Periyar and The Justice Party

In the early 1930's, Periyar undertook a tour of Europe visiting both Soviet Russia and the fascist countries. The objective of the trip, according to Periyar, was to study communism.[36] The political ideology, economic policies, social organizations, and mobilization techniques of the Soviet regime impressed Periyar greatly. On his return to India in 1931, he translated *The Communist Manifesto* into Tamil. The Marxian materialistic interpretation of history was basically in accord with his political thinking and he was convinced that materialism was the answer to India's problems. Also, his visit to the totalitarian countries increased his revolutionary fervour and he advocated the overthrow of the government through revolutionary violence. His political extremism led to his imprisonment in 1933 on a charge of sedition and he was released the following year.

After his release, Periyar wanted to continue his political activities thru one of the existing major political parties, but was not prepared to compromise his political convictions. He formulated a set of proposals known as the "Fourteen Points Erode Programme" and presented it to both the Justice and Congress parties for their consideration. He agreed to join either of these parties if it accepted his proposals. The Congress Party rejected the proposals because they conflicted with its own all-India ideology. But the Justice Party, which was rapidly declining as a political force, and was riddled with factionalism, accepted Periyar's proposals in the hope that his dynamic leadership might lead to its revitalization.

The issue that brought Periyar to the forefront of the Non-Brahmin political movement was C. Rajagopalachari's (leader of Madras Congress ministry and a Brahmin) plan to introduce Hindi as a compulsory subject in schools in 1938. Rajagopalachari's attempts to force Hindi in schools in Madras was interpreted by many Tamils as a calculated affront to Tamil culture and its great literary heritage, and as part of a wider plan by the Aryan North to subjugate the Tamil peoples. There was widespread popular protest against compulsory Hindi in schools and Periyar, who played a leading role in this anti-Hindi campaign, was jailed. This further enhanced

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[35] Ram, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

[36] Lloyd Rudolph, "Urban Life and Populist Radicalism: Dravidian Politics in Madras," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 20:3 (May 1961), p. 287.

his political standing and while in jail, he was elected President of the Justice Party. The widespread popular protest and the death of two anti-Hindi campaigners, Thalamuthu and Nadarajan, in police firings forced the government to change Hindi from a compulsory to an optional subject in schools.

The Madras Congress government's retreat on Hindi did not lead to a reduction in the tempo of the anti-Hindi campaign. On the contrary, it increasingly led to the adoption of extremist political postures by Periyar and his followers and Tamil patriots in general. In the Justice Party convention of 1938, the "Tamil Nadu for Tamils" resolution was adopted. C.N. Annadurai figured prominently in the passing of this resolution. The "Tamil Nadu for Tamils" demand was not for an independent sovereign state. The Justice Party wanted a Tamil Nadu that would be directly under the Secretary of State for India in London and not under the Viceroy in New Delhi. According to Mohan Ram,

> The meaning of the demand was clear. The Tamil [*sic*] did not have any common destiny with the rest of India and even if they could not get independence immediately, they should part company with the north immediately.[37]

However, in the following year, at the "Dravidanadu Conference" organized by Periyar, the limited "Tamil Nadu for Tamils" demand was replaced by a demand for the creation of a separate and independent sovereign federal republic of Dravidanadu. The desired federal polity was to include the present states of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Mysore and each unit was to have residual powers and autonomy in internal administration. The basic assumption of the Dravidanadu demand was that the Aryans and Dravidians were of different racial stocks and that there were fundamental cultural differences between them. Although the Dravidanadu demand was vague, lacking in basis, and self-contradictory in many respects, Periyar and his lieutenants did their utmost to mobilize mass support for the Dravidanadu demand. The political battleline was now drawn in terms of "Aryan versus Dravidian". Despite the intensive propaganda efforts of Periyar and his followers, they never succeeded in mobilizing "Dravidian nationalism" among the populace of the four Southern states because of the "internal contradictions" of the movement. The Dravidanadu movement remained essentially a Tamil movement.

The Salem Conference of 1944

While the Dravidanadu movement was underway, important changes were also taking place within the Justice Party and they reached their climax in 1944, a year which represents a major landmark in the evolution of the Non-Brahmin political movement. It was in this year that the historic Salem conference of the Justice Party was held. At that time, Annadurai was the Secretary-General of the Justice Party, having succeeded Visuwanatham who

[37] Ram, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

had earlier resigned from the post because of political differences with Periyar. Annadurai played a leading and decisive role in the conference. According to Balasundaram, the conference proved to be a battleground between the conservative and radical sections of the party.[38] Sir P.T. Rajan, C.G. Netto, Rathinasamy, Thirumalaisamy, T.R. Kothandarama Mudaliar, T. Thamotharam Naidu, Visuwanatham, T.A.V. Nathan and P. Balasubramaniyam were some of the prominent personalities in the "conservative" faction. The radical faction was led by Periyar and Annadurai.

In order to effectively meet the political challenge posed by the Indian National Congress, the radicals argued that the Justice Party had to be reorganized and given a new orientation. Also, the radicals pointed out that if they were to achieve their political objective of Dravidanadu, the party had to cease being elitist and become mass based, with leadership in the hands of those who had close contacts and identification with the masses.

Specifically, in the Salem conference, the "conservative-radical" elite rivalry centered around the famous "Annadurai resolutions." [39] The important resolutions tabled by Annadurai urged the following: (1) the immediate renunciation of honorary titles, that were conferred by the British, by all those who had received them and they and others were not to accept such titles or awards from the British in the future; (2) the dropping of caste suffixes to personal names; and (3) the adoption of a new name, the *Dravidar Kazhagam* (DK), for the South India Liberal Federation ("the Justice Party"). The resolutions reflected the desire of the "radicals" to achieve a "casteless society", to demonstrate that they were not and would not be the lackeys of British colonialism, and generally to give the party a new orientation.

The "Annadurai resolutions" were the focus of intense debate within the "subjects committee" of the Justice Party. The conservatives tried their utmost to defeat or alter substantially the contents of the resolutions. One of the reasons for their opposition to the resolutions was that they would lose many of the special privileges and concessions which they were getting (partly because their titles carried some "influence") from the British if the resolutions were passed and implemented. The "subjects committee" of the party discussed the resolutions and other matters for thirty-five hours, and thirty-five year old Annadurai played a decisive role in ensuring that his resolutions emerged from the "subjects committee" unaltered, and in the actual conference, it was unanimously passed.[40]

It is necessary to examine the significance and consequences of the passing of the "Annadurai resolutions". The most important consequence was it led to a split in the Justice Party. According to Mohan Ram,

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[38] Balasundaram, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

[39] T.M. Parthasarathy, *Thi. Mu. Ka. Varalaaru 1916-1960* (D.M.K. History 1916-1960) (Madras: Paari Nilaiyam, 1967), pp. 27-28.

[40] Maraimalaiyaan, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-128.

> The Justice Party's break was inevitable. At the Salem Conference in 1944 there was little doubt that it was largely a Tamil party, with very little non-Tamil participation.[41]

The radical elites who commanded the majority support reorganized the party. Thus, the DK under the dynamic leadership of Periyar came into existence. According to Balasundaram,

> The non-Brahmin leadership passed on to men who held rather extremist ideas about society, religion and politics and actively sought the support of non-Brahmin sections, like the Naickers, Nadars, Mukkulathors and Adi-Dravida untouchables.[42]

The conservative orthodox group led by Sir P.T. Rajan left the movement but continued to call itself the "Justice Party". It continued to adhere to its commitment to the idea of a *Dravidasthan*. It also reiterated its faith in caste representations in public services, legislatures, and educational institutions until the ultimate objective of a "casteless society" was achieved.[43] However, the party became increasingly irrelevant in Tamil Nadu politics. It won only one seat (Sir P.T. Rajan's) in the 1952 local legislative elections and lost even that in 1957.

The resolution calling on party members to drop caste suffixes in their personal names had an impact on many party leaders, members, and youths. From then onwards, it became difficult to identify the caste affiliations of such persons from their names. It represented a symbolic gesture on their part to advance the cause of a "casteless society". In some cases, they adopted new Tamil names; for example, Narayanasamy became Nedunchezhian and Ramayya became Anbazhagan.

The Salem Conference represented a personal political triumph for Annadurai. His defense of Periyar's leadership won him the praise of many. The passing of the "Annadurai resolutions" increased his prestige tremendously and clearly established him as the most important political leader, next only to Periyar, in the Non-Brahmin political movement and also as the leading ideologue and spokesman of the party and Dravidian separatism. He also had a large personal following among the youth.

The DK, which came into existence immediately after the Salem Conference, held its first party conference at Tiruchi in 1945 and adopted black flag with a red circle in the centre as its symbol.[44] Organizational units of the DK were set up at village, *taluk*,[45] and district levels. The DK elaborated the anti-Brahmin theme of earlier Non-Brahmin political organizations but with greater militancy. Specifically, it attacked the injustices of the Hindu caste system which was an important theme of the earlier Self-Respect Move-

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41 Ram, *op. cit.*, p. 80.
42 Balasundaram, *op. cit.*, p. 169.
43 Bhaskaran, *op. cit.*, p. 47.
44 Black to symbolise the subjugation of Dravidians and red circle symbolising the hope of the downtrodden Dravidians. The circle was to expand to fill the darkness all round until the flag was red.
45 The *taluk* is an administrative unit below the district level.

ment. However, its major political objective was the achievement of a sovereign independent Dravidanadu and the energies of the party members were directed toward promoting this cause. Also, in order to rid the party of the "pro-British" image of the Justice Party, Periyar called upon his followers to renounce all titles conferred by the British colonial regime and to quit the National War Front.

In order to mobilize anti-Brahmin, anti-caste system, anti-Hindi and anti-North sentiments and to promote a feeling of Dravidian identity, the party launched a "cultural offensive" on many fronts. Widow re-marriage, inter-caste marriage, and "reform marriages" were encouraged. No member was allowed to wear the sectarian marks of faith across his forehead. Furthermore, the Hindu mythological figures were ridiculed and Hindu religious idols were destroyed. The Hindu religious epics also became targets of attack. For example,

> The *Kamba Ramayanam,* a classic in Tamil literature sacred to Tamil Vaishnavites, was described as an attempt to glorify the Aryan, his culture, his superiority, his ideas, and also as an attempt to undermine the Dravidian South and its hero, Ravana. By way of a protest against this, the burning of *Kamba Ramayanam* in public was advocated.[46]

There was also a conscious attempt to revive the Tamil literary classics, to popularize a new literary style, and to "purify" the Tamil language from Sanskritic "pollution". According to A.C. Chettiar, it was estimated that in 1900, nearly fifty per cent of the words in the written language were sanskritically influenced. Fifty years later, its influence had been reduced to only twenty per cent.[47]

The political goals, strategies, and the "cultural offensive" of the DK were exerting a tremendous influence on the social and political life of Tamil Nadu. The attempts by the DK to glorify the political and life of past of the Tamils, the radical political postures of Periyar, the oratorical abilities of Annadurai and the felicity of his prose style, the forceful writings of other party members and sympathisers proved to be crucial magnets for attracting mass support and also in creating a sense of identity and "political community" among the Tamils. The party was particularly successful in securing support for its objectives and activities from many Tamil youths. Among the active youth members of the party who later went on to play important roles in the political life of Tamil Nadu were E.V.K. Sampath, Nedunchezhian, Anbashagan, and Karunanithi.

As the DK was making deeper inroads in the political arena of Tamil Nadu, very important changes were taking place within the party. There was increasing dissatisfaction with Periyar's political leadership mainly among the younger members of the party. Periyar's chief lieutenant, Annadurai, was the leader and spokesman of the younger generation of the party.

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[46] Balasundaram, *op. cit.,* p. 172.
[47] Hardgrave, *op. cit.,* p. 30.

Although there was a general consensus on political objectives between Periyar and Annadurai and their respective followers, there were basic disagreements between them on the methods of achieving their common objectives and also on other intra-party matters. These were the basic causes of the intra-party rivalry which developed a few years after the founding of the party. It must be pointed out that although the role of personal political ambition cannot be discounted in an analysis of any political rivalry, there were important differences in viewpoints on substantive issues between the two leaders and their respective followers. In the following paragraphs, we will examine in some detail the nature of Periyar-Annadurai relations and their political differences.

Periyar-Annadurai relations were similar in many ways to a guru-disciple relationship.[48] In fact, Annadurai, on many occasions, had publicly stated that Periyar was the only person whom he had accepted as leader in public life. Similarly, Periyar, on various occasions, indicated that Annadurai would be his successor, and in the Erode Conference of the party on October 23-24, 1948, he publicly stated that he was handing over the "keys" to Annadurai because his old age did not permit an active role in the political arena of Tamil Nadu any longer.[49] Annadurai's disciple-like admiration and Periyar's guru-like response seemed to indicate that the relationship between these two men was based on deep personal attachments and that this was going to be a permanent relationship. However, a year after the Erode Conference, the "disciple" left the "guru" and became one of the founder members of the DMK.

"Party Uniform"

The issue of "party uniform" became a point of political controversy between Periyar and Annadurai. Just before independence, Periyar organized the *Karuppu Sattai Thondar Padai* or the Black Shirt Volunteer Corps.[50] According to Rudolph, "some of the inspiration for the Black Shirts may have come from Naicker's European tour in the early thirties when he visited both the fascist countries and Soviet Russia."[51] The Black Shirt Volunteer Corps was part of the organizational set-up of the DK and was supposed to be made up of full-time workers. It was formed "to strengthen the *Dravidar Kazhagam*"[52] and gave the party a militant character. Maraimalaiyaan gives two reasons for the use of black shirts by members of the unit: firstly, "to identify those people who were prepared to make any kind of sacrifice";

[48] Maraimalaiyaan, *op. cit.*, p. 138.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 178.
[50] A resolution was passed at the DK conference held at Tiruchi in 1945 to form the Black Shirt Volunteer Corps. The resolution also specified that only members of this organization were to wear black shirts. See P.V.R. Pandiyan, *Aringar Anna Vazhkai Varalaaru* (Scholar Anna's Life History) (Madurai: Kalaipponi, 1969), p. 24.
[51] Rudolph, *op. cit.*, p. 287.
[52] Maraimalaiyaan, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

and secondly, "to symbolise the downtrodden conditions of the Dravidians".[53]

Annadurai did not raise any objections to the *Karuppu Sattai Thondar Padai*. Periyar, however, increasingly argued that all party members should wear black shirts.[54] Those who did not abide by this directive of Periyar increasingly came to be regarded as "traitors" and "enemies" of the party by some members.[55] Annadurai disagreed. His argument was as follows: "A policeman wears his 'khaki' uniform only when he is on duty. Similarly, black shirts should only be worn by members when they participated in political agitations". He pointed out that, at times, a party member or anyone wearing a black shirt may be engaged in an activity which was inconsistent with the party principles. In such a situation, it was highly likely that the public would associate the person concerned with the DK and ultimately the image of the party would be adversely affected.[56] However, Periyar did not change his initial decision.

On May 1946, a conference of the Black Shirt Volunteer Corps was convened at Madurai with Periyar as chairman and Annadurai also participated. On the second day of the conference, some anti-DK elements set fire to the conference *panthal* (stage) and the meeting ended in confusion. At this time, the Congress party which was in power declared that the Black Shirt Volunteer Corps was an illegal organization. In order to condemn the government's action, Periyar organized a public meeting at the Memorial Hall in Madras. Prior to this meeting, the executive committee of the party was to meet at Periyar's house in Meeraan Sahib Road in Madras. Periyar issued a directive that all those attending the two meetings must wear black shirts to symbolize their opposition to the government's action. One of the interesting question posed then was whether Annadurai, given his objection to wearing black shirts, would attend the two meetings. However, to the surprise of many, Annadurai was given a tremendous welcome when he attended the meetings wearing a black shirt.

Attitude Towards India's Independence

India was finally freed from about two hundred years of colonial bondage and became a sovereign independent state on August 14, 1947. In general, this represented the beginnings of the end of colonialism in Afro-Asia. In particular, it was a day of national rejoicing for the Indian National Congress leaders and other freedom fighters. However, within the DK, the significance of "August 15, 1947" was a point of political controversy between the top two leaders of the party and their respective followers.

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53 *Loc. cit.*
54 Parthasarathy, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
55 *Loc. cit.*
56 Maraimalaiyaan, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

As Independence was approaching, Periyar warned his fellow Dravidians that "we must guard against transference of power from one British to the Aryans".[57] In his attempt to achieve a Dravidanadu, Periyar sought the political support of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the *Quaid-e-Azam,* and the Muslim League so that Dravidanadu might be formed simultaneously with Pakistan but the latter's support was not forthcoming. Also, the British ignored the Dravidanadu demand. This led Periyar to declare (without consulting the party) "August 15, 1947" as a day of mourning for Dravidians and he called on them to boycott Independence Day celebrations. He argued that the departure of British colonialism meant the subjugation of the Dravidians to the political, economic, and religious imperialism of the Aryans.

Annadurai, however, gave a different interpretation of the significance of "August 15, 1947". As Hardgrave puts it, he saw "national independence as the accomplishment of all India, not merely the Aryan North."[58] Annadurai argued that the exit of British colonialism meant the removal of one of the triple "enemies" of the Dravidians and therefore "August 15, 1947" was a day of rejoicing for the Dravidians. One of the slogans of the DK was "Wreck the Triple Alliance of the British, Brahmin, and Bania."

> [T]he slogan tried to involve in a subtle manner both the Congress (which in Tamilnad was dominated by Brahmins despite the strident anti-Brahmin campaigns of Naicker) and the north (symbolised by the Bania because Mahatma Gandhi was a Bania by caste) and suggested a conspiracy by the British with north Indian Aryans (whose agents the Tamil Brahmins and the Bania Ghandi were supposed to be) to keep the Dravidian people in subjugation.[59]

Annadurai also argued that by celebrating Independence Day, they could disprove Congress accusations that they were lackeys of British colonialism.[60] He further pointed out that in "independent India", the energies of the DK could now be directed mainly to rousing the masses against the north Indian Aryan exploitation and he was confident that they had the will and capacity to succeed.[61]

The *Dravidanadu, New Justice, Mandram,* and Anbazhagan's *Puthuvaazhu* endorsed Annadurai's interpretation. However, with the DK, those who supported Annadurai's viewpoint did not constitute a majority.[62] Also, Annadurai's persuasive arguments failed to change Periyar's decision to boycott Independence Day celebrations. This, however, did not deter Annadurai from defying Periyar's directive and he hoisted the Indian national flag atop his residence in Kanchipuram on Independence Day. This act clearly demonstrated Annadurai's determination to act on the basis of his own political convictions on fundamental issues.

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57 *Hindu*, February 11, 1946.
58 Hardgrave, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
59 Ram, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
60 Pandiyan, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
61 Parthasarathy, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
62 Maraimalaiyaan, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

"Intra-Party Democracy"

The issue of the lack of "intra-party democracy" also created dissensions within the party. Although the party had an elaborate organizational set-up, the various organizational units including the party's general council and the executive committee, which, in theory, were the most important decision making units of the party, did not have any real power. Most of the important decisions were taken unilaterally by Periyar himself. The "progressive" section of the party led by Annadurai opposed Periyar's authoritarianism in decision-making within the party and argued strongly for "intra-party democracy" but Periyar did not make any concessions at all.

Attitude Towards Electoral Participation

In Periyar's conception, the DK was not strictly a political party but a social and political movement whose basic objective was to bring about fundamental changes in the social and political attitudes and practices of the people rather than the capturing of political power through participation in elections. According to Mohan Ram,

> The stubborn patriarch was keeping the Kazhagam off parliamentary politics to prevent its degeneration into a power-seeking caucus like the Congress with all the temptations any party system offers.[63]

But Annadurai and the "progressive" wing of the party disagreed. They argued that if the party did not participate in elections, which were to be held on the basis of adult franchise, its political support would be eroded by other election-oriented parties which appealed to the masses along the same lines as the DK and succeeded in securing representation in the legislature. Such parties would then become the real representatives of Dravidian interests and the DK would increasingly become politically irrelevant. On the positive side, they also pointed to the possibility of fulfilling their objectives through capturing constitutional power. As on other issues, Periyar did not yield and refused to lift the "keep off elections" signs.

In the above paragraphs, some important issues on which there were differing viewpoints between Periyar and Annadurai and their respective followers have been examined. However, none of the above issues really threatened party unity and solidarity to a significant extent. The differences were temporarily patched up and surface unity was achieved. However, political differences between the two groups came to the forefront again very soon. In the party conference of 1948, Annadurai and his supporters staged a walkout in protest against Periyar's authoritarianism. Also, sensing Periyar's opposition to his political convictions, Annadurai deliberately kept off the Tuticorin conference of the party. At this time, there were speculations that Annadurai and his supporters might resign from the party. But the speculations were temporarily proved wrong when Periyar appointed

[63] Ram, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

Annadurai president of a special party conference at Erode in 1948. On the surface, it therefore seemed that Periyar-Annadurai differences had been resolved and that elite consensus had been achieved at Erode. There was a new mood of optimism within the party. But this was short-lived and within a year, there was a split in the party. Periyar's second marriage to Maniyammai was the main cause for this dramatic development.

Periyar issued two lengthy press statements under the title "Explanation" which appeared in the 19th and 28th June, 1949 editions of the *Viduthalai*.[64] In his "explanation", he made it absolutely clear that he did not have any confidence in his political lieutenants to lead the party after his exit from the political scene; he also announced the formation of a "trust" headed by a widow, Maniyammai, ("who has a genuine concern for my personal and the party's interests")[65] and four or five members for the management of his personal and the party's properties. By this act, Maniyammai became the political "heir" to Periyar. This came as a shock to many party members and sympathisers.

Periyar's "explanation" and the formation of a "trust" headed by Maniyammai do not logically follow from his earlier announcement at the Erode conference that he was handing over the "keys", that is, the leadership, to Annadurai. This sudden political turnabout by Periyar came as a surprise to everyone from the top leaders to the lower echelons in the party hierarchy. Annadurai and Sampath (Periyar's nephew) certainly had greater political acumen and enjoyed greater popularity both within and outside the party than Maniyammai. Also, at this time, there was no evidence to indicate that Annadurai and/or Sampath were attempting to oust Periyar from the leadership of the party. Although their political viewpoints differed from Periyar on certain issues, they still accepted Periyar's leadership and many expected them to succeed Periyar. Under such circumstances, why were Annadurai and Sampath discarded in favour of Maniyammai? What were the real motivations behind these moves of Periyar? These were the unanswered questions of the day. There were a great deal of speculations within the party.

Before the other leaders of the party could formally react to these developments, another surprising news came into the open. A Madras daily newspaper reported that Periyar was about to get married to Maniyammai and that both had visited the Registrar of Marriages office on June 18, 1949.[66] The report came as a real shock to party leaders and members. The central executive committee of the party and other members issued statements condemning the marriage and requested Periyar to give up the idea but Periyar's response was firmly negative.

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[64] For the full text, see Parthasarathy, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-68.
[65] *Ibid.*, p. 67.
[66] M. Thamizhchelvan, *Aringar Anna* (Scholar Anna) (Madras: Asokhan Pathippagam, 1967), p. 106.

In fact, it can be argued that Periyar was only practising what he preached (widow re-marriage) and that therefore he should have been supported: but the reaction was an almost unanimous condemnation of the marriage. Why did the party leaders and members object vehemently to the marriage? Their basic argument was that it was a *poruntha thirumanam* or "unequal marriage" (in terms of age). Periyar and Maniyammai were 72 and 26 years old respectively. The wide disparity in their ages meant that it was "a highly unequal union". As a social reformer, Periyar had been campaigning against the widely prevalent practice of old men marrying young women, proudly pointing to his own widower's life since the death of his wife, Nagammai. This was also one of the principal creeds of the Self-Respectors. Some supporters of Periyar's marriage argued that, as a social reformer, he was not deviating from his principles because he objected to *forced* "unequal marriages" only, that is, generally without the bride's consent. There was some element of truth in this argument. However, the objectors argued that the "unequal marriage" of the party leader himself would affect the party's image adversely.

The second argument centered around the fact that Periyar's re-marriage was not in keeping with the Dravidian tradition of "reform marriages"[67] which

> were of course not lawful as they conformed neither to the Hindi religious custom requiring the presence of the priest and the worship of the sacred fire, nor to the secular practice of registration under the Civil Marriages Act. The zealous followers of the Periyar did not care for this. But they were shocked, and, indeed, deeply offended to learn that Periyar's wedding was registered under the Civil Marriages Act as Periyar wanted his wife and offspring to be his legal heirs.[68]

The third argument centered around Periyar's designation of Maniyammai as his "political heir". The objectors questioned Periyar's right to appoint a successor to lead the party after his exit and pointed out that the party's leadership had to be elected by the members of the party.[69] This was related to the criticism of Periyar's authoritarianism and the lack of intra-party democracy.

Despite the barrage of protests, Periyar did not change his decision and the wedding took place on 9th July 1949. This threw the entire party machinery into confusion and for the next few months, party activity in terms of propagating party objectives came to a virtual standstill. During these months, Annadurai demonstrated remarkable skills of leadership and

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67 "The 'reform' marriage rites of the DK gained wide acceptance among the non-Brahmins of Tamilnad. Dispensing with the priest and Hindu ritual, the couple to be married was seated and someone was selected from those attending, without consideration of caste, to preside over the function. To seal the ties of marriage, he requested the couple to exchange garlands and, in some cases, the man tied a *tali* (golden chain or yellow thread) to the bride." Hardgrave, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

68 Balasundaram, *op. cit.*, p. 170. After the DMK came into power in 1967, it passed a bill which made "reform marriages" legally valid.

69 Parthasarathy, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

organized support for a new party, the DMK, which was inaugurated on September 17, 1949.[70] Most of the members of the DK resigned and joined the new party led by Annadurai, and the founding of the DMK represented the beginning of a new chapter in the politics of Tamil Nadu.

[70] The party later adopted the "Rising Sun" as its symbol.

POLITICAL NATIONALISM IN BRITISH INDIA: A REVIEW ARTICLE

Y. MANSOOR MARICAN

ONE OF THE DIFFICULTIES FACED BY SOCIAL SCIENTISTS IN RESEARCH is the lack of an adequate and unambiguous vocabulary. In political science, for instance, the meaning of concepts such as "modernization," "political development," "ideology," "integration" and "power," to mention only a few, vary according to the research foci and objectives of the scholars using them. This has given rise to a "diversity of definitions" of many concepts in social science and to a situation in which the users of certain terms are talking about different things when using the same words. The term "nationalism" is no exception. Its meaning has varied with each language, each nationalist, and with each period of time. Quite understandably, scholars, looking at it from different nations, at different times, and for different reasons, have defined it differently.

Some scholars have focused almost exclusively on the psychological aspects of the phenomenon of nationalism. Thus nationalism is referred to as "a condition of mind,"[1] "an ideological commitment,"[2] and "a consciousness"[3] of membership in a nation. Probably, the most well-known example of a definition of nationalism which contains language that is psychologically loaded is Hans Kohn's. He defines it as "a state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due the nation-state."[4] The limited utility of definitions with a "psychology-bias" arises partly from the difficulties involved in measuring the psychological variable, "state of mind" or "consciousness".

In other psychological definitions, nationalism has been treated synonymously with "patriotism"[5] and ethnocentrism.[6] For example, Walter defines

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[1] Carlton J. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1930), p. 6.

[2] Lloyd A. Fallers, "Ideology and Culture in Uganda Nationalism," *American Anthropologist*, 63 (1961), p. 677.

[3] Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Nationalism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), xviii.

[4] Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History* (New York: Van Nostrand Co., 1965), p. 9.

[5] According to Carlton Hayes, "Nationalism is a modern emotional fusion and exaggeration of two very old phenomena—nationality and patriotism". *Essays on Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1926), p. 6. For an attempt by a psychologist to distinguish "nationalism" for "patriotism", see Leonard W. Doob, *Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 6.

[6] According to Mostafa Rejai and Cynthia Enloe, nationalism is "a belief in the intrinsic *superiority* of one's own nation over all other nations," (emphasis mine). "Nation-states and State-nations," *International Quarterly*, 13:2 (June 1969), p. 142.

it as "loyalty to one's group, reinforced by a corollary disdain or hostility toward other groups."[7] While a sense of identification with a group is an essential component of nationalism, it does not *ipso facto* imply hostility toward other groups. It is theoretically possible to have positive or neutral orientations toward groups other than one's own.

In much of the "political development" and "social change" literature, definitions of nationalism revolve around political or sociological concepts which themselves require explication: "nation," "state," "community," "nationality". In most cases, scholars have have attempted to overcome this by citing certain objective characteristics which are common to the individuals composing the "nation" and/or "state". These include territory, language, religion, shared historical experiences and memories, sovereign government, and the like. However, some of these characteristics do not seem to be necessary for nationalism to exist. According to Dankwart A. Rustow, the citing "objective" characteristics represent more or less "adequate attempts at *explanation*" rather than "genuine attempts at *definition.*"[8] "For common language, common history, prolonged self-government and other circumstances are likely to promote feelings of nationality, but they are not among the defining characteristics of nation."[9] For example, in regard to the requirement of a common territory, a well known exception, though admittedly an extreme one, is that of the nationalist movement of Zionism which existed long before the creation of a sovereign state of Israel in 1948.

Deutsch has attempted a causal explanation of the emergence of nationality in terms of the spread of "social communication" and the impact of "social mobilization". His basic argument is that nationality is the consequence of habit forming and social learning and not a biological or inborn characteristic. In North America and Europe, the spread of a network of travel and trade links and the like ("social communication") over a long period of time provided a link between the urban ("core") areas and their respective regional hinterlands and the process of "social mobilization" helped to erode or break down parochial affiliations. The consequence of this was that a larger group of persons were linked by complementary habits and facilities of communication. Once this stage was attained, an external threat to this new way of life and the emergence of a new generation usually acted as catalysts in forging a political consciousness of nationality.[10] To the

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[7] P. A. Walter, Jr., *Race and Culture Relations* (New York: McGraw-Hill series in Sociology and Anthropology, 1952), p. 28.

[8] Dankwart A. Rustow, "Nation" in David L. Sills, ed, *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 11 (USA: The Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1968), p. 9. (emphasis mine).

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1966).

author's knowledge, the relevance of Deutsch's formulation has yet to be systematically tested in the context of the emergence of nationalism in the "new states" of Asia and Africa.

In discussing the emergence of nationalism in Asia and Africa, we have to address ourselves to the important question of whether "non-Western" nationalism is fundamentally similar to, or different from, its Western counterpart. Kautsky and Hailey represent the latter viewpoint while Coleman is closer to the former. In discussing African nationalism, Lord Hailey, the British Africanist, argues that it differs so greatly from Western nationalism that "Africanism" would be a more appropriate description of it. In a somewhat similar fashion, Kautsky argues that the forces which produced nationalism in Europe and the underdeveloped areas are quite different and hopes that the use of a single term, "nationalism," to designate the two phenomena will not obscure the differences between them.[11]

Those who emphasize the *sui generis* character of European nationalism argue that a national consciousness preceded and created the state in 19th century Europe ("nation-state"). In some "new states," the process has been reversed in that political leaders in these states are trying to create a feeling of common nationality among divergent social groups found within their respective territories who often have very little in common ("state-nation"). Although Rajai and Enloe accept the validity of the above broad generalization, they point out that both sequences and formations are found in the West as well as in the less developed countries.[12] Coleman goes one step further when he argues that "nationalism" as a concept "has associations [with recent European nationalism] which makes it difficult for application in the conditions of Africa" but "if one goes far enough back into European history, one can find some very interesting parallels; and recurrent patterns are the lifeblood of the social scientist."[13] However, Coleman does not go further on the latter aspect.

Nationalism in many of the less developed countries cannot be understood apart from European colonialism. A significant number of the present sovereign states in the less developed world have had little or no histodir continuity as a political community prior to the advent of European colonial rule and they were more accurately described as "cultural" or "geographical expressions". In most parts of South and Southeast Asia, partly through the exercise of force and largely through the acquiescence of the colonized, European powers proclaimed exclusive rights to delineated territories and their inhabitants. The introduction of a common legal and administrative system and the spread of western education and rapid communication net-

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[11] Lord Hailey, *An African Survey Revised 1956* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 251 ff; and John K. Kautsky, *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 33.

[12] Rejai and Enloe, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

[13] James S. Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965) p. 478, fn. 13.

works helped to erode old social, economic, and psychological commitments and more people became available for new patterns of socialization and behaviour. They, regardless of their specific origins and cultural traditions, became related to one another in terms of the imposed colonial power structure. On this aspect, Emerson's definition of nationalism as "the striving of a society threatened by the intrusion of alien forces to reconstitute itself in order to achieve a new place of dignity and equality in a changing world"[14] is somewhat misplaced because the "constituting" of most societies in Asia and Africa, in a political sense, was itself a function of colonial rule. However, in the process of consolidating the political framework, which they brought into existence, by introducing western ideas and institutions, the colonizers, paradoxically, also forged the instruments for the destruction of the colonial order.

As the developmental syndrome characteristic of nationalism in the less developed countries has been excellently described by James Coleman in a fairly comprehensive comparative summary on the politics of the developing areas,[15] it will not be detailed here. Briefly, in the initial phases, political groups, that were usually organized by members of the small "westernized" indigenous elite, pressed for increased political participation. In the later phases, these groups became the nuclei of comprehensive nationalist movements which agitated for independence from colonial rule.

II

In this section, we will briefly examine the character of British rule in India and the nature of the nationalist response as viewed by the different schools of historiography.

British rule in India extended over a course of one to two hundred years, beginning from 1765 in Bengal when the British East India Company acquired *diwani* rights. The other parts of what was commonly referred to as British India came under British hegemony much later: Madras (1799), Bombay (1818), Sind (1843), Punjab (1848), and Oudh (1856). Thus, while Bengal experienced about two hundred years of British *raj,* Punjab and Sind were under British rule for less than one hundred years. These differences in time periods when the various territories came under British rule had important consequences in that they varied significantly in regard to the rates and levels of social, economic, and political mobilization. It was no accident that the earliest nationalist activity in India emerged in areas that were the first to come under British rule. In *Deutsch-ian* terminology, these could be seen as the "core" areas from which political penetration of the hinterlands took place.

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[14] Rupert Emerson, "The Progress of Nationalism," in Philip W. Thayer, ed., *Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956). pp. 72-73.

[15] James S. Coleman, "Conclusions: The Political Systems of the Developing Areas," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

The year 1858 represents an important watershed in the history of British rule in India. Until that year, colonial rule was technically exercised by the British East India Company. In 1858, as the most important consequence of the "Sepoy revolt" of 1857, the Company was replaced by direct British rule administred by the Queen-in-Parliament in Great Britain. In the pre-1858 period, the measures taken in land settlement, in social reform, in administration, in economic organization, and in the legal order undermined the traditional structure of authority, created newly privileged classes, and new political and administrative centres. In some cases, the consequences of these policies were diametrically opposed to their original intentions. This was particularly true in the area of social reform. For example, social reforms such as widow re-marriage and the abolition of *sati* which emanated from their "civilizing mission" often led to negative reactions in that they were interpreted as attempts to destroy Indian traditions and to "Christianize" India. Such dissatisfactions and the more immediate discontents in the army led to the "revolt" of 1857.

The post-1858 phase saw a radical change in the earlier British policies of trying to mould India into a "civilized" nation and Indians into Victorian gentlemen and rational men. The events of 1857 left a legacy of mutual distrust and British reformers were disillusioned about ever being able to "anglicize" India. The new conservatism that replaced the earlier reformist dynamism was marked by a policy of non-interference with local traditions and also support for loyal conservative groups such as the hereditary ruling families and landed classes. Various ideological justifications for continued colonial rule were also provided. Kipling saw the uplifting of countries like India as "the white man's burden". Similarly, Curzon justified British rule in India in terms of the superiority of British administration in a context of Indian "unfitness" for self-rule.

However, the "change of heart" and the new rationalizations failed to stop the emergence of various reformist and revivalist movements, both within Islam and Hinduism, which influenced greatly and, in most cases, dovetailed into, the politics of nationalism and communalism. In the political sphere, various regional associations emerged demanding greater Indian participation in government. From 1885 onwards, the Indian National Congress dominated the demand for political change and a separate communal organization, the All-India Muslim League, was formed in 1906 to safeguard and advance Muslim interests. In a series of constitutional reforms, the British acceded to the political pressures which ultimately led to the creation of two states, India and Pakistan, in 1947.

The nature of the nationalist response to British rule in India has been the focus of a great deal of scholarly writing. However, much of the literature suffers from varying degrees of "selective misperception" arising partly from the differences in intellectual socialization and political leanings of the various scholars. Until comparatively recent times, the history of

British India was almost the monopoly of British scholars. The underlying premise of many of their works was that the British in India had a "civilizing mission" whose purpose was to train Indians for self-government. The *Rise and Fulfillment of British Rule in India*[16] or what the British did and how these affected the Indians was the dominant intellectual concern of these scholars. Also, like traditional historiography, which was largely an account of kings and queens, British Viceroys in India received a great deal of scholarly coverage. The nationalist response to British rule was either de-emphasized or dismissed by resorting to catchy phrases such as "microscope minority," "unscrupulous agitation," "anarchism," and "murderous conspiracy".

As a strong reaction against the British histories of India, there came into existence many accounts by (Indian) "nationalist historians".[17] In contrast to the argument by many Britishers that India contained many "nations," *The Fundamental Unity of India*[18] was emphasized. The harmful consequences of British rule received voluminous treatment. The economic exploitation of India by the British formed the theme of laborious works by men like R. C. Dutt and Dadhabhai Naoroji. The nationalist struggle was glorified and most of the accounts were highly polemical in origin or in purpose. The "revolt" of 1857 was characterized as *The Indian War of Independence*.[19]

As a consequence of the nationalist belief that Hindu-Muslim unity was a *sine qua non* for success in the independence struggle, "the entire history of India during the Muslim period was accordingly re-interpreted in order to prove that the Hindus and Muslims always behaved towards each other like good brothers and formed one nation; that the Hindus were not a subject people during the so-called Muslim period, and that it is the British who for the first time imposed foreign rule upon India."[20] Such historical distortions are found in Lajpat Rai's *Young India*[21] and Tara Chand's *Influence of Islam on Indian Culture*.[22]

Alongside the "nationalist" historiography should also be placed the writings of Marxist historians. Like the former, they emphasized the exploitative character of British rule. They differed, however, in their interpretation of the nationalist movement. In addition to over-emphasizing the activities of the Indian "working class" in the nationalist movement, the

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16 Edward Thompson and G. T. Garratt, *Rise and Fulfillment of British Rule in India* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1935).

17 R. C. Majumdar, "Nationalist Historians," in C. H. Philips, ed., *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 461-428.

18 R. K. Mookerji, *The Fundamental Unity of India* (Bombay; Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1954).

19 Vinayak D. Savarkar, *The Indian War of Independence, 1857* (Bombay: Phoenix Publications, 1947).

20 R. C. Majumdar, "Nationalist Historians", *op. cit.*, p. 425.

21 Lajpat Rai, *Young India* (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1916).

22 Tara Chand, *Influence of Islam on Indian Culture* (Allahabad: Indian Press, 1963).

Marxist historians also saw the independence struggle partly in terms of a conflict between the British and Indian bourgeoisie.[23] An important contribution of Marxist historiography on British rule and the nationalist response was the conscious attempt to relate political and economic developments in India to conditions then prevailing in Britain.[24]

The Indian nationalist movement has also attracted the attention of many Muslim scholars. Muslim historiography, particularly in the last two decades, largely concerned itself with the major question of the preceding decades, the emergence of Muslim nationalism and the establishment of Pakistan. While some see the traces of a separate Muslim nationalism and the state of Pakistan visible as early as the eleventh century Ghaznavid Empire,[25] the majority relate it to the period of British rule, the development of self-government in India which gave rise to fears of Muslim subordination in a Hindu-dominated India, and some Congress activities which tended to confirm Muslim suspicion.[26] A greater part of the Muslim historiography dealing with the post-1857 period is devoted specifically to discussions about Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the formation of the Muslim League, the award of separate electorates and partition. A significant gap in the Muslim historiography relating to this period is the inadequate attention given to Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the *Quaid-e-Azam,* who from a staunch advocate of Hindu-Muslim unity and joint electorate became the architect of the separate state of Pakistan.[27] Many questions about the political career of Jinnah still remain to be answered satisfactorily. For example, when did Jinnah really decide in favour of Pakistan?[28] Also, what are the variables that explain the success of his political leadership in the Indian context, given his aloofness, arrogance, aristocratic conception of politics, and "western" life style?

It does not take much insight to suggest that each of these schools of historiography provide a "partial" account and that, when read together, they may provide a more "balanced" assessment of the general nature of Indian nationalism. They will provide a general rather than a comprehensive understanding of Indian nationalism because there are still many im-

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[23] See R. Palme Dutt, *India: Today and Tomorrow* (Delhi: People's Publishing House Ltd., 1955).

[24] See R. Palme Dutt, *India Today* (Bombay: People's Publishing House, 1949).

[25] Ishtiaq H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent, 610-1947: a Brief Historical Analysis* (The Hague: Mouton, 1962); and Hafeez Malik, *Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1963).

[26] Sheikh M. Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan* (Lahore: Sh. M. Ashraf, 1965); K. K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1967); Khalil B. Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857-1948* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968); and Mohammed Mujeeb, *The Indian Muslims* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1967).

[27] See Masood Ghaznavi, "Recent Muslim Historiography: The Problem of Perspective" (Paper presented at the conference on South Asian Historiography at the University of Minnesota, June 1969), p. 28.

[28] *Ibid.*

portant gaps in our knowledge of this phenomenon. Two important research gaps are as follows. Firstly, there is a real paucity of studies on regional nationalism. This is largely because of the dominance of the "all-India" perspective in most scholarly writings on modern India. According to Low:

> It is only at a rather rarefied level that modern Indian history can be said to comprise a single all-India story. At other levels marked variations exist, and if we are to proceed to understanding it further, regional studies, within the orbit of an awareness of the overall story, are now of quite vital importance.[29]

Secondly, while a great deal has been written about the leading stalwarts of the nationalist movement such as Gandhi and Nehru, we know very little about what was said and done by many "middle level" nationalists who took part in spreading nationalist ideas in the vernacular and in mofussil areas. It is only very recently that many scholars, with a perspective which time and distance provide, have attempted to fill these gaps.

III

In this section, we will examine some of the recent contributions to our understanding of Indian nationalism, which, in comparison with the various schools of historiography discussed above, could be considered more "value free".

One of the recent studies on Indian nationalism is *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism* by Anil Seal. The sub-title, "Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth Century," sums up well the main theme of the book.

In his preface, Seal sets out his chief task as the study of "the emergence of national political organization in India" by concentrating upon "Indians educated in the western mode."[30] The book, which covers the period 1870-1888, has four broad sections: the first is concerned with the social position and economic and political ambitions of the new English-educated indigenous elites in the 1870's in the three British presidencies of Bengal, Bombay and Madras; the second with British policies toward these elites; the third with the formation of regional and all-India nationalist associations; and the fourth with "the Muslim breakaway".

Seal begins his study with a basic axiom that the history of any colonial system is a series of permutations between government and different sets of allies and enemies. The "cheaper" and "less embarrassing" form of government that the British maintained in India was not due solely to "the passivity of the majority". The collaborators (defined as those Indians whose actions fell into line with the purposes of the British) formed the backbone

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[29] D. A. Low, "Introduction," in D. A. Low, ed., *Soundings in Modern South Asian History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 5.

[30] Anil Seal, *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth Century India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), xiii.

of British rule in India. They comprised the landlords, businessmen in the great new port cities; above all the bureaucracy, which was almost wholly Indian beyond the thousand or so Britishers, and the new professionals created by western education in the fields of law, journalism, teaching and medicine.

Seal also describes the social groups from which this class of collaborators emerged. In Bengal, it was the *bhadralok* ("respectable people"), consisting of the Brahmins, Kayasths, and Baidyas, who came from the eastern and western districts of Bengal Proper and were concentrated in the metropolis of Calcutta. In Bombay and Madras, the important collaborators were the Brahmins of Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu respectively.

However, for many of the newly educated, collaboration was a conditional bargain. "So long as working with government seemed to benefit their regional, caste or communal aspirations, then they would do so. But once the benefits lessened, then so too did their pliancy."[31] It was because the latter happened that the newly educated passed from being collaborators to competitors for power. In the initial phases, dissatisfactions with British rule were articulated through various regional associations which were formed first in Bengal and later in Bombay and Madras. These regional associations provided the basis for the later formation of India's first national political organization, the Indian National Congress (INC), in 1885. In discussing the events that led to the founding of the INC, Seal fairly effectively refutes the thesis put forward by the first president of the INC, W.C. Bannerjee, that Lord Dufferin supported A.O. Hume in bringing the Congress into existence. He also provides a more balanced account of the role of Hume in the formation of the INC.

Seal discusses the British responses to the Indian "awakening" from the perspective of the vice-royalties of Lytton, Ripon, and Dufferin. Their differing conceptions of the role of the British in India, disagreements between the British Cabinet and the India Council in London, Gladstone's preoccupation with the troubles in Ireland and Egypt and the consequent lack of time to support his Liberal Viceroy, Lord Ripon—these were some of the major factors that influenced the totality of the British response. In short, it was characterized by a great deal of ambiguity and lack of consistency. Seal also attributes the latter to the political style of the new professionals. While the autocratic rule of the British was adequately equipped to crush revolts organized on traditional lines, it found itself confused before a movement which proclaimed the divine dispensation of British rule in India and yet spoke of the "un-Britishness" of British rule in India.

In the final section, in a concise discussion of what he terms as "the Muslim breakaway," Seal analyses the economic position of the Muslims and their response to the founding of the INC. He points out that their economic position varied as between different areas and that it is "meaning-

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

less" to state that Muslims were backward throughout the country. For example, while the Muslims were generally backward in Bengal, they were in a much better position in the North-West provinces. According to Seal, this "unevenness" partly accounted for the non-emergence of "common interests" between Muslims at that time, despite the attempts to extoll them for tactical reasons.[32]

The lack of common interest between Muslims was clearly reflected in the lack of unanimity in their attitudes towards the INC. Badruddin Tyabji of Bombay and Syed Ahmad Khan of North-West Provinces and Oudh represented two extremely opposed viewpoints. Tyabji joined the INC out of the conviction that it could be used to articulate those grievances that were common to Hindus, Muslims, and other social groups. In contrast to this view, Syed Ahmad Khan and the Aligarh group challenged the credibility of the "national" character of the Congress and condemned it as "seditious". At that time, the Congress was demanding representative Legislative Councils and hinted at a parliament for India in the future. In voicing his strong opposition to these demands, Syed Ahmad Khan argued that in any such set-up, the Muslims would be in a permanent minority and they would always be outvoted as the Irish were at Westminster. In the rest of the chapter, Seal describes various interpretations regarding the growing rift between the Hindus and Muslims in the evolving politics, and argues their fair common assumptions that the Muslim community in India constituted a monolithic bloc "whose conditions were generally equal, whose interests were generally the same and whose solidarity was generally firm" were not true.

Seal's work is likely to be the most outstanding contribution to our understanding of the emergence of Indian nationalism in the later nineteenth century for a long time to come. His arguments are well-documented by much careful research of hitherto untapped sources and imaginative interweaving of research by other scholars. His ambitious study is so impressive that one hesitates to mention its shortcomings. Nevertheless, they exist. Some of these are as follows: Firstly, since collaboration is based on the extent of benefits such a relationship provides, one would expect some discussion of how the economic policies of the *raj* affected various social groups and were important for the particular results of collaboration and competition. This is not given enough attention in the book. Secondly, although he observes at one point that "educated men had many roles to play and several loyalties to preserve,"[33] he does not explore any role other than that of nationalist policies. Had he done so, he would have added much depth to our understanding of early Indian nationalism and also helped to answer a basic query, that is, whether there were other types of important political activity besides nationalist politics. Despite these short-

[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 338-340.
[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 341-342.

comings, in my opinion, Seal's contribution is still one of the best to have appeared on this subject.

In its initial phase, the demands of the Congress were limited and mainly represented the immediate concerns of the "westernized" indigenous elite. The reforms demanded included the expansion of the legislative councils by admitting a considerable number of elected members, the conduct of competitive examinations simultaneously in England and in India, the raising of the maximum age of candidates for entrance into the coveted Civil Service to not less than 23 years, and the complete separation of judicial and executive functions. Self-government was not the goal of early Congressmen. Their political method was strictly constitutional, such as petitioning or making representations to the government of India and the British parliament. However, the failure of the Congress to attain many of its objectives in the first one) and half decades of its existence led many to doubt the usefulness of constitutional methods. A significant number of Indians, both within and outside the Congress, were dissatisfied with the "gradualism" of the "moderates," demanded radical advances in the political and economic spheres, and also, in contrast to the support of the "moderates," strongly opposed the social and religious reforms introduced by the British. The latter group have been popularly dubbed both by the "moderates" then and in the literature as the "extremists".[34] The "ideological" controversies between these two groups and the political struggles for control of the Congress ultimately led to the open split of Congress at Surat in 1907. The "moderates" versus "extremists" struggle centered very much around the personalities of *Tilak and Gokhale,* who are the foci of Wolpert's "comparative biographical analysis."[35]

The two key phrases, "reform" and "revolution," in the sub-title of his book sum up Wolpert's assessment of Gokhale and Tilak respectively. G.K. Gokhale (1866-1915), the "political guru" of Mahatma Gandhi, is depicted by Wolpert as a complete antithesis of B.G. Tilak (1856-1920), "the father of Indian Unrest". While Gokhale believed in the divine providence of British rule, Tilak viewed British rule as "a predatory foreign incubus rather than a blessing". While Gokhale attributed India's "misery, poverty, and humiliation" mainly to "the inequities and inadequacies of Hindu society," Tilak placed the blame on "foreign rule" rather than on the "shortcomings" of Hindu society such as the disabilities of caste, the lack of a spirit of public service, and unhygienic practices and superstition.

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[34] The struggle between the "moderates" and the "extremists" has generally been discussed in terms of ideological differences and very few have seen it in terms of a political struggle between the "ins" and the "outs". In this regard, Seal's comment is illuminating: "For all the disputes over tactics or over the principle of social reform, 'Extremism' was less an ideology than a technique. Its most conspicuous form was an all-India coalition of dissidents who having been outmaneuvered in their own provinces, tried to reverse at the top the defeats they had suffered in the localities". *Ibid.,* p. 347.

[35] Stanley A. Wolpert, *Tilak and Gokhale: Revolution and Reform in the Making of Modern India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).

Both these Maratha Brahmins, according to Wolpert, differed not only in their diagnosis of India's problems but also in their prescriptions. Gokhale saw the remedy in education (defined broadly), in continued association with British democracy and justice, and in constitutional methods of political and administrative change. His eloquence made marked inroads into British official opinion, and his own memorandum to Lord Morley provided the basis of the Morley-Minto Reforms. Tilak, on the other hand, saw the solution in *swaraj* (self-rule) which was to be attained by agitating and organizing among the masses and by depicting British rule as "the single simple cause of India's multiple miseries". He found in the Shivaji and Ganpati festivals, the age of consent bill, Bengal's partition, the boycott, and *swadeshi* movements, issues and opportunities for furthering his cause. Wolpert provides a good descriptive analysis of how the diametrically opposed strategies of these two Chitpavans and their respective followers led to the growth of factionalism in the Congress and also in the *Poona Sarvajanik Sabha* and the Deccan Education Society.

The basic question that emerges from Wolpert's study is, how does one explain Tilak's and Gokhale's "differing responses to the historical environment which they imbibed," which, in some respects, was similar? For example, both were from the Chitpavan community, joined the Ferguson College, and belonged to the Deccan Education Society. Wolpert is quite evasive on this question. He states: "The ultimate explanation for the differing responses of Tilak and Gokhale to British rule must remain shrouded in the hidden wellsprings of their personalities and those unrecorded potent influences of heredity and early environment".[36] Although one does not expect a historian or a political scientist to provide explanations of individual attitudes and actions in terms of the influence of heredity, Wolpert could have, at least, explored the influence of early socialization as an explanatory variable.

The initial differences in Gokhale's and Tilak's responses to British rule, according to Wolpert, was later reinforced by the differing nature of their contacts with the colonial administration and rulers. Tilak's "most intimate and extensive contact with Western thought and Englishmen came from the Indian Penal Code, trial procedure, and British judges, magistrates, prosecutors, and police officers, who with the aid of their Indian counterparts, repeatedly compelled him to endure the hardships and humiliations of physical restraint".[37] Gokhale, on the other hand, was brought into warm personal contact with the leaders of English liberalism when he visited England, his "moderate" views gave him "access to rooms in British society which were forever closed to Tilak" and in contrast to the latter's experience, he never had to face the coercive apparatus of British rule.[38] "Little wonder

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 302.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 303.
[38] *Ibid.*

then if with such different portraits of the Western world and its representatives indelibly impressed upon the minds of Tilak and Gokhale they each stanchly (sic) adhered to their diverging views of how their nation's problems could best be solved."[39]

In the final chapter, which is the best chapter in the book, Wolpert states that the differing political philosophies and methods of political action of Tilak and Gokhale were "tenuously joined" by Gandhi with his "remarkable syncretic capacity," [40] but fails to answer the important question of which of these two traditions had a greater influence on Gandhi's political style. Although Tilak and Gandhi had different ideas on the philosophical question of the relationship between "ends" and "mean," [41] Gandhi's methods of political mobilization and his emphasis on *swarajya* was closer to that of Tilak rather than to that of his "political guru," Gokhale.

The study of Gandhi's contributions to Indian nationalism has probably, and understandably, received more scholarly attention than that of any other nationalist leader. Gandhi as a subject of research has often been handled sentimentally, superficially, or, worse, without empirical support. A general exception to this is Joan V. Bondurant's *Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict* which is "concerned with that part of the Gandhian impact which centers upon *satyagraha,* the premier Gandhian means".[42]

In the introductory chapter of the book, "Gandhian concepts" are categorized as follows: (i) objectives (*swaraj* and *sarvodaya*); (ii) principles (non-violence, adherence to truth, and dignity of labour); (iii) means (*satyagraha* and Bhoodan or "land gift"); and (iv) policies (prohibition, removal of untouchability, and the program for social and political decentralization). In the second chapter, the basic theories of *satyagraha* covering such principle as truth, non-violence, and self-suffering (*tapasya*) are analysed. The rules, disciplines, and procedural steps, that is, the essentials of applied *satyagraha* are discussed in the third chapter. To illustrate these, five historic campaigns are described and the extent of their success are analysed.[43] In the fourth chapter, Gandhi's "transformation or adaptation of Hindu tradition to develop a social and political technique" is discussed and the argument that Gandhi was a Hindu revivalist is dismissed as "superficial understanding".[44] In the remainder of the book,

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[39] *Ibid.*

[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 305-306.

[41] In Tilak's ethical relativism it was the motive rather than the action itself which determined the guilt. From this it followed that a political murder with a higher motive was different from an ordinary murder. On this point he differed basically from Gandhi who believed that the means must be as noble as the ends.

[42] Joan V. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 7.

[43] The five were: Vykom, Bardoli, Ahmedabad, the Rowlatt Bills struggle, and the salt *satyagraha.*

[44] Bondurant, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

Gandhi's thought is considered in relation to conservatism, anarchism, and the "dialectics" of the Hegelian and Marxian systems.

Bondurant over-emphasizes Gandhi's contributions to the emergence of the Congress as a mass movement. In her words: "Gandhi did indeed transform it into a revolutionary organization which repudiated the existing government of India; he was responsible for transforming the Congress into a popular movement."[45] She fails to take into account many operative forces which were laying the basis for the emergence of "mass nationalism" before Gandhi's assumption of the leadership of the Congress. In the pre-Gandhi period of Indian nationalism, some degree of political mobilization was already taking place as a consequence of colonial rule, the activities of the INC during the period of Tilak's activism, and international developments. The introduction and expansion of education, communications, and other social and economic reforms by the British were having their impact in that more people were being brought into the political framework. Tilak's emphasis on the greatness of India's past, his working up of the Hindu religious tradition, his assertion that "Swaraj is my birth right and I will have it," his organization of great politico-religious festivals to honour the militant Shivaji and the Hindu deity, Ganesh—all these were certainly creating a sense of nationalist pride among a fairly large section of the Indian populace. Also, Japan's defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 created a new surge of confidence and optimism among Indians that European hegemony was not insurmountable. In short, the objective conditions for Indian "mass nationalism" were beginning to take shape. In Nehru's words: "There was an amazing psychological change. The time was ripe for it, of course, and circumstances and world conditions worked for this change. But a great leader is necessary to take advantage of circumstances and conditions. Gandhi was that leader."[46]

While Bondurant devotes a major portion of the book to comparing and contrasting Gandhi's thought in relation to Western thought and the Hindu religious tradition, there is not enough discussion of Gandhi's thought in relation to the mainstream of Muslim political thought in India, particularly Gandhi's failure to successfully incorporate the latter in his nationalist appeal. Aziz Ahmad has analysed the landmarks of religious and political thought of Muslims in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent in his recent book, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan.*[47] Although Professor Ahmad has intended his book as an introduction to western students, one wonders if he has not assumed a greater knowledge and understanding of Islam than really exist among all but a very few of the advanced western students.

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[45] *Ibid.*, p. 125.

[46] See Jawaharlal Nehru, "On Gandhi," in Martin D. Lewis, ed., *Gandhi: Maker of Modern India* (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1965), pp. 1-8.

[47] Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

He has chosen the period from 1857 to 1964 for presenting the "struggle between modernism and orthodoxy" in Muslim thought in the sub-continent. About two-thirds of the book deals with the period up to 1947 when India and Pakistan became two independent states; and the rest with post-independence developments. Professor Ahmad begins his analysis proper with Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the Aligarh movement. Sayyid Ahmad Khan's modernizing role of interpreting Islam to show its compatibility with modern science and his policy of "loyalism in politics" to restore British confidence in the Muslim community and the consequences of the latter are discussed by Ahmad. While emphasizing the modernizing role of the Sayyid, he points out the ambivalence in Sayyid Ahmad Khan's thought between fundamentalism and rationalism.

In the chapter on "Approaches to Islamic History," Ahmad, in effect, shows how closely the self-identity of the Indo-Pakistani Muslim is related to their perception of the history of Islam. The thoughts of Shibli Nuamani, Amid Ali, and Hali are discussed in this chapter. In Ahmad's view, Shibli, who was probably the most important intellectual Indian Islam produced, was essentially a traditionalist who was "marginally influenced by modernism". While approving of the modernists' application of "the principle of rationalist analysis" to determine the authenticity of a *hadis,* Shibli pointed out that this principle is "modernistic but implicit in the Qu'ran itself."[48] Amir Ali, who was much more of a polemicist than Shibli, adopted the "offensive" tactic of asserting the superiority of Islam and Muhammad to Christianity and Jesus in his writings. In his polemics, he even went to the extent of asserting that world civilization was set back for centuries by the failure of the Arabs to conquer medieval Europe!

One chapter is devoted to Indian Islam's flirtation with the Caliphate and Pan-Islamism, which temporarily brought together the Congress and the Muslim League, but which received its psychological blow when the Caliphate was abolished by fellow Muslims of the Turkish National Assembly in 1924.

Probably, the most important discussion in the book is found in the four chapters dealing with the political and religious thoughts of Iqbal, the genesis of Pakistan, the religious ideas of Abu'l Kalam Azad and the theory of composite Hindu-Muslim nationalism championed by Azad and the Deoband group of *ulama.* Despite Iqbal's earlier Pan-Islamism, his theological rationalizations led directly to the "two nation" theory and the demand for a separate Muslim state which found its champion in Muhammad Ali Jinnah. In contrast, Azad took the term *umma,* used in the Prophet's covenant with the Jews and the Arab residents of Medina in the 7th century, to mean a nation encompassing different religious communities and thus reached the Muslim "nationalist" conclusion of co-existence with Hinduism.

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[48] *Ibid.,* p. 79.

Although Islamic scholars and Muslims may find some intriguing and unacceptable remarks in Ahmad's study, such as his distinction between "Islamic" states and "Muslim" states[49] and his concluding remark that "the west may eventually help" in the "real restoration of Islam,"[50] there is no doubt that his work is a major contribution to our understanding of the intimate interaction between Indian Islam and politics which decidedly affected the course of Indian nationalism.

Although the Hindu-Muslim cleavage dominated the course of nationalist politics in pre-partition India, there were also other cleavages, particularly at the regional level, which gave rise to regional movements that aimed at altering the inequities of the social structure at the regional level. Irschick's *Politics and Social Conflict in South India*[51] is concerned with one such movement, namely, the "Non-Brahmin Movement" of Madras and his study covers the period between 1916 and 1929.

In the first chapter, Irschick examines the complexities of Madras social structure, focusing mainly on the nature of Brahmin dominance in the social, educational, administrative and political life of Madras Presidency, despite the fact that they constituted only about three per cent of the population.

The Non-Brahmin reaction to this Brahmin dominance did not take long to organize itself. In Chapters two to seven, Irschick traces the evolution of the Non-Brahmin movement. The main themes discussed are: the Non-Brahmin opposition to theosophist Annie Besant's call for Home Rule; the formation of the Justice Party; the award of separate electorates to Non-Brahmins; the Justice Party's control of the legislature from 1921 to 1926 and its work for the Non-Brahmins (minus the untouchables and the Muslims) in the spheres of civil service and education; and then the party's gradual decline. Irschick has successfully weaved into his discussion the interests of the British in the Brahmin — Non-Brahmin conflict. He shows convincingly how British administrative and commercial interests in Madras were generally sympathetic to Non-Brahmin demands partly because they supported continued British rule.

By mid-1920's the Justice Party was in decline and even before then many Muslims and untouchables had drifted away from the party, mainly because it did not serve their interests. As the author remarks: "Very soon after taking office the Justice Party severed its connections with the untouchable groups"[52] and the party changed from "the idealistic reform association which Dr. Nair had intended it to be into a mere political mechanism, a broker for government jobs for a few select non-Brahmin caste Hindus."[53]

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[49] *Ibid.*, p. 264.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 273.
[51] Eugene F. Irschick, *Politics and Social Conflict in South India: The Non-Brahman Movement and Tamil Separatism, 1916-1929* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).
[52] *Ibid.*, p. 188.
[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 192-193.

The decline of the party was manifested in its failure to retain its majority in the council in the elections of 1926. Some disillusioned Justicites joined the Congress while others carried on the Non-Brahmin struggle, which now stood for Tamil separatism, in the Self-Respect Movement led by E.V. Ramaswami Naicker (popularly known as *Periyar*). The separatist theme was further developed by the DK and the DMK, the rise of which Irschick briefly summarizes.

Irschick's study is an important contribution to our understanding of regional developments in the Indian national movement. He has not only utilized previously neglected material such as the evidence to the Joint Select Committee on the Bill (Montagu-Chelmsford Report) but also Tamil sources and private documents which give insight to Non-Brahmin activities. However, there are some gaps in his study which probably could be filled by one or two articles. For example, while Irschick devotes a great deal of attention to a limited number of South Indian leaders, there is a relative lack of detailed discussion of the organizations (such as party and caste associations) which they led. Also, in his attempt (in the concluding chapter) to generalize about regionalism in pre-partition India, he could have attempted some comparisons with developments in other regions such as Bengal and Punjab which have received a great deal of scholarly attention.

Concluding Remarks

Our survey of the literature on nationalism and the historiography of Indian nationalism reveals a significant gap between the existing theoretical formulations and the empirical studies. If any single criticism can be made of any of the works on Indian nationalism, it is surely one of a failure to work with an explicit theoretical focus and a set of hypothesized relationships. This tends to limit the utility of many of the existing studies in regard to replicating them in other contexts with a view to arriving at a set of generalization that have cross-cultural applicability.

Among the existing theoretical formulations, Deutsch's "social communication" theory and his notion of the "core area" seems to be particularly rewarding for explaining the emergence of nationalism in India and elsewhere. However, Deutsch's formulations may have to be supplemented by incorporating other important variables. For example, while Deutsch's emphasis on the range of communications and transactions amongst different groups in society may be useful in regard to providing the infra-structure for the emergence of nationality, the forging of this consciousness is often a function of the political cognitions, motivations, and leadership styles of the important elites in society.

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