Asian Studies

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CONTENTS

AN EXPLANATION OF THE METHODOLOGY USED IN A DISSERTATION ENTITLED "THE NATURE OF COOPERATION AMONG ASEAN STATES AS PERCEIVED THROUGH ELITE ATTITUDES — A FACTOR FOR REGIONALISM" *

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The movement towards regionalism in contemporary years has been motivated by group survival as it had been in the past. In ancient times, city-states coalesced into federations and empires; in the Middle Ages, feudal entities evolved into nation-states, and in modern times, states banded themselves into world and regional organizations. It appears that the underlying reason for all these events was that there were many difficult problems which threatened people's survival.

The trend towards regionalism in Europe has gained impetus since the end of World War II, while attempts in Southeast Asia have not been as successful. But Southeast Asians appear determined to come together in some collaborative efforts. Perhaps this is partly due to the demonstration effects of the European experiences but it is more because of the felt need to pool their scarce resources together to solve common problems. Based on a cost-and-benefit calculation, Southeast Asian leaders believe that on some issues, it costs less to meet problems on a cooperative endeavor than if each had to tackle them singly.

This work tried to study the nature of cooperation among five Southeast Asian states (the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia) during the last ten years, with several objectives in view. First was to find out the attitudes of Southeast Asian leaders regarding regional cooperation. Second was to see whether these leaders perceived the threats to their existence in identical or converging fashion. Third, it was interesting to find out whether the policy-makers looked at rapid development towards regionalism as more desirable than a gradual one. Then, it also tried to see the attitudes of each ASEAN member state regarding the other integration experiences of its partners. For example, Indonesia could have had misgivings about Thailand and Philippine participation in SEATO which Indonesia had rejected from its inception. Finally this study tried to test several hypotheses on integration which were generated by the European and Latin American experiences. Among these hypotheses were:

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* Microfilm copies of this dissertation may be obtained from the Microfilm Office at Ann Arbor, Michigan.

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1. A strategy of rapid change is most effective when "background factors are not ripe."[1]
2. Unique cultural attributes create situations for acceptance of innovations.[2]
3. For early stage cooperation among developing countries, it is useful to amplify "close or safe" targets and to underplay remote ones.[3]
4. All decisions impinge on one another. Cooperation in one sector can spill over into another sector.
5. Physical proximity encourages cooperation among states.

It is interesting to see how states, which had very little contacts with one another for nearly two centuries, different historical experiences, and which reached statehood only barely thirty years ago, could engage in collaborative efforts. This study did not intend to look into the problems of regional integration since it was not the stated objective of current cooperative ventures in Southeast Asia. Rather, it looked at the nature of cooperation, an early relationship that occurs long before integration sets in.

Analytical Framework

Cooperation is the conceptual framework used in this study because it is one of the early phenomena in integration. Cooperation is a necessary precondition to integration as it contributes to the building of mutual understanding and confidence, and hopefully, to the sharing of values, habits, and expectations among peoples of discrete political units. These conditions bring about a social and psychological foundation for social assimilation, a necessary condition for integration.

Cooperation is defined as the act of working together towards one end. The goal is shared and it is the relationship to that goal which holds the cooperating units together.[4]

Integration is the process whereby two or more actors form a new actor.[5] The actors involved are peoples who develop a consensus in values, aspirations, policy preferences, and general world outlook. They are the ones who shift their expectations on a significant range of values to a new actor, the new political community.[6]

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[1] Amitai Etzioni, "European Unification, A Strategy of Change," in *International Political Communities, An Anthology* (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1966), pp. 194-195.

[2] Ernst B. Haas and Philippe G. Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections About Unity in Latin America," in *Ibid.*, p. 284.

[3] Etzioni, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

[4] Margaret Mead, *Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), p. 8.

[5] Johann Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Integration," *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 4 (1968), p. 377.

[6] Haas and Schmitter, in International . . . *op. cit.*, pp. 264-276.

The focus of this paper are the attitudes of the political elites of the five Southeast Asian (SEA) states regarding cooperation. In this study, *political elite* denotes the group of officials occupying formal government positions with authority to influence foreign policy-making. They are the President or Prime Minister, Deputy Foreign Minister, Secretary-General, and Ambassador who is a member of the Standing Committees of the regional organizations. It is assumed in this study that the political elites are the ones who take the lead in interacting with one another in Southeast Asia because the various societies have not developed any appreciable degree of mutual knowledge which could serve as the basis for cooperation. Political elites perceive national goals. When the attitudes of political elites are expressed officially in communication, they are taken as policies.

General Hypothesis

This study tried to see if there is a positive relationship between the *attitudes* of the political elites regarding cooperation, perceptions of external threat, internal stability, economic development, and their attitudes toward the desired strategy for change and the previous integrative experiences of their partners, on one hand, and actual cooperation on the other.

Data Base

The materials used in this study consisted of documents pertaining to the pre-organization, organization, and post-organization activities of ASA, Maphilindo, and ASEAN (1959-1969). The author's own interviews of the political elites of the five states were added to the documents and all together the universe of documents was 86.

Methods

Thematic analysis was the initial method used. Each variable was broken down into possibly all the themes found in all the documents. Then the themes were classified into three groups. Every variable therefore had a set of three groups of themes, corresponding to measurements of high — medium — low on a three-point scale. For example, let us take the variable attitudes on cooperation. All the officials mentioned the desire for cooperation in their speeches. However, the varying intensity is discerned in the themes that were used. All themes which meant mere subscription to the idea were classified low (1). Themes that called for specific ideas for cooperation, such as meeting, consultation, organization, were classified medium (2). All statements that strongly urged action and set specific dates for meetings were grouped into high (3).

As to the classifications of attitudes regarding external threats, internal
stability and economic development, they were patterned after Haas.[7]
If the ideas of the elites were identical with the general definition as
contained in the agreements and followed identical reasoning, they were
classified as identical (3). If the goals were the same but the paths
of reasoning taken were different, they were converging (2). Non-
congruent ideas or those with reservations were opposed (1).

Regarding strategy of change, attitudes were for rapid strategy (3)
when elites were using mainly policies, fiats, legislation, propaganda
and involving a few key sectors. Mixed strategy (2) would use both
rapid and gradualistic strategies. Gradualistic (1) meant slow evolution
from nationalism to regionalism, waiting for a community of sentiments
to develop through education and unplanned exposures of people to
one another.

As for previous integrative experiences — expressions that considered
them as beneficial to the present cooperative movements were classified
as reinforcing (3). Attitudes expressing non-commitment to the question
were called neutral (2), while attitudes that were unfavorable to such
previous experiences were lumped into disintegrative (1).

It may be seen then that although the criteria for measurement
differed with each variable, there was comparability in the intensity
of attitudes.

The frequencies of each theme were added for each rank in scale
(1-2-3) and the highest frequency or modal position was taken as the
country attitudinal position. Country positions represented all the attitudes
enumerated for every level of conference, communication, or interview
of all the named political elites of each country.

It was thus possible to compare country positions per organization
or year (ASA — 1959-67, Maphilindo — 1963-65, and ASEAN — 1967-69).
Or one could also compare attitudes by the rank of the political elites —
Presidents, Foreign Ministers, or Secretaries-General.

Actual cooperation which was the dependent variable, was broken
down into seven indicators. Each indicator was also measured on a 3-
point scale. Thus,

		1	2	3
1. Resolution of conflicts	—	unresolved	impasse	resolved
2. Status of treaties	—	abrogated	suspended	operational
3. Projects as joint endeavors	—	no action	suspended	operational
4. Intra-regional trade	—	low	medium	high
5. Visitor exchanges	—	low	medium	high
6. Sectors involved in direct sharing	—	none	few	many
7. Machinery set up for regional activities	—	none	few	all

[7] Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1958), Chapter 1.

Each attitudinal position was compared with each indicator of co-operation. It was found out that although most attitudes were only converging (2), yet they were supportive of cooperative projects. Con-verging attitudes on the lowest common denominator (mostly projects that were "feasible, quick-yielding and beneficial to all")[8] were sufficient starting points for cooperation. Where the attitudes were high (3) and the actual cooperation were either medium or low, social and political realities which are products of historical experiences accounted for the lack of congruence.

[8] ASEAN definition of the types of projects to be undertaken initially.

THEMES IN PHILIPPINE FOLK TALES

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The four folk tales presented in this paper come from at least four groups in the Philippines. "Juan Pusong and the Hermit" is a translation of a Bisayan tale obtained from Baylao, barrio of Mambajao, in Camiguin Province. It was collected by Miss Minerva Inguito from old folks of Baylao in the summer of 1967. The second tale "The Story of Juan Pikas" comes from Bukidnon Province. It was obtained from a native informant by Mrs. Carmen Ching Unabia in the summer of 1968. It was originally in Cebuano Bisayan. The third tale or "The Story of Adam and Eve" comes from the Taosug group in Jolo, Sulu. It was collected under the direction of Fr. Gerard Rixhon, OMI, from a native informant between 1961-1970. The story belongs to the class which the Taosug informant Mullung calls *katakata* which he defines as orally transmitted stories "that relate to a distant past of which no testimony is available, except that they are to be believed."[1] The fourth story comes from the north of the Philippines gathered in the last century by Fray Ruperto Alarcon and translated by William Henry Scott.[2]

The writer is conscious of the inadequacy of his analysis. It is purely literary and psychological. There is very little of sociological analysis, the reason being that no fieldwork has been made to check the tales against story-teller and audience reactions. However, what is worth doing is worth doing even badly. We hope to complement this work with field observation in the not too distant future.

1. JUAN PUSONG AND THE HERMIT

While hunting, Juan came upon an old man who was kneeling beside the trunk of a tree. He inquired from the man what he was doing. But the old man did not answer. He asked again and again, but the old man gave no answer. Juan returned home.

Having reached home, Juan inquired from his mother if such be the way of hermits that they pay no attention to their neighbors. The mother replied that such indeed is the way of hermits. Then Juan assured her that in a short while he would bring the hermit into their home. His mother simply laughed at him.

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[1] cf. Gerard Rixhon, *Sulu Studies,* Vol. I (1972), p. 183.
[2] cf. Fray Ruperto Alarcon, "A Description of the Customs of the Peoples of Kiangan, Bunhian and Mayoyao, 1857," *Journal of the Folklore Institute,* Vol. II, No. 1 (June 1965), pp. 78-100, esp. pp. 82-83.

Juan returned to the mountain, carrying with him a rope and a bag made of *guinit* (rough sackcloth-like wrappings of young coconut shoots). He climbed a tree close to where the hermit was kneeling.

From the tree top, Juan began to sing:

An angel am I	*Ako ang manulunda*
Come down from the sky	*Gikan sa langit sa kahitas-an*
Guarding men from the peril	*Mianhi ako sa tuman*
Of the devil	*Aron sa panalipod batok sa dautan.*

Three times he sang the self-same song. Then he lowered the *guinit* bag to where the old man was praying. Then he resumed his song:

Hermit, hermit	*Ermitanyo, ermitanyo*
Get into this bag of *guinit*	*Mosakay ka ning puyong guinit*
To heaven I'll bring you in it	*Kay dad-on ko ikaw sa langit.*

Juan repeated his song over and over again, until the bag reached the old man.

Without delay the hermit stood up and entered the *guinit* bag. The bag closed in upon the hermit as soon as Juan gave it a jerk upwards. He tied the rope to the branch and came down the tree. He cut the rope, threw the bag over his shoulders and started for home at a run.

After he had ran quite a distance, the hermit asked this question: "San Miguel, is heaven still afar off?"

Juan replied: "It's quite near already; hold on a while and we'll be there soon."

When they arrived at his house, Juan said to the old man inside the bag: "At last, here we are in heaven."

Then he opened the bag in the presence of his mother.

To his surprise, his mother began to cry.

The hermit was his father.

THE THEMES

There is real humor in this little droll. There is also a mild exposé of the stupidity of the hermit. Of course, there were no hermits in abundance to make this a really credible instance. In fact, I still have to find real proof of hermits ever existing in the Philippines, even in the past. But the hermit may be taken as a symbol of the so-called "holy" people who spend their day praying, away from their fellows and their families and their commitments. These people are shown to be simpletons in the extreme, with a strong dash of selfishness in their character. But the point of the story does not seem to lie in the criticism of this type of people.

Rather, the thrust of the story is directed first at the mother and finally at Juan. First the mother. When Juan asked her if indeed hermits are known to be heedless of their neighbors, she answered in the affirmative. But when Juan proposed to bring the hermit home, she simply laughed. But as soon as Juan opened the bag in her presence, the woman cried. The hermit was her husband.

Next Juan. Juan was obviously irritated by the uncouthness of the "holy" man who would not even reply to his inquiry. He did intend to get scores evened up with this fellow. As he climbed the tree and sang his song, and when he saw the old man get up to enter the bag, Juan must have laughed secretly, if not openly at the stupidity of the man. And when the hermit inquired from within the bag whether heaven was still far away, and when Juan gave his reassurance that they would soon be there, again he must have been greatly amused at this man's stupidity. And when he opened the bag in front of his mother, his feeling of complete satisfaction, particularly in having fulfilled his boast to his mother, must have been perfect. Yet, how easily this was turned to disappointment and perhaps disgust with himself: the laugh was on himself, too; for this man was his own father. The moral seems to be this: Don't gloat over your having shown others to be stupid. In doing so, you may find out your intimate links with their stupidity.

2.   THE STORY OF JUAN PIKAS

Juan Pikas had only one leg, one arm and one eye. Thus he was called Juan Pikas (The One-Sided). As he grew, Juan Pikas was thinking what he should do since even to walk was too difficult for him. So one day, Juan, of his own counsel, decided to go out and search for God in order to find out if he might become a complete man.

So he went on a journey in search of God. He had not been gone for long when he came upon a horse tied to a tether that was very short; yet the horse was stout and well-fed. The horse inquired from Juan where he was going. "To the house of God," Juan replied, "to find out if I may have another body and thus become a whole man."

The horse continued: "Good, Juan, I have a question to ask of God: why is it that I am stout and well-fed when my rope is too short?"

Juan continued his journey. Soon afterwards he came upon another horse with a very long tether, but was very short and hungry-looking. The horse asked Juan where he was bound for. "To God," Juan countered, "in order to inquire if I yet may become a whole man."

The horse in answer said: "Good, I have a question I'd like to ask of God: why is it that my rope is long and yet I am so thin?"

Juan continued on his journey and he came across a man who built a house right at the crossing of the roads. And no man passed by there without this man giving the passer-by food to eat. This man also asked Juan whither he was destined. Juan gave the same response: "I am going to God to ask him if I may get a complete body."

The man was pleased, saying "I have a question for you to ask of God: shall I have salvation in what I do, since, without discrimination, I give food to everyone who comes along?"

Juan proceeded onwards and now came upon a man who had a house built over a very high waterfall. Whoever passed by that place, this man would kill. This man also inquired from Juan where he was going. Juan told him that he was off to visit God's house in order to find out if his body would yet be changed for the better. This pleased the man who said, "I have a message to inquire from God: is there salvation for me in what I do, since I have deprived so many people of their lives?"

Juan moved on and presently came to the territory of God. God now asked Juan what he came for. Juan answered: "I have come in order to see if my body might be changed."

In return God replied: "I now know, Juan, that you have a good mind, because you are of my own making. The reason why you are not yet complete in your body is because I have not yet tested you. But now you will have a complete body and a complete mind."

Then and there Juan recovered a complete body and he was no longer Juan Pikas (or The One-Sided Man). Then Juan relayed to God the question-messages: first from the horse with a short tether: why was he stout and well-fed? God replied: "That horse was possessed of a righteous mind; that is why he is stout. Therefore, he has salvation."

Concerning the second horse with the long rope: "why was he so lean and hungry-looking?" "That horse," God said, "did not possess a good mind, nor was he honest, and therefore, he will have no salvation."

Next Juan mentioned the missive of the man who was very good and invited and fed everyone who came his way: was he to gain salvation? God replied: "Indeed, he will."

Finally he relayed the question of the man who lived over a high waterfall and who killed his fellowmen: "was he to attain salvation?"

"Certainly not," God replied, "for he is a murderer."

Juan returned. He met the wicked man who asked about his message. Juan told him: "I have referred your question to God. But you shall have no salvation because you have deprived many of their lives."

Juan reached the place of the good man who marked how changed Juan was, and inquired what was the answer to his question: and Juan told the man: "You will have salvation because you are a good and honest man."

But the man said: "Indeed, I tried my best to lead an honest life because I did not know whether I may attain salvation or not; but he (i.e., the murderer), since he has killed so many, it is clear he will attain no salvation at all."

But this man because he judged the murderer, reached perdition; on the other hand, the murderer was saved.

Juan continued on his journey until he reached the thin horse which accosted him; "Juan, you are back and your body is now complete; but what about my message?"

Juan replied, "I told God about it, but he said that you have no salvation because your mind is not right."

He went further and came upon the horse with the short tether. This horse was happy to see Juan's complete bodily form and inquired also about his question, Juan assured him that he would have salvation because he had an honest mind.

The Themes

The motif of the One-Sided Man is quite common in folklore — there is need for a good, honest mind. Both men and animals are expected to have this kind of mind. It is the basis for salvation.

Among animals, good mind is shown by the possession of the healthy body; among men, by never judging others but leaving the judgment to God; and among both men and animals, by the desire to know God's will for each individual.

God tests men. For example, he gave Juan a chance to prove his honest mind and initiative in coming to God in order to ask for the reason of his being One-Sided as well as to petition for a more complete form. Juan successfully passed the test and was thus rewarded. The good man who lived at the crossroads and the bad man who dwelt over the waterfall also had their test. Both showed at least the beginning of an honest mind by asking Juan the favor to inquire from God about their respective statuses. In this way, both of them were successful. But in the end the roles were reversed. The reason is that one of them (the originally good one) tried to judge the other. This perhaps lights up an important difference between man and the animals. Man alone judges and condemns others. In so doing, he can lose his honesty and become wicked. On the other hand, the animals do not judge or condemn their fellows. Thus it is impossible for them to lose their righteous mind, nor change their mind from bad to good.

In other words, animals take things as they are. They accept reality with its distinctions and discriminations. Of course, they suffer no moral change either for better or for worse.

Other secondary themes may be pointed out, namely: the fraternal relationship between animals and men; and the common concern showed by both for salvation, whatever that means.

3. THE STORY OF ADAM AND EVE

God, when about to create man, said to the angels: We should create Adam from a solidified earth. This was a revelation to the angels. And he asked them to fetch soil from the four corners of the earth.

But the angels were unable to obtain the soil because they were seduced by the satans or devils.

The reason for the seduction was that the satans were jealous of the angels. God had not revealed to them as he did to the angels the kind of substance to use in creating man. They promised, however, to help the angels obtain the soil from the four corners of the earth if they were also given the *parman*.

The angels reported to God this complaint of the satans. Then God, through the angels, gave his *parman* also to the satans. So the satans and the angels together went to fetch the earth needed for the making of man.

When the soil had been obtained it was mixed together. But Adam had no movement. Besides, he began to crack up because of the sun's heat.

God ordered the angels to pour water on him. But a new problem arose: Adam would not get dry. So God gave another order to apply air to him. But the problem remained: Adam would not move. This time, God commanded them to put fire in Adam. This made him better: he now had within himself: earth, water, air, and fire.

Still, another difficulty came up: whenever Adam sneezed his neck would be pulled off. God gave a revelation to the angels to the effect that Adam should say when sneezing: "Praise be to God." Besides, whenever Adam yawned, his chin would drop and remain fallen on his chest. To prevent this, another *parman* was given enjoining him to say this ejaculation whenever he yawned: "God send the satans away from me." All these problems solved, the *partubuhan* of Adam was complete.

But Adam was alone. God put him to sleep and in his sleep, he dreamt that a rib of his was pulled out of his side and placed on his arms. He woke up and found the beautiful Eve pillowed on his arms. From then on the world began to be peopled.

Their first offsprings were a white boy and a white girl. Next they
gave birth to a black boy and a black girl. Then white children married
each other; and the blacks did likewise. After their marriage, the
children left to find their own home. They bypassed the silver and
gold mountains and remained on the iron. The children of the whites
and the children of the blacks also married their own color. Thus
the white and black races began.

In Paradise or Surgah, a man came to Eve and offered her a
fruit to eat. Eating the fruit had been advised against by God and
by Adam. Probably Eve did not eat the fruit. That was why Eve was
tempted again but in another form.

A little child, newly born, was crying; and Eve hearing the poor
thing, ordered the angels to bring the child to her. The baby spoke
and said that it was crying because Adam and Eve would be sent
out of Paradise because they would not eat of the fruit of the tree.
It stopped to cry only after Eve did actually partake of the fruit.
Afterwards, Eve induced Adam to eat of the fruit despite his repeated
refusals. Since the day Eve squeezed the juice of the fruit into Adam's
mouth, both she and Adam began to urinate and defecate in Paradise.
Thus they were sent out of it. Until now they can't be found. It was
Eve's *napsu* or greed which sent them out of Paradise.

THE THEMES

There are many themes expressed in this myth. But the most
important, I think, is the theme of the problem of evil. It is a problem
because evil is not a simple thing. In its origin and its continuance,
the angels, good and bad, man, and even God, seem to be implicated.

In the myth, evil is considered to be built into the very nature
of man. The soil out of which he was fashioned was gathered through
the hands of the angels and the satans. In fact, were it not for the
help of the satans, the angels would not have obtained it. For they
were seduced by the satans the first time they went on their own,
under orders from God, to secure the soil from the four corners of
the earth. Why did the satans seduce the angels? Out of jealousy
because God had not revealed to the satans the material out of which
man was to be formed. And there seems to be an indirect though real
fault finding with God who had reserved the revelation to the angels
and kept it away from the satans. In some sense, too, it appears
that the satans had some right to the knowledge of the revelation,
otherwise, why did God, after he had been appraised of the jealousy
of the satans, acquiesce to let them in on the knowledge, by also
granting the revelation to them through the agency of his angels?
Thus God appears to be responsible for opening the door to the devil
in the making of mankind.

However, there was a card in God's hand which he could always throw in order to foil the work of the satans. This was his powerful *parman* or revelation. What the exact nature of this *parman* is, is not quite clear. But by it God's superiority over all the angels is secured.

The power of the satans over man and the materials that went into his formation seems to be equal if not superior to that of the angels, and is second only to that of God. Without the help of the satans, the angels were powerless to obtain the soil; and even after the material had been obtained, the satans seem to have engineered all sorts of difficulties in the making of man. At the command of God, the angels mixed the soil from the four ends of the world. But Adam would not move. Worse, he began to crack up under the intense heat of the sun. God therefore enjoined the angels to pour water on him. Still a new problem came up. They could not get Adam dry. So God had to order them to apply air on him. Even when dried, Adam still would not move. So God had to command the angels to put fire into Adam. So the four elements are found in man. And these elements, even as earth or the soil, appeared to be under the power also of the satans. For even the Judaic-Christian thought acknowledges that the elements of this world are under the special ken of the "prince of this world."

Nor did the satans cease their contrary activity after man was formed and life and movement was given to him. For whenever Adam sneezed, the satans caused his neck to be pulled off; even if he yawned his chin would not return to its normal position. In each case, only the *parman* or revelation from God was a match to the machinations of the satans. The angels themselves, without the help from God, were powerless.

We have seen that the angels themselves were not immune to the seduction of the satans. The myth also tells us that man, once fully made a man, possessed with life and movement, would not be free from their annoyances. Even in Surgah or Paradise, Adam and Eve did not remain unmolested. The devil, disguised as an adult man one day approached Eve and invited her, to partake of the fruit of the tree, the eating of whose fruit, both God and Adam had warned against. It seems that Eve was firm against this first seduction. But the devil would not be put off. He devised another trick. And it was more calculated to touch the sympathy of the mother and the wife in Eve. He appeared in the form of a little baby, crying. And, liar that he was, he told Eve that he was crying because he knew Adam and Eve would be sent out of Paradise unless they ate of the fruit of the tree. Deceived by her pity for the child and touched by his concern for her and her husband, Eve ate of the fruit. Henceforward,

there was no need for the satans to deceive Adam. Eve was to do the
task of seduction herself. Picturesquely, the myth says that Eve squeezed
the juice of the fruit into her husband's throat. And they found
themselves very human: constrained to perform very human actions.
This brought about their expulsion from Paradise and their still being
at large. The myth ends with a weak accusation of woman's *napsu*
or greed as responsible for the expulsion. I say weak because the whole
tenor of the myth from the beginning had alerted us of real and
deeper springs of evil and its punishment.

The avowed, though indirect, implication of God, the devil, and
the angels in the origin of mankind and of evil in the world is quite
common among the myths of many peoples. If there is any merit or
validity in them it is this: that they acquaint us of a very important
truth — the complexity or the paradox of evil. Although the myth closes
with an attribution of the loss of paradise to the greed of women (one
can see that the Taosug world is a man's world), one cannot close
his eyes to the truth running throughout the myth. There is a will
at work in the universe which runs counter to the will of God. This
will is equal to that of the angels. In fact, it is shown to be more
potent than that of the angels unaided by God. Only the will of
God is above it. Yet God is shown to have no complete dominion over
it. God may foil the contrary work of the satans by his *parman.* But
he is also, as it were, compelled to honor the will of the satans if he
must see his designs accomplished. Perhaps this is a crude but valid
insight into the aweful mysteriousness of free will in both angels and
men, and God's powerlessness before the working out of free will which
originates from him, as well as of the complicity of created free wills
in evil.

Man is subject to the seductions of the satans. For the satans had
a hand in his making. But he is not altogether without blame for the
evil that he does. Eve was enticed to eat the fruit by her very instincts
of pity and gratitude to the infant who was the devil in disguise.
Once seduced by the devil, Eve herself has become the instrument for
the seduction of her own husband. Nor is Eve or womankind the only
seducer. Mankind itself including men have also become seducers. For
Eve or woman was part and parcel of Adam or of man. She was
drawn from his own side. When Eve fell under the sway of Satan,
Adam (man, himself) also fell. The failure of other men and women,
that is, their complicity in evil, and their becoming imitators of the
satans in the art of leading others to do evil was a foregone conclusion.
The more universal theme celebrated in this myth is: man's fall into
evil is *also* a thing of *his* making. In this myth, the other complementary
theme: man's rise in goodness and virtue is also a thing of his making
is not celebrated.

4. KIANGAN ORPHEUS TALE

There once died Bugan, the young spouse of Aliguyung who was left inconsolable in his bereavement. An infant that could not live without its mother's breast increased the anguish of the unhappy widower. The boy cried and wasted away, and his distracted father passed the nights singing him little ditties which could not placate his crying.

"Why do you not come, my beloved spouse? I have just finished a *pangulan* (?) basket for you to go and get camotes with your son on your back. The souls of three pigs I sent to accompany you have not brought me back any news of you. I feel your spirit *(banig)* that slips between the *taranas* (?) of our hut. I caress it and it does not respond; I wish to embrace it, and it flees. Why do you not come? Our son cries, he does not sleep, he is wasting away; if you delay, he will waste away to his death."

Then Aliguyung, seeing that he addressed his wife's shade in vain, resolved to make a trip to Cadungayan, the land of the souls, in search of her.

After many weary days along a painful path, he reached a pleasant valley where it was neither hot nor cold, where rice grows without hull and birds allow themselves to be caught by hand. It is crossed by the clearest of brooks on whose banks grow sturdy trees all filled with delicious fruit. Aliguyung didn't see anybody or any sign of habitation; but at night he heard the sound of voices — souls in conversation. Then he noticed that what by day had appeared as trees were at night changed into cabins which were all filled with people rejoicing and merrymaking.

He looked into one or two of the cabins and noticed that almost all the souls were occupied in spinning. At last having recognized his wife by the sound of her voice, he called to her and she, though with some repugnance, approached him.

"What are you doing here?" He asked her. "You have a child who needs your care to live; he will die if you don't give him your breast, and I, likewise, cannot survive such sorrow."

"I am here," she replied, "waiting for you the same as for him." And she told him of the delights of that lazy life where they lived off the most exquisite foods without it costing any labor.

Nevertheless, Aliguyung insisted that she must accompany her husband so that the child would not die, and she, so as not to increase his pain, agreed to follow him.

They travelled the whole night, and about dawn stopped to rest near a tree. Aliguyung fell into a tired sleep and, upon waking, found no more of his wife than her head. Grieved by this turn of events, he decided to go back home, so he wrapped up his wife's head in a

blanket and put it in his knapsack. He returned to the house; and when he took out the bundle, he found only a piece of wood in place of the head he thought he had been carrying.

Aliguyung was not to be deterred by this trick of fate. He returned to Cadungayan and met his wife again; and tried to get her to go with him. But she convinced him of the impossibility of his desires, saying, "Do not wear yourself out trying to do something impossible. Those who once enter here can never again live with mortals. I will give you a remedy so our child will live: take this handful of rice, which will be sufficient to feed our child till he grows up, but you will take care not to give him more than one grain each time. The day he eats more will be the day of his death."

With this, Bugan bade her husband farewell, telling him that there she would be waiting for him when death came to him, too.

Back home, Aliguyung complied with his wife's instructions, and from then on the child grew extraordinarily robust and never again missed his mother's natural milk.

Some years passed, and when the child was grown big, there were still some grains left of the rice brought from Cadungayan by his father. Ignorant of their power, the boy one day mixed them in their food. He and his father ate it, and in the act met their deaths.

THE THEMES

The major theme in this story is the triumph of the dead over the living.

We see the power of the dead over the living, first of all in the crying and wasting away of the infant, as well as in the anguish of the husband which was double-edged due to his pity for the child and longing for his dead wife.

Again the power of the dead is seen when the husband had to leave home in order to search for his wife in the land of the dead. We also see it in his willingness to undergo the perils of a journey, so painful.

The anguish and pain is reinforced when he sees the happy state of the land of the dead and their seeming disregard for those left behind. Thus he asked:

> What are you doing here? You have left a child who needs your care to live; he will die if you don't give him your breast, and I, likewise cannot survive such sorrow.

What irony: the living asking the dead to help them against death!

The answer of the wife betrays her total distance from the worldly pains of her husband. She lives in a totally different world:

"I am here waiting for you the same as for him, i.e., the child." And
she told him of the delights of the lazy life where they lived off the most
exquisite foods without it costing any labor."

This sends another spasm of pain into the husband's heart.

Another theme is introduced here which, although subordinate, is
also quite important to the major theme — the dead tricking the living
to believing that they are being helped, only to find in the end that
they have been mistaken.

She consents to go with him. At dawn he falls asleep near a tree,
tired out from the journey. (Looks like the tree of dream and since
his sleeping is an early dawn, the dream promises to be true). But
the height of the disillusionment is sharpened by this incident. He
wakes up and finds his wife gone. Only the severed head remains
which he wraps in his blanket and brings home.

Again the mockery of the living by the dead is quite apparent.
Kiangan victors on the warpath must bring home the heads of their
victims in order to be truly considered victors. Here Aliguyung is
equivalently being imaged as finally overcoming death, he bringing
home the head of his own dead wife. But the semblance yields to
reality. He opens the blanket. Instead of the severed head, he finds
a piece of dry wood.

Yet man will not give up. He returns to the land of the dead
(death triumphant still) and asks for another reprieve. He is bluntly
told the truth: "Do not wear yourself out trying to do something
impossible. Those who once enter here can never again live with your
mortals."

However, death is merciful and grants man another palliative. It
will make man forget for a while that he is subject to death. But
in the end, the very thing that makes him forget his being bounden to
death undoes him.

The wife gives him "a remedy so our child will live: take this
handful of rice, which will be sufficient to feed our child till he grows
up, but you will take care not to give him more than one grain each
time. The day he eats more will be the day of his death." She bade
him adieu and told him she would be waiting for him when death
comes to claim him.

The husband complied with the wife's instruction. The child grew
and waxed into a man. One day, the son seeing some grains of rice
left from the handful given to his father by his dead mother, and
ignorant of its power, mixed the grains into their food. They both died.

Death allows itself to be put off for a while. In the end he is
again the victor. The child grew robust and big. But like a lamb for
the sacrifice, he was only being fattened. His mistake in not knowing
the power of the rice, undid him and his own father.

UNDERLYING CASE IN NORTHERN KANKANAY

MARJORIE DRAPER

0. Introduction

In the past the description of verbs in Philippine languages often stopped with answering questions regarding the behavior of verbs in the surface structure. However, this kind of description was of little value in understanding the underlying semantic structure of a language, the meaning of its sentences has to be included and accounted for.[1]

The "... semantic relationship of a predicate to the nominal expressions that go with it is largely independent of ..." traditional grammatical notions like subject, direct and indirect objects, and oblique object.[2] Descriptions of verbs in Philippine languages that reflect how a verb stem functions to the limit of its semantic range are needed.[3] The easiest and most direct method of describing many semantic relationships is in terms of role or case. A system of naming the kinds of relations between nominals and a predicate can be thought of as the case structure of that predicate.[4]

This paper describes how Northern Kankanay[5] case structures are mapped to clause structure, particularly active clauses.

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[1] Jerry A. Fodor and Jerrold J. Katz, *The Structure of Language Readings in the Philosophy of Language* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964).

[2] D. Terence Langendoen, *Essentials of English Grammar* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970).

[3] William C. Hall, "A Classification of Siocon Subanon Verbs," *Anthropological Linguistics*, Vol. XI, No. 1 (1970), pp. 25-32.

[4] Charles J. Fillmore, "The Case for Case," in *Universals in Linguistic Theory*, Ed. by Emmon Bach and Robert T. Harms (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968), pp. 1-88.

[5] Northern Kankanay is spoken by approximately 17,000 people living in the municipalities of Besao and Sagada, Mountain Province, Luzon, Philippines. The information for this paper is based upon material gathered during a four month stay in the years 1970-1971 in Balugan of the municipality of Sagada, under the auspices of the Summer Institute of Linguistics. The write-up is specifically the result of a workshop conducted by Joseph Grimes in May-July 1971, at Nasuli, Malaybalay, Bukidnon. I am deeply indebted to Dr. Grimes for his valuable help and consultation. Also the excellent consultation of Miss Donna Hettick and Mr. Richard Gieser is greatly appreciated. Miss Rose Padalla acted as my language helper and without her able assistance this paper would never have been written.

Analysis was aided by a concordance of texts in Northern Kankanay collected by Miss Donna Hettick and Miss Carolyn Kent. These texts were run off on the IBM 1410 Computer at the University of Oklahoma by the Linguistic Information Retrieval Project of the Summer Institute of Linguistics and the University of Oklahoma Research Institute, and sponsored by Grant GS-270 of the National Science Foundation.

This paper, although only a basic introduction to the underlying case in Northern Kankanay, has been of great value in the author's experience of learning

Active clauses are those which include an active predicate and one or more noun phrases which stand in relation to it. Active predicates, in turn, are affixed in various ways to show how one of the noun phrases, formally marked by a series of pronouns and particles[6] which is called the topic, is related to the action of the predicate. This relationship is called focus.[7] The function of the topic element in a clause is narrowed down by the focus affix into one of five categories. For any one of these, the set of underlying case relationships that can be represented is small, and taken together with all the focus possibilities and certain semantic traits of the individual verb in practice usually maps only one case to each focus category.

In Northern Kankanay grammar active clauses include predicate tagmemes manifested by verbs which are distinguished by their focus affixation and by the set of topic pronouns and particles which introduce the noun phrase. These focus relationships mentioned are described in this way: subject focus *men-, -om-*[8] in cross reference with a subject tagmeme, object focus *-en* in cross reference with an object tagmeme, referent focus *-an* in cross reference with a referent tagmeme, accessory focus *i-* in cross reference with an accessory tagmeme, and benefactive focus *i . . . -an* in cross reference with a benefactive tagmeme. The constituent that is in cross reference with a focus affix is topic of the clause and carries the appropriate topic indicator.

Symbols used are as follows: T = Topic, Sf = Subject focus, Of = Object focus, Rf = Referent focus, Af = Accessory focus, and Bf = Benefactive focus.[9]

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a new language. Its value will also be much appreciated and very useful in making an accurate dictionary.

[6] Virginia M. Austin, *Attention, Emphasis and Focus in Ata Manobo,* Hartford Studies in Linguistics No. 20, 1966; Topic subject pronouns are singular, 1st person *-ak,* 2nd person *-ka,* 1st plus 2nd person *-ta,* 3rd person *0*; plural, 1st person *-kami,* 2nd person *-kayo,* 1st plus 2nd person *-tako,* 3rd person *-da.* These are suffixed to verbs. Non-subject topic pronouns are singular, 1st person *sak-en,* 2nd person *sik-a,* 1st plus 2nd person *daita,* 3rd person *siya;* plural, 1st person *dakami,* 2nd person *dakayo,* 1st plus 2nd person *datako,* 3rd person *daida.* Topic particles on noun phrases are general and common *nan,* anaphoric (i.e. denotes a unit of experience shared with the hearer) *san* antedated, (i.e. indicates something from previous time) *din;* personal noun or proper name, singular *si,* plural *da,* antedated *din si.*

[7] The following articles refer to focus: Howard Mckaughan, *The Inflection and Syntax of Maranao Verbs* (Manila: Institute of National Language, 1958); Kenneth Pike, "A Syntax Paradigm," *Language,* Vol. XXXIX (1963), pp. 216-230; Footnote 9 in Jannette Forster, *Dual Structure of Dibabawon Verbal Clauses,* Oceanic Linguistics No. 3, 1964, pp. 26-48; Lawrence A. Reid, *An Ivatan Syntax,* Oceanic Linguistics, Special Publication 2, 1966; Austin, *op. cit.;* Araceli C. Hidalgo, "Focus in Philippine Languages," Vol. I, No. 1 (1970), pp. 25-32.

[8] The subject focus affixes *men-* and *-om-* put the subject in two different relationships to the clause and define two clause types. Although the analysis in this area is quite sketchy, we feel that *men-* is something of a long duration, and is already begun; *-om-* is of shorter duration and is about to begin or to become.

[9] Carolyn Kent and Donna Hettick, *An Introductory Study of Stem Classification in Northern Kankanay.* (Manuscript)

1. *Case*

The participants in the case structure that match the clause level tagmemes are Agent, Patient, Experiencer, Instrument, Goal, Source, Non-instigative Cause, Range, Benefactive, Factitive, and Essive. They are always named with a capital letter.

Agent indicates who initiates or performs the action; it is always animate. Patient undergoes a process, either by being changed or by being moved, or is a stimulus for an experiencer. Experiencer indicates a person who perceives or feels things with no action. Instrument refers to what is used by the Agent in the execution of the action. Goal indicates where the action ends. Source indicates a causal factor that is not being wielded by any Agent. Range or location identifies the spatial orientation of the predication.[10] Benefactive indicates for whom or against whom the action is done, the one who benefits or suffers from it. Factitive indicates the result or what the action ends up with. Essive identifies the element designated by a predicate noun.[11]

These case relationships separate verbs into sets in which certain participants are inherent in the meaning of the verb. These sets are then sub-classified as action, process, experience, and state or combinations of these. Most of these action categories are completely predictable from the set of cases. The only ones that are not are state vs. process, both which take patient.

2. *Agent Oriented*

2.1   Gathering verbs are formed from nouns.[12] The Patient moves toward the Agent which is simultaneously the Goal. Patient matches object and Instrument matches accessory: *obiyen nan obi adi mabogis* (dig-sweet-potatoes-3rd-sing T-the sweet-potatoes negative spoil) 'he will dig the sweet potatoes so they will not spoil', *iyobim nan tinidol* (Af-dig-sweet-potatoes-2nd-sing T-the fork) 'you dig sweet potatoes with the (spading) fork'. Other verbs in this class are *sakati* 'cut grass', *kaiw* 'cut wood', *kaling* 'catch mudfish'.

2.2   Conveyance verbs are those in which the Patient moves. In accessory focus the Agent is also in motion along with the Patient. Patient matches object and accessory, Instrument matches accessory. Some Conveyance verbs have Gathering counterparts that mean the same but for direction. Gathering verbs may have a Range or Source: *depapen nan aso nan manok et isdana* (catch-Of the dog T-the chicken connective eat-3rd-sing) 'the dog will catch the chicken and eat it',

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[10] Donald G. Frantz, "Toward a Generative Grammar of Blackfoot," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alberta, 1970).

[11] Langendoen, *loc. cit.*

[12] Reid, *op. cit.*

ibakloymo si Amkenit (Af-carry-in-sling-2nd-sing T-person Amkenit) 'you carry Amkenit', *ibadengmo nan ballogo isnan palanggana* (Af-put-2nd-sing T-the corn article basin) 'put the corn in the basin', *idolinko isnan palanngo nan botilas* (Af-put-away-1st-sing article bottle T-the beans) 'I will put the beans in a jar', *ikaanmo nan dagom isnan sobe isnan sikim* (Af-remove-2nd-sing T-the needle article thorn article foot-2nd-sing) 'use the needle to remove the thorn from your foot'. Other verbs in this class are *abab* 'put soil between the stones of a terrace wall', *anap* 'seek, look for, search, find', *bekas* 'throw', *dogos* 'push', *ey* 'go', *gayang* 'throw something', *idya* 'give', *wasit* 'throw away', *agto* 'carry on head', *sakli* 'hold on lap'.

2.3   Motion verbs are those in which the Agent moves within a Range. Accessory focus verbs are Conveyance counterparts of Motion verbs; but the Agent is in motion as well as the Patient. Patient matches accessory, Range matches object: *nan agdan nan layogenyo* (T-the stairs article descend-Of-2nd-pl) 'you descend the stairs', *ilayawyo nan kosa* (Af-go-away-2nd-pl T-the cat) 'you take the cat away', *iyaliyo nan liblo* (Af-come-2nd-pl T-the book) 'you bring the book'. Other verbs in this class are *bala* 'go out', *gedang* 'cross water', *lagto* 'jump', *tagtag* 'run', *tikid* 'go up', *ablo* 'run away from home', *daan* 'walk'.

2.4   Change of Body Position verbs are similar to the verbs of motion. The Agent moves himself to this position, but no topic tagmeme is expressed with accessory focus. Range matches referent: *itakdegmo* (Af-stand-up-2nd-sing) 'you stand up', *adim podanan nan galot* (negative-2nd-sing lie-down-Rf T-the clothes) 'don't lie on the clothes', *itokdom* (Af-sit-down-2nd-sing) 'you sit down'.

2.5   Directional verbs are those in which the Agent is simultaneously the Source and directs an action toward a Goal. Goal matches referent: *sakayan Juan nan esa ay kabayo* (mount-animal-Rf John T-the one connective horse) 'John will mount the other horse'. Other verbs in this class are *ammeng* 'laugh', *ayowan* 'care for'.

2.6   Symmetric action verbs[13] are those in which the Agent and Patient can be interchanged with no semantic difference. Patient matches object: *asawaen Indi si Amkenit* (marry-Of Indi T-person Amkenit) 'Indi and Amkenit will marry'. Other verbs are *sape* 'fight' and *abat* 'meet'.

2.7   Speech verbs have Conveyance counterparts. In these verbs the Agent is simultaneously the Source. The Agent directs the Patient, which is a speech act, toward the Goal. Goal matches object and Patient matches accessory: *todowenyo si Magnas ay mensolot* (teach-Of-2nd-pl T-person Magnas) 'you teach Magnas how to write', *itodom nan ikkan di solat ken Lingan* (Af-teach-2nd-sing T-article to-do article write person-article Lingan) 'you teach Lingan how to write'.

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[13] D. Terence Langendoen, *The Study of Syntax* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969).

2.8   Change of State verbs are verbs in which the Agent performs
an action with an Instrument that changes the state of the Patient.
Patient matches object and referent, and Instrument matches accessory:
adim abes agidan nan pao (negative-2nd-sing also sharpen-to-a-point-Rf
T-the reed) 'don't make a point on that reed', *gepaken Indi nan tawa*
(break-Of Indi T-the window) 'Indi will break the window', *itokabyo
nan paglokat isnan lata* (Af-open-2nd-pl T-the can-opener article can)
'you use the can opener to open the can'. Other verbs in this class
are *atong* 'burn, cause pain', *bayo* 'pound', *betbet* 'chop, hack', *dalos*
'clean', *disig* 'split wood', *gedged* 'cut or slice', *kiskis* 'mill, husk', *palti*
'butcher', *sebseb* 'put out a fire by throwing something on it', *saba* 'cul-
tivate', *sokpot* 'cut'.

3. *Patient Oriented*

Stative verbs are those in which Patient matches subject: *mendagsen
nan kalton* (Sf-heavy T-the box) 'the box is heavy'. Other verbs in
this class are *bolinget* 'dark', *amay* 'good, comfortable, good looking',
atong 'hot', *anando* 'tall', *aged* 'sour', *obaya* 'holiday'.

4. *Experience Oriented*

4.1   Perception verbs are those in which Patient, as a stimulus, matches
object and accessory, and Non-instigative Cause matches object: *adiyak
layden ay dengen nan kanana* (negative 1st-sing like connective hear-
Of T-article say-3rd-sing) 'I don't want to hear what she is going to
say', *ipatik nan kinwanin ama ken sak-en* (Af-believe-1st-sing T-article
past-say father article 1st-sing) 'I will believe what my father told me',
getken nan esa si Magnas (know-Of article one T-person Magnas) 'one
of them knows Magnas'. Other verbs in this class are *ila* 'see', *likna* 'feel'.
4.2   Emotion verbs are those in which Patient matches object, accessory
and referent. The verb *adawag* 'sad' has a Conveyance counterpart which
is 'cry'. Patient matches accessory meaning 'cry' and matches referent
meaning 'sad'. It is supposed that this also exists in other verbs in this
class although at present it cannot be proven: *adawagan amana nan
gastos nan anakna* (sad-Rf-3rd-sing father T-the expenses article child-
3rd-sing) 'his father is sad because of his son's expenses', *iyadawagna
nan ot-ot nan sikina* (Af-cry-3rd-sing T-article ache article foot-3rd-sing)
'he is crying because his foot aches', *layden Pedro si Maria* (like-Of
Peter T-person Mary) 'Peter loves Mary', *agaan Lingan nan lobban* (cry-
Rf Lingan T-the grapefruit) 'Lingan is crying because she wants the
grapefruit'. Another verb is *sakit* 'hurt feelings'.

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NATURAL CLUSTERS IN KALINGA DISEASE TERMS

RUTH GIESER AND JOSEPH E. GRIMES

To understand the words the Kalinga[1] use for disease in their own terms, rather than imposing on them the categories of Western medicine, it has proved useful to employ an optimization model to block out semantic areas. This paper is part of a wider ethnolinguistic study on medical terminology, and it is presented more to show the method behind it than for its comprehensiveness, since considerable lexicographic work remains to be done.

By collecting scaled judgments of similarity and difference between pairs of terms for illnesses, focused on specific criteria of similarity, rough cognitive maps emerge that seem to be a natural starting point for investigation of semantic fields. They are especially promising because they cover areas where hierarchies of inclusion,[2] cannot be established readily.

SCALING

Kalinga is well provided with words that relate to disease. In exploratory elicitation the informant[3] gave terms for parts of the

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body, stages of illness, symptoms, causes, remedies, and 51 names of specific diseases. Of these, thirteen were chosen for the pilot study: *tíli* (dysentery), *táqqon* (cholera), *qoláng* (worms), *pangqúl* (viral infections ranging from influenza to the common cold), *pípit* (tuberculosis), *bilibíli* (beriberi), *gagátol* (spreading skin eruption), *busáli* (boil), *qoltóy* (epilepsy), *dáqo* (malaria), *pílay* (any permanent crippling), *naqammalóg* (possession by a spirit), and *lápang* (insanity). These terms typify the gamut of familiar diseases. Lack of time prevented including all the diseases in the list; but their incorporation and processing is a matter of a straightforward addition to what is already there, and so should sharpen but not essentially change the conclusions we sketch.

The informant was presented with pairs of disease names and asked to give his judgment on their similarity and difference. This was done in four separate areas: similarity in body parts affected, in symptoms, in causes, and in treatment, in that order. He ranked each pair of disease names on a five point scale: (1) similar, (2) somewhat similar, (3) neither noticeably similar nor noticeably different, (4) somewhat different, and (5) different. The answers he gave went into a square, symmetric matrix in which both rows and columns were labeled with the thirteen disease names (Table 1).

OPTIMIZATION

The results were analyzed using a clustering algorithm developed by the second author for the interpretation of dialect intelligibility tests[4] but applicable to problems of grouping in general. It is based on the principles of optimization through dynamic programming to take care of the inherent nonlinearity and asymmetry of intelligibility data. In this instance there appears to be no loss in treating the data as linear, thereby, permitting the use of any number of linear programming algorithms for solving what is known as the transportation model with fixed setup costs.[5] This optimization model has the effect of showing up the tightest networks of association among interrelated points, and the addition of a fixed cost vector to it has the effect of minimizing the number of networks. Here it is networks of related disease terms that are being explored. They are calculated for a series of fixed costs from 1 (similar) through 4 (somewhat different), which establish successively wider groupings.[6]

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[4] Joseph E. Grimes, *Finding Networks of Communication.* (Manuscript)

[5] Saul I. Gaas, *Linear Programming: Methods and Applications*[2] (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), Chapter 10. See also Richard E. Bellman and Stuart E. Dreyfus, *Applied Dynamic Programming* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 70-96.

[6] The fixed costs are actually set between the response levels in order to minimize degenerate outcomes. The threshold level of 1 is actually calculated at 1.5 and so forth.

Mapping

Although it is not absolutely necessary for understanding the conclusions, it is convenient to present the results of optimization in the form of a contour map (Figure 1). The terms that are closely associated are enclosed in the same contour line, and the terms that are in distinct areas are kept apart by two or more contour lines depending upon their degree of separation. This mode of presentation requires the terms to be placed on a map somewhere; and for illnesses this placement is arbitrary but constant from map to map.

Body Parts Affected

Table 1 gives the data that correspond to the question, "How similar are diseases A and B with respect to the part of the body

TABLE 1

Similarity of Body Parts Affected by Illness

	DYS	CHO	WOR	VIR	TB	BER	ERU	BOI	EPI	MAL	CRI	SPI	INS
Dysentery	0	1	1	5	4	4	5	5	4	4	5	5	5
Cholera	1	0	2	4	4	4	5	5	4	4	5	5	5
Worms	1	2	0	4	4	4	5	5	5	4	4	5	5
Viral	5	4	4	0	2	4	5	5	4	4	4	2	2
TB	4	4	4	2	0	3	5	5	3	3	3	4	4
Beriberi	4	4	4	4	3	0	4	4	3	2	3	4	4
Eruption	5	5	5	5	5	4	0	1	5	5	5	4	4
Boil	5	5	5	5	5	4	1	0	4	4	4	5	5
Epilepsy	4	4	5	4	3	3	5	4	0	2	2	2	2
Malaria	4	4	4	4	3	2	5	4	2	0	4	2	2
Crippling	5	5	4	4	3	3	5	4	2	4	0	5	5
Spirits	5	5	5	2	4	4	4	5	2	2	5	0	1
Insanity	5	5	5	2	4	4	4	5	2	2	5	1	0

affected?" Figure 1 is the contour map that shows the grouping implied by the answers. It shows that the diseases fall readily into four groups, each of which will be the springboard in the next phase of the study for a series of questions directed at uncovering the fine grained Kalinga organization of anatomy. The skin diseases *gagátol* (spreading skin eruption) and *busáli* (boil) stand sharply apart from the rest as do the ones localized into the abdomen: *tíli* (dysentery), *táqqon* (cholera), and *qoláng* (worms). Diseases that affect the thorax break into tuberculosis and viral infections on the one hand and beriberi on the other. In the informant's view beriberi belongs here because, although it affects the whole body, its ultimate effect is to overload the heart and thereby bring about death; cardiac involvement is therefore behind

its classification as thoracic. The other diseases, which include malaria, crippling, epilepsy, spirit possession, and insanity, group strongly apart from the others. Our guess pending further investigation is that these are taken to be systemic diseases, not "localizable." Even crippling, which usually involves an arm or a leg, is considered systemic partly because of its debilitating effect on the whole body and partly because of the reassignment of functions of which impairment of one part imposes on all the rest of the body.

Figure 1. *Similarity of body parts affected by illness.*

The optimization method employed not only finds networks based on closeness of association but also points out the centers of those networks when they exist. The center in this case seems to represent the most typical diseases for the part of the body affected; it may be the most frequent, or it may be a kind of prototype for diseases found in that part of the body. The skin diseases have no center in this grouping; either one represents the affected part adequately. Dysentery is the central disease in the abdominal group, tuberculosis in the thoracic group, and epilepsy in the systemic group.

SYMPTOMS

The grouping implied by the informant's reaction to symptoms differs
from the grouping by body parts. We can surmise that in asking,
"How similar are diseases A and B with respect to their symptoms?"
the informant's attention is directed to aspects of the illnesses that
may have not been important in considering their location in the body.
Table 2 gives the data for the similarity and difference judgments on

TABLE 2

SIMILARITY OF SYMPTOMS OF ILLNESS

	DYS	CHO	WOR	VIR	TB	BER	ERU	BOI	EPI	MAL	CRI	SPI	INS
Dysentery	0	4	2	4	4	4	5	5	4	4	5	4	4
Cholera	4	0	3	3	4	4	5	5	3	4	5	4	4
Worms	2	3	0	4	4	3	4	4	5	4	5	5	5
Viral	4	3	4	0	4	4	4	4	4	2	4	5	5
TB	4	4	4	4	0	4	5	5	3	4	3	5	5
Beriberi	4	4	3	4	4	0	4	4	4	4	4	5	5
Eruption	5	5	4	4	5	4	0	2	4	4	4	5	5
Boil	5	5	4	4	5	4	2	0	5	5	4	5	5
Epilepsy	4	3	5	4	3	4	4	5	0	3	4	3	3
Malaria	4	4	4	2	4	4	4	5	3	0	4	2	2
Crippling	5	5	5	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	0	4	4
Spirits	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	3	2	4	0	2
Insanity	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	3	2	4	2	0

Figure 2. *Similarity of symptoms of illness.*

symptoms. In Figure 2, the skin diseases group closely together just as they did in Figure 1, again without a center. The other groups, however, are not the same. By symptoms, dysentery and worms group closely, then, go together with cholera and beriberi to form a group of what might be called diseases with watery symptoms, or else debilitating diseases, with worms as the center. Tuberculosis and crippling fit together in what could be a group that represents long term symptoms, with tuberculosis as prototype. The remaining diseases, with epilepsy standing slightly apart from viral infections, malaria, spirit possession, and insanity, form a fourth group whose common denominator pending further work seems to be symptoms of shaking. Malaria is the center; it is without doubt the most common in the area.

CAUSES

As Table 3 and Figure 3 show, diseases are most sharply distinguished from each other by their causes. The group caused by some-

TABLE 3

### SIMILARITY OF CAUSES OF ILLNESS

	DYS	CHO	WOR	VIR	TB	BER	ERU	BOI	EPI	MAL	CRI	SPI	INS
Dysentery	0	2	2	4	4	4	5	5	5	4	5	5	5
Cholera	2	0	4	4	4	4	5	5	4	4	5	5	5
Worms	2	4	0	4	5	4	4	4	5	4	5	5	5
Viral	4	4	4	0	4	5	5	5	4	4	5	5	5
TB	4	4	5	4	0	4	5	5	2	4	4	5	5
Beriberi	4	4	4	5	4	0	5	5	4	4	4	5	5
Eruption	5	5	4	5	5	5	0	1	5	5	5	5	5
Boil	5	5	4	5	5	5	1	0	5	5	5	5	5
Epilepsy	5	4	5	4	2	4	5	5	0	4	4	4	4
Malaria	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	4	0	4	4	4
Crippling	5	5	5	5	4	4	5	5	4	4	0	5	5
Spirits	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	5	0	1
Insanity	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	5	1	0

thing in the intestines remains solid, with dysentery as its center; and so does the skin group, again with no center. Spirit possession and insanity are held to be highly similar in their causes; they are more distinct from each other in their symptoms, in which the first seems to be short term and the second long term. Most of the other diseases, however, remain apart at levels 2 and 3. They group at level 4 with epilepsy as center, giving generalized causes in opposition to the intestinal and skin groups.

Figure 3. *Similarity of causes of illness.*

Tuberculosis and epilepsy group at level 2 with respect to causes. Both seem to be regarded as hereditary diseases because they tend to follow family groups. Tuberculosis, the more common, is the center.

REMEDIES

Apparently the informant took the question about similarity of remedies in more than one way; the results are less conclusive than for the other areas. This is the aspect of disease in which the most

TABLE 4

SIMILARITY OF REMEDIES FOR ILLNESS

	DYS	CHO	WOR	VIR	TB	BER	ERU	BOI	EPI	MAL	CRI	SPI	INS
Dysentery	0	2	2	3	4	4	2	2	4	4	3	5	5
Cholera	2	0	4	3	3	3	4	4	3	3	3	3	3
Worms	2	4	0	4	5	4	2	2	4	2	4	5	5
Viral	3	3	4	0	3	3	4	4	3	4	4	3	3
TB	4	3	5	3	0	4	4	4	2	4	4	2	2
Beriberi	4	3	4	3	4	0	2	2	4	2	4	5	5
Eruption	2	4	2	4	4	2	0	1	4	2	4	5	5
Boil	2	4	2	4	4	2	1	0	5	2	5	5	5
Epilepsy	4	3	4	3	2	4	4	5	0	4	4	2	2
Malaria	4	3	2	4	4	2	2	2	4	0	5	5	5
Crippling	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	5	4	5	0	4	4
Spirits	5	3	5	3	2	5	5	5	2	5	4	0	1
Insanity	5	3	5	3	2	5	5	5	2	5	4	1	0

rapid change is taking place, with injections now accepted alongside with ceremonies and herbal infusions. Both ritual and medical treatment may be applied to the same patient simultaneously. We feel that if questions were put about similarity between remedies before the war and those of the contemporary period, the two patterns would differ but each would be more clearcut.

Nevertheless, since the optimization process takes into account the bearing of the entire matrix on any one similarity judgment, the results are at least suggestive. In the first place, three main groups emerge: (1) enteric remedies of which that for dysentery is typical; (2) nonenteric but explicit and fairly quick acting medical remedies, centered around that for skin eruptions; and (3) rituals, typified by the cure practiced for tuberculosis. In addition, the remedy for crippling groups with the enteric remedies at level 3, and the cure for influenza-like virus infections groups with the ritual remedies at the same level. While it is tempting to suggest that the ritual cure for flu may not really be any less effective than Western pills — seven days for one and a week for the other, as the saying goes — it is more likely that this is simply the point at which the indeterminacy of the question asked affects the results most.

Figure 4. *Similarity of remedies for illness.*

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COHESION IN IVATAN

Betty Hooker

Introduction

Cohesion that runs through Ivatan[1] discourse has several components: thematization, deixis, linkage, and participant identification. The scope of this paper includes participants only in their relation to the other kinds of cohesion. The elements which make possible following the theme throughout a discourse and which give the reader signals of continuity are the cohesive elements.

1. Thematization

Ivatan narrative discourse structure is similar to Becker's formula for English paragraphs:[2] Topic, Restriction, and Illustration. In addition to these a discourse also includes Closure.

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[1] Ivatan is spoken by approximately 13,000 people most of whom live in the province of Batanes, Philippines, on the islands of Sabtang, Batan, and Itbayat. The language has been divided into three dialects: Northern Ivatan (Itbayaten), spoken by the people of Itbayat, Central Ivatan, the language of the provincial capital, Basco, and Southern Ivatan, spoken by the people of the southern towns on Batan and those of Sabtang. Ivatan is also spoken by many people in Manila and in Mindanao, relocated by the government to the communities of Malinao in Western Bukidnon and Wao in Lanao del Sur. Ivatan belongs to the same subgroup of the Malayo-Polynesian languages as other languages of the Philippines. Dyen (1965) places Ivatan as an independent member in the Philippine Hesion.

Dominican priests prepared materials on Ivatan, and some of their catechisms are still in use. One published work of theirs is *Diccionario Español-Ibatan por Varios PP. Domínicos de las Islas Batanes* (Manila, 1914).

This description is based on texts gathered by Morris and Shirley Cottle between 1955-1956 and 1959-1961 and on texts gathered by the author during residence in the municipality of Basco in the Central Ivatan dialect from April, 1970 to April, 1971.

This paper was written during a three month field workshop in 1971 at Nasuli, Bukidnon, Philippines, partly funded by the National Science Foundation. I am thankful for the assistance of my informant, Fausta Balinton. I also wish to express my thanks to Joseph E. Grimes of the Summer Institute of Linguistics and Cornell University for his valuable assistance in the preparation of this paper. Valuable aid for data organization was provided by a concordance made on the IBM 1410 computer at the University of Oklahoma under a joint project with the Summer Institute of Linguistics, funded through Grant GS-270 of the National Science Foundation.

Phonemes of Ivatan are consonants *p, t, k, b, d, g, v, s, ch, ʝ, l, r, m, n, ny, ng, w, y, h,* and glottal stop (represented by grave accent ˋ over the vowel it follows), and vowels *i, a, o,* and *e* (a high central unrounded vocoid). Through borrowing from Spanish *f* is used in some borrowed words.

[2] Alton L. Becker, "A Tagmemic Approach to Paragraph Analysis," *College Conference on Composition,* Vol. XVI, No. 5 (1965), pp. 237-242.

In the initial paragraph of an Ivatan narrative, the topic of the
discourse is stated in general terms in the first one or two sentences.
In the following parts of the introductory paragraph, the topic is
restated in more specific terms. This is the restriction. For example,
in the first sentence of one discourse the topic is a chief who stays
at Chedkerey. In the next sentence, which begins the restriction, the
name of the chief is given, and in the next sentence we are told that
he is well known for his strength. The illustration of a discourse is
its body, or main part, which consists of episodes that tell about the topic.

The topic and its restriction constitute the theme, or what is being
talked about, in Halliday's terms.[3] The illustration is the theme, or
what is said about the theme, at this high level. Paragraphs, sentences,
and clauses each have their own themes as well. In this description,
theme refers to a semantic component of the discourse which represents
the speaker's choice of a point of departure for a stretch of speech.
Topic, on the other hand, refers to the specific surface structures used
in Ivatan and other Philippine languages to express thematic choices.[4]

As already mentioned, the subject or theme of a narrative dis-
course is usually announced in the first sentence of the first paragraph.
In a folk tale this is usually done in a single sentence which contains
a 'once upon a time' formula followed by the introduction of the
main characters (1.1). The discourse theme may also be introduced
by dialogue, by implicitly involving the hearer in the story in asking
questions, or by introducing the character, either in connection with
the first event or in connection with setting.

Theme statement by means of dialogue is illustrated by this sen-
tence: *Mangay ta do piknik andelak, kwana ni Juan di Angel do asa
ka araw no Sabado.* ' "Let's go on a picnic tomorrow," says Juan to
Angel one Saturday.' The theme of the discourse is the picnic and
what happens there. Juan and Angel are the main characters.

Theme statement that involves the hearer in the story can be
made in one of two ways, an 'if' statement with the hearer as subject,
or a rhetorical question. The hypothetical question goes: *An akmay
mangay ka do kavahayan do Hoaridi am mavoya mo a asa kàoyod a
magolang a tao.* 'Suppose you go to the town of Hoaridi, you will
see a very thin man.' The thin man is the theme of the discourse.

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[3] M.A.K. Halliday, "Notes on Transitivity and Theme in English, Part 2,"
Journal of Linguistics, Vol. III, No. 2 (1967), pp. 199-236.

[4] Mckaughan (1958) was the first one to name the relationship between a
predicate and the rest of the clause, the topic. Later Alan Healey in the preface
of Studies in Philippine Linguistics (1958) used the term focus to refer to this
relationship. Austin (1966) discusses focus quite fully. 'The feature of focus permits
the topic to stand in differing relations to the verb. The topic is formally marked
by a series of pronouns and particles, and is frequently embedded within the
comment. Its function in a verbal clause is indicated by the focus affix on the
verb.'

The rhetorical question introducing the theme is illustrated in the following paragraph: *Sino a maytataw o di a makapanmo sia o kàoyod na dilikado no viay do mahaod? Ara o màyet anmana solib do taw? Ara ava o makapanmo sia atavo o manam a mapaparin. Moyvoh o Dios a makapanmo sia.* 'Who is a fisherman who does not know that the life of a rower is really dangerous? Is there one who is strong or knowledgeable about the sea? There is no one who can know all before it happens. Only God knows it.' The theme is stated in the first sentence, a fisherman and danger. The second paragraph introduces the characters and the way they are related to each other: *Nangay KAMI do taw do kabispera no fiesta no San Antonio, patron no taotao do Diptan. Ara ava o akmay katangtanggal namen sia o kayan no manam a rahet no tiempo aran do kakavavayat naranaw. Oyod a masehdang as kahteng na pa. Sivog NAMEN a trato kan nira O RARAYAY KO SAWRI o kangay namen do taw. SI PIO kan NI LAZARO o nararay ko sawri. YAKEN o BOGADOR as na SI LAZARO am na MANIPED. SI PIO o MANIDO so dibang a bedberen.* 'WE went to sea on the evening of the fiesta of San Antonio, patron saint of the people of Diptan. There was nothing to warn us beforehand of bad weather even till it was met. It was really calm and light yet. For a long time already MY COMPANIONS and I had contracted to go to sea. PIO and LAZARO are my companions. As for me, I was the ROWER and LAZARO was the STEERER. PIO is the one who nets the flying fish.' Here again the topic and restriction go from a general statement to a lower level of generality. The capitalized words indicate the progression.

Each of these discourse introductions provides the setting in space and in time. A second purpose is to introduce the characters and the theme, providing a definite cohesive function for the discourse as a whole. In the following section I describe the most characteristic way of introducing folk tales in Ivatan.

1.1 FOLK TALE INTRODUCTION

In the first sentence of a folk tale narrative the theme is usually introduced by what Taber calls the Formal Introduction.[5] This formal introduction is composed of two major parts: a 'once upon a time' formula and the character introduction.

The formula includes the following lexemes. The existential verb *mian* 'is, was' is often the first word of the narrative. Of the twenty-nine narratives examined, twenty-two used *mian* in the first sentence. There are some folk tales which did not use *mian*, but merely named the character and described him: *Si Juan am mayfirmi a magolo.*

[5] Charles Taber, *The Structure of Sango Narrative,* Hartford Studies in Linguistics No. 17, Part I, 1966, pp. 80-81.

'John is always in trouble.' Still other tales began with 'This is a story about three sisters.' Some of the folk tales using *mian* merely introduce the characters and do not include any other of the lexemes which may be found in a 'once upon a time' formula; these I have not included as having the formula. Therefore, of the twenty-two above which use *mian,* only eighteen are included as using the formula.

Kono 'it is said' immediately following *mian* lends an air of fiction-ality, or at least warns that the narrator does not take responsibility for the truthfulness of the account. Of the eighteen texts which use the 'once upon a time' motif, eight use *kono.*

Often the next item which follows is a time element *kaychoa* 'long ago.' Occasionally this lexeme can be the first word of the discourse. Of the eighteen 'once upon a time' texts, fourteen use *kaychoa* and of these *kaychoa* was found once initially.

The final item in the formula may be some kind of vague locative. This can be *dia* 'here' or *daw* 'there'. In this context *dia* and *daw* do not have any situational meaning but are part of the 'once upon a time' formula. Another way of expressing a vague location is *do asa ka marai a kavahayan* 'in a far town' or something similar. The vague locative was used in five of the eighteen 'once upon a time' introductions.

Characters are introduced in the thematic position of this formal introduction by means of a descriptive noun phrase. The character is topic of the first clause and also of the discourse. The introductory noun phrase often includes indefinite *asa* 'one'. Some examples are as follows: *o asa ka mahakay* (topic-marker one count-relational man) 'one man'; *o asa ka mapteng a tigri* (topic-marker one count-relational hungry relational tiger) 'a hungry tiger'.

When a character is introduced in the formal introduction by himself, he is the theme and main character of the narrative. For example, *o asa ka mapteng a tigri* 'a hungry tiger' is the main character of a story.

If there are several characters introduced in the first sentence, they can be introduced in one of two ways. First, they may be introduced as a group such as 'two friends' or 'three sisters'. This fills the topic slot (Becker) of the discourse. *Mian kono kaychoa sa daw o dadwa ka maykayvan* (Exist it-is-said long-ago plural there topic-marker two count-relational friends.) 'Once upon a time there were two friends.' Then the statement or statements following fill the restriction slot and specify the individuals who compose the group: *Am no asa aya am CHONGGO as no asa aya am IRANG.* (Relation-marker function-marker one this relation-marker MONKEY and function-marker one this relation-marker TURTLE.) 'One was a MONKEY and one was a TURTLE.'

Second, the characters may be introduced separately in a topic sentence, joined by the phrase conjunction *kan* 'and'. *Mian kono sa dia o asa ka mavota KAN no asa ka mavokot.* (Exist it-is-said plural here topic-marker count-relational blind AND function-marker one count-relational cripple.) 'Once upon a time there were a blind man AND a cripple.' Usually the first mentioned will be the least active in the total plot, and the one last mentioned is usually the hero. When there are more than two, quite often they will be a group versus an individual or a group versus a group. This is seen in a story about three sisters in which the older sister, mentioned first, is by herself and the two younger sisters, mentioned last, act as a group and live together. In the story of the blind man and the cripple, the cripple is the one who acts and who also states the summary at the end. In the first example, the turtle in the restriction is the one who outwits the monkey, and following the same pattern is mentioned last. Thus the introductions introduce the theme and give clues as to who is the hero.

1.2 PARAGRAPH THEME

The theme of the discourse is also the theme of the first paragraph. It may be the theme of subsequent paragraphs as well, or the theme may differ from paragraph to paragraph. The paragraph theme is introduced in the first sentence. As examples of different themes in adjoining paragraphs, here are the first two paragraphs of one discourse in which the theme of the discourse, a chief, is in the initial sentence and expanded in the rest of the first paragraph: *Mian kono kaychoa o asa ka dato a matda do di Chedkerey. No ngaran no dato aya am si Dato Jade do di Chedkerey. Niaya a dato am navahey a màyet do logar ori di Chadpidan.* 'Once upon a time there was a chief who lived at Chedkerey. This chief's name was Dato Jade from Chedkerey. This chief was known for strength in that place of Chadpidan.' Then, in the second paragraph a new character, Chief Tayong, is introduced and is theme of that paragraph: *Asa ka araw am nangay si Dato Tayong do di Chedkerey as kakey na a omproyba dia o ayet awri no madngedngey nawri a si Dato Jade. Kawara na daw ni Dato Tayong am vatahen na di Dato Jade o kakey na a omproyba dia o ayet awri no Dato awri do di Chadpidan.* 'One day Dato Tayong went to Chedkerey and wanted to prove that strength which he heard of Dato Jade. When Dato Tayong arrived there, he said to Dato Jade that he wanted to prove that strength of that chief at Chadpidan.'

Paragraphs are unified in temporal sequence, in linkage, and in their relation to a central theme. Many paragraphs in Ivatan are distinguished because of temporal borders in the first sentence such as 'one day', 'later', 'noon', 'sunrise', and 'again'. The major cohesive element of a paragraph is the theme. When the theme changes, there is a

new paragraph. The two paragraphs just given illustrate a change of theme. Chief Jade in paragraph one is the theme; in paragraph two Chief Tayong is the theme. There seems to be a correlation between what is grammatical subject of the first independent clause of a paragraph and the theme.

1.3 CLAUSE THEME

According to Halliday each clause has a theme, or what is being talked about.[6] In Ivatan as in many other Philippine languages the theme of the clause is marked by a topic marker in cross reference with a corresponding focus inflection on the verb. The topic markers in Ivatan are *si* for personal nouns and *o* for common nouns and embedded clause that function as topic. If a pronoun is the theme, one of the topic pronoun sets[7] is used. The focus inflections of Ivatan indicate subject focus, object focus, associative focus, and referent focus.

The following are some examples of unmarked theme of a clause exemplified by the topic marker and the focus inflection that tells what grammatical function is in focus with the topic following the verb in normal order: *MAngay SI Dato Tayong do di Chedkerey* (SUBJECT-FOCUS-go PERSONAL-TOPIC Chief Tayong function-marker place-marker Chedkerey) 'Chief Tayong is going to Chedkerey', *tapian no ahapEN da O aro sawri a kaddin* (so-that function-marker get-OBJECT-FOCUS they TOPIC-MARKER many plural-that relational-marker goat) 'so that they may get those many goats'.

Thematic identification puts the theme and the rest of the clause in the two parts of an equative construction.[8] It is used for definite-

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[6] Halliday, *op. cit.*

[7] The personal pronouns are divided into five subclasses by Lawrence Reid, *An Ivatan Syntax,* Oceanic Linguistics, Special Publication No. 2, 1966, p. 88ff. based on the focus-topic system. The nontopic pronouns are *ko* 'I', *mo* 'you', *na* 'he', *ta* 'we incl.', *namen* 'we excl.', *nio* 'you pl.', and *da* 'they'. The topic subject pronouns are *ako* 'I', *ka* 'you', *sia∽O* (no pronoun word), *ta* 'we incl.', *kami* 'we excl.', *kamo* 'you pl.', and *sira∽sa* 'they'. The topic object set, which also serve as emphatics, are *yaken* 'I', *imo* 'you', *sia∽iya* 'he', *yaten* 'we incl.', *yamen* 'we excl.', *inio* 'you pl.', *sira∽sa* 'they'. The focus markers are topic common *o*, topic personal *si*, singular, *sira*, plural; nontopic common *no* associative, subject; *so* object; *do* referent and locative, and nontopic personal singular *ni* associative, subject and plural *nira*; *di* referent and locative singular and plural *dira*.

[8] Austin describes attention as a feature of a paragraph. 'Two diverse elements marked as 'topic' may occur within one clause only in an equational relationship. When attention is on topic the favorite clause order of comment-topic is reversed.'

'Any clause having an expressed topic may form the basis of an identificational clause. The topic is permuted to pre-predicate position, the topic relation markers changing to the *no* series where topic is in portmanteau function with either subject, object, associative or beneficiary. (Before a personal noun phrase however, *ni* remains *si*.) When topic is in portmanteau function with referent, the relation markers change to the *do* series. Topic pronouns change to emphatic. Topic demonstratives, dem$_1$ change to the dem$_2$ set. Predicate is nominalized by an immediately preceding *o*.'

ness and exclusiveness. In Ivatan there are two kinds of thematic iden-
tification: Halliday's 'identifying clause' and his 'predication'. In Ivatan
a special identifying construction is formed by placing that which is
thematic, a nominalization, first in the clause. Following the nominaliza-
tion is a link *am* and then the rest of the clause: *no pinarin na am
mayyayo* (nominalizer past-do he link subject-focus-run) 'what he did
was run'. In this clause 'run' is the exclusive goal of his doing; 'what
he did' is theme. Another form of thematic identification found in Ivatan
is predication. Reid calls it an identificational clause.[9] Predication is a
cleft sentence which in English places the theme as the complement of
the verb 'be': *It is JOHN who broke the window.* This predication
implies that 'John and only John is the theme of this sentence'.[10] In
Ivatan any clause having an expressed topic may form the basis of an
identificational clause: *NO PAGAD o palangen no tao no pinospos*
(function-marker CARABAO nominalizer lead-object-focus function-mark-
er man function-marker rope) 'it is the CARABAO that the man leads
with a rope'.

2. DEIXIS

Any speech act takes place in a particular place and at a particular
time. It is made by a particular person, the speaker or first person,
and addressed to another person, the hearer or second person. It also
may include a reference to objects or persons distinct from the speaker
or hearer. Thus personal pronouns, especially first and second person,
are part of the deictic system of any language.[11] Second person is
especially related to imperative and interrogative, in Ivatan. One rarely
makes a flat statement to another person such as 'You are going to
Mahatao tomorrow'. He might say *Mangay ka do Mahatao andelak?*
(Subject-focus-go you function-marker Mahatao tomorrow) 'Are you
going to Mahatao tomorrow?', but he would not say *Mangay ka do
Mahatao andelak* 'You are going to Mahatao tomorrow' except as affirma-
tion of the other person's answer to the question. One can also say
Mangay ka do Mahatao andelak in the imperative sense: 'Go to
Mahatao tomorrow'.

Besides person, other deictic categories are place, time, and visibility.
Place deixis includes the relative distance from the first or second person.
In Ivatan there seems to be a four way division of distance. This

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The demonstratives are divided into four types by Reid, p. 68: dem$_1$ *ya* 'this',
ori 'that'; dem$_2$ *niaya* 'this', *naori* 'that'; dem$_3$ *diaya* 'here' and *daori* 'there';
dem$_4$ *tia* 'here it is' and *tori* 'there it is'.

[9] Reid, *op. cit.*
[10] Halliday, *op. cit.*
[11] John Lyons, "Deictic Categories," in *Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics*
(Cambridge: University Press, 1969), pp. 275-281.

will be presented in 2.1. Also related to place deixis is visibility. *Ango parinyen mo AYA?* (What do-object focus you THIS) 'What is THIS you are doing?' implies that the speaker can see what is going on; but when the activity is not visible the question is *Ango parinyen mo AW?* 'What is THAT you are doing?'

Time deixis can be expressed by deictic adverbs and demonstrative adjectives. Some of the deictic time adverbs are *andelak* 'tomorrow', *sicharaw* 'today', *kakoyab* 'yesterday', *antiaw* 'later today', *kaytiaw* 'earlier today', *kàhep* 'last night'. For a further discussion of time adverbs see Hidalgo and Hidalgo.[12] In addition to the deictic time adverbs, the deictic demonstratives in themselves have a time element. For the most part, *aya* 'this' implies what is nearer in time and *aw* 'that' and *ori* 'that' imply what is farther away in time. An example of this difference is in the question *Do mavokhas AYA anmana do mahep na PAW?* (In morning THIS or on night its yet-THAT) 'In THE morning or on THAT night yet?' Here morning is closer in time than the night before.

2.1 DEIXIS AND INFORMATION STRUCTURE

The information structure[13] is based upon two types of information in a clause, given and new. Given information relates to what the speaker was talking about before, and new information is the rest. "Language permits the transfer of information from the mind of the speaker to the mind of the hearer. The speaker assumes that some of the information he is conveying is new; it is information he is introducing into the hearer's mind for the first time."[14] The information which is not new is what the speaker and hearer share, either from their common environment (extralinguistic) or from sentences already uttered (linguistic).

Chafe also notes that there must be definiteness on a noun that is not new. Definiteness indicates familiarity with the concept. In Ivatan the frequent use of *aya* 'this' and *awri* 'that' within an oral text and the less frequent use within a written text leads me to think that *aya* and *awri* are being used to mark definiteness, thus letting one know that the information is not new. This marking of the old information also has the function of information focus with contrastive identification. One speaks of 'this girl (the one I talked about before)' in contrast to any other girl there might be.

Within the information unit there is a focal point where the speaker chooses to place the main burden of the message. This focal point

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    [12] Cesar Hidalgo and Araceli Hidalgo, *The Structure of Ivatan: Phonological, Lexical and Grammatical Components* (University of the Philippines, 1970).
    [13] Halliday, *op. cit.*
    [14] Wallace L. Chafe, "New and Old Information," in *Meaning and the Structure of Language* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 210.

lets one know that this constituent of the information unit is 'new'. Halli-day points out that for English intonation marks information focus. In Ivatan information focus seems to be marked less by intonation than by the use of specific words, the deictic demonstrative adjectives.

Hidalgo and Hidalgo divide the demonstrative pronouns into locative and nonlocative.[15] They further indicate that these involve four categories of spatial relationships. The following diagram gives these categories and their exponents:

	Nonlocative	Locative
Near Speaker	*ya∽na aya* 'this'	*diaya∽dia* 'here'
Near Hearer	*nawri∽naw∽ori* 'that'	*dawri∽daw* 'there'
Remote	*nongoya* 'that over there'	*dongoya* 'over there'
Very Remote	*nongoriaw* 'that over there far'	*dongoriaw* 'over there far'

In the chart *nawri* and *naw* and *ori* 'that' are all listed as alternates, as are *dawri* and *daw* 'there', and *diaya* and *dia* 'here'. According to Reid *ori* and *aw* 'that' are morphophonemic alternants.[16] I suggest, however, that there is a semantic difference in forms of each set. Initial informant reaction is that there is no difference of meaning in the alternatives. But changing from single words to full sentences, I asked my informant what the difference in meaning was between (1) *do màhep ori am naholi da o krimino* (on night that relation-marker catch-past they topic-marker criminal) 'on that night they caught the criminal' and (2) *do màhep aw am naholi da o krimino* (on night that relation-marker catch-past they topic-marker criminal) 'on that night they caught the criminal', I was told that in (1) *ori* would mean 'that very night and no other' and in (2) *aw* would be 'that night'.

Because of this reaction and similar ones I suggest that there is a semantic difference between *aw* and *ori,* and that this difference also exists between *daw* and *dawri* 'there', *naw* and *nawri* 'that one', and *kwansaw* and *kwanasawri* 'later'. The same difference also seems to exist between *dia* and *diaya* 'here' and *nia* and *niaya* 'this one'. This semantic difference seems to have to do with information focus with contrastive identification. So *daw* 'there' and *dia* 'here' are new information either in situational reference or perhaps also in textual reference with unmarked information focus, but *dawri* 'there' and *diaya* 'here' are given information being given contrastive identification and therefore carry marked information focus.

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[15] Hidalgo and Hidalgo, *op. cit.,* p. 47.
[16] Reid, *op. cit.,* p. 93.

3. Linkage

According to Longacre, linking is 'repeating, paraphrasing, or refer-
ring in some manner at the onset of a succeeding sentence to the
whole or part of the preceding sentence.'[17] Linkage is a cohesive device
which provides continuity of participants, continuity of action, and
continuity of the sequence.[18]

Conceivably, linkage could occur on the discourse level as one moves
from one structured discourse to another in a conversation or in a situation
where more than one tale is related. In the narrative texts that I
examined, the linkage between topics of conversation was obtained by
asking a question about someone or something just mentioned or ask-
ing a question about something that was brought to mind by the con-
versation but perhaps not explicitly mentioned. Here is an example:
Francesca says in a conversation, 'And also Fabian met her in Luisa's
place. That was when they went to bid on her departure to Batanes.
She had no letter to come here.' Antonio answers, 'Now how about
Luisa? Are they still in Manila or are they yet in Batanes?' and the
topic of conversation shifts from Fabian to Luisa and her doings.

Linkage between paragraphs is mainly through the continuity of
participants.[19] Another link is a temporal border such as shown in the
following: *Oyod a nasaray a tigri aya ta iktokto na o kakan na so
motdeh awri an kapakahavas no tao awri do rarahan.* New paragraph:
KWANASAW am madngey na o vatahen no mavakes. (Very attributive-
marker happy topic-marker tiger this because think he topic-marker eat
he function-marker child that when pass function-marker that function-
marker road. LATER relation-marker hear he topic-marker say-object-
focus function-marker woman) 'This tiger was really happy because
he thinks that he will eat that child when that man on the road
passes by. LATER he hears the woman say.' As mentioned before,
the major cohesive unit of a paragraph is its contribution to a theme.

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[17] Robert E. Longacre, *Discourse, Paragraph and Sentence Structure in Selected
Philippine Languages,* Vol. I (Santa Ana: Summer Institute of Linguistics, 1968).
[18] Robert C. Thurman, *Chuave Medial Verbs.* (Manuscript)
[19] Virginia Larson, *Pronominal Reference in Ivatan Narrative.* (Manuscript)

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SPEECH DISGUISE IN ITBAYATEN NUMERALS

Yukihiro Yamada

1. Introduction

The present paper[1] is an attempt to analyze the numeral formation of the seven sets of Itbayaten[2] cardinal numbers, some of which are considered by the people to be archaic, semi-archaic, or of *anito*. The numbers under consideration are from 'one' to 'ten'.

There are two kinds of numeral systems being used at present: one is of the Austronesian origin, and the other is of foreign origin, *i.e.* Spanish. During my field work, several sets of cardinal numbers have been newly recorded, most of which show an interesting language play. Some of the cases illustrated below are definitely used as a secret language.

A speaker in a speech community may limit his communication with others. He may change the phonological shape of the original word and hide what he really means from other people. This type of conceal-

[2] Itbayaten is spoken in Itbayat which is the northernmost inhabited island in the Philippines. Its population is 2,760 according to the *1970 Census of Population and Housing* (Advance Report No. 8, Batanes), Bureau of Census and Statistics, Manila. I thank Mr. Rodolfo Q. Baliton, officer of the Bureau, who also furnished me with the same data when we were in Basco, 1971.

The consonants in Itbayaten are /p, b, t, d, k, g, q, č, ǰ, m, n, ñ, ŋ, v, s, x, h, l, r, w, y/ and the vowels are /i, a, o, e/, of which /q/ is the glottal stop, /x/ is the velar-uvular voiced fricative, and /e/ is the mid-high central vowel. /q/ which usually occurs in word-initial position before a vowel and in word-final position after a vowel in isolation is not spelled out in this paper. /Vv/ is a phonetically long vowel. For details, see my paper, "Phonology of Itbayaten," *Philippine Journal of Science*, Vol. XCIV, No. 3 (1965).

ment is called speech disguise.[3] I was told that people of Marapoy in Itbayat are particularly skillful at this method of rearranging phonemes and that some of them can make a long speech or converse with each other by this method.

It is the present writer's hypothesis that the formation of those unfamiliar sets of cardinal numbers are explainable from the point of view of either rearrangement of the phonemes of the numbers being presently used, or sound change of the proto-Austronesian phonemes.

There are four major dialects in the linguistically and culturally homogeneous area which is located between Formosa and the Babuyanes islands North of Luzon. From North, they are Yami, Itbayaten, Divasay Ivatanen [Basco area], and Saamorong Ivatanen [area South of Basco, including Sabtang],[4] each of which has its indigenous cardinal numbers. The Yami living on Botel Tobago Island belong to Formosa, and the Itbayat and the Ivatan to the Philippines.

2. List of Numerals

In the following list, Sets 1 to 7 are cited from the Itbayaten data. The place where the data was gathered is indicated in the square brackets under the name of each dialect.

	Proto-Austro-nesian[5]	Yami [Imorod]	Set 1 Itbayaten [Mayan]	Divasay Ivatanen [Vasay]	Saamorong Ivatanen [Sabtang]
1	'eťa'	asa	aqsa	asa	asa
2	ḍuva'	dowa	doha	dadoa	dadoa
3	telu'	tilo/atlo[6]	atlo	tatdo	tatdo
4	'e(m)pat	apat	aqpat	apat	apat
5	lima'	ʎima	lima '+ hand'	dima	dadima
6	'enem	annem	aqnem	anem	anem
7	pitu'	pito	pito	pito	papito
8	valu[']	waw	waxo '+ ¢5'[7]	waho	wawaho
9	ťiva[']	siiyam	siam	siam	sasiyam
10	puluh	poxo	saapoxo	asapoho	asapoho

[3] Harold C. Conklin, "Tagalog Speech Disguise," *Language*, Vol. XXXII (1956).

[4] The materials here listed were recorded at various times. (1) Yami: collected in April, 1971. I am very much indebted to Mme. Inez de Beauclair, Academia Sinica, Taipei, for taking me to Botel Tobago Island. See also Ogawa, Naoyoshi and Eirin Asai, *Taiwan Takasagozoku Densetsushû* [The Myths and Traditions of the Formosan Native Tribes], Taihoku, 1935. (2) Divasay Ivatanen: collected in June, 1965. (3) Saamorong Ivatanen [one cited here is that of Sabtang]: collected in May, 1966. Regarding the initial syllables of the Saamorong Ivatanen numbers, see their discussion on 'quasi-reduplicative' in Hidalgo and Hidalgo *The Structure of Ivatan*, University of the Philippines, 1970.

[5] Otto Dempwolff, *Vergleichende Lautlehre des Austronesischen Wortschatzes*, Zeitschr. f. Eing.-Spr., Berlin; III. Band, Austronesisches Wörterverzeichnis, 1938. His schwa is 'e' in this paper.

[6] The Yami informant told me that *atlo* was used to count fish.

[7] Terms for counting money are not treated in this paper, but my data show that *waxo* also means 'five centavos, 2/5 real.' We can find *sikawalo* '1/2 real' in *Vocabulario Ibatán-Español* por varios PP. Dominicos Españoles Misioneros de Aquellas Islas, Manila, Imprenta de la Universidad de Sto Tomás, 1933.

	Set 2		Set 3	Set 4	Set 5
1	oono	< uno (Sp.)	sah	asqa	saqa
2	doos	< dos	doh	ahod	haqdo
3	tris	< tres	tlo	olta	[loqat]
4	kwatro	< cuatro	pat	tapa	{patqa]
5	siŋko	< cinco	lim	amil	[maqli]
6	sayis	< seis	nem	mena	[nemqa]
7	siiti	< siete	pit	otip	[toqpi]
8	oočo	< ocho	wax	owax	xoqwa
9	noybi	< nueve	sih	mayis	[amsi]
10	ǰiis	< diez	pox	oxopas	xosapo

	Set 6-a	Set 6-b	Set 7-a	Set 7-b	Set 7-c
1	ŋakasa	masaŋa	itti	itti	itti
2	ŋayoda	mayada	doyyi	doyyi	doyyi
3	naliod	talo	illo	illo	illo
4	taptap	atap	ippa	ippa	ippa
5	mila	mila	malana	lamana	malana
6	anim	anim	iddam	iddam	iddam
7	sipo	tipo	virigo	birigo	birigom
8	xayo	xayo	salago	salago	salagom
9	miiyas	miga	omayam	omayam	homayam
10	sop	sop	kaloyi	kalawič	kalawi

3. Discussion

3.1.   Set 1 is being used in daily life.

3.2.   Set 2 is at present used when one shouts time and counts money, while *aqsakasintimos* [aqsa-ka-sintimos] 'one centavo' is also often heard.

3.3.   Set 3 is often referred to as an archaic or semi-archaic numbers, and is rarely used. Each number is one syllable, composed of three phonemes. All are CVC except the case of *tlo*, and mostly made by omitting either an initial or final vowel of the shapes of Set 1.

3.4.   Set 4 is an example of complete reversal of the phonemic shapes of the word base in Set 1 (1-2-3-4 > 4-3-2-1). Some of them behave slightly different as follows:

tapa: aqpat [q→Ø] > apat [reversal] > tapa

mena: aqnem [q→Ø] > anem [reversal] > mena

owax: waxo [reversal of o] > owax

mayis: siam [ia→iya] > siyam [reversal] > mayis

oxopas: saapoxo [aa→a] > sapoxo [reversal] > oxopas

Although there are some phonological modifications as mentioned above, the major phenomenon in Set 4 is of the complete reversal type. This is an example of speech disguise which is active in formation at present, and that is also applicable to other words than numbers, as in an isolated word *rakox* > *hokar* 'big', and as in a sentence *akoh (o) vatah mo?* > *hoka qataw qom?* 'What did you say?'

3.5.   Set 5 is an example of reversal of the syllabic shape of the original form of Set 1 and the reversal is made in such a way that the last syllable of the original form is transferred to the initial position (1-2-3 > 3-2-1).

Shapes in the square brackets under Set 5 are not found in the collected data, and are constructed in accordance with the rule of syllable-reversal. As regards the form for 'ten', it seems that the long vowel of the original shape *saapoxo* is shortened. One may expect another form with a glottal stop, *i.e., xoqsapo.*

The reversal is also observed in other words than numerals.

kaysoma   < somakay 'to ride'
manko   < koman 'to eat'
nomqomi   < ominom 'to drink'
yatmaŋba   < maŋbayat 'to go to Itbayat'
yiqay   < ayi 'foot'
yohmayay   < mayayoh 'to run'

The last two examples above show the split of *y* in the last syllable. In connection with this, it is worthy to note the fact which I experienced during the field work: the Itbayat people many a time used an intervocalic consonant in a word two times when they deliberately divided the word into syllables so that I could correctly write down what they said. Take *mayayoh* 'to run' and *karosokan* 'a place name' for example, they divided and pronounced them as *may-yay-yoh,* and *kar-ros-sok-kan.* The fourth example *yatmaŋba,* however, does not follow this method.

3.6.   Sets 6-a and 6-b seem to be known to a very limited number of old people. The old woman who gave me Set 6-a calls it *vilavilaŋ no anito* 'counting or number of *anito*',[8] but she does not know of its use or its significance. It was probably once used as a secret language, for many of the numbers of Sets 6-a and 6-b can be explained by such phenomena as partial reversal of the phonemic shape of the word base (metathesis), loss or change of phonemes, and the like.

Set 6-a taptap: aqpat [q→∅] > apat [p-t metathesis] > atap
                  [a→∅] > tap [reduplication] > taptap
         mila: lima [l-m metathesis] > mila
         sipo: pito [p-t metathesis] > tipo [t→s] > sipo
         xayo: waxo [w-x metathesis] > xawo [w→y] > xayo
         miiyas: siam [y-accretion] > siyam [i-lengthening] > si-
                  iyam [s-m metathesis] > miiyas

Set 6-b talo: atlo [a-t metathesis] > talo
         atap: See *taptap* above.

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[8] Supernatural being, ghost, spirit, of which people are usually afraid.

tipo: See *sipo* above.

miga: Cf. *miiyas* above. siyam [s-ṁ metathesis] > miyas
            [y→g] > migas [s→Ø] > miga

The rest are difficult to solve. *Sop* can be regarded as having derived
in the following way: *saapo₁xo₂* [aa-o₁ metathesis] > *sopaaxo* [aaxo→Ø]
> *sop*. The shape *asa* (< *aqsa*) may be extracted from *ŋakasa, masaŋa,*
but it is hard to explain the remaining part. As for *ŋayoda* and *mayada,*
see *doyyi* of Set 7. The numbers 'one' and 'two' in both Sets 6-a
and 6-b are alliterative. *Naliod* 'three' is so far unexplainable.

3.7.   Sets 7-a, 7-b and 7-c are called among the Itbayat *vilavilaŋ no
tawo aŋkakohay* 'counting system of people in older times' or *vilavilaŋ
no inannoma* 'ancestral way of counting', and are also known only to
a small number of old people.

    Although it is not so fruitful to consider the derivatives from proto-
Austronesian forms and to try to explain their historical changes, there
are some interesting features. Suppose *a* took the place of *i* in numbers
'one', 'two', 'three', 'four', and 'six', the results are *atta, doyya, allo,
appa,* and *addam,*[9] which are somewhat comparable with the forms of
the corresponding numbers of Set 1.

    aqsa   [q→t] > atsa [s→t] > atta
    doha   [h→yy] > doyya
    atlo   [t→l] > allo
    aqpat   [q→p] > appat [t→Ø] > appa
    aqnem   [q→t] > atnem [t→d] > adnem [n→d] > addem
            [e→a] > addam

'Five' has two forms, *malana* and *lamana*. The first two syllables are
easily traced back to the original form *lima*. Cf. Set 6. Final vowels in
Set 7-b rhyme: i-i, (o), a-a, (m), o-o, (m, č), the three vowel phonemes
(i, a, o) being equally distributed in rhyming. In all the three sets, 7-a,
7-b, and 7-c, the numbers 6 and 9, and 7 and 8 rhyme: -*am*, -*go*, and
-*gom*. The phonemes *lo* of the second syllable of 'ten' in Set 7-a may
be derived from *law* in Sets 7-b and 7-c.

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[9] In Itbayaten, the consonant C_2 in a two-syllable word $[(C_1)VC_2V(C_3)]$ with
an accent on the last syllable tends to be phonetically slightly longer, but it is
interpreted phonemically as a single consonant. Words of two syllables in Set 7,
however, are pronounced with an intervocalic consonant which is twice as long as
a single consonant in duration, and they are spelled out doubly.
    It should be referred to here that Ibanag, spoken in the northern part of Luzon,
has some similar forms to those in Set 7. The Ibanag numbers from 'one' to 'ten'
are *itte, due, tallu, appat, lima, annam, pitu, ualu, siam,* and *ma-fulu*. This list
was quoted from Izui, Hisanosuke, *Hikaku Gengogaku Kenkyû* [Etudes Comparatives
des Langues du Sud], Tokyo and Osaka, 1949, p. 81.

4. Conclusion

The formation of the numbers of Sets 3, 4, and 5 is explainable from the forms of Set 1, and Set 6 is partly explainable. Sets 4 and 5 show examples of language disguise which are significant in their present day life, while Sets 3, 6, and 7 are inactive now, being known only to a limited number of old people. The process of formation of the forms of Set 7 and some of the forms of Set 6 are hard to explain linguistically and to trace back. While the method of formation represented by Sets 4 and 5 is active in Itbayaten, the method exhibited in other sets of numerals seems to have been fossilized.

CHARISMATIC AUTHORITY AND PHILIPPINE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR: THE ELECTION OF 1953

Jesse F. Marquette

The impact of a political figure is usually defined in terms of his policies. This research concentrates on the significance not of policies or the political process, but rather on the impact of a campaign; specifically Ramon Magsaysay's attempt to become President of the Philippines. Particular attention is paid to pre-existing factors in the social and political environment and how they magnified the campaign's importance.

Ramon Magsaysay's victory in the 1953 Philippine presidential election can be viewed as the end-point of the Republic's first crisis of legitimacy. Given Magsaysay's extreme popularity and lopsided victory, it is reasonable to accept this election as a benchmark in Philippine political development.

In the Philippines or any political system, the level of legitimacy is produced by the interaction of a rational appraisal of system performance on one hand, and a non-rational allegiance to symbols of regime righteousness on the other. When a political system has a low output capacity, the basis of legitimacy must rely heavily on the non-rational element if the system is to survive. This is the case in many of the developing nations where there has been a tendency for the charismatic leader to personify the righteousness of the regime. Weber has argued that charismatic authority can be institutionalized in a bureaucracy identified with the purposes of the leader. The roster of such leaders is long: Nehru, Sukarno, Nkrumah, Nasser, Mao, Kenyatta and others. A singular preoccupation of these leaders has been the necessity for transferring their charismatic authority to some less mortal set of institutions — passing the torch, as it were, to a set of roles.

Seemingly, it is possible for the charismatic leader to donate his authority to the set of roles which comprise the democratic electoral process.[1] Witness, for example, Washington, Nehru, and now DeGaulle. It is the specific hypothesis of this paper that the presidential candidacy of Ramon Magsaysay resulted in such a transfer of charismatic authority

[1] This logical extension of Weber's concept of charismatic authority is offered in Seymour M. Lipset, *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Prospective* (New York: Basic Books, 1963), pp. 15-23.

to the institutions of the Philippines and to the voting process itself. It is not inferred that this transfer was an intended result of Magsaysay's campaign, but rather, that a particular combination of political and social factors which existed in 1953 resulted in extending the effects of Magsaysay's charismatic appeal to the institutions of the democratic electoral process. This discussion will attempt to explain the means by which such an electoral landslide can be translated into popular acceptance of certain political institutions.

AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A crisis of legitimacy has some basis in the social events which affect political perceptions. The most evident factor is simply the lack of any real or imagined reason for the people to feel allegiance to the current regime. In the Philippines, as with any newly independent nation, the problems which faced the nation in the early post independence era were extremely complex. The unfortunate tendency for nationalist movements to equate independence with social panacea found no exception in the Philippines, and many Filipinos unreasonably hoped that independence would end the myriad problems of social and economic development. When the expected solutions did not materialize, the popular reaction was widespread frustration with the government. In addition, the corruption and incompetence of the Quirino administration gave the masses definite reasons for dissatisfaction with the current government, and for many this dissatisfaction extended to the democratic process itself. It can be argued that for the many members of the middle class responding to the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) appeal, dissatisfaction was directed primarily against the government. On the other hand, the dissatisfaction of the Huk and their sympathizers quite evidently extended to the democratic process. The aspiring middle class was frustrated by what it saw as the failure of the government to comport itself in a manner which would allow them an adequate slice of the pie. For the Huk and their supporters, the causes of unrest were volubly related to the execrable social and economic conditions of the peasantry.

If Magsaysay did have a special role in changing the course of Philippine political development it was based on more than his exercise of presidential authority; his legislative success was very limited and his tenure of office was a short three years.[2] The bulk of his social and agrarian reform programs was quashed by a recalcitrant Congress, and although corruption may have been practiced more dis-

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[2] For an extended discussion of Magsaysay's agrarian reform program, see Frances L. Starner, *Magsaysay and the Philippine Peasantry: the Agrarian Impact on Philippine Politics 1953-1956* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961), pp. 140-187.

creetly, it was not eliminated. Yet, although Magsaysay did not significantly better the lot of the Philippine populace there was no serious resumption of the Huk revolt, and the people were generally content to affect the system through the ballot box after his election. As the recent election (1969) again demonstrates, the system is still effecting a relatively peaceful transfer of power.

The factors listed above are the basis for the argument that Magsaysay's election and administration were not nearly as important as the emotional impact of his candidacy. Magsaysay's candidacy transferred and institutionalized his charismatic authority into pre-existing Philippine political institutions — particularly the vote.

MAGSAYSAY'S IMPACT IN 1953 — A CRITICAL ELECTION

With no survey data for this period of Philippine history, there is no way to directly evaluate Magsaysay's impact on the political attitudes of the Philippine voters. Therefore, this research will examine specific behavioral changes in the Philippine electorate which are directly related to the 1953 election and then use these behavioral changes to infer possible attitudinal changes which may have occurred.

Voting as a behavioral activity can be viewed as two separate decisions: first, the decision of whether or not to vote (participant choice); and second, choosing a candidate (partisan choice). As previously stated, the mass of the Philippine populace was at least dissatisfied with the Quirino regime.[3] This dissatisfaction was widely evidenced by Magsaysay's overwhelming victory in 1953. For this victory to have lasting significance for Philippine politics there would have to be a noticeable change in the long-term behavior of the electorate in making its partisan choice. Since President Quirino was the leader of the Liberal Party, and Magsaysay the leader of the Nacionalistas, the most obvious hypothesis is that the 1953 election resulted in a long-term partisan shift toward the Nacionalista Party. This hypothesis can be tested using V. O. Key's concept of a critical election, "an election in which there occurs a sharp and durable electoral realignment between parties."[4]

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[3] Three excellent histories of the post-war Philippine period are: Alvin H. Scaff, *The Philippines Answer to Communism* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1955); Robert A. Smith, *Philippine Freedom 1946-1958* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958); and Frances L. Starner, *op. cit.*

[4] V. O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics,* Vol. XVII, No. 1 (February, 1955), p. 16.

It should be understood that Key dealt with a relatively long time period in which the previous systems could be clearly identified. Since the Philippines had achieved their independence in 1946, there was no effective way to definitely establish the previous system state. The situation as prevailing in 1949 had to be taken as the base point. There is, therefore, no possibility of asserting a definite earlier division. Concern is focused as much on behavior after the 1953 election as on change from previous behavior. In Key's research, his primary

The first step in testing this hypothesis is to quantify Key's terms "sharp" and "durable." Quantitatively "defining" a critical election, *a priori*, rather than using some search means, for example factor analysis, may raise some methodological eyebrows. This analysis was conducted using fifty provinces as the number of cases, with data for five national elections. The number of possible combinations was obviously quite high. It was considered much more efficient to "define" a critical election and then check the results, rather than attempting a very sophisticated and probably misleading search technique. The election of 1949 was taken as the base year, and a 15% increase in electoral support for the Nacionalista Party from 1949 to 1953 was chosen as the criterion for considering the change "sharp." This large change was the minimum deemed appropriate considering the somewhat amorphous nature of Philippine political parties. Conceivably, in a system where strong party allegiances are the norm, and parties are closely matched, a change of only three or four per cent could be justifiably considered critical.

The convincing Magsaysay victory in 1953 left little doubt that if a critical election had occurred, the change would be in favor of the Nacionalista Party. Tests were made using the per cent of Nacionalista Party vote, designated as %N. A "durable" realignment was defined as a continuation of the new pattern at a level of 5% higher than the base year, 1949, during the period 1957 through 1965. Key's argument assumes the existence of a unique conjunction of factors at one point in time producing a critical election. While the effects of this conjunction are expected to continue over time, the long-term effects are not expected to be of the same intensity as the original phenomenon. The five per cent figure was chosen so that the definition did not demand unreasonable stability of a partially transient phenomenon. To consider the election as critical in any given province, it had to satisfy the following four conditions:

$$\%N\ 1953 - \%N\ 1949 \geq 15\%$$

$$\text{and } \%N\ 1957 - \%N\ 1949 \geq 5\%$$

$$\%N\ 1961 - \%N\ 1949 \geq 5\%$$

$$\%N\ 1965 - \%N\ 1949 \geq 5\%$$

Using this test, 21 provinces met the criteria and were considered "critical provinces" while 27 did not. Two provinces, Pampanga and Catanduanes, were not included because sufficient data were not available.

Examination of the data for the five elections produced the results shown in Figures I and II. Comparison of Figures I and II since 1953

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interest was identifying an election as being of particular importance. The technique adopted here allows such identification, but does depart from Key's original concept.

FIGURE 1

MEAN NACIONALISTA PARTY VOTE AS A PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL PRESIDENTIAL VOTE: CRITICAL PROVINCES —
1949-1965

n = 21

FIGURE 2

MEAN NACIONALISTA VOTE AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
PRESIDENTIAL VOTE: NON-CRITICAL PROVINCES —
1949-1965

n = 27

illustrates quite clearly the difference between the electoral behavior
in the non-critical, and more stable, critical provinces.[5]

A check on the quantitative requirements for the critical election
was performed using the correlation coefficients of Liberal Party vote
before and after 1953. The Liberal vote is used for two reasons:
the Liberal Party was expected to lose ground as the result of the
election, and more important, the possibility existed that there would
be temporary inflation of the Nacionalista vote by marginal participants
who would be motivated to engage in only this election. In critical
provinces, following the argument of Neldrum and Macrae,[6] the cor-
relation of electoral behavior between the pre- and post-critical election
years (1949 and 1953) should be low, while correlations between 1953
and subsequent years should be higher. Table 1 presents the results

TABLE 1

LIBERAL PARTY VOTE CORRELATION CHECK ON CRITICALITY

Years Correlated	Critical Group R	Non-Critical Group R
1949-1953	0.57	0.94
1953-1957	0.77	0.92
1957-1961	0.85	0.94
1961-1965	0.67	0.97

of this check and provides rather convincing confirmation for the basis
on which critical provinces were chosen. Obviously, the 21 provinces
represented by Figure I fulfill the requirements for a critical election
in 1953.

In the critical provinces, after the wide swing of voter support
in 1953, the Nacionalista vote has, in subsequent elections, remained
relatively stable at approximately 50% of the vote. On the average,
there occurred a stable 22% increase in Nacionalista support from the
base year average of 28.8%. The converse of this change is, of course,
the reduction of Liberal Party strength. Stabilization of the distribution
of party support around the 50% level indicates that the election of
1953 resulted in the development of a consistent two-party system in
the 21 provinces where the election was critical. In short, Magsay-
say's candidacy in the 1953 election resulted in a marked shift in the
partisan choice of the voters in almost half of the Philippine provinces.

[5] All electoral data were drawn from *Philippines Republic Commission on
Elections* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1950, 1958, 1962, 1966).
[6] Duncan Macrae, Jr., and James A. Neldrum, "Critical Elections in Illinois:
1888-1958," *The American Political Science Review,* Vol. LIV (September, 1960),
p. 669.

In the non-critical provinces, the winning party has garnered at
least 57% of the vote in three of the last four elections, and in
1953, the winning candidate obtained 72% of the vote. The 1957
election clouds the issue somewhat due to the candidacy of a third
party hopeful, Manuel Manahan, who ran quite strongly in many of
the non-critical provinces. In these provinces, Manahan averaged 27.3%
of the vote, and in the Central Luzon region he averaged 41%. From
the radically oscillating pattern of voter support it seems that the
"common man candidate" explanation of presidential vote operates in
the non-critical provinces. This type of explanation is further supported
by the effectiveness of Manahan's radical agrarian reform program in
gaining support in these provinces.

Some Philippine scholars have suggested that one impact of Mag-
saysay's candidacy was on participant choice, claiming that he mobilized
previously non-participant elements of the peasant population.[7] Positive
results in a test of this hypothesis would also lend credence to the
contention that Magsaysay's candidacy brought an end to the Philip-
pine's crisis of legitimacy by altering the perception of the political
system by significant elements of the population. Examination of the
electoral data on the level of turnout finds no support for this hypothesis.
Figure III shows a consistent increase in the level of electoral participation
in the Philippines from 1949 to 1965. Figure IV presents the same
data controlling for the increase in the literate population. The rather
large increase between 1946 and 1949 seen in Figure IV is probably
illusory in part due to the prevalence of corrupt electoral practices
reported during the 1949 elections. Neither Figure shows any abrupt
increase in electoral participation centering around the 1953 election.

Within the aggregate voting patterns, countervailing trends may
result in the same total outcome. In this case, it is possible for the
total figures to mask very opposite forms of behavior, and thus lead
us to improper interpretation. Operating from the premise of possible
masking tendencies, the level of literacy was correlated with the level
of voting turnout in the elections from 1949 to 1965. Table 2 presents

TABLE 2

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF LITERACY AND TURNOUT: 1949-1965

Year	Correlation
1949	—0.268
1953	+0.660
1957	+0.607
1961	+0.707
1965	+0.490

7 Onofre D. Corpuz, "Filipino Political Parties and Politics," *Philippine Social
Sciences and Humanities Review*, Vol. XXIII, Nos. 2-4 (June, 1968), pp. 147-159.

FIGURE 3

ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION — 1946-1965

FIGURE 4

VOTING PARTICIPATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE
LITERATE POPULATION: 1946-1965 FOR ALL PROVINCES

the correlation coefficients for literacy and turnout for the five elections.
The literacy figures were drawn from the 1948 decennial census and
were the same for both the 1949 and 1953 correlations. Since the
literacy rates were constant, it is obvious that a radical alteration occurred
between 1949 and 1953 in the patterns of electoral turnout. This will
be explored further in the discussion section.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS AND CRITICALITY

Since social and economic factors provide the background for
political attitudes, this research will next examine Magsaysay's impact
in terms of the socio-economic milieu in which the voters functioned
essentially determining what factors differentiate critical versus non-
critical voting patterns.

A series of socio-economic variables was drawn from the 1948
and 1960 Philippine Census.[8] The variables were chosen to indicate
the two dimensions believed to underlie the Philippine crisis of legitimacy;
the process of social mobilization, and the relative rate of agrarian
disadvantage. A factor analysis was performed to validate the hypothesis
that these variables were, in fact, measuring two dimensions; the results
provided confirmation. Table 3 presents the results of a series of regression

TABLE 3

MULTIPLE CORRELATIONS — SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES
AND NACIONALISTA VOTE

Year	R^2 All Provinces	R^2 Critical Provinces	R^2 Non-Critical Provinces
1949	10%	54%	54%
1953	29%	83%	41%
1957	52%	53%	59%
1961	46%	54%	62%
1965	44%	73%	56%

analyses using the per cent of the Nacionalista vote by province as the
dependent variable in each of the five elections. In the first column
the sample includes all provinces. In the second and third columns
the provinces are dichotomized on the basis of criticality in the 1953
election. The R^2's indicate the proportion of the total variance in the
turnout which can be accounted for by the five socio-economic variables
included in the regression equations. The radical difference in the mean
R^2 before and after dichotomization demonstrates two things: first, it

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[8] All socio-economic data were drawn from the *Census of the Philippines* (Manila:
Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1950, 1961).

is clear that in regard to voting behavior, a high level of explanatory power is obtained using socio-economic data; and second, the great increase in R^2 again confirms the original method of determining critical provinces.

As would be expected if socio-economic factors had a significant bearing on the 1953 election, controlling for the election brings about a high increase (44%) in the R^2 for 1949, the election prior to 1953. We may, therefore, argue that the outcome of the election was, in part, determined by the electorates' prior perception of its economic situation, and not merely by the manipulations of the political elite. This indicates that in a partisan sense, Magsaysay's long-term appeal was most effective in certain provinces with similar economic and social environments.

Table 4 presents a comparison of the critical and non-critical provinces in terms of the mean values of six socio-economic indicators. The first three indicators present the differences in the dimension of social mobilization and urbanization, while the last three present a general picture of the agricultural characteristics of these provinces.

TABLE 4

COMPARISON OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICES

Variable	Critical Provinces	Non-Critical Provinces
Literacy	67%	76%
Density	105.9/km²	175.0/km²
Radios	5.4%	10.4%
Tenancy	33%	43%
Palay	32%	60%
Agricultural Population	56%	49%

A primary difference between the critical and non-critical provinces is the potential for a much more effective communications network in the non-critical provinces. The non-critical provinces tend to have a higher proportion of radio owners, a much higher proportion of literate persons, and a much greater population density. These factors indicate that the level of social mobilization and urbanization is considerably higher in the non-critical provinces.

The lower level of social mobilization in the critical provinces, as well as the smaller number of persons able to speak Tagalog, would suggest that these provinces possess communications networks which are more definitely "oral" in character.[9] Ninety per cent of the critical

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[9] Daniel Lerner, "Communications Systems and Social Systems — A Statistical Exploration in History and Policy," *Behavioral Science*, 2 (October, 1957), p. 267.

provinces are in the low Tagalog speaking category, versus only 40% of the non-critical provinces. Magsaysay's barrio to barrio campaign would, therefore, be expected to be more effective in a partisan sense, than in those provinces which possess "media" type communications systems, and had already been directly subjected to the blandishments of national candidates.

Table 5 presents a cross-tabulation of provinces in terms of high or low radio ownership and criticality in the 1953 election. It is clear that media consumption via the radio was a major factor in the long-term effects of the election. Magsaysay's barrio to barrio campaign had the greatest long-term effects in precisely those provinces which had not previously been integrated into the national media network.

TABLE 5

RADIO OWNERSHIP

	High	Low
Non-Critical	14	13
Critical	2	19
$Q = .82$	$x^2 = 9.53$ @ 1 d.f.	$p < .01$

As a corollary to the effects of differential media consumption it is possible to examine the effects of differentials in the proportion of the population who speak Tagalog, the dominant Philippine language. Table 6 compares the provinces in terms of criticality and the proportion of the population able to speak Tagalog.

TABLE 6

TAGALOG SPEAKING POPULATION

	High	Low
Non-Critical	16	11
Critical	1	20
$Q = .93$	$x^2 = 15.39$ @ 1 d.f.	$p < .001$

The combined effects of radio ownership and language are presented in Table 7. These combined effects are treated as high, mixed, and low communication potential. Again, it is clear that the effects of the available communications network had a major impact upon the continuing effects of the events of 1953.

It was suggested earlier that the level of agrarian disadvantage would likely have an effect upon the electoral behavior of the populace.

TABLE 7

COMMUNICATION POTENTIAL

	High	Mixed	Low
Non-Critical	12	6	9
Critical	0	3	18
C = .492	$x^2 = 15.49$ @ 2 d.f.		p < .001

The agrarian situation in the non-critical provinces seems to be, on the average, much less favorable than in the critical group. In the non-critical provinces only 49% of the population is directly engaged in agriculture, but as of 1960, 43% of these farmers were tenants as compared to only 33% in the critical provinces. In both groups of provinces, approximately half of the population is directly engaged in some form of agricultural occupation, but as the difference in tenancy rate suggests, the situation of the peasantry in the non-critical provinces is much less favorable than in the critical provinces. This is especially true given the vast difference in the level of cultivation of the Philippine principal crop, palay. In the non-critical provinces, 60% of the cultivated land is sown to palay as contrasted to only 32% in the critical provinces. The effective marketing of palay requires a series of middlemen to handle the product as it proceeds from primary producer to final consumer. The system of credit relations produced by this process is not conducive to the well-being of the primary producer even though it may be absolutely vital to his existence.[10] In Table 8 the provinces are compared in

TABLE 8

AGRARIAN DISADVANTAGE

	High	Low
Non-Critical	19	8
Critical	7	14
Q = .65	$x^2 = 6.54$ @ 1 d.f.	p < .02

terms of the prevailing level of agrarian disadvantage and criticality in 1953. While it is obvious that the level of agrarian disadvantage is associated with critical or non-critical behavior, agrarian disadvantage by itself is not as effective an explanatory factor as either language

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[10] Barbara Ward, "Cash or Credit Crops? An examination of some implications of peasant commercial production with special reference to the multiplicity of traders and middlemen," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (January, 1960), pp. 148-163.

or media consumption. There is little reason to suspect however that
mere disadvantage would be that powerful and explanatory factor.
Unless those who had reason to be dissatisfied were able to effectively
communicate this dissatisfaction the ramifications in the political sphere
would be slight.

Table 9 presents the combined effect of both the communications
variables and the prevailing level of agrarian disadvantage. These com-
bined effects are collectively referred to as the dissatisfaction potential.

TABLE 9

DISSATISFACTION POTENTIAL

	High	Moderate	Low
Non-Critical	16	7	4
Critical	1	8	12
C = .51	$x^2 = 16.78$ @ 2 d.f.		p < .001

Only four of the non-critical provinces are found in the "low dis-
satisfaction potential" category, and only one of the critical provinces
is found in the "high dissatisfaction potential" category. Clearly the
effect of Magsaysay's campaign was extremely different depending upon
the socio-economic backgrounds of the various provinces.

The effectiveness of the "Common Man" campaign in the non-
critical provinces may be understood in the light of this combination
of factors.[11] Since social mobilization is expected to produce higher

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[11] For a fuller explanation, see Carl Lande, *The Structure of Philippine Politics:
Leaders, Factions and Parties* (Detroit: Yale University Press, 1964). Carl Lande's
work on the dyadic relationship in Philippine politics strongly emphasizes the
local orientation of the average member of Congress. A working dyadic relation-
ship rests upon several factors: acceptance of an ascriptive social order, deferential
patterns between leader and led, and the social and physical proximity of the
actors in the system. Nacionalista dominance of the political system prior to World
War II suggests that even presidential politics operated through the dyadic mechanism.
Faction leaders contrived to deliver their clients' votes to the national candidate
supported by the local faction. In this type of relationship it must be assumed
that the voter relates not primarily to the candidate, but to the local patron
to whom he is indebted.

If a national candidate competes with local leaders, attemption to appeal
directly to the voters using their self-interest as campaign material, he faces two
important problems. First, he must reach the voter across great social distance,
and second, he must out-do the local leaders without benefit of accustomed ascriptive
patterns. Despite these problems, Magsaysay ran and won with just such a campaign
in 1953. In presidential elections subsequent to 1953, similar campaigns were also
effective suggesting 1953 as the start of a weakening or destruction of the traditional
dyadic relationships. Unless confined to presidential elections, this argument runs
into diametrically opposed data found by Lande while studying Philippine local
electoral politics. However, it is highly probable that the Philippine situation is
highly analogous to the prevalent situation in the American South where many
voters desert their traditional party allegiances to vote for another party's presidential
candidate, returning to the fold when voting for lesser candidates.

levels of political awareness, the population in the non-critical provinces may be expected to have a more participant attitude toward the political system. At the same time, these provinces possess a much higher level of agrarian disadvantage, a situation which the political elite has been promising to rectify for many years. Thus, it is not at all surprising that the majority of the electorate in these provinces should support whichever candidate promises to do the most for the common *tao*, regardless of the candidate's party. These findings are bolstered by the fact that the Central Luzon region, the major area of Huk activity and the area in which Manuel Manahan polled 41% of the vote, is composed of all non-critical provinces.

CONCLUSION

Political participation is a means to an end. When no perceived rewards are forthcoming from participation, it is likely to cease. In the Philippines, the negative correlation between education and participation in 1949 (Table 2) underscores the possibility of a breakdown in the process. To restore the positive nature of the process, the average citizen must be given some reason to believe that in the future, rewards will follow participation. Ramon Magsaysay's candidacy in the 1953 election seems to have had such a restorative effect upon the socially mobilized sector of the Philippine populace. In this sense the charismatic appeal of Magsaysay was transferred to the electoral process, as the continuing positive correlation between education and participation indicates.

Partisan behavior in the Philippines was most directly effected in those provinces in which the 1953 election was critical. Examination of the socio-economic background factors of the critical provinces indicates that Magsaysay's appeal was most effective in those provinces which were neither highly mobilized nor highly disadvantaged agrarian regions. In this regard the successful transference of Magsaysay's charismatic appeal occurred in the least volatile of the Philippine provinces. Continuing wide shifts in the partisan loyalties of the electorate in the non-critical provinces indicates that the transfer was least successful in precisely those provinces most in need of a long term stabilizing influence.

THE PHILIPPINES AND VIETNAM:
ANOTHER FALSE ANALOGY

John M. Gates

Americans seem to have an almost perverse attachment to argument from analogy, and the mystical power and persuasiveness of that particular form of argumentation seems to be immense. The image of falling dominoes has been all too prevalent during the continuing debate over United States involvement in Vietnam, and as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. observed, "the multitude of errors committed in the name of 'Munich' may exceed the original error of 1938."[1] In the wake of the tragedy of MyLai and the trial of Lieutenant William Calley, a new analogy caught hold of the minds of many people opposing the Indochina war. What might be termed the Philippine analogy has been the subject of both extended commentaries and passing references, particularly to the court martial of General Jake Smith in 1902.

One author has been bold enough to state that "rarely do historical events resemble each other as closely as the involvements of the United States in the Philippines in 1899 and Vietnam in 1964,"[2] and another focused upon the Philippine experience to argue that, as the title of his article made clear, "MyLai Was Not the First Time." This latter work concluded, with help from a quote by a leading anti-imperialist, that "the 'great and deep' lesson to be learned" from the Philippine experience was that "the ultimate responsibility . . . lay with the highest authority of all, 'the people of the United States.' "[3]

In a typical presentation of the Philippine analogy the basic argument is the traditional one that the American army waged an incredibly brutal campaign against the Filipino revolutionaries between 1899 and 1902 in the face of enlightened opposition to the war by anti-imperialists at home. Usually emphasis is given to the unfeeling and atrocious acts of individual American soldiers, the brutality and destructive nature of the conflict, the merit and value of the anti-imperialist opposition, and, finally, the attempts of the administration to justify its actions and bury evidence of American war crimes. Parallels to the Indochina conflict are made both explicitly and by implication.

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[1] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy, 1941-1966* (Greenwich, Conn., 1966), p. 96.

[2] Stuart C. Miller, "Our MyLai of 1900: Americans in the Philippine Insurrection," *Trans-action* (September, 1970), p. 19.

[3] D. B. Shirmer, "Mylai Was Not the First Time," *The New Republic* (April 24, 1971), p. 21.

Although often quite valuable, such an argument by analogy has many pitfalls. An event can easily become distorted in the process of demonstrating its similarity to a supposedly analogous happening. Perhaps even more significant in terms of the long run consequences of argument by analogy, the similarities, even if real, may obscure more important dimensions of the phenomena under study because those things do not fit into the analogy. Rather than increasing one's understanding, an argument from analogy may actually obscure important lessons to be learned from current mistakes. Unfortunately, the Philippine analogy suffers from all of these failings.

Most commentaries on the American experience in the Philippines invariably contain important oversights that significantly alter the picture of American actions in the islands, and most interpretations are inaccurate enough to make the Philippine analogy they present of questionable value at best. For example, the portraits usually painted of the American military commanders in the Philippines are uncomplimentary in the extreme and, as a result, hide much of the astute leadership given to the Army's pacification efforts in the archipelago. General E. S. Otis, commanding the United States troops during the first year of the Filipino-American War, is commonly shown as an indecisive and overly optimistic antique unfit for command. Nothing could be further from the truth, for in the early stages of the war General Otis was almost alone among high ranking officers in seeing the true nature of the conflict that had developed. He was over optimistic, continually underestimating the size of the force he would need to contend with the Philippine revolutionaries, but significantly, he realized that the basic issue was not military but political. He therefore stressed reform rather than military action and worked to increase American troop strength in the islands before embarking on campaigns to destroy the revolutionary army.[4]

The officers who criticized Otis and counseled immediate offensive action against the Filipino army were certainly decisive in their intent, but they were even more optimistic than Otis in their assumption that such foolish and premature activity could bring an end to the war. General S. B. M. Young's assumption that a force of 2,500-3,000 cavalry and 5,000 infantry under the command of Major General Henry W. Lawton could disperse the Filipino army in 30 days was ludicrous.[5] General Otis recognized as well as General Young that a large column

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[4] Otis showed his interest in the political dimensions of the conflict both in his regular messages to Washington and in his annual reports. For the former see *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, April 15, 1898 - July 30, 1902*, 2 vols. (Washington, 1902), II. For the latter see *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1899*, House Document 2, 56th Congress, 1st Session, V, and *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1900*, House Document 2, 56th Congress, 2d Session, V.

[5] Young to Theodore Roosevelt, August 7, 1899, Elihu Root Papers, Library of Congress.

of American troops could easily disperse any Filipino concentration, but he also knew that the results of such activity would be temporary at best.[6] American sovereignty in the islands depended on his ability to hold rather than to clear territory and to gain the support of the Filipino elite and villagers. Cautious advance, the policy Otis was criticized for most, seemed the only course of action open to the Americans that did not court disaster at the hands of a Filipino guerrilla movement. Theodore Roosevelt, originally swayed by the views of Young and other officers, eventually changed his opinion of Otis and wrote that the views he had seen in 1899 were "one-sided."[7] The administration of President William McKinley supported Otis in the face of growing opposition, allowing him to establish a pacification policy based on an appeal to the political, economic, and social desires of the Philippine revolutionaries rather than an attempt to coerce them by brute force.

Adherents to the Philippine analogy like to cite the dramatic statements of officers such as Captain John H. Parker to the effect that "the fundamental obstruction to complete pacification" was "the attempt to meet a half-civilized foe . . . with the same methods devised for civilized warfare against people of our own race, country and blood."[8] Of greater significance, however, was the policy of enlightened military government and campaigning that provoked such statements. Many American officers were committed to what their revolutionary enemies identified as a "policy of attraction" based on winning Filipinos to the American government by acts of mercy and reform rather than through the use of military force. This policy, begun under General Otis, emphasized the development of schools, municipal governments, public health facilities, and public works projects. General Arthur MacArthur, who replaced Otis in May 1900, was as committed to the benevolent policy as his predecessor, and he also recognized that severity in the treatment of Filipinos would only work "to impede the policy of the United States and to defeat the very purpose which the army is here to accomplish."[9]

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[6] Otis, annual report of August 31, 1899, in *Annual Reports of the War Department for 1899*, V, p. 162.

[7] Roosevelt to John Henry Parker, May 16, 1900, Elting E. Morison (ed.), *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, 8 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), II, pp. 1078-1079.

[8] Parker to Roosevelt, October 13, 1900, found in Roosevelt to Elihu Root, November 24, 1900, Root Papers.

[9] Field Order No. 26, Headquarters 2d Division, 8th Army Corps, April 22, 1899, reprinted in Senate Document 331, 57th Congress, 1st Session, Part 2, p. 893. For similar opinions of other officers see *ibid.*, pp. 982-988; Part 3, p. 2430; Col. Lyman W. V. Kennon to Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin, October 25, 1899, Corbin Papers, Library of Congress; the comments of Capt. Joseph B. Batchelor, Jr., *Annual Reports of the War Department for 1900*, VII, p. 379; James Parker, *The Old Army* (Philadelphia, 1929), p. 342; "Official Reports of the 43d Infantry, U.S. Volunteers," Vol. 1, March 28, 1900, Henry T. Allen Papers, Library of Congress; General William A. Kobbé to Otis, April 3, 1900, Allen Papers.

Although obscured by hundreds of pages of anti-imperialist propaganda, humanity and not brutality was the cornerstone of American military policy in the Philippines. The Philippine revolutionaries saw this at the time, and they were forced to resort to widespread terrorism against their own people to attempt to prevent them from accepting American rule.[10] As one Filipino guerrilla leader observed, "continuous contact with our enemies may cause the gravest damage to our sacred cause" owing, in his estimation, to the American "policy of attraction."[11] Significantly, the Filipino revolutionary documents seen by this author contained many references to problems caused by American benevolence and few references to American brutality.[12] One must turn to anti-imperialist propaganda, American history texts, and current recitations of the Philippine analogy to find the latter. Clearly, such atrocities did happen, but they have been greatly exaggerated.[13] The significant feature of American action and policy in the Philippines was not the brutality but the reform orientation of the Army's commanders that enabled them to end the conflict in a relatively short time through co-option rather than coercion.

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[10] In John R. M. Taylor, "The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States — A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introduction," 5 vols. (unpublished galley proofs, 1906) see Manuel Tinio, proclamation, March 20, 1900, p. 47GV; José Alejandrino, proclamation, July, 1900, p. 53GV; Pecho Caballes, proclamation, July 15, 1900, p. 55GV; C. Gonzales to Sandico, August 3, 1900, p. 57GV; Juan M. Gutierrez to Inocencio Peralta, November 4, 1900, p. 70GV; Mariano Trías, proclamation, November 24, 1900, p. 70GV; and Fullón, proclamation, July 11, 1900, p. 49HK. In Robert H. Noble, comp., "A Compilation of Insurgent Documents consisting chiefly of letters and orders issued by insurgent officials during the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands from 1898 to 1902 pertaining chiefly to the Visayan group, comprising the islands of Panay, Negros, Cebu, Bohol, Leyte, and Samar," 34 vols. (unpublished, 1902) see Honesto Ruiz to Moxica, August 11, 1900, VI, pp. 767-778; unsigned order, August 22, 1900, XVIII, p. 3080; and Arcadio Maxilom, proclamation, March 14, 1900, XXXII, pp. 5077-5079. In the Philippine Insurgent Records, 1896-1901 with Associated Records of the U.S. War Department, 1900-1906 (referred to hereafter as PIR) see Juan Cailles to Presidents of Nagcarlan, Rizal, Saluyan, St. Rosario, San Pablo, and Alaminos, May 6, 1900, No. 220.4; Juan Quesada to Julio Tinio, March 22, 1900, No. 342.3; Manuel Tinio to Pedro Legaspi, March 10, 1900, No. 353.7; Aguinaldo to Trías, August 8, 1900, No. 638.5; Dionicio Papa to Rufo Uyos, May 19, 1900, No. 970.4; and Arcadio Maxilom, "Instructions for the Magdudukuts," June 22, 1900, No. 981.1. All three sources are on microfilm obtainable from the U.S. National Archives.

[11] R. F. Santos, Circular No. 21, August 24, 1900, Taylor, p. 58GV.

[12] Evidence of Filipino support of the Americans and guerrilla worry about it can be found in Maxilom to Mabini, May 1, 1899, PIR 144.4, 144.5, and 144.2; Eustasio Malolos to Mateo Almosara, March 24, 1900, PIR 1219.7; Aguinaldo to Julian Pilar, August 2, 1900, Aguinaldo Collection, Minnesota Historical Society. In Taylor see García to Torres, February 10, 1900, pp. 45-46GV; José Alejandrino, unnumbered general order, September, 1900, p. 58GV; Torres, Circular No. 633, September 11, 1900, p. 59GV. In Noble see Pío Claveria to Local Presidents of Tigbauan, November 21, 1900, I, p. 12; Fullón, order, July 11, 1900, IX, p. 1454; Maxilom, proclamation, March 14, 1900, XXXII, pp. 5077-5079.

[13] Terror was a constant theme in American anti-imperialist writing. See, for example, Moorfield Storey and Julian Codman, Secretary Root's Record: "Marked Severities" in Philippine Warfare (Boston, 1902). Significantly, even the witnesses

The so-called "extreme measures" begun in December 1900 should by no means be equated with the shocking atrocities usually associated with the Philippine campaign. One of the "harsher" methods, for example, was the incarceration of captured revolutionaries. Prior to the end of 1900, guerrillas had been disarmed and released as a part of the benevolent policy. The trial of terrorists as war criminals, a perfectly legal process under the military laws of the day, was also one of the new "extreme measures." The policy of population reconcentration, used primarily in regions where recalcitrants refused to surrender even after it was obvious that their cause was lost, is certainly of a more questionable nature from our present perspective, but it too was neither illegal nor unprecedented (Americans had used it during the Civil War). Contrary to the view prevailing in most accounts, General MacArthur consistently rejected the recommendations of some of his subordinates for the adoption of a highly repressive policy. Even William Howard Taft, head of the civilian Philippine Commission, advocated a harsher policy than that developed by MacArthur.[14]

Given his reputation for saving his "little brown brothers" from the brutality of military rule, Taft's actions in the Philippines are of interest if only to show how distorted the history of the period has become. Taft, not the military, recommended the deportation of captured rebel leaders to Guam, and Taft, not MacArthur, wanted the Filipinos who refused to lay down their arms "treated as outlaws and subject to the severest penalties."[15] The head of the Philippine Commission was among those Americans in the islands who were convinced that with McKinley's re-election "the time will have come to change our lenient policy," and he even criticized MacArthur for being "much too merciful in commuting death sentences" of convicted terrorists.[16]

testifying to having seen acts of brutality in the islands before the Senate investigating committee noted that brutality was not the policy of the military government and that Filipinos not engaged in revolutionary activity were treated well by the soldiers, as were prisoners of war. See Senate Document 331, 57th Congress, 1st Session. Of interest in this regard are the petitions from Philippine villages praising the work of the soldiers garrisoned in them. See Senate Document 331, Part 3, pp. 1799-1853 and pp. 2461-2543.

[14] The new policy is outlined in *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1901*, House Document 2, 57th Congress, 1st Session, V, pp. 91-93. According to General J. F. Bell, the new policy did not represent a repudiation of the previous benevolent pacification program. See Bell to the Adjutant General, December 31, 1900, "Diary of Events, 29 Dec. 1900-12 Jan. 1901," AGO 365565, Records of the Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 94, U.S. National Archives. For Taft's criticism of MacArthur's leniency see Taft to Root, November 30 and December 27, 1900, Root Papers. On the Army's use of population reconcentration earlier see Charles R. Mink, "General Orders, No. 11: The Forced Evacuation of Civilians During the Civil War," *Military Affairs*, Vol. XXXIV (1970), pp. 132-136.

[15] Taft to Root, September 21, 1900, Root Papers.

[16] Taft to Root, October 10 and October 31, 1900, Root Papers. The very best that can be said for Taft's recommendations is that they were contradictory. See, in addition to the above, Taft to Root, November 14, 1900, Root Papers

In statements of the Philippine analogy General "Howling Jake" Smith is invariably presented as an example of American military leadership and brutality, although in fact he was really an anomaly. His Samar campaign was inept, consisting primarily of futile search and destroy missions.[17] In 1902, while Smith's forces were devastating much of the sparsely-inhabited interior of Samar, a more typical example of American campaigning was taking place in Batangas Province under the direction of General J. F. Bell. Although Bell resorted to population reconcentration and a modified scorched earth policy to deny guerrillas the supplies they needed to exist, he also kept control over his men and provided for the welfare of the reconcentrated Filipino population under his supervision.[18] Of equal significance, both of these operations took place at a time when the revolution had all but ended and under the overall direction of General Adna R. Chaffee, who had replaced MacArthur in 1901. Chaffee seemed to lack the perceptiveness and the commitment to humane campaigning of his predecessor, and it was Chaffee who made the comment that the only way to achieve peace was to pin down the Filipinos "with bayonets for ten years until they submit,"[19] a statement usually erroneously attributed to MacArthur. Fortunately, the majority of Smith's subordinates and the majority of officers throughout the Philippines retained their belief that reform was the road to peace. Bell, for example, had made it quite clear that he was not advocating torture, burning, or other unauthorized severities when he instructed his men to be "firm and relentless in action."[20]

One can hardly end a discussion of the Philippine analogy without a comment on its picture of the anti-imperialist movement. The anti-imperialists were a courageous and sincerely motivated group. The questions they raised provided a valid challenge to their more imperialistically minded countrymen, but to call the anti-imperialists "antiwar

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and, in the William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress, Taft to Horace H. Lurton, September 22, 1900; Taft to Henry Cabot Lodge, October 17, 1900; Taft to William R. Day, December 10, 1900; and Taft to Henry M. Hoyt, January 7, 1901.

[17] The Samar campaign is covered in *Annual Reports of the Secretary of War for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1902*, House Document 2, 57th Congress, 2d Session, vol. XII; Senate Document 331, 57th Congress, 1st Session, Parts 2 and 3; Senate Document 213, 57th Congress, 2d Session; and Joseph L. Schott, *The Ordeal of Samar* (Indianapolis, 1964).

[18] The Batangas campaign is covered in *Annual Reports of the Secretary of War for 1902*, vols. VIII and XII; Senate Document 331, Part 2; and *Telegraphic Circulars and General Orders, Regulating Campaign Against Insurgents and Proclamations and Circular Letters, Relating to Reconstruction After Close of War in the Provinces of Batangas, Laguna, and Mindoro, P.I. Issued by Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, U.S. Army, Commanding Brigade, from December 1, 1901, to December 1, 1902* (Batangas, 1902), AGO 415839, Records of the Adjutant General's Office.

[19] Taft to Root, October 14, 1901, Root Papers.

[20] *Telegraphic Circulars and General Orders . . . op. cit.,* p. iii.

radicals," as has one author,[21] conveys an inaccurate picture of this early peace movement. In reality the majority of anti-imperialist leaders constituted an old, backward-looking and politically ineffective minority that was localized primarily in New England. Elitists like Edward Atkinson, Andrew Carnegie, E. L. Godkin, Charles Eliot Norton, and Carl Schurz made up an important segment of the movement, and the anti-imperialist leagues contained some of the most reactionary men in America. Although a current of racism and a belief in Anglo-Saxon superiority was present in American imperialism, that same stream ran through the anti-imperialist movement as well. In fact, some Southern Congressmen had opposed annexation of Spanish territories because of their desire to prevent the incorporation of more dark-skinned people into the American nation. To call such people radicals is a significant error, and to compare them even implicitly to the more forward-looking and relatively more effective members of the contemporary anti-war movement is misleading to say the least.[22]

The foregoing revision of the traditional picture of American operations in the Philippines can easily be misinterpreted. The argument that the American campaign was not unduly brutal is not an apology for the imperialistic policies that provoked the conflict or the war crimes committed by Americans during the course of the war. Even more important, it is definitely not an attack on the motives of authors who, in a sincere effort to assess the present conflict in Indochina, have presented the Philippine analogy to the public. The analysis being presented here has an entirely different purpose. Atrocities of war and American attitudes toward other peoples are an important topic for discussion, and the Philippine analogy highlights them both. For one interested in military affairs, however, there seems to be an even more important area of debate that may be much more significant than a discussion of either American war crimes or imperialistic attitudes.

Vietnam in 1971 or 1969 is not the Philippines in 1901 or 1899, and the differences between the two situations are extremely important. In the Philippines, for example, the revolutionaries had neither a place of sanctuary, free from American attack, nor material support from the outside. Unlike the war in Indochina, the Philippine conflict did not take place in a tense international situation where a small war could easily be a prelude to a much larger and more disastrous one. Furthermore, it was not being fought in the shadow of nuclear weapons or

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[21] Miller, "Our Mylai of 1900," p. 22.

[22] Robert L. Beisner, "1898 and 1968: The Anti-Imperialists and the Doves," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. LXXXV (1970), pp. 187-216; E. Berkeley Tompkins, "The Old Guard: A Study of the Anti-Imperialist Leadership," *The Historian*, Vol. XXX (1968), pp. 366-388; and Christopher Lasch, "The Anti-Imperialists, the Philippines, and the Inequality of Man," *Journal of Southern History*, Vol. XXIV (1958), pp. 318-331.

in the context of an ideologically and emotionally-charged cold war. American military and political leaders had a freedom of action in the earlier conflict that they have never had in Vietnam, where the necessity of cooperating with an indigenous government and other allies has placed some limitations on policy and other decisions. Finally, the technological differences apparent between the two wars are tremendous, not only in terms of weapons, but also in virtually every other dimension of the conflict from communication to medical care. It seems almost absurd to compare the operations of less than 70,000 American troops in an archipelago of approximately 8,000,000 people with the work of over a million men, if one includes Vietnamese and allied troops, in a nation of about 18,000,000. This is particularly true when one compares the weapons available to each group. The rifle and the match of 1899 can hardly be equated with the helicopter gun ships and the napalm bombs of 1972. Thus, the Philippine analogy, as usually stated, has little value.

A more balanced view of the American campaign in the Philippines should lead to conclusions that are far different from those stressed by most adherents to the Philippine analogy. First, although the claim that "MyLai Was Not the First Time" is obviously correct, the implication that that is the significant thing to be learned from a study of the American intervention in the Philippines is not. As long as war exists there will be MyLais, and one certainly does not need to go to the American Philippine experience to learn that war is atrocious or that politicians and military men will go to great lengths to override criticism of their actions. That is apparent enough in the Vietnamese case alone.[23] Second, by focusing on the atrocities committed in the Philippines and by stressing the numerous points of commonality between the American experience there and in Vietnam, authors have done much to obscure the nature of both conflicts. Why, one wonders, must the United States need to have been atrocious in the Philippines to enable Americans to understand the war in Vietnam?

If anything, the Philippine experience probably teaches a lesson exactly the opposite from the one that is usually presented. American soldiers repressed the Filipino revolution because of their careful stress on the political dimensions of the conflict and their implementation of a variety of reforms, not because of traditional military action or combat. The conscious efforts of military leaders to prevent MyLais were much more significant than the occurrence of atrocities in opposition

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[23] Two vivid examples have been the government's attempt to prevent the publication of the Pentagon Papers (see *The New York Times,* June, 1971, *passim*) and the Army's harassment of Lt. Col. Anthony B. Herbert after he tried to disclose alleged atrocities in Vietnam (see *The New York Times,* September-November, 1971, *passim*).

to the stated policy. Revolutionary wars are political conflicts. Americans realized this in the Philippines and acted accordingly.

However, although the counter-insurgency theory of the early 1960's recognized the importance of civic action, more conventional military activity has been the primary point of focus in Vietnam, and the lack of results has frustrated military and political leaders alike.[24] Thus, if one uses the Philippine analogy at all, experience seems to indicate that part of the failure in Vietnam has been because Americans have done things so differently rather than so similarly from what had been done more than half a century before.

With the widespread destruction of Indochinese society and the region's environment, the time has probably passed in which the Philippine experience might provide useful lessons for would-be counter-insurgents in Vietnam. Bombs, anti-personnel weapons, defoliants, flame, inflation, the displacement of thousands of villagers, and a host of other horrors have moved the situation in Vietnam too far away from what it was in the early 1960's to make a political solution of the problem, even through reform, a realistic option.[25] Building schools, clinics, and roads in the midst of such destruction and chaos as exists in Vietnam at present can be of little value as a pacification effort. Instead, it can be no more than sideshow to the destructive firepower displays that are a part of daily life in the Indochina of the 1970's. Consequently, one

[24] There have been many interesting assessments of the way in which more conventional military approaches have triumphed over less destructive, more difficult methods of counter-insurgency. Roger Hilsman documented the shift from small unit action on the ground to bombing in *To Move a Nation* (Garden City, 1967), pp. 525-537 for example. See also William R. Corson, *The Betrayed* (New York, 1968), ch. 2 in particular; Eqbal Ahmad, "Revolutionary War and Counter-Insurgency," in David S. Sullivan and Martin J. Sattler (eds.), *Revolutionary War: Western Response* (New York, 1971), pp. 1-47; Daniel Ellsberg, "Laos: What Nixon Is Up To," *The New York Review of Books* (March 11, 1971), pp. 13-17; and Jonathan Schell, *The Village of Ben Suc* (New York, 1967) and *The Military Half* (New York, 1968).

[25] The destruction of Indochina has been extensively documented. See, for example, the various reports of hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems connected with Refugees and Escapees of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 91st and 92d Congress. In particular, see "Refugee and Civilian War Casualty Problems in Laos and Cambodia" (1970); "War-Related Civilian Problems in Indochina" (1971); and "World Refugee and Humanitarian Problems" (1971). According to AID sources, since 1964 over 5,000,000 people, "or nearly one-third of the total population, have become refugees or suffered damage to life, limb, and property" ("World Refugee and Humanitarian Problems," p. 49). For a short, but interesting survey of the effects of the war upon the land as well as the people, see John Lewallen, *Ecology of Devastation: Indochina* (Baltimore, 1971). The ecological problems being created in Indochina have been discussed in numerous scientific journals. For a sample of this growing literature see Arthur H. Westing and E. W. Pfeiffer, "The Cratering of Indochina," *Scientific American.* Vol. CCVI (May, 1972), pp. 20-29; "The Destruction of Indochina: Report of the Stanford Biology Study Group," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist,* Vol. XXVII (May, 1971), pp. 36-40; and Gordon H. Orians and E. W. Pfeiffer, "Ecological Effects of the War in Vietnam," *Science,* Vol. CLXVIII (May 1, 1970), pp. 544-554.

clear lesson of any Philippine study should be that one cannot reproduce the Philippines of 1899 in the Indochina of 1972. The situations, for all their apparent similarity, are just not analogous!

Other lessons of the American experience in the Philippines, if there are any, seem also to lie in the differences between that campaign and the more recent one in Vietnam. Attempts to demonstrate that the United States was as inept in the Philippines as it has been in Indochina are not only false, but also misdirected. Instead, there is a need to emphasize the new and unique dimensions of the struggle in Southeast Asia, for the horror seen there is being caused to a large extent by conditions growing out of the current state of the art of war and not, as the purveyors of the Philippine analogy would have one believe, out of some racist or imperialist stream running deep in the American past.

The dimensions of the Indochina conflict that many people find most abhorrent — the death and mutilation of thousands of noncombatants, the terror, the incredible destruction of the environment, and the disintegration of the societies there — are the direct result of the use of modern weaponry having massive destructive capability but often lacking in effectiveness and decisiveness when used in the type of conflict being waged in Indochina today.[26] Debate focusing on specific war crimes and the withdrawal of American ground forces from Vietnam has obscured the more important problem of the type of war being waged in Southeast Asia. The use of weapons of mass destruction is a subtler but much more important issue.

A comparison of the Philippine experience and the Indochina War can help to highlight two significant lessons that Americans must learn and learn rapidly for the good of all mankind. First, the destructive capability of modern weapons is so great that *war in which a great power uses the latest weaponry that its technology can provide may no longer be a legitimate or useful extension of national policy.*[27] For over a decade military strategists have recognized that nuclear war is not a feasible policy option,[28] but only now has it become apparent that other forms of war may be impossible for states with the resources and weaponry of the United States. The use of fire and airpower has been the direct and major cause of the destruction, mutilation, and death

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[26] *Ibid.*

[27] For a short but provocative view of the war crimes question by an expert in the field see Telford Taylor, *Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy* (New York, 1970). See also Richard A. Falk, ed., *The Vietnam War and International Law,* 2 vols. (Princeton, 1968, 1969). The question of war crimes has come up in hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. See, for example, "Legislative Proposals Relating to the War in Southeast Asia," 92d Congress, 1st Session (1971).

[28] For a quick survey of the change in strategists' views on the value and use of nuclear weapons see Morton H. Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age* (New York, 1963), pp. 58-63 and his excellent annotated bibliography, pp. 133-184.

that many Americans deplore in Vietnam and the rest of Indochina. The majority of the refugees fleeing to the cities have not been running from either Viet Cong terrorism or the horror of a MyLai. Their displacement has been caused by the relatively indiscriminate use of weapons of un-imaginable destructive capability. American airpower has caused a large share of civilian casualties and done the greatest amount of damage to the environment.[29] The withdrawal of American combat troops from Vietnam or the argument from analogy that Americans have also fought brutally against Asians before will do little to end this devastating use of air and firepower. Experience has shown that the fewer troops the United States has in the zone of conflict, the more it will rely upon massive fire and airpower to keep the balance of force in the hands of the government of South Vietnam.[30]

In the Philippines in 1899 war was a useful tool for the extension of national policy, although in retrospect the policy being implemented has been justly criticized. Still, good or bad, the policy could be fostered by military means, providing, of course, that the military leaders carrying the policy forward did so in an enlightened manner. That was exactly what happened at the turn of the century, and the results were decisive. The Philippine revolution was crushed, American imperial-ism triumphed, and the anti-imperialists were ignored, all with much less destruction and death than has accompanied the much less success-ful conflict in Indochina. What adherents to the Philippine analogy overlook is that, although American attitudes may have remained relative-ly constant, war has changed.

Unlike their counterparts in 1899, the modern weapons technology and the military activity undertaken presently in Southeast Asia seem unable to end the war there. The destructive techniques of military force have been perfected considerably since the turn of the century, but their ability to be truly decisive when used seems to have declined. The development of airpower is a case in point. World War II showed that strategic bombing was not capable of the achievements that Giulio

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[29] Some excellent material on the problems of refugees in Indochina and on the effects of the air war are contained in the published reports of the hearings of Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees. In addition to the other sources already cited here, see Frank Harvey, *Air War — Vietnam* (New York, 1967). The United States government's continued lack of candor when speaking on most aspects of the war make its attempts to refute testimony regarding civilian casualties and refugees somewhat less than convincing. The tendency of secret documents such as the Pentagon Papers to support charges of anti-government and anti-war critics calls public statements of government officials into further question.

[30] Neil Sheehan, "Study Shows U.S. Presses Air War," *The New York Times,* November 8, 1971, p. 6 and Herbert Mitgang, "Changing the Color of the Corpses," *The New York Times,* November 21, 1971, p. 2 of section IV. Both articles refer to a comprehensive study of the air war in Indochina by Raphael Littauer *et al* of the Cornell University Center for International Studies.

Douhet and other theorists attributed to it.[31] Bombing could not destroy the war-making capacity of a belligerent (the peak of German war production came in mid-1944), and it did not destroy his will to fight.[32] The war in Korea showed that the supply line of an army that depended primarily on human beings as prime movers could not be interdicted successfully through the use of airpower alone.[33] Both of these experiences have been repeated in the course of the conflict in Indochina, yet some American military officers continue to adhere to a doctrine that has been repudiated by their own experience.[34] Bombing and firepower can kill, but they cannot convince. They can make war more destructive than anything that man has heretofore imagined, but they cannot make war a successful extension of policy. This fact seems to have been understood clearly by Americans in the Philippines, and their stress on reform and other political factors gave a more proper guide to their military activities. It is too late, however, for a similarly enlightened policy of imperialism in Vietnam.

The second lesson of the Philippine-Indochina comparison stems directly from the first. If modern war has become so destructive that it can no longer be relied upon as an instrument of policy, then *intervention in any situation where war using weapons of mass destruction is a probable outcome has also lost much of its utility*. In this respect, the situation in Indochina is a far cry from that in the Philippines. Today, the great nation relying on its massive firepower and modern weapons technology cannot really protect its allies from either internal or external subversion, and it certainly cannot intervene in the domestic affairs of another nation against any sizeable opposition. It can only destroy nations and peoples in the name of protecting them. As Daniel Ellsberg has observed, a national leader would be committing "an act of treachery against his society" if he called for American aid in a conflict that he knew would be long and would entail a large American

[31] See Giulio Douhet, *The Command of the Air*, Dino Ferrari, trans. (New York, 1942); William Mitchell, *Skyways: A Book on Modern Aeronautics* (Philadelphia, 1930); and Alexander P. de Seversky, *Victory Through Air Power* (New York, 1942).

[32] *United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (European War)* (Washington, 1945).

[33] David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War* (London, 1964), pp. 374-383; Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (New York, 1967), p. 244; and J. Lawton Collins, *War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea* (Boston, 1969), pp. 312-313.

[34] The Pentagon Papers showed that throughout the period of the intensive air war over North Vietnam the Joint Chiefs were continually over optimistic in their estimates of the ability of air power to achieve a variety of goals. Their optimism was not borne out by either the response of the North Vietnamese or the assessments of its effectiveness by other governmental agencies, in particular the CIA. See, for example, Neil Sheehan *et al, The Pentagon Papers as published by The New York Times* (New York, 1971), pp. 542-554 and 577-585. In *Militarism, U.S.A.* (New York, 1970), James A. Donovan aptly characterizes the air war as "The Great Bombing Hoax" (see pp. 176-190).

military commitment.[35] In Vietnam there is clear evidence of what an American commitment means in terms of destruction and waste of human life. It is far removed from the village burning and isolated war crimes of 1899.

As a comparison of the Philippine and Vietnam experience makes crystal clear, the whole nature of war has changed. We have changed it through our emphasis on weapons technology and our reliance on the modern weapons that the technology has produced. Ironically, many Americans have been unwilling to admit the change and act upon it, although the time for a significant reassessment of American military policy is long overdue.

The Philippine analogy seems to have extremely limited value in a debate over American policy in Southeast Asia. It may help to show that war is atrocious, but men have known that fact for centuries. It can highlight American racism, but racism has been a part of American life since the colonial period and one need not study the Philippines or Vietnam to show its deplorable effects on the nation. If free from its usual errors of fact and interpretation, a modified Philippine analogy may help to show that political techniques are more effective than military force in a revolutionary conflict, but that lesson seems to have little application in Vietnam at the present time. Rather, the signifiicant lesson to come from a comparison of the Indochina War and the earlier conflict in the Philippines rests on the important differences between the two wars. In short, it is that great powers can no longer intervene and engage in such conflict except at the risk of severely damaging the people they are seeking to aid. Unfortunately, this is the one lesson that a number of American leaders have yet to learn.

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[35] Richard M. Pfeffer, ed., *No More Vietnams? The War and the Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1968), p. 38.

SPATIAL ASPECTS OF FOOCHOW SETTLEMENT IN WEST MALAYSIA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SITIAWAN, PERAK, SINCE 1902

S.H. Khoo, G. Cho, and K.E. Chan

Introduction

The settlement of Chinese Christian converts in Sitiawan, Perak from 1902 was an instance of a planned attempt at the peopling of the Federated Malay States[1] with permanent colonies of agriculturists. The predominantly transient nature of the population of the Federated Malay States at the end of the 19th century had given rise to feelings of disquietude. The immigrant Chinese and the Indians, while accounting for the bulk of the population of these states, were definitely of a temporary nature,[2] and the migrational turnovers and fluctuations of these two components of the population had adversely affected many aspects of settlement of the country, for instance, the inavailability of labour for many economic undertakings, the depopulation of a host of villages and towns, the uneven distribution of population, etc. Immigrant groups of Malays from Indonesia had also arrived at this time to seek employment and eventually too, to return to their islands of origin, and they added a further dimension to the problem of a fluid population in an undeveloped country. Besides posing difficulties of control to the administrators in question, and being unable to be depended upon indefinitely to provide labour for the various economic under- takings — for instance, the introduction and planting of rubber, the prospecting and mining of tin, etc., the transients also did not help economically, in that the flow of money in the form of remittances, for example, to the settlers' homelands, meant the non-accumulation of capital in these states. The administrators increasingly were con- vinced that a 'back-bone'[3] of permanent population to form and to provide increasingly a pool of all types of labour must be established to offset both economic and human problems.

In the context of the situation outlined, many suggestions were made to the administrators to actively encourage the settlement by new

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[1] The Federated Malay States which comprised Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang came into existence in 1895.

[2] S.H. Khoo, "Population and Landuse Changes in Perak, 1891-1940" (Un- published M.A. thesis, University of Malaya, 1969), pp. 30-31.

[3] J.C. Willis, *A Report upon Agriculture in the Federated Malay States* (Kuala Lumpur, 1904), p. 6.

immigrant agriculturalists who could form this so called 'back-bone' of
the population. Such a step it was hoped would also help to transform
the immigrant transients of Indonesian Malay, Chinese and Indian origins
already in the states into components of this permanent population. This
scheme, the administrators further hoped, would help in the settlement
and development of uninhabited areas, so that settlement could be
affected on a wider spatial base, not concentrated in pockets in the
mining areas or ports. At the same time this development was also
aimed at fostering agricultural interest so that the fortunes of mining
alone would not continue to determine the economy and settlement
of the country.

The introduction of a group of Foochows into the Sitiawan area
in 1902 was a positive expression of the official call for the estab-
lishment of a permanent population in the Federated Malay States.
Though this attempt was effected mainly through non-government agen-
cies, in this case the Methodist Missions of the Federated Malay States
and China, the administration lent its full support.

Aim of Study

The intention of this paper is to chronicle the spatial aspects of
Foochow[4] settlement in West Malaysia[5] with special reference to that
found in Sitiawan, Perak. As an experiment, the settlement was highly
successful in that the Foochow population had increased to such an
extent that Sitiawan became identified as a Foochow area. Circumstances
for the growth and spread of the Foochow community into other parts
of West Malaysia with distinctive causes and end-results will be examined
with special emphasis on the Sitiawan area which may be designated
as the 'core' as it were, of Foochow settlement in West Malaysia. It
is from this core that other settlements of this dialect group in West
Malaysia were formed, the settlers from this area forming the nuclei
of Foochow settlement in other areas, and despite the independent move-
ments of Foochow immigrants later into these other areas, the Sitiawan
area has remained a pre-eminently Foochow area, if not in terms of
numerical strength, at least in terms of association. Two points of
interpretation may be introduced at this juncture. The establishment
of a Chinese settlement had also meant that there was a spatial dis-
placement of other peoples, for example, the Malays, and, this in effect
caused a concentration of Foochow in Sitiawan which, as a consequence,
came to be regarded as a Foochow area. Secondly, it is also possible
the Malays who had originally moved out, came back to the peripheral

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[4] The term "Foochow" is a generic reference for several Chinese sub-dialects
primarily made up of Hokchiu, Hokchiang/Hokchia, Henghwa and Kutien who
originated from the Foochow Prefecture in China.

[5] In this article, the term "West Malaysia" is preferred to "Malaya".

areas of Foochow settlement later on, contemporaneous with the in-
movement of other Chinese. This meant the constriction of space for
the extension of Foochow settlement. Inevitably there began a spread
or a redirection of the Foochows into other areas in West Malaysia.

Study Area

The area under study is the *mukim*[6] of Sitiawan which covers an
area of 157.5 square miles and a part of the Dindings district in Perak
(Fig. 1). Until 1935, the *mukim* of Sitiawan was administered as
part of Lower Perak from the district capital at Telok Anson. Since
1935, however, Lumut has been the administrative centre, with the
retrosession of the Dindings district to the government of the state of
Perak from the Straits Settlements. The *mukim* of Sitiawan is made
up of several small settlements which include Kampong Koh, Simpang
Dua, Pekan Gurney (Simpang Tiga), Simpang Empat and Ayer Tawar.[7]
The population of the *mukim* in 1970 was 55,972 persons of which
14.4 per cent were Malays, 67 per cent Chinese and 18.7 per cent
Indians and others.[8] The *mukim's* economy is based mainly on rubber
which accounts for nearly 80 per cent of the cultivated land. This
figure is no less different in 1921 when, for instance, rubber accounted
for 38,675 acres of a total of 42,309 acres under commercial cultivation
in the Sitiawan district.[9] The remaining 20 per cent of cultivated land
is based on *kampong* cultivation, a mixed cultivation of fruits, vegetables
and other marketing crops which are usually associated with rural settle-
ments. The topography of the area is made up of low-lying and undu-
lating land, interspersed with swamps and mangrove along the river banks
and the coasts further to the south and west.

Origins

The settlement of Foochows in Sitiawan was set in motion early
in 1902 when the Methodist Church in Singapore appointed two pastors,
a German, Rev. H.L.E. Leuring, and a Foochow Chinese pastor, Rev.
Ling Chin Mee, to travel to the Foochow district in China to recruit
settlers for the Sitiawan area. Before this step was made, however,
permission was sought from, and an agreement negotiated with, the British
government administering Perak at that time.[10] Although official written

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[6] The *mukim* is the smallest administrative unit in West Malaysia, the larger
administrative units being the district and state in order of magnitude.

[7] For further details of these settlement units see K.E. Chan *et al,* "Foo-
chow Settlement in Sitiawan, Perak: Preliminary Investigations," *Geographica,* Vol.
VI (1970).

[8] R. Chander, *1970 Population and Housing Census of Malaysia Community
Groups* (Kuala Lumpur Statistics Department, 1972), p. 184.

[9] *Sitiawan District Office Files* (SDOF), 12/21, 1921.

[10] H.C. Belfield, *Perak: Administrative Report for the Year 1903* (Taiping,
Perak: Government Publishing Office, 1904), p. 11.

Fig. 1. *The Mukim of Sitiawan, Perak, Malaysia. (Inset: West Malaysia: Location of the Mukim of Sitiawan and the towns of Ipoh, Sepang and Yong Peng.)*

evidence pertaining to the agreement between the Methodist council and the British government has yet to be uncovered, a study of unofficial written materials has revealed that several points were agreed upon. Some of the provisions of this Agreement[11] included paid passage for each settler, housing and provisions for the first six months on landing; necessary agricultural goods and implements on loan and repayable in three years, interest-free; 3 acres of land, without quit rent for three years; and a strict moral stipulation that there were to be no brothels, bars or opium dens in the new settlement.[12]

Rev. Leuring and Rev. Ling had intended to recruit some 1,000 Chinese Christian converts from Foochow to go over to Sitiawan in family units, each of which, possessing specific skills, (for example, building and construction, making of farm implements, medicine, etc.) could contribute to making the colony self-sufficient and, presumably, assure its permanency. Only about 500 settlers were recruited eventually owing to a lack of conviction on the viability of such an ambitious scheme and lack of information on pioneering, let alone settlement, in a foreign country. Moreover, since the colonising attempt was directed at Methodist converts in Foochow, it is possible that the more willing and enthusiastic non-converts were unable to volunteer for this scheme unless they posed as Methodist converts. There were however, "instant" converts joining the genuine converts in this pioneer attempt, mainly because of the presupposed advantages they hoped to derive from being a Methodist. The journey to Sitiawan was by a chartered steamer to Sitiawan calling at Singapore enroute. The voyage by steamer took its toll in the form of diseases and illness. The point of disembarkation was at Kampong Sitiawan and then overland on bullock-carts to the site of the present Kampong Koh where the *"Mok-Su-Lau"* or parsonage was subsequently built. The first batch of Foochow settlers was made up of Hokchius, Kutiens, Hokchings/Hokchias and Henghwas. Thus began an interesting and unique pioneering settlement in the Sitiawan area of Perak.

The aim and choice of location of the settlement are embodied in the following words written in 1902:

"A very interesting experiment is now in progress in the establishment of Chinese agricultural settlement, near the mouth of the Perak river, but it is too early yet to draw any conclusions. The settlers have been imported *en masse* by one of the missionary bodies, and settled upon land as far removed from the

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[11] Further amplification of this agreement and other details are contained in L.H. Chen, "A Glimpse of Pioneer Life," *The Loyal Pioneer,* Vol. I, No. 1 (1931); C.C.U, "A Short History of the Cultivation Activities of Sitiawan Chinese," *30th Anniversary Souvenir Magazine,* Kwok Min Primary School (1948); and Chan, *et al, op. cit.*

[12] U, *op. cit.*

temptations of the mines as far as possible. If this experiment
proves successful it may very well be repeated, the new settle-
ments being placed near the old, so as to get a fairly dense
population in the district. There is also the possibility of at-
tracting single families or individuals, in the same way as the
colonies of America and Australia have attracted European
settlers."[13]

The above statement indicates clearly the important role agricul-
ture was expected to play in the development of the settlement. It
is not unreasonable to assume that not only subsistence food-cropping
was envisaged for the settlers. Rather, commercial cropping, either
independently carried on or in conjunction with food-cropping, was also
to be given an important place in the settlement's economy. Rubber
was then emerging as the most lucrative cash-crop in the country
and it was this crop more than anything else that ensured the per-
manence and success of the Foochow experiment, a success that gene-
rated an even more accelerated and greater volume of migrants into
this area, as indeed the whole country.

Since 1903, the Foochow settlement at Sitiawan has been identified
with Kampong Koh, this being the first centre of concentration of the
new arrivals into the area. Intra-dialectic identifications have also been
isolated for Kampong Koh.[14] A description of the environmental charac-
teristics of Kampong Koh in the 1900's must include the dense jungle
and wild animals in the area.[15] Also, the area was covered with swamps
especially in the patch of land around the present-day market. To
the Malays this area was then known as Bangol Acheh. Towards the
north of Kampong Koh lay Kampong China, known among the Chinese
as *"k'ou you ti"* or "the land behind the opened-up area."

When the Foochow Chinese arrived around 1902, the area was said
to have been occupied by a few Malays, altogether about 2,000 in num-
ber.[16] Some of the Malays originated from Acheh in Sumatra.[17] They
had settled here to seek a livelihood and then return home with their
savings. There were also other settlers from such nearby and already
existing settlements such as Kampong Pasir Panjang Laut, Lekir and
Kampong Permatang. Both groups of Malays, either derived locally or
from Sumatra, could be regarded as transients for their stay in the
area which came to be known as Kampong China and Kampong Koh

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[13] Willis, *op. cit.,* p. 36.

[14] See Map 1, Chan *et al, op. cit.*

[15] *The Malaysia Message* (October 5, 1904).

[16] Rev. B.F. van Dyke, "Sitiawan," *The Malaysia Message,* Vol. XIII (May
1904), p. 73.

[17] Interview with Pak Din Hokchiu at Kampong Serdang, Sitiawan, on 30th,
July, 1970.

was only temporary, returning eventually to their original homes and abandoning their clearings to revert to forest or to be re-occupied. The process of land utilisation, it should be noted, might not also have involved permanent occupance of the land. The cultivators could have opened the land from their homebases in their kampongs and the land in this area could serve as additional agricultural land for catch-cropping purposes. Protective stipulations against non-permanent usage of land, however, were being increasingly enforced. Land that could only be alienated on the condition that it was planted under some "permanent product."[18]

The economic activities of the Chinese initially included the planting of dry rice, *lada hitam* (black pepper) and *nilam* (patchouli). But the importance of these crops, especially economic, began to be overshadowed by that of rubber from about 1903.[19] Rising rubber prices and the ease with which rubber could be grown under local environmental conditions helped to dispel initial pessimism and doubts[20] concerning rubber-cultivation in the Sitiawan area. Undoubtedly, the implantation and popularity of rubber as the economic staple almost at the beginning of Foochow settlement in Sitiawan was the factor which served to perpetuate the settlement. The spread of rubber-cultivation activities by the Foochow Chinese, initially based on *getah rambong* (*ficus elastica*) and later on, *getah para* (*castillao elastica*), led to the clearance of new land-areas and to the occupance of those areas abandoned by the Malays. Indeed out-movement of the Malays[21] from the area did make additional space available for newly arrived Foochow immigrants as well as those wishing to extend their rubber-areas beyond the confines of Kampong Koh into once Malay-occupied clearings.

Another circumstance important in the displacement of Malays from the area was that connected with pig-rearing, an activity carried on by the Foochows and other Chinese almost in the same areas as or adjoining the areas of Malay settlement. Pigs are taboo for religious reasons to Malays. Since these animals roamed freely, it was inevitable that they encroached onto the areas of Malay holdings. The presence of these unwelcome animals[22] no doubt played a significant role in

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[18] J.C. Jackson, *Planters and Speculators* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1968), p. 235.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 224-225.

[20] Information based on interviews with long-established local residents in the Kampong Koh area in August 1970.

[21] Malay out-movement from the Sitiawan area is, to some extent, reflected in the fact that the Malays formed only 14.3 per cent of the total population of Sitiawan in 1957 and 14.4 per cent in 1970.

[22] A more romantic notion seems to have been expressed by Chen, *op. cit.*, p. 48 in which he says, "...for a time, it seems, the hope or faith would scatter itself into aimless confusion; for in those days, the wealth of a person was measured by the number of pigs he owned." Also cf. *Times of Malaya,* 2nd August, 1906; and *Sitiawan D.O. Files* 182/3, 1931.

the decision by some of the Malays to move away into areas in which this form of animal husbandry was absent.

A land-boom was triggered off from the time of the first rubber-boom between 1905-1908[23] when prices were reported to be as high as $4 per sheet,[24] a princely sum by prevailing standards. The Chinese were both able and eager to pay good prices for rubber-land. With no clause to protect their holdings as that set out in the Malay Reservation Act of 1913,[25] it was not surprising that the Malay settlers prior to this date sold off their land-holdings to the land-hungry Chinese. A factor which undoubtedly encouraged the Malays to dispose of their holdings to the Chinese was the relative ease with which they could acquire land elsewhere in other states, such as Pahang and Negeri Sembilan.[26] The attraction of good prices[27] for their holdings and the desire to avoid a quarrel with their Chinese neighbours acted in combination with this third factor to convince the Malays to abandon their holdings in the Kampong Koh area and its environs. However, not all the Malays left for other states. Some, in fact, moved out to areas further beyond Ayer Tawar towards Bruas. The creation of Malay reservations in 1913 also encouraged some of those who had moved to Pahang to return, particularly those disappointed in their expectations of settlement outside Perak state. Such persons, however, did not move back into Kampong Koh which was becoming increasingly, and eventually mainly Chinese.[28]

Expansion

Foochow settlement in Sitiawan was by no means confined to the immediate area and surroundings of Kampong Koh. As these areas

[23] cf. Jackson, *op. cit.*, pp. 226-234.

[24] According to long-established Sitiawan residents, four dollars in those days was a respectable sum, "capable of purchasing a bullock-cart load of provisions."

[25] The Malay Reservation Enactment of 1913 was promulgated to preserve the Malay ownership of land and to further Malay participation in commercial agriculture. To prevent the encroachment of Malay lands, reservations of lands for the Malays were created and the settlers on these lands were prevented from transacting their holdings to non-Malays. Refer Proceedings of the Federal Council, 25th November, 1913.

[26] An interview with the oldest resident of Kampong Serdang, Sitiawan, Pak Din Hokchiu on 30th July, 1970, establishes the fact that, for example, in 1924 several families in the area left for Negri Sembilan. It was also learned that even before this date, in the first few years of the twentieth century, at the time when Foochow settlement in Sitiawan was just beginning, a number of Malays had left the area for Pahang prompted by the desire to colonise new agricultural areas in that state.

[27] "Good" as a relative term in relation to the fact that the owners of the land were hitherto unaware of the monetary significance of their holdings. Such transactions however cannot be traced with much precision as some of the holdings could actually be occupied on unalienated land which, however, in practice could be recognised as customary reserves.

[28] In 1957 there were no Malays in Kampong Koh. However, in 1970, there were 71 Malays. See *1957 Population Census, State of Perak,* Report No. 8 (Kuala Lumpur Statistics Department, 1959), p. 9; Chander, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

became "saturated,"[29] other areas were sought for new settlements and extension of holdings even if the lots were discontiguous and physically located miles away from the main settlement of Kampong Koh in which resided the settlers concerned. One of the later settlements to be developed on this manner was Ayer Tawar. Even this and other later settlements were eventually fully in-filled by the migrants. In the case of Ayer Tawar, opportunities for land-settlement and development were limited by the fact that the lands fronting on the road linking the settlement to Ipoh were largely being alienated or held in reserve for estate development. Nor was it possible with the creation of the Malay reservations from 1913 to acquire land in these reservations from the Malays, let alone clear new holdings which were becoming increasingly scarce.

In 1919, Ayer Tawar had consisted of only about 10 houses, of which three or four were shops.[30] The population then numbered about 100 persons. As with Kampong Koh, the processes of settlement by the Foochows ushered in changes in land-ownership and occupance. Lands originally in the hands of the Malays came under the acquisition of the Chinese as well as parcels of hitherto unalienated land which were specifically set aside for the use of the Chinese. In the village of Ayer Tawar itself, there were a few Malays who sold their lands to the Chinese because they wanted to regroup themselves among members of their own community in specific localities.[31] The money derived from the sale of their land was used to purchase new holdings in the Malay Reservations, or areas earmarked for Malay settlements. There was, however, a later counter-movement of Malays back into Ayer Tawar, into areas which had been settled by the Chinese who later either moved away or returned to China.

The Malays were not the only ones displaced in the Foochow dominated settlements at Kampong Koh and Ayer Tawar. Paradoxically, some of the Foochows themselves, especially those who came to Sitiawan later, were also affected. The displacement of these Foochows was the natural outcome of the numerical growth of this com-

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[29] The process of "saturation" did not take long for only some 2,700 acres of land were conceded to the Foochow community in the areas of Kampong Koh and its environs (refer van Dyke, *op. cit.*, p. 73) while the Foochow population increase was quite pronounced, from only about 300 in 1904 (E.W. Birch, *Administrative Report of Perak, 1904* [Taiping, Perak: Government Publishing Office, 1905], p. 8) to 3,278 in 1921 (J.E. Nathan, *The Census of British Malaya, 1921* [London, 1922], p. 187).

[30] Based on an interview with Mr. Lee Boi Choon on 31st, July, 1970 at Ayer Tawar, Sitiawan.

[31] According to one source (interview with Mr. Ngan on 3rd, August, 1970, at Ayer Tawar, Sitiawan) there was an area in Ayer Tawar known among the Chinese as *"Melayu K'on"* where the Malays were said to have been concentrated. The land in this area was sold out prior to the enforcement of clauses relating to protection in the Malay Reservation Act of 1913 had been enforced.

munity as well as of the other Chinese dialect-groups in Sitiawan.[32]
In 1924 alone it was reported that "thousands of Hokchius had arrived
in Sitiawan,"[33] inspired by the success of Foochow settlement in this
part of the country. The influx of the Foochows and, later on, other
Chinese, was no doubt related to the success and lucrativeness of
rubber-cultivation in the Sitiawan area.

The population increase would not have entailed a channelling
of the migrants to other areas if there had been a corresponding
increase in the opportunity to expand and develop new areas in Sitiawan.
Even as early as 1905, only three years after the establishment of the
settlement at Kampong Koh, there were instances of early settlers
applying for additional land outside Kampong Koh to extend their agri-
cultural operations.[34] As it was, the Foochow settlers were largely con-
fined to the areas apportioned to them under the 1902 agreement[35]
with the Perak government. With the enforcement of the Malay Reserva-
tion Act of 1913 it became no longer possible to purchase Malay-owned
land. The presence of land-extensive European estates[36] in these areas,
established before the increase in Foochow immigration, helped to aggra-
vate the crisis of land-shortage faced by the Foochow arrivals. The
problem of inadequate land was partially overcome by some Foochows
who bought over land belonging to other Foochows and hence, some
of the immigrants acquired more than the 3-acre lot originally allocated
to each of the first batch of pioneers. While there was a likelihood
for the concentration of land-ownership in the hands of a relative few,
there was, at the same time, little likelihood for more Foochow Chinese
to acquire land for the reasons mentioned. In fact, with the concen-
tration of land-ownership, disposable land became less available all
around. In this situation, some Foochows had to work as paid labourers
or as tenants on holdings owned by other Foochows, while others
were diverted from Sitiawan as it began to diminish in attraction as
a centre of Foochow settlement with the diminution in land-owning
opportunities.

A factor of far-reaching consequences on the occupational and
distributional characteristics of the Foochows in West Malaysia was the
World Depression of the 1930's. It was reported, for example, that as
symptoms of the times, a number of Hokchiu rubber holdings had

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[32] The number of Hokkiens, for example, increased from 7,643 to 11,308
between 1921 and 1931 (Nathan, *op. cit.,* p. 187; C.A. Vlieland, *British Malaya:
A Report of the 1931 Census* [London, 1932], p. 180).
[33] It is also worth noting that by 1929, the influx of Hokchius into Sitiawan
had become so pronounced that the area became even more identified as a
Hokchiu settlement, the other Foochows forming only a "negligible percentage"
(*Sitiawan District Office Files*, 72/79, 1929; *Perak Administration Report*, 1925, p. 5).
[34] *Dindings District Office Files*, 8/05, 1905.
[35] See, for example, Chen, *op. cit.*
[36] Estates are legally defined as holdings of at least 100 acres.

passed into the hands of the *chettiars*.[37] Such transactions could of course be only temporary with the former owners repurchasing these foreclosed holdings when times improved. On the other hand, the *chettiars* could have subsequently sold the land they had thus obtained to other Foochows who might already have been in residence in the area or to those newly arrived Foochows or in fact any other Chinese with capital to purchase these holdings. In the meantime, a more immediate effect of the World Depression was the channelling of the interest of many Foochow settlers in Sitiawan to the cultivation of food-crops,[38] either on their own land or on land newly cleared on Temporary Occupation Licenses (TOL) the issuance of which was relaxed for this purpose. This in fact became a significant practice so that in the period of Japanese Occupation (1941-1945) for example, the settlers resorted to such cultivation of food-crops in the surrounding unalienated areas as a contingency measure in obtaining their food-supply. In effect, this too, helped move to anchor the persons concerned in the area. This process was also effected in other areas and cumulatively effected the "spread" of the Foochows.

Another result of the World Depression of the 30's was that applications for land leases and land grants became closed. Later arrivals were thus confronted with the non-availability of land except for those they could purchase of already established privately owned holdings or those holdings which had passed into *chettiar* possession. Thus significant numbers of Hokchius were turned away from their intended settlement in the Sitiawan area and had to seek their fortunes elsewhere. The Hokchius among others of the Foochow community moved to localities in Selangor, Johore and southern Thailand.[39]

Despite these developments, Foochow population in the Sitiawan area and its surroundings did appreciate by 201 per cent between 1921 and 1931 when the Foochow population grew from 7,643 to 11,693 persons respectively, and by 40.2 per cent between 1931 and 1947, the Foochow population at the last mentioned date being 16,396 persons.[40] Additionally, the Sitiawan area continued to remain the most important centre in which the Foochow population of West Malaysia were found: in 1921, 39.8 per cent of the total; in 1931, 41.7 per cent and in 1947, 30.1 per cent.

The Aliens Ordinance of 1933 was another outcome of the World Depression of the 1930's to have important repercussions on the distri-

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[37] A community of South Indians who are identified as money-lenders and dealers in currency exchange. Rubber holdings of a number of Hokchius that passed into *chettiar* hands is also mentioned in *Sitiawan District Office Files*, 861/30, 1930.

[38] *Sitiawan District Office Files*, 9/31, 1931.

[39] *Sitiawan District Office Files*, 547/31, 1931.

[40] Nathan, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-189; Vlieland, *op. cit.*, p. 180; M.V. del Tufo, *Malaya: A Report on the 1947 Census of Population* (London, 1949), pp. 292-293.

bution and structure of the Foochow community, as indeed of the whole
Chinese population. It regulated the immigration of male Chinese labour
on a quota basis and this certainly affected the growth of the Foochows
in Sitiawan by net immigration. But because it did not restrict female
immigrants, large numbers of the latter arrivals consisted of females
thus helping to increase the number of Chinese women, especially those
of marriageable age in the country. The influx of immigrant women
in the post-1933 period was indeed one of the most important factors
helping to stabilise the Foochow community in West Malaysia for it
reduced the need to return to China either for reasons of marriage or
to be with the families of the emigrants. The outbreak of the Second
World War (1941-1945) further stimulated the stabilisation of the Foo-
chow community as it led to the cessation of Chinese migration into
and out of West Malaysia. Thus, the 1947 census, owing to the two
developments mentioned, showed a more balanced sex-ratio of 198 Foo-
chow males per hundred females in Sitiawan against 254 males per
hundred females in 1921.[41] For the country as a whole, the sex-ratio
of the Foochow population also showed substantial improvement between
1921 and 1947 from 310 per hundred females to 106 males per hundred
females respectively.[42] It should be mentioned here that even without
a substantial improvement in the proportion of females in the Foochow
population, there were no serious problems in the availability of mar-
riage partners for the Foochow males owing to the possibility of
marrying other Chinese females of different dialect groups, a practice
which is reportedly becoming more common among the Foochows in
Sitiawan. Also, as descent among the Foochows is reckoned on a patri-
lineal basis, the children of marriages between Foochow males and
other non-Foochow Chinese females continued to be regarded as Foo-
chows. In this way, the growth of the Foochow community by "iden-
tification" was assured. These factors explain why despite the diversion
of Foochows to other areas which subsequently began to acquire substan-
tial numbers of Foochows themselves, Sitiawan still remains the main
area in which the Foochows of the country are found.

Another circumstance that affected the Foochow community in
Sitiawan was the eruption of Communist insurgency and the declara-
tion of a country-wide State of Emergency in 1948. Sitiawan was
one of the "hottest" areas of Communist unrest in the country and
this, no doubt, caused some of the Foochows to leave the area. In
addition, there were instances of youths fleeing the country to escape
compulsory conscription into the armed forces, the idea of service in
the armed forces being one traditionally unacceptable to the more con-
servative Chinese. The Emergency was, however, not as great a "push"

41 del Tufo, *op. cit.*, pp. 292-293; Nathan, *op. cit.*, p. 187.
42 Nathan, *op. cit.*, pp. 186-187; del Tufo, *op. cit.*, pp. 294-295.

factor as it might have been. The dispersed settlement patterns of the Chinese included among whom were the Foochows, was a feature which was officially construed as an advantage to the insurgents and this among one of the top priorities for action. The programme for re-settlement saw the concentration of these people on specific pre-chosen sites in the form of "New Villages". This, in fact, has served to rein-force the identification of the *mukim* with the Foochows in that, per-force, the Foochows were fixed to these new created settlements with-in the *mukim*, not in other areas as could have happened. These settlements which remain till the present time include Kampong Raja Hitam, Kampong Merbau Pekan Gurney and Simpang Lima New Village.

Another factor that could be said to have had an effect on the Foochow settlement of Sitiawan could be the fact that in the post-Second World War period, synchronous with the Emergency, there were estates in the area which were reported to have been subdivided and resold in smaller plots to the Foochows, thus easing partially the problem of land-shortage.

It was perhaps due to these stabilising factors that the 1957 and 1970 censuses showed further improvements in the sex-ratios of the Sitiawan Foochows: 104 and 100 males per hundred females respective-ly.[43] These ratios, in remarkable contrast to earlier ones mentioned, could only be due to the reduction or the elimination of international migra-tion which was a characteristic feature of earlier periods, especially before the Second World War.[44] In addition, the proportion of the Foochow population in West Malaysia found in the Sitiawan area and its surroundings continued to be considerable: 36.6 per cent in 1957[45] and 35.4 per cent in 1970.[46]

While all these developments were occurring in Sitiawan, the Foo-chow communities elsewhere in West Malaysia had continued to increase through the infusion of immigrants directly from China as in the period before the Second World War, or through additions by in-migration from other Foochow communities already domiciled in the country. Two other states in West Malaysia which have attracted significant numbers of Foochows are Johore and Selangor — Batu Pahat district in the case of Johore and Kuala Langat district in the case of Selangor. These Foochows have been predominantly Hokchius.

In 1947, the Batu Pahat Foochows accounted for 57.9 per cent of the total Foochow population of the state, while the Kuala Langat Foochows comprised 30.8 per cent of the state total in Selangor. In 1957, the Batu Pahat Foochows still accounted for a significant propor-

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[43] *1957 Population Census, State of Perak,* Report No. 8 (Kuala Lumpur Statistics Department, 1959); Chander, *op. cit.,* p. 73.
[44] del Tufo, *op. cit.,* pp. 292-293.
[45] *1957 Population Census, State of Perak, op. cit.,* p. 5.
[46] Chander, *op. cit.,* p. 48.

tion of the state's Foochow population, 42.6 per cent; and in the case
of Selangor the Kuala Langat Foochows formed 20.6 per cent of the
total Foochow population in the state. In 1947, the Hokchius of Batu
Pahat comprised 66.2 per cent of the district's Foochows; the Hok-
chius of Kuala Langat district in Selangor accounted for 55.9 per cent
of the district's Foochows. In 1957, 84.4 per cent of the Foochows
in Batu Pahat were formed by the Hokchius while 77.9 per cent of
the Foochows in Kuala Langat were Hokchius.[47] In 1970, the com-
parable figures were 81.3 per cent Hokchiu in Batu Pahat and 83.8
per cent Hokchiu in Kuala Langat.[48]

In both Johore and Selangor, several pockets of Foochow con-
centration other than those mentioned above have also emerged. These
include Johore Bahru and Kuala Lumpur, capitals respectively of the
two states concerned. In 1957, of the 10,143 Foochows in Johore, 2,022
or 19.9 per cent were found in Johore Bahru[49] while in Selangor, in
the same year, of a total of 8,926 Foochows, 1,299 or 14.5 per cent
were recorded in Kuala Lumpur.[50] Since these centres are urban, it
follows that the majority of the Foochows in these places must have
been engaged in urban-based and non-agricultural activities in contrast
to the Foochows of Sitiawan and this itself reflects an interesting change
in the nature of Foochow settlement in West Malaysia from one predo-
minantly agrarian, clearly exhibited in the Sitiawan example, to one
that was markedly non-agrarian.

It is hypothesised that many of the Hokchius in these settlements
could have originated in Sitiawan. The Foochow settlement in Sitiawan
was a Hokchiu originated and dominated process. Sitiawan could be
regarded as the seeding ground for the growth and eventual distribution
of the Hokchiu to other parts of West Malaysia for, according to
informed sources in Sitiawan itself, many of their Hokchiu relatives
and friends have migrated from Sitiawan to the other Foochow settle-
ments in the country both before and after the Second World War
in response to the "push" factors discussed. In addition, the fact
that Chinese immigration in Post-Second World War Malaysia came
to a virtual standstill makes it unlikely that the increase in the
Hokchiu, or the Foochow community as a whole, in these places could
have been the result of international migration. The Hokchiu figures
are probably inflated by others of the Foochow community through the
social prestige attached to the Hokchius in the Foochow community.

[47] *1957 Population Census, State of Selangor*, Report No. 2 (Kuala Lumpur
Statistics Department, 1959), p. 9; *1957 Population Census, State of Johore,*
Report No. 6 (Kuala Lumpur Statistics Department, 1959), p. 12.
[48] Chander, *op. cit.*, pp. 48, 78.
[49] *1957 Population Census, State of Johore, op. cit.*, p. 12.
[50] *1957 Population Census, State of Selangor, op. cit.*, p. 9.

Dialect considerations are said to be a particularly revealing indicator of the class of the different groups of the Foochow community, e.g. the dialects as spoken by the Hokchius and the Henghwas are said to be "rough" to the Hokchius. Occupationally, too, the Hokchius were coincidentally mainly engaged in the menial and lowly occupations.[51]

With the cessation of international migration to provide the recruitment of new Foochows from China, it is inevitable that the growth of the Foochow community, as indeed for the whole of the Chinese community, would depend on natural increase. Distributional changes occur however in the face of rural-urban and urban-urban movements, movements which may entail inter-district and inter-state crossings. With the inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak to the Malaysian Federation of 1963, a new perspective of movement was introduced, with numbers of the Foochows in Sarawak possibly moving into West Malaysia or vice versa. In the case of Singapore, however, the creation of the Republic did not inhibit the movement of Foochows across the causeway in both directions.

A further hypothesis can be put forward at this juncture. There are indications that even though the Sitiawan area has remained the "core" of Foochow settlement in West Malaysia, the involvement of Foochows in the population shift has meant the likely emergence of Kuala Lumpur as an increasingly important centre of Foochow settlement. The Sitiawan area cannot conceivably absorb the Foochows in many occupations and those with higher qualifications have had a tendency to move out of the Sitiawan area.[52] Kuala Lumpur has indubitably become the focus of administrative, cultural and economic activities[53] and the Foochows of Sitiawan and of other areas in Malaysia have also been drawn into Kuala Lumpur in search of employment or education.

Conclusion

That the experiment at permanent settlement succeeded was beyond question as demonstrated by the size of the Foochow community in not only the Sitiawan area but also in other parts of the country. Admittedly the growth in number of this group cannot be solely attributed to the increase in number of the original settlers in the missionary project, other circumstances lending their forces also to attract and to disperse the Foochows together with the other Chinese immigrants

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[51] cf. Nathan, *op. cit.*, p. 84.
[52] From personal interviews with Foochow residents in Sitiawan in August, 1970.
[53] T.G. McGee, *The Urbanization Process in the Third World* (London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd., 1971), pp. 149-177; M.K. Sen, "Planning Strategy of Greater Kuala Lumpur A.D. 2000," Paper presented at the Enviro 2000 Symposium, February 26, 1972.

into the Sitiawan area and into other areas of their settlement. But the establishment and the development of a prospering community in Sitiawan must still have a relevance in its beginning as an experiment which succeeded and also in the fact that despite their presence in many parts of the country, the Foochows have become associated with that first area of their colonization. The choice of the Sitiawan area could have been actuated by the administrators' desire to develop the area whose fortunes had been stated to be not particularly bright.[54] It has to be stated however that the choice of Sitiawan proper could also very well be fortuitous in being just the choice of a party interested in the scheme. Yet the selection of this area for the experiment has had the result of the area thus selected becoming identified as the Foochow area of West Malaysia despite the vicissitudes of subsequent events and developments.

Economic opportunities, legislation and events of national import have provided the means or the controls for the growth or containment of the Foochows in the country. From the small beginning of a few hundred to a community of several thousands the Foochows have retained their identity, and what is more remarkable an identity that is spatially designated in a manner and with a validity that cannot be claimed for any of the dialect groups that make up the Chinese population in West Malaysia.

The Second World War had meant a cessation of replacement or renewal constituents in the whole of the Chinese community. That the Foochows could preserve its identity can perhaps be explained by certain aspects of its make up, possibly in terms of close kinship, economic, territorial, social or sociological indicators that have made for the perpetuation, if not intensification, of group identification of the Foochows.

The transformation of the Foochows into a settled community of permanent inhabitants was undoubtedly caused by general factors which had also affected the Chinese population in the country as a whole with the same end-result in creating permanent settlers from what was once a basically immigrant, ephemeral and transient population. But in the case of the Foochows, it was more than the interplay of general factors, a very notable and distinct difference being the origins of Foochow settlement in this country which was the expression of a deliberate official attempt at transplanting and nurturing a community specially selected from China. Post Second World War and recent events have necessitated an outlook that is essentially self determined. With no regenerative elements from China, Foochow identification or polarization must be seen as the result of the decision of the history and characteristics of the Foochows in the country.

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[54] *Perak Pioneer,* January 9, 1896.

TABLE 1

WEST MALAYSIA: DISTRIBUTION AND PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF
FOOCHOWS, 1947-1970

STATE	1947		1957		1970		Percent increase in Foochow population 1947-1957	Percent increase in Foochow population 1957-1970
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent		
Johore	8,611	15.8	10,143	15.0	13,460	16.2	+ 17.8	+ 32.7
Kedah	2,840	5.2	3,479	5.1	3,427	4.1	+ 12.3	− 11.0
Kelantan	381	0.7	424	0.6	635	0.8	+ 11.3	+ 49.8
Malacca	1,792	3.3	2,462	3.6	3,094	3.7	+ 37.3	+ 25.7
Negri Sembilan	3,570	6.5	4,268	6.3	5,802	7.0	+ 19.6	+ 35.9
Pahang	1,504	2.8	1,513	2.2	2,880	3.5	+ 0.6	+ 90.3
Perak	24,889	45.5	31,011	45.8	35,223	42.4	+ 24.6	+ 35.8
Perlis	96	0.2	123	0.2	158	0.2	+ 28.1	+ 28.5
Penang	3,467	6.4	4,904	7.2	5,847	7.0	+ 41.2	+ 19.2
Selangor	6,915	12.7	8,926	13.2	11,821	14.2	+ 29.2	+ 32.4
Trengganu	578	1.1	523	0.7	711	8.6	− 9.1	+ 35.9
Total	54,562	100.0	67,781	100.0	83,058	100.0	+ 24.3	+ 22.5

SOURCES: Compiled from del Tufo, *op. cit.*, pp. 294-295; H. Fell, *1957 Population Census of the Federation of Malaya*, Report No. 14 (Kuala Lumpur Statistics Department, 1960), p. 57; Chander, *op. cit.*, pp. 48, 53, 58, 63, 68, 73, 78, 83.

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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A RESIDENCY
IN BRUNEI 1895-1905

Colin N. Crisswell

The British government had no territorial ambitions in Borneo in the early nineteenth century but it did consider that northern Borneo, lying on the flank of the trade route to China, was of some strategic importance. Consequently the basic aim of British policy in Borneo at this time was to ensure that the northern coast did not fall under the control of a foreign power, while at the same time, keeping direct British involvement to the minimum. Partly to this end, the rule in Sarawak of a British subject, James Brooke, was given some support, a treaty was made in 1847 with the sultan of Brunei whereby he agreed not to cede any territory to foreign powers without British consent; and the island of Labuan was acquired to serve as a naval base, coaling station and entrepot.[1] For some years this seemed sufficient as the only two European countries with any pretensions in this area, Holland and Spain, were too weak to be able to make any serious attempt to assert their claims. However the steady decline of the once powerful sultanate into anarchy and poverty and the consequent willingness of the sultan to make cessions of territory to foreigners, despite the 1847 treaty, led the British government to strengthen its position by granting a royal charter to the British North Borneo Company in 1881.[2] It was not long before the growing interest in colonies on the part of Germany and France necessitated a further step, and in 1887 the British authorities decided to establish protectorates in the three territories of Sarawak, North Borneo, and Brunei. There was no intention that Britain should assume responsibility for the internal administration of the protectorates, nor did the grant of protectorate status mean that the British officials envisaged that the sultanate would survive for long. On the contrary, in order to remove a possible source of international embarrassment, it was considered desirable that Brunei should ultimately be divided between its two neighbours.[3]

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[1] See G. Irwin, *Nineteenth Century Borneo* (Singapore, 1955); and Leigh Wright, *The Origins of British Borneo* (Hong Kong, 1970), for an account of early British policy in Northern Borneo.

[2] In 1877 the sultan of Brunei had granted to Alfred Dent, a British merchant, and Baron von Overbeck, Austrian consul in Hong Kong, territory from Gaya Bay to the Seboekoe river totalling some 28,000 square miles. Dent later bought out von Overbeck's interests.

[3] Memo by Salisbury, undated, Herbert to Holland, January 31, 1888, FO 12/78.

By establishing the three protectorates in northern Borneo, the British government made it unlikely that any foreign power would directly challenge the British position there, short of war. Moreover the diplomatic scene in the late 1880's was dominated by the possibility of a Franco-Russian rapprochement; and earlier, Germany, the most likely trouble-maker in northern Borneo, was concerned to avoid unnecessary disputes with Britain. For a time, colonial affairs ceased to be a major international problem, and improved Anglo-German relations culminated in the Zanzibar agreement of 1890. This diplomatic friendship began to fade in 1892 when Gladstone, who had always distrusted the Triple Alliance, was returned to power. The following year, the dispute between France and Britain over Siam flared up and encouraged Germany to think that Britain might be forced into an alliance by a policy of colonial blackmail. At the same time, Germany, herself, began to display a revived interest in colonialism after the accession to the chancellorship of Hohenlohe. Contrary to the expectations of the British authorities, Brunei still survived as a weak link in the British position in northern Borneo.

When the decision that it was desirable that Brunei should be absorbed by its neighbours had been made, it had not been thought that Brunei would make any serious effort to resist. However Sultan Hasim, who succeeded the senile Sultan Mumin in 1885, was a proud man of some ability who did not want to see the extinction of the ancient sultanate. His opposition to the absorption of his remaining territory became more determined, almost obsessive, when Britain in 1890 accepted Rajah Charles Brooke's annexation of the Limbang, the last major river remaining to him. His efforts to retain what remained of the sultanate were viewed with some sympathy by the governors of the Straits settlements who, after 1888, were also high commissioners for Borneo. Another factor which seemed to render the policy of absorption less feasible was the failure of the North Borneo Company to establish itself on a sound footing. From the start the Company's finances had been shaky and by the mid 1890's it did not seem probable that it would survive for long.

Nonetheless the Foreign Office still hoped to avoid any direct British involvement, and now it envisaged the possibility of the ultimate absorption of both North Borneo and Brunei by Sarawak. This possibility revived doubts in the Colonial Office regarding the future of the Brooke regime after the death of Rajah Charles.[4] Moreover, in general, support for the Brooke type of paternal government, with its emphasis on the preservation of the traditional way of life, was waning in the Colonial Office. A new consciousness of obligation to native peoples had begun

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[4] Rajah Charles, born in 1829, was no longer a young man and his eldest surviving son, Charles Vyner, who was only twenty two in 1895, was unknown.

to appear. No longer was it sufficient to preserve them from over exposure to Western civilization and protect them from exploitation. Britain had a duty to promote the economic progress of her colonial peoples, not only for the resulting material benefits, but also to enable political progress to take place. This did not bode well for the Rajah's aspirations in northern Borneo especially as Joseph Chamberlain was a leading figure in Salisbury's third ministry, formed in June 1895. With Chamberlain as colonial secretary the opinion of the Colonial Office became more influential and Chamberlain used his powerful position to give shape and drive to this new concept of colonialism. He believed that the future basis of colonial policy should be the assistance of the empire's "undeveloped estates" with the aid of the Treasury and of British capital.[5] The commonly held opinion in Singapore and London was that Rajah Brooke discouraged the commercial development of Sarawak.[6] In these circumstances it was not likely that Chamberlain would favour allowing Sarawak to absorb the remainder of northern Borneo. However northern Borneo seemed to suffer not so much from neglect as from lack of resources, and Chamberlain showed little enthusiasm for the idea of establishing a residency in Brunei. This proposal originated from Charles Lucas, who became assistant under secretary in 1897, the same year that Under Secretary Sir Robert Meade, hitherto Sarawak's principal supporter in the Colonial Office, retired. Lucas was a wholehearted imperialist and envisaged that in the future Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo would be administered by British residents with a resident general in Labuan. The first step would be to establish a resident in Brunei.[7] His opinion did not immediately prevail with Chamberlain or with the Foreign Office, for it was difficult to draw up a convincing case for the assumption by Britain of the direct responsibility for northern Borneo on either strategic or economic grounds. Nonetheless his advice to the Foreign Office, that Rajah Brooke's request in 1895 for permission to make an offer to the sultan for the remainder of Brunei "should not in any way be entertained," in view of the sultan's hostility to Sarawak, was accepted.[8]

It still seemed more than a possibility that, despite the unwillingness on the part of the British officials to force the sultan to cede his

[5] See J.L. Garvin, *The Life of Joseph Chamberlain* (London, 1934), III; A.F. Madden, "Changing Attitudes and Widening Responsibilities 1895-1914," *Cambridge History of the British Empire* (Cambridge, 1959), III; and A.P. Thornton, *The Imperial Idea and its Enemies* (London, 1959).

[6] For example see *Straits Times,* July 16, 1888; *Financial Times,* December 18, 1893; J. Swettenham to FO, January 17, 1900, FO 12/108; Keyser to FO, December 14, 1899, FO 12/104.

[7] Lucas to Fairfield, May 18 and 11, 1896, July 1896, CO 144/70; Lucas to Wingfield, July 9, 1897, CO 144/71; Lucas to Selborne, September 29, 1899, CO 144/73.

[8] Lucas to Fairfield, November 12, 1895, CO 144/70, CO to FO November 18, 1895, FO 572/30.

territory against his will, the sultanate would vanish long before Lucas could win approval for his scheme. The loss of the Limbang even without the compensation of cession money, which the sultan had refused, had dealt a near fatal blow to the already tottering economy. Desperate for money, the sultan fell increasingly under the influence of unscrupulous speculators; and while he was insistent that he would not cede any of his sovereign rights, it seemed likely that all that remained of commercial value within his territories would be leased. The sultan himself was deterioriating mentally and physically and the weakening of his feeble control threatened complete anarchy.[9] It was in this situation that the growing tendency on the part of the high commissioners to exercise closer surveillance over the affairs of northern Borneo proved vital to the continued existence of Brunei. As governor of the Straits at a time when the residential system in the Malay states was being hailed as a great success, Sir Charles Mitchell had no desire to see the sultan deprived of his throne with undue haste or against his will. He was determined to uphold what he interpreted as being the policy of the British government regarding Brunei, namely, "to recognize and support as far as possible the rule of the present Sultan and to make no change in the government of the state during his lifetime."[10] He and his successor, Sir J. A. Swettenham, adhered to this policy rigidly and so enabled the sultanate to survive until a time when opinion was more strongly in favour of a residency.[11]

Pressure on Brunei from North Borneo had revived after a lull following the economic crisis of the early 1890's. After the rejection in 1894 by the shareholders of Rajah Brooke's offer to take over the Company, an ambitious Scot, W. C. Cowie, had become managing director. He hoped to assure the future prosperity of the Company by the construction of a railway, and so he was anxious to acquire the remaining enclaves of Brunei territory which lay across the proposed route.[12] This matter assumed greater urgency when the development of serious trouble with the rebel, Mat Salleh, in 1897 made it imperative to gain control of places of potential refuge and supply. After the crisis of 1894 and the accession to the board of directors of Cowie, well known and not highly regarded in Singapore, opinion in the Straits Settlement had become increasingly critical of the Company.[13] This opinion

[9] Keyser to FO, December 25, 1898, FO 12/99.

[10] Mitchell to Keyser, July 23, 1899, FO 12/102.

[11] Mitchell was governor of the Straits from 1894 until his death in 1899. Sir J.A. Swettenham was acting governor in the later part of 1898 and became governor after Mitchell's death. His brother, Sir Frank Swettenham, took over from him in March 1901.

[12] Martin to Beaufort, June 14 and December 6, 1895, CO 874/307.

[13] For example see Straits Times, March 10, 17 and 19, 1896, March 25, 1899, January 30, 1902.

was shared by Mitchell and J. A. Swettenham.[14] Both viewed the Company's policy towards Mat Salleh with distinct disfavour and their opposition to it drew them deeper into Bornean affairs. Moreover their hostility to the Company was another reason to support the existence of the sultanate for as long as possible. The situation in North Borneo became so serious that Cowie decided to deal with it personally, and after his arrival late in 1897, he succeeded in leasing from the sultan all the remaining river enclaves with the exception of the Membakut. Mitchell disapproved and persuaded the Foreign Office to rule that in the future no negotiations with the sultan were to take place without the sanction of the high commissioner. When Governor Beaufort visited Brunei at the end of 1898, ostensibly to pay his compliments but in reality to seek the cession of the Membakut, Mitchell's claim that the ruling meant that no visits at all were to be made to the sultan without permission was upheld by the Foreign Office.[15] When the continuation of difficulties with Mat Salleh made the Company resolve to acquire the area between Si Pitong and the Trusan, Swettenham was equally obstructive. As the hostility of Abu Bakar, the principal holder of the *tulin* rights,[16] made it unlikely that he would cede these to the Company, it had been decided instead to treat with another *pangeran* who disputed Abu Bakar's claim to Merapok, the principal settlement in the Lawas area. Swettenham complained that such talks could only take place through the sultan and with the high commissioner's consent. The Foreign Office told the Company to break off the talks.[17] Meanwhile Abu Bakar had approached Rajah Brooke with a view to the assumption of Sarawak control over the area. The Rajah professed himself not to be very interested but declared that he was willing to accede to the request for the good of the inhabitants. Swettenham opposed the proposal on the grounds that it was contrary to the policy of preserving Brunei. In fact the Foreign Office had by now decided to press on with the idea of partitioning Brunei and hoped that this could be arranged during the course of a visit by Swettenham to the sultanate. As Lawas was assumed to be in the Company's sphere of interest the matter was deferred until then.[18]

Despite the efforts of the high commissioners to preserve the sultan's authority, the disturbed international scene and the continued deteriora-

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[14] Mitchell to FO, November 30, 1899, FO 12/102; J.A. Swettenham to Cowie, October 4, 1900, CO 874/266.

[15] Mitchell to FO, April 6, 1899, FO 12/101; Beaufort to Mitchell, December 25, 1898, Mitchell to FO, January 19, 1899, FO to B.N.B. Co., January 30, 1900, FO 12/106.

[16] These were vaguely defined local fiscal and administrative rights.

[17] J.A. Swettenham to FO, December 14, 1899, FO 12/106; FO to B.N.B. Co., January 15, 1900, FO 12/113.

[18] Brooke to Keyser, April 11, 1900, J.A. Swettenham to FO, May 3, 1900, FO 12/108, FO to CO, May 2, 1900, FO 12/112.

tion of affairs in Brunei had led the British authorities to reconsider
the question of the fate of the sultanate. Germany had sent a fleet
to the vicinity of the Philippines at the outset of the war between
Spain and the United States, probably in the hope of acquiring a base
there if the United States decided not to retain them. Keyser, the
British consul at Labuan, reported that the Germans were especially
interested in the Sulu archipelago; and this aroused Foreign Office con-
cern over Brunei, for the sultan of Brunei asserted that part of the
Sulu sultanate was under his sovereignty.[19] After a delay of some
months the United States did take possession of the Sulu sultanate in
October 1899, but German interest in acquiring bases was confirmed
when Germany subsequently purchased the Spanish possessions in the
Pacific which the United States had overlooked. Moreover Germany's
exploitation of British difficulties in Samoa and her attitude to the Portu-
guese colonies had led the British cabinet to regard her as "the profes-
sional black-mailer." It did not seem impossible that Germany might
try to take advantage of the anarchical situation in Brunei.[20] In fact
as revolts had broken out on the last two major rivers remaining to
the sultanate, the Tutong and the Belait, the final collapse of the sul-
tanate seemed imminent.[21]

The revival of the question of Brunei's fate gave Lucas an oppor-
tunity to air his scheme. He observed that although he preferred Sara-
wak's claims on Brunei to those of North Borneo, "Sarawak is dis-
appointing and unprogressive and . . . the Imperial Government had better
take Brunei itself."[22] Lord Selborne, the Under Secretary, and Chamber-
lain agreed that the annexation of Brunei after the death of the sultan
should be proposed to the Foreign Office. However Assistant Under
Secretary Sir Robert Herbert noted that the continuing pressure on
Brunei from her neighbours might prejudge the fate of the sultanate.
Accordingly he thought it would be best to discover from the sultan
whether he would agree to the annexation of his territory by Britain
and then decide what to do with the country. This was accepted by
the Foreign Office and Mitchell was asked to instruct Keyser to seek
the sultan's opinion, whether or not the sultan would agree to annexation
by Britain. Mitchell replied that he himself did not think that Brunei
could support a resident. A few days later before anything else could
be done, he died. His successor, Swettenham, wrote that he agreed

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[19] Minute by Lucas, February 9, 1899, CO 144/73; Keyser to FO, April 29,
May 5 and 11, 1899, FO 12/104.

[20] The British government had accepted, in the African Order in Council
1892, that the protecting power had an obligation to establish proper government
in any protectorate where there was no effective government in the European
sense. See Sir H. Lauterpacht, "International Law and Colonial Questions 1870-
1914," Cambridge History of the British Empire, III, pp. 679-681.

[21] Keyser to Mitchell, May 16, 1899, FO 12/101.

[22] Lucas to Selborne, September 29, 1899, CO 144/73.

with Mitchell, and in any case he would take no further action since he did not believe that the sultan would favour the idea.[23]

The opposition of the high commissioners to a residency caused Selborne and a number of other Colonial Office officials to revert to the idea of partitioning Brunei on the death of the sultan. Lucas accepted that the consensus of opinion was against his scheme. Accordingly the Colonial Office now proposed to the Foreign Office that Swettenham should be sent to ascertain whether or not the sultan would accept the partitioning of his territory. The bulk would be given to Sarawak with Lawas and possibly Trusan going to the Company. The sultan would be allowed to retain Brunei town if he wished. If he agreed, negotiations could begin immediately; if he did not, then the partitioning would be delayed until his death. Francis Villiers, Assistant Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, was of the opinion that the situation in Brunei required immediate action and he agreed to the Colonial Office's proposal.[24]

Swettenham's instructions were "to ascertain whether His Highness would be willing to agree to a partition of his territories."[25] However after his arrival in Brunei he decided that "it would be unwise ... to make any hint or mention of partition." Instead he asked the sultan how he thought the state of affairs could be improved. Hasim made no definite reply but intimated that, according to the agreement of 1888, he could rule as he wished. Swettenham did not press the matter and returned to Singapore.[26] In his report Swettenham explained his course of action by maintaining that by the agreement of 1888 Britain was pledged to support the independence of Brunei unless the sultan sought a modification of the terms. Despite his previous rejection of the idea, he now proposed the installation of a resident. The problem of finance could be overcome by persuading Rajah Brooke to return the Limbang to Brunei. Although Britain had recognized the Rajah's possession of the Limbang this did not alter the fact that the Rajah had unlawfully usurped the territory and could accordingly be charged in a Brunei court for this offence.[27] An enforceable judgment would be the seizure of his coal rights in Brunei and rather than lose these

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[23] Minute by Selborne, September 29, 1899; minute by Herbert, October 19, 1899, CO 144/73; FO to Mitchell, November 8, 1899, FO 12/100; Mitchell to FO, November 30, 1899, FO 12/102; Swettenham to FO, January 17, 1900, FO 12/108.

[24] MacNaghton to Lucas and minutes on this by Lucas and Selborne, January 8, 1900; MacNaghton to Lucas, April 4, 1900. Lucas to Herbert, April 7, 1900, CO 144/74; minutes by Villiers and Salisbury on Swettenham to FO, February 24, 1900, FO 12/108; CO to FO, April 12, 1900; and minute on this by Villiers FO 12/112.

[25] FO to CO, May 2, 1900, FO 12/112.

[26] J.A. Swettenham to FO, June 27, 1900, FO 12/109. The *Straits Times,* May 29, 1900, observed that Swettenham had "a reputation for reaching conclusions with over zealous speed."

[27] In fact there were no courts in Brunei and by the agreement of 1856 the sultan did not have the right to try British subjects.

he would agree to surrender the Limbang.[28] Reaction in the Foreign Office was strong. Salisbury remarked that such a procedure would be "a shameless piece of sharp practice" and advised that Swettenham be informed that his proposal could not be considered under any circumstances.[29] Nonetheless, although the situation in Brunei made the continuation of the status quo unlikely, Swettenham's reluctance to implement the policy of partition decided upon in London caused the fate of the sultanate to remain in abeyance for the time being.

Lucas had by no means abandoned his plan to make Britain directly responsible for the administration of the three protectorates, and growing disquiet over the affairs of the Company soon enabled him to raise the matter again. The issue which brought this about was the resignation of Hugh Clifford, governor of North Borneo. Relations between Cowie and Clifford had deteriorated rapidly. Cowie evidently expected that a governor of North Borneo should carry out the policy of the directors unquestioningly. Clifford had been seconded from Colonial Office service and was an outstanding official who already had a distinguished career in the Malay states. He was a man with his own ideas on the administration of native states and was not afraid to express them. In particular he did not think that the railway project would bring the benefits expected by the directors. When Cowie wrote him a strong letter and requested him to adopt "a tone of laudation" in his references to the railway, Clifford resigned.[30] The Colonial Office regarded this incident with concern. Not only had a distinguished administrator nominated by the Colonial Office resigned after six months but he had also criticized virtually every aspect of the Company's administration.[31] Lucas proposed to Chamberlain that the Company should be threatened with the loss of Labuan, for whose administration it had become responsible in 1890, if matters did not improve. Chamberlain did not agree. He told Lucas that he thought the matter could be better dealt with in a friendly talk with the directors and inquired whether, in any case, North Borneo was not the concern of the Foreign Office. Lucas agreed that North Borneo was technically the responsibility of the Foreign Office, but did not conceal his belief that eventually the Colonial Office would have to take responsibility for the whole of northern Borneo. Chamberlain had no great admiration for the Company but, as the Colonial Office subsequently agreed to nominate a

[28] J.A. Swettenham to FO, June 30, 1900, FO 12/109; J.A. Swettenham to CO, July 11, 1900, FO 12/112.
[29] Minute by Salisbury on CO to FO, August 28, 1900, FO 12/112.
[30] Comment by Cowie on Clifford to Martin, April 9, 1900, CO 874/265; Clifford to Martin, July 5, 1900, CO 874/266. Clifford stated that he could no longer remain associated with "an administration, many of whose methods I am unable to approve, none of which I have the power to alter or reform, and for all of which I am nominally responsible."
[31] Clifford to Lucas, July 7, 1900, CO 144/74.

successor to Clifford, it is evident that he did not think that the time was ripe for the adoption of Lucas' proposal.[32]

The Foreign Office officials were pressing for a final settlement in northern Borneo. Villiers told Lord Lansdowne, the foreign secretary, that the Colonial Office had been unwilling to commit itself because "there is an idea, not submitted so far as I know to Mr. Chamberlain, of a large Colony in North Borneo" but that in the meantime the situation had become critical.[33] Accordingly it was agreed to seek the opinion of the new high commissioner, Sir Frank Swettenham. Sir Frank was one of the creators of the residential system in the Malay states and not surprisingly his personal opinion was in favour of the appointment of a resident in Brunei. However since his brother's proposal that this should be done had been dismissed out of hand, it would obviously have been pointless for him to have pressed his own views immediately. He had an admiration for Rajah Brooke[34] and, faced with the Foreign Office's continued support for the absorption of Brunei by Sarawak, he agreed that this was an acceptable solution if the consent of the sultan could be obtained.[35] Rajah Brooke was therefore authorized to offer the sultan $3000-$4000 p.a. for the rebellious rivers and Brooketon. However the immediate urgency of the situation on the Tutong and the Belait had passed, for by the end of 1901 the sultan had succeeded in regaining control of them. Moreover, apart from the sultan's own reluctance to cede, the Brunei nobles were opposed to the acceptance of the offer since no provision had been made for them under the settlement. Thus the offer was refused.[36]

The Rajah was not the only one to be disappointed, for the Company had encountered serious difficulties in its effort to acquire the Lawas area. The Foreign Office had lifted its objection to this, in accord with the intention of finally partitioning Brunei, subject to the approval of the high commissioner being given to the terms. The sultan agreed to sell his sovereign rights but Abu Bakar remained intransigent in his refusal to cede his *tulin* rights. Cowie hoped that the acquisition of the sovereign rights would be accepted by the high commissioner as sufficient to enable the Company to exercise control over the area in anticipation of the acquisition of the *tulin* rights.[37] The Company tried to circumvent the problem by coming to an agreement

[32] Lucas to Chamberlain, August 16 and 25, 1900; minutes by Chamberlain, August 17 and October 21, 1900, CO 144/74.

[33] Villiers to Lansdowne, March 30, 1901, FO 12/116.

[34] See the preface by Swettenham to Ranee Brooke's *My Life in Sarawak* (London, 1913).

[35] F. Swettenham to FO, August 14, 1901, FO 12/114.

[36] Hewett to FO, March 7, 1902, FO 12/117; March 30, May 10 and July 10, 1902, FO 12/118.

[37] Martin to Birch, July 8, 1901, CO 874/316; F. Swettenham to Birch, October 22 and December 26, 1901, CO 874/269.

with *Pangeran* Bakar, the rival claimant to the rights at Merapok.
However Abu Bakar fled to Sarawak where he produced documents
which Sir Frank accepted as establishing the validity of his claims.[38]
Cowie still hoped that it might be possible to use the sovereign rights
to control the area despite the Foreign Office ruling. This hope rested
on the fact that H. C. Brooke-Johnson, a nephew of the Rajah formerly
in the Sarawak service, had been given permission by Abu Bakar to
administer the *tulin* rights for ten years in return for 10% of the
revenue. Brooke-Johnson asked the Company, as the holder of the
sovereign rights, for permission to exercise Abu Bakar's rights and Cowie
agreed provided that Brooke-Johnson entered the Company's service,
becoming resident of Province Clarke, within which Lawas was situated.
He saw this as a temporary expedient which would pave the way to
the ultimate cession of all the rights to the Company. This end seemed
nearer realization when, in March 1904, Abu Bakar died, his rights
passing to several heirs. Cowie hoped that with Brooke-Johnson's
assistance the matter would soon be settled. However Brooke-Johnson's
aim was not to acquire the rights for the Company at the cheapest
price but quite the reverse, for he intended by this means to increase
the compensation due to himself for the loss of his share of the revenue.
The negotiations reached stalemate and Cowie suddenly abandoned the
struggle. On October 8th 1904 he transferred the sovereign rights to
Sarawak in return for £5000 and the Rajah's coal rights in North Borneo.[39]

     Doubts in the Colonial Office regarding the Company's adminis-
tration in Labuan and North Borneo had continued to grow. Early
in 1902 a petition had been received from the inhabitants of Labuan
requesting that the British government resume direct responsibility
for the island. Articles in the Singapore press reported the rundown
state of the island and it was commonly assumed that Cowie's railway
policy would lead to ruin.[40] Accordingly a request to the Colonial Office
from the Company in 1902 for a loan of £500,000 was refused. Some
of the officials hoped that this refusal might hasten the day when
the directors would be forced to surrender their territory.[41] These doubts
were further enhanced by the dismissal of Governor Birch at the end
of 1903. Hostility had grown up rapidly between Cowie and Birch,

     [38] Birch to Martin, January 15, 1902, CO 874/269; F. Swettenham to FO,
April 13, 1902, FO 12/120; March 20, 1903, FO 12/125, CO memo May 27,
1903, FO 12/125.
     [39] Memo on the position of Brooke-Johnson in the Lawas 2nd Rajah's Letters;
Brooke-Johnson to Birch, October 28 and 29, 1903, CO 874/272; Cowie to Gueritz,
February 19 and March 4, 1904, CO 874/320; Brooke-Johnson to Gueritz, March
12 and May 12, 1904, CO 874/273; Brooke to Cowie, October 8, 1904, 2nd
Rajah's Letters.
     [40] For example see *Straits Times*, January 26, February 23, 24 and 27, March
7 and 8, April 6, 1904.
     [41] Stubbs to Lucas, December 16, 1902; minutes by Lucas and Onslow,
December 25, 1902, CO 144/76.

who, like Clifford, had been seconded from Colonial Office service in the Malay states. Their disagreement centered around the railway project but was exacerbated by a personality clash between the idealistic and impulsive governor and the self-made man of business. When Cowie discovered that Birch had written privately to Lucas, suggesting that the Colonial Office should take over North Borneo, he did not hesitate to dismiss him.[42] Although the Colonial Office officials felt that Birch had been indiscreet, the course of events following Clifford's hasty resignation had only served to confirm distrust of Cowie and dislike for his methods. Consequently Cowie was advised that the Colonial Office considered that Birch should be allowed to resign and be granted the six months leave to which he was entitled. Driven to anger by Birch's attitude to him and aggrieved that his request for a loan had been refused, Cowie replied, in a letter verging on rudeness, that Birch would not be granted any leave although he would be permitted to resign. The tone of this letter caused considerable offence and such defiance of the wishes of the Colonial Office was unprecedented. In addition Lucas may have wanted to make the most of this opportunity to discredit the Company further. In a reply drafted by Lucas, the Colonial Office objected to "both the substance and the tone of the Company's letters" and threatened to remove the administration of Labuan from the Company if the wishes of the Colonial Office were not complied with. Cowie could not withstand the threat that the Colonial Office would make public its lack of confidence in the Company's adminis-tration and reluctantly gave way.[43] The permanent officials in the Colonial Office now accepted Lucas' view that it was undesirable that the Com-pany should be encouraged in any way and unlikely that it would survive much longer.

Despite the difficulties encountered in the attempts to partition Brunei, Villiers continued to oppose the idea of establishing a residency in the sultanate. Whereas the Foreign Office continued to regard the problem of Brunei from the point of view of expediency, the Colonial Office officials thought that the fate of Brunei should be considered as part of the broader issue of the fate of all northern Borneo. The consensus of Colonial Office opinion supported Lucas but Chamberlain was still lukewarm. Lucas suggested, as a compromise, that a new consul should be appointed with instructions to support and advise the sultan. Villiers was not enthusiastic but he did agree that any final decision should be deferred until he had discussed the matter with Sir Frank, who was

[42] Cowie to Colonial Office, November 10, 1902; memo by Villiers, January 24, 1904, FO 12/125.
[43] B.N.B. Co. to CO, November 21, 1903, CO 144/77, November 25 and December 2, 1903, FO 12/125; CO to B.N.B. Co., December 1, 1903, CO 144/77.

due to return to England towards the end of 1903.[44] Sir Frank was
adamant that the sultan should not be forced to do anything against
his will and gave his personal opinion in favour of a residency. How-
ever in face of Villiers' attitude he suggested that Rajah Brooke should
be invited to offer better terms. The Rajah refused to do this on the
grounds that Sarawak could not afford to pay more. Villiers now
concluded that the cession of Brunei to Sarawak was no longer a
feasible solution. He was still determined to settle the matter since
the sultan was reported to be very feeble after a fall. Accordingly
he agreed with Sir Frank and Lucas that M. S. MacArthur, an officer
in the Malay service, should take over the post of acting consul and
prepare a report on the future of Brunei. In so doing he had virtually
agreed to install a resident noting "that the Protectorate should be
made effective and the administration placed under the Colonial Office."[45]

In December 1904, MacArthur submitted his conclusions.[46] He found
the sultan senile but dignified and courteous. He had shown no wish
to check abuses but was not tyrannical nor cruel. MacArthur found
him hostile to Sarawak but thought that he might be willing to accept
a greater degree of British control. The sultanate would undoubtedly
decay away if left to itself but the opposition of the sultan and the
nobles was a serious obstacle to peaceful absorption by Sarawak. The
Rajah himself was old and his task would be a difficult one in view of
the strength of Malay feeling against him. The acting consul concluded
that the desideratum was the maximum relief of oppression with the
minimum of interference in the rights of those in power and that a
residency would best fulfill this. The problem of finance could be
alleviated by the joint administration of Labuan and Brunei and, in
the likely event of the rule of the Company ending, the three adminis-
trations could be amalgamated. In any event it would not be un-
reasonable to suppose that Brunei would eventually become self-supporting
since the deposits of coal, oil and antimony were potential sources of
revenue.

Chamberlain's resignation in September 1903 had removed the prin-
cipal obstacle to the residency scheme within the Colonial Office, since
his successor Alfred Lyttleton had no strong objections. Accordingly
MacArthur's report was unanimously praised in the Colonial Office. Sir
Frank and the new high commissioner, Sir John Anderson, urged its
immediate implementation. It was agreed that the vision long held

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[44] Villiers to Lucas, February 21, 1903 and memo by Villiers, March 12,
1903, FO 12/124; Lucas to Ommanney, March 4 and 12, 1903; minutes by
Ommanney, March 5 and 12, 1903, CO 144/77.

[45] Memos by F. Swettenham and Villiers, December 21, 1903, FO 12/124;
Brooke to FO, January 4, 1904; FO to CO, March 4, 1904; memo by Villiers,
February 21, 1904, FO 12/127.

[46] Report by MacArthur, December 5, 1904, FO 572/39.

by Lucas of a British colony embracing North Borneo, Sarawak, Brunei, and Labuan seemed a strong possibility within measurable time. Meanwhile it would be advantageous to establish the nucleus of the future administration by resuming responsibility for Labuan and installing a resident in Brunei.[47] Villiers conceded that the solution he preferred had been ruled out by the sultan's persistent refusal to cede his territory to the Rajah and by the likelihood that the Company would come to ruin before long. In these circumstances he agreed that it was essential "to re-establish good order in Labuan and introduce some proper form of government into Brunei."[48] Once this decision had been taken, the new attitude to colonial development and the prosperity of the Malay states, who could lend the initial funds needed, ensured that the financial difficulties were easily overcome. An agreement was drawn up for presentation to the sultan by which, as in the Malay states, he was to act upon the resident's advice in all matters except those pertaining to Malay custom and religion. MacArthur was to conduct the negotiations with the sultan and any reluctance on his part was to be overcome by the threat that if he refused to accept a resident then the British government would not prevent his neighbours from taking action to end the disorder in Brunei. In December 1905, the sultan signed the agreement.[49]

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[47] F. Swettenham to CO, January 17, 1905; Anderson to FO, February 18, 1905, FO 12/128; minute by Lucas, April 25, 1905; minute by Ommanney, April 27, 1905, CO 144/79; Lucas to Churchill, December 6, 1906, CO 144/81.

[48] Memo by Villiers, June 3, 1905; FO memo, November 27, 1905, FO 12/128.

[49] FO to Anderson, July 24, 1905; Anderson to MacArthur, November 9, 1905, FO 12/128; CO to FO, December 6, 1905, FO 572/39.

SOME RURAL-URBAN COMPARISONS OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN TAIWAN

RICHARD W. WILSON

When asked what person he most wanted to be like when he grew up, one small Chinese boy on Taiwan, laboring diligently with his characters, wrote in response, "I want to be a brave soldier, kill the Communists, and recover our wonderful Mainland." This reply, made with such fervor, was part of a two year project which studied socialization of elementary school children (grades 1 to 6) in Taiwan.[1] When the responses to this question were analyzed for differences between rural and urban children, the following general distinctions became apparent:[2]

TABLE 1

DIFFERENCES AMONG SCHOOLS IN STATUS ASPIRATIONS — %

	Urban-Public	Urban-Private	Rural-Public
Aspire to:			
Status Role	50	49	27
Status Abstraction*	27	41	26
Non-Status Role	4	3	4
Don't Know	19	7	43
Number Responding	330	172	193

Significant at the .01 level.   * — To be noble, brave, etc.

An examination of Table 1 reveals a pattern that is typical for this sample of rural and urban children and is useful as a starting point

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[1] Conducted from 1964 to 1966 primarily at three different elementary schools: a large urban (Taipei) public school (enrollment 8,600) with children of mixed socio-economic backgrounds; an elite and relatively small urban (Taipei) private school (enrollment 1,000) with the great majority of children from well-to-do Mainlander families; and a large rural public school in Taipei hsien (enrollment 3,000) with children from farmer or small town merchant families. Other aspects of this research can be found in Richard W. Wilson, *Learning to be Chinese: The Political Socialization of Children in Taiwan* (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1970).

[2] The selection of status roles was admittedly arbitrary. I made my categories quite general and followed the types of heroes introduced in the children's school stories. Thus farmer became a status role as well as mid and upper tier government personnel, military personnel, mid and upper level business roles, and professional roles. Significance levels throughout this analysis are derived from a chi square analysis.

for an analysis of their differences in political socialization. Clearly the data from the rural school shows that children there do *not* aspire to the low status roles which their society has in relative abundance. Nor are they, when compared to the urban public school children, deficient in their aspirations to become noble and filial citizens. Good and brave men and women are seen by both urban and rural children as desirable models for adult life. When we examine the category of specific occupational aspirations, however, we find the rural children far less articulate about naming a specific status role. In direct proportion to the percentage reduction in the status role responses of rural children we find an increase in their percentage of don't know responses. As this paper will point out, rural children frequently (but not always) answered with a higher percentage of don't know responses than the urban children. It is the hypothesis of this paper that this pattern reflects both the more limited exposure of the rural children to the stimulus of certain types of political learning experiences and also the fact that "...don't know" often means "Don't want to know," which is another way of saying, "I don't want to get involved."[3]

Problems of Political Socialization

The Chinese, Fairbank posits, have had little experience with egalitarian relationships. Their solution to politics, he says, "began with the observation that the order of nature is not egalitarian but hierarchic. Adults are stronger than children, husbands than wives. Age is wiser than youth. Men are not equally endowed..."[4] Statements such as this frequently appear, often less explicitly, in the wealth of literature concerning the patterns of Chinese social interaction. There is no need to repeat the oft-given five Confucian loyalty relationships in which all but one, that of friend to friend, involves a well-defined status ranking. One has only to reflect that within the Chinese family, the social unit which is a prime socializing agency and which for many individuals is the unit in which the most relevant inter-personal interactions of their lives take place, status roles are clearly indicated. Despite rapid social change the positions of authority within the family are still accorded great prestige and power. In Taiwan the training received in the home with regard to hierarchy and the appropriate behavior for the various family hierarchical roles is directly relevant to later training concerning non-family authority behavior and political behavior specifically.

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[3] Leo Bogart, "No Opinion, Don't Know, and Maybe No Answers," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Fall, 1967), p. 344.

[4] John K. Fairbank, "How to Deal with the Chinese Revolution," *The New York Review of Books,* Vol. VI, No. 2 (February 17, 1966), p. 12.

Political learning is only one aspect of general learning. Like all types of learned behavior that which relates to authority is most effectively acquired early in life and when the appropriate responses are subsequently reinforced over time. Without consistent and uniform reinforcement of early training, behavior for members of the same social unit is apt to be incongruent and unpredictable with a consequent potentiality for chaos. One reason, however, why even in rapidly changing societies we are apt to find general similarities in childhood training is cogently stated by Erikson, who says,

> ". . . values persist because public opinion continues to consider them 'natural' and does not admit of alternatives. They persist because they have become an essential part of an individual's sense of identity, which he must preserve as a core of sanity and efficiency. But values do not persist unless they work, economically, psychologically, and spiritually; and I argue that to this end they must continue to be anchored, generation after generation, in early child training; while child training, to remain consistent, must be embedded in a system of continued economic and cultural synthesis."[5]

Greenstein echoes these sentiments for the specifically political realm when he states that ". . . political authority is likely to be more stable when it is obeyed automatically because citizens have learned to accept certain institutions and leaders as legitimate than when sanctions have to be threatened or employed."[6]

Political socialization as a process can be usefully subdivided into two sub-categories of learning which are usually, but not always, reinforcing; these are (1) *relevant* political education and (2) *specific* political education, the first concerning the values and behavior associated with authority situations in general (home, school, work, etc.) and the second having reference to the way in which the individual relates to the political system itself. In terms of the learning process there are certain common characteristics for both relevant and specific political learning. In both, for instance, there is a well-defined and usually overlapping pattern of rewards and punishments which is related to the goals of the learning situation. Models, both negative and positive and both direct and symbolic, are also a feature.

The extent to which specific political education is a feature of childhood training varies according to the cultural norms of the society and, to some extent, with the instability (actual or potential) that political leaders perceive as being present in the system. I would hypothesize that the more insecure a particular leadership group feels in its political power the more likely it will be to direct that specific political policy

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[5] Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1950), p. 121.

[6] Fred I. Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 2.

alternatives and specific personal loyalties be taught in the classroom. In other words the ratio of specific political learning to relevant political learning is likely to rise the more that political leaders view the educational process as being directly relevant to the attainment of specific and partisan political objectives. The effectiveness of such training depends to a great extent on the degree of reinforcement between specific and relevant political training.

While aspects of specific political training may involve the learning of policy objectives, its basic components are far broader and less well-defined. The child must first acquire a notion of himself as a member of a particular social unit and political order. He must, if a member of a modern nation state, develop what Verba has called a sense of national identity (a vertical form of identification) and also a sense of integration with his fellow citizens (a horizontal form of identification). Secondly the individual must absorb, cognitively and affectively, the ideas, symbols and values relating to politics which are part of his culture in general but which transcend any specific political relationship. Lastly individuals must learn the types of behavior relevant for specific political roles in specific political situations. They must learn what is expected of them at what time and they must learn to fulfill these expectations, largely unconsciously.

Involvement in the political process may take more than one form. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in *The Civic Culture* have identified two types of political competence, citizen and subject. Citizen competence is where the "... competent citizen has a role in the formation of general policy. Furthermore he plays an influential role in this decision-making process..."[7] The subject, however, "... does not participate in making rules, nor does his participation involve the use of political influence."[8] His competence "... is more a matter of being aware of his rights under the rules than of participating in the making of the rules."[9] Citizen competence, these authors feel, develops after subject competence. The critical component for the development of citizen competence is the involvement of the child in decisions in the family, in school, and later, at work. Family and school participation are exceptionally important, especially the family, for early reciprocal discussion in these social units apparently develops a measurable sense of political competence and a tolerance for ambiguity and controversy in politics.

The most important component of relevant political training for children in Taiwan is a steadily increasing pressure to minimize inter-

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[7] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), p. 168.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

personal controversy and role ambiguity. Dependency training is severe and begins virtually at birth. Subservience to authority, best noted by the term "filial piety," is given heavy positive sanction. Political controversy is also not an aspect of specific political training except for anti-Communist indoctrination. In the home, politics along with sex, is a taboo subject for children. What children learn outside school of political controversy comes from silent observation, the "grapevine," or street talk.

A multiplicity of "don't know" responses to questionnaire items is most prevalent when people are so isolated from controversy that custom is largely their only source of belief. Only with a perception of alternatives does a person appreciate that he has opinions, for it is in the controversy of alternatives that opinions become meaningful.[10] Where custom itself encourages non-involvement and non-controversy, strong reinforcement will be provided for the tendency to state neither a positive nor negative position with regard to even the most innocent questions. Yet even a high response rate may not actually reflect a desire for positive influential involvement. Recent work indicates that children in whom dependency habits are strongly developed are more responsive to social reinforcers.[11] We may well, therefore, find children who have been exposed to alternatives in their socialization but whose often rote-like responses reveal both their dependency and the effectiveness of heavy reinforcement training. These children know the rules and they know what answers they are supposed to give.

In studying the political socialization of rural and urban children in Taiwan it is my contention that, despite a highly uniform educational system, the responses of the rural children reflect their lack of experience in observing and dealing with significant alternatives. This is particularly true concerning those alternatives related to aspects of the "modern" political process, plus a fear, acquired as part of the socialization process, in becoming involved in controversy by making a commitment to a particular position. Conversely, while the urban children more readily respond, we note that among those in whom dependency training has been strongest — and I refer as a group to the urban private school children — that their responses will reflect the most positively sanctioned values of their home and school environment. It is the home and school environment, in fact, which is the basis for responses toward the political system. A knowledge of training in primary groups, therefore, helps explain why certain political responses — among a possible range of alternatives — have a greater expectancy than others. For

    [10] Lloyd and Susanne H. Rudolph, "Surveys in India: Field Experience in Madras State," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. XXII, No. 3 (Fall 1968), pp. 236-37.
    [11] Albert Bandura and Richard H. Walters, *Social Learning and Personality Development* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1963), pp. 142-43.

this reason a very limited statement concerning aspects of learning in the home and school has validity.

Relevant Political Training

The children at the three schools were asked to identify who the chief authority is at home and at school. The responses of the children, broken into home and school categories, were as follows:

TABLE 2

LOCUS OF AUTHORITY AT HOME AND AT SCHOOL: %

	Urban Public School	Urban Private School	Rural Public School
Home:			
Father	71	63	49
Mother	4	5	7
Both Parents	16	30	24
Others	4	2	8
Don't Know	5	0	12
School:			
Principal	78	91	55
Others	14	8	20
Don't Know	8	1	25
Number Responding	330	172	193

Significant at the .01 level.

Regardless of the differences among the three schools we note in all of them a pattern of heavy emphasis on the father as the ideal authority figure in the home and the generally correct identification of the principal as the leading authority at school (although this is much less pronounced for the rural children). The children were also asked how they felt about the person they had selected as an authority figure. The patterns of affect toward school and home authority figures are shown in Table 3.

While rural children less openly state positive affect for primary level authority figures than their urban counterparts, the same difference could not be noted when the children were asked a question concerning whether authority figures in the home and school are always correct.[12] Table 4 shows the results after scoring their responses.

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[12] Although the differences among the schools themselves were significant at the .01 level.

TABLE 3

AFFECT FOR HOME AND SCHOOL AUTHORITY FIGURES: %

	Urban Public School	Urban Private School	Rural Public School
Home:			
Positive	88	92	60
Negative	3	2	6
Neutral	0	2	0
Don't Know	9	4	34
School:			
Positive	88	90	50
Negative	2	1	4
Neutral	0	2	1
Don't Know	10	7	45
Number Responding	330	172	193

Significant at the .01 level.

Table 4 indicates no real conclusive differences between rural and urban children concerning their notions about the correctness of authority (although urban private school children see authority as less universally correct than public school children. This gives no hint as to their dependency relationship but does seem to reflect a greater exposure in the home to alternatives). Table 3 shows that urban children have a much greater positive affect toward authority figures than rural children. Feeling positive toward parents and teachers is constantly emphasized in school. Urban children seem clearly to reflect this training to a far greater extent than rural children, indicating perhaps that the traditional "distance" between fathers and children is more operative in the countryside.

TABLE 4

ON WHETHER AUTHORITY FIGURES IN HOME AND SCHOOL
ARE ALWAYS CORRECT: %

	Urban Public School	Urban Private School	Rural Public School
Always Correct	74	56	61
Not Always Correct	7	22	11
Mixed (Home and School)			
Responses	16	21	15
Don't Know	3	1	13
Number Responding	330	172	193

Significant at the .01 level.

The correctness of primary group authority figures (or, conversely, the obedience of followers) is a goal which is given heavy emphasis in primary school education and is one on which both urban and rural children learn early to make the appropriate responses. At a third grade class in the rural public school, for instance, the lesson one afternoon dealt with filial piety. Under the heading, "How Should We Be Filial to Our Parents?" the following injunctions, among others, were written down. "Mind what they say." "Help our parents to do things." "Love and protect our younger brothers and sisters." "Guard the regulations." Etc.

During an interview with a 13 year-old sixth grade Mainlander boy from the urban public school the conversation, oriented around a picture of a policeman and a vendor, went like this:

Interviewer: "Should we obey the policeman?"

Child: "Yes, we should."

Interviewer: "Why?"

Child: "Well otherwise we will obstruct traffic order."

Interviewer: "Is what a policeman says always correct?"

Child: "Yes."

Interviewer: "Is there anytime when he's not correct?"

Child: "No!"

Interviewer: "Really?"

Child: "Yes, really."

Interviewer: "Can we criticize a policeman?"

Child: "No, we can't..."

Children frequently use the phrases "to have character" and "having morals" and "being able to reform conditions" as descriptions of a leader. He is a person who wants to do good and who corrects the wrongdoing of others. As such he merits respect and obedience. An 11 year-old fourth grade Mainlander boy at the urban public school had this to say with regard to a picture showing a young man talking to two small children:

Interviewer: "Is older brother always right?"

Child: "Most of the time he's right because he's pretty grown up. When he's wrong the parents will criticize him. Relatively younger brother and younger sister can't criticize older brother. They're too small and can't take care of their older brother. If they criticized their older brother to his face he'd get angry and sometimes fighting would start. Therefore they should tell their parents. They can't criticize their older brother. If they start to fight then the parents will come and solve the problem. The parents will scold them because they shouldn't be impolite to people who are older. Older people have more experience and know better how to solve a situation..."

It is perhaps for this reason that the high percentage of responses indicating positive affect for authority figures expressed in the urban schools plus, in the urban private school, a greater willingness to question the correctness of authority, do not, as the data will point out, translate themselves into non-conformist responses. While greater conformity cannot, of course, be attributed solely to shaming punishments these do not form one essential ingredient.

Punishments may elicit "respect" from a child but they are also likely to elicit a latent fear of authority with considerable implications for later socialization. At the rural public school, for instance, a fifth grade girl wrote this about a public meeting scene, "The people were watching others speak when suddenly they saw a policeman. They didn't know who he was looking for and as a result everyone ran away." A sixth grade Taiwanese farmer's son at the same school wrote of a schoolroom scene that a student had not been able to answer a question. The other students, he wrote "... think that it would be right if this student were punished by the teacher." Later, he said, the other students "... will be even more studious because they fear being punished by the teacher."

Punishments are only one means of eliciting conformist group responses. They are primarily efficacious in discouraging deviant behavior but it is the more positive training, based on modeling of actual or symbolic models and involving rewards for correct performance, which is more important in terms of developing widely shared relatively uniform patterned responses. Training concerning one's role and proper role behavior begins early in the home and is carried on the moment a child enters school. In the pre-character reader used in the first grade, for instance, the lessons frequently are couched in terms of children taking instructions from clearly defined hierarchical superiors (and models). "Shut the door, open the window, close the eyes," mother directs in one of the stories. "Stand up, bow, sit down, take out books," says the teacher to the children in another.

Throughout the school years themes related to cooperation and the suppression of interpersonal conflict are heavily emphasized. Such precepts occur in many contexts. In fourth grade in the urban public school, for instance, in a class on writing, the teacher wrote the characters for "selfish" on the blackboard and asked the class if this word was good or bad. "Not good," they all said. "Say it again," the teacher said, and the class responded, much louder, "Not good." In a sixth grade self-study book a review question is asked, "How can the unity of everyone be improved and increased?" and the answer that is supplied is "Cooperation."

While these points concerning general socialization in the home and school are both brief and selective, they are suggestive of some

Interviewer: "What sort of things does one have to do as an older brother?"

Child: "You have to be a good example. You should do your lessons well. When an older brother returns home he should do his lessons. That way younger brother and younger sister will know how to study well."

One may certainly obey an authority figure because he sets a good example and is older, but as the passage quoted above suggests, there are often other less noble reasons involved. Release of aggression against an authority figure may subject one to reprisal and punishment. This is recognized quite early in a child's life. At the urban private school, when asked what the policeman and the vendor (in the picture alluded to previously) were going to do, a first grade girl replied, "The policeman is thinking of hitting him and taking him to prison" (because, the child said, the vendor was selling dirty fruit). When asked how a teacher should be toward students, a 5th grade girl at the urban public school replied, "If the students make mistakes, he should speak with them. If every time a student makes a mistake, he doesn't correct himself, then he should be strictly punished." To the question. "And how should the students be toward the teacher?" came the rejoinder, "They should be respectful."

There is a feeling held by urban school teachers that discipline in the countryside exceeds in severity that which urban children experience. Rural children are beaten with a switch, it is said, or made to run around a field for some specified period of time. Observation of physical punishment is exceedingly difficult for the outsider, but children at all three schools mentioned that beating was occasionally employed. In the urban public school, first graders who misbehave have their heads shaken back and forth. In all schools, however, while physical nastiness is known to exist it is neither the most prevalent form of punishment nor the one which has the greatest force of negative sanction. Instead shaming punishments are widely employed and are, in fact, an integral part of the instruction process. The most common form of this punishment is to require the offender to stand up among his peers and to be allowed to sit only after he has answered correctly or the teacher is satisfied that a proper time penalty has been paid. As a technique, shaming is used for both behavioral and academic shortcomings. Reading aloud the names of children who fail an examination is an apt example of the latter case. The use of shaming punishments seems, from observation, to be employed both more frequently and more severely in the urban schools and especially the private schools. This is particularly interesting if we can trust the comments about the greater use of purely physical punishment in the rural schools. Punishments involving affect are an important component of effective dependency training.

of the main aspects of development of attitudes and behavior toward authority. The paramountcy of authority and the suppression of the individual's needs to group interests are aspects of general learning which, if reinforced, we would expect to find prominent in specifically political situations. In the next section some information is presented on how formal political training in Taiwan is structured to reinforce salient patterns from general socialization.

Specific Political Training

Among other things, the goal of citizenship and morals training is the "nurturing of a happy group spirit of cooperation."[13] In Taiwan this means something more precise than the words themselves might indicate. Social studies materials, for instance are considered to be of prime importance in obtaining this goal because they contain citizenship oriented lessons. These not only instruct about government but also on how to be a good citizen which means specifically, in terms of group behavior, a firm understanding of the values associated with the concept of filial piety. Filial piety is the basis of group cooperation because it includes not only the relations of children to parents but also those between spouses, among siblings, and in paired relationships generally. Ultimately such training is designed to go beyond the values governing primary group relationships and to show each child his relationship to the society as a whole. Such linking is by no means implicit. As a third grade home study book succinctly puts it in a true-false section, "In the school we are good students; in society we ought to be good citizens."

Educational authorities are at some pains to develop a rapport among educational materials. In the primers, for instance, the lessons are designed so that several will cover one central theme. Citizenship training of a general nature can and should, it is felt, start from first grade. In the first two years the "general knowledge" section of the curriculum often includes citizenship content and therefore is coordinated with other courses such as nature studies where in some stories, animals, for instance, may be made to express political values. Beginning in the third grade, however, history and geography become the prime media for the dissemination of citizenship training.[14]

In the fifth and sixth grades citizenship ceases to be an aspect of other courses and becomes a subject in its own right. The lessons themselves are broken down according to the following schedule (the

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[13] Wu Yuan-chieh, ed., *Hsiao-hsueh she-hui-ko, chiao-hsueh-fa* (Teaching Methods for Elementary School Social Studies), (Taipei, Taiwan, National Educational Materials Office, 1961), p. 8.

[14] Suen Pang-cheng, *Hsiao-hsueh tu-shu chiao-hsueh-fa* (Methods for Teaching Reading in Elementary Schools), (Taiwan, National Educational Materials Office, 1961), pp. 29-31.

numbers in the boxes denote the number of lessons devoted to each heading):

TABLE 5

CATEGORIES OF CITIZENSHIP LESSONS IN FIFTH AND SIXTH GRADES

Grade	The Individual	The Family	School	Society	Nation	World
5	3	3	5	4	0	0
6	0	0	2	3	7	4

As can be noted there is a steadily increasing emphasis in the fifth and sixth grades on "society" and "nation" and a declining emphasis on the individual and primary groups. This does not mean, however, that the lower grades are excluded from training concerning the secondary group level but only that such training becomes more specific as age increases. Thus when a school as a whole is studying "patriotism" first and second grade children will study sub-topics such as "I respect the flag," "I respect the President" and "I like to use the products of my country." Third and fourth grade children cover such items as "I am not frightened when a crisis occurs" and "I respect the great people in my country's history" while fifth and sixth grade children study sub-topics with titles of "I wish to use my full strength to serve the country," "I give special attention to guarding defense secrets," "I wish to join in the activities of the glorious and respected military" and "I deeply believe that the Three Principles of the People is the ideology for saving the country."[15]

Reinforcement of an identification with China and a knowledge of one's "Chineseness" goes on throughout the educational process. In kindergarten, for instance, the children are taught in one of the lessons, "We are Chinese and we all love China. Our China's national territory is the largest, the population the greatest and our products the most abundant." In fourth grade in the primer there is a poem every stanza of which begins with the lines, "China, China, Lovable China. There is no other country in all the world greater than you." The second stanza goes on, "With 400 million people and a civilization 5000 years old. With Confucius and the Father of the Country (Sun Yat-sen), great names filling the whole world. You are the enlightened and prosperous country of the world."[16]

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[15] Department of National Elementary Education, Ministry of Education, *Kuomin hsueh-hsiao k'o-ch'eng piao-chuen* (Curriculum Standards for National Elementary Schools), (Taipei, Taiwan, Cheng Chung Book Co., 1962), pp. 22-23.

[16] National Compilation and Translation Office, *Kuo-yu k'o-pen* (Mandarin Primer), (Taiwan, Office of Education, Taiwan Provincial Government, 1964), Book 8 (Lower and Middle Grades), Lesson 27.

Citizenship training, as the poem above only barely suggests, is intimately connected with the names of Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen. At the urban public school one enters the building flanked by a bust of Chiang and a statue representing Confucius. On the playground, below the flagpole and directly in front of it, is a large bust of Sun Yat-sen. Pictures of Sun and Chiang abound in the schools. No other political symbols are given such weight in the educational process, and it is quite fair and legitimate to say that the position of Chiang and Sun as symbolic models for correct behavior is unchallenged.

Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek serve in the political socialization process as pre-eminent models. Yet they are of interest for more than this reason. A knowledge of the roles of these two men can be an initial point for an understanding of national politics generally. While clearly an analysis of Sun and Chiang can be only a beginning, it can be suggestive of how awareness of national politics is acquired. Moreover, an examination of the roles of these two leaders leads to a better understanding of the relationship between attitudes toward primary group authority figures and those toward political figures at the secondary level.

National Political Leaders

When asked who the most heroic person they had ever heard of was, nearly 50% of all the children named someone associated with the government while roughly 17% named family or other authority figures. Between rural and urban children there was a significantly (.01 level) greater capacity for the urban children to respond by naming some concrete individual. Fifty four percent of the rural children gave don't know responses while only 20% of the urban children answered this way. When asked who the most likeable person was, however, nearly 60% of all the children responded by naming some family authority figure. Again differences between rural and urban children were significant (.01 level) with 40% of the rural children giving don't know responses. On a question concerning the most intelligent person, however, children are almost as ready to name some peer as they are an authority figure (30% vs. 32%). Only 15% of the children named someone associated with the government. However, in the urban private school this percentage was 19%; it was 15% in the urban public school; and the percentage drops to 10% in the rural public school. There was a significant difference (.01 level) among the pattern of responses of the schools with the rural public school, as before, giving a far higher percentage of don't know responses. Clearly the urban children are far more able to identify and characterize specific authority figures with specific traits.

Of all the children who named some government figure in response to the question of who was the most heroic person they had heard of, some responded by naming Sun Yat-sen or Chiang Kai-shek. Within the total sample the proportion of children who answered in this way was a little over 23%, or roughly a quarter of all the respondents. Among the children who named some government figure as their heroic ideal there was no significant difference between rural and urban children. Of all the answers in this category these two men, taken as one sub-category, were named more frequently than any other response.

David Easton and Jack Dennis have written, "But for the fact that each new generation is able to learn a body of political orientations from its predecessors, no given political system would be able to persist. Fundamentally, the theoretical significance of the study of socializing processes in political life resides in its contribution to our understanding of the way in which political systems are able to persist, even as they change, for more than one generation."[17] This persistence, Easton and Dennis feel, hinges on the presence of a readily identifiable point of contact between the child and the political system.

While difficult to pinpoint precisely, the "point of contact" for children in Taiwan seems to be located primarily in the early training children receive concerning Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek. Around these two men is constructed an imagery of the political system in which their role is seen as preponderant and crucial, an imagery which in fact may not be far from the truth. Moreover, Sun and Chiang serve as models for the behavior of the good citizen. Their position at the apex of the political system serves as a readily identifiable point for political loyalties at the same time that the virtuous behavior of these two heroes is presented as the reason for their eminence.

The children are undoubtedly exposed to some knowledge of Chiang and Sun prior to their entry into school. Pictures of the two men are in public buildings and Chiang is featured in the movie accompanying the national anthem which is shown before every feature performance throughout Taiwan. It is thus very difficult to ascertain at precisely what age children become aware of the national leadership aspect of the political system or whether urban children, as would seem more likely, receive an earlier impression in this regard than rural children. But whatever the pre-school impressions once children commence their formal education they are, from the very beginning, systematically made aware of this feature of their political environment. While much of the training concerning Sun and Chiang is incidental, some are almost embarrassingly adulatory in content. In the sixth grade, for instance,

[17] David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Image of Government," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol. CCCLXI (September, 1965), p. 41.

all children in Taiwan read a lesson in their History Primers entitled "The People's Savior: President Chiang." Relating various incidents in Chiang's early life the account states that Sun Yat-sen "... praised and admired [Chiang], considering him to be most excellent and the most loyal revolutionary cadre." Finally, throwing caution to the winds, the lesson ends with these words, "All his life the president has been loyal to the party and patriotic to the country and, struggling for the revolution, has continued to carry out the teachings of the Father of our Country (Sun Yat-sen) and has industriously labored to build a new China. He is the savior of the Chinese people and the greatest man in the whole world."[18]

Although adults in Taiwan will occasionally express political cynicism this is very rarely observed among children. On the contrary the statements children make are often guileless and genuinely enthusiastic. A fifth grade Taiwanese boy at the rural public school, for instance, wrote a description of a public meeting scene saying that some Chinese people were listening to a lecture when sad but generous thoughts of Sun Yat-sen developed. "Everybody," the boy wrote, "is thinking of elevating himself in the same style as the Father of the Country." Speaking about the same scene a third grade Taiwanese girl at the urban public school, during an interview, responded in part in the following way:

Interviewer: "When we have a meeting, who speaks?"

Child: "President Chiang."

Interviewer: "Is he here?" [in this picture]

Child: "... yes."

Interviewer: "Where?"

Child: "At the Sun Yat-sen hall." [points to the speaker on the platform in the picture]

Interviewer: "What is President Chiang talking about?"

Child: "He's talking about the affairs of the country."

Interviewer: "What sort of person can become President?"

Child: "... honest, patriotic, brave."

Interviewer: "How does a person become the president?"

Child: "... is he born one?"

Interviewer: "No, how does it happen?"

Child: "A long time ago the Communists persecuted the people and the President led the people in a revolution."

Interviewer: "What do you think the President ought to do for the people?"

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[18] National Compilation and Translation Office, *Li-shih k'o-pen* (History Primer), (Taiwan, Office of Education, Taiwan Provincial Government, 1964), Book 4, Lesson 16.

Child: "He ought to make the people happy and peaceful."
Interviewer: "What do you mean by happy and peaceful?"
Child: "We must re-take the Mainland."
Interviewer: "When the President speaks is he always correct?"
Child: "Yes."
Interviewer: "Is there anytime when he isn't correct?"
Child: "No. . . ."
Interviewer: "Do you feel a President is needed?"
Child: "Yes."
Interviewer: "Why?"
Child: "Because he is the one who raises the revolution. He is the first person in the country."
Interviewer: "What should the President do?"
Child: ". . . he should do those things which protect the country."

Like this child most of the children, rural and urban, see the President as loyal and brave, the protector of the country. They may not be too sure how he becomes President but they sense an integral relationship between the virtues they claim for him and his position. Moreover, as the rural child inadvertently revealed, there is a reciprocal identification between the leader and his followers.

Following a test form given by Easton and Dennis to American children,[19] a symbolic association quiz was administered to 180 children from grades 1 to 6 at each of the three schools. In this test the children were shown ten pictures (a policeman, Sun Yat-sen, Double Ten Holiday, voting, the Courts, the Presidential Palace, the Legislative Yuan, the flag, the Three Principles of the People, Chiang Kai-shek, plus one more blank space lettered "I don't know") and asked to pick two each that first came to mind in response to two questions: (1) What do you first think of when you think of government? and (2) Who makes the laws?[20] Using the same criteria as Easton and Dennis that for any picture a response rate over 20% was significant it turns out that for question 1 only 4 pictures achieve this rating — Sun Yat-sen, the flag, the Three Principles of the People, and Chiang Kai Shek — and for question 2 there are also 4 pictures with this rating — Sun Yat-sen, the Courts, the Legislative Yuan, and Chiang Kai-shek. The patterns at the urban and rural schools with regard to the most important symbolic associations concerning government are reflected in Table 6.

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[19] Easton and Dennis, op. cit., pp. 44-45.
[20] Because of ambiguities in the Chinese language this question could be read "Who made the laws?" thus making a response of Sun Yat-sen both possible and likely.

TABLE 6

Most Important Symbolic Associations
Concerning Government (Question 1): %

	Urban Public School	Urban Private School	Rural Public School
Sun Yat-sen	54	58	53
The Flag	21	32	26
The Three Principles of the People	26	18	23
Chiang Kai-shek	45	51	38
Number Responding	180	180	180

Due to the double responses for each question percentages may be over 100.

As symbolic associations of government Chiang and Sun, with some
variations, are unmatched at all schools. This pattern changes, however,
with regard to law-making:

TABLE 7

Who Makes the Laws (Question 2):   %

	Urban Public School	Urban Private School	Rural Public School
Sun Yat-sen	41	37	26
The Courts	34	44	28
The Legislative Yuan	47	54	36
Chiang Kai-shek	28	28	32
Number Responding	180	180	180

Due to the double responses for each question percentages may be over 100.

Clearly, although the differences between the rural and the urban
children are not great (and there were changes in the response patterns
by age at all schools), it would seem that rural children hold Chiang
Kai-shek less as a symbol of government than the urban children al-
though they see him as slightly more influential in making the laws.
This discrepancy is probably due to the greater proportion of Taiwanese
in the rural sample (who at every school identify less with Chiang
than the Mainlanders) and because the rural environment makes exposure
to reinforcing influences outside the school less likely. The Sun Yat-sen
symbol, however, is virtually uniform between the country and the city.
Since all children are taught about the various branches and
functions of government in school the failure of the rural children, in
comparison to their urban counterparts, to name the Legislative Yuan
as chief law-maker is instructive. As in the case of Chiang Kai-shek

as a symbolic association, it would seem that the absence of a capital city environment and the reduced involvement with national level politics and political symbols that this implies decreases for rural children the reinforcement in specific political learning which urban children receive as part of their daily lives. It is just this type of overall response pattern, in which direction of choice is the same but where intensity varies, that we can note for rural children the effects of deprivation from outside reinforcement which urban children in Taiwan receive. Urban children witness political involvement and can themselves become involved (as in Double Ten parades, for instance) in a way which makes politics more meaningful and exciting for them. Such involvement, however, may be highly stereotyped in form and particularly so if the socialization process puts an emphasis on certain defined responses. Involvement, therefore, should not be equated with variety in political behavior but only in this case with greater awareness (at the conscious and sub-conscious levels) of the major facts and values in the political socialization process.

Local Political Leaders

In the realm of political socialization, where the time sequence and the intensity of learning are analyzed, local politics must logically follow national politics. Chinese children (and American children as well) learn of national politics far earlier than they do of local politics. It is through the President and great historical national figures that children are introduced to the political world and take the first steps in acquiring appropriate political behavior. Knowledge of local politics comes when an awareness of politics itself is already an established fact. Superficially it might appear that learning about local politics after national politics violates the normal learning sequence of the simpler to the more complex. This is not true, however, for in political socialization the elements of national politics acquired by a child initially constitute no more than symbol sets and a knowledge of individuals who are models for behavior in general. The complexities of political action at any level are only learned much later.

In Taiwan, as has been pointed out, training in political attitudes and behavior begins the moment a child enters school. Slowly, and at first only incidentally, more information is supplied about the actual workings of the political system. By the fifth and sixth grade, such training becomes formalized in citizenship primers where the child is introduced to the structure and functions of government at all levels. Reinforcing such factual data is corollary training on the proper attitudes toward the government.

Children at the three schools were asked who the head of the city government of Taipei is. Unfortunately, since the general thrust of

the main body of this research was not concerned with local politics
per se, no question was asked about comparable rural political roles.
The question was not worded so as to require a name response (al-
though some children may have thus construed it) but rather to elicit
at what age children become aware of the role of Mayor. By the sixth
grade in elementary school it could be assumed that both rural and
urban children would be able to respond to this question correctly
since by that time they have been formally instructed concerning
city government. It is true that with age all the children show, as
would be expected, a marked increase in ability to respond correctly
to this question. It is also to be expected that Taipei children would
show a greater capacity to identify correctly this role since they are
more likely to be aware of the leader of their own local political unit.
This is perhaps particularly the case in Taipei where the Mayor, a
Taiwanese, was a successful candidate against the ruling Kuomintang
Party and where, in addition, he seemed constantly to be embroiled
in allegations — reported in the press — concerning his financial integrity.
Nevertheless it should also be taken into account that the rural school
which was sampled was located only a few miles from the city proper.
These particular children had much greater opportunity to acquire knowl-
edge of the city than their more isolated compatriots; many had un-
doubtedly visited Taipei on more than one occasion. Taking such
factors into account, however, we still note a surprising discrepancy
in the ability of rural and urban children to answer this question.
In coding responses the children were first categorized by whether they
named any government figure or role as the head of Taipei's city
government.

TABLE 8

THE HEAD OF TAIPEI'S CITY GOVERNMENT: %

	Urban Public School	Urban Private School	Rural Public School
Government Role or Figure	59	71	31
Non-Government Role or Figure	3	3	4
Don't Know	38	26	65
Number Responding	330	172	193

Significant at the .01 level.

The chart indicates that urban children are almost twice as capable
as rural children in answering this question. The assertion cannot be
proven but the suspicion remains that the discrepancy cannot be totally

attributed to the wording of the question but may have to do with the rate at which urban and rural children acquire a knowledge of politics. This second assertion is given credence if we analyze the "government" responses from each of the three schools and divide them into the categories of Mayor's name or Mayor's role, President's name or President's role, and Others. In this way it can be seen whether the rural children who do respond are doing so on the basis of political knowledge acquired earlier in their socialization process.

TABLE 9

ANALYSIS OF "GOVERNMENT ROLE OR FIGURE" RESPONSES
(TABLE 8) BY SELECTED CATEGORIES: %

	Urban Public School	Urban Private School	Rural Public School
Mayor/Mayor's Role	73	76	20
President/President's Role	24	19	57
Others	3	5	23
Number Responding	194	123	60

Significant at the .01 level.

The percentage of responses naming President or President's Role under rural public school is very high compared to the urban schools. If we look at the fifth and sixth grade children from the rural public school and the urban private school, the two schools most diametrically opposed, the comparison is even more startling. Taking again just those children who gave a "Government Role or Figure" response we note that in the rural public school in the fifth grade, the percentage who named Chiang is 69% and in the sixth grade 31%. In the urban private school, on the other hand, almost all the children in this response category in both upper grades respond Mayor, only 5% naming Chiang in the 5th grade and 4% in the sixth grade. It seems quite clear, therefore, that the rural children, despite the similarity in political educational instruction which they receive, show an appreciable lag behind the urban children in the acquisition of secondary information about politics, particularly that which is not directly relevant to their own environment. Once again it seems logical to infer that the rural environment insulates children more from a sense of the excitement and possibilities in politics. Not only do rural children themselves have less interaction with the national level political world but the adults with whom they are associated also have less interaction, thus reinforcing a distinctive pattern. Although factual data on "modernized" political roles and functions may

be acquired in school by rural children at the same time as the urban
children, it is not reinforced in terms of the environment so that
under stress (as when answering questions) earlier acquired and still
more important political information is utilized.

Children in Taiwan do not have the same affective attachment to
local political leaders as they do for their national leaders. Indeed, it
may be quite the opposite as it was for a sixth grade boy from the
city private school who responded, when asked what he thought about
the Mayor, that this worthy was "out for himself."

For national political leaders, as Greenstein has pointed out, affective
knowledge precedes factual knowledge. On the local political level,
however, the reverse process seems to be true and factual knowledge
precedes affective. The implications for the system as a whole of a
negative affective response toward a local leader are not nearly as serious
as they would be toward a national leader. Adults, it seems, take care
that a positive affective orientation toward high status political roles
is acquired early and is heavily reinforced. The more children know
about local politics and local political leaders, however, the more there
seems to be a willingness to voice negative sentiments. In this regard
the difference between learning about local and national politics is
marked. Whether negative sentiments about local politics are a pre-
cursor to cynicism concerning national politics (so evident among many
adult Chinese) is a matter of conjecture although some linkage un-
doubtedly exists.

Despite the fact that learning about local politics does not carry
the heavy affective load that exists in learning about national politics,
it is still true, as the following table shows, that children by and
large have positive feelings about local political leaders.

TABLE 10

AFFECTIVE ORIENTATIONS TOWARD THE HEAD OF THE
CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAIPEI: %

	Urban Public School	Urban Private School	Rural Public School
Positive	46	50	29
Neutral	3	4	0
Negative	6	10	1
Don't Know	45	36	70
Number Responding	330	172	193

Significant at the .01 level.

Conclusion

Although elementary education in Taiwan is theoretically uniform it is quite apparent that differences exist among children in the rate in which certain information is acquired and in the depth to which the knowledge imparted is absorbed. In the data presented here the populations of three schools were examined, one in a rural area outside Taipei and two within the city of Taipei itself. While differences in responses are clearly due to a variety of factors — sex, income level of family, Mainlander versus Taiwanese, age — one clear differentiating characteristic in the data is the fact that the children in these schools are either predominantly rural or urban in family background. Using this as a basis, an examination was made of the educational system in general and empirical data was presented on selected differences in response patterns between rural and urban children.

In general the data indicated that rural children show a marked propensity to give "don't know" responses whatever the question, whereas for urban children the higher the socio-economic level the less the propensity to give a "don't know" answer but a corresponding inclination to respond in a uniform and educationally "expected" fashion. One of the hypotheses of this paper was that frequent "don't know" responses indicated an unwillingness to become involved coupled, in the case of rural children, with an inability to comprehend adequately the alternatives that may be available in a question response. Clearly the rural development in Taiwan does not expose a child to the excitement of national level politics the way the urban environment does. This in itself strongly suggests a reduced saliency of politics at this level in the lives of rural children which decreases their interest in acquiring and retaining relevant political information. "Don't know" responses therefore may truly reflect a lack of knowledge of alternatives but this ignorance is coupled with a lack of interest whose basic roots lie in lack of exposure.

A failure by rural children to respond to questions concerning specific political information may be related to lack of exposure but this argument seems much less persuasive with regard to questions concerning personal, family, or school matters. But even in these areas a greater number of "don't know" responses was indicated for rural children. Rural children do seem to manifest a certain fear in responding, a fear which is not as noticeable with the urban children. Yet this fear to become involved was clearly one of the most noted characteristics of traditional Chinese society and its continuance in rural areas of Taiwan is therefore hardly strange. The changing environment of the city, both from a physical and a work standpoint, presents the individual with a challenge for adaptive responses. Such a challenge

is on a much lower scale in the countryside. There is much less need there to question or modify prevailing values and patterns of behavior. The cultural ethic of remaining uncommitted — where the possibility exists for making a false step — seems much stronger in the rural areas and is reflected, I believe, in the responses of the rural children.

But if rural children in Taiwan fail to respond to the questionnaires many urban children respond in a patterned fashion. For while urban children seem more aware of certain aspects of politics than rural children, training and exploration of new forms of "authority" behavior has been rather rigidly curtailed. Both rural and urban children receive training in authority behavior which is highly similar. The essential difference between the two groups is that the urban environment makes national level and urban politics more salient and interesting and give the children a sense of the possibilities in this area. Urban children thus seem to acquire an earlier more rounded concept of "modern" politics. But in terms of response patterns some very traditional influences are at work in both rural and urban areas, supporting the role of authority and making deviation from well established norms undesirable. The result for the rural children is manifested by an inclination not to respond and thus risk involvement by having responded incorrectly and for the urban children by responses showing a high degree of social acceptability.

Whether rural or urban, however, children in Taiwan show a highly favorable disposition toward their national leaders and political institutions. Without their even realizing it this early favorable disposition has great implications for the stability of the system. Unfavorable information learned at a later date is evaluated in terms of already acquired favorable beliefs and values, giving a strong underpinning to the political system.

One conclusion faintly suggested by the data is that the children most likely in the future to be politically innovative are the lower middle class urban public school children. Exposed to politics, not so constrained as their more privileged peers nor so fearful of involvement as their rural equals, this group has the most potential volatility. In good times the plums will probably continue to fall to the privileged. In a time of crisis, however, it is probably the graduates of the urban public schools who would have the greatest capacity to innovate decisively and to politicize other groups in terms of their own goals.

INDIA'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
RELATIONS WITH SIKKIM

VALENTINE J. BELFIGLIO

Sikkim is situated in the most strategic and exposed position in the frontier region between India and China. Not only is Sikkim the major channel of communication between India and Tibet, it is also the connecting link between the predominantly Hindu culture of the Central Himalayan Region, and the Buddhist and Animist communities of the Eastern Himalayan Region.[1] The Chinese threat has been responsible for a greatly stepped up program of road construction and economic development in Sikkim, as well as Bhutan.[2]

INDIAN AID AND INVESTMENT PROGRAMS

In 1952, Sikkimese Maharaja Sir Tashi Namgyal, the Chogyal (ruler) of Sikkim and Indian Prime Minister Nehru met and formulated Sikkim's Seven Year Plan. Since then Sikkim has prospered economically as the result of the implementation of two economic plans. The first one began in 1954 and lasted until 1961. On March 15, 1955, the Maharaja of Sikkim recommended the Seven Year Plan to his people with the following words:

> I would now earnestly call upon my people to set themselves, with purpose and determination to the fulfillment of this great adventure. I am confident that with the implementation of the Plan, we shall have advanced far towards achieving the welfare and happiness of the people.[3]

The second plan began in 1961 and terminated in 1966. At the end of the second plan the Kingdom had shown an annual per capita income of Rs 700, approximately double that of India, its benefactor. The two plans have been financed from funds provided by India as outright grants.[4] India spent a sum of Rs 32.369 million on the Seven Year Plan (1954-1961). An examination of the plan is provided in the following table:

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[1] Leo E. Rose, "India and Sikkim: Redefining the Relationship," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XLII, No. 1 (Spring, 1969), p. 32.

[2] Karan, "Sikkim and Bhutan: A Geographical Appraisal," *Journal of Geography* (February, 1961), p. 58.

[3] Chandra Das Rai, "Sikkim 3-Seven Year Plan," *United Asia*, Vol. XII, No. 4 (1960), pp. 360-361.

[4] "Sikkim Parties Share Hostility to China," *Hindustan Times*, June 1, 1967, p. 9.

TABLE 1

EXPENDITURES ALLOCATED TO SIKKIM DURING THE
1954-1961 SEVEN YEAR PLAN

Project	Expenditure in Rs Million
Agricultural and Rural Development	1.300
Horticulture	1.121
Minor Irrigation Works	0.155
Animal Husbandry	0.292
Dairying and Milk Supply	0.552
Forest	2.258
Co-operation	0.542
Power Project	2.983
Cottage Industries	0.387
Other Industries	1.440
Roads and Buildings	13.901
Communications	0.001
Road Transport	1.670
Education	2.322
Medical and Public Health	2.273
Buildings	1.026
Cultural Organizations	0.146
Total	Rs 32.369

SOURCE: Adapted from information obtained from the Information Service
of India, Political Office, Gangtok, Sikkim, July 5, 1968, p. 16.

The emphasis on road construction evident in the first plan doubt-
less reflects India's concern for being able to transport its troops to
Sikkim to meet any military threat from the Communist Chinese. Also
it is understandable that without good roads and bridges none of the
other schemes under the plan could be developed. Medical aid would
remain static, the farmers' markets would be restricted, education would
be departmentalized, etc.[5]

In the second plan (1961-1966) India doubled its aid to Sikkim,
with the major emphasis again on road construction. Table 2 shows
the expenditures allocated to Sikkim during the implementation of the
Five Year Plan (1961-1966). An examination of the plan demonstrates
the area of road construction to be of greatest concern to New Delhi.

It is an important consideration to take note of the fact that
both the Seven Year Plan and the Five Year Plan were completely
financed by the Government of India.[6] The greatest emphasis of both
plans has been on communication and transportation development. Before

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[5] "Sikkim 3-Seven Year Plan," *op. cit.*, p. 361.

[6] "Bhutan and Sikkim," *Information Service of India, Political Office*, Gangtok,
Sikkim, July 5, 1968, p. 17.

TABLE 2

EXPENDITURES ALLOCATED TO SIKKIM DURING THE
1961-1966 FIVE YEAR PLAN

Project	Expenditure in Rs Million
Agricultural Production	2.892
Minor Irrigation	0.145
Animal Husbandry	1.179
Dairying	0.209
Forests	5.379
Soil Conservation	0.456
Fisheries	0.026
Co-operation	0.315
Power	5.305
Cottage Industries	0.935
Other Industries	0.241
Roads	26.084
Road Transport	4.400
Tourism	0.524
Education	7.682
Health	4.267
Housing	0.632
Publicity	0.140
Press	0.440
Cultural Activities	0.139
Marketing Centers	0.174
Secretariat Building	0.525
Community Center	0.306
Planning Development	1.242
T o t a l	Rs 63.637

1954, there were only 50 kilometers of motorable road between Gangtok and Rangpo, on the West Bengal-Sikkim Border; and only 342 kilometers of motorable roads throughout the entire country. By 1962, several jeep tracks in lower Sikkim and about 153 kilometers of the North Sikkim Highway connecting Gangtok with Lachen and Lachung in North Sikkim had been constructed. Former pathways inaccessible to motor vehicles have been developed into roads capable of supporting mechanized traffic. These include a road between Rishi on the West Bengal border, and Jalepla on the Tibet border; a road from Gangtok to Natu La on the Sikkim-Tibet border; and other roads in eastern Sikkim.[7] On June 29, 1965 a Rs 500,000 suspension bridge linking Kalimpong, a sub-division in West-Bengal, and Western Sikkim at Malli was completed. The 292 foot long bridge traversed the Teesta River and linked the Sikkim-Namgyal highway with the Siliguiri-

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[7] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

Gangtok highway.[8] The bridge was subsequently "washed away by heavy landslides" but plans have been drafted to build it again. In addition 19 "long bridges"[9] were constructed in outlying areas. As a result of the road construction programs, almost all parts of Sikkim are within easy reach of Gangtok and the Sikkim Nationalized Transport operated services on all important routes. Sikkim has neither airfields nor railways, but Gangtok is connected to the Indian Air terminal and railhead of Silguru by a motorable road via Rangpo.[10] Under the 1950 Indo-Sikkimese Treaty, communications are managed by the Government of India. Under the Indian Development assistance programs, Sikkim has increased the number of Post and Telegraph offices from two to nine.

Before the onset of the two development plans, 88 schools with a total enrollment of 2,500 students existed in Sikkim. "With the termination of the Second Plan, there were 191 primary schools, 5 secondary schools, 1 public school, 1 technical training school and one monastic school."[11]

The Government of India has donated about Rs 1 million since 1958 to the Namgyal Institute of Tibetology, at Gangtok, where Mahayana Buddhistic Studies are carried on. Two hundred fifty Sikkimese students have been trained in India on scholarships made available by the Government of India.[12]

There are plans for a college to be established in Gangtok in 1971, and four Adult Education Centers have recently been established. The total student enrollment in July, 1968 was 15,000.[13]

About one-third of Sikkim's 2,828 square miles of territory are forested, and lumber is considered one of the Kingdom's greatest assets. The Sikkimese Forest Department has been engaged in soil conservation and afforestation programs. Sikkim sells timber to India for its railway development projects. The Forest Department has also embarked upon a tea plantation program which is providing jobs for hundreds of Tibetan refugees. Contour surveys are also being carried out for a proposed tea garden and reclamation area to be located at Kewzing.[14]

Sikkim has considerable hydro-electric potential. In 1961 the Rangni Hydel Project was completed and is now generating 2,100 kilowatts of electricity for the Gangtok area.[15] The project was expanded during the Five Year Plan, and is now the principal source of power supply

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[8] "Bridge with Sikkim Inaugurated," *Hindustan Times,* July 8, 1965, p. 4.
[9] "Sikkim's March to Progress," *Hindustan Times,* March 31, 1966, p. 3.
[10] *Statesman's Yearbook 1968-1969,* p. 424.
[11] "Bhutan and Sikkim," *op. cit.,* p. 19.
[12] *Ibid.,* p. 22.
[13] *Ibid.,* p. 19.
[14] "Sikkim's March to Progress," *op. cit.,* p. 3.
[15] Karan, *The Himalayan Kingdoms,* p. 72.

to Singtam, and Rangpo. In addition, it will soon be supplying hydro-electric power to adjoining areas in West Bengal.[16]

A micro-hydel project in Manul in North Sikkim is also under construction, and plans have been completed for three more hydel projects at Rothak Geyzing and Lagyap.[17]

Before the commencement of planning, there were only two hospitals in Sikkim. At the conclusion of the Five Year Plan, there were 5 government hospitals, 24 government dispensaries and 4 sub-dispensaries. Medical complexes consisting of a maternity ward, and isolation ward, and a T.B. ward have been completed in almost every district. Government programs for the eradication of such diseases as malaria, tuberculosis, venereal disease, Kols Azar, and intestinal worms have had remarkable success. One hundred fifty-four village water supply schemes have also been instituted with Indian help. Indian army doctors have been quite active in all of these programs.[18]

Agriculture has traditionally been the chief support of Sikkim's economy. Ninety-five percent of the population of Sikkim depends upon agricultural production for their livelihood. In order to assist in the development of this vital area, a Department of Agriculture was created in 1955.[19] Under Indian grants the Department has given Rs 400,000 in loans to needy farmers and opened 100 acre farms at Geyzing, and Ribdi to provide quality seeds. A crash program to step up food production and provide seeds, fertilizers and technical expertise to farmers has also been introduced.[20] Government demonstration centers have been set up at Tadung, Lachen and Gangtok.[21] A Department of Animal Husbandry recently established, has taken steps to improve the quality and yield of wool, improve cattle and sheep breeds, and provide veterinary hospitals and dispensaries for all district headquarters.[22]

Since 1960, the Sikkim Mining Corporation, a joint undertaking of the Governments of India and Sikkim has been instrumental in sponsoring systematic mineral development. Copper, lead and zinc are mined in appreciable quantities. In addition the Five Year Plan has provided for an industrial survey of the Kingdom to determine possibilities for setting up of industries based on forest products.[23] A Rs 13 crore paper pulp project with Indian collaboration is currently under consideration.[24]

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[16] "Bhutan and Sikkim," op. cit., p. 19.
[17] Ibid., p. 19; Hindustan Times, March 31, 1966, p. 3.
[18] "Bhutan and Sikkim," op. cit., pp. 19-20; Hindustan Times, March 31, 1966, p. 3.
[19] Karan, op. cit., p. 70.
[20] Hindustan Times, March 31, 1966, p. 3.
[21] "Bhutan and Sikkim," op. cit., p. 20.
[22] Hindustan Times, March 31, 1966, p. 3.
[23] Karan, op. cit., p. 71.
[24] "Indian Aid for Sikkim Paper Pulp Project," Hindustan Times, March 31, 1966, p. 3.

Twenty-four co-operative societies and four fair price shops are now functioning in Sikkim. A sum of Rs 840,000 was given in 1965 to Sikkim by India to start four small-scale industries. These include a wire nail factory at Rangpo, a gas plant at Rhensek, an orchard sanctuary at Gangtok, and an extension of the nursery at Rhenock.[25]

A third plan (1966-1971) is currently in effect. Under the plan, India is contributing outright grants totalling Rs 90 million to Sikkim, with the accent on further industrialization. Allotments have also been made for improving agriculture.[26]

Virtually the entire development budget is met by India through direct grants-in-aid, loans or subsidies. Article IV of the Text of the Indian-Sikkim Peace Treaty issued in Gangtok, on December 5, 1950 forbids Sikkimese acceptance of foreign aid from countries other than India. The Article asserts:

> (1) The external relations of Sikkim whether political, economic or financial, shall be conducted and regulated solely by the Government of India and the Government of Sikkim shall have no dealings with any foreign power.[27]

Sikkim is interested in such multi-national aid programs as the Colombo Plan or in private foreign capital investment. However, the Indian Finance Minister, Morarji Desai made it quite clear during his visit to Gangtok in March 1968 that the government of India is not disposed to approve foreign collaboration in the development of industries in Sikkim.[28] Indeed most of the local commercial and credit structure is dominated by Indian merchants and bankers domiciled in Sikkim. Even the recently established Sikkim State Bank is closely connected with the Indian State of Marwari banking firm. In addition, Sikkim's industrial development program has been entrusted to a corporation in which 92.5 percent of the share capital is held by the Kamani Engineering Group of Bombay.[29]

INDO-SIKKIMESE TRADE RELATIONS

The restrictions on Sikkim's external relations with other countries under Article IV of the Indian-Sikkim Peace Treaty of 1950 also applies to Sikkimese trade, which is consequently limited to India alone. Imports from Sikkim to India include:

1. Cardamon
2. Oranges and apples
3. Potatoes

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[25] *Hindustan Times,* March 31, 1966, p. 3.

[26] "Sikkim Parties Share Hostility to China," *op. cit.,* p. 9; Rose, *op. cit.,* p. 35.

[27] "Text of India-Sikkim Peace Treaty," Issued in Gangtok on December 5, 1950, *Texts of Documents 1947-64,* Lok Sabha, New Delhi, 1964, p. 170.

[28] Rose, *op. cit.,* p. 44.

[29] *Ibid.,* p. 36.

Imports from India to Sikkim include:
1. Essential textiles
2. Foodstuffs
3. Other consumer goods.[30]

Under the 1950 treaty and supplementary arrangements, Sikkim has almost been constituted as an integral part of the Indian economy. The procedures under which Sikkim obtains its foreign-exchange requirements from India are not specifically mentioned in the treaty, but rather stem from the pattern of economic relations implicit in the treaty provisions, and from the fact that the Indian rupee is the only legal currency in the state. Article V of the 1950 treaty states that the government of Sikkim agrees:

> not to levy any import duty, transit duty, or other import on goods brought into, or in transit through Sikkim, and the Government of India agrees not to levy any import or other duty on goods of Sikkimese origin brought into India from Sikkim.[31]

The treaty thus bars Sikkim from imposing excise duties on imports that it has gained from Indian economic assistance. The Sikkimese Maharaja has spoken of the "very great disadvantage to us, and suggested that this is an appropriate subject for negotiations."[32] Sikkim has been even more dissatisfied by the system by which India has collected and retained excise duties on goods imported into Sikkim. The Sikkim Executive Council claimed in 1967 that:

> It is true that the financial aid amounting to Rs 12 crores or so given to Sikkim during the past 14 years of the plan period by the Government of India has considerably increased the revenue of Sikkim. But the granting of aid which has generated the increase has been more than offset by Indian excise duty levied on all the goods imported to Sikkim from India, which has not been transferred to Sikkim so far. And this excise duty paid by Sikkim amounts to nearly a crore of rupees per annum.[33]

If these figures are correct, Sikkim has obtained approximately Rs 120 million in aid from India since 1953, but has paid nearly Rs 140 million in excise duty during the same period. The implication is that Sikkim would have been better off if it had not received any economic aid from India but had itself imposed excise duties on Indian imports.[34] Sikkimese officials have resented the Indian Foreign Ministry's restrictions on Sikkim's exports and other contacts with the outside

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[30] "Bhutan and Sikkim," *op. cit.*, p. 15.
[31] "Text of India-Sikkim Peace Treaty," *op. cit.*, p. 170.
[32] Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 44.
[34] *Ibid.*, Peter Braestrup, "Sikkimese Want Pact with India That Gives Them More Self-Rule," *New York Times*, July 2, 1967, p. 3.

world.[35] The Maharaja is particularly unhappy that the state cannot trade and earn hard currency from Cardamon.[36]

POLITICO-LEGAL RELATIONS

India's relations with Sikkim have as their foundation the India-Sikkim Peace Treaty signed by both countries, and issued in Gangtok on December 5, 1950. The Treaty was patterned after a March 17, 1890 Convention between Great Britain and China in relation to Sikkim and Tibet. The Convention signed at Calcutta delimited the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet, and according to Article III, both Governments agree to respect the boundary as defined in Article I and to prevent acts of aggression from their respective sides of the frontier. In accordance with Article IV, regulations regarding trade communication and pasturage were appended to the Convention.

Article II of the treaty had the effect of making Sikkim a protectorate of the British Government. It provided:

> (2) It is admitted that the British Government, whose protectorate over the Sikkim State is hereby recognized had direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of that State, and except through and with the permission of the British Government, neither the Ruler of the State nor any of its officers shall have official relations of any kind, formal, or informal, with any other country.[37]

British suzerainty was thought by the British to have been established by an earlier treaty which Britain imposed upon Sikkim in 1861. This view however, was repudiated by the Tibetans who proceeded to engage in official activities in Sikkim. In 1888, a British military expedition drove the Tibetan army out of Sikkim and pursued it into the Chumbi Valley in Tibet. The Chinese suzerains of Tibet then ordered their resident in Lhasa to make peace and the 1890 Calcutta Treaty was signed.[38] The *London Times* in commenting on the signing of the Treaty said: "It is understood that the main effect of the treaty is to confirm the British claims to treat Sikkim as a feudatory State."[39]

A controversy arose almost immediately after Indian independence over whether India automatically inherited the paramount rights the British had enjoyed in the border states. India argued that as the successor government, it enjoyed all the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of the British. The Sikkim Court disagreed and argued that

[35] *New York Times,* July 2, 1967, p. 3.

[36] *Hindustan Times,* June 1, 1967, p. 9.

[37] "Convention Between Great Britain and China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet (1890)," Texts of Treaties, Agreements and certain exchange of notes relating to the Sino-Indian Boundary. *Indian Society of International Law,* New Delhi, 1962, p. 14.

[38] Karan, *op. cit.,* p. 59.

[39] "Sikkim," *The London Times,* March 24, 1890, p. 5.

independent India was "a new juristic person" which could not "claim to be subrogated to the rights and obligations of the British Government."[40] Paramountcy had lapsed, the Sikkimese insisted, with the British withdrawal from India. The political climate in Sikkim during the negotiations with India in 1950 was seriously disadvantageous to the Sikkim government. Internal disorders in the state had reached alarming proportions between 1947-1949, and the very survival of the ruling dynasty had seemed to require outside support. With the exception of a small (300) man State Police, the only military force in Sikkim at the time was an Indian army detachment that had been sent to Gangtok during the disturbances in May 1949. The Chinese occupation of Tibet, with all that this implied for both India and Sikkim, occurred between the signing of the Indo-Bhutanese Treaty of 1949, and the signing of the Indo-Sikkimese Treaty. This latter Treaty in particular reflected New Delhi's heightened concern with frontier security.[41] Articles II and XI, deal with Sikkim's relationship with India regarding Sikkim's internal affairs.

Article II states:

Sikkim shall continue to be a Protectorate of India and, subject to the provisions of this Treaty, shall enjoy autonomy in regard to its internal affairs.[42]

Article XI states:

The Government of India shall have the right to appoint a Representative to reside in Sikkim; and the Government of Sikkim shall provide him and his staff with all reasonable facilities in regard to their residential and office accommodations and generally in regard to their carrying out their duties in Sikkim.[43]

In theory, the Maharaja of Sikkim controls the State's internal affairs. However, he is aided by an Indian appointed civil servant who acts as the Principal State Administrative Officer. The Indian officer called a *Dewan* is permanent chairman of the State Council. His duties are rather similar to those of a prime minister, and he has now become an essential part of the Kingdom's administrative machinery. The *Dewan* is appointed by the Government of India with the approval of the Maharaja.[44] There is also an Indian financial adviser, an Indian chief engineer, an Indian director of the state distillery and Indians at the head of other important departments of Government.[45] Hence, India

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[40] Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 33; Gyalmo Hope Namgyal, "The Sikkimese Theory of Landholding and the Darjeeling Grant," *Bulletin of Tibetology,* Vol. III, No. 2 (July 21, 1966), pp. 47-60.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

[42] "Text of India-Sikkim Peace Treaty," *op. cit.*

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 172.

[44] "Parliamentary Government Sought for Sikkim," *Hindustan Times,* September 1, 1960, p. 3.

[45] *Statesman's Yearbook 1968-1969,* p. 424; Karan, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-75; "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With Bhutan and Sikkim)," p. 383.

and Sikkim share in the executive-legislative functioning of the Sik-
kimese government. Article VI of the treaty grants India further control
over the internal affairs of the Kingdom; in particular, control over
Sikkim's transportation and communication systems. The Article states:

> (1) The Government of India shall have the exclusive right of constructing,
> maintaining and regulating the use of railways, aerodromes and landing
> grounds and air navigation facilities, posts, telegraphs, telephones and wire-
> less installations in Sikkim. . . .
> (3) The Government of India shall have the right to construct and maintain
> in Sikkim roads for strategic purposes and for the purpose of improving
> communications with India and other adjoining countries.[46]

Although the Kingdom exercises judicial power over its subjects,
Article XII of the 1950 treaty gives India supremacy in judicial disputes
regarding interpretation of the treaty itself. Since many of the articles
deal with matters concerning Sikkim's internal affairs, the Article in-
directly gives India juridical control over these affairs. Article XII reads:

> If any dispute arises in the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty
> which cannot be resolved by mutual consultation, the dispute shall be referred
> to the Chief Justice of India whose decision thereon shall be final.[47]

Article IV, which grants India domination over the political, economic
and financial external relations of Sikkim has already been discussed.
As a result of Article IV, Sikkim has not, nor may it have external
relations with any country other than India. In addition, the unit of
exchange in Sikkim is the Indian rupee.[48]

Despite Indian influences, the Maharaja exercises strong authoritarian
control over his Sikkimese subjects and areas of the Sikkimese govern-
ment not covered by the 1950 treaty. In 1960, a delegation from the
Sikkim National Congress Party presented a memorandum to Prime
Minister Nehru of India seeking a promise that India would not inter-
fere when the Party "launched civil disturbances" in an effort to attain
a more democratic rule. The group was particularly interested in
securing a constitution, since Sikkim has none, and a parliamentary form
of Government. The delegation also asked for the abolition of the post
of *Dewan,* and the formation of a Constituent-Assembly to write the
desired constitution. India failed to act, and the Party's attempt for
reforms were aborted.[49]

India has been most adamant about limiting Sikkim's relations
with all other nations through the Indian Government, particularly in

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[46] "Text of India-Sikkim Peace Treaty," *op. cit.,* p. 170.
[47] *Ibid.,* p. 173.
[48] Paul Grimes, "Two Sikkimese Ask Closer Indian Ties," *New York Times,*
August 27, 1960, p. 5; *Hindustan Times,* September 1, 1960, p. 3.
[49] "Sikkimese Prod India," *New York Times,* August 27, 1960, p. 5; *Hindustan
Times,* September 1, 1960, p. 3.

the case of Communist China. In December 1963, China sent a condolence message to the new Maharaja of Sikkim, Thondup Namgyal, upon the death of his father. India, upon learning of the incident, issued a protest to the People's Republic, that "this was a breach of protocol."[50] In April 1965, Liu Shao-chi, Chairman of the People's Republic of China, sent the Maharaja of Sikkim a telegram of congratulations on the occasion of his coronation. In a note sent to the Chinese Embassy in Delhi, on April 9, 1965, the Government of India said that the Chinese action "is totally unacceptable." The note went on to say that the Chinese Government was well aware that the external relations of Sikkim were the responsibility of the Government of India, and any communications either formal or informal from the Government of China to the Government of Sikkim or its Chogyal (Maharaja) should be channeled through the Indian Government.[51]

Publicly and superficially the relations between India and Sikkim have been warm and friendly. In Gangtok on April 6, 1965, the Sikkimese Maharaja extolled the friendship of the two countries:

> "India is a great and peaceloving country and we feel secure in her protection. The bonds of friendship between our two countries are strong and indissoluble. I take this opportunity to affirm that it will be our purpose and endeavor to further strengthen these bonds in the fullest measure."[52]

After the Maharaja concluded his speech, Mrs. Lakshmi Memon, India's Minister of State of External Affairs, asserted:

> We are certain that your benevolent guidance will lead the people of Sikkim to great prosperity and well-being and will preserve and promote cultural and spiritual values.[53]

Underlying the cordiality and camaraderie of such statements there has existed great tension between the two nations, as Sikkim has sought to attain greater internal and external autonomy. In a joint statement, issued in June 1967, three members of the Executive Council of Sikkim stressed the need for a "thorough change" in the provisions of the Indo-Sikkimese Treaty. The statement contended that any right which had become the responsibility of India under the treaty had been entrusted to her by Sikkim. It was therefore, an obligation on the Government of India to "gracefully sponsor our membership of various international organizations." The statement said that since Sikkim had signed the treaty with India, it was within her rights as a sovereign nation to demand its revision. The note concluded:

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[50]"India Protests to Peking over Message to Sikkim," *New York Times*, December 23, 1963, p. 3.

[51] "Protest at Message to Sikkim," *Hindustan Times*, May 6, 1965, p. 6.

[52] "Sikkim Maharaja Affirms Friendship with India," *Hindustan Times*, April 15, 1965, p. 4.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

> Every country has the inherent right to exist and maintain its separate identity and to review and revise its Treaty obligations in the wake of changing circumstances.[54]

On May 19, 1967, the Maharaja of Sikkim told newsmen in Gangtok that the Indo-Sikkim Treaty of 1950 had to be "reviewed" in view of the changed situation since the treaty was signed. This was the first time that the Maharaja had spoken publicly of the need to review the treaty, although he had earlier expressed similar views about the matter to members of the Sikkimese Court. Asked how soon he would seek review of the treaty the Maharaja said:

> We await the convenience of the Government of India. We have chosen to throw our lot with India. We share the ideology that you (India) follow. This does not, however, mean merger with India.[55]

He also spoke of economic independence as being "more important than political independence in the present day world."[56] Mr. Vincent Coehli, a local representative for the Government of Sikkim said in July 1967 that he had a great distrust of "New Delhi's colonialism." He spoke with great disfavor of the Indian Foreign Ministry's restrictions on Sikkim's exports and other contacts with the outside world. To gain a visa to enter Sikkim a foreigner must apply several days in advance to the Indian Foreign Ministry, which may or may not grant him permission.[57] India appears to face a great dilemma with regard to Sikkim. Sikkimese authorities have attempted to maintain a neutral attitude toward the Chinese Communists and have exercised care to avoid actions or disputes which might be used as a pretext for retaliatory tactics by the Chinese Government.[58] The Maharaja of Sikkim had said as late as May 19, 1967: "Sikkim was a small country and she did not seek a quarrel with the north (China)."[59]

Meanwhile, the Chinese continued to remain in strength along the northern borders.[60]

DEFENSES

The defense of Sikkim is the responsibility of the Indian Army. The 1950 Treaty grants India the right to station troops anywhere in the country, take any measures regarded as necessary to defend it,

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[54] "Call for Revision of Indo-Sikkimese Pact," *Hindustan Times,* June 24, 1967, p. 12.

[55] "Sikkim Ruler on Need to Review Treaty with India," *Asian Recorder,* Vol. XII, No. 25 (June 24-28, 1967), pp. 7755-7756.

[56] *Ibid.,* p. 7756.

[57] Braestrup, *op. cit.,* p. 3.

[58] Foreign Affairs Studies Division, The American University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (with Bhutan and Sikkim)," p. 387.

[59] *Asian Recorder,* June 18-24, 1967, p. 7756.

[60] "Heavy Casualties Inflicted on Chinese at Nathu-La," *Hindustan Times,* November 24, 1967, p. 9.

control all imports of arms, build strategic roads and track down fugitives within the country. Article III of the treaty states in part:

> (1) The Government of India will be responsible for the defense and territorial integrity of Sikkim. It shall have the right to take such measures as it considers necessary for the defense of Sikkim or the security of India whether preparatory or otherwise, and whether within or outside Sikkim. In particular, the Government of India shall have the right to station troops anywhere within Sikkim.[61]

In December 1960, the Sikkimese Maharaja expressed a desire for increased participation in its own defense.[62] The Army, then consisting of only 60 men, was used primarily to guard the Maharaja's palace. India agreed to establish and equip a separate militia force of 280 men to be trained and commanded by Indian officers to help man the border outposts.[63]

The size of the Sikkimese army was later raised to 560 men, a strength at which it remained up to October 1968. The Sikkim guard is not under the direct command of the Indian army, however, nor is it currently used as a border defense force. In times of emergency, such as during the border firings in September 1967, the guard is available for defense purposes, and presumably would then come under the authority of the Indian army commander in the area.[64] *The New York Times* reported the Indian troop strength in Sikkim in July 1967 at 40,000 men.[65]

Briefly summarizing:

I. INTERNAL RELATIONS:

a. *Rule Making Authority* — Under the control of the Maharaja, who is aided by the Indian *Dewan* (or prime minister), nominated by India.

b. *Rule Application Authority* — Under the control of the Maharaja and the elected State Council, assisted by the Indian *Dewan* and other Indian department heads.

c. *Rule Adjudication Authority* — Under Sikkimese control except for those matters dealing with Article XII of the 1950 Treaty, in which case the Chief Justice of India has the final say, e.g., transportation, communication, defenses, etc.

d. *Economic Aid and Investments* — India is the sole provider of Sikkim's foreign aid, and its sole economic investor. This has been required under Article IV of the 1950 India-Sikkim Peace Treaty.

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[61] "Text of the India-Sikkim Peace Treaty," *op. cit.,* p. 169.
[62] "Sikkim Wants Its Own Military Force," *Hindustan Times,* December 8, 1960, p. 1.
[63] "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With Bhutan and Sikkim)," p. 388.
[64] Rose, *op. cit.,* pp. 41-42.
[65] *New York Times,* July 2, 1967, p. 3.

e. *Internal Communication and Transportation* — India has ultimate control over the communication and transportations network of Sikkim under Article VI of the 1950 India-Sikkim Peace Treaty.

f. *Currency* — The medium of exchange in Sikkim is the Indian rupee.

Conclusion: Sikkim and India share control over the internal relations of Sikkim. India's control over economic aid and investments, internal transportation and communications, and the use of the Indian rupee as a medium of exchange, all give the Indian Government enormous influencing leverage. A *Dewan* and other Indian officers constitute an indispensable part of the Government's administrative machinery. However, the Maharaja must approve the *Dewan's* appointment, and the former exercises strong authoritarian control over his Sikkimese subjects and governmental areas not covered by the 1950 Treaty.

II. EXTERNAL RELATIONS:

a. *Diplomatic Representation* — Article IV of the 1950 India-Sikkim Peace Treaty places the external relations of Sikkim under the regulatory power of the Government of India.

b. *Foreign Trade* — Article IV places a similar restriction on Sikkim's foreign trade.

Conclusion: The external relations of Sikkim are under the control of the Government of India.

III. DEFENSES:

Article III of the 1950 India-Sikkim Peace Treaty places the defense of Sikkim under the protection of the Government of India. A small 560 man self-defense force exists in Sikkim, but it is trained by Indian officers and is inconsequential to Sikkim's defense.

NEPAL AND THE INDIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

KANCHANMOY MOJUMDAR

The Indian Nationalist Movement had an important bearing on Anglo-Nepalese relations in the first half of the present century. The autocratic Rana rulers in Nepal[1] and the British in India, each had heavy stakes in the maintenance of the other's rule when the movement posed a threat to both. British support was indispensable for the Ranas as a source of strength to meet internal challenges. The British, for their part, valued the strong and obliging Rana regime as essential for the security of the most populous and the richest regions of India and, militarily, its most exposed frontier.

Besides, the Rana rule, in ensuring the supply of Gurkhas, the *"nulli secundus"* of the Indian army, constituted a vital element in the Indian military structure.[2] Reports of some Punjabi elements in the Indian army having been tainted with anti-British feelings[3] reinforced the British conviction that the Gurkhas were the only insurance against any uprising in other ranks of the Indian army.[4] The Ranas, for their part, regarded Gurkha recruitment as essential for the sustenance of the Nepalese economy[5] and valued it as a lever to wring concessions and personal favours from the British. Naturally, then, both the British and the Ranas were determined to prevent the exposure of the Gurkhas to anti-British feelings in India.

In 1907 the Government of India banned the circulation of *Gorkha Sathi*, a Nepali newspaper published from Calcutta, in which articles

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[1] The Rana rule in Nepal was established by Jang Bahadur Rana in 1846. The head of the Rana administration was the Prime Minister. The Kings of Nepal were *rois faineant*, virtual prisoners in the hands of the Rana Prime Ministers. The Rana rule was an absolute autocracy. See Satish Kumar, *Rana Polity in Nepal, Origin and Growth* (New Delhi, 1967).

[2] The Gurkhas were first enlisted in the Indian army in 1815-16. See my article, "The Recruitment of Gurkhas in the Indian army, 1814-77," *The Journal of the United Service Institution of India* (April-June, 1963), pp. 143-53.

[3] Minto Papers (M.P.), National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, M995: Minto to Earl Roberts, 6 June 1907, Minto to Prince of Wales, 29 August 1907.

[4] *Ibid.*, M836: Record of Lord Kitchener's Administration of the Army in India, 1902-09, pp. 269-74.

[5] There were several thousand retired Gurkha soldiers in Nepal to whom the Government paid, in 1927-28, a sum of Rupees twenty five lakhs. There were more than 20,000 Gurkha soldiers in the Indian army. The annual revenue of Nepal was only fifteen million rupees. H. Wilkinson-Guillemard, "Nepal and her relation to the British Government," *The Asiatic Review* (April 1934), p. 214. *Census of India*, Vol. I, Pt. 1, 1931, p. 76. W. Brook Northey and C.J. Morris, *The Gurkhas, their Manners, Customs and Country* (London, 1928), pp. 82-3.

strongly critical of the Rana regime were written. The paper also urged the Nepalese to support the *Swadeshi* movement in Bengal.[6] Between 1908 and 1910 several Indian newspapers critical of the British rule were banned in Nepal and Bengali doctors, engineers and teachers in the — Nepalese State service were warned against having any relations with the terrorists in Bengal. The entry of aliens to Nepal without the permission of the Rana Government was declared a punishable offence.[7]

The many military and political problems during and after World War I created by intensified nationalist agitations in India drew the British and Rana Governments closer. The expansion of Gurkha Corps from twenty to thirty three regiments and the garrisoning of the North-West frontier by Nepalese troops lent by the Rana Prime Minister, Chandra Shamsher, during the war were precautionary measures against any sudden uprising by Indian troops, in some of whom anti-British feelings were reported to have been working.[8] The British Government were particularly anxious over the likely effect of the third Afghan War and the Khilafat movement on the large Muslim elements in the army. The Government's feeling of "grave uncertainty" regarding their military strength was clear from their admission that:

> the recent internal troubles have . . . emphasized that Nepal is next to the British garrison our sheet anchor in time of great trouble in India.[9]

During the war, the Germans tried to incite Nepal against the British, the German Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, having personally written to Chandra Shamsher and the King of Nepal. Raja Mahendra Pratap, the Head of the Provisional Government of Independent India and an accomplice to the German scheme, sent the letter to Kathmandu, promising Chandra Shamsher territorial rewards and the premiership of the independent Indian Republic. However, the scheme fell through; Chandra Shamsher remained steadfast in his loyalty to the British.[10]

The increasing interest of Soviet Russia and Japan in Tibet and Nepal appeared to the British as a sinister bid to weaken British influence in the two frontier states. The Pan-Asiatic League formed of Rashbehari Bose and other Indian political emigres in Japan and several Japanese

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[6] The *Swadeshi* movement or the movement for the boycott of foreign goods, was launched after 1905, when Bengal was partitioned by Lord Curzon.

[7] Foreign Political Proceedings, External, B (National Archives of India), September 1907, Nos. 101-09. Political and Secret Letters from India to Secretary of State (P.S.L.I., India Office Library, London), Vol. 205, Register No. 1651/1907; Vol. 242, Reg. No. 1203/1910; Vol. 231, Reg. No. 1372/1909.

[8] Kitchener Papers (Public Record Office, London), PRO 30/57, No. 70: H. Butler to Kitchener, 20 October 1915. Political and Secret Library, Vol. D. 187: *Memorandum on Nepal and Leading Personages in that Country* (Calcutta, 1922), pp. 5-6 (India Office Library).

[9] Chelmsford Papers (I.O.L.), Vol. 10: Viceroy to Secretary of State, Telg. 9 May 1919.

[10] Political and Secret External (Subject) Files (P.E.F.-I.O.L.), No. 3443/1914, Pt. 6: Reg. Nos. 2854, 5051, 2750, 3769.

intellectuals criticised the British policy towards Tibet and Nepal. Raja
Mahendra Pratap urged the Nepalese to emulate the Afghans in freeing
themselves from British domination and establishing relations with Bhutan,
Tibet, Afghanistan, Japan and Soviet Russia. Mahendra Pratap was
reported to have raised funds in the United States for effecting a
revolution in Nepal to overthrow the Anglophile Rana regime. Exclusion
of all foreign influence from Nepal being the basic British policy,
the Rana Government was urged to introduce a passport system to
prevent the entry into Nepal of aliens and Indian seditionists having
close links with the Russians and Japanese.[11]

All these post-war problems convinced the British of "the supreme
importance of a friendly and contented Nepal." The British feared that
if Nepal were disaffected, she could give encouragement to the Indian
nationalists;[12] Nepal could even be a political Alsatia as the French
settlements in India had been. The Ranas were therefore kept in good
humour by British honours and titles, which they coveted. In 1920
an annual subsidy of ten lakhs of rupees was given to the Nepalese
Government.[13] In 1923 a treaty was concluded, recognising Nepal's internal
and external independence and her right to procure freely arms and
ammunition. The treaty also provided for commercial concessions which
enabled the Ranas to obtain luxury items from abroad.[14]

The war and the post-war years saw in a section of the Nepalese
the beginnings of political, social and economic consciousness which
the Ranas sought to suppress, often with the help of the British in
India. In the post-war years large scale migration of the Nepalese to
India for jobs worried the Rana Government.[15] This was not only
indicative of deep-seated economic discontent but one which boded
political danger for the Rana regime. Education in Nepal, so long
deliberately discouraged by the Ranas, spread in the Nepalese com-
munity in India, creating gradually in them, a desire for political, economic
and social changes in Nepal. These Nepalese drew inspiration from
the Indian national movement and imbibed the current Indian social
and political ideas. Institutional changes in Nepal became their ultimate
objective and in these Nepalese the Rana Government saw their great-
est enemy.

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[11] P.E.F. 3764/1913; 4353/1920, Pts. 1-2. Political and Secret External Files
(P.F.-I.O.L.), 1919, Vol. 5: Reg. Nos. 1362, 3713, 388.
[12] P.F., 1920, Vol. 7: Reg. No. 3426, Departmental Note.
[13] P.E.F. 3085/1912, Pt. 1: Reg. No. 2612, Viceroy to Secretary of State,
Telg. 8 May 1919, Secretary of State to Viceroy, Telg. 11 June 1919; Reg. No.
5596, Resident to Gov't., 30 June 1919.
[14] P.E.F., 3085/1912, Pt. 2. See my article, "Background to Anglo-Nepalese
Treaty, 1923," *Journal of Indian History* (December 1970), pp. 599-655.
[15] Nepalese immigrants to India in 1901 numbered 243,037 and in 1931,
327,028. Nearly two-thirds of the people of Sikkim were born in Nepal. *Census
of India*, Vol. 1, Pt. 1 (1921), pp. 95-6; Vol. 1, Pt. 1 (1931), p. 76.

By the 1920's, then, the British concern over the Indian unrest was matched by the Rana anxiety over the influence of Indian nationalists on the Nepalese in India and through the latter on the Nepalese at Kathmandu. The Rana and the British Governments, therefore, committed themselves to the maintenance of each other's security against subversive elements, and the Treaty of 1923 had an article to this effect.[16] Already in 1922 the British Government had banned the circulation of *Gorkhali*, a Nepali weekly from Benaras for publishing articles critical of the Rana regime.[17]

The progressive realisation of self-government by the Indians following the Montford reforms made the Rana Government anxious over the likely discontinuance of both the annual subsidy and recruitment of Gurkhas by a future nationalist Government in India, thereby gravely damaging the Nepalese economy. In the Indian press and legislative assemblies, the subsidy had already come in for strong criticisms. The British had to dispel the Rana government's fear by an assurance that constitutional changes in India would not be allowed to affect the existing relations between the Indian and Nepalese governments.[18]

In the 1920's several associations were formed by the Nepalese in India of which the All India Gurkha League was the most important. The League, under the dynamic leadership of Thakur Chandan Singh, claimed a large membership, mostly in Gurkha ex-servicemen. The League urged the Rana government to lift their ban on foreign travel by the Nepalese and to introduce reforms to modernise Nepal. In its weekly journal, *Tarun Gurkha*, later renamed *Gorkha Sansar*, the League strongly urged for education and the dissemination of scientific knowledge among the Nepalese.[19]

The League presented a memorandum to the India Office in 1931-32, demanding representation of the Nepalese community in India in the Round Table Conference and the provision for the security of their rights and interests in the future Constitution of India by either granting them special representation or by reserving seats for them in the Central and Provincial legislatures in the same proportion as the Sikhs had claimed for themselves.

The memorandum drew the Government's attention to the economic backwardness of the Nepalese and blamed the Rana government for "its sheer inaction, indifference and apathy, sometimes bordering an

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[16] See Article Four of the Treaty.

[17] P.F., 1920, Vol. 7, Reg. No. 3119 filed with 8149/1920.

[18] Political and Secret External Collections (E.C.-I.O.L.), 21/10: Reg. Nos. 6337, 1607, 4029, 6733, 1969, 2600, 3358, 3185. Halifax Papers (I.O.L.), Mss. Eur. C. 152, Vol. 4: Halifax to Birkenhead, 9 Feb. 1928. Foreign Political Proceedings — Secret External, File Nos. 21/1928, 373/1925. *Modern Review*, Calcutta (July 1925), p. 116.

[19] Home Department Proceedings — Political (National Archives), File No. 258/1931. E.C., 21/18, Reg. Nos. 8124; 21/2, Reg. No. 489/1932.

open hostility" to any progressive ideas among the Nepalese in India. The League expressed its "strongest support" to the "patriotic aspirations and legitimate demands" of the Indians for dominion status, while disclaiming any sympathy for any movement disruptive of law and order. It condemned the Civil Disobedience Movement launched by Gandhi and expressed its loyalty to both the Rana and British governments. The President of the League, Thir Shamsher Rana, wrote to the Private Secretary to the Viceroy urging the Government's desistance from the use of Gurkha troops to quell nationalist agitations and warning that the promotion of political and economic interests of the Nepalese in India could alone ensure their immunity from the influence of the Civil Disobedience Movement.[20]

Prominent Congress leaders had for some time been trying to draw the Nepalese into the movement and to sow anti-British feelings in the Gurkha regiments. One Kharag Bahadur was "the chief anti-British propagandist among Gurkhas." In June 1930 he, together with one Dhanapati Singh and thirteen other Gurkha volunteers of the Congress were arrested while going to Dharsana to meet Sardar Vallabhai Patel. After serving a three-month sentence in the Sabarmati jail, Kharag Bahadur was rearrested in November 1930 on the Delhi Railway station for carrying with him seditious pamphlets and letters. These letters clearly established the involvement of Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhai Patel, Desbandhu Gupta and other Congress leaders in anti-British intrigues in the Gurkha regiments. Kharag Bahadur had earlier met Motilal at Benaras and was encouraged to enrol Gurkha volunteers for the Civil Disobedience Movement on payment of a monthly allowance of a sum of ten rupees to each volunteer. In one of his letters to Kharag Bahadur, Motilal informed him that Jawaharlal had agreed to issue on behalf of the Congress an authoritative declaration that Gurkhas were an integral section of the Indian people. Dhanapati, too, had known Vallabhai Patel, Abbas Tyabji and Gandhi's sons in the Sabarmati jail, and had, at their instance, written many articles in Nepali, encouraging Gurkha soldiers to join the Congress movement.[21]

Kharag Bahadur and Dhanapati were sent to jail, but the Government, in view of the recently concluded Gandhi-Irwin Pact, calling off the Civil Disobedience Movement, thought it prudent to take no action against the Congress. Any thorough search of Congress offices for incriminating materials and arrest of Motilal, Jawaharlal and other top Congress leaders would, so the Government feared, stir up popular unrest, apart from giving undesirable publicity to the Congress' attempts

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[20] E.C. 21/2, Reg. No. 489/1932.
[21] *Ibid.*, Reg. Nos. 938/1931, 5371/1935, 1410/1931.

at sowing sedition in Gurkha ranks.[22] Chandra Shamsher had, in the meanwhile, received many reports of such attempts.[23]

The death of Chandra Shamsher in 1929 aggravated the dissensions in the Rana family caused by jealousy and itch for power. Several abortive attempts were made on the life of Bhim Shamsher and Yuddha Shamsher, the two succeeding Prime Ministers, by disgruntled members of the Rana family. The latter, fearing reprisals, fled to India and established close connexion with the local anti-Rana elements. Meanwhile, at Kathmandu there were growing signs of opposition to the Rana regime. In 1931 a group of young men were involved in a conspiracy to replace the Rana regime by a parliamentary government. In 1933 a similar conspiracy was nipped in the bud. In the following year a number of educated Nepalese were punished by heavy fines and imprisonment for attempting to set up a public library at Kathmandu. In 1935 a political party, named the *Praja Parishad,* was formed at Kathmandu, the members of which also suffered similar punishment.[24]

The Rana government's agents in India warned the local Nepalese settlers against any anti-Rana activity on pain of confiscation of their property at home and social ostracism. Belated realisation that economic reforms could assuage the people's discontent drove Bhim and Yuddha Shamsher to attempts at some economic development of the country. A few cooperative credit societies and a bank were established, followed by a match and a sugar factory and a jute mill in the Terai. Swampy pestilential lands in the Terai were reclaimed for the settlement of not only pensioned Gurkha soldiers but for all the:

> Nepalese flotsam and jetsam thrown up by worldwide economic blizzard which might otherwise be sucked into the whirlpool by revolutionary movements in India.[25]

Land laws were revised and house building loans given. Duties on salt and cotton were abolished. A provident fund scheme for army personnel was implemented. With these reforms the Rana government expected "to some extent to combat the activities of the Gurkha League," which had been using Nepal's economic backwardness under the Rana regime as grist for its propaganda mill.[26]

However, these reforms, belated as they were, fell far short of popular expectations. In fact, the Ranas never wanted extensive economic development, for fear that the resultant improvement of the material

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[22] Home Political Proceedings, 1931, File No. 14/9.
[23] Foreign Department Proceedings-External, B, Secret (National Archives), Aug. 1921, Nos. 120-37.
[24] E.C., 21/6, Reg. Nos. 4291, 5610, 5831, 80, 5057, 3181; 21/18, Reg. Nos. 2011, 1949, 2765; 21/2, Reg. Nos. 5831, 6012.
[25] *Ibid.,* Reg. No. 3415/1933.
[26] E.C., 21/10, Reg. No. 2903/1941; 21/19, Reg. Nos. 5664/1931, 32/1933; 21/51, Reg. No. 1690/1938; 21/2, Reg. No. 1946/1932.

conditions of the people would lead to demands for political changes.

Nor did the British want any large-scale economic changes in Nepal. All that they wanted was some reforms by the Ranas to take the bite off the criticisms of the Rana regime by the Indian nationalists and the progressive Nepalese. Some economic reforms, the British government realised during, particularly, the Second World War, were the only answer to the growing political problems in Nepal. During the war years, as the British Minister at Kathmandu, Colonel G. Betham, testified, the social and political opposition to the Rana regime was no longer a feeling but had become a force to reckon with. Yuddha Shamsher's lecherous character, which endangered the honour of every comely damsel in Nepal, made him extremely unpopular; even the royal family was reported to be sympathetic towards the anti-Rana forces.[27] In 1940-41 several persons implicated in anti-Rana conspiracies were arrested and executed. The younger generation of Nepalese, who had become politically conscious, wanted a more liberal administration which alone, so it seemed to Betham, could stave off an impending violent political shake-up at Kathmandu. It even seemed to Betham not unlikely that Yuddha Shamsher would abdicate, and then his son's attempts at succession would be resisted by his elder cousins, the sons of Chandra Shamsher, having stronger claims to succession.[28]

Any political disturbance in Nepal during the war years was likely to interfere with the supply of Gurkha recruits, vital for the war, and so the British would prevent any such disturbance. The British had consistently maintained that an obliging family oligarchy heavily dependent on the Government of India suited the British interests most. The British, therefore, took several measures to stem the anti-Rana tide and strengthen Yuddha Shamsher's position. Assistance was rendered to his economic projects and British titles and honours were conferred on him. The Defence of India Rules were enforced to suppress anti-Rana activities in India and the editors of the *Janata* and *Naya Hindustan*, papers condemning the Rana regime, were warned. During the Quit India Movement (August 1942) the Nepalese Terai became a base for anti-Rana and anti-British activities which led the two governments to undertake a joint mopping up operation, resulting in the arrest of many Congressmen.[29]

The anti-Rana movement gathered further strength at the end of the War when the Labour government in Britain decided to grant independence to India and seemed less keen on supporting the Rana regime; so, at any rate, the Ranas alleged. The anti-Rana movement

[27] E.C., 21/6, Reg. Nos. 6664/1939, 1632/1941.
[28] *Ibid.*, Reg. Nos. 4631, 5895, 6693, 6986, 1630, 540, 1632, 264, 289, 4676, 4384, 4808, 6664.
[29] E.C., 21/12, Reg. Nos. 2677, 1318; 21/6, Reg. Nos. 4862, 6664, 6986, 1699, 4808, 5448, 6191, 640, 7036.

became more closely linked with the anti-British movement in India
as evidenced from the resolution of the *Nepali Rashtriya Congress,* a
political party formed in Calcutta in January 1947, with B.P. Koirala,
later Prime Minister of Nepal, as its principal spokesman.[30] The party
resolved that the problems of India and Nepal were "identical and
one" and that the end of the British rule in India was the pre-
requisite to the emancipation of the Nepalese people from the Rana
tyranny. The Nepali Congress supported the striking mill workers at
Biratnagar in March 1947 which was followed by a student agitation
at Kathmandu in May 1947, demanding the end of Rana rule. The
Rana government under Padma Shamsher, who had taken over from
Yuddha Shamsher after the latter's abdication in 1945, conceded a written
constitution in January 1948, providing for a Council of Ministers, a
bicameral legislature at the centre and village councils, a judiciary and
fundamental rights. Padma Shamsher's liberal policy cost him his position;
he was replaced by Mohan Shamsher, whose reactionary and repressive
measures reinforced the anti-Rana movement, ultimately involving the
new independent Government of India. In November 1950 King Trib-
huban escaped to India, and then the *Nepali Rashtriya Congress* launched
a liberation struggle in the Terai, which, with the Government of India's
intervention, ended in the replacement of the century-old Rana auto-
cracy by a democratic government in Nepal in 1951.[31]

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[30] Anirudha Gupta, *Politics in Nepal* (New Delhi, 1964), p. 29.
[31] *Ibid.,* pp. 29-50.

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