

Asian
Studies



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CULTURAL IDIOM AND THE PROBLEM OF PLANNED CHANGE: A CASE STUDY FROM A PHILIPPINE MUNICIPALITY

F. LANDA JOCANO

INTRODUCTION

ORDINARILY, WHAT COMES TO MIND WHEN WE SPEAK OF CULTURAL or social change is the process of modification and subsequent alteration, not only of the behavior of individual members of society but also of the patterns, as well as the content, of their culture. These changes take place as part of the gradual process of social development, as a result of contacts between two groups of people, or as a consequence of planned programs. In any of these cases, it must not be construed that change, as a process, is a matter of one group of people absorbing the culture or planned programs of another. It is not that simple, even if change may be characterized in its simplest dimension; something more dynamic underlies the shift. In passing from one context to another, an element of culture or an aspect of an institution is normally made over to fit the new setting.¹ Or to use Meyer Fortes' metaphor: social institutions cannot be regarded as having been pitchforked, like bundles of hay, from one culture to another.² For one thing, culture is highly selective. Whatever social or cultural elements one group of people borrows from another, is generally modified by the recipient to suit local patterns of doing, believing, and thinking. It is therefore the inner structure of a culture or institution which needs to be understood if innovators want to accelerate the process of planned change.

Of course, understanding the inner structure of a culture is difficult. It is not likewise a guarantee that, once understood, change is easily implemented. There are external factors which also need to be grasped. As Prof. Fred Eggan, writing about culture change in Northern Luzon, has stressed:

Long continued contacts with Asiatic and European peoples have brought about both direct and indirect changes; these have affected the coastal peoples more profoundly but also penetrated into the interior. But certain of the changes seem based upon internal socio-economic factors which vary from

¹ Felix Keesing, *Culture Change: An Analysis and Bibliography of Anthropological Sources to 1952* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953).

² Quoted by John Beattie, *Other Cultures* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 243; M. Fortes, "Culture Contact as a Dynamic Process," *Methods of Study of Culture Contact in Africa*, International Institute of African Languages and Cultures, Memorandum XV, p. 62.

one region to another and which operate relatively independently. Thus the shift in village organization seems more closely related to topography and water distribution than to acculturation phenomena. Likewise, the variations in social organization which we have noted seem to represent a series of correlated phenomena which has an internal consistency and which is related to factors such as population density, relative wealth per capita, and the like, rather than to external contacts.³

Although this observation focuses attention to changes occurring in upland villages, the same approach can be rewarding in examining the process of change in lowland Philippine communities. No more is this true than today when various programs of planned changes are being introduced. Many of these programs have failed to accelerate social and technological changes for different reasons. One among them is the failure of agents of change to see the *internal consistency* and *rationale* of the orientation people have to their social, cultural, and natural environment. These internal factors are incorporated into the existing set of institutions around which community life is built. Knowing what these factors are, will enable planners to ask whether the existing institutions in communities they are working on are viable to *absorb* the pace of change programmed to take place. Submerging the peasants with concepts for which nothing in their own society has prepared them, often results in frustrations, enmities, and failures.

In this paper, I shall examine the internal factors which innovators label as "resistance" to planned change, particularly in the field of modern health services, in a Tagalog-speaking community of Bay, Laguna province, in the Philippines. No comparative analysis will be made for the reasons that research in lowland Philippine communities has just begun to take shape and that materials on the subject-matter I am presently interested in are not available. At any rate, study of a single group also has its own usefulness: (1) it provides initial data for future comparative work; and (2) it enables one to exercise a good deal of control over the data on hand for intensive analysis.

THE SETTING

Bay is one of the thirty municipalities of Laguna province. It is approximately sixty-eight kilometers south of Manila and is located close to the shore of Laguna Lake. The topography of Bay is varied. As it stretches lengthwise from the shores of Laguna Lake to the foothills of Mt. Makiling, it covers an area of approximately 4,687 hectares. The interior portion of the municipality is rugged and mountainous, although not entirely inaccessible. A dirt road traverses the mountainsides and links the last upland barrio of Bitin with the rest of the municipality. The mid-

³ Fred Eggan, "Some Aspects of Culture Change in the Northern Philippines," *American Anthropologist*, XLIII (1941), 16.

dle section of the municipality consists of rolling hills and plains which taper uninterruptedly to the shore of the lake. The lakeshore area is level at all sections.

Bay is peopled by peasants oriented to two types of economic activities—fishing and agriculture. Raymond Firth's view of peasants as "small-scale producers, with a simple technology and equipment, often relying primarily for their subsistence on what they themselves produce,"⁴ finds support here, even if technological innovations have occurred in agriculture and fishing. Most of the inhabitants are still small-scale producers, tenants, laborers, and fishermen. There are some professionally employed residents, but they constitute a negligible portion of the population. There are also big landowners, but most of them are residing outside of the community. Thus, when I speak of people in Bay as peasants, I mean they constitute a group of rural cultivators and fishermen whose ways of life are traditionally oriented to, linked with, but separate from, urban centers, combining market activity with subsistence production.⁵

Because earning a living is done in small-scale production, the relationship between the economic and social referents of community life in Bay is very close. Everyday activities are pursued mostly for economic reasons—whether these are done in the name of leisure (as in card games and cockfights) or carried out as part of the existing social obligations (as in reciprocal exchange of services). In endeavors where modern technology has become dominant, traditional beliefs and practices have lost their influence over local activities. But in other aspects of community affairs where there is little control over environmental conditions, they continue to play important roles. They provide the *rationale* for most of individual and group actions.

This orientation has set a particular type of community organization, code of ethics, and standards of values which the people consider vitally important. It includes explanations for the existing practices and rules of behavior. This is remarkably true in the field of health and illness. These two aspects of community life are frequently the source of local anxiety, sorrows, joys, and optimism. However, they are difficult to grasp in isolation because they are defined in the context of practices having to do with religion, economics, and the family. It is this *inter-linking* of specific activities with other institutions in the community which makes planned innovation a complex and difficult task to pursue.

ELEMENTS OF LOCAL BIOMEDICAL PHILOSOPHY

Introduction of scientific medicine and modern health practices has been a recurrent phenomenon in Bay since the early 1950s. However,

⁴ Raymond Firth, *Elements of Social Organization* (London: Watts & Co., 1951), p. 87.

⁵ Cyril Belshaw, *Traditional Exchange and Modern Markets* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 54.

local reception proved unsatisfactory to health innovators.⁶ Folk medicine continues to command wider acceptance and higher preference among the people. Health practices remain traditional in spite of efforts to change them. Of course, this problem is not unique to Bay for it also exists in many parts of the Philippines. Thus, even if the scope of this study is limited only to Bay, health innovators elsewhere may find the data comparatively relevant to their own work.

The following questions therefore become relevant. What are the prevailing conditions in Bay which have provided the peasant folk with intelligible behavioral and moral environment, enabling them to uphold traditional values with certitude and validity? What accounts for the apparent satisfaction with the cultural *status quo*, especially in the area of health and illness? What constitute the rationality of preferences, attitudes, and thinking, with respect to the development, patterning, and transmission of the local culture? It has been argued that men can not act and feel as they do if they can not form concepts and make judgments; and this ability is made possible only through their membership in a social community and in their participation in the cultural tradition.⁷ If this is true, what are the component elements of the social community and the cultural tradition in Bay which enabled the people to perceive the world and to respond to it with satisfying personal experiences? What is the basic conceptual framework of the local biomedical philosophy?

To answer these and many other questions, I shall focus my descriptive analysis on four areas of consensus people hold as valid ways of adjusting to their environment and of participating in community affairs. These are the man-and-nature relationship, the hot-and-cold syndrome, the concept of the body and its response to ecological pressures, and the idea of sanitation as an environmental reality. These views provide the villagers with consistent reasons for much of what they are doing and, at the same time, for changing their ways when these become inadequate to meet their daily problems.

Man and Nature

The English term *nature*, meaning the sum total of all things in time and space, like the physical universe, has no generic corresponding word in the Tagalog language spoken in Bay. Most informants use *kalikasan* to approximate the physical reality of the surrounding world, although the term has reference more to abstract ideas, to essence or quality of objects, than to the concrete objects themselves. Human existence is similarly viewed. Man is perceived, not entirely in terms of his physical being,

⁶ Antonio Tan, *A Study of Health, Hygienic and Sanitary Conditions Obtaining Among Rural Homes*, CDRC Study Series No. 10 (Quezon City: Community Development Research Council, University of the Philippines, 1960).

⁷ Grace de Laguna, "Culture and Rationality," *American Anthropologist*, LI, No. 3 (July-September, 1949), 379-80.

but also in terms of his human nature, translated as *likas ng tao*. (plural: *kalikasan ng mga tao*).

The physical universe—the earth, the sky, the sea, the wind, and the surrounding vegetation—is known as *sansinokop*. Here again we find the same system of classifying meanings of similar terms attached to different elements of nature, cutting across the people's interpretation of *sansinokop*. Generically, *sansinokop* implies wholeness of being, an encompassing attribute of the universal design. The concreteness of knowledge about it, is crystallized through linguistic identification of specific units of the surrounding world—an infinite space like the open sky, the horizon, or the open field is known as *kakawakan*; a vast expanse of geographical contour and vegetational cover is labeled as *parang* or *bukid*; and the physical totality of the earth is abstractly known as *sanlibutan*. *Sansinokop* can be anyone of these subcategories, depending upon the system of relevance governing the choice of perception used to identify and describe a given object, a phenomenon, a relationship, or an abstract idea encompassing all of these.

Aside from this detailed and intimate knowledge of the environment, the ability of the people in Bay to relate empirical data to abstract generalization, is equally amazing. Each event is provided with a theory, with a logical explanation and predictive hypothesis, replete with familiar symbols as to make the argument culturally convincing, if not empirically valid. Seasonal changes, climatic conditions, and the succession of events, for instance, are defined, not only in the context of rain and sunshine or of social occasions, but also in terms of *panahon* or time. Things do not occur in a haphazard manner. They are all rooted to time—among humans, it is time to be born, time to live, and time to die.

Retrogression is never a part of the order of nature. In health, disease epidemics occur because it is time for their appearance. Even if these ailments are not treated, they will simply pass away or become ineffective if their time comes to do so. There are times when life is good and others when it is bad. All depends upon time. Most informants believe that time functions as the *link* between nature and man. Man becomes part of the universal design because of time. It is this logic about human existence, generally accepted in Bay, which enables the average man to relate himself to his environment, that makes the fisherman or the farmer observe time in whatever he does. Solar, lunar, seasonal, agricultural, and meteorological events are used to indicate time and to put any event in the community in proper perspective. On top of all these, the people also believe that time largely determines man's success or failure in life. Thus, when a farmer or a fisherman in Bay makes a major decision, he consults the *almanaki* (i.e., almanac; the Honorio Lopez edition in the vernacular) or the position of the stars, the moon, and the sun for the *best time*

to plant crops, to build a house, to perform a medical seance, to cure an illness, and, among single people, to start a family.

It is clear from this standpoint that the peasant folk in Bay possess a genuinely keen and analytical mind. Even if he rarely expresses himself in a language known to modern science, the average fisherman or farmer understands the logic of events in a manner comparable to the scientific method of observation. Take, for example, the above-mentioned belief that some diseases are prevalent during certain parts of the year rather than in others because it is "their time to appear." If we turn to modern science, especially in the fields of ecology and microbiology, we find the same assertions made to the effect that climate changes affect the resistance of the human body and the growth and spread of microorganisms.⁸ Thus, diseases like asthma, respiratory diseases, acute rheumatic fever, rheumatoid arthritis, and so forth, have also been noted to be widespread during certain parts of the year.

In other words, the difference between traditional and scientific ways of dealing with disease phenomena, as shown in the contrast of presenting information, lies to some extent in the mode of expressing elements of observation. The technical language of science expresses observed events or phenomena in concrete terms, known as facts. The technical language of tradition, on the other hand, is directed toward abstract ideas related to facts. Thus, disease causation, for example, is not explained in terms of the germ theory because local technology has not developed adequate ways of illustrating the concreteness of the phenomenon. In contrast, tradition has developed a way of showing the concreteness of local knowledge about specific events or phenomena through cultural explanations. It is therefore to cultural explanations that we must look if we are to understand the system of folk medicine or the logic of ritual and prayer treatments. The same generalization may be said with respect to other forms of social behavior in the community.

It is commonly held in Bay that events happen because of disequilibrium in the relationship between man and nature and between the elements of nature itself. Events are either positive (favorable) or negative (unfavorable) to human existence. Positive events are caused by favorable but *disequilibrated relationship* between man and his environment. The technical language of modern science may describe this as *adjustment*. Here, the disequilibrium has constructive effects on man. Informants liken the relationship to "growth of a plant—certain leaves must fall so new ones can grow." It is part of the universal law of existence. Or, as in normal body function, "certain flesh must dissolve so that new ones can expand.

⁸ Rene Dubos, *Man, Medicine and Environment*, A Britanica Perspective (New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1968); S.W. Tromp, "Weather, Climate and Man," *Handbook of Physiology*, Section 4, Adaptation to Environment (Washington, D.C.: American Physiological Society, 1964); Paul Shepard and Daniel McKinley, *The Subversive Science: Essays Toward an Ecology of Man* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969).

That is why the flesh of a child is soft while that of an adult is hard. Growth becomes fixed when you are old." It is part of the whole organization of life that an interplay between decay and growth has to take place. This process, explained in a familiar, analogic way, is close to what modern biology calls *metabolism*; in Bay tradition it is known as *bisa ng kalikasan* (force or power of nature). Except for terminologies, the principle held and understood is the same.

The principle of favorable disequilibrium process is locally understood as simultaneous replacement of broken elements, a kind of metabolic development which brings about growth, progression, and harmony. It is further compared to remodeling a house. Said one informant: "You do not destroy all the parts, only portions which you like to change. You tear the walls apart, for example, so that you can construct better and stronger ones." In contrast, *unfavorable disequilibrium*, as informants explain it, "is like a disintegrated rock—its elements are difficult to put back." Disease is one effect of unfavorable disequilibrium process. Reintegration of fragmented elements of nature is not possible unless man helps nature—through rituals and prayers—to accomplish this. Other end-results of unfavorable disequilibrium are misfortunes, natural calamities, like storms, typhoons, and earthquakes, and among humans, illness, emotional disturbances, and mental derangements.

Another essence of nature which farmers and fishermen are articulate about is *contradiction*. According to them, nature is what it is because of contradicting forces inherent in its state of being. Man is continuously buffeted from all sides by these contradictions in nature. His survival rests largely on how he consistently keeps himself neutral between two opposing elements. Contradictions, however, are seen as natural means of facilitating the accomplishment of harmony. This is clearly seen in the *binary system* of relationships: day and night, light and shadow, rain and sunshine, hot and cold, high and low, male and female, and so forth. All these points of reference require balance of functions, or nature falls apart. Harmony is the theme of the universe. Even contradictions—as long as they remain within the pull of their influence—help nature achieve harmony. For example, vegetation needs heat and cold, rain and sunshine, or it dies. So with man's responses. Man needs just enough contradicting elements from nature in order that he can function normally—too much of one element causes imbalance in the function of the body and this brings about disease and discomfort.

Balance is another important aspect of nature known to the people in Bay. It is latent in almost all processes in the surrounding world. The human body is a good model. The heart must be kept in balance with the head; emotions, with reasons. Food intake must be balanced, or the body suffers. Risk-taking must be balanced with empirical knowledge of resources,

or misfortunes take place. Man exists favorably when his ways, thoughts, and body are attuned with the conditions that surround him.

Disequilibrium, contradiction, and balance are recognized as *likas ng sansinokop* (inherent property of the universe). Their manifestation is controlled by the position of the wind, which brings about fluctuations in atmospheric pressure and weather conditions, as well as the harmonious or disastrous relationship between man and nature. These fluctuations result from the passage of cold and warm meteorological fronts, locally known as *simoy ng hangin*. *Amihan* (northwind) brings in the cold front, while *timog* (southwind) ushers in the warm one. Closely following these two main fronts are minor wind-flows which exhibit diurnal and nocturnal oscillations. These are *habagat* (westwind), *sabalas* (northwest wind), and *salatan* (southwest wind). This overlapping of wind-flows often causes imbalance in atmospheric pressures and is locally believed to "bring about the appearance of illnesses like typhoid fever, cholera and common colds."

Wind-flows, collectively known as *masamang hangin*, are one of the sources of diseases. These are strayed air with humid temperature. They are not part of the main wind-fronts or of the minor undercurrents discussed above. These are the dangerously charged emanations from the environment, believed to be controlled by the malevolent spirits. They appear in two kinds. The *masamang hangin* controlled by the spirits of the atmosphere or the earth, are known as *hunab*. These are streaks of warm gaseous emanation from the bowels of the earth. They enter into the body through the posterior openings, like the anus, the soles of the feet, the pores of the skin. The *masamang hangin* controlled by the spirits of the atmosphere or *engkanto* are known as *sareno*. They are cold and humid and they enter into the body through the crown of the head and the back part of the chest.

Aside from the wind, the earth is also conceived to be subject to the controlling force of nature. The *singaw ng lupa* (temperature emanating from the soil) affects man in various ways. Some fields, for example, are productive because the *singaw ng lupa ay malamig* (the temperature of the soil is cool). Such condition is favorable to the growth of crops. Other fields are less productive because the *singaw ng lupa ay mainit* (the temperature of the soil is hot). Because such properties are inherent in nature, man cannot do much about them. Even if the *mainit na lupa* are saturated with commercialized fertilizer, the crop still will not grow well. If fruit trees are planted in this type of soil, the fruits will be less juicy. Sugar canes are found to show similar characteristics—the juice is scant and the stalks are hard.

Building a house is another local activity in which the nature of the soil is considered seriously before construction. Some lots are believed to be lucky because the *singaw* is cool; others are unlucky because it is hot. In the upland area of Bay, this is seriously considered before building a house; in the lakeshore area where residential lots are becoming scarce, much of the traditional beliefs have been modified, if not done away with. If building

a house on an unfavorable lot is unavoidable, rituals are performed to obviate the effects of *masamang lupa* on the occupants of the house. Coins, lime, brass, and other paraphernalia are buried underneath the four main posts, to neutralize the annihilating force of *singaw ng lupa*. Coins and brass objects are said to absorb the evil elements of the soil, which lime prevents from restructuring should the coins and brass disintegrate. The occupants of the house will thus be protected from sickness and harm.

The belief that what causes certain diseases to happen is the best medicine for their cure, permeates the conceptualization of healing in Bay folk medicine. If the ailment was acquired from the lake—for example, the *pasma sa tubig* (characterized by pains in the joints)—lake weeds are used for medicine. If an individual suffers from stomach-ache from over-eating, the most potently hot or cold food (*matapang na pagkain*) among those he has eaten, are secured, burnt, and the decoction taken internally. Because it is the *bisa* or power of the food which has upset the balance of elements in the body and causes the malfunction of body-mechanisms, it is also this *bisa* which can restore them.

In effect, then, there are two perceptual organizations of natural events recognized by the peasants in Bay. One is the binary system of opposition and the other is the self-rectifying quality of objects themselves. Nature is conceived as a system of oppositions—bad and good, sacred and evil, favorable and unfavorable, controlling and manipulating, hot and cold, and so on. Man can control nature only in a limited way. Nature holds man in multiple ways. Technology is one way of controlling nature, but nature soon takes control over technology. Thus, in folk medicine, before the patient is brought to the clinic or to the hospital for treatment, the *lamang lupa* are first appeased and their power controlled through the performance of proper rituals and the application of local medication. It is only when clues from the ritual indicate that the *lamang lupa* are satisfied that scientific medicine can be effective. This view constitutes the dominant rationale for medical care in Bay as well as in the neighboring communities, a guideline for the various steps taken in the process of making decisions concerning health problems.

Hot-and-Cold Syndrome

The principle of the hot-and-cold syndrome was partly touched on in the discussion above. This binary system of opposition is one of the most important conceptual frames of reference in understanding the man-nature relationship. The terms *hot* and *cold* do not imply the presence or absence of temperature but the effects of such qualities on the human body. Certain illnesses are believed to be caused by cold or hot elements of nature entering into the body through the pores of the skin, food consumed, and air inhaled. Most ailments associated with the hot syndrome are caused by factors coming from within the body itself. Informants state that when stim-

ulated, either by elements from the surrounding world or by psychic forces (*bisa*) within it, the body generates much heat which, when unchecked, causes skin eruptions, boils, hoarseness of voice, gum swelling, appearance of hard coatings over the tongue, and fever.

In contrast, cold maladies are believed to be caused by elements outside of the body. These elements include the wind, water, acidic foods (also known as *matapang na pagkain*), and other environmental conditions. The *singaw ng lupa*, for example, which is generally associated with the hot syndrome, is considered cold during rainy days. Exposure to it causes stomach-aches among adults and convulsions among small children. Most illnesses due to cold elements of nature are characterized by muscular pains, chest pains, stomach cramps, and loose bowel movements. The sensory and the motor functions of the body are usually disrupted in ailments due to cold elements coming from the environment.

As previously stated certain illnesses are closely related to kinds of food eaten. Local food classification is also based on the concepts of hot and cold. Unregulated intake of cold foods brings about maladies generally characterized by swelling of joints, muscular pains, and stomach discomforts. Similarly, over-consumption of hot foods brings about a general malaise and most of the known skin ailments. The hot-cold balance has to be maintained even in terms of food consumed, if good health is desired.

Most vegetables and juicy fruits are considered cold, if only because "these contain juice and fleshy substances that cool the mouth and the stomach, hence the entire body." There are, however, some vegetables which are hot. Beans, like *mongo* (*Phaseolus mongo* Linn.) and dried *sitao* (*Vigna catjang* Endl.) seeds, are hot and, if not cooked in a leafy vegetable mixture, or with cold foodstuffs for that matter, can bring about skin rashes, lip eruptions, and other discomforts like shortness of breath and pain in defecating. Hot foods make an individual sweat profusely and when this remains unchecked for a period of time, skin rashes known as *bungang pawis* appear. Newly harvested foodstuffs, except leafy vegetables, are considered hot. One needs to let some time pass before eating or cooking them for meals.

Meat of horses, carabaos, dogs, cats, goats, and pigs (mostly the fat) are considered hot to the body. Meat from cattle, pork meat, chicken, geese, turkey, and meat from other fowls are cold. Fresh-water fish, except big ones like eels, are never considered hot. On the other hand, salt-water fish are classified mostly as hot to the body: *labahita*, *lapad*, *lapu-lapu*, shark, and all big fish. Fish or meat should be cooked with other foodstuffs containing cold elements in order to neutralize the former's harmful effects on the body.

The surrounding world is also seen in terms of hot and cold. The direction of wind source during any part of the year brings about changes in the ecological conditions of the area. People believe that the appearance

and disappearance of certain types of illnesses are dependent upon the "kind" of wind flowing over the place. *Amihan* and *amihan mura* (north and northeast winds) are considered cold winds bringing common colds, joint pains, and muscular cramps. *Timog* (south wind) is neutral but it sometimes brings about skin rashes and minor ailments. *Habagat* (west wind) is hot and causes major illnesses like typhoid fever, cholera, headaches, and others.

The appearance and changes in the positions of the celestial bodies are said to produce either hot or cold effects on man, directly or indirectly. Stars are cool and their appearance in heaven indicates good weather, cool atmospheric conditions, and auspicious time to start planting crops or building a house. The full-moon is cool but the half-moon is hot. Appearance of a star close to the moon indicates hot conditions and the likely occurrence of events like suicide, elopement, fighting, and others. Overlapping periods between the receding half-moon and the rising full-moon and vice-versa, are turbulent times; there is no definite flow of elements of nature, although hot elements predominate. That is why during this period the *lamang lupa* come out from the bowels of the earth, the *engkantu* roam around, the sorcerers are active, the *mananangal* are dangerous, and even women have their menstrual flow. Many men are said to be highly sensitive and temperamental during this time.

The sun is conceived as hot, but not until it reaches certain points in the sky. Early-morning sun is cool; at noon and in the afternoon it is hot, and before sun-down, it is cool. Planting crops, building houses, starting new business ventures, and so forth follow closely the solar time. The appearance of a comet or shooting star indicates prolonged summer or possible drought. The clouds are generally cool because they bring in rain. But when clouds appear in fleshy hues and are scattered in clusters in the eastern sky every early-morning for several days, or in large masses of deep violet-red in the western sky at dusk, also for a number of days, they indicate that the atmosphere is becoming warm or hot and that a storm, or at least strong winds, is forthcoming. Most fishermen keep close to the shore when fishing at night.

Water is similarly conceived—that is, as either hot or cold. The bases for evaluation are its source and effects on the body. Spring water is cold and is good for health. But once the water has flowed down the stream it becomes hot and is detrimental to health. Ice-cold water is hot in the sense that it produces painful reactions on the skin and muscles when handled. Sea water is hot but lake water is cold. Sometimes water is also conceived as hard or soft. Rain water is said to be soft while faucet water is hard. Water taken from open wells is soft, while that obtained from water-pumps is hard. Softness and hardness, like hot and cold, have reference not to the physical object but mainly to taste and sensation experienced "when drinking the water and not when touching it."

Modern drugs are hot. When these are injected into the body or taken orally they upset the internal balance of elements in the body and lower its resistance to the *bisa* (power) of disease. If modern medicine is necessary to treat an illness, it must be taken with other medication which will neutralize its effects on the body. Otherwise, it will take long before the illness can be cured.

The Human Body and its Response to Ecological Pressures

The above discussion brings us to the local concept of the human body and how it responds to the elements of the external world. The body is viewed by many peasants as "a good model for understanding the significance of the hot-cold syndrome in folk medicine." To remain healthy, informants are agreed, one "has to keep the balance of hot and cold elements in the body in a constant state." Any break in the equilibrium causes illness. The term equilibrium is used technically here to mean a state of adjustment between opposing or divergent influences of elements in nature, including the forces of disequilibrium and contradiction mentioned earlier.

Physically, the head, neck, arms, and legs are by nature considered cold, while the joints, chest, stomach, and the genitals are hot. When these parts of the body are exposed more to either one set of elements mentioned above (i.e., hot or cold), illness and discomforts arise. Treatment consists of medication which will restore the balance.

The head is said to be sensitive to heat. That is why it reacts to problems with emotionalism; emotions are conceived as heat emanating from the blood. *Mainitin ang ulo* (hot-tempered) is the term used to characterize a man who easily loses his temper even over trivial matters. Temper is in the head (specifically at the temporal area), although it can be generated by the *damdamin* (feelings) which are based in the chest. When the head is over-exposed to the heat of the sun or of fire, as in cooking, the individual suffers from a headache. The blood that maintains the coordination of brain activities is unnecessarily heated; this numbs certain nerves and causes the pain.

The chest is divided into two parts—depending upon its response to cold and hot elements of the surrounding world. The back part of the chest, known as *likod*, is very sensitive to cold. Thus over-exposure of this part of the body to rain, wind, draft, cold water (as among fishermen), and other similar elements of nature, brings about chest cramps known as *puntada*, *sipon* (colds), tuberculosis, asthma, pneumonia, and other physical infirmities. While these diseases are known and recognized as due to over-exposure to elements of nature, explanations also exist concerning their etiology, involving the workings of environmental spirits.

In contrast to the back part of the chest, the breast responds to hot elements. It is by nature conceived to be warm, the seat of love and affection. When a person is exposed to stress, to emotional problems, and to other kinds of pressures, he suffers from chest pains. The heat generated by the

heart paralyzes the nerves controlling the chest-muscles, hence the pain. This can be cured by rubbing coconut oil all over the painful area. Recently, *Vicks Vaporub* has been recommended by some healers as good medication for illness due to heat.

The portion of the body immediately below the *dibdib* and right above the upper section of the *tiyan* (abdomen) is known as the *sikmura* or stomach. This is vulnerable to cold, exposure to which makes the person suffer from pain known as *sikmura*. It is similar to gas pain. There are certain health rules connected with this body response to elements of nature. If one is hungry, tired, or has been exposed to the heat of the sun, for example, he should rest before he takes anything cold. Or else he takes a handful of sugar or a pick of salt before drinking. Otherwise, he will suffer from *sikmura*.

To keep body resistance at a maximum when one is tired or has been exposed to the heat of the sun, warm food or liquid like broth, coffee, tea, or boiled ginger should be taken first before eating. In the morning, one should avoid milk, sour liquids like lemon juice, and cold cereals. These can cause *sikmura* pains. This is one reason, perhaps, why many people in Bay, as elsewhere in the rural areas of the Philippines, are not milk drinkers, apart from the fact that milk is not financially accessible to them.

Immediately below the *sikmura* is the *tiyan*. This portion of the body contains the intestines, womb, kidneys, and other internal organs. Like the *sikmura*, the *tiyan* is also said to be vulnerable to hot and cold. The intestines react in a neutral manner to either element. However, if an excess of hot foods is partaken of, the individual also suffers from abdominal pains because these upset intestinal reactions to body conditions; the converse is equally true—that is, if cold foods are taken in excess, the person also suffers. Thus, food mixtures have to be in the right proportion and their intake has to be regulated.

The womb, locally known as *matris*, also responds to heat. Over-heating the portion of the body immediately above the womb results in abnormal menstruation or, if the woman is pregnant, in abortion. Sterility and thinness (*pangangayayat*) also results from the imbalance of the hot-cold syndrome in the womb. Thus, newly-delivered mothers are advised to wear long skirts and long-sleeved dresses, so that the cold (*ang lamig*), meaning actually "cold air," will not enter into her body. Menstruating women are likewise not allowed to take a bath or to over-expose themselves to cold weather because, if they do, they will suffer from menstrual pains. *Coitus interruptus*, although known as a method of preventing pregnancy, is not highly favored by many couples, especially by the wives. Some informants agree that there is danger of becoming ill—usually suffering from pains around the waist—when this method is used because "when the man withdraws his penis, cold air enters into the woman's *puerta* (i.e., vagina) and harms the heated womb." The womb is known as *bahay-tao* and if the body is exposed to heat, it reacts unfavorably to the semen and the woman becomes sterile.

As informants said: "*Natutunaw ang kukusta ng ating similya kapag ang bahay-tao ay mainit.*" (Free transl: "The reproductive power of the semen disintegrates if the womb is hot.")

The buttocks and the lower extremities are by nature hot. This includes the *pus-on* (hippogastrium), the genitals, and the thighs. Since these are inherently hot, treatment of any illness in this portion of the body requires cold medicine. During menstruation the body of a woman is hot and pain is felt at the *pus-on*. Cold medication, like decoction derived from medicinal plants and vinegar, is applied. Genitals are conceived as hot because a little friction on them generates heat all over the body and awakens the dormant energies of the individual. Application of cold medication, like ice cubes or cold water, offsets the feeling if sexual excitement is to be controlled, as among people with heart troubles. Young people are said to be hot because the genitals are not fully used; these respond quickly to slight provocation. In contrast, when the genitals have been used, as among old people, the heat no longer generates as much emotional desire and conflict. That is why old age is conceived to be cold, while youth is hot. The thighs are vulnerable to heat in the same way as the genitals are. As informants state: "*Paghinipo mo ang paa, nanginginig ang buong katawan—ayos na.*" (Free transl: "Rub the thighs and the entire body shakes with emotions—everything can be consummated.")

The skin and joints are sensitive to heat and cold. Rashes known as *bungang araw* are brought about by over-exposure to the heat of the sun, profuse sweating, and over-consumption of hot food. Joints become painful when exposed to cold elements like water (*babad sa tubig*) or cold wind. Medication for such discomforts consists of rubbing over the painful parts preparations which produce heat, like ginger or brew from *makabuhay* plant.

Blood is also said to respond to the hot-and-cold syndrome. There are three blood types known to the people, namely, *malapot* (thick), *malabnaw* (thin), and *dilaw* (yellowish). When the body is over-exposed to heat or cold, the blood becomes thick and causes illness like *mataas ang dugo* (possibly high-blood pressure) and *sakit sa puso* (heart illness). Because of its thickness, the blood circulates very slowly and parts of it stick to the walls of the *ugat* (veins, nerves), thereby causing further malfunctioning of body mechanisms. People suffering from insomnia (*hindi makatulog*), anemia (*maputla*), and weak body resistance (*sakitin*) have *malabnaw* (thin) blood. Those having *dilaw* or yellowish blood are sick with asthma, bile troubles, tuberculosis, and malaria.

When two people are said to be incompatible in blood type and temperature (*init*), they cannot bear children. Hot-blooded males are conceived to be impotent. They cannot have offspring because their *similya* (semen) causes an imbalance (more heat) in the body mechanisms controlling the woman's *bahay-tao* or womb. When both male and female have

cold blood they also cannot bear children. Those with normal qualities are highly prolific.

Because of this conceptual frame of reference, the blood is considered the bearer of symptoms relative to the illness suffered by the people. This brings us to the significance of pulse-taking in the diagnostic technique of folk healing. The pulse is found at the wrist, fingertips, the feet, and ends of the toes. By feeling these areas, the healer knows which part of the body is afflicted. This recognition is based on pulse rate and degree of *singam* (temperature), either hot or cold, generated by the pulse at sections of the body mentioned above.

Food Preferences and Health Habits

Food is another aspect of human existence in Bay which needs to be examined intensively because of its close association with health and illness. Moreover, the concept of food underlies much of the social and cultural practices of the people. Thus indirectly, but more profoundly, by studying food preferences, one achieves an understanding of the peasant way of life.

Food is one of the elaborate topics of everyday conversation in most barrios. People talk about it almost incessantly—what, where, when, and how to procure it. However, in spite of this magnified preoccupation, food is eaten not only to meet the necessary biological need but also to satisfy certain social, cultural, and psychological requirements of everyday life. Some foods are taken because of their medicinal value; others, exclusively for social functions, such as appetizers during prolonged drinking sessions among friends, visitors, and kinsmen. In the process, foods get the cultural labels “bad,” “good,” and “agreeable.” These labels do not necessarily imply recognition, on the part of the people, of the nutritional values of food as understood by the nutritionists and the home economists. Rather, they imply the operation of a relatively stable pattern of cultural selectivity in the community.

The social function of food often transcends its nutritive value insofar as the community is concerned. For example, food is used as a measure of an individual's rank in the community and as an index of social class differentiation within the group. This means that people with a more plentiful food stock in their house, or who can afford fancy meals, are rated higher in status than those who have an inadequate supply and can not afford anything beyond the usual rice-and-fish combination. Of course, education has slowly replaced this economic criterion in recent years. At any rate, the economic position of an individual in the community is still one of the dominant cultural symbols of status.

This is so because food represents security and power. Most people recognize that only those who are economically well-off can afford to stand up and fight for their individual or group rights. The law has given the tenant ample protection but the judicial processes are usually long, com-

plex, and expensive; most peasants cannot afford the cost. As a group of farmers commented: "Sometimes it is better to conform and fight. Sure your pride is hurt when your rights are trampled upon but in conforming, these are all that you lose. If you hit back against the landlord, you lose your pride and the privilege to work on his land. If you have no ready access to other resources, your family suffers." Of course this is not unique in Bay because it also occurs in all cultures. I emphasize this here to underscore the fact that the people are aware of it and have developed a way by which problems of this nature can be resolved.

In the family, food is used by housewives to show their affection for their husbands and children. Choice foods, for example, are reserved for the husband—beef, chicken, pork, and others. Children may not share in these if the supply is very limited. Housewives are agreed that "this is one way of making the husband feel good. After all he works so hard during the day in order to support a family. So serving him the choicest food available when he comes home is one way of compensating for his hard work." Husbands, especially those who have jobs outside of the community, also show their love and concern for their families by bringing food to their wives and children when they come home from work.

Certain foods are classified as good only for children and not for adults. Such preparations as *lugaw* (porridge), native cakes, bread, candies, ice cream, and sweets are mostly reserved for children, although adults may partake of them. Carbonated drinks—*i.e.*, *Coca-Cola*, *Pepsi-Cola*, *Seven-Up*, and so forth—are used as substitutes for milk or solid food during weaning. Some foods considered harmful to children include pork, beef, leafy vegetables, milk, mung beans, squash, and chicken. But in spite of this, I have seen children fed on these foods. In the interior barrios, fish is considered harmful because "it produces worms inside the body" (*Nagkakaroon ng bulati ang bata*). Fatty foods and vegetables are "bad" foods because they are hard to digest. Milk is discouraged in other parts of the community because "it causes diarrhea" (*nagtatae ang bata*).

There are certain foods which, because of their effects on the body, are not given to pregnant, puerperal, and lactating mothers. It is not generally understood that nursing mothers have higher food requirements. As a result, many mothers are required to observe numerous food-taboos. Most of those I interviewed said that the food they eat is similar to that served in the normal meals. During conception, however, some foods craved for are added but the diet in late pregnancy returns to the usual rice-and-fish combination, with a few occasional vegetables.

Sour foods are avoided during pregnancy because they can cause miscarriage or abortion; chicken brings about edema; squash results in infantile beriberi and skin disease even before the infant is born. *Ampalaya* (bitter melon) can cause miscarriage. Eggplants are forbidden because they cause scalp ailments on both mother and child; these can also bring about *beri-*

beri. During puerperium, foods like pork, vegetables, sour fruits, eggs, big fish, and sweets are avoided because these can cause internal hemorrhage or prolapse. In contrast, foods like *tulya* (sea shell), *malunggay* leaves, and other vegetables are taken in considerable quantities because they induce abundance of milk in lactation.

Certain foods are more highly preferred than others for cultural reasons. Meat, for example, is served mostly during festivities. Vegetables, except for newly-introduced ones like lettuce, pechay, and carrots, are not served during special occasions or when there are guests at home. Vegetables are served mixed with meat. Bread is served by those who can afford it and where it is available, only during breakfast and *merienda* (afternoon snacks). It is never a part of the normal meal. Among males, onions, garlic, ginger, and pepper mixed with vinegar are used as meal appetizers to keep them physically vigorous and sexually virile. The other reason is that "these foods have medicinal value and therefore they store up enough resistance against illness."

Among adolescent girls, food preference is related to aesthetic value: tomatoes are eaten raw because "these are food for the skin—make the skin smooth and reddish"; *kalamansi* (a kind of citrus) juice makes the skin soft; and *ampalaya* cleanses the blood, makes the cheeks rosy, and rids the face of pimples.

Rice is the main staple in Bay. Corn and sweet potatoes may be served as substitutes, but this is not normally done, for the reason that corn and sweet potatoes are low-prestige food and are resorted to only when the family is economically hard-up; otherwise, rice is purchased even at an exorbitant price. Among the high-prestige foods in Bay are: canned foods, beef, chicken, pork, eggs, canned fruits, and carbonated drinks. Dried fish, vegetables, unrefined sugar, and similar items may be nutritionally desirable but are nonetheless considered socially shameful and therefore undesirable. These are served mainly to members of the family, kinsmen, and close friends.

Local Sanitation

The discussion of the ecological base of community life in Bay is not complete without considering the concept of sanitation and how the people deal with it. Sanitation, defined as the science and practice of effecting healthful and hygienic conditions, is a vague concept when applied to actual ecological situations in the community and to the manner people respond to it. The local concept of cleanliness differs from that held by the health officers. In San Antonio, for example, absence of visible dirt is sanitation. The term *malinis* or clean certainly takes different shades of meaning. Anything washed with water becomes *malinis*. Contamination is not part of the *malinis* category. Water devoid of particles is conceived as clean, even if it appears potable but is not actually so. I have seen many fishermen drink

lake-water. When I raised the question of cleanliness, they argued that "the water is clear, therefore clean."

Variations in the ecological features of the municipality of Bay bring about differences in sanitation perspective among the people. Most residents in the poblacion have modern facilities and many of them understand what constitute hygienic conditions in pretty much the same manner as the health officers. Those residing in the upland barrios have different views from those living close to the lakeshore area. Backyards are clean in the poblacion and barrios close to it, although this is true only in some barrios. In the lakeshore area, yards are clean, but it is also common to see garbage piled in mounds nearby, especially underneath the kitchen windows. When cooking, housewives simply throw out of the window fruit peelings, wrappers of purchased articles, vegetable fronds, and all types of kitchen refuse.

Front yards are usually kept differently from *silong* (sections underneath the house). Among the lakeshore dwellers, duck corrals are built right below the sleeping quarters and the kitchen. In the interior upland regions, some farmers tie their carabaos underneath the house, too. Some build corrals close to their front yards. Debris around these corrals or piled close to the kitchen windows, are seldom removed, and domestic animals—dogs, pigs, ducks, chickens—forage among the scraps for food and bones. In due time maggots are found creeping all over the place and the pungent smell of decomposing garbage and fowl refuse permeates the neighborhood. But the people seem so conditioned to the scent that it does not bother them at all.

Most houses in Bay, except in the poblacion and in some barrios close to it, have no latrines. The open fields and the wide shore of Laguna lake provide them with convenient places for meeting their biological needs, especially at night. Those who have privies construct them close to the house; in the poblacion, they form part of the kitchen. Privacy in Bay, as in other parts of rural Philippines, is a matter of definition. Sometimes, to turn one's back from another person is privacy. It is not uncommon to see men seeking the bush or standing beside a tree to urinate (in spite of many people passing by). At home, the girls change their dress inside the *silid* or room, but the men simply turn their backs and face the corner—then they change their attire.

The kitchen is an interesting part of the house in Bay. In the poblacion and neighboring barrios, the cooking place is well-kept, tiled, and clean. In some barrios, however, especially those along the lake, the kitchen area is never dry. Fishermen and farmers coming from work proceed to the kitchen for a cup of water and in the process wet the place. Water pumps are installed in most kitchens. Since the pumps are not buried deep, the water is sometimes not clear and has a peculiar smell and taste. The water used for washing is emptied right over the place where the pipe of the pump has been drilled. Seepage is evident in the particles of sand found

in the water pumped out. However, the people do not consider this as dirty, and the fact that "no one has died because of it" is an argument for the water's being potable and safe.

Foodstuffs brought into the house are deposited on the floor near the stove or in the center of the kitchen. These are unprotected from flies, cats, dogs, and chickens. Sometimes, children, with their hands dirtied from playing in the yard, come up and handle the foodstuffs. Flies alight on and crawl over lumps of meat, unscaled fish, or ingredients being readied for cooking. Raw materials for cooking are not washed thoroughly because "too much washing removes the taste of the food." Anything is safe as long as it is boiled. Thus, no precaution is taken to prevent contamination of food.

Before eating, most people do not wash their hands. If they do, washing consists in drenching one's hands. Sometimes onlookers see dirt-droplets mingle with food eaten, particularly as most fishermen and farmers eat with their hands. In the process, one notices dirty fingernails turn clean after meals: the broth in the plate has washed them. After eating, the left-overs on the floor are often left to the dogs and cats to fight over. Sometimes they are wiped away.

Except in the poblacion, personal hygiene in many barrios is apparently very inadequate. Of course this observation is a biased one—colored by the standards of an outsider. The reader has to take it from that point. For even in the barrios where water is not a problem, like those along the lake, personal hygiene is a matter with which people are not so much concerned. Among the fishermen, the nature of their work does not encourage the cleanliness conceived of in modern society. This is certainly true also among the farmers. Cleanliness is locally seen as a matter of personal definition and preference. To wash one's body constitutes cleanliness among those living in the interior barrios, and this is not necessarily true among the fishermen. To be free from mud may constitute the definition of cleanliness among the poblacion dwellers because the streets on which they walk and the houses in which they live, plus the nature of their work, are relatively free from mud. This would hardly be the case among the farmers. To be free from a repugnant kind of mud constitutes cleanliness. Plowing the field, cleaning the dikes, and grazing the carabaos hardly keep anyone from mud and dirt.

The toothbrush is not frequently used by the people in many parts of the community. This is common among those living in the poblacion. Most fishermen and farmers use their fingers to clean their mouths and teeth after meals. Sticks and coconut mid-ribs are used to clean the teeth; sometimes areca nut peels are used. Food particles, as well as the astringent concoction of lime, betel leaves, and tobacco among those who chew betel, harden and form scales around the base of the teeth. After a period of time these scales harden and push the gums downward, irritating and infecting

them in the process. It is not uncommon to see bleeding gums among adults and children in Bay; gingivitis is prevalent.

Summary and Conclusions

From what has been discussed, it is clear that the peasants in Bay share a common ecological model for behavior and views of life. They have an elaborate way of defining man's relationship with nature, the function of the human body, the effects of elements of nature on the physical well-being of man, the bio-social functions of food, and the local concept of sanitation. These definitions are based on concrete knowledge and on a complex theoretical abstraction of natural and social relationships in the community. The cognitive categories resulting from such concrete and theoretical knowledge constitute the framework of rationality through which the people perceive the world and guide their actions, with respect to health and medical practices. These also provide strategic points of reference for the variations that take place in the organization of interpersonal and inter-group behavior in the poblacion, interior barrios, and lakeshore areas of Bay. That is why there is an apparent satisfaction with the prevailing conditions relative to health and illness.

It needs to be emphasized at once, however, that most members of the community are not aware that they view the structure of their universe and the realities of their natural-social relationships in a particular way and on the basis of an elaborately formulated bio-ecological model. Of course, this is true with almost all humans, including the modern, scientifically oriented individuals. Once a particular way of thinking has been accepted and adopted, the concomitant behavior ceases to be deliberate and/or calculated, and, for the most part, is carried out spontaneously and naturally. Thus, in Bay, it is only when people are pressed for explanations and reasons, or are required by circumstances to offer these, that the abstract model on which the broad pattern of behavior is based, is described and articulated.

For example, almost all people recognize the relationship between man and nature. The fishermen know they have to depend on the lake for a living, just as the farmer is certain that the land is the key to economic security for himself and his family. Although they do not articulate it, the fishermen have impressive and detailed knowledge of the directions of the wind and the contours of the lake, and the farmers, a very intimate familiarity with the land and plant life. Both groups of peasants carry on their everyday tasks without serious thoughts about the mechanisms which cause the wind or make the plants grow. But when something happens in the lake or in the farm, then the *rationale* for the event, the reason for its occurrence, is discussed. Bits and pieces of circumstances are put together like a jigsaw puzzle against the outline of the accepted theoretical model of causation. When empirical evidence and the original hypothesis reinforce

each other, then a general conclusion is drawn; otherwise, the approach is changed until a satisfactory relationship is discovered and the problem is dealt with accordingly.

In describing the way in which people perceive the world and show contentment with what they have at present, I do not mean to imply that they are not willing to change. Individually, they express their desires for change—i.e., to better themselves—but when faced with a decision which tends to upset the *status quo* the reaction is one of hesitation to break away from what are known and done by most members of the community. One reason for this is that the community is not very heterogeneous in terms of cultural upbringing. The process of learning and transmission of traditional values is almost the same for everyone. This has instilled in most, if not all, the people in the community an intelligible behavioral and moral commitment to tradition which provides them not only with social and emotional support but also with certitude for their actions. New ways of doing things do not have this widespread support of the community and therefore do not provide the same security as traditional practices. Of course, this is not only true in Bay, or of peasants, but also of modern man.

Thus, if we wish to understand why peasants behave the way they do, if we wish to develop strategies for introducing programs of directed change in medical and health services in rural communities, it is desirable, I think, to consider the direction in which the internal factors, as Eggan calls them, shape local behavior. Elements of these local practices that highlight the social, moral, and behavioral commitment of the people to the wider peasant way of life have to be included in the plan for change if accelerated pace of development is to be achieved. In this way, the initial break from what is traditional and secure is not decisively traumatic but imperceptibly fluid.

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CULTURAL FICTIONS: THE FUNCTIONS AND DYSFUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL MYTHOLOGY

GEORGE H. WEIGHTMAN

SOCIOLOGISTS HAVE FROM TIME TO TIME NOTED THE TENDENCY OF members of a society to hold beliefs, and even to implement such beliefs, though they know such beliefs to be untrue. Indeed, they know them to be obviously contrary to reality. Robin Williams, an American sociologist who studied such patterns of beliefs and behaviour, called them "cultural fictions"; and he argued that they could be highly "functional" (i.e., contribute to the ongoing-ness of the society).¹ Although he did not stress the point, it would also follow that such patterns might prove "dysfunctional" (i.e., disrupt or threaten to disrupt the ongoing-ness of the society), if such beliefs were too contrary to objective reality, or were too zealously believed, or were too discredited in the eyes of too many members of the society.

In this paper, I propose *first* to illustrate these patterns in their simplest form with respect to crime and society. After the reader grasps the nature, functions, and possible dysfunctions of such fictions, I shall turn to a specific and profoundly American cultural fiction which has ensured the continuity of American society for nearly two hundred years. Crucially, this American fiction was even more functional for Europeans and Afro-Asians *in the past*. Continued subscribing to this peculiar American fiction by Afro-Asians now can be and has proven highly dysfunctional to Afro-Asian progress and liberation.

Since all of the limited literature on the phenomenon of cultural fictions was done by American sociologists, I shall draw my examples from American criminology. The Filipino reader can readily relate these examples to Philippine society.²

Americans believe, and their novels, television, cinema, and newspapers affirm: (1) crime does not pay; (2) there is no such thing as a perfect crime; and (3) the policeman is your friend. These beliefs are so manifestly contrary to reality that one can only be impressed by the persistence of such beliefs.

First of all, crime pays fantastically well in America. I refer not merely to organized crime (e.g., the *mafia*), which has been described as "bigger than General Motors," but to major business irregularities, corruption,

¹ Robin M. Williams, Jr., *American Society: A Sociological Interpretation* (2nd ed.; New York: Knopf, 1960), pp. 391-95.

² A cynical awareness of this situation was once summed up by a Filipino colleague who once observed, "Nothing here is impossible—particularly if it is illegal."

bribery, tax evasion, etc. (termed "white-collar crime" by sociologists).³ Second, all criminologists agree that only a small proportion of illegal activities are ever reported to the police. A still smaller proportion ever leads to any arrest. A yet smaller proportion leads to trials, and, finally, an even smaller proportion yields convictions. This does not necessarily imply that the convicted actually were the guilty parties. What, indeed, could be more "perfect" than a crime never noticed? Finally, in America no Negroes, no poor people, not even upper-middle class white college students would support the view that the policeman is one's friend. Studies have indicated that policemen in many societies possess characteristics much in common with the criminal elements. It has even been argued that an effective policeman must possess certain sadistic elements.⁴

How, then, could one explain the persistence of such beliefs? The question may perhaps better be answered by another question: What would society be like if the majority of its members actively rejected such beliefs? To the extent that the members of a society can be persuaded to believe and to implement such fictions, the stability of that society can be maintained. In recent years in America there has been a deterioration of "law and order" partly because ethnic and class differences between the police and the inhabitants of the central cities have intensified the old basic animosities. Clashes between Black Panthers and the police, and between college students and the police, increasingly reflect the breakdown of these old cultural fictions.⁵

Now let us turn to the role of fictions in societal mythology. History has been described as a joke we play upon our ancestors. All the peoples of the world are forever busily rewriting their histories to suit the contemporary scene. Thus, the "Japanese" cherry trees in Washington, D.C. became "Korean" cherry trees during World War II — a far better fate than an alternative proposal that they be chopped down! With the improvement of American and Japanese relations, they reverted back to the original classification. Similarly for Americans, the Russians and the Chinese were once "good guys," but have now changed places with Germans and Japanese as "bad guys." Jefferson, the great slave-holder, becomes the great libertarian. Americans remember the Alamo, but it is forgotten that the Mexican Army was fighting to abolish slavery and the Texas whites were fighting to preserve Negro servitude. Lincoln, a manic-depressive racist, becomes The Great Emancipator. Jack Kennedy, who manipulated the Bay of Pigs Disaster and the escalation of the war in Vietnam, becomes a man of peace. His brother, Robert, who was a protege of Senator Joseph McCarthy and who was the Master Wiretapper, becomes a champion of

³ This conceptualization has been most fully set forth in the writings of the criminologist, Edwin H. Sutherland.

⁴ In a community near Manila, the area near the city police station is deemed an undesirable residential area.

⁵ Similarly, student-police clashes in the Greater Manila area reflect the same phenomenon.

civil rights. And so it goes everywhere. I have given only American examples, but the British, Russians, Germans, Israelis, Filipinos *et. al.* have been just as resourceful and imaginative.

A national history, thus, provides a field day for sociologists intrigued by such cultural fictions. However, I am particularly intrigued by one myth (another term for a cultural fiction) in American history profoundly important for world development in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. It is the myth of what Jack Kennedy (that master-manipulator of world public opinion) called the "continuing American Revolution." Related tenets of this doctrine hold that the "American Revolution" was the first victory for liberty and equality (thus an inspiration for eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe)⁶ and the first colonial war for independence (thus a promise and a hope for Afro-Asia in the early twentieth century).⁷

And now we can perceive the ironic significance of such a fiction. Without such beliefs, hopes, and expectations, the French and later European struggles against absolute despotism might not have prevailed. Without such rhetoric and inspiration, Afro-Asians in the earlier decades of this century might have faltered, and yet — it was all an illusion. The American War for Independence was *not* anti-colonial war, *nor* was it a struggle for liberty, equality, and the pursuit of happiness for all. Though, so the Americans came to believe. More crucially, they eventually got everybody else to believe so, too.

The true colonial struggle for independence was being waged and ultimately lost by the Indians against the white colonial settlers determined to exterminate them. England, for purely economic self-interest, eventually decided to protect the Indians in the old Northwest Territory and, in the famous "Quebec Act," sought to prevent further white settlements in the area. The American Declaration of Independence, which eventually followed, bears profound parallels with the White Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence in recent years. Extreme rightists in America openly admit this and warmly support the white settler regime in Rhodesia.⁸

Similarly when the "Founding Fathers" affirmed that "we hold these truths to be self-evident that all men are created equal . . ." they meant white men, not Indians or Negroes. From its very beginning America has always been what sociologists term a "Herrenvolk democracy" — a democracy only for the chosen. European writers in the nineteenth century, who sought a dream and believed they saw it in America, discovered slavery and the treatment of the Indians. They had to believe that such things were

⁶ See especially the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville and James Bryce.

⁷ This cultural mythology was generously imposed during the American colonial period in the Philippines. Probably no other people have been so saturated by the American mythology of freedom, despite its juxtaposition with economic exploitation and racism. Indeed, many Filipinos seemed to have convinced themselves that "little brown brother" was a desirable status.

⁸ See especially *The National Review* and the candid remarks of senators like Barry Goldwater.

aberrant behavior, departing from the ideal. They could not face the fact that racism is a keystone of American political, economic, and social life. Similarly, and later, came Afro-Asians seeking aid and hope in their colonial struggles. Again, they, in order to ensure their dreams, had to close their eyes to the treatment of the conquered peoples (the Indians and the Mexicans) and the Pariahs (the Negroes).

But, as I noted earlier, it was functional *in the past* for both radical Europeans and restive Afro-Asians to embrace the illusions of the Americans. They could create an Utopia — an El Dorado which did not exist, but they could believe it existed and hope to create a true anti-colonial state with equality for all. But woe to the Afro-Asian, who would think the true racist, imperialistic American to be the champion in the struggle for human dignity and equality. It is bad enough that the American people believe that when they rain down napalm in Vietnam, they are bringing peace, freedom, and salvation from Communism. Often, Afro-Asians complain that America falls short of its principles, its dreams, and its true nature. Nothing could be farther from reality, and if Afro-Asian societies wish to ensure their ongoing-ness, they must dispense with such illusions no matter how functional they may have proved in 1910, 1920, or even 1945.⁹

⁹ Jean-Francois Revel in his new book, *Without Marx or Jesus: The New American Revolution Has Begun*, provides a classic example of the functions of the myth of the continuing American Revolution. Revel's bitter attacks on both De Gaullism and Communism required him to offer some satisfactory and inspiring alternative. Indeed, as European and a few perceptive American critics have stressed, Revel's book concerns itself overwhelmingly with what is wrong with 1971 France, not with what is beginning in America.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AS A NUCLEAR POWER: A STUDY OF CHINESE STATEMENTS ON GLOBAL STRATEGY

LEO Y. LIU

During the 1960's China emerged as another nuclear power in the world. Since 1964, China has conducted ten nuclear tests.¹ Her first test, conducted on October 16, 1964, consisted of an enriched uranium (U-235) device (in contrast with the less advanced plutonium devices used by Britain and France) which yielded a blast equivalent to 20 kilotons of T.N.T. This indicated a considerable degree of sophistication on the part of the Chinese nuclear program. After the test, the British Royal Institute for International Affairs predicted that China might have hydrogen bombs within two to five years. China's later tests proved the Royal Institute's estimate to be correct.

The test further proved interesting to observers in that a no-fail trigger technique, known as "implosion," was used instead of the more conventional "gun-barrel" method.

The second test, yielding 40 to 50 kilotons T.N.T. equivalent, conducted on May 14, 1965, indicated that China was able to deliver warheads from aircraft. Experts estimated that China could test a dozen bombs of this type (low-yield enriched uranium) per year.²

On May 9, 1966, the third test, a 200-kiloton bomber-dropped device, was exploded using a fission trigger indicating that China was on her way toward H-bomb (thermonuclear) development.

In early 1966, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara estimated that China would soon be able to launch a nuclear attack on countries within 500 miles of her borders.³ His estimate was substantiated by China's fourth test, conducted on October 27, 1966, using a guided missile carrying a nuclear warhead approximately 600 miles, which reportedly hit the target accurately.

The fifth test was a detonation on December 28, 1966. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission observed that the detonation used a three-stage method which made the blast not only powerful but "dirty," in the sense that

¹ China successfully launched two space satellites in 1970 and 1971, respectively. These doubtlessly indicate the progress she has made in the development of her Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). However, since they were not nuclear tests, they will not be discussed in this article.

² *New York Times*, December 4, 1964.

³ *New York Times*, October 28, 1966. See also *New China News Agency* (NCNA), October 27, 1966.

radiation and fallout were maximized. They further estimated that the blast had an equivalent of a few hundred kilotons.⁴

On June 17, 1967 came the sixth test which consisted of a hydrogen bomb dropped from a high-flying bomber. It yielded 3 to 7 megatons equivalent of T.N.T. United States officials were surprised by the speed of China's H-bomb development, and U.S. Senator John O. Pastore described the test as a "dramatic and upsetting event."⁵

On December 24, 1967, an attempted thermonuclear explosion was conducted. Only the first fission cycle in the process was completed, yielding 20 kilotons. The test was never officially announced by China.

After this abortive test, there was no nuclear testing until December 27, 1968, when a hydrogen bomb was detonated, producing a yield equivalent to 3 megatons of T.N.T.

Finally, in September, 1969, two tests were conducted. The first was an underground fission device detonated in September 22, yielding 200 to 250 kilotons; the second was a hydrogen bomb explosion equivalent to 3 megatons, conducted on September 29.

These tests indicate a very rapid nuclear development in China. By successfully developing a hydrogen bomb in only two-and-a-half years after her first test, reducing her warheads to deliverable form, and conducting an underground test, she has passed France and may yet overtake Britain in the near future.

China takes great pride in what she has achieved in her nuclear weapons development:

The first nuclear test by our country surpassed the levels attained in the initial tests of the United States, Britain, and France! It took China just over a year to carry out a nuclear explosion containing thermonuclear material after successfully exploding its first atomic bomb. This big-leap-forward speed proves fully that the Chinese people, armed with the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, dare to break a path none before has walked and dare to scale peaks others have not climbed.⁶

In late 1969, after she had successfully conducted two nuclear tests—one underground explosion and one hydrogen bomb—China claimed that she was "making the most rapid progress in science."

Many U.S. officials, as well as the U.S. Joint Congressional Commission on Atomic Energy, admitted that China's nuclear weapons progress had been more rapid, and surprisingly more effective, than had been expected or predicted. In October, 1966, Dr. R. E. Lapp observed that China could have one hundred atomic bombs and missile warheads by 1967. In 1967, this was confirmed by Japanese military officials who estimated that China already had about one hundred nuclear bombs. In June, 1967, another report conservatively estimated China's nuclear power at thirty bombs at

⁴ *New York Times*, December 29, 1966.

⁵ *New York Times*, September 10, 1967.

⁶ *Peking Review*, No. 41 (October 7, 1966), p. 31.

least. The U.S. State Department said in 1970 that China would have a medium-range ballistic system soon and a moderate intercontinental ballistic missile force by the mid-1970's.⁷

The above discussion indicates that, judging from its present rate, China will become a major nuclear power in the foreseeable future, at most within the next fifteen years.

China critics opine that China is an irresponsible and dangerous nuclear power because of her alleged claim that a third world war is inevitable and that it would not matter much if half of the world's population were to die in this war. For example, the Soviet Union claimed that:

To prevent a new world war is a real and quite feasible task. [T]here is no fatal inevitability of war between states. This conclusion is not the fruit of good intentions, but the result of a realistic, strictly scientific analysis of the balance of class forces on the world arena; . . .

And what is the position of the CCP [i.e., Chinese Communist Party] leadership? What do the theses that they propagate mean: an end cannot be put to wars so long as imperialism exists; . . .

These theses mean that the Chinese . . . do not believe in the possibility of preventing a new world war. . . .⁸

The Soviet Union further claimed "every Communist Leninist will feel disgust at an attitude to thermonuclear war such as this: 'Never mind if a half of mankind perishes, if 300 million Chinese die. . . .'" What is more, the Soviet Union pointed out that the Chinese Communist statement "was no chance remark but considered conception."⁹

However, it is very doubtful that China has actually made these claims. In fact, over the past years, China has reiterated that "1. China wants peace, and not war; 2. it is the imperialists, and not we, who want to fight; 3. a world war can be prevented."¹⁰ It appears that China has not claimed that a world war is inevitable. Nor has she sought such a war. Instead, her statements show more apprehension than aggressiveness: "It is they and not we who want to fight; . . ." China's other apparently bellicose statements are of the same nature:

Should the U.S. imperialists invade China's mainland, we will take all necessary measures to defeat them. . . . With the defeat of U.S. imperialism, the time will come when imperialism and colonialism will be really liquidated throughout the world.¹¹

⁷ For all these estimates, see *New York Times*, June 18, 1967; August 3, 1967; October 30, 1967; January 22, 1967; and June 20, 1967; *Edmonton Journal* (News dispatch from Washington), January 7, 1970.

⁸ *Pravda*, July 14, 1963; and *Soviet News*, July 17, 1963, pp. 29-43.

⁹ See Raymond L. Garthoff, "A Soviet Critique of China's 'Total Strategy,'" *The Reporter*, XXXIV, No. 10 (May 19, 1966), 49.

¹⁰ *People of the World, Unite, for the Complete, Thorough, Total and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), p. 43. See also *Peking Review*, No. 44 (November 1, 1963), pp. 19-20.

¹¹ *Peking Review*, No. 41 (October 8, 1965), p. 14.

Another charge against China is that she "obviously underestimate[s] the whole danger of thermonuclear war" because she has contended that "the atomic bomb is a paper tiger" and is not terrible at all.

Through the years, China has indeed advocated the "paper tiger" assumption. In 1964, for instance, after her first nuclear test, China reiterated:

The atomic bomb is a paper tiger. This famous statement by Chairman Mao Tse-tung is known to all. This was our view in the past and this is still our view at present.¹²

However, the "paper tiger" argument does not necessarily mean that China has failed to understand the implications of nuclear weapons. In fact, as early as 1934, China had warned her people that "with the appearance of the atomic, hydrogen, and other types of weapons of mass destruction, a new war will bring greater sacrifices of lives and material power beyond comparison with former wars."¹³ In 1961, Marshal Yeh Chien-ying advised his troops to learn how to preserve their lives in a nuclear attack.¹⁴ China is particularly concerned about her vulnerable industrial and commercial centers which are concentrated in, and limited to, certain areas of the Chinese mainland. In February, 1964, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai pointed out that "the imperialists and certain other persons unscrupulously have distorted China's position and made widespread propaganda about it." He pointed out that in a nuclear war China would lose more people than would other countries.¹⁵

Thus, there is little reason to maintain that China does not understand the implications of nuclear weapons. She fully realizes that the "paper tiger" is quite capable of becoming a "living tiger."

By contrast, the statements that the Chinese have made after each nuclear test have emphasized: (1) her desire for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons; (2) a never-to-use-first pledge; and (3) the defensive purpose of her nuclear weapons.

China calls for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. For example, in 1964, after her first test, China stated:

In developing nuclear weapons, China's aim is to break the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers and to eliminate nuclear weapons.¹⁶

The Chinese also proposed a summit conference of all countries to discuss the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

¹² *Break the Nuclear Monopoly, Eliminate Nuclear Weapons* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 3. See also *People's Daily*, December 31, 1964.

¹³ *Kuang-ming Jih-Pao* [*Kuang-ming Daily*] (Peking), November 23, 1954; also in SCMP, No. 934 (November 24, 1954), pp. 13-14.

¹⁴ *Bulletin of Activities*, No. 26 (July 13, 1961); J. Chester Cheng, ed., *The Politics of the Chinese Red Army* (Stanford, California: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1966), pp. 651-57.

¹⁵ *Peking Review*, No. 7 (February 14, 1964), p. 16.

¹⁶ *Peking Review*, No. 42 (October 16, 1964), pp. ii-iii. See also Editorial, *People's Daily*, November 22, 1964, reprinted and translated in *Peking Review*, No. 48 (November 27, 1964), p. 12.

In 1969 after her ninth and tenth tests, a similar statement was made:

As in the past the Chinese people and government will continue to make common efforts and persevere in the struggle. . . to achieve the lofty aim of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.¹⁷

China pledges that she will never at any time and under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons. In 1969, after two tests, China confirmed the consistency of her policy, formed after the first nuclear test in 1964:

The Chinese government has solemnly declared many times that at no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons.¹⁸

China claims that she is developing her nuclear weapons for the purpose of defense only. For example, after her first test, China declared that "the development of nuclear weapons by China is for defense and protecting the Chinese people. . . ." A similar statement was made in 1969:

The conducting of necessary and limited nuclear tests and the development of nuclear weapons by China are entirely for the purpose of defense. . . .¹⁹

According to these statements, one may be tempted to assume that China's nuclear weapons development will not affect her foreign policy and her external behavior even after she has become a major nuclear power with a sizable stock of ICBMs and an invulnerable nuclear force of some size. However, such an assumption could be very misleading. It is one thing to say that China does not want a nuclear world war, does not belittle the lives of human beings, does not underestimate the mass destruction caused by nuclear weapons, and would like to see the complete destruction of nuclear weapons. It is quite another to say that she will not take advantage of her nuclear weapons, at least indirectly, to pursue major foreign policy objectives, such as the establishment of her hegemony in Southeast Asia.

It is quite true that an examination of China's behavior over the past years indicates that China's deeds do not always match her words — her bellicose statements have not been paralleled by her actions which are relatively cautious and realistic. In other words, there appears to be a gap between China's words and deeds. One explanation of this gap may be that China realizes that so far she has not had the capability to give what she has pledged, such as vigorous and direct support to revolutionary wars in the world, or to challenge the superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) and establish her hegemony in Asia. China especially fears that any reckless moves might provoke the United States or provide the latter with an excuse to launch an attack on China or her nuclear facilities. Evidence indicates that this fear dates from approximately 1954. For ex-

¹⁷ NCNA, October 4, 1969. See also *Peking Review* (October 10, 1969).

¹⁸ *Peking Review*, No. 42 (October 16, 1964), p. iii. *Peking Review* (October 10, 1969).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

ample, in that year, Marshall Yeh Chien-yeng warned his people to prepare against a sudden attack by the "imperialists," and admitted that in a nuclear war China's army would be in a comparatively backward position. In 1964, after her first nuclear test, China openly admitted that American nuclear forces in Asia were a threat to China.²⁰ Later, China appeared to believe that the United States might be tempted to launch a sudden nuclear attack on China:

The perfidious imperialists are accustomed to launch sudden attacks in starting an aggressive war, and new techniques create more favourable conditions of carrying out sudden military attacks.²¹

But will this gap remain in the future? Will it be filled when China becomes a major nuclear power and therefore feels that she is capable of pursuing her foreign policy objectives? Perhaps these questions cannot be answered with certainty at present. Too many uncertain factors are involved, such as the Chinese leadership, the relations between China and the Soviet Union and the United States, China's economic conditions, etc. Nevertheless, it appears that as China's nuclear weapons capability increases, she is also becoming more confident of her ability to neutralize the nuclear deterrence of the superpowers. This tendency can most clearly be seen in the statements issued after each of her nuclear tests.

Before her first nuclear test in 1964, China had never indicated that she intended to break the superpowers' monopoly of nuclear weapons. China only attacked this monopoly indirectly by criticizing the Partial Test Ban Treaty which had just been signed by the three nuclear powers (i.e., the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain) in an attempt to maintain nuclear monopoly and keep the rest of the world under nuclear threat.²²

However, after her first nuclear test in 1964, China began to argue that she had decided to develop nuclear weapons to break the superpowers' nuclear power monopoly and that her nuclear test was intended to "oppose the U.S. imperialist policy of nuclear blackmail and nuclear threat. . . [and] to break the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers." China also claimed that the test was conducted to ensure that the U.S. blackmail and nuclear threat would no longer be so effective.²³ A similar statement was made by China after her second nuclear test in 1965. But China, in these and other statements, never claimed that her nuclear test had any direct effects on the superpowers' nuclear monopoly.

²⁰ See NCNA, July 27, 1955; *Current Background*, No. 347 (August 23, 1955), pp. 29-31. See also Editorial, *People's Daily*, October 22, 1964, reprinted in *Break the Nuclear Monopoly*. . . , *op. cit.*, p. 13. In this statement, China apparently had exaggerated the "nuclear threat" of the United States. For one thing, the United States does not have these "nuclear bases" in Asia.

²¹ *Peking Review*, No. 6 (February 5, 1965), p. 19.

²² *People's Daily*, July 31, 1963. See also *Peking Review*, No. 31 (August 2, 1963), pp. 7-8.

²³ See *Peking Review*, No. 42 (October 16, 1964), p. iii.

Initially, after she conducted her first hydrogen bomb test in May, 1966, China claimed that the purpose of her nuclear weapons development was merely to oppose the U.S.-Soviet attempt to maintain nuclear monopoly. However, apparently believing that she had reached a "high level of science and technology" due to the development of a hydrogen bomb, China began to imply, although very indirectly, that her test was a "positive factor supporting all people opposing the nuclear monopoly, nuclear threats, and joint schemes of the U.S. imperialists and the Khrushchevian revisionists."²⁴

After her fourth test, China repeated that the purpose of her nuclear weapons development was precisely to undermine the nuclear monopoly and oppose nuclear blackmail by the superpowers. But a few days later, on November 3, 1966, China issued another statement in which the word "blow" was introduced to describe the effects of her nuclear weapons achievement on the monopoly of nuclear weapons by the superpowers.²⁵ Nevertheless, the word "blow" was not applied directly to the nuclear monopoly by the superpowers. Rather China merely claimed that the test was a blow to their "scheme" to perpetuate nuclear monopoly by seeking the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.²⁶ A similar statement was made by China after her fifth test, but this time, the expression "heavy blow" instead of "blow" was used:

The success of the three nuclear tests conducted by China in the one year of 1966 is a heavy blow to the plot of U.S. imperialism and Soviet modern revisionism which have been collaborating in a vain attempt to enforce their nuclear monopoly. . . .²⁷

Up to that moment, China had merely claimed that her test had only affected the superpowers' "scheme" or "plot" to maintain nuclear monopoly and those only in an indirect manner. She declined to make any claims about the direct effects that her nuclear tests might have had on the actual "nuclear monopoly" of the superpowers.

However, after her sixth nuclear test, China claimed that her nuclear weapons development had further broken the nuclear monopoly of the superpowers:

China has got atom bombs and guided missiles, and she now has the hydrogen bomb. This. . . greatly deflates the arrogance of imperialism, modern revisionism, and all reactionaries. The success of China's hydrogen bomb tests has further broken the nuclear monopoly of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism and dealt a telling blow at their policy of nuclear blackmail.²⁸

In this statement, China made two very significant changes. *First*, by claiming that her test had "further broken the nuclear monopoly" of the

²⁴ NCNA, May 9, 1966. See also *Peking Review* (May 13, 1966).

²⁵ NCNA, October 27, 1966. See also *Peking Review* (October 28, 1966); and *New York Times*, November 4, 1966.

²⁶ *New York Times*, November 4, 1966.

²⁷ NCNA, December 28, 1966. See also *Peking Review* (January 1, 1967).

²⁸ NCNA, June 17, 1967. See also *Peking Review* (June 23, 1967).

superpowers, China apparently felt that her nuclear weapons achievement had already begun to have direct effect on the breaking of their nuclear monopoly. *Secondly*, in her previous statements, China had merely claimed that her nuclear tests were "a heavy blow to the plot of the superpowers to enforce their nuclear monopoly." But in this statement, China directly began to claim that her nuclear weapons achievement was "a telling blow at their [the superpowers'] policy of nuclear blackmail."

After she conducted her eighth nuclear test, China further indicated in her policy statement that the test had directly affected both the superpowers' "nuclear blackmail" and their "nuclear threat." In September, 1969, after her ninth and tenth nuclear tests, China further claimed that her new tests served as another heavy blow at the U.S.-Soviet attempt to maintain nuclear monopoly. Two months later, China declared herself to be a stronger power than ever.²⁹

Thus, it appears that as her nuclear weapons capability grew, China increasingly claimed that her nuclear weapons development had direct and significant effects on the "nuclear monopoly," "nuclear threat," and "nuclear blackmail" by the superpowers. In other words, China appears to have become more and more confident of the military and political significance of her nuclear weapons. When China believes that her nuclear weapons capability can really neutralize the superpowers' nuclear deterrence, she might possibly become more militarily and politically venturesome in Asia in order to establish her hegemony in that area.

In fact, the effectiveness of U.S. nuclear deterrence on China is likely to decrease as China emerges as a major nuclear power. In 1964, immediately after China conducted her first nuclear test, U.S. President Johnson assured American allies in Asia that the American commitments there would be honored, announcing at the same time that "nations that do not seek nuclear weapons can be sure that if they need United States support against the threat of nuclear blackmail, they will have it."³⁰ The Soviet Union did not give China any encouragement or guarantee of security.

However, Johnson's guarantee was not mentioned after 1964. In fact, on July 19, 1967, one month after the sixth Chinese test was conducted, American Secretary of State Dean Rusk announced that the guarantees mentioned by Johnson in 1964 would only be discussed again in Geneva, where the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty would be negotiated, or in the United Nations Security Council. On April 26, 1968, Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. ambassador to the General Assembly, made it very clear that the United States expected the United Nations Security Council to take measures

²⁹ NCNA, December 28, 1968; October 4, 1969. See also *Peking Review* (October 10, 1969).

³⁰ For text of Johnson's statement, see *New York Times*, October 17, 1964.

in accordance with the UN Charter to counter any nuclear aggression.³¹

It would be questionable whether a security guarantee offered by the superpowers would be effective in deterring a possible Chinese nuclear threat. Asian leaders might doubt that the United States or the Soviet Union could stop or deter a Chinese nuclear attack in time to save their countries from destruction.

In addition, the United States will be in an uncomfortable position in case China has an operational nuclear force and is in a position to attack many of the American bases in Asia. If China were to attack a country whose security was guaranteed by the United States, the Americans would have to take into consideration the possibility that retaliation on their part might provoke a Chinese nuclear attack on U.S. bases in Asia, igniting a Sino-American nuclear war, or possibly a nuclear world war. The consequences of such a war the United States would certainly not be willing to accept.

Furthermore, if Chinese nuclear weapons can, in the future, definitely imperil the homelands of the superpowers and cause irreparable damage to them, Asian and other countries probably will not trust in the commitments and guarantees offered by either superpower, whose ability and willingness to come to the rescue at the risk of its own cities, would be considered suspect. As one renowned Indian political scientist pointed out, "If the Chinese ever succeed in building up a strategic balance with the U.S., . . . it is very questionable if [the United States] would sacrifice Boston for Bombay or Detroit for Delhi."³²

Employing indirect methods, China could also convince or force Asian countries to remove superpower influence from their territories. On November 24, 1964, China appeared to apply such tactics to Japan.³³ China resorted to the same tactics against Japan in 1969:

Placing itself [i.e., Japan] under the wing of U.S. imperialism, working hand in glove with Soviet revisionism. . . and acting as the vanguard in opposing China, the reactionary Sato government will. . . end shamelessly in being buried together with U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism.³⁴

If the present nuclear deterrence on China were neutralized in the future, then China's huge ground force would become a much more effective instrument in the pursuit of her foreign policy objectives through such tactics as the support and encouragement of revolutionary wars. At present, China has a 115-division army of 2,250,000 men. She also has four armoured

³¹ Arthur J. Goldberg, "U.S. Calls for Prompt Endorsement by the General Assembly of the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," *The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, Department of State Publication, 8385 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, 1968), p. 8.

³² Sisir Gupta, "The Indian Dilemma," in *A World of Nuclear Powers?* ed. by Alastair Buchan (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 61.

³³ *Peking Review* (November 27, 1964), pp. 16-18; (December 18, 1964), pp. 6-8.

³⁴ "Japanese Reactionaries' Pipe Dream," *Peking Review*, No. 38 (September 19, 1969), p. 27.

divisions and one or two airborne divisions. In addition, there is evidence that China is prepared to equip her ground troops with tactical nuclear weapons.³⁵ More significantly, as China's nuclear capability has increased, her attitude towards the military and political implications of her nuclear weapons on revolutionary wars, also appears to have changed. For example, in 1964, after her first nuclear test, China declared:

The mastering of the nuclear weapons by China is a great encouragement to the revolutionary peoples of the world in their struggles.³⁶

A few days after the test, China's official organ, *People's Daily*, carried in an editorial which claimed that China's experience in the world proved that she was a nation which could be relied upon to resist imperialism, support revolutionary movements, and ensure world peace. A similar statement was made by China after her third nuclear test.

Significantly, before her fourth nuclear test, China had never in her nuclear test statements specifically encouraged any particular revolutionary war, such as that in Vietnam. Instead, she had only vaguely claimed that China's nuclear weapons development was a great encouragement to the revolutionary peoples of the world. Such an omission indicates the caution with which China described the military and political significance of her first nuclear weapons achievements. At least it indicates that China did not want to antagonize the United States and other non-Communist countries in Asia by pointing out any particular revolution she encouraged. Many noted writers have supported this assumption. For example, Alice L. Hsieh pointed out:

According to Peking's propaganda, the mastering of nuclear weapons technology through China's own efforts was a great encouragement to the revolutionary peoples of the world. . . . The Chinese, however, carefully avoided any specific application of this principle to concrete situations, such as those in Vietnam and Laos.³⁷

Similarly, John W. Finney, in an article in the *New York Times*, pointed out that China's pride in her nuclear development was tempered by a cautious attitude toward any practical application of her increasing nuclear power to revolutionary situations in the world.³⁸

Based on this assumption, China's estimate of the significance of her nuclear weapons capability certainly increased after her fourth nuclear test. On October 27, 1966, after her guided nuclear-missile test, China claimed:

³⁵ Alice Langley Hsieh, "China's Secret Military Papers: Military Doctrine and Strategy," *China Quarterly*, No. 18 (April-June, 1964), p. 87. See also *Bulletin of Activities*, No. 27 (July 25, 1961), and *The Politics of the Chinese Red Army*.

³⁶ *Peking Review*, No. 42 (October 16, 1964), p. iii.

³⁷ Alice Langley Hsieh, *Foreword to the Japanese Edition of Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era: Implications of the Chinese Nuclear Detonations* (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corp., 1965), p. 6.

³⁸ *New York Times*, May 31, 1966.

The possession by the Chinese people of guided missiles and nuclear weapons is a great encouragement to the heroic Vietnamese people who are waging a war of resistance against U.S. aggression and for national salvation and to all the revolutionary peoples of the world who are now engaged in heroic struggles, . . .³⁹

Here, for the first time, "a specific application," i.e., the encouragement of a particular revolution, was presented. A similar statement was made by China after her fifth nuclear test.

In June, 1967, after her sixth nuclear test, China began to include Arabs among those who she claimed were encouraged and supported by China's nuclear weapons. A similar statement was made by China in December, 1968, after conducting her eighth nuclear test.⁴⁰

After successfully conducting two more nuclear tests in October, 1969, China identified other revolutions supported and encouraged by her nuclear weapons achievement.

These new achievements in China's development of nuclear weapons. . . are a great encouragement and support to the heroic Vietnamese people who are courageously carrying on the war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, to Laotian people who are fighting against the armed invasion by U.S. imperialism and the reactionaries of Thailand, to the Palestinian and other Arab people who are resisting the U.S. imperialist Zionist aggression, and to the people of all countries who are fighting for people's liberation.⁴¹

Therefore, it appears that, with increasing nuclear weapons capability, China has changed her attitude towards the impact of her nuclear tests on revolutionary wars. The original vague and cautious statement that her nuclear weapons achievement was a "great encouragement to the revolutionary people," has been replaced by more specific and concrete statements that her nuclear weapons achievement encourages the Vietnamese, the Laotian and other revolutionary wars. The "enemies" were also clearly identified, namely the United States, Thailand, and Israel.

Conclusion

The preceding discussion indicates a feeling on China's part that as her nuclear weapons capability increases, a new system of deterrence, more to her advantage than the previous one, is being developed, especially in Asia. As this new deterrence system develops, the likelihood of successful pro-Chinese or Chinese-supported revolutionary movements increases. The statements of Asian revolutionary movements seem to support this idea. North Vietnam viewed the Chinese nuclear tests as a great encouragement to her struggle against U.S. aggression. The Laotian Patriotic Front and the Communist Parties of Malaya, Thailand, and Ceylon regarded the tests as an

³⁹ NCNA, October 27, 1966. See also *Peking Review*, special supplement (October 28, 1966).

⁴⁰ NCNA, January 17, 1967. See also *Peking Review* (June 23, 1967). See also NCNA, December 28, 1968.

⁴¹ NCNA, October 4, 1969. See also *Peking Review* (October 10, 1969).

encouragement and support for the struggle for the liberation of all "oppressed peoples."⁴²

Many non-Communist Asian countries fear that the Chinese nuclear weapons development might encourage revolutionary wars in Asia. Thai Premier Thanon and Malayan Deputy Premier Razak both stated that the tests would encourage other Communist subversive activities, as did P. K. Banerjee, minister of the Indian Embassy in Washington. Indian Prime Minister Shastri pointed out that it was necessary to have some guarantees from the superpowers for the security of India. Japanese Prime Minister Sato expressed a similar view, saying that "China with a nuclear capability is, as far as Japan is concerned, a threat." Cambodia repeatedly reminded China that she "has solemnly declared that it [China] will never be the first to use these weapons of mass destruction."⁴³

The Asian countries' fear of China as a nuclear power might have the following policy repercussions. First, these countries might become reluctant to resist, or accept help in resisting, Chinese-sponsored revolutionary wars in their countries. Secondly, they might consider it expedient to join in the Chinese hegemony and follow the Chinese lines of policy. Thirdly, they might unresistingly accede to Chinese demands in such events as border disputes. Thus, China's becoming an operational nuclear power will pave the way for her nuclear blackmail policy in Asia.

Furthermore, when China becomes a major nuclear power the superpowers' ability to restrain other countries from engaging in serious military conflicts will also be reduced. For example, the restraints that the superpowers successfully imposed in the 1965 war between Pakistan and India might have failed had China then been a major nuclear power. Capable of discrediting U.S. deterrence and containment, China might have decided to offer not only substantial military aid to Pakistan but also a guarantee of security, which could have seriously complicated the situation and made settlement impossible. Also, hopes stirred by the Paris talks of the 70's would have diminished if China, as a major nuclear power, had felt confident enough to supply the North Vietnamese and Vietcong with substantial military aid⁴⁴ or to offer them guarantees of security. In the face of the

⁴² Many of these statements were reprinted in *Peking Review*, No. 47 (November 21, 1969), pp. 10-11, 18-19. See also *New York Times*, October 18, 1964, May 17, 1965, May 11 and 12, 1966, December 30, 1967. See also *Peking Review*, No. 45 (November 4, 1966), p. 27.

⁴³ For these statements, see for example, M. R. Masani, "The Challenge of the Chinese Bomb," *India Quarterly*, XXI, No. 1 (January-March, 1965), 23; *The Times* (London), December 5, 1964; "World Reactions to the Chinese Nuclear Bomb," *Foreign Affairs Reports*, XIV, No. 1 (January, 1965), 9; *New York Times*, October 17, 1964; October 18, 1964; December 5, 1964; May 15, 1965; November 4, 1966; Kei Wakaizumi, "The Problem for Japan," *A World of Nuclear Powers?*, p. 82; *Peking Review*, No. 22 (May 27, 1966), p. 38; No. 45 (November 4, 1966), p. 27.

⁴⁴ For details about the Chinese involvement in the Vietnamese war, see for example, "Foreign Affairs: China's Motionless Army," *New York Times*, May 6, 1966; article by Philip Frandkin of *Los Angeles Times* Services from Saigon, reprinted in *Edmonton Journal* (March 24, 1969); *New York Times*, January 17, 1965; *Edmonton*

restraint exercised by both superpowers on themselves and their Indochinese "allies" from taking advantage of the situation and engaging in military ventures, China's recent support for the ousted Cambodian head of state, Prince Sihanouk, further indicates that the situation will complicate further when China becomes a major nuclear power.⁴⁵

Journal (news dispatch from Hong Kong, April 13, 1970); *Edmonton Journal* (*New York Times* Service, September 3, 1969).

⁴⁵ For China's position and attitude on this issue, see, for example, Mao Tse-tung, "People of the World, Unite, and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs," *Peking Review*, special issue (May 23, 1970). See also *Peking Review*, No. 24 (June 12, 1970), p. 12ff.

INDONESIA-INDIA RELATIONS, 1955-67

NITISH K. DUTT

STRUNG ALONG THE FRINGES OF THE EQUATOR FOR NEARLY THREE thousand miles like a girdle of emeralds, lie the three thousand islands of Indonesia. It is the largest island group in the world, lapped by the waters of the Indian Ocean in the south and east, and the Java Sea in the north.

A careful study of the map of South-East Asia will highlight the strategic and geo-political importance of Indonesia. This fact is more obvious to India than to any other country, perhaps, for historical, economic, strategic, political, diplomatic, and sentimental reasons.

India and Indonesia have known each other for centuries. Their contacts date back to the beginning of the 2nd century A.D. with the arrival of the first Hindu traders from South India who settled along the coast of Java. At first the contacts were mainly commercial in nature, but with the spread of Hindu culture, religious beliefs and practices, the first cultural links were established between the two countries.

These early cultural and economic contacts continued until the arrival of the Dutch. During the Dutch colonial rule, Indonesia's links with her Asian neighbours virtually snapped. The advent of Indonesian nationalism and that country's drive for independence, witnessed the re-establishment of friendly ties between the two countries.

The years 1950-1955 were marked by extreme cordiality. India's efforts at mobilizing international recognition of the Sukarno-proclaimed Republic of Indonesia; the convening in New Delhi by Mr. Nehru of a conference of eighteen governments in support of the Republic; the signing of a Treaty of Friendship on March 3, 1950 and a Trade Agreement on January 20, 1951;¹ the adoption of a policy of non-alignment by Indonesia following India's example, which resulted in the establishment of a community of views between India and Indonesia on various issues—all these and many other factors resulted in creating boundless goodwill for India in Indonesia. The close cooperation that existed between the two countries finally culminated in the convening of the Bandung Conference in 1955 which proved to be the high-water mark in Indonesia-India relations.

At first India's Jawaharlal Nehru and Burma's U Nu, while both nodding polite approval of the idea, were skeptical of the feasibility and value

¹The cultural agreement that was signed between Indonesia and India was the first friendship treaty signed by Indonesia with a foreign country. The Trade Agreement provided for a three-fold increase in trade. As a result of this agreement, trade between Indonesia and India increased perceptibly. Cultural and Air agreements were signed on December 25, 1955 and February 8, 1955, respectively.

of the conference. But once Nehru had been won over to the idea of holding the conference, India and Indonesia cooperated closely at Bogor and Bandung so that the conference achieved "a surprising degree of success, modest it is true, but more than most statesmen Western or Eastern had expected."²

Also furthering the consolidation of goodwill were some important ways in which the two countries contributed to each other's vital national interests. Djakarta was viewed by New Delhi as the key to the latter's aspirations for the leadership of Asia.³ Indonesia provided India with a wonderful opportunity to use South-East Asia as a laboratory for her fond concepts, "the area of peace" and the *Panch-Sheel*. Friendship with Indonesia was also valuable to India in order to isolate Pakistan—her persistently irritating neighbour. Intimacy with Indonesia (and the UAR) provided proof that India's frictions with Pakistan did not arise from her hostility to a Muslim country as such. On the other side, India's rising prestige in the early years of her statehood helped Indonesia elevate herself in world affairs, partly by identifying herself with India and partly by being able, largely because of Indian encouragement and support, to organise events such as the Bandung Conference.

The community of views between Indonesia and India during the period of 1950-1955 was so close that Premier Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia could say that the foreign policy of Indonesia "was parallel" with Indian foreign policy and that for an Indonesian to speak of Indonesian problems to an Indian audience was like "speaking to a sounding board."⁴

II

Bandung, however, marked the culminating point of close cooperation between Indonesia and India. The years following the Bandung Conference witnessed a gradual beginning of the rift between the two countries. In one sense, the rift between the two countries might have had its beginning as early as 1952. However, it became more pronounced after the Bandung Conference. A number of factors were responsible for this development. Perhaps the most important was the growing instability in Indonesia.

The general elections had long been awaited and urged by the socialists. On September 29, 1955 the first general elections since independence, were held for the selection of a parliament. However, the elections failed to produce a party strong enough to run the government. As a result, short-lived coalition governments followed, no party gaining more than twenty-five percent of the seats.⁵

² George Mc. T. Kahin, *Asia-Africa Conference at Bandung, Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 1.

³ For further elaboration, see Michael Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography* (London & New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 593.

⁴ *The Statesman* (Calcutta), November 29, 1954.

⁵ During the period 1945-1958, there were seventeen cabinet changes, an average of a change every ten months.

The political situation being unstable, disorder and confusion became the order of the day. As a result, extra-parliamentary forces were bound to play a role of considerable importance. As Dr. Soedjatandke pointed out in his article "Role of Political Parties in Indonesia," disregard of them . . . [and] inability to cope with them will lead to extra-parliamentary political crisis."⁶ Political power being as diffused as it was, too much emphasis, for instance, on centralism—on one particular area, on one particular region, or on one particular ideology—upsetting the system of political balances, may lead, and in some cases had led, to armed rebellion and eventually to the breakdown of the national political structure, either through separatism or through chaos without a clear and open break.

Amidst squabbling parties, enfeebled ministers, and economic crisis, Sukarno emerged as a powerful political factor extending beyond the scope of political parties. He had always been the biggest fact in the Republic. But whereas Prime Ministers Hatta and Natsir restricted him to the role of Head of State, their less secure successors drew him into the political arena.

This was due in no small measure to the fact that since 1950 no cabinet had been able to function with an absolute majority in parliament. As a result of this, all the cabinets were to a large extent dependent for their continued existence upon the whims of the President. This weakness was exploited to the hilt by President Sukarno to enhance his own position and prestige. Hence, despite the fact that his constitutional position placed him outside the political arena, the President at frequent intervals had been forced to assume emergency powers, and Sukarno, by means of his personal authority and political acumen, was able to transform the machinery of government to suit his own ends.

Another important factor was the rise of the army. This was due to the fact that popular discontent, which was in evidence during this period, also affected the army and other sections of the country. Officers became emotionally restive and politically active. Consequently, the army, which in the past had refrained from interfering in government affairs, forced the resignation of the Minister of Justice in the Sukiman Cabinet in June, 1951, because he refused to sanction the arrest of some guerrilla leaders. Friction also developed between the military and Mr. R. T. Seward, Sukiman's Minister of Defense. It is not surprising to learn, therefore, from the carefully judicious, authoritative Cornell University White Book on the Wilopo Cabinet (1953-1955) by Herbert Feith, that "the army leadership representing an enormous centre of political power, played a role of importance in ousting the cabinet" of Sukiman on February 23, 1952. "This date," pointed out Louis Fischer, "marks the emergence of the army as a primary political factor" in Indonesian politics.⁷

⁶ Phillip W. Thayer, ed., *Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1956), p. 139.

⁷ Louis Fischer, *The Story of Indonesia* (New York, 1959), p. 211.

Six-and-a-half months after the Wilopo Cabinet took office (April 4, 1952), there occurred a major event which is recorded in the chronicles as "the October 17 affair."⁸ On this date the army made its first attempt to seize power. This attempt was, however, foiled by the personality and oratorical genius of Sukarno. Hence, the army would, for sometime in the future, continue to be one of the extra-parliamentary factors to be seriously taken into account in plotting the course of the nation.

Finally the Partai Kommunis Indonesia (PKI), which had so long been an important factor in Indonesian politics, began to make its voice felt under the protective umbrella of President Sukarno. The PKI's success in the 1955 general elections proved beyond doubt that one of the most important outcomes of the elections in Java in 1957, was the improved position of the party. The success of the PKI hence made itself felt on the policies of the government in the post-election period.

The political situation that prevailed in Indonesia at this time was in direct contrast to that in India. India, having successfully experimented with a parliamentary system of government and having attained a large degree of political and economic stability, was naturally disillusioned at the breakdown of democratic government in Indonesia as a result of the struggle between rival political parties and factions for control of the seat of power.

Consequently, India's interest in Indonesia was marked by a steady decline. India welcomed the news of the holding of general elections but the subsequent instability in Indonesia was the subject of adverse comments in the Indian press. For instance the editorial in *The Sunday Statesman* commenting on the political and economic instability in Indonesia stated:

It had been hoped after the general elections that a new government with a popular mandate at last would get down to serious work. But that hope seems so far to have been disappointed.⁹

Later, President Sukarno's call for the "burial of political parties," the increasing interference of the army in politics, the alarming activities of labour unions, and, last but not the least, the sudden increase of the powers of the President, were all subjects of critical comments in India. There was a general tendency to compare the situation in India with the situation in Indonesia. It is interesting to note that in Indonesia, itself, the image of India was not very complimentary: India's continued membership in the Commonwealth and her extremely cautious approach to many world problems were criticised by Indonesian observers. The editorial in the *Times of Indonesia* on November 12, 1956, perhaps summed up the prevailing opinion about India. The editorial commented on India's attitude towards the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt. It stated:

⁸ For details, see "Press Comments on 'October 17 Affair,'" *Indonesian Affairs* (September-October, 1952), 29.

⁹ *The Sunday Statesman* (Calcutta), September 4, 1962.

Mr. Nehru did not feel that strong angry reaction which the greater part of the world in general, and Afro-Asia in particular, has felt and still feels. We in Indonesia have for very long kept parallel with India in the field of foreign affairs, but the time has come to ask ourselves with the utmost seriousness if we can continue to do so indefinitely after Mr. Nehru's confession that he did not sense what every Indonesian felt, that strong angry reaction.¹⁰

The emergence of differing views in Indonesia and India towards Communist China, and the consequent divergence of their relations with Peking, had been a prime factor in deteriorating New Delhi-Djakarta relations. During the early 1950's, India and Indonesia viewed China as a great neighbour, led by genuinely popular leaders working to restore Asia's lost prestige in the world, and trying to build a just social and political order somewhat similar to their own. They believed that if China could be brought out of her isolation she would not be aggressive.¹¹ Furthermore, like Mr. Nehru, Indonesian leaders believed that if an "environment" could be created by China's reiterated public pledges of adherence to the *Panch-Sheel*, it would be made difficult, or at least embarrassing, for her to flout those principles and violate the integrity of her neighbours—extremely wishful thinking as subsequent events were to prove. But by the years 1958-1959, Mr. Nehru himself began to feel that his device was not working. The boundary dispute between India and China, the Tibetan uprising of 1959, and India's moral support to the Tibetans, made it public that all was not well in Sino-Indian relations. The "honeymoon period" (if it ever were so) had come to an end. But to the Indonesian leadership China remained an anti-imperialist, aggressive power with whom it was worthwhile to cooperate. The differing views of India and Indonesia with regard to China began to cause serious misunderstandings. The Indonesians were dismayed by India's persistence in clinging to the British-made frontiers and refusing to understand Peking's viewpoint. This, in turn, led Indians to question Djakarta's friendship.

A significant factor which eventually led Sukarno to lose patience with Mr. Nehru was his refusal to agree to Sukarno's favourite plea for a second Bandung Conference. The first conference had given Sukarno and his country tremendous international prestige. Moreover, the Indonesian leader found boundless emotional satisfaction in inaugurating pompous conferences of this kind. Ever since Bandung, he had again been keen to play host to a similar meeting. But Bandung had confirmed Mr. Nehru's views that a second conference would do more harm than good to Asia and Africa, by publicly displaying intra-Afro-Asian tensions. With China and Pakistan sharpening their talons and with the distinct possibility of the conference degenerating into an unedifying brawl, it was only natural that India should approach the conference with a certain amount of unconcealed trepidation. There was also the fear that if she attended the conference—and there was

¹⁰ *Times of Indonesia* (Djakarta), November 12, 1956.

¹¹ A rather false notion as was proved later. This line of reasoning coupled with Chou En-lai's astute diplomacy, only succeeded in enhancing China's image vis-a-vis the Afro-Asian nations.

little chance that she would not—India would undoubtedly return bruised in spirit and reputation.

If she stood to gain little from it and lose much, why did India attend the conference? The complex, in fact somewhat tortuous, thinking that sometimes goes into the formation of her attitude in certain situations, makes it difficult for one to give a simple answer. Perhaps she was dragged into joining the conference by the fear of isolation or by the charge that she was unwilling to face the bar of international opinion. Or maybe Mr. Nehru did not wish to miss an opportunity, however uncomfortable and unprofitable it might have seemed at that stage, of a talk with the Chinese leaders. Perhaps again, India was anxious not to antagonise Dr. Sukarno who was working with the sort of single-mindedness that he and his Government displayed later over the Asian Games.¹²

Quite apart from the expected hostility from China and Pakistan and the unpredictability of Dr. Sukarno, what contributed in no small measure to the Indian delegation's discomfiture at the time of attending the conference, was the fact that during the past few years she had neglected to cultivate friendly relations with the leaders of the African and Asian nations.

India was the founder of the Afro-Asian club, yet, due partly to her own volition and partly to the force of international circumstances, she found herself out of touch with most of its members. Owing to the wider perspective that Mr. Nehru had always kept before him, India had been taking a greater interest in the issues involving the big powers of the world than in the problems concerning the small nations of the two continents.¹³

However, Mr. Nehru and his advisers were becoming increasingly conscious of this weakness. The Prime Minister's decision to visit Ghana, Nigeria, and Mali on his way back from the Commonwealth premier's conference was itself an attempt to win over some of his hitherto neglected friends.

As has been pointed out earlier, Pandit Nehru was extremely reluctant to attend the conference and had on several occasions turned down suggestions of a second meeting. Peking, in contrast, became an ardent supporter of Indonesia's aspirations to convene another Bandung-type gathering. Tito, Nasser, and Nehru, much to the resentment of Sukarno, shelved the proposal of a second conference and, instead, planned a conference of non-aligned countries which eventually took place at Belgrade in September, 1961.

III

The outbreak of hostilities between the Dutch and the Indonesians over the question of West Irian, witnessed the emergence of a new irritant in Indo-

¹² In Indonesian minds, India's refusal to attend would be adequate justification for another mob attack on her embassy.

¹³ To contribute something to the world's thinking on the futility of the armament race and East-West tension, should indeed give one a sense of history, but sympathetic understanding of the petty problems of small nations establishes links which could prove valuable on occasions like the Bandung Conference.

nesia-India relations. From 1954 to 1957, Indonesia had tried to settle the West Irian dispute through the United Nations, but following the 12th General Assembly's inability to initiate action, Indonesia forsook further efforts through the United Nations. During the period 1957-1961 nothing was done to improve the situation. Indonesia thus adopted what Sukarno had spoken of as a new "policy of strength" and started preparing itself for an armed confrontation with the Dutch. Speaking on the occasion of the inauguration of the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian on August 15, 1958, President Sukarno said that a "sweet reasoning and persuasion policy" cannot be continued any longer in Indonesia's efforts to secure control of West Irian from the Dutch.¹⁴ The struggle to gain control of West Irian should take the form of building up power and applying such power. Though President Sukarno did not elaborate on what he meant by "building up power," observers felt that he wanted the country's military potential to be strengthened.

This posture of the Indonesian government was viewed with alarm in India, and when Dr. Sukarno visited India in July, 1958, he failed to sway Mr. Nehru to endorse Indonesia's policy of occupying West Irian by force. In a press statement issued on this occasion, Mr. Nehru reiterated his opposition to the continuance of colonialism, but, at the same time, he expressed the hope that the problem of West Irian would be resolved in a peaceful way.

Indonesia, however, did not pay any heed to India's view on the question of West Irian, and was determined to obtain this territory by all means, not excluding force. It should be noted in this connection that if India did not give unreserved support to Indonesia in its dispute with the Netherlands, neither did she receive support from Indonesia in her dispute with Pakistan. Indonesia was bound to India for political and sentimental reasons, but, at the same time, it was anxious not to offend Pakistan.

The differing attitudes of Indonesia and India in their approach to the settlement of the West Irian disputes were only the prelude to the almost violent, and sharply differing, attitudes that emerged at the Belgrade Conference in September, 1961. Here the differences in outlook and attitude of the two countries to world problems were made crystal clear in the course of the proceedings of the conference.

At the Belgrade Conference an angry Sukarno challenged with full vigour Mr. Nehru's pre-eminent position in the "Third World." He insisted, and was allowed, to deliver the first major address after Tito's welcoming speech. In the group photo of the participants, Sukarno, not Tito, Nehru, or Nasser appeared in the centre. He also tried vainly to repudiate the prevailing belief that India, or more precisely Nehru, was the originator of the idea of non-commitment in the cold war. More than that, Sukarno disregarded a gentleman's agreement not to turn the conference into an anti-

¹⁴ *Asian Recorder*, September 13-19, 1958, p. 2239.

Western tirade, nor make any proposals of substance without the full agreement of all. Disregarding this informal understanding, he went ahead on some controversial issues and supported, for instance, the recognition of two Germany's. Sukarno's bid to dominate the conference and to determine its statements on his own terms, upset Nehru to a point of necessitating friendly intervention by third parties on the very first day of the conference.

Perhaps, the main bone of contention between Sukarno and Nehru at Belgrade was over the question of colonialism, in its varying forms, as outlined by President Sukarno. Nehru argued the question of eradication of colonialism was of secondary importance, in comparison to the growing crisis over Berlin and the resumption of nuclear tests. A study of the speech delivered by Mr. Nehru makes it clear that the danger to international peace and security according to him was the rivalry between the two power blocs.¹⁵

During the course of his speech, however, President Sukarno totally disagreed with Mr. Nehru's views. To President Sukarno, the question of eradication of colonialism was of primary importance and, hence, should be the chief concern of the nations of the Afro-Asian world. The source of all international strife and tension, he pointed out, was the struggle of the "New Emerging Forces" against the "Old Established Order" of the world.¹⁶ As to the question whether the forces of colonialism and imperialism were still a potent factor in the world, Sukarno and Nehru held diametrically opposite views. Nehru felt that "the era of classic colonialism is gone and is dead, though of course it survives and gives a lot of trouble yet; but essentially it is over."¹⁷ Sukarno, on the other hand, pointed out that even though the forces of colonialism and imperialism may be dying, they were as yet far from dead.

In his later speeches, he elaborated his ideas still further, and, in short, he suggested a closer alliance of the Asian and African states so as to form a powerful and unified bloc against the "Old Established Order." His violent attacks against colonialism and imperialism, represented by the Western democracies, was naturally viewed favourably by Peking and was instrumental in bringing Indonesia closer to China.

The failure of Nehru to follow the Sukarno line in world affairs thus further embittered the already rapidly deteriorating relations between Indonesia and India, particularly with the introduction in later years of President Sukarno's favourite conception of "guided democracy."

IV

The adoption of guided democracy in Indonesia resulted in drastic

¹⁵ For the text of Nehru's speech, see *The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries* (Yugoslavia: Publicisticko Izdavachi Zavod, 1961), p. 108.

¹⁶ For a detailed analysis of his theory of conflict, see *New Forces Build a New World*, Indonesian Policy Series (Jakarta: Dept. of Foreign Affairs, 1965), pp. 7-19.

¹⁷ No. 15, p. 107.

changes in Indonesia's foreign policy. With the scrapping of the constitution of 1950 and the revival of the 1945 constitution by a presidential decree, Sukarno was able to transform the machinery of government and to exercise almost unchecked legal power. The return to the republican constitution meant not only a return to a presidential cabinet secure from parliamentary attack, but to the "1945 spirit," sometimes called the "Rails of the Revolution." Under Sukarno's authoritarian leadership, Indonesian foreign policy took on a more aggressive character. The "active and independent" foreign policy of Indonesia was not far different from the policies of India, Burma, and several other countries in the post-independence period. Indonesia kept out of power blocs in general, though from 1950-1952 she was closer to the United States. However, the bitter controversy over the signing of an agreement with the United States (Mutual Security Act, 1951) by Foreign Minister Subarjo in 1952, and the eventual fall of the cabinet on this issue, deterred the succeeding ministers from moving closer to either bloc. The Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet that came to power after the general elections, confirmed the "non-alignment" policy, but numerous factors, the most important of which were internal problems, began to influence foreign policy in the post-election period. The increasing criticism of the failure of the government to recover West Irian and the disappointment that the Western nations were not helping Indonesia to solve her dispute with the Netherlands, considerably influenced her foreign policy in later years.

President Sukarno's visit to the Soviet Union and other Communist countries and the exchange of delegations since 1956 had undoubtedly brought Indonesia closer to the Communist countries. In 1959, while addressing the students of the Padjajaram University at Bandung, President Sukarno declared:

It is in Moscow that they justify Indonesia's claim for West Irian. It is there that our independent policy has been justified. . . .¹⁸

President Sukarno's domestic policies received bitter criticism abroad; and there was a suspicion among many Indonesians that the Western nations were sympathising with the cause of the rebels in Central Sumatra. This attitude in turn led to the further estrangement of Indonesia from the West.

When the Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakyat (MPRS) laid down the basic policies to be pursued under guided democracy, the general lines of foreign policy were explained. The MPRS stipulated that the President's address before the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations on September 30, 1960 provide the basic principles that could serve as the basis of foreign policy. An executive direction issued later explained:

¹⁸ Extracts of President Sukarno's speech to the students of Padjajaram University, reproduced in S. Krishnamurthi, "Indonesia under Guided Democracy," *Indian Yearbook of International Affairs*, Vol. XIV (Madras, 1965), p. 557.

The foreign policy of the Republic of Indonesia must be based on the ideals of the Indonesian people as contained in the framework mentioned above: The obligation to wipe out imperialism and colonialism from the face of the earth while aiming at perfect world peace is the task of mankind.¹⁹

A militant anti-colonial stance was adopted by Indonesia more and more since 1960. In his speech to the United Nations, Sukarno elaborated Indonesia's view that imperialism and colonialism and continued forcible division of the nations are the causes of all international tensions:

. . . Look around this world of ours. There are tensions and sources of potential conflict in many places. Look closer at those places and you will discover that almost without exceptions, imperialism and colonialism in one of their many manifestations are at the root of the tension or conflict. Imperialism and colonialism and the continued forcible division of nations are the root of almost all international and threatening evil in this world of ours.²⁰

The same view was reiterated during his address at the conference of the heads of state or of governments of non-aligned countries on September 1, 1961 at Belgrade. Here Sukarno stated that "there can be no co-existence between independence and justice on one side and imperialism-colonialism on the other."²¹

Indonesia in the fifties, like many other non-aligned countries, was not in favor of these non-aligned countries forming a bloc. But since 1960, President Sukarno had repeatedly urged that the uncommitted nations should come closer together and should exercise their influence for the preservation of peace in the world. He demanded that the uncommitted nations should be represented at the Paris summit meeting of the major powers. In due course President Sukarno increasingly attempted to identify non-alignment with anti-colonialism. In his independence day speech of August 17, 1965 he declared:

In Indonesia's view, non-alignment is, I think, sufficiently clear. In Indonesia's view, non-alignment is in reality already aligned, because it favours anti-imperialism.²²

Though President Sukarno spoke of the "need for the new emerging forces" to come closer together at the Belgrade Conference in 1961, it was only during his address to the nation on August 17, 1961 that he elaborated his ideas of the "new emerging forces." He said:

The New Emerging Force is a mighty force that consists of . . . the oppressed nations and the progressive nations. The New Emerging Force is composed of the Asian nations and African nations, the Latin American nations of the Socialist countries, the progressive groups in the capitalist countries.²³

¹⁹ "Two Executive Directions of Manipol," *Handbook of the Political Manifesto* (Djakarta: Department of Information, 1961), p. 89.

²⁰ *Indonesia Leaves the United Nations*, Indonesian Policy Series No. 22 (Djakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1965), p. 6.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *To Build the World Anew*, Indonesian Policy Series (Djakarta: Department of Information, 1966), p. 32.

²³ Extracts of President Sukarno's speech on August 17, 1963, reproduced in *New Forces Build a New World* (Djakarta: Department of Information, 1963), p. 16.

These ideas have their roots in Sukarno's "theory of conflict" which was developing towards the end of 1957. This theory was first outlined in its concrete form to the world during the Belgrade conference of non-aligned countries in September, 1961. The conception of the "New Emerging Forces" versus "The Old Established Forces," formulated for the first time in 1960, steadily grew in emphasis. In his speech at the Bandung Conference in 1955, the Indonesian President had faithfully preached the precept of non-alignment. Sukarno's idea of the neutralist position as a rational break in the power-maddened nuclear rivalries of the two world blocs, is a continuous theme in early Indonesian statements about the world, and remains operative today in Indonesia.

The increasing emphasis on the need to forge a strong unity among the New Emerging Forces, put Indonesia on a different road, and President Sukarno moved well to the left of other Asian leaders. The left-wing radicalism and nativism of the emerging African leaders appealed to the Indonesians more, and Indonesia sought closer contact with them. The shift from the authoritarian system within the country had considerable impact on her foreign policy. This brought her closer to countries with monolithic party systems. There was increased contact with the East European countries, the United Arab Republic, China, and other countries with such systems.

Like many other charismatic leaders, President Sukarno also had systematically attempted to inspire and sustain the loyalty and devotion of the people around him by constantly reminding them of the country's glorious past.²⁴ Many other Indonesian leaders have followed his example in reminding the people of Indonesia's importance in the world and of what she could achieve. The foremost of these was Prof. Muhammed Yamin who has written extensively about the past history of the country. Indonesia, or Nusantara as it was known in pre-colonial days, argued Prof. Yamin, consisted of eight groups of Islands (Astadwipa): the Malay peninsula, the islands of Sumatra, the Kalimantan (Borneo), Java, the southeastern islands, the islands of Sulawesi, the groups of Moloccas, and West Irian.²⁵

The present-day Indonesia, according to Yamin, is the rightful heir to these areas. Such arguments obviously had tremendous appeal for the Indonesians. The constant reminders of past achievements roused hopes of

²⁴ In this respect Indonesians seem to be rather history-conscious, like the Chinese. This "history consciousness," if it can be so called, was perhaps partly responsible for the aggressive claims of Indonesia and China on West Irian's and India's northern frontiers, respectively. This seems to be indicated by the fact that Indonesia, in claiming West Irian, and China, in gobbling up large stretches of territory in Ladakh, have sought to justify their claims on historical grounds.

²⁵ For details see Muhammed Yamin, "A Legal and Historical Review of Indonesia's Sovereignty Over the Ages," *The Indonesian Spectator*, December 1, 1958, p. 10. Also Justus M. Van der Kroef, "On the Writing of Indonesian History," *Pacific Affairs* (December, 1958), p. 371.

the possibility of playing an equally important role in the present-day world. Indonesia's "confrontation" policy is partly the result of her ambition to play such a dominant role in the above areas. While taking these steps, Indonesia's foreign policy makers took the country away from the countries whom she had once considered close to her. Thus, since Indonesia came under guided democracy, she has moved away from India. The aforementioned differences between Indonesia and India came out clearly during the 1961 Belgrade Conference. Although subsequent efforts were made to patch up these differences, the Indian stand with regard to Malaysia largely undermined these efforts.

Before Indonesia had taken over the administration of West Irian in May, 1963, she was entangled in another issue which promised to become more demanding than the "confrontation" with the Dutch over West Irian. In May, 1961, Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman broached the idea of "closer association" of Malay with Singapore, the British protectorate of Brunei, and the British colonies of Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo). In August, Lord Selkirk, British Commissioner-General for South-East Asia, visited Djakarta with plans for a federation of the five units, now known as Malaysia. In an address to the United Nations General Assembly on the West Irian issue on November 20, 1961, Dr. Subandrio made the following statement:

. . . When Malaya told us of her intention to merge with the three British Crown colonies of Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo as one federation, we told them that we had no objections and that we wish them success with this merger so that everyone may live in peace and freedom.²⁶

This neutral, even permissive, attitude of the Indonesian government towards the proposed Federation of Malaysia, continued vaguely in 1962, although the PKI, in line with the international Communist view that "Malaysia" was a British neo-colonialist plot, stated its opposition clearly at a conference December 30-31, 1961. On December 8, 1962, however, the leader of the Brunei Party Rakyat, A.M. Azahari, who opposed "Malaysia," staged an armed rebellion in Brunei. The rebellion, however, was smashed in five days by British troops flown from Singapore. The Azahari rebellion received widespread support from Indonesia. In January, 1963, Sukarno emphatically rejected the "Malaysia" concept on the ground that it was based on the will for freedom of the peoples concerned. On January 21, Subandrio announced that Indonesia's patience was not inexhaustible and declared a policy of "konfrantasi" (confrontation) towards Malaysia. At the same time, the campaign against Malaysia mounted in Djakarta.

Towards the end of May, however, with Australian and Philippine efforts to bring Indonesia and Malaya to the conference table, there was a lull in the exchange of propaganda, and at the end of May, Tunku Abdul Rahman and Sukarno met in Tokyo. They reaffirmed their faith in the 1959

²⁶ *New Forces Build a New World*, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

Malaya-Indonesia friendship treaty and captured the headlines with smiles and handshakes. On June 7, the three foreign ministers met in Manila and agreed to "welcome" Malaysia, provided the support of the Borneo territories was ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative. The three ministers concluded their conference with a declaration of friendship and unity. A summit was prepared for July 30. On July 10, however, President Sukarno, in a speech on the 40th anniversary of the Indonesian Catholic Party, reverted to "confrontation," claiming that the Malaysian agreement signed the day before in London, broke the guarantees given in Tokyo and Manila for ascertaining the wishes of the people. After weeks of apparent hesitation and some powerful rally oratory by Sukarno ("We will crunch up Malaysia and spit out the pieces."), the President attended the three-nation summit meeting in Manila which ratified the foreign ministers' agreement and proposed a detailed form for United Nations ascertainment.

Indonesian press and public response to the results of the meeting was cautiously favourable, encouraged by British criticism of the Tunku for having conceded too much. Djakarta comments stressed that Indonesia's position in Southeast Asia had been recognised by the consultations on Malaysia. But it was evident that, in spite of what was said in public, the mechanics of confrontation were continuing. General Nasution visited Kalimantan and made several tough speeches urging the frustration of Malaysia "by force if necessary."

The disputes in the following weeks over the United Nations team and the time given to the team to complete its task, seemed peripheral to the fact of confrontation. This was indicated by the raid on the Sarawak border by Indonesian-trained guerrilla bands when the Secretary-General of the United Nations (U Thant) announced the team's strong endorsement of the majority will for Malaysia.

The finding of the United Nations team was rejected by Indonesia on the ground that it was not a fair reflection of the wishes of the people. To support its claim, the Indonesian government pointed out that the ground covered by the United Nations team was approximately the same as that covered by the earlier inquiry of the British Cobbold Commission. Often, the very same groups were interviewed all over again, except that two weeks were spent by the team in Sarawak and Sabah, instead of the Commission's two months. The atmosphere of intimidation was even more pronounced than at the time of the Commission inquiry whose finding had been far from conclusive. Indonesia further pointed out that the British were determined to establish the "Federation of Malaysia," regardless of the findings of the United Nations team. In this connection, Indonesia referred to a statement made at Kuala Lumpur by British Colonial Affairs Minister Duncan Sandys, that no matter what the results produced by the United Nations, the "Federation of Malaysia" would be set up on September 16, 1963.

The "Federation of Malaysia" was formally proclaimed and in due course became a member of the United Nations. Except for Indonesia and the Philippines, most countries, including India, supported Malaysia. On September 17, the Kuala Lumpur regime severed diplomatic relations with both Indonesia and the Philippines. Indonesia, in retaliation, severed economic relations with Malaysia and Singapore. This brought the political and economic relations of the Southeast Asian neighbours to the lowest point since they achieved independence.

Indonesian disillusionment with the United Nations, which had started with the failure of the organisation to solve the West Irian dispute, reached its peak with the seating of Malaysia as a member of the Security Council. On December 30, 1964, President Sukarno, in the course of an address referring to the possibility of Indonesia leaving the United Nations, observed:

Recently Malaysia has been working hard in order to become a member of the Security Council of the United Nations. We have already stated our stand. We do not want Malaysia to become a member of the Security Council of the United Nations.

If in spite of our explanations in the United Nations, Malaysia is nevertheless made a member of the United Nations Security Council, we will leave the United Nations.²⁷

Malaysia did become a member of the United Nations, and Indonesia withdrew in January, 1965.

One important reason for the withdrawal was that, in September, 1964, when the question of Indonesian infiltrators in Borneo territory was brought before the Security Council, a resolution deploring the Indonesian attitude was introduced therein and was supported by Morocco and the Ivory Coast. The resolution, however, was vetoed by the USSR. Apparently, Indonesia was worried that, with Malaysia in the Security Council, she would have to face criticisms of her anti-Malaysia campaign. USSR attempts to dissuade Indonesia from taking a hasty step did not succeed. Indonesia's action was hailed by Communist China, and Indonesia's threat that she would try to establish a new-style United Nations, was applauded by China.

In letters sent to friendly heads of state to explain the background and the reasons motivating Indonesia to withdraw from the United Nations, President Sukarno gave the following reasons:

. . . The Malaysia issue is a long-outstanding problem. We have explored many avenues . . . to bring the problem to a solution . . . but to no avail. The acceptance of Malaysia as a member of the Security Council was the culminating point of a long and arduous search for a solution acceptable to all the parties concerned. Indonesia cannot accept an engineered situation whereby Malaysia becomes a member of the agency of the United Nations that is charged with the responsibility to safeguard international peace and security,

²⁷ *Indonesia Leaves the United Nations, op. cit.*, p. 30.

when that country, in fact, is a tool of neo-colonialism . . . and non-existent for Indonesia. . . .

It is to be hoped that our withdrawal will bring about renewed vigour for the endeavour to reflect a reorganisation and renewal of the United Nations, a complete overhaul of the mental and structural set-up of that body. . . .

The withdrawal of Indonesia from the United Nations will serve as a catalyst to strengthen the solidarity amongst us, the new emerging forces (especially among the Asian-African nations) in our bilateral relations as well as collectively. In this way we hope that the internal reorganisation of the United Nations will be accelerated, and in such a renovated and rejuvenated United Nations, Indonesia may find it possible eventually to resume its membership.²⁸

Indonesia had been an important beneficiary of U.N. membership, and very often it was the U.N. and her allied organisations that had helped the country to tide over her difficulties. To deprive the country of the services and assistance rendered by such an organisation for the purpose of pursuing the confrontation policy against Malaysia, was perhaps the most thoughtless action of President Sukarno.

India welcomed the proposal for the formation of Malaysia. From the beginning, India felt that the move was in the right direction and constituted the best step towards the emancipation of the Borneo territories. India's support for Malaysia, in her dispute with Indonesia, infuriated the latter; and from this time onwards we find Indonesia increasingly identifying India with the Old Established Forces or neo-colonialists. Perhaps, in this connection, an extract from President Sukarno's speech entitled "New Forces Build a New World," is revealing:

Most regrettably, some misguided nationals of the 'decolonised country' (India) had played a role in these acts of arrogance, having unwittingly or unwillingly become amenable yes-men of the old forces of colonialism and imperialism which continued their domination of the former colony.²⁹

Taking advantage of the deteriorating relations, Pakistan intensified her propaganda in Indonesia. In 1964, Indonesia organised the Asia-African Islamic Conference which was attended by representatives from several Asian countries, excluding Malaysia. During the conference the Pakistani representative attempted to raise the Kashmir issue, and there were heated exchanges between the Indian and Pakistani representatives. Though the final communique did not mention anything about self-determination for the people of Kashmir as desired by Pakistan's representative, the conference itself revealed the extent to which Pakistan had intensified her campaign to woo Indonesia.³⁰

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-39.

²⁹ *New Forces Build a New World*, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

³⁰ The usual mass demonstrations in front of the Indian Embassy turned out to be more violent and Embassy losses were heavy. The Indonesian government, however, later expressed its regret for the incidents.

The militant and aggressive posture of Indonesia in her foreign relations, under guided democracy, alienated her from the countries whom she had once considered very close to her. Thus, with the advent of guided democracy, Indonesia moved farther away from India.

V

The extent to which Indonesia-India relations had deteriorated was demonstrated by the incidents during the Asian Games in Djakarta in September, 1962. Indonesia's refusal to grant visas to the teams from Nationalist China and Israel resulted in spoiling an otherwise well-advertised event. G. D. Sondhi, the Federation's vice-president and the Committee's official observer (incidentally an Indian national), warned the organisation that the bodies he represented would withdraw recognition of the Asian Games because of the exclusion of two accredited members. The government-controlled Djakarta press whipped up mass hatred not only against Sondhi's statement but against India as well.

President Sukarno and the organisers of the Games took Sondhi's statement as a grave offense. The government of India, sensing the increasing resentment over the controversy, privately and publicly let it be known that it "completely dissociated itself from the statements and activities of Sondhi," who, it was evident, was neither a representative of India nor a member of the Indian athletic contingent.³¹ Even then, a well-planned, violent anti-Indian campaign followed, which seems to indicate that the whole affair had the blessing of President Sukarno himself.

Strong and anti-Indian feeling was aroused by the National Front despite the explanation given that Mr. Sondhi had acted as a private person and had nothing to do with the Asian contingent. The National Front passed a resolution which read:

The attempt of Mr. Sondhi (India), Vice-President of the Executive Committee of the Asian Games Federation, to sabotage the Fourth Asian Games, is an insult to President Sukarno and the people of Indonesia.³²

Anti-Sondhi posters and banners were splashed all over town, and Indonesian resentment was expressed (as has already been pointed out) in terms of an unpleasant demonstration on the premises of Hotel Indonesia where Mr. Sondhi was staying. Almost simultaneously came the storming of the Indian Embassy in Djakarta.

After winning the soccer finals, the Indian team was booed and jeered by a large section of the crowd at the main stadium during the victory ceremony, and the Indian National Anthem was drowned by a deafening din. Finally, the Indian contingent was jeered during the closing ceremony to end the story on a most unhappy note for India.

³¹ *The Economic Weekly* (Bombay), September 8, 1961, pp. 1428-29.

³² *The Statesman* (Calcutta), September 9, 1962.

Although Dr. Subandrio expressed his "regret" and emphasised that "friendship with the Afro-Asian countries and particularly with India is of the greatest importance," it is significant to note that President Sukarno did not care to say one word of sympathy, let alone apologize for the unfortunate episode.³³ Even though Indonesia might have been sincere in her desire to maintain cordial relations with India, in spite of the Djakarta incidents, she wanted India's goodwill on her own terms. Statements, like the one made by First Minister Dr. Djuanda that the Sondhi incident "should be a lesson to both parties,"³⁴ imply that Indonesia continued to hold the Indian government responsible for Mr. Sondhi's actions and that there was still no unequivocal condemnation of the disturbances.

Side by side with disgust and distress over the Djakarta incidents, one noted in India a sense of puzzlement. How could a large fund of goodwill, personal and national, built so assiduously over the years by a leader as senior as Mr. Nehru, be dissipated in a matter of a few days and over something as utterly trivial as a controversy in a sports organisation? Perhaps, as many said, Mr. Sondhi was tactless (although there is no reason why the functionary of a non-official, multi-national body should be expected to act as his country's diplomatic representative); perhaps the Indonesians are a volatile people who had set their hearts on the success of the jamboree. Perhaps, again, there is a strong pro-China group among the Indonesian leftists. But even the combination of these factors does not convincingly explain the sudden outburst against India.

The real reason is obviously much deeper than Mr. Sondhi's indiscretion. Feelings against India must have been simmering for some time for them to boil up in this manner. Why, despite all the Indian show of friendliness, such an unhappy development should take place, is the baffling question to which India might have tried to find an answer. To say that it was an isolated episode and that good Indonesians themselves are penitent is a rather simple answer to a very complex question. If the Djakarta incident had led to a soul-searching among the policy makers of India, one might well have asked himself if there were not something basically wrong in Delhi itself.

When Communist China attacked India a week later, Indonesia failed to show any sympathy over the troubles of a fellow Asian and non-aligned nation. It was Indonesia's attitude that shocked many observers in India. Earlier, in 1959, Indonesia had taken a strong stand against China in the dispute regarding the status of overseas Chinese in Indonesia. Many observers in India felt that India's case against that of China should have been supported by Indonesia. The first indication to the contrary came as early as October when the influential Communist daily, *Harian Rakyat*, came out with background reports supporting China's claim and condemning India's

³³ *The Statesman* (Calcutta), September 5, 1962.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

occupation of these disputed territories. Later, when China started its campaigns on a major scale, Indonesia criticised India for precipitating a crisis.

At the Colombo Conference of the six non-aligned nations in December, 1962, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Subandrio clearly stated that he was not interested in knowing or saying who was the aggressor and who was the victim; his main concern was to ensure the solidarity of the peoples of Asia and Africa. The Indian government, press, and political public were quick to note the difference between the Indonesian stand and that of the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.), which was the only non-aligned country among the Afro-Asian nations to express genuine sympathy with India's ordeal and which demanded that there be no territorial gains on account of the recent military clashes.³⁵ On April 21, 1963, President Liu Shao-chi and President Sukarno issued a joint communique at the end of President Liu Shao-chi's state visit to Indonesia. The communique made clear that China did not yield any ground on the Sino-Indian border conflict and that Indonesia did go some way in endorsing the Chinese line on a number of important points arising out of the conflict—perhaps in an effort to placate China. Indonesia also expressed her appreciation of the Chinese ceasefire and subsequent withdrawal.³⁶

One of the direct consequences of Sino-Indian tension has been a growing friendship between India's principal adversaries—China and Pakistan. The strained relations between India and Indonesia and the growing friendship between China-Indonesia and China-Pakistan, resulted in another international marriage of convenience: the Peking-Djakarta-Rawalpindi Axis. From 1963-1965, President Sukarno visited Pakistan several times, and in the process he seemed to have privately given some psychological comfort to the Pakistan leaders in their desire to win Indonesia's support for Pakistan in her dispute with India over Kashmir. The Sukarno-Ayub communique on June 26, 1963 expressed "their resolve to liberate the Afro-Asian peoples and to secure the right of self-determination of peoples still held in bondage."³⁷ The communique clearly proved that Indonesia was gradually abandoning her neutrality in regard to the Kashmir problem, just as Pakistan went a long way to support Indonesia's "Crush Malaysia" campaign.

The growing Indonesian-Indian rift affected the non-aligned group as well. Within this "Third World" Indonesia and India became the symbols of two poles. Indonesia and the militants viewed the main function of non-alignment as the eradication of colonialism by every means. India and the moderates, while no less anti-colonialist, viewed the main function of non-alignment as the prevention of situations which threaten world peace, partic-

³⁵ For details see *Asian Recorder*, IX, No. 2 (January 8-14, 1963), 4979-80; and *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 3, 1963, pp. 17-19.

³⁶ For details of the communique see *ibid.*

³⁷ *Asian Recorder*, IX, No. 3 (August 17-19, 1963), 5350. It is noteworthy that the Pakistanis and Indonesians themselves have denied self-determination to the Paktoons and Bengalis, and the West Irianese, respectively.

ularly a nuclear war involving the two super powers. As a result of the polarisation of views around the two countries—Indonesia and India—the Belgrade Conference, as noted earlier, had been faced with the emergence of divisions within the “Third World.” Sukarno further intensified his militant attitude towards various world problems. Hence, at the second conference of non-aligned nations at Cairo in October, 1964, President Sukarno declared that peaceful co-existence was impossible. How could co-existence be applied to the situation in Malaysia, Cyprus, Vietnam, and Cambodia, he asked.³⁸ Thus at Cairo, as was to be expected, Indonesia and India had crossed swords over the concepts of peaceful co-existence and non-alignment. India, in an effort to save the concept, put up a staunch defense so that in the end the India-Yugoslavia-U.A.R. (the moderate trio) view of peaceful co-existence prevailed. Indonesia and India, besides violently disagreeing at the Cairo Conference on the meaning and feasibility of peaceful co-existence, clashed on practically everything, including the question of what the main business of the conference should be.³⁹

It must be stressed that the greatest setback for Indonesia at Cairo was the exclusion of the Malaysian dispute from the agenda, thanks to Indian diplomacy. Although India favoured the idea of a Malaysian Federation, she did not wish to annoy Indonesia by publicity, questioning Djakarta's motives. The growing anti-Indian posture of the Sukarno regime and its flirtations with Peking (in comparison to Malaysian Premier Tunku Abdul Rahman's unequivocal support for India in her dispute with China) in the end led India to give up her reluctance to support Malaysia publicly. If one takes into account the massive propaganda mounted by Indonesia, the exclusion of Malaysia from the agenda was a great victory for Indian diplomacy (in concert with the U.A.R.), particularly since the conference did pronounce on a number of controversies involving states represented there. For the second time (the first at Belgrade), Indonesia's aspirations to legitimize through the support of international gatherings its adventurous policies, were thwarted largely by Indian initiative. An angry Sukarno did not attend the final session of the conference. Here again India struck directly at the root of Indonesian aspirations. She proposed, to the great dismay and disappointment of the pro-Peking groups, and succeeded in persuading the delegates, that the second Afro-Asian Conference should not only be convened in 1965 (after the conference of non-aligned nations) but should meet in Africa. India's Swaran Singh outmaneuvered the chairman of the meeting, Dr. Subandrio of Indonesia, with these clever words:

³⁸ *The Hindustan Times* (Calcutta), October 7, 1964.

³⁹ During the course of the conference President Sukarno and his lieutenant Subandrio made a concerted effort to give the “war of liberation” or the “Confrontation between NEFOS and OLDEFOS” priority over everything else. However, this effort was foiled by “the moderates.”

The anniversary of that historic (Bandung) conference will fall on April 18, 1965. What can be more appropriate and befitting, what can be more inspiring to the people of Asia and Africa than that the second Asia-African Conference should be held on the auspicious occasion of that anniversary?⁴⁰

Recalling that at Bandung there had been a general feeling that the second Asian-African conference should be held somewhere in Africa, the Indian Foreign Minister suggested that it would be a fitting tribute to the achievements of new Africa if the next conference were to be convened at a place in Africa to be selected by the Organisation for African Unity. The Indian move thus not only embossed the militant trio but enhanced Indian prestige with the African states which outnumbered the Asian. Something else was yet to come from India, much more perturbing than the time and venue of the proposed conference. India's Foreign Minister surprised the meeting by proposing that USSR and Malaysia also be invited to participate in the conference. The militant trio put up a strong fight, and the question of the Soviet and Malaysian participation was left undecided. The government-controlled Djakarta press accused India of insulting Indonesian sensibilities and deliberately trying to wreck the conference.⁴¹

By early 1965, it became abundantly clear that there was no love lost between Indonesia and India. At the Bandung Conference's "Dasavora" celebrations in Djakarta, to which China sent her Prime Minister, India was represented by her Food Minister (who, incidentally, had been asked to drop in at Djakarta on his way home from Australia). While Chou En-lai, Pham Van Dong (North Vietnam), Sihanouk, and Bhutto (Pakistan) all shared the limelight, the representatives of India, Japan, and Thailand were left out. (The representatives of these countries, not being able to bear the insult, walked out.) As one commentator admirably put it:

Bung Karno's regime reserved its most clamorous accolades for the most conclusively Communistic of its Afro-Asian guests and muscled away from the microphone all the friends of the West.⁴²

Indonesian-Indian rivalry reached its peak with the approach of the proposed Afro-Asian Conference. Indian diplomacy, in conjunction with Japan's and the U.A.R.'s, foiled an attempt by Communist China and Indonesia to dominate the conference. When China, Pakistan, and Indonesia sent their ministers to Japan, Southeast Asia, and Africa, India also did the same to offset the visits of the representatives of the militant trio. In this regard, Indian diplomacy on the eve of the Algiers Conference (scheduled for June 29, 1965) was rather successful in so far as India was able to secure an adequate number of concurrences for the admission of Malaysia, and at least partially successful regarding Soviet participation. The frustrated Sukarno immediately burst out: "I really do not want to criticise India but I

⁴⁰ *Foreign Affairs Record* (New Delhi), X, No. 4 (April, 1964), 122-23.

⁴¹ Willard A. Hanna, "1965 Djakarta," *American Universities Field Staff Reports*, S.E. Asia Series, Vol. VIII, No. 4 (April, 1965), p. 7.

⁴² *Indonesian Observer* (Djakarta), April 15, 1964.

cannot stand it any longer."⁴³ Unable to do anything, he gave the green signal to the violence-addicted mobs of Djakarta who once again stoned the Indian Embassy on June 23, 1965 and carried banners marked: "India and Malaysia are Nocolim Siamese twins."⁴⁴ In retaliation India further destroyed Indonesia's hopes of dominating the Algiers Conference by successfully securing the approval of the member nations to a resolution postponing the conference until November 5, 1965. This resolution, sponsored by Ethiopia, clearly bore the stamp of Indian draftsmanship.⁴⁵

The Indonesian press continued to whip up anti-Indian sentiments in the subsequent months. In retaliation socialist-led demonstrations in Delhi burned an effigy of Sukarno.

If one studies how India's policies were executed during this period, one may quite accurately point out some glaring weaknesses. Time and again, foreign diplomats, visiting politicians, and observers had talked with ill-concealed irritation of India's tendency to "sermonize." Indian leaders and diplomats have always talked a bit too much of the country's rich and ancient culture and of having exported some of it to the South-Asian countries. Latterly, they had also been flaunting India's success with democracy and her five-year plans, in a similarly aggressive manner. In fact, India seemed to wear her moderate political system like a badge.

Her friendly relations with Indonesia derived sustenance chiefly from Mr. Nehru's personal friendship with Indonesia's top leaders. India's historical ties with Indonesia had partly bound India all those years with the latter, but primarily the closeness resulted from Mr. Nehru's relation with Sukarno. There was little evidence of any strong emotional and commercial integration. Cordiality with the leaders at the top is indeed valuable, but the individual leaders do not last forever, nor are they above displaying a mercurial temperament.

Last but not least, India's choice of diplomatic representatives has sometimes been far from happy. At the External Affairs Ministry, stories are often heard purporting to describe the offensive behaviour of some of India's diplomats abroad.

When, much to the shock of the Indian people, Pakistan launched its attack against India on August 15, 1965, the sub-continent became engulfed in an undeclared war. The outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan war, however, proved to be a source of discomfort and embarrassment for most of the Asian countries, since two fellow Asian nations were involved in the dispute. While most of the countries in the region maintained an uneasy silence, it is significant to note that Indonesia hesitatingly expressed her support for Pakistan while condemning India in the war between the two countries over Kashmir. Thus, on the anniversary of the Indonesian Islamic Party,

⁴³ *Times of India* (Bombay), June 21, 1965.

⁴⁴ *Times of India* (Bombay), June 24, 1965.

⁴⁵ For details see T. B. Miller and J.D.B. Miller, "Afro-Asian Disunity: Algiers, 1965," *Australian Outlook*, XIX, No. 3 (December, 1965), 306-21.

President Sukarno said that all Muslim countries should give their sympathy and support to Pakistan in its struggle against India because Islam always defended justice and truth and always opposed tyranny.⁴⁶

In a speech at the presidential palace on September 9, 1965, President Sukarno further expressed his admiration over Pakistani resistance to the onslaughts of what he called the "far superior military might of India," and said that "the strength" of the Pakistani people lies in their "love of liberty."⁴⁷

In Indonesia itself demonstrations organised by the Communist "Central Youth Front" took place outside the Indian Embassy. On September 9, 1965, in sympathy with Pakistan, many Indonesians ransacked the Indian Embassy in Djakarta. These actions were applauded by Foreign Minister Subandrio who said that he "appreciated the revolutionary actions taken by the youth in their denunciation of India's actions against Pakistan."⁴⁸

When Pakistan officially asked for Indonesia's help in the fighting in the subcontinent, Foreign Minister Subandrio, after consultations with President Sukarno, said that it was the obligation of "all nations belonging to the new emerging forces" to give help to Pakistan, to face what he called "India's aggression."⁴⁹

Earlier, the Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakyat Sementara (Provisional Peoples' Consultative Congress), Indonesia's top legislative body, unanimously asked the government to aid Pakistan against India as early as possible. In a resolution the Congress endorsed President Sukarno's earlier statement that:

Indonesian sentiments, sympathies and prayers are with the people of Kashmir and the people and Government of Pakistan who are courageously and heroically defending their independence and sovereignty.⁵⁰

Djakarta retained this anti-Indian posture even after the abortive September 30, 1965 coup. As late as January, 1966, the *Indonesian Herald*, organ of the Indonesian Ministry of External Affairs, was warning India that "she could not continue to bully Pakistan into accepting her expansionist policies," and was praising Pakistan's "burning will" and "invincible strength" in standing by what was "legally and legitimately" her right in Kashmir. The hostile attitude and pronouncement of the Indonesian people and government further embittered the already rapidly deteriorating relations between Indonesia and India.

President Sukarno's failure to provide a suitable answer to the most pressing political and economic problems of the country brought about the downfall of the regime he had established during the last six years. On September 30, 1965, a group of army officers led by Lt. Col. Untung suddenly

⁴⁶ *The Statesman* (Calcutta), September 4, 1965.

⁴⁷ *Hindustan Times* (Calcutta), September 10, 1965.

⁴⁸ *New York Times*, September 10, 1965.

⁴⁹ *Asian Recorder*, October 1-7, 1965, p. 6696.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

swooped down on the capital, arrested the leading army generals, and announced later that these steps had been taken to protect President Sukarno. However, at 8:45 p.m., on October 1, 1965, an announcement over Djakarta radio established that the September 30th movement had failed. Troops under Major General Suharto had regained control of key Djakarta installations from the handful of army units supporting Untung's plot. Moreover, the commander of the army, General A. H. Nasution, and President Sukarno were both safe and well. Suharto soon emerged as the strongman in the country and proceeded to take firm steps against Untung and his followers. It was then alleged that the P.K.I. had been behind the September 30 coup, and Suharto began a brutal policy of extermination of the P.K.I. and its sympathisers.⁵¹

The ill-fated Communist coup of September 30, 1965 upset the precarious balance in favour of the army as the Communists were largely eliminated. The edifice of "Guided Democracy" which Sukarno had constructed on twin pillars collapsed suddenly with the fall of the P.K.I. In a series of trials begun in Djakarta in 1966 most of the close associates of President Sukarno, including Subandrio and Chairul Saleh, were tried and imprisoned. An attempt was made to discover whether President Sukarno was aware of the alleged P.K.I. plot and whether he had tacitly approved of the plans. However, within a year he was deprived of his favourite titles and, early in 1967, was politely asked to surrender his powers as president, and was virtually removed from office in spite of his objections.

The leaders of the new regime, the Suharto-Malik-Sultan Hamengku triumvirate, recognised the necessity of hearing the "message of the people's sufferings," which Sukarno had ignored for a long time. In an effort to re-establish Indonesia's shattered economy and tottering international prestige, the new leadership decided to call off its "confrontation" with Malaysia and to restore friendly relations with the countries of the West in order to attract badly needed foreign economic and financial assistance. The Peking-Djakarta axis, having been demolished (because of the alleged complicity of the People's Republic of China in the September 30 coup), the stage was now set for improving relations with those countries which had been declared enemies during the Sukarno-Subandrio period.

The drastic change wrought in the Indonesian administrative set-up was welcomed by Malaysia. Adam Malik proceeded "to clear up the present climate" prevailing between India and Indonesia and to re-establish friendly ties between the two countries. For obvious reasons, India responded promptly, particularly when Malik indicated abandonment of the pro-Pakistani policy of his predecessor. Both Malik and Finance Minister Sultan Hamengker Buwono visited New Delhi in September, 1966 and they were offered Rs. 100 million worth of credit facilities. The Indian government

⁵¹ The Tokyo newspaper *Asahi Shimbun* reported in February, 1966 that Indonesian Communist leader D.N. Aidit had confessed leading the attempted September 30 coup d'etat before being executed by the army.

and the press welcomed the new orientations in Indonesian policy towards New Delhi as a "vindication of India's policy of showing patience and forbearance towards the excesses of the previous Indonesian regime."⁵² Additional trade agreements were concluded in early 1967.

VI

A survey of the relations between Indonesia and India reveals a broad trend with important implications so far as Indian future relations with that country is concerned. So long as there was a similarity of views and objectives the two countries were able to cooperate admirably in various fields. But when Indonesia's views and objectives differed from those of India, the two countries found themselves at loggerheads with each other.

Hence, the re-establishment of cordial relations between the two countries in recent years should not lead to complacency on the part of Indian policy makers. If the past is any indicator of the future, and if one takes into account Indonesia's ambitions of being recognised as a major power in Southeast Asia,⁵³ then it is conceivable that in the near or distant future Indonesia and India might again find themselves at loggerheads. Still, one need not despair of the possibility of building a close relationship between the two countries. This of course would call for a high level of diplomacy on the part of both nations. Much will depend on serious attempts to discover areas of agreement.

The first and foremost task is to establish close cooperation between the two countries in the economic field, an area sadly neglected in the past. There is much that India can offer Indonesia. India's technical superiority can benefit a rising country like Indonesia. In the same way, Indonesia can offer her raw materials, tin, teak-wood, rawhides, and so on. In the past, trade between the two countries had been erratic mainly because of badly administered commercial policies on both sides.

In the final analysis, it cannot be ignored that there are more common points between Indonesia and India. It is true that for a brief period, when Indonesia was under "Guided Democracy," the country was moving closer to China. The administration in Djakarta somehow discovered common points between China and Indonesia and attempted to cement closer relations. Even during those days of "glorious" relations between the two countries, public protestations against the Chinese were not uncommon in Indonesia. For centuries the average Indonesian has resented the economic domination of the Chinese. They would certainly resent a politically dominant China near their frontier. It is this fear of Chinese expansionism that

⁵² *The Times of India* (Bombay), May 8, 1966.

⁵³ Certain goals related to a position of Indonesian dominance in the region have been common to the attitudes of its leaders. Clear evidence of the "Greater Indonesia" thesis was to be found in the statements of Sukarno himself, and its crudest manifestation was the willingness of some Indonesian leaders to accept certain expansionist goals.

is likely to bring Indonesia closer to her Asian neighbours. One of the first acts of the new regime in Djakarta was to show a keen interest in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), an organization comprising most of the Southeast Asian Countries. It is now an accepted fact that for many years India has had to reckon with a hostile neighbour in the north. Undoubtedly, in her search for allies to meet the Chinese challenge, Indonesia should have a prominent place. If Southeast Asia is to be retained as an "area of peace," as Pandit Nehru once dreamt, then it is the task of Indian and Indonesian diplomats to discover possibilities of closer co-operation in the future.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE JUNE 17, 1971 AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

VALENTINE J. BELFIGLIO

FEW HAVE SUFFERED AS EXTENSIVELY AS THE ISLAND PEOPLE OF Okinawa. The Chinese dominated this gentle group from 1372-1872, forcing them to pay exorbitant tributes.¹ In 1609 the Japanese from Satsuma invaded the Ryukyus and imposed harsh economic demands upon the Okinawan economy.² When Commodore Matthew Perry of the United States Navy visited the oppressed land in 1853, Okinawans were making coerced payments to both Japan and China.

In 1879 Japan devoured the little kingdom and assimilated it into the Japanese empire.³ That same year a cholera epidemic swept the Ryukyu Islands afflicting 11,200 persons and killing 6,400.⁴ The total population of Okinawa at that time was 351,374.⁵

During World War II the Okinawan people were required to make a terrible sacrifice on Japan's behalf. Although Okinawans had no part in formulating Japan's military policies, more than 110,000 perished during the American invasion of March and April, 1945.⁶

On June 17, 1971, Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Kiichi Aichi signed an agreement between Japan and the United States. This accord provided for the U.S. government to relinquish in favor of Japan all rights and interests in the Ryukyu and Daito Islands which the former had acquired as a result of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed in San Francisco on September 8, 1951.⁷

The significance of the 1971 agreement for the governments and people of the United States, Japan, and Okinawa, is very great. Referring to the document, Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato said at the signing ceremony:

. . . It will mark the birth of a new era where Japan and the United States will cooperate in order to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the Asian-Pacific world. . . .⁸

¹ George H. Kerr, *Okinawa: The History of an Island People* (Rutland, Va: Charles E. Tuttle, 1959), pp. 62-74.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 156-59.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 396-411.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 393.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 394.

⁶ Public Information Bureau, "Okinawa: Some Basic Facts," Japan Reference Series No. 2-69 (Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1969), p. 4.

⁷ "Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Minister for Foreign Affairs Kiichi Aichi Sign Ryukyu Islands Agreement," Dept. of State Release No. 133, Washington, D.C., June 17, 1971, p. 1.

⁸ "Statements by Prime Minister Sato and Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi on

Secretary Rogers read a statement from President Richard M. Nixon applauding the treaty as one which "enables us to work together in peace for the continued progress of our two countries and that of the entire world."⁹

The entente encompasses nine Articles. Article One is the most important to Japan. It affords the return of Okinawa and the other Ryukyu and Daito islands to Japan on an unspecified date in 1972.¹⁰ This officially ends the period of postwar occupation and returns to Japan the last of its territory taken in battle by United States forces.

The Japanese-controlled Ryukyu Islands came under the administration of the United States along with the Bonin and Volcano Islands as a result of the defeat of Japan in World War II. The islands remained under the control of the American military government until December 5, 1950, when the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) was formally established.

Okinawa's legal status was outlined in Article III of the San Francisco Peace Treaty which was signed by 49 nations on September 8, 1951. The Article reads in part:

. . . The United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters. . . .¹¹

Executive Order 10713, dated June 5, 1957, provided for a U.S. High Commissioner to act as the Head of the Civil Administration of the Ryukyu chain. This individual was given the power to promulgate laws, ordinances, or regulations, and to veto Ryukyuan legislation. The local Ryukyuan government has had a popularly elected legislature and Chief Executive, as well as an independent judiciary.¹² The Executive Order was amended by Executive Order 11010 signed by President John F. Kennedy on March 19, 1962.¹³

A gradual erosion of American administrative control occurred between 1951 and 1971. This was caused by constant pressure from the Japanese government and people and the Okinawans themselves. By 1951, the reversion movement on Okinawa was significant. Seventy-two percent of the voters on the islands signed petitions favoring reunification with Japan. The petitions were sent to Japanese and United States delegates at the San Francisco Peace Conference.¹⁴ In September, 1951, John Foster Dulles, as a

the Occasion of the Signing of the Agreement on Reversion of Okinawa," Embassy of Japan Press Release, Washington, D.C., June 17, 1971, p. 2.

⁹ Terence Smith, "Pact for Okinawa Return Signed," *New York Times*, June 18, 1971, p. 1.

¹⁰ Dept. of State Press Release No. 133, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

¹¹ Raymond Dennett and Katherine D. Durant, *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1951* (Binghamton, N.Y., 1953), p. 471.

¹² Executive Order 10713, dated June 5, 1957, The President, Code of Federal Regulations, 1954-1958, No. 3 (Washington, 1961), pp. 368-71.

¹³ Executive Order 11010, dated March 19, 1962, The President, Code of Federal Regulations, 1959-1963, No. 3 (Washington, 1964), pp. 587-90.

¹⁴ "Okinawa: Some Basic Facts," *op. cit.*, p. 11.

United States representative to the conference of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, stated: "The United States felt that the best formula would be to permit Japan to retain residual sovereignty."¹⁵

Okinawan agitation continued. On April 14, 1953, the voters from the fourth electoral district elected Choko Tengan, a strong proponent of reversion, as their representative to the Okinawan Legislative Council.¹⁶ Eight months later, on December 25, 1953, the United States announced that the northern islands of the Ryukyu Archipelago, known as the Amami Oshima group, would revert to Japanese control that day.¹⁷ The erosion of American control had begun. In August, 1954, a District Court in Hawaii, in rendering a decision concerning an Okinawan resident, regarded the defendant as a Japanese citizen. The Court asserted:

Japan, and not the United States, having 'de jure sovereignty' over Okinawa since the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, the defendant is not a national of the United States.¹⁸

The reversion movement became more widespread and continued to gain in strength and momentum. On September 10, 1955, the members of an organization known as the Inhabitants for Promotion of Settlement of the Question of Military Land, held a mass meeting. The organization passed a declaration which stated:

. . . There can be no reasonable settlement of the question if it be attempted by ignoring and overriding the living rights of us, the 800,000 inhabitants of the islands. . . .¹⁹

The establishment on April 28, 1960, of the Council for the Return of Okinawa Prefecture to the Fatherland, by seventeen organizations, including the Okinawa Teachers' Association, Civil Servants Labor Union, Okinawa Women's Association, and political parties on Okinawa, gave a special impetus to the movement.²⁰ All Okinawan political parties have been committed to the restoration of the Ryukyus to Japan.²¹ On April 28, 1964, the twelfth anniversary of the Japanese Peace Treaty, mass demonstrations demanding reversion were held. In the Okinawan legislative assembly a resolution was passed calling upon the 49 signatories of the Treaty to restore the island to Japan. In Naha some 75,000 people attended rallies. The

¹⁵ U.S. Dept. of State Publication No. 4392, Records of Proceedings, Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan (Washington, D.C., 1951), p. 78.

¹⁶ Asahi-Shimbun Anzen-hoshomondai, "Chosakai, Amerika Senryakuka No Okinawa" (Tokyo: Asahi-shimbunsha, 1967), pp. 116-17.

¹⁷ Kerr, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁸ "U.S. vs. Ushi Sheroma, Sovereignty over Okinawa Treaty of Peace with Japan Nationality," *American Journal of International Law*, XLIX (1955), 88-90.

¹⁹ Embassy of Japan, "The Second Mass Meeting of the Inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands for Promotion of Settlement of the Question of the Lands for the Use of the United States Armed Forces" (Washington, D.C., 1967), p. 1.

²⁰ "Okinawa: Some Basic Facts," *loc. cit.*

²¹ Mikio Giga, *Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa* (Hong Kong: Cathay Press, 1963), p. 38.

reversion movement reached a great crescendo as the majority of city, town, and village assemblies passed resolutions to this effect.²²

The first serious discussions between Japan and the United States concerning the reversion of Okinawa, occurred in the meetings of Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi and President Dwight D. Eisenhower on June 22, 1957.²³ Eisenhower, while recognizing Japan's residual sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands, did not make any concrete commitment on returning them. In March, 1962, President John F. Kennedy stated that he recognized the Ryukyus to be a part of the Japanese homeland and looked forward to the day when the security interests of the free world would permit their restoration to full Japanese sovereignty.²⁴ On April 25, 1964, Japan and the United States initiated a Consultative Committee on Okinawa in Tokyo. The purpose of the Committee was to coordinate Japanese-American economic and technical assistance to Okinawa.²⁵

Prime Minister Eisaku Sato held talks with President Lyndon B. Johnson in January, 1965. Following the talks, the Japanese government stepped up the intensity of its demand that Okinawa be returned to Japan. Tokuji Tokonami, a member of the Japanese House of Representatives, said on April, 1965:

Twenty years now since the end of the War, there is growing a strong desire for the return to Japan of full administrative rights over Okinawa. In this context we recall the statement by the United States Government to the effect that they recognize the Ryukyus to be a part of the Japanese homeland and look forward to the day when they will be restored to full Japanese sovereignty. . . .²⁶

On August 19, 1965, Japanese Prime Minister Sato visited Okinawa. In his arrival speech at Naha International Airport, he asserted:

. . . I am most well aware that the post-war period is not over for Japan unless and until Okinawa's return to its home country is realized. When I visited the United States last January, I strongly expressed our desire to President Johnson.²⁷

The Prime Minister and President Johnson agreed in talks on November 14 and 15, 1967, that the two governments should jointly and continuously review the status of the Ryukyu Islands, with the goal of returning administrative rights over them to Japan. As a result of the talks, the United States established in Naha an Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner, composed of representatives of the two Governments and of the

²² "Okinawa Today," *Japan Quarterly*, XI (July-September, 1964), 269.

²³ "Okinawa: Some Basic Facts," *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

²⁴ "U.S.-Japanese Cooperation in Asia," U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin 7776, No. 9 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 3.

²⁵ "Okinawa: Some Basic Facts," *op. cit.*, p. 8.

²⁶ Tokuji Tokonami, "My Personal Views on the Return of Okinawa to Japanese Sovereignty" (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of Japan, 1965), p. 1.

²⁷ "Prime Minister Sato's Statement at Naha International Air-Port" (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of Japan, 1965), p. 1.

Government of the Ryukyu Islands, in order to pave the way for reversion.²⁸

On April 5, 1968, the United States and Japan signed an agreement restoring Japanese jurisdiction over the Bonin and Volcano Islands.²⁹ Erosion was proceeding rapidly. From November 19-21, 1969, Japanese Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon met in Washington to discuss the restoration issue. In a Joint Communique the two leaders agreed that Japan and the United States should begin immediate consultations regarding the specific arrangements for the return of Okinawa and the other Ryukyu and Daito Islands to Japan.³⁰ The agreement, signed by Japan and the United States on June 17, 1971, was a direct result of the November, 1969 negotiations and top-level discussions.

Article Two of the June accord makes applicable to Okinawa all conventions, treaties, and other agreements concluded between Japan and the United States.³¹

Article Three is the most important to the United States government. It provides that after Okinawa passes to Japanese control, the United States will be permitted to retain 88 of its military installations on the islands. These include the huge Kadena Air Force Base from which American B-52 bombers have set out for strikes in Vietnam. A total of 46 smaller facilities, such as warehouses and storage depots, will revert to Japan.³² The importance of maintaining these bases by the United States should not be underestimated. It means that Okinawa will remain the most powerful base in the Western Pacific and an integral link in the U.S. defense chain, stretching from Alaska to Thailand.

The United States has been primarily interested in the Ryukyus as a military base from which to contain Communist expansion in Asia. Okinawa has been described as the keystone in our Pacific defenses. Located in the center of the Ryukyu chain, Okinawa is also the nucleus of our advance line of defense in the Pacific—a line extending from the Philippines northward through Taiwan, the Ryukyus, and Japan to the Aleutians and Alaska.³³ With regard to the presence of the United States armed forces in the Ryukyu Islands, Brig. Gen. John G. Ondrick, the civil administrator, said in a speech March 3, 1966:

I have made the point that our sole reason for being in the Ryukyu Islands is a military one: the deterrence of Communist aggression.³⁴

²⁸ "Okinawa: Some Basic Facts," *op. cit.*, p. 12.

²⁹ "Bonin Islands Restored to Japan," *New York Times*, April 6, 1968, p. 36.

³⁰ "Joint Communique Between President Richard Nixon and His Excellency Prime Minister Sato of Japan," Attachment No. 8, U.S. Dept. of State Press Release No. 133, June 17, 1971, p. 3.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

³² *Ibid.*, Attachment No. 6, pp. 1-11.

³³ "Okinawa," U.S. Dept. of Defense Pamphlet No. 2-50 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 9.

³⁴ Gen. John G. Ondrick, "Why Are We Here?" U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, June, 1966, p. 4.

The central location of Okinawa makes it an excellent defense base against attack anywhere in the Far East. The island is located 868 miles southwest of Tokyo, 1,200 miles northwest of Guam, 440 miles southeast of Shanghai, China, 336 miles from Taipei, Formosa, and 736 miles northeast of Clark Air Force Base, Philippines.³⁵ Also within a few hundred miles are the Communist regimes of China and North Korea, a constant threat to the security of the area. From Okinawa, air strikes and amphibious or airborne operations could be launched quickly in the event of enemy aggression against any territory in the Far East. This was demonstrated in 1959 when American troops and B-29 bombers from Okinawa helped turn back the Communist invasion of South Korea.³⁶ It was proven again by the dispatch of American B-52 bombers for strikes in Vietnam.³⁷

All Department of Defense services have been represented on Okinawa. The U.S. Marine Corps, the largest unit, has been located at several bases. The Army, third in strength, has the greatest responsibility for maintaining and supporting the necessities of servicemen there. In addition to its defense mission, Army units perform the major police work and provide such island facilities as a milk plant, a bakery, waterworks, electrical power, a hospital, petroleum storage and distribution harbors and ports, and a telephone system. The Army also works directly with the U.S. Civilian Administrator and High Commissioner who is an Army Lieutenant General.

The U.S. Navy, under the title of Fleet Activities Ryukyus, has performed air and sea operations utilizing the ports of White Beach and Naha Air Base to support Navy air operations on Okinawa.

The Air Force is also in great strength on the island. Fifth Air Force, with two divisions in Japan, one on Okinawa, and another in Korea, is part of the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) air arm in the Pacific. With its allies, PACAF is responsible for maintaining control of the air over the Pacific Far East. In so doing it operates over one-third of the earth's surface.

Strategically located in the Western Pacific, Okinawa is an excellent base for Air Force operations. The Air Force mission there served: (1) as air defense of the Ryukyu Islands, (2) to support a combat ready force, and (3) to train and prepare units for combat. Two jet airfields on Okinawa form the core of air power covering a 300,000-square-mile area, designated the Okinawa Air Defense Identification Zone. Kadena Air Base centers around two parallel air strips. One strip is 12,000 feet long; the other, 9,900 feet. Both can accommodate any aircraft flying today. Naha Air Base, fifteen miles from Kadena, has a single 8,000-foot runway. Both bases have the most modern servicing equipment available.³⁸ As a result of the June 17, 1971 agreement, a military complex valued at more than two billion dollars will remain in U.S. hands.

³⁵ "Okinawa-Air Force Guide," *Life On Okinawa Enterprises Co.* (Naha, Okinawa, June, 1966), p. 17.

³⁶ U.S. Dept. of Defense Pamphlet No. 2-50, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-10.

³⁷ *New York Times*, June 18, 1971, p. 1.

³⁸ *Life On Okinawa Enterprises Co.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

However, the United States government will no longer have a blank check on the deployment of men and weapons from these strategic bases. Article II and paragraph 2 of Article III make relevant to Okinawa the provisions of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, signed between Japan and Washington on January 19, 1960. Article IV of this treaty requires:

The parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this treaty and, at the request of either party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.³⁹

What this means is that the United States will no longer be able to launch an air or ground military operation from Okinawa without the approval of the Japanese government. The agreement would also prohibit the United States from storing nuclear weapons on the island after reversion, without Japanese consent. The sensitive attitude of the Japanese toward the storage of nuclear weapons is understandable. Japan is the only country in the world to have suffered the devastation of an atomic attack. On August 6, 1945, the bomb dropped on Hiroshima leveled 4.4 square miles of the city and killed 80,000 people. On August 9, 1945, another bomb exploded over Nagasaki, leveling that city.⁴⁰ Japanese public opinion over nuclear testing by the U.S. in the south Pacific had been easily aroused prior to the American signing of the nuclear test ban treaty of September 24, 1963. Japanese citizens had feared nuclear fallout and the contamination of Japanese fishing grounds.⁴¹ The desire of Japan for consultation prior to the dispatch of American military operations from Okinawa, is also easily understood.

From the Japanese point of view, the use of Okinawa for combat operations in the Korean and South Vietnamese wars directly involved Japan.⁴² Although the ruling Japanese Liberal Democratic Party advocates the retention of U.S. bases in Okinawa,⁴³ as does its ruling counterpart in Okinawa,⁴⁴ both groups fear the threat of the leading opposition party, the Japan Socialist Party. This political force advocates the withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from the island. All opposition parties in Okinawa advocate the abolition of U.S. military bases.⁴⁵ A coalition of these parties won the Chief Executive race in Okinawa in the 1968 elections.

³⁹ "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security," U.S. Dept. of State Publication No. 4509 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 1-2.

⁴⁰ Alexander DeConde, *A History of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1963), p. 648.

⁴¹ George Kahin, *Major Governments of Asia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 257.

⁴² Robert Trumbell, "Bombing of Vietnam from Island Stirs Public Outcry," *New York Times*, August 1, 1965, p. 4.

⁴³ "Background Notes — Japan," U.S. Dept. of State Publication 7770 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 6.

⁴⁴ "Okinawa: Some Basic Facts," *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

Under pressure from opposition parties in his own country and Japanese public opinion, Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato told the Japanese Diet as early as August, 1965, that the Japanese government was "not entirely satisfied," that U.S. B-52 bombers, after taking shelter from a typhoon, had made an attack in South Vietnam. The Prime Minister expressed the hope that "this sort of thing won't happen again."⁴⁶ Japanese Socialist Party Chairman Kozo Sasaki had called "absolutely unpardonable" the use of Okinawa as a launching pad for Vietnam-bound B-52 bombers.⁴⁷

Article IV of the June 17, 1971 agreement between Japan and the United States contains two items of consequence. First, Japan waived all claims against the United States arising from the presence of the latter in Okinawa prior to the date of entry into force of the agreement. The waiver does not include claims of Japanese nationals recognized by the laws of the United States or local laws applicable during U.S. administration. Second, the United States agreed to make contributions to Japanese nationals whose lands were damaged prior to July 1, 1950, as a result of land use by United States authorities.

Article V provides that Japan assumes jurisdiction over all criminal proceedings as of the date of entry into force of the agreement.

Article VI requires that all properties of the United States government on the islands, located outside the facilities mentioned in Article III, shall be transferred to the government of Japan.

By the terms of Article VII, Japan assumed a responsibility of 320 million dollars in compensation to the United States, to be paid over the next five years, for the civilian and military facilities being turned over under the agreement.

Under Article VIII, Japan consented to the continued use of the Voice of America relay station on Okinawa Island for a period of five years from the date of entry into force of the agreement.

Article IX asserts that the accord shall become effective two months after the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification.⁴⁸

The reversion of Okinawa to Japan by the United States was a gesture of great magnanimity. It was also an action catalyzed by potent political factors. Japan is of vital importance to the national security of the United States and to its international trade. A pro-Communist or neutralist Japan would upset the balance of power in the Far East. The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security provides that an armed attack against Japan or the United States in the territories under Japan's administrative control would require each party to

act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ "Sato Cautions U.S. on Use of Okinawa Base for Raids," *New York Times*, August 3, 1965, p. 3.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ U.S. Dept. of State Press Release No. 133, June 17, 1971, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-5.

⁴⁹ U.S. Dept. of State Publication No. 4509, *loc. cit.*

This treaty has also permitted the stationing of U.S. forces in and about Japan to maintain international peace and security in the Far East.⁵⁰

Without reversion, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty would likely terminate. When the ten-year treaty was originally signed in 1960, it caused a great deal of controversy and outbreaks of violence in Japan. It had the effect of forcing the resignation of Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, and led to a last-minute cancellation of a scheduled visit by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.⁵¹ In addition, Japan has been under severe external pressure from its neighbors, Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. These nations denounced the treaty as representing an act of collaboration between "Japanese militarism" and "United States imperialism" for aggressive purposes.⁵²

Despite these internal and external troubles, the Japanese Government announced in June, 1970, that it would let the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security continue for an indefinite period. Most observers believed that the lessened incidence of violent demonstrations accompanying the Japanese government's announcement, was due to the November 22, 1969 agreement between President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato to return the Ryukyus to Japanese sovereignty.⁵³ The Security Treaty remains in effect for one year after either party has given notice of its intention to terminate it.⁵⁴

In the realm of international trade, the United States has long been Japan's leading partner. The U.S. supplies 27 percent of Japan's imports,⁵⁵ which makes the latter the second largest customer for the exports of the United States and the largest customer for its imports.⁵⁶ Japan purchased 31 percent of the total U.S. exports in 1968.⁵⁷ She has the most rapidly growing economy in the world, is the strongest industrial power in Asia, and is the only Asian country that has developed a modern economy.⁵⁸ The United States would not want Japan to drastically reduce its imports of American goods. Yet the United States has been faced with a great paradox.

From 1967 to 1971 America has been experiencing an expanding balance-of-trade deficit with Japan. The deficit was 304 million dollars in 1967. By 1971, the January-June annual rate deficit had swelled to 3 billion, 42 million dollars.⁵⁹ Because of the vanishing trade surplus with Japan

⁵⁰ U.S. Dept. of State Publication No. 7770, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁵¹ Kahin, *op. cit.*, pp. 253-54.

⁵² "Reds Assail Pact's Extension," *New York Times*, June 24, 1970, p. 3.

⁵³ "Japanese Government Continues Treaty," *New York Times*, June 23, 1970, p. 5.

⁵⁴ U.S. Dept. of State Publication No. 4509, *loc. cit.*

⁵⁵ U.S. Dept. of State Publication No. 7770, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁵⁶ Committee for Economic Development, "Japan in the Free World Economy" (New York, 1966), p. 8.

⁵⁷ U.S. Dept. of State Publication No. 7770, *loc. cit.*

⁵⁸ "Japan in the Free World Economy," *loc. cit.*

⁵⁹ U.S. Bureau of Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1971* (92nd ed.; Washington, D.C., 1971), p. 790.

and other countries, President Nixon announced on August 15, 1971 that as part of a new economic policy for the United States:

I am today imposing an additional tax of 10 percent on goods imported into the United States.⁶⁰

This emergency economic measure applies worldwide but strikes especially at Japan, because of the large volume of trade between that country and the United States. Consider the plight of the 2.3 million U.S. textile workers, a large percentage of whom are located in the rural South. This industry has been hard-pressed to compete with low-cost Japanese imports. U.S. textile imports from Japan have increased from \$375 million in 1965⁶¹ to a 1971 January-July annual rate of \$616.8 million.⁶² The sale of new Japanese automobiles has increased from \$25 million in 1965 to \$456 million in 1970.⁶³ Other Japanese products which have been increasingly imported into the United States include canned fruits and vegetables, cosmetics, color film, computers, gas turbines, shoes, and other products.⁶⁴

Nevertheless, Japanese Foreign Ministry sources stated that they were "shocked" by the U.S. action. An official of the Japan External Trade Organization said:

The import surtax is one step short of a total suspension of imports on the part of the United States.⁶⁵

Yasuo Noguchi, Consul of the Japanese Government, of the Consulate General of Japan located in New York City, stated on September 20, 1971:

. . . Our position is that the surcharge should be removed at the earliest possible date since it has raised the danger of countermeasures. . . .⁶⁶

Although there is no direct connection between the United States import of Japanese goods and the restoration of Okinawa to Japan, it may be that President Nixon chose June, 1971 to return the island, partially to soften the blow of the increased import tax that he initiated in August, 1971. The return of Okinawa and the other islands of the Ryukyu and Daito chains could perhaps be delayed no longer, without jeopardizing Japanese support for the strategic goals of the United States in Asia, and for American international economic policies. Communist factions within and outside of Japan may have capitalized on American recalcitrance toward returning

⁶⁰ James M. Naughton, "Nixon Orders Pay-Price Freeze For 90 Days and Asks Tax Cuts in Plan to Stimulate Economy," *New York Times*, August 16, 1971, p. 1.

⁶¹ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of International Commerce, "Overseas Business Report," Report OBR 71-010, May, 1971, p. 24.

⁶² U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Highlights of the U.S. Export and Import Trade," Report FT 990, June, 1971, p. 103.

⁶³ U.S. Department of Commerce Report OBR 71-010, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

⁶⁴ U.S. Bureau of the Census Report FT 990, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-103.

⁶⁵ "Government Strongly Opposed to US Import Charge," *Mainichi Daily News*, August 17, 1971, p. 1; Clive Baxter, "U.S. Power Play—What It Means to Us," *The Financial Post*, LXV (August 21, 1971), 4.

⁶⁶ Letter from Yasuo Noguchi, Japanese Government Consul, New York City, September 20, 1971.

Okinawa to the Japanese nation. Also, reversion of Okinawa could put pressure on the Soviet Union to return the Kurile Islands to Japan.

The agreement of June 17, 1971 represents a compromise on the part of Japan and the United States: reversion for the United States, and maintenance of American military strength on the Island, for Japan. It may have delayed, for a time, Japanese retaliation for the ill effects of the new surtax which President Nixon had invoked as a part of his New Economic Policy.

THE CURSILLO MOVEMENT: ITS IMPACT ON PHILIPPINE SOCIETY

PURIFICACION G. BAUTISTA, R. C.

CHANGE IMPLIES A MOVEMENT, A PROCESS. IT IS A PROCESS OF development and growth, of risking new things and new ways, of making mistakes and learning from these. Thus, change implies tension—a very healthy tension—arising from people's attempt to wrest themselves from anachronistic systems, structures, and values; to adopt, perhaps even to create, entirely new forms. This attempt is necessary if a society is to meet the demands of the present and assure its future generation's own coming-into-being. Intelligent change will come about only from a balanced combination of the wisdom-from-experience of the past, the ingenuity and initiative of the present, and the continually unfolding possibilities of the future.

As a newly developing and rapidly changing country, it is expected of the Philippines at the moment that it should be fertile soil for all kinds of social movements, from highly ideological specific movements, youth movements, fashions, to movements of thought. The particular problems of Philippine society which seem to have everybody's attention nowadays, have long been there. It is evident, however, that it is only now that Filipinos have formed a clearer picture of the social situation, and are collectively concerned and rallying together to attempt some solution. Cantril aptly said that social movements flourish when the times are out of joint.¹

Though sociologists type social movements differently, all agree that they share the same essential characteristics and pass through more or less the same predictable stages or phases of development. A social movement is a conscious, intentional, collective effort of people aimed at promoting or resisting change in society at large. Each social movement arises in a particular social context; each has its characteristic followers; each, its special appeals. The nature and course of development of social movements in any given society reflect the "mood" and the collective desires of the members of that society.

Not all social movements progress in the same way. Some begin quietly and grow steadily into large and enduring institutions. Others originate from a wave of collective excitement and enthusiasm and run through a course of settling down to conventionality and, in some cases, even to corruption and disintegration. The life span of any social movement is

¹ Hadley Cantril, *Psychology of Social Movements* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1948), p. vii.

directly proportional to the extent to which it meets the urgently felt needs of the people among whom it has arisen. A great deal likewise depends on the leaders of a social movement. Depending on how they are able to manipulate certain mechanisms, namely, agitation, development, and maintenance of *esprit de corps* and morale, formation and sustained clarity of ideology, and the continual adjustment of operating tactics to the growing and changing needs of the group, a social movement will either grow into an institution or just slowly disappear.

The title of this article is the concluding sentence of an exploratory study made of the Cursillo Movement two years ago.² The study was mainly exploratory and descriptive in nature, aimed at gaining familiarity with a social phenomenon in the Philippines, which had, particularly during the progress of the study (1969-1970), spread out so rapidly and stimulated reactions both favorable and adverse. Tracing the origin, history, nature, objective, and structure of the Cursillo, the study set itself the task of finding out whether or not the Cursillo had the essential characteristics of a social movement. More specific hypotheses about the subject could not be formulated for lack of adequate research data. The study answered fundamental questions about the Movement upon which later studies could be based. The particular focus of the study was the women's Cursillo of the Archdiocese of Manila during its first three years.

To answer the question posed by the above-mentioned study scientifically requires a formal, in-depth research on the third and most important stage of the Cursillo Movement, namely, the post-Cursillo stage or, in Cursillo parlance, the "Fourth Day." The writer has not had the opportunity to do such research, but two years after the first study the question is once again reiterated as an invitation both to students of social movements, and perhaps to Cursillo leaders as well, to reevaluate the Cursillo Movement in the context of more recent development on the Philippine social scene and in direct relationship to the stated ideals and objectives of the Movement. The following pages will simply review briefly the data already gathered in my earlier study to serve as foundation material for a better understanding of, and insight into, the Cursillo Movement in the Philippines.

THE CURSILLO MOVEMENT: A GENERAL PERSPECTIVE

"Cursillo de Cristianidad," Spanish for "Little Course in Christianity," is the original and full title of the now more popularly named "Cursillo Movement" or "Cursillo." "Cursillo" is a very common Spanish word, a diminutive of "curso," and means "a little course," that is, a course that lasts just for a few days rather than the usual six-to-nine-month course of the school calendar. The term connotes the idea of intensity, of doing a great

² Sister P. G. Bautista, r.c., "The Cursillo Movement: A Study of the Women's Cursillo of the Manila Archdiocese" (unpublished Master's thesis, Department of Sociology, University of the Philippines, 1970).

deal in a short time. Furthermore, it is a word commonly used in educational circles, e.g., language "immersion courses," seminars, workshops.

Hence, the designation "Cursillo de Cristianidad" is a short, intensive course in Christianity. More specifically, in the words of the founder, Bishop Juan Hervas:

the Cursillo is a short and intensive period of exercises that aim, and by the grace of God ordinarily succeed, in making each participant live for a few days a life of militant Christianity, while furnishing the necessary means to make that life of militant Christianity endure within each participant for the rest of his life.³

It is interesting to realize that a word as "neutral" or as "secular" as "cursillo" was purposely chosen for a religious movement which also had its origin in a thoroughly Catholic country. The reason for this seems to be the founder's desire to move away from a name that was overly "pious," for the Cursillo was born in an environment and at a time when anti-clericalism was strong; and a Christian movement with a name that had no immediate religious overtones was more likely to be accepted.

The first Cursillo was held from January 7-10, 1949 in the Monastery of San Honorato del Monte Luliano de Randa at Palma de Mallorca, an island off the coast of Spain. Behind this first Cursillo were seven years of what the founder calls "remote preparation: a great collection of ideas and facts, personal experiences and the experiences of others." The Cursillo, in the form that we know it now, is the culmination, so to say, of many years of study and research, diligent effort, and collaboration of a specially selected team of young priests in Rome and laymen, under the direction of their Bishop, Juan Hervas.

The Cursillos actually began with the youth—the Spanish youth who were members and leaders mostly of "Juventud de Accion Catolica," the Catholic Action group of the diocese of Mallorca. Over a period of several years there were series of spiritual exercises for those going to the world-famous pilgrimage center, Santiago de Compostela, the sepulchre of the apostle, St. James the Greater, in the province of La Coruna in Northwest Spain. In time these "Cursillos of Advanced Pilgrims" gave way to an improved approach to the apostolate for the same youth which were named "Cursillos of Pilgrimage Leaders." From these earlier Cursillos there sprang something new which, incubating over a lengthy period of time, studied minutely, and experimented with in "Apertivos de Cursillo," finally germinated into today's Cursillos in Christianity.

The Cursillo is an international Catholic religious movement, the immediate aim of which is the revivification and intensification of the Christian life of individuals and, through them it is hoped, ultimately that of the larger community. The term "Christian life" may be defined as a per-

³ Bishop Juan Hervas, *Cursillos in Christianity: Instrument of Christian Renewal* (2nd ed.; Arizona: Ultraya Publications, 1967), p. 57.

sonal closeness to God, expressed outwardly by specific gestures of worship and devotion and, quite importantly, by concrete acts of service to, and good influence over, one's fellowmen.

Bishop Mariano G. Gaviola, Secretary-General of the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines and Director of the National Secretariat of the Cursillo of the Philippines, defined the Cursillo as

an instrument of Christian renewal; a civic-religious movement instituted for the renewal of the parish, and through the parishes, the renewal of the diocese, and indeed for the entire people of God It is not an organization but a center of formation, a school which lasts three days in formal classes and a subsequent in-training of their apostolate throughout their lives.⁴

Before proceeding with the study of the Movement's organizational structure one may ask, what were the determining influences on the ideology of the Cursillo? Bishop Hervas cites three major influences. He says that the Cursillo was, first and foremost, begun as a response to the call of the Roman Pontiffs to build a new social order: particularly, Pope Pius X's "restoring all things in Christ" and Pope Pius XII's "toward a better world." Secondly, the Movement was born in the hope of furthering the purpose of Catholic Action, which is "to make religion a thing for grown-ups, living and practical." Lastly, he gives definite credit to the inspiration that the Cursillo takes from the "Spiritual Exercises" of St. Ignatius of Loyola, the founder of the Jesuit Fathers. Apropos of the latter, however, the Bishop explicitly points out that the Cursillo is not a mere adaptation of the Exercises, nor should the two be compared. He states, "It is simply a matter of two different methods that offer their own doctrinal core, with their own particular arrangement of material and with adequate rules for the immediate objective."

The ordinary understanding of "cursillo" actually refers only to the three-day course that a cursillista undergoes. As a whole, the Movement can be really said to consist of three distinct stages of which the three-day course is only one.

The first stage consists of a plan which the bishop draws up with his assistants for his whole diocese and for each parish in the diocese. It is a preliminary plan wherein are outlined the objectives, division of labor, and responsibilities of the apostolate of the laymen and priests together. This is the pre-Cursillo stage.

The second stage, which may be called the Cursillo proper, refers to the three-day course that takes place in a Cursillo House. These are three days of intensive study, prayer, and "Christian community living" conducted by a team of laymen and priests.

The third stage, or the post-Cursillo, also known as the "Fourth Day," denotes the rest of the cursillista's lifetime after his Cursillo. It is in this

⁴ Rebecca E. Jimeno, "60,000 Strong in the Cursillos," *Weekly Nation*, October 2, 1967, p. 12.

stage where the efforts of Cursillo leaders in perfecting organization and technique are centered, because they realize that within this stage lie the continuance and future of the Movement.

The organizational structure of the Cursillo is diocesan, that is, every diocese (district governed by a bishop, consisting of several parishes) has its own Cursillo. Referred to as the Diocesan Secretariat,⁵ it is made up of a group of chosen priests and their lay collaborators, under the final direction of their bishop. Technically, the Cursillo is an organization of laymen in the given diocese. As a body in the Secretariat, the clergy and laity have the joint and full responsibility of promoting, directing, and regulating the entire work. However, it is not a "Mandated Organization," unlike the SCA, Catholic Charities, etc.

The team of priests appointed by the bishop, is responsible for the formative and doctrinal guidance of the Cursillo. The team of laymen, also appointed by the bishop, carries on the executive management of the Movement, taking charge of its organization and operation in accordance with the approved rules and regulations. Both teams are divided into departments for the purpose of making each one especially responsible for specific activities.

The Diocesan Secretariat, "the brain directing the organization," was in sole operation when the idea of a National Secretariat was conceived. The latter has no jurisdictional functions over the various diocesan secretariats of the country, which actually are wholly autonomous in conducting their own diocesan Cursillo Movement.

The manuals of Bishop Hervas repeatedly emphasize the idea that the Cursillo Movement is not an association of persons with special rituals and activities, but rather an "organized movement." By this he means that all cursillistas, after their three-day course, are to go their individual way in their mission of christianizing their particular milieu; and whatever formal organization and structure the Movement presents to the public are limited to its leaders whose task is to help the individual cursillista attain his Cursillo ideals. It may be truly said that even in the post-Cursillo "group-activities," like the weekly "ultreya" and "group reunions," it is aimed at further informing the individual member doctrinally and forming him spiritually.

From the aforesaid nature of the Movement, the nature and ends of the National Secretariat follow. An afterthought of Cursillo leaders, the Secretariat's functions are outlined only in Bishop Hervas' third book.⁶ It is created by and directly dependent only on the particular country's Conference of Bishops (i.e., the national body of the episcopate); it is autonomous of all other national lay organizations. Its task is to direct the

⁵ Bishop Juan Hervas, *Leaders' Manual for Cursillos in Christianity* (Arizona: Ultreya Publications, 1967), pp. 299-314.

⁶ Bishop Juan Hervas, *Questions and Problems Concerning the Cursillo* (Arizona: Ultreya Publications, 1967), pp. 180-86.

Cursillo Movement on the national level and represent it on the international level. It is composed of a director, a secretary, a treasurer, and a few subordinate staff members "demanded by its nature and ends." The National Secretariat is not the governing body but merely a "guardian" and a "clearing house," a coordinator of services for all the diocesan secretariats, a source of information, and an official promoter of the Movement on the national level.

Although charted as being directly under the Chairman, the Leaders' School is a structure apart within the Cursillo Movement. It is an eight-month course wherein Cursillo leaders are trained technically and formed spiritually. The School meets for two hours once a week. A priest appointed by the bishop and usually the Counsellor-Director of the Diocesan Secretariat, aided by other priests, directs the School. These priests handle the doctrinal aspect of the course. The co-director of the School is a layman. He and a team of other veteran Cursillo leaders give the technical training to the future rectors and *rollistas* (lecturers) of Cursillos. The student-members of the School are all volunteers rigorously screened by the Diocesan Secretariat. The subjects studied in the Leaders' School aim at a mastery of Catholic doctrine and a thorough knowledge of the Cursillo Movement itself.

The goal of the Cursillo Movement is essentially to discover, to further form, and, hopefully, eventually to make use of real "Christian leaders." While it is true that the doctrinal content and life program of the Movement is for every Christian, the organizational objective of the Cursillo goes beyond simple dissemination of Christian doctrine and ideals. Therefore, men of maturity and of leadership potential are those that the Cursillo wishes to tap. It is in this regard that the leaders of the Movement stress that the Cursillo is "not a reformatory" but first and foremost a training ground for promising and willing leaders of the Christian community. It is required that the candidates be generally in good moral standing.

Each parish in the diocese is assigned a quota of candidates for every Cursillo that is held. Thus, at every new Cursillo class, all or nearly all the parishes of the diocese are represented. The respective pastors of the diocese parishes who, it is assumed, know the moral fibre and qualifications of their parishioners, are entrusted with the task of recruiting and recommending worthy candidates for Cursillo training. Ideally, too, the pastor, or at least one of his assistants, is to have made the Cursillo first, before encouraging his parish members. This is not always the case. In fact, there are many pastors who have none or little to do with the Cursillo and the cursillistas in their parish.

In the course of time, it is those laymen who have made the Cursillo who sponsor other candidates. The sponsor is responsible for seeing his candidates through the screening process before they are admitted to

the three-day Cursillo course. No candidate is to be admitted without his pastor's signed recommendation bearing the official seal of the parish.

Cursillo-proper consists of four nights and three days, a blend of spiritual exercises, lectures or "rollos" by a team of laymen and priests, and tension-releasing activities, like singing, games, or joke sessions. It is perhaps the very intensity of such serious activities as prayer and study that justifies and logically explains the balancing side of the Cursillo days, namely, the atmosphere of gaiety and laughter and song that is so consciously and faithfully generated by the conducting staff.

The main spiritual exercises of a three-day Cursillo include daily Mass, common prayers, visits to the Blessed Sacrament, and climactic events, like the "confrontation" and the solemn closing ceremonies or "clausura." There are fifteen "rollos" in all: five are doctrinal and therefore given by priests, and ten are given by various laymen.

In the post-Cursillo stage, the new cursillista is expected to regularly and perseveringly attend the "ultreya" or weekly meeting. The Spanish word "ultreya" is derived from "ultra," meaning "beyond." The medieval pilgrims to Compostela (Campo de la Estrella, or Field of the Stars), on the arduous journey in the bitter cold of winter, used the enthusiastic cry, "Ultreya!" ("On to the end!"), to encourage one another to continue their long pilgrimage. So the Cursillo leaders adopted the cry of courage, aspiration, and perseverance of the will to epitomize the firm resolve to make the Cursillo a lifelong commitment.

The aim of the ultreya is continued and systematic formation and the stimulation of zeal and fervor among the Cursillo graduates. It is also meant to foster the spirit of unity and brotherhood first learned and experienced in the Cursillo house. The weekly ultreya lasts only an hour and is held in the parish's ultreya center.

To maintain fidelity in keeping the promises made by the cursillista in his "service sheet" at the end of his Cursillo, to encourage others in the group, and to check up on the slackers, there is also the post-Cursillo "group reunion" or the "team reunion." This is a ten-to-fifteen-minute prayer-meeting of a small group of cursillistas, ranging from about three to six persons. It is done weekly, at their own convenience, at a time and place of their choice, decided usually during the ultreya meeting.

Annually, each particular "class" (a three-day Cursillo group) has a general reunion. This is to keep the cursillistas in contact with their original source of "happy Christian community living." The post-Cursillo or "fourth day" is really where collective efforts at perseverance and sustenance of *esprit de corps* become important and necessary.

THE WOMEN'S CURSILLO: AN ADAPTATION FROM THE MEN'S CURSILLO

The Cursillo was not originally intended for women but was designed for young men and only eventually for mature men. In 1957, however, the first experiments with women's Cursillos took place in Mallorca, more

specifically for the wives and girlfriends of the men attending the Cursillos, "to fill the gap in spirituality and outlook which created difficulties in the heart of the home."

Speaking of the women's Cursillo, Bishop Hervas says, "Their origin marks their destiny." He stresses that this background of the women's Cursillos was taken into account in determining their immediate objective and their post-Cursillo objectives. Hence are detailedly outlined the criteria and rules for the adaptation of the men's Cursillo to the women's Cursillo.⁷

The objective of the women's Cursillo is not so much to make of the woman-cursillista a zealous leader outside the home, as it is to form her into an exemplary wife and mother—a real woman. This is emphasized in the rollos or lectures during the Cursillo for women. The main apostolate of the woman-cursillista is her own household; she is to play a complementary role in relation to her husband. Only after she has made her influence felt in her own home may she try to extend it to the larger community. The women's Cursillo is exactly the same as the men's Cursillo except for modifications necessary to suit the particular psychology and pedagogy applicable to women.

The Cursillo Movement remains primarily a men's movement and great care is exercised to keep it a men's movement. That is why, in the acceptance of women candidates, it is required that the husband shall have first completed the Cursillo. Furthermore, in the scheduling of Cursillos in a diocese, it is also so arranged that women's Cursillos are less frequent than the men's.

From the diocese of Mallorca in 1949 the Cursillo spread to every diocese of Spain and to other parts of the world. It was introduced in the United States in May, 1957 and the first English Cursillo was given in November, 1961 in San Angelo, Texas.

During the 1962 sessions of the Second Vatican Council in Rome, at which Catholic bishops throughout the world were present, four Filipino bishops who were there were invited by the Cursillo founder Bishop Hervas, to come to Ciudad Real. They were Archbishop Lino Gonzaga of Zamboanga; Bishop Epifanio Surban of Dumaguete; Bishop Alejandro Olalia of Lipa; and Bishop Cipriano Urgel of Calbayog. The first two observed the women's Cursillo while the latter two observed the men's Cursillo.

After this, Archbishop (now Cardinal) Julio Rosales of Cebu invited two American laymen from Stockton, California to form the first Cursillo team in the Philippines. Thus, early in February of 1963, the first men's Cursillo opened in Cebu, under the leadership of Mr. John Markey and Mr. Jack McFarland.⁸ From there it spread quickly to other dioceses. Thus, the flame of the Cursillo Movement was ignited in the very place where, four

⁷ Hervas, *Leaders' Manual for Cursillos in Christianity*, op. cit., pp. 317-24.

⁸ Gloria Sales Martinez, "A Strange and Awesome Christian Movement," *Weekly Graphic*, December 15, 1965, p. 137.

centuries ago, the seed of Christianity was planted in the Philippines by the Spanish missionaries. At present, almost all twenty dioceses and eight archdioceses in the country have each a Cursillo House for men and another for women. About four of them have more than one.

The women's Cursillo was brought to the Philippines by Mrs. Aurora Aquino and Mrs. Rafaela Vera, who stayed a year in Spain to study the Movement firsthand.⁹ In November, 1964 they organized the women's Cursillo in Ciudad Real and, returning to the Philippines, they conducted the first women's Cursillo in Sorsogon in August, 1965. The following month they conducted another women's Cursillo in Cebu and from these first beginnings, the women's Cursillo Movement spread out to other dioceses of the country. Now there is a women's Cursillo House, as well as a men's Cursillo House, in almost every diocese.

Five months after the first women's Cursillo in Sorsogon was organized, the Movement was introduced in the archdiocese of Manila. The first women's Cursillo in the archdiocese was held at the Betania Retreat House in Quezon City in January, 1966.

THE WOMEN'S CURSILLO OF THE MANILA ARCHDIOCESE

As earlier mentioned, the data for this paper is based on a study made two years ago of the Cursillo Movement, the special focus of which was the women's Cursillo in the archdiocese of Manila, over a period of three years from its beginning in January, 1966 through December, 1968. The principal source of information was the records file at the Office of the Cursillo at the Pius XII Catholic Center in Manila. From 1966 to 1968, 78 Cursillo classes were held which graduated a total of 3,597 participants. Data was collected from a 10% stratified random sample of these women-cursillistas' application forms. A 50% sub-sample was taken, to whom were mailed questionnaires. The three-page questionnaire consisted of 12 questions. Eleven of these were open-ended questions, and one was subdivided into nine close-ended questions answerable by multiple choice. The questionnaire was meant to elicit replies not covered by the application forms. It was geared toward finding out some of the activities of women-cursillistas in the archdiocese of Manila after finishing the Cursillo. It was also meant to gain some insight into their attitude toward, and evaluation of, the Movement and fellow-cursillistas.

In the first three years of the women's Cursillo in the archdiocese of Manila, the highest percentage of participants were middle-aged married women, coming from the upper or upper-middle classes of the Greater Manila area. They were also mostly college graduates, professionals, teachers,

⁹ Interview with Mrs. Aurora Aquino, March, 1968. In this connection, Mrs. Aquino also pointed out that no women's Cursillo is started in any diocese unless there are already a thousand men-cursillistas (in the large dioceses) or at least 500 (in the smaller dioceses).

and college instructors.¹⁰ Most of the women stated that they had joined the Cursillo on their own initiative, although a good number attributed their joining to the influence of either their husbands or friends. Personal evaluation of the Cursillo was generally favorable and the expressed desire to have others join a Cursillo was unanimous. At the same time certain "undesirable factors" in the Movement as a whole and "annoying or offensive practices" of some cursillistas were frankly admitted by a significant percentage of the respondents. Attendance at ultreyas after finishing the Cursillo was very poor; and very many did it only in the beginning and then gradually dropped off.

It is to be expected that the early followers of any movement will be drawn from the circle of people closest to the organizers, with later ones coming from other groups. The women's Cursillo in Manila was begun by women of the upper class, by all standards, so that a similar distribution of the first recruits, evident from their residential districts, occupations, professions, and educational attainments, is easily explainable. The continuing trend in the Movement now, however, is the membership's seeping down into the lower strata of society. From this can be deduced that the educational level, occupational distribution, distribution by residential districts, and other variables will also change.

Until August, 1969, when Pentecost House (as the archdiocesan Cursillo House in Antipolo, Rizal is called) was inaugurated, both men and women's Cursillos were held at various available places. It may also be pointed out that the women in this sample were those who actually attended their Cursillo in the archdiocese of Manila. There are hundreds of other cursillistas, both men and women, residing in the archdiocese but who attended their Cursillos "outside," that is, in Cursillo Houses in other dioceses, like Pampanga, Batangas, Bulacan, or Bataan. However, at present, the men's Cursillo and the women's Cursillo of Manila share Pentecost House according to schedule (one women's Cursillo to two men's Cursillos monthly; by December 2-10, 1971, the women's Cursillos should have numbered 136, which is 58 more Cursillo classes since the study was completed in 1968 and with around 2,320 more women-cursillistas added). The two groups also share a common office at the Pius XII Catholic Center in Manila.

THE CURSILLO-PROPER OR "THE" CURSILLO

A carefully recorded participant-observation of Women's Cursillo No. 46 is found in Chapter V of the thesis. This was done by the author with the realization that this is the most valuable contribution of the study, since it will give the necessary insight into what is actually just one stage of the Cursillo Movement but which is generally referred to as "the" Cursillo.

¹⁰ Appendix C of the thesis gives a more detailed tabulation of selected items from the application forms. Replies to the mailed questionnaires are likewise more completely tabulated in Appendix D.

The three-day course distinctly proves that the Cursillo (again, may we reiterate that this actually refers to the Cursillo-proper alone) is a minutely-planned and well-knit sequence of activities that presupposes specified results if properly carried out. Bishop Hervas and his colleagues purposefully made it so. A Cursillo is the synthesis of the most valid psychological, pedagogical, sociological, and ascetico-theological principles, resulting in what he calls "a precise instrument." As in all precise instruments, each part has its place; the instrument is sensitive and cannot, should not, be tampered with.

In a Cursillo every single activity in the sequence has its place and is meant to yield specific results at specified junctures in the sequence. Of course, unlike an inanimate instrument, the Cursillo mechanism involves thinking and "will-ing" human beings, and therefore allowances must be made for possible "mis-operations," so to say. Nevertheless, the fact remains that this precision-of-the-instrument is the biggest factor in the success with which a Cursillo staff is able to elicit from a Cursillo class the precise reactions called for as the course moves on from one day to the next.

It is a well-known psychological principle that the will of man can be effectively trained by implanting a complex of the highest values, systematically arranged and interlinked. Under the most favorable conditions possible, this can develop motives and cultivate daring activity. The more general and challenging the motives are, and the more they are associated with future experiences in life, the more profitable they will be. This principle is the crux of the Cursillo's operational techniques.

Other principles made to operate during a Cursillo are the very personalized approach to a new candidate, both during the Cursillo and in the pre-Cursillo stage, making the person feel important. Here is included the element of delightful play and the cultivation of a spirit of joy and camaraderie among the group. A lot depends on the skill, devotedness, and enthusiasm of a staff; the rector and the spritual director set the tone of a Cursillo.

It is important to add that a new candidate comes to a Cursillo expecting hard things (since veteran cursillista-friends have leaked out very knowing "tidbits of information"). He comes expecting and desiring a deep "religious experience," a "conversion," like the one he heard of from many of his cursillista-friends. And he is willing to pay the price, joyfully and courageously. The thought of W. I. Thomas' "self-fulfilling prophecy" suggests itself appropriately at this point.

Are the emotions exploited in a Cursillo, as is often criticized? If by that is meant the staff of rollistas and the rector doing the exploiting, the answer is negative. Cases may be singled out as proof, but ordinarily what accounts for occasional hysterias or breakdowns is the weak constitution of the candidate. This is why candidates need to be screened properly. Other abuses in this area which may be true in some places could only be attri-

buted to the wrong, or at least exaggerated, interpretations of the original intentions and directives of the Cursillo founders.

The Cursillo of three days is an intense psychological, emotional (in the normal, human sense), and spiritual experience. To face oneself squarely and "know oneself," much more, accept what one sees in oneself, is not an experience for which every person is ready. It requires sufficient emotional and psychological maturity and stability to be able to go through a Cursillo profitably. The "mechanism" of the Cursillo, as explained earlier, does make use of human emotions to advantage, which is valid. This is true even of the oft-questioned "confrontation" experience. Exploitation of the emotions, however, is far from accurate. All said, this is an area of investigation the details of which are the proper interests of psychologists, especially group dynamicists and perhaps psychiatrists.

Finally, the Cursillo is, of its nature as a religious movement, such an intricate combination of natural and supernatural elements. This may be a matter of mere personal belief, but it cannot be discounted because it is a factor that enters into any attempt at analyzing a movement like the Cursillo. The best that can be done is to say that if "grace builds on nature" and if the Cursillo harnesses the best natural means in psychology, sociology, theology, and pedagogy to accomplish its aims, whatever is not completely or even satisfactorily explained by these sciences, as far as what takes place within a person during a Cursillo is concerned, will have to be attributed to the realm of the supernatural.

THE CURSILLO AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT

The Cursillo is a social movement, bearing all the essential characteristics of one. It can best be typed as a "mixed movement," as it combines within itself certain characteristics of specific, expressive, revolutionary, religious-reform, and gain-through-community types of social movements. The Cursillo is a post-Vatican II phenomenon, a challenge to the "emerging layman" who is supposedly also an increasingly theologically discerning layman. As a responsible 20th-century layman, the modern Christian (which the Cursillo is meant to eminently help produce) is no longer content with mere pious rituals and devotions nor with a nice little private affair with God. Rather, he wants action and involvement which, he believes, put him in touch with his God as well and, therefore, faithfully "practising religion." This calls attention to the post-Cursillo phase of the Movement. How seriously do cursillistas take it and how do Cursillo leaders manage it?

True enough, as the incumbent national and Manila archdiocesan president of the Cursillo Movement wrote three years ago:

There are now some 180,000 cursillistas throughout the country. Imagine what an impact they can create in our national life, if they get united and live

their Christianity in their professions and public life.¹¹

These words embody both the ideals, the goal, and the challenge for the future of cursillistas and the Cursillo Movement. There are now more than 180,000 cursillistas; they are a very potent force to help solve our social problems in the country, including the building up of a country, a people, a whole future. The validity of the existence of a social movement and its sole guarantee for continued survival lie in the extent to which it meets the felt needs of a group. We need not look long at our Philippine society at the moment to establish priorities among these needs.

There is no doubt that the individual Christian, the individual cursillista, is trying to exert what little influence he can contribute to his social milieu, but as a group—an organization with the number and motive-power that it has within itself—the Cursillo has an awful lot to offer because of its own avowed ideals and objectives, as well as the crying needs of the society wherein the Cursillo hopes to continue to flourish.

¹¹ Carlos J. Valdes, "A 'Think-Tank' To Solve the Nation's Problems," *Action Now*, December 14, 1968, pp. 22-23.

MODERNIZATION AND THE SECULAR STATE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

ALFREDO G. PARPAN, S.J.

IN HIS PREFACE TO A VOLUME OF ESSAYS ON MODERNIZATION—HOW it occurs and how it can be accelerated—Myron Weiner frankly admits that the term “modernization,” though popularly used, is indeed an elusive one. Generally used in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to refer to the “growth of rationality and secularism and to the process by which men broke away from the constraints and tyrannical regimes as well as the constraints of superstition,” the term, Myron Weiner writes, is often used today simply as “another word for economic growth or as a mere palatable synonym for still another elusive concept, ‘Westernization.’”¹

MODERNIZATION

One, of course, could and should always strive for a working distinction, however simplistic, between *modernization* and *Westernization*. The latter is basically a geographical concept; the former can be understood as a sociological process of change, e.g. “the process by which a society replaces institutions, ideas and practices that it regards as no longer appropriate.”² Be that as it may, no two terms perhaps are more susceptible to confusion, since modernization, it would seem, is the inevitable concomitant of *Westernization*. A case in point, this study would argue, is the phenomenon of the “secular state”³—a concept Western in origin and derived from the liberal democratic tradition of the West, and in Southeast Asia the very visible manifestation of what is popularly termed “modernization.”

This is a rather strange fact if one considers that secularism in the political sphere divorces religion from politics and hence its offshot, the “sec-

¹ Myron Weiner (ed.), *Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth* (U.S.A.: Voice of America Forum Lectures, 1966), p. i (Preface). He adds: “Because the term is so loosely used, it is tempting to drop it entirely and to speak more precisely of changes occurring in individual attitudes, in social behaviours, in economics and politics. But scholars persist in using the term not only because it is a part of popular speech, but also because they recognize that these many changes are related to one another—that many countries in the developing world are today experiencing a comprehensive process of change which Europe and America once experienced and which is more than the sum of many small changes.”

² Cf. Knight Biggerstaff, “Modernization and Early Modern China,” *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXV, No. 4 (August, 1966), 609. The writer cites in his article the criteria of modernization which were developed at a meeting of scholars in Hakone, Japan, in 1960.

³ This study adopts for its own the working definition of the secular state as proposed by Donald Eugene Smith in his book, *India as a Secular State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 3-8.

ular state," could hardly be expected to thrive in a region where the interaction of religion and politics has been most manifest: Southeast Asia. Religion in this part of the world, observes Lucien Pye, "is unquestionably the strongest cohesive force" and is "the basic ingredient in the sense of national identity in many of the Southeast Asian societies."⁴ Thus it is not surprising to find constitutional references to religion in almost all the charters of the various Southeast Asian nation-states. Constitution-wise, religion is accorded a special role in the predominantly Buddhist countries of Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and even in the not quite predominantly Muslim state of Malaysia.⁵

Thus the charter of the Union of Burma declares: "Buddhism being the religion professed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union shall be the State religion" (Chapter II, #20) and that being such the Union Government shall "promote and maintain Buddhism for its welfare and advancement" (#21 A).⁶ Cambodia expressly states, "Buddhism is the religion of the State" (Title II, Art. 8) and so does Laos: "Buddhism shall be the established religion. The king shall be its high protector" (Sec. I, Art. 7). The newly-promulgated Thai constitution of June 20, 1968 asserts: "The King is Buddhist and the Defender of the Faith" (Division 2, section 6) while below the border, Malaysia declares: "Islam is the religion of the Federation" (Part 1, 3, #1). And for her part, the city-state of Singapore avows her responsibility "constantly to care for the interests of the racial and religious minorities . . ." (Part II, 89, # 1).

THE SECULAR STATE

In Southeast Asia, it would seem, the odds are stacked against the concept and practice of the secular state. For the secular state, to follow the working definition of Donald Eugene Smith, is "a state which guarantees individual and corporate freedom of religion, deals with the individual as a citizen irrespective of his religion, *is not constitutionally connected to a particular religion nor does it seek to promote or interfere with religion* (underscoring supplied)."⁷ Judged against the strict criteria of such a secular

⁴ Lucien W. Pye, *Southeast Asia's Political Systems* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 36. But one should not forget that religion likewise has been both a "binding and dividing force in the evolution of Asian nationalism." Cf. K.M.A. Kennedy, *Asian Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), pp. 95-99. The emergence of present-day India and Pakistan is the classic proof for such a fact.

⁵ Cf. Amos J. Peasles, *Asia, Australia, Oceania*, Vol. II of *Constitution of Nations* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), for all pertinent constitutional references, with the exception of the Thai charter.

⁶ The coup government of General Ne Win neither repealed nor suspended the Constitution; technically it would appear still to exist, but in practice it operates only in those areas where the new government has not taken specific actions. And for all practical purposes, Ne Win's Burma is a secular state.

⁷ Smith, *loc. cit.*

state, the aforementioned countries with their favored-religion clauses have already disqualified themselves.

But this would be a premature judgment. For, *de facto*, every South-east Asian country in practice adheres (or vows to adhere in its charter) to the other criteria of a secular state, i.e., it "guarantees individual and corporate freedom of religion. It deals with the individual as a citizen irrespective of his religion."⁸

A CHARTER SURVEY

And thus the Burmese charter enumerates among the fundamental rights (Chapter II): "#13—All citizens irrespective of birth, religion, sex or race are equal before the law; that is to say, there shall be no discrimination between one citizen or class of citizens and another." "#20—All persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess and practice religion subject to public order, morality or health and to the other provisions of this Charter." Cambodia declares likewise in the article quoted previously (Title II, Art. 8): "Freedom of conscience shall be absolute. Freedom of religion is similarly guaranteed subject only to such restrictions as are necessary so that public order may not be disturbed."

Indonesia is explicit (Chapter XI, Art. 29, #2): "The State shall guarantee freedom to every resident to adhere to his respective religion and to perform his religious duties in conformity with that religion and that faith." Laos in its preamble implicitly affirms the same sentiments: "This Constitution recognizes as fundamental principles the rights of the people of Laos, especially their equality before the law, the legal protection of their means of life, their freedom of conscience and other democratic liberties as defined by law." Despite the official profession of Islam as the State religion, Malaysia gives a saving clause: "but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation." The Philippines is quite explicit (Article 3, #7): "No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights."

The Thai charter in Division III (the Right and Freedom of the Thais) states: "#24—Every person, regardless of race or religion, is equally protected by the Constitution" and "#26—Every person has complete freedom of practising his religion and his religious duties according to his faith as long as they are not contrary to his civil duties."⁹ North Vietnam is likewise explicit (Chapter III, Art. 26): "Citizens of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam enjoy freedom of religious belief; they may practice or not practice a religion." No explicit mention is made in the charter of

⁸ *Ibid.* This would constitute the most basic of all the criteria.

⁹ Translated from the Thai original by Ruangvos Kalvichitr, a Thai student at the Loyola House of Studies.

South Vietnam but the fact of religious freedom is well-known and implicitly safeguarded in such a declaration: "The Republic of Vietnam accepts and respects the principles of international law, subject to the reservation that these principles do not conflict with national sovereignty and the present struggle of the nation."

It is well to remember, moreover, that all the Southeast Asian countries, with the exception of the two Vietnams, are duly accredited members of the United Nations and as such adhere to the U.N. Charter avowing among others, its purpose of "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. . . ."¹⁰ And it is well to remember likewise that the two Vietnams are in full accord with the spirit of this charter; their applications for U.N. membership have been pending since 1951. But the clearest and most marked indication of the secularist triumph over historical religious traditions in the political system of a country is seen in an overwhelmingly Christian (93%) Philippines and an overwhelmingly Muslim (90%) Indonesia. The secular state that emerged in the Philippines repudiates a tradition of some three hundred years or so of Church-State union under the Spanish regime; and that in Indonesia, the rejection of an official Islamic State in the tradition of neighboring Malaysia and Pakistan.¹¹

Not every Southeast Asian nation can pass the strict criteria of a secular state proposed in this study, but it is clearly no overstatement to conclude that in this area of the world the drift of political institutions is toward the realization of the "secular state." And the secular state as such, this study contends, is the inevitable and concomitant feature of modernization, the "process by which a society replaces institutions, ideas and practices that it regards as no longer appropriate,"¹² thus in the Philippines the rejection of the Spanish-fostered Church-State union provided for by the Malolos Constitution of 1899 and further confirmed by the Commonwealth Constitution of 1935.¹³

¹⁰ Cf. Appendix C, Charter of the United Nations, in Diosdado Macapagal's *The Philippines Turns East* (Quezon City: Mac Publishing House, 1966), pp. 284-309.

¹¹ For the comparative statistics of the religious and ethnic composition of SEA countries, cf. Lucien Pye's chart, *op. cit.*, p. 37. For pertinent studies on the Philippines and Indonesia, cf. Cesar Adib Majul, *The Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Philippine Revolution* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1967) and Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun* (The Hague and Bandung: W. Hoeve, Ltd., 1958). For introductory studies on the various SEA countries referred to in this study, cf. George McTurnan Kahin (ed.), *Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia* (2d ed.; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966).

¹² Biggerstaff, *loc. cit.*

¹³ The Malolos Constitution expressly declared: "The State recognizes the freedom and equality of religious worships, as well as the separation of the Church and the State" (Title III, Article 5). And the Commonwealth Constitution (which serves for the present-day Republic as well): "No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and no religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights" (Article III, Section 7). Cf. Appendices 2 and 4, Vicente Albano Pacis, *Philippine Government and Politics* (Quezon City: Alemar & Phoenix, 1967).

What remains therefore is to ask why this is so. The Malolos Congress debates on the "religious question" (whether or not Catholicism was to be the State religion as proposed by Calderon) brought to the fore the fact that the Filipinos as a people, though up in arms against Catholic Spain, were not anti-Catholic but merely anti-clerical. But one of the basic contentions of those who argued against a state religion was that the unity of Church and State in the Philippines, in all the years of the Spanish Occupation, did not further the progress of the Philippines but on the contrary hindered it.¹⁴ Whether or not religion itself was the primary cause (the Catholic religion in this case) or the involvement of religion—institutionalized religion—with politics was the impediment to progress, could of course be debated.

RELIGION AND MODERNIZATION

The rationale may be gleaned in part from the following observation of Gunnar Myrdal on the role of religion and development in this part of the globe.

Religion is, of course, crucial, but not the interpretation of old scriptures and the lofty philosophies and theologies developed over centuries of speculation. It is, indeed, amazing how much Western, as well as South Asian, writers think they are saying about the peoples in the region when they refer loosely to the impact of Hinduism, Buddhism or Islam, which they think of as general concepts and often as intellectualized and abstruse. Religion should be studied for what it really is: a ritualized and stratified complex of highly emotional beliefs and valuations that give that sanction of sacredness, taboo and immutability to inherited institutional arrangements, modes of living, and attitudes.¹⁵

Understood in this realistic and comprehensive sense, Myrdal continues, religion acts as a tremendous force for social inertia:

. . . The writer knows of no instance in present-day South Asia where religion has induced social change. Least of all does it foster realization of the modernization ideals—though, of course, appeals to religious principles on the "higher" level can be used for, as well as against, those ideals, while cruder religious conceptions can be exploited to incite people to resistance or to demonstrations, riots, and lynchings. From a planning point of view, this inertia related to religion, like other obstacles, must be overcome by policies for inducing changes, formulated in a plan for development. But the religiously sanctioned beliefs and valuations not only act as obstacles among the people to getting the plan accepted and effectuated but also as inhibitions in the planners themselves insofar as they share them, or are afraid to counteract them.¹⁶

THE BURMESE CASE-STUDY

It would certainly be quite interesting and profitable to make comparative case studies of the secular state as it currently exists in such professedly

¹⁴ Cf. Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1960), pp. 297-306, and Majul, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-59.

¹⁵ Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, Vol. I (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968), p. 103.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 103-104.

“secular states” as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Burma where indeed the interaction between religion and politics has been most markedly manifest. This study will limit its attention to Buddhist Burma where the transition into a “secular state” has been most recent and highly dramatic. As Donald Eugene Smith observes:

The case of Burma provides illustrations of a wide spectrum of religio-political phenomenon: the breakdown of an effective Buddhist ecclesiastical hierarchy under the impact of foreign rule, the role of religion in Burmese nationalism, the interaction of Buddhism and modern political ideologies, the uses of religion in democratic politics, the political role of the Buddhist monks, the unique leadership of a politician in promoting religious revival, and the contrasting role of a military regime. Burma has indeed passed through a remarkable cycle: from General Aung San’s secular state (1948) to Premier Nu’s religion (1961), and back to a secularistic orientation following General Ne Win’s coup (1962).¹⁷

It would seem that Burma as a case-study readily confirms and substantiates Gunnar Myrdal’s candid observations on the role of religion as a “tremendous force for social inertia” that must somehow “be overcome by policies for inducing changes, formulated in a plan for development.”¹⁸ For again, to quote the eminent Swedish observer of the Asian scene:

Even Islam and Buddhism, which at the rarefied “higher level” are so rational and free from iconism and magic, have, in the forms in which they actually influence life and social relations, become demonological and permeated by taboos, magic and mysticism. In particular, social and economic stratification is accorded the sanction of religion. The attitudes, institutions, and modes of living and working that make up and are reflected in this stratification do constitute very real inhibitions and obstacles to planning and the execution of plans.

Such observations became demonstrably vivid in U Nu’s Burma.

During his inaugural address at the AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League) convention of January, 1946, Thakin Aung San had openly declared: “We must draw a clear line between politics and religion, because the two are not one and the same thing. If we mix religion with politics, then we offend the spirit of religion itself.” And while conceding that Buddhism could become the “greatest philosophy in the world” if its ritual could be eliminated, he had gone on to condemn the exploitation, injustice, superstition, and priestcraft frequently associated with religion. But the Aung San secularist-nationalist tradition that had outshone the earliest nationalist-religious U Ottama-Saya San tradition and was dominant in 1948 when independence was achieved, was virtually relegated to the

¹⁷ Donald Eugene Smith, *Religion and Politics in Burma* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. vii.

¹⁸ Myrdal, *loc. cit.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

²⁰ Smith, *Burma, op. cit.*, p. 158.

background with Aung San's assassination in 1947 and the subsequent ascendancy of U Nu.²¹

For U Nu, unlike his secularist confrere Aung San, was a deeply religious man; and on the eve of independence he would give public expression to his "profoundly religious approach to the responsibilities of political power" by stating: "I have just returned from my religious observance at the Myathabeik Pagoda Hill. I made a solemn prayer while I was there that if by any chance I misuse my powers as premier for my personal gain in any respect, may I go headfirst to the lowest hell of Maha Avici."²² And U Nu's religiosity would only deepen with the experience of public life.

Subsequent activities confirmed the strength and authenticity of U Nu's piety. Writes Smith:

By July, 1948 the country appeared to be disintegrating under the pressure of the insurrections. To counter this threat, the prime minister knelt before an image of the Lord Buddha, and although a married man, made a solemn vow that he would lead a life of celibacy from that day until death, and prayed by virtue of this vow the menace of the insurgents would disappear. According to his testimony at a press conference reported in the October 26, 1958 issue of the *New Times of Burma*, he had never committed a breach of that vow. Stepping down from the premiership in October, 1958, U Nu divested himself from all personal possessions (these were later sold at auction and the proceeds used for charity), renounced the secular world, put on the yellow robes of the monk and spent a week in the monastery. Nu has become a monk seven times in his life, including a six-week period shortly before the 1960 election campaign. Held in "protective custody" after the coup of March, 1962, it was natural for U Nu to request a Buddha image, which was provided by the army authorities (*Guardian*, March 7, 1962).²³

Not surprisingly, the Burmese Government, under U Nu's initiative and encouragement, became increasingly involved in religious affairs. The reasons frequently given were that: (1) The promotion of Buddhism has traditionally been one of the chief functions of government in Burma; (2) The Government must encourage the revival of Buddhism because of its decline during the sixty years of foreign rule; (3) The Government's promotion of religion will help to end lawlessness and disorder in the country and strengthen the nation's moral fibre; (4) The Government has a positive duty to promote the people's welfare in future existence as well as in this life; (5) The revival of Buddhism is the most effective way to counteract Communist ideology.²⁴

The Buddhist revival movement was to give birth to the Buddha Sasana Council in 1950, a separate body not directly responsible to the

²¹ For further studies on Burma, cf. John F. Cady, *A History of Modern Burma* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958); Maurice Collins, *First and Last in Burma* (London: Faber & Faber, 1956); Frank N. Trager, *Burma: From Kingdom to Republic* (New York: Praeger, 1966).

²² Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

government, which could devote itself exclusively to the promotion and propagation of the *Dhamma*. U Nu's government sponsored the Sixth Great Buddhist Council held at Rangoon in May, 1954, an event considered by observers the most dramatic evidence of the government's determination to Theravada Buddhism in Burma and in the world.²⁵ There was a marked official government involvement in varied religious ceremonies, the building of pagodas and public veneration of relics, the sponsoring of spirit worship (actually a pre-Buddhist religious practice). And in November, 1961, some 60,000 sand pagodas were ordered simultaneously built "to avert impending dangers and to achieve complete peace and tranquility in the Union."²⁶ Through its educational system, the government stepped up its promotion of Buddhism by the use of Buddhist monasteries as state primary schools and the instruction of Buddhism in state schools and universities.

Commenting on the over-all results of the government's promotion of Buddhism, Smith writes: "The cost of the government's religious involvement has been high in terms of: the unintentional encouragement of intolerant communalistic forces which are disruptive of national unity, the increased political power of the *Sangha*, the promotion of non-rational religious practices at the expense of scientific progress, and the general lack of serious interest in economic development."²⁷ Smith's appraisal is especially telling in the light of Gunnar Myrdal's observation that "religion acts as a tremendous force for social inertia."

One recalls that Burma began its independent-state existence as a "secular state" with a strongly Marxist government. It adopted a constitution which struck a compromise between secularism and an official religion, when it stated in Section 21: (1) The State recognizes the special position of Buddhism as the faith professed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union; (2) The State also recognizes Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Animism as some of the religions existing in the Union at the date of the coming into operation of the Constitution. But by August, 1961, Burma was constitutionally committed to the promotion of Buddhism as the state religion by the promulgation of the Third Amendment which described in precise Pali terminology the scope of the government's new responsibilities in the field of religion. "Buddhism being the state religion of the Union, the Union Government shall:

- (a) promote and maintain Buddhism for its welfare and advancement in its three aspects, namely *pariyatti sasana* (study of the teaching of the Buddha), *patipatti sasana* (practice of the Teachings), and *pativedha sasana* (enlightenment);

²⁵ Theravada Buddhists accept the historicity and validity of five previous Councils: the first three in India, the fourth in Ceylon, and the fifth in Burma. During the Fifth Great Council convened in Mandalay by King Mindon in 1871, the Tripitaka texts were inscribed in 729 marble slabs. Cf. Smith, *ibid.*, p. 157, also pp. 3-37 (Chapter I: *Buddhism and the State in Old Burma*).

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

- (b) honor the *Tiratana*, namely, the Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha;
- (c) protect the said religion in its three aspects and the *Tiratana* from all dangers including insult and false representation, made by words either spoken or written, or by other means.

The State Religion Promotion Bill provided moreover that: Buddhist scripture would be taught to Buddhist students in all state schools; government servants were to be granted leave to take examinations in Buddhist scriptures conducted by the Buddha Sasana Council or other state agencies; on Buddhist Sabbath days the state broadcasting system would be closed, and no liquor would be sold or served in any shop, restaurant, or public place in a hotel; Buddhist scripture classes would be opened in prisons, and all state public libraries would be provided with a complete set of the Tripitaka Pali texts and commentaries.²⁸

U Nu's religiosity, it seemed, caused his own downfall. The Third Amendment caused resentment among the non-Buddhist Burmese sectors and the Fourth Amendment (seeking to safeguard the religious minorities) provoked similar resentment from the Buddhists. Thus "religious factors were of considerable significance in the deteriorating situation which according to the military, necessitated the take-over."²⁹ After General Ne Win's coup of March 2, 1962, and the formation of a government by the Revolutionary Council, official policy regarding religion came full circle. Aung San's vision of Burma as a secular state was a reality again. No one religion would be overemphasized at the expense of another.

The coup was widely interpreted as "a repudiation of U Nu's revivalism and medievalism in favor of a modern scientific approach to Burma's problems" and, in the light of this study's topic, a "coup for modernization" and all the modernizing goals Burma had in mind. Articulate public reaction to General Ne Win's coup was favorable. A reader wrote in the *Guardian* issue of March 16, 1962: "Whatever be the causes of the coup d'etat in Burma, with the establishment of a military government, an era of giving effect to her administration by telling metamorphical stories and ostentatious display of piety and worship of *nats* (spirits) has at last come to an end."³⁰ Four days after the coup, the old practice of Sunday and half-Saturday holidays was restored and the ban of liquor on Buddhist Sabbath days was lifted; a week later, the ban on cow slaughter was repealed; six weeks later, the Buddhist Sasana Council was abolished.

In its first policy declaration entitled *The Burmese Way to Socialism*, published less than two months after the military take-over, the Revolutionary Council recognized the right of everyone freely to profess and practice his religion. In another section, however, dealing with the orientation of the people's views as a necessary part of the program for transition to socialism,

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 281. For more on U Nu's successor, cf. Jesus V. Merritt, *Free Asia and Its Leaders* (Quezon City: Phoenix, 1965), pp. 4-10.

³⁰ Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-83.

it was asserted that attempts would be made to do away with "bogus acts of charity and social work for vainglorious show, bogus piety, and hypocritical religiosity. . . ." But every effort would be made to foster "bonafide belief and practice of personal morals as taught by ethics and traditions of every religion and culture."³¹ While there was no explicit rejection of the state religion provision, it was clear that Buddhism was not to be accorded a special recognition by the new regime.

And thus has Burma reverted to its status as a secular state that divorces religion from politics. Burma as a case-study of the interaction of religion and politics is indeed *sui generis*. As Donald Eugene Smith well observes: "In no other country has the mixing of religion and politics demonstrated so clearly about the usefulness and limitations of religion in relation to: the legitimacy of the political leadership, national integration, economic development, and the democratic process." And he adds: "In no other country has the role of government in the promotion of religion been expanded so earnestly and the inherent limits of that role been revealed so clearly. Finally, in no other country have we observed the full circle reversion to secular politics under an authoritarian military regime which has rejected religion as a source of legitimacy."³²

CONCLUSION

This study underscores the Burmese scene to illustrate the Southeast Asian nation-states' rationale in opting for the secular state. The Burma of U Nu seems to have confirmed Gunnar Myrdal's indictment of religion in this part of Asia as a "tremendous force for social inertia"³³ and thus a block to the nation-state's striving after its modernization goals. A summary survey of the Southeast Asian scene, however varied the religious-cultural

³¹ *The Burmese Way to Socialism* (Rangoon: Information Dept., 1962), quoted by Smith, *ibid.*, pp. 283-87.

³² Smith, *ibid.*, p. 307.

³³ Myrdal, *op. cit.*, p. 103. As Myrdal himself points out: "No religion on the higher level need be in conflict with the modernization ideals. But as religion is part and parcel of the whole complex of people's beliefs and valuations, their modes of living and working, and their institutions, it needs to be reformed in order to break down inhibitions and obstacles to development" (pp. 105-106). What Myrdal does indict is "popular religion" and this he stresses: "By characterizing popular religion as a force of inertia and irrationality that sanctifies the whole system of life and work, attitudes and institutions, we are, in fact, stressing an important aspect of underdevelopment, namely, the resistance of that system to planned, induced changes along the modernization ideal. This wider definition of popular religion by the social scientists is defensible on the ground that any narrower definition is arbitrary and does violence to reality." Cf. pp. 109-10. For Myrdal, the modernization ideals would be: rationality, development and planning for development, rise of productivity, rise of levels of living, social and economic equalization, improved institutions and attitudes, national consolidation, national independence, political democracy in a narrow sense, democracy at the grass roots, social discipline versus "democratic planning, derived value premises." Cf. pp. 57-69. The modernization ideal of: rationality would demand that policies should be founded on rational considerations, that superstitious beliefs and illogical reasoning should be eradicated.

setting, would seem to confirm this study's contention — so dramatically exemplified in Burma—that if the Southeast Asian nation-state is to be “modernized,” it has likewise to “secularize” itself. And in proportion to the efforts expended on the latter, will the modernization goal or goals be realized.³⁴

³⁴ Among the eight Hakone criteria of modernization cited by Biggerstaff, the fifth is especially relevant for the purpose of this study: “Widespread literary works accompanied by the spread of a *secular* and increasingly scientific orientation of the individual to his environment” (underscoring provided). Biggerstaff, *loc. cit.* In an emerging nation, Neil J. Smelser (*Modernization of Social Relations*, p. 120) observes, we may expect profound changes, e.g., in “the religious sphere, as secularized belief systems begin to replace traditionalistic religions.” Myron Weiner remarks however that while religion may not be a lubricant for modernization, it need not be an obstacle either. Weiner cites Milton Singer's observation in his essay (*Modernization of Religious Beliefs*, pp. 59-70) that “the relation of ‘ascetic Protestantism’ to early industrialists, far from being a lonely exception, may turn out to be one of the many cases of mutual interaction and adaptation between religious and social change.” Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-7.

THE SINGAPORE HERALD AFFAIR

JOSEPH B. TAMNEY

IN MAY, 1971 THE SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT CAUSED AN ENGLISH-language newspaper, *The Singapore Herald*, to cease publication. Although its circulation was considerably less than the long-established *Straits Times*, in its year of existence the *Herald* had gained many loyal readers. They looked to the *Herald* for balanced, critical commentary on national affairs, something rarely found in the *Times*, at least during the three years (May, 1968 - May, 1971) I lived there. The letters from readers published in the *Times* only became interesting after the *Herald* began publishing provocative letters from the public. Nor is the *Herald* to be considered an expatriate newsheet. After the paper was threatened by the government, a group tried to establish a cooperative that would take over the *Herald*; among the leaders of this move were local staff members and students from the University of Singapore. In fact, on May 21, 1971, the University of Singapore Student Union issued a statement declaring that it was not convinced by the government's arguments against the *Herald*. The statement read: "Till the *Herald* is proven guilty, we assume it to be innocent, and we shall support its right to exist as a newspaper." The closing of the *Herald* was traumatic for the English-educated in Singapore, which is about half the population. They lost the one public voice willing to speak out in a country controlled by one party, the People's Action Party (PAP), if not by one man, the prime minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew. As a reader wrote to the *Herald*, "*Herald* is the only English paper that has the guts to criticize the government without fear. I give three cheers to the management and the staff."¹ This sentiment was repeated in numerous letters published in the *Herald* while the paper awaited a final decision on its fate. Why was the paper closed?

On May 24, 1971, the government issued the following statement—

The real issue is not the freedom of the press. It is whether foreigners, including an ex-chief minister of a foreign government, and currently a high-ranking diplomat in its employ, should occupy a commanding position from which they could manipulate public opinion in the Republic. No government can allow this.

The *Herald* was financially backed by a high-ranking Malaysian official and by Hong Kong money. This is undisputed. But what many, such as the University of Singapore Student Union, believe is that the government failed to prove that this foreign money unduly influenced the policy of the *Herald*.

¹ *The Singapore Herald*, May 26, 1971.

The *Herald* affair has been commented on frequently, both in the *Herald* itself before closing and in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (FEER). In the comments, both pro and con, the issue continually referred to is not foreign manipulation of the *Herald* but the broader issue of how much freedom can be tolerated in a developing society.

As one defender of the government's action wrote: "If according to you there is no free press, we would rather have this system which ensures freedom from want and starvation by proper management of the affairs of the country than any system which may give a 'free press' according to your notions, with riots and anarchy."² Similarly another correspondent wrote: "It may be necessary to choose stability as against 'freedom of expression,' whatever that may mean."³

That development requires the absence of criticism, seems a spreading idea in Southeast Asia. Speaking of President Marcos, an article in the FEER contained the following remark:

Deploping the "negative concept of freedom" adopted by the media, he made almost Lee Kuan Yew-ish references to "the duty of the press to strengthen and fortify the freedom of the country in which it operates." "The press," he warned, "was weakening, through the reckless exercise of freedom, the very society in which it thrives."⁴

In a recent report on the University of Malaya prepared for the Malaysian National Operations Council, the students were counseled "to pay greater attention to the real problems the Malays face and less to elitist interests, such as opposing the Internal Security Act and urging intellectual freedom."⁵

There is a general fear that criticism will destroy the nation, and the *Herald* affair is just one symptom of this fear. Almost two years before the closing of the *Herald*, Derek Davies wrote of Singapore:

Obviously a conflict exists which, put broadly, is between the enormous pressures for progress and efficiency on the one hand and the system of checks and balances necessary in a free society on the other. The demands of Singapore's 'Rugged Society' have placed some restrictions on the power of the trade unions, while the press is far from convinced that it is free to comment, critically if need be, with the threat of the newspapers' licensing system hanging over its head. Inordinate delays in legal processes led recently to the abolition of the jury system for murder trials, while the dangers of a high birth rate led to the swift (not to say ruthless) passage of a bill legalizing abortion.⁶

Mr. Davies, in my opinion, is correct in emphasizing the importance of efficiency to the Singapore government. Criticism delays change, and so offends the impatient Mr. Lee Kuan Yew.

² M. Coomaraswamy, "A Singaporean's Disgust," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 26, 1971, p. 31.

³ W. M. Chua, "Freedom Can Wait," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 26, 1971, p. 35.

⁴ "The Impatience of Job," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 26, 1971, p. 17.

⁵ James Morgan, "Hub of Imbalance," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 7, 1971, p. 15.

⁶ "Rugged Sensitivity," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 21, 1969, p. 461.

An examination of Mr. Lee's speeches, however, suggests that efficiency is not the right word. It is not efficiency which is valued but discipline—an ideal frequently referred to by the Prime Minister. For instance, consider his discussion of the differential development of China and India in his recent Dillingham Lecture at the University of Hawaii's East-West Center:

Could it be that, in part, the difference between the more intense and more *exacting* Sinic culture, and the less intense and more *benign* leisure values of Hindu culture, has made for the difference in results of industrial progress between Eastern and Southern Asia?

Progress, he said, was not consistent "with a *relaxed* culture."⁷ (Underscoring mine.) In a speech at the University of Dar-Es-Salaam, he stated that modernization requires: "first, a highly disciplined work force. . . ."⁸ Lee's contrast between "exacting" and "benign" is consistent with his frequent reference to discipline. To him, Chinese culture is rugged, demanding, disciplined. Criticism is a break in the ranks. Reflecting this same attitude, Lee has referred to academic freedom as an "airy-fairy" abstraction. On one side are disciplined and exacting and hard-working and practical; on the other side are relaxed and benign and leisure-oriented and living in the abstract. Apparently to Lee many freedoms, such as freedom of the press, are associated with the second set of attitudes, and are, therefore, inconsistent with Sinic culture and, consequently, with development.

In Singapore, what does not contribute to discipline is irrelevant. A student reporter attended a forum entitled "Singapore in the Seventies." One of the speakers was a local artist. The reporter commented as follows:

Her speech was interesting. One only felt embarrassed at the way she had to defend the development of the arts. "Rugged resilient Singaporeans" could be created through the arts because artistic integrity requires tough discipline. Surely this is crap!⁹

The cost to Singapore of this stress on discipline is not measured solely in terms of artistic surrender. Adela Koh, once a reporter for the *Herald* and now banned from Singapore, devoted an article to discussing a public forum on the mental health of children. She called the forum a failure because it ignored important topics:

A G.P. with ten years' experience had this to add: "Ours is an achievement-oriented society. The emphasis at every level, starting from the schools and going right through the social system, is on the survival of the fittest. Nobody cares for those who drop by the wayside, in fact the attitude is that it's better for everyone that the weak should be left behind as we march along the road to progress. . . ." What we must do, he says, is to give new worth to human beings, to define excellence in other than material terms.

The doctrine of discipline is costing Singapore in terms of artistic development and human considerations and not just freedom of expression.

⁷ Speech printed in *The Sunday Times* (Singapore), November 15, 1970.

⁸ Speech printed in *The Sunday Mail* (Singapore), November 15, 1970.

⁹ *Singapore Undergrad*, November 30, 1970.

But the argument from efficiency or discipline is not the public justification for limiting criticism, nor is it believed by some observers to be the most compelling covert reason for acts such as the closure of the *Herald*. Dick Wilson, for instance, stresses Lee's concern for unity and nation-building—a concern heightened by the increasing respectability of Peking which reenforces a resurfacing Chinese chauvinism in Singapore.¹⁰ Indeed, Lee is worried about national unity. At the time of the *Herald* affair the Prime Minister gave a talk at a Singapore community centre on the lack of homogeneity within the country's population.¹¹ He spoke of religious communalism in connection with the Malays, and the pride of the Chinese-educated in the Chinese language and culture. Without saying this is a full explanation of the *Herald* affair, it seems clear that freedom to criticize was sacrificed for national unity. Freedom, according to this view, must await the development of a national identity.

But the question I wish to raise is whether a Singapore identity can develop in the present repressive atmosphere of Singapore.

Several commentators on Singapore have very simplistic ideas on the emergence of a national identity. Nancy Ma, for instance, believes that because Singaporeans are becoming multi-lingual, national unity will occur: "A generation or two of this sort of mixing of languages and cultures would ensure Lee's Singaporean identity."¹² But a sharing of language has not integrated the Chinese into Philippine society, the Indians into African society, or the Catholics into Northern Ireland. Surely this faith in multi-lingualism is naive.

The "theoretician" of the PAP, Mr. S. Rajaratnam, claimed that "Technology is the new Messiah which will save Asia from its otherwise grim future." The building of a technological society "can be an exciting and satisfying venture—sufficiently exciting and sufficiently satisfying to weld together groups of immigrants, who have left their past behind them, into a cohesive, progressive, and thrusting community."¹³ Rajaratnam has faith in the new *deus ex machina*-technology. But technological society in the United States has not produced the unity Mr. Rajaratnam so simplistically associated with technological development.

On the one hand, the government restricts freedom until a national identity emerges. On the other hand, there seems to be no meaningful policy for the development of this identity. It is true that the government has introduced the teaching of the history of Singapore into the primary school curriculum, and this was a deliberate attempt to build a Singapore identity. But, surely, one must wonder if the citizens will choose to identify with

¹⁰ Dick Wilson, "A Long View—or Bogey," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 7, 1971, p. 30.

¹¹ *The Singapore Herald*, May 26, 1971.

¹² Nancy Ma, "The Rigid Society," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 28, 1971, p. 24.

¹³ Speech reported in "Age of Technocrats," *The Mirror* (Singapore), Vol. IV, No. 32 (August 5, 1968), pp. 4, 7.

the short and rather uninspiring history of Singapore, when it is possible for them to choose the Chinese, Indian, or Malay-Muslim tradition. Moreover, the importance of Singapore history as a source of identity seems disputed within the government. In the speech just referred to, Mr. Rajaratnam stressed as one of the advantages of Singapore that they are a future-oriented people. It is doubtful if history can be as significant in Singapore as it can be in India and China.

It can be questioned, of course, if in a society like Singapore it is possible to plan for a national identity. In fact, this would be my position. A new identity must emerge from the attempts of the people to solve the problems specific to Singapore, especially the attempts of the more gifted people. But the present limitations on freedom are making new and creative responses unlikely, thereby putting off indefinitely the emergence of a new identity.

In 1969 Singapore established an elite pre-university school called the National Junior College. On July 29, 1970 the *Herald* printed a feature article on the College. The question was raised whether the school was going to really produce leaders. Reporters found the students to be self-assured and well-adjusted, but they commented: "If leadership is something positive, shown in a willingness to question principles and to act without self-interest, then there is reason to be a little pessimistic." Some students at the College believed Singapore to be a materialistic society. "But they also feel it is futile to even try to raise questions about the structure and development of our society 'for any form of protest will inevitably be suppressed.'" Reporters found it difficult to find independent thinking, or students who challenged the assumptions behind major issues. "They know . . . they were selected because they were 'safe,' because they had approved points of view, and that to continue getting privileges they should continue to play it safe." Surely such an atmosphere is unlikely to produce people who will build a new identity.

In November, 1970, while he was acting prime minister, Mr. Goh Keng Swee gave a speech at the University of Singapore which contained the remark: "And so we have in Singapore intellectual conformity in place of intellectual inquisitiveness, and the sum total is a depressing climate of intellectual sterility." Rightly, Goh said it was too simple to blame this entirely on the government. On the other hand, the government has contributed to this sterility. A student commentator, for instance, related this sterility to "incessant propagandizing over radio and television" and "the gagging of the press."¹⁴ In the same issue of the student newspaper, there was an editorial comment on the University (which is closely controlled by the Cabinet) changing from a three-term to a two-term system: "The University Administration has finally disclosed that the two-term system is definitely being imposed. Once again, we, the recipients of the system, have

¹⁴ *Singapore Undergrad*, November 30, 1970.

been mere puppets, with no say in the final decision." The government has kept the students under control and out of power. There is a fear of government within the English-language University. This does not seem likely to produce people who will give Singaporeans a basis for national unity.

Although this repressive atmosphere pervades all of Singapore, the *Herald* affair would be especially meaningful for the English-educated, and not only because the *Herald* was an English-language newspaper. Because of the history of Singapore, the English-educated have taken as their own, not just the English language but also English political values. So, one writer to the *Herald* submitted this Patrick Henry-type statement: "At this critical moment of our history, it is not the survival of the *Herald* that is at stake; nor is it the freedom of the press that is at stake. What is at stake is the freedom of the entire people. What is at stake is our national conscience and our national pride." We are not suggesting that English values are right for Singapore. We do maintain, however, that if the English-educated are to develop a new identity they will begin with English values and through trial-and-error work out a new system of values. Government action, by calling trial-by-jury and academic freedom "airy-fairy," does not help this process but blocks it. And, as Nancy Ma wrote, "The multiracial society will not be furthered by the alienation of its most genuinely 'Singaporean' components — raised to idealize their brilliant Prime Minister."¹⁵

The *Herald* affair, then, seems part of a growing set of controls preventing free expression in Singapore. This development, we suggest, has at least two causes: 1) Lee Kuan Yew's devotion to Sinic culture, in the form of discipline and order, and 2) the belief that free expression cannot be allowed until a national identity has emerged. As to the first, its cost in humaneness and artistic development seems high. As to the second, we suggest that, in fact, in the absence of free expression, no national identity will develop in Singapore. Finally, we note that, to the extent Lee's discipline-culture dominates public policy, Singaporeans will be forced to act as if they believed in the Prime Minister's version of Chinese culture, while keeping their true ideas hidden. Play-acting on such a massive scale is not likely to produce a new, spontaneously-accepted common identity for all Singaporeans.

¹⁵ Ma, "The Rigid Society," *op. cit.*, p. 24.

GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION FOR CHINESE SECRET SOCIETIES IN THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS IN THE LATE 19TH CENTURY

CHENG SIOK-HWA

Before dealing with the various legislative enactments passed by the government in the attempt to solve the extremely difficult and complex problem posed by the existence of secret societies, it would be necessary for a better understanding of the issues involved to describe briefly the origin, development, and nature of Chinese secret societies in the Straits Settlements.

The Chinese had been coming down from China to this region since remote times, but it was only during the first half of the nineteenth century that the stream of Chinese immigrants grew into a flood due to the conditions of security, increased trade, and economic growth accompanying the introduction of British administration in the Straits of Malacca. Other factors causing the influx were the disturbed internal conditions of South China itself and the opportunities for profit offered by the nascent tin mining industry of the west-coast Malay States. The powerful immigrant flow meant that the Chinese population in the Straits Settlements became increasingly important.¹ Still, there was no direct contact between the British Government and the mass of the Chinese people.

During the period of the East India Company's rule in the Straits the main concern of the British administration was the development of trade. The Chinese were left to their own devices and it was only when fights and riots broke out, endangering life and property and impeding the conduct and development of trade, that the British Government began to realize the urgent need to control the Chinese. Even then the administration lacked the means to do anything effective. An essential requisite of effective control was knowledge of the Chinese, their language and customs; but until 1871 there was no European Government official with a sufficient knowledge of the Chinese.² In addition, the small police force was inadequate for the task; for example, the whole police force in 1831 numbered eighteen for a population of 16,000.³

¹ For example, in Singapore, the Chinese population numbered in 1824, 3,317 (31.0%) out of a total population of 10,683; in 1840, 17,179 (50.6%) out of a total population of 33,969; and in 1860, 50,043 (61.3%) out of a total population of 81,734.

² In 1871, W. A. Pickering was appointed the first European to be Chinese Interpreter to the Government of the Straits Settlements.

³ C. V. Buckley, *An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore: 1819-1867* (Kuala Lumpur, reprint 1965), p. 213.

For these reasons the British left the Chinese very much alone, a condition which, together with the Chinese propensity for associations, led to the establishment of self-governing secret societies. The Chinese immigrants came from the provinces of South China, notorious for clannishness and turbulence. They brought with them their regional antagonisms and rivalries, and the resultant friction led to an increased tendency to organize separate and exclusive associations. Their turbulence, recklessness, and lawlessness increased in the new land where they were without the restraining influence of women and elderly Chinese. There were many criminals, political refugees, and paupers among them, and almost all the immigrants were sojourners who intended to return to China as soon as they had acquired some money. It would, therefore, have been an extremely difficult task for any government to control the Chinese. Another factor added to the difficulty. Coming from the lowest stratum of society, the immigrants had too often come into contact with Chinese governmental corruption, extortion, injustice, and misrule. So they came with a strong innate prejudice against constituted authority. Taking all these factors together, it is not surprising, therefore, that on their arrival here the Chinese should combine themselves into powerful, self-governing secret societies.

The societies were branches of the Tien-ti Hui (known also as the Triad Society, the Hung League, and the Ghee Hin Society) whose origins were shrouded in antiquity and which, after the Manchu conquest of China in 1644, had the purpose of overthrowing Manchu rule in China and re-establishing the Ming Dynasty.⁴ Outside China, however, the main object ostensibly was combination for mutual benefit in times of poverty, sickness, and death. These aims were harmless enough, but in reality the societies also provided for mutual support against any inconvenient consequences of law-breaking. Thus thieves, pirates, murderers, etc., who belonged to the societies, were sheltered from arrest and helped to escape. Obnoxious prosecutors were made to disappear and witnesses directly threatened until they denied all knowledge of incriminating evidence. In short, the secret societies brought justice to nought and formed a virtual *imperium in imperio*. Moreover, they used force, terrorism, extortion, and blackmail to establish a reign of terror over the people; and on the slightest provocation—a dispute over the takings of a brothel, a fight between two men belonging to rival societies—a full-scale riot might break out.⁵

Doubtless, such a state of affairs should not be tolerated by any self-respecting administrative body. But until 1867, the Straits Settlements Gov-

⁴ For an account of the origins, organization, rituals, etc., of secret societies, see Leon Comber, *Chinese Secret Societies* (New York, 1959) and M. L. Wynne, *Triad and Tabut* (Singapore, 1941).

⁵ In fact, society headmen encouraged riots since these occasioned the levying of extra subscriptions supposedly to pay lawyers and false witnesses and to support the families of those killed, sentenced to death, or imprisoned. However, much of the money collected went into the pockets of the headmen. See R. N. Jackson, *Pickering, Protector of Chinese* (Kuala Lumpur, 1965), pp. 51-52.

ernment had no power to legislate against secret societies, since that power lay in the hands of the Supreme Government in India, which unfortunately was ignorant of the nature of the problems in the outlying Straits Settlements. With the transfer in 1867 of the Straits Settlements from the India Office to the Colonial Office,⁶ the Straits Settlements Government acquired the right to legislate fully for the needs of the Colony. At about the same time, in 1866, G. Schelegel's work on the Tien-ti Hui supplied the much-needed information about the very complicated working of the Triad Society. Further insight was provided by the Report of the Commissioners on the Penang Riots of 1857.

In 1867, the Dangerous Societies Suppression Ordinance was passed.⁷ The title of the Ordinance is misleading, for the practical result of the Ordinance was not suppression but formal registration. In fact, the Ordinance inaugurated a period of unrestricted registration from 1870 to 1881. This system of registration necessarily involved some recognition of the secret societies. W. A. Pickering, who became Head of the Chinese Protectorate when it was established in 1877, wrote in an article in *Fraser's Magazine* for August, 1876, that in his opinion the Ordinance of 1869 was not effective as a measure to control the secret societies, and "the opinion of every respectable Chinese in the Straits Settlements is that the recognition of the Triad Society is a disgrace to our Government."

In practice, the system of registration proved a farce as oaths, rules, and membership lists were faked to mislead the authorities. "Men of straw" were put up so that the real "wire-pullers" were not known and the activities of the secret societies continued as in the past while their membership continued to grow. Registration was also a failure in putting a stop to riots for in Singapore alone, where control could best be exercised, riots broke

⁶ One reason for the transfer was the discontent of the local European mercantile community regarding the lack of an officially determined policy towards the secret societies.

⁷ The main features of the 1869 Ordinance were:

- (1) All societies and associations of ten or more persons, except commercial companies and lodges of British freemasonry, must register.
- (2) If any society, whether registered or not, should appear to the Governor to have an illegal object or to be likely to prove dangerous to the public peace, it could be called upon to furnish the following particulars:
 - (i) Name, address, and occupation of all office-bearers and all members.
 - (ii) Copy of rules, orders, instructions, by-laws, and regulations of the society.
 - (iii) Statement of all payments required of members and the sources of all income of the society.
 - (iv) Copy of all engagements, obligations, or promises taken and given, proposed, or tendered by members.
 - (v) Explanation of all signs and pass-words used by members.
 - (vi) Description of ceremonies used by the society.
 - (vii) Particulars of every proposed change, alteration, or addition to the above.
- (3) The Registrar was given power to refuse registration when the above particulars were of a warlike or aggressive character or showed an illegal purpose.
- (4) The Governor could require bonds with two sureties up to one thousand dollars from the manager or office-bearers of any society registered under the Ordinance.
- (5) The administration of oaths of any kind was prohibited.
- (6) Notice of meetings of any registered society was to be given to the Registrar.

out in 1870, 1871, 1872, 1874, and 1876, the last-mentioned being particularly serious as it was an anti-government riot.

In 1870, 1872, and 1877 amendments were passed to strengthen the 1869 Ordinance, but it was found that secret-society influence was far from abating. After ten years of an unsatisfactory registration system, Pickering in his annual report on the Chinese Protectorate, 1879, wrote that under the 1869 Ordinance there was no provision for the suppression of a society once it had been registered. He stressed the need for another amendment which would give the Governor power to suspend or cancel the registration of any society which proved to be dangerous to the public peace. The situation was made worse by the increased participation in secret-society activities of Straits-born Chinese and Malays who, because they were non-banishable, became extremely bold.⁸

Ordinance IV of 1882 amended and re-enacted the 1869 Ordinance such that membership of registered secret societies was confined to immigrant Chinese; non-banishable persons would be prevented from becoming members. Malay secret societies—the Red Flag Society and the White Flag Society—and all societies counting non-banishable persons or persons of non-Chinese descent as members, were declared unlawful societies. Another Ordinance clause provided for the suppression of registered societies which proved to be dangerous.

In March, 1884, Sir Cecil Clementi Smith, the Colonial Secretary, assumed the administration of the government when the Governor went on leave. Equipped with his intimate knowledge of the Chinese language and customs, acquired through sixteen years' service in Hong Kong,⁹ he at once set about tackling the secret-society problem. Although only a *locum tenens* he attempted to strengthen Ordinance IV of 1882 by an amendment which empowered the Government to list in a gazette the names of Chinese secret societies and to outlaw membership in these secret societies with the penalty of a fine or imprisonment or both, except for China-born Chinese. The draft Bill was sent to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Knutsford, who replied that it would simplify matters if the Bill could provide for the suppression of all societies shown to be dangerous to the public peace, instead of making a separate case for China-born Chinese.¹⁰ Smith agreed that the policy of total suppression was most desirable but he realised that the practical difficulties involved were too great due to the lack of a sufficiently qualified staff. He wrote to Knutsford that he had consulted the Executive Council and those best able to judge, i.e., the Heads of the Protectorate and the Police, and they had expressed their unanimous opinion that the time had not yet arrived for such a policy. He added:

⁸ Wynne, pp. 389-91.

⁹ Smith was in Hong Kong from 1862 to 1878, first as cadet undertaking full-time training in the Chinese language, then as Head of the Chinese Department, and subsequently Colonial Treasurer.

¹⁰ *Open Despatch from the Colonial Office to the Governor No. 229, August 19, 1884.*

Although, therefore, personally anxious to take the earliest opportunity for getting rid of what is a blot on the reputation of the Colony, I am not prepared to recommend the adoption of any such course as the general suppression of so-called Dangerous Societies, but on the other hand I am wholly in favour of drawing the reins tighter and tighter, so that with improved and strengthened Government Departments it may be found possible at no distant date to adopt stronger measures than are now expedient.¹¹

In the face of these objections, Knutsford withdrew his counter-proposals and the Bill, as originally drafted by Smith, was passed as Ordinance IV of 1885. Within a few months, however, it was realised that the Ordinance did not produce the desired effect, for the secret societies continued their nefarious activities. Their membership increased alarmingly;¹² the Straits-born Chinese, Malays, and Indians secretly continued to take part in society activities; and the suppressed societies simply re-appeared again under different names or went underground.

In October, 1887, Sir Cecil Smith was appointed Governor of the Straits Settlements on the retirement of Sir Frederic Weld. Smith was the first Governor of the Colony with an intimate, first-hand knowledge of the Chinese, and he at once got down to the problem of secret societies. The attack on Pickering a few months before Smith's arrival perhaps focused his attention on this "challenge to Government." This attack, which took place in July, 1887, was a very ferocious attempt to murder Pickering by a member of the Ghee Hok Society. It was thought that the attack was due to Pickering's action in getting the Gambling Commission appointed in 1886 to find means of suppressing gambling, a source of much profit to secret societies.¹³

On June 20, 1888, Smith wrote a long despatch to Knutsford recommending a policy of total suppression and attached a draft Ordinance to put this policy into effect. Smith wrote:

The policy adopted up to this time as regards these societies is one that I have never ceased to regret since my first connection with this Colony ten years ago, for I believe it to be a weak policy, and most detrimental to the public interest Of this I feel quite confident that the complete suppression of the Secret Societies must be, at one time or another, carried out, and the longer it is delayed, the more difficult will be the task, and the more serious will be the conflict between the Government and the Societies.¹⁴

In his long and informative despatch to the Colonial Office regarding

¹¹ *Open Despatch from the Governor to the Colonial Office No. 502*, November 17, 1884.

¹² In Singapore alone, membership of Chinese secret societies grew from 49,000 in 1885 to 65,000 in 1888. *Straits Settlements Legislative Proceedings*, February 7, 1889.

¹³ Wynne, however, contended in his *Triad and Tabut*, p. 372, that the attack was an attempt by the Ghee Hok Society or Tokong to damage the prestige of the rival Ghee Hin Society or Triad of which Pickering was an "honorary" member. W. L. Blythe, in the preface to the same work, disagreed with Wynne's thesis.

¹⁴ *Open Despatch from the Governor to the Colonial Office No. 292*, June 20, 1888.

the suppression of Chinese secret societies, dated June 20, 1888, Smith pointed out that previous legislation—the 1869 Ordinance together with subsequent amendments—had failed to achieve control over the societies. He quoted extracts from the reports of the Inspector-General of Policy, Colonel Dunlop, and the Protector of Chinese, W. A. Pickering, to point out the dangerous nature of the secret societies and their capacity for creating trouble. Pickering, in his 1887 report, recommended that the Ghee Hok Society, in particular, should be suppressed, and that it was time the Government used all possible means towards the gradual abolition of dangerous societies throughout the colony. Upon this recommendation, Dunlop wrote the following:

I have given this matter my most serious consideration, and I submit that the time has come for Government to suppress entirely Chinese Dangerous Societies. It may be possible to do it piece-meal, as suggested in this letter, but in my opinion it would be better to make bold stroke and suppress all the existing Dangerous Societies at once.¹⁵

Smith advanced his arguments for the complete suppression of secret societies. First, he pointed out that these societies were prohibited in China, the Dutch colonies, Hong Kong, and the Protected Malay States. In short, only in the Straits Settlements were they allowed “to exist, to flourish, and to increase in number and power—a standing menace to all good government, and a great scandal to British administration.”¹⁶ Second, the government was now better equipped to cope with the problem than in 1869 when the first Ordinance dealing with the societies was passed. At that time there was not a single officer of the government who had any knowledge of the Chinese language and customs. Since 1871 the government had enjoyed the valuable service of Pickering, and the Chinese Protectorate had developed till it was second to none in importance. There were also other officers trained in the Chinese language as well as in public service.¹⁷ In Smith’s opinion the government was strong enough to “give to the Chinese inhabitants a real and honest protection in lieu of that protection which they believe they obtain by joining a Secret Society.”¹⁸ Third, the activities of the Chinese secret societies were not confined to the Straits Settlements but extended to the Malay States and Siamese territory so that disturbances in these territories might affect the peace of the Straits Settlements and vice versa.

Fourth, he argued, an *imperium in imperio* had no place in a properly administered colony. It was a most intolerable situation in which officers

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, paragraph 7.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, paragraph 11.

¹⁷ In 1888 there were ten government Officers who had qualified in Chinese and therefore could deal with the Chinese without interpreters, while three more were studying. “List of Straits Settlements Officers Who Have Qualified Or Are Now Qualifying in Chinese,” *Straits Settlements Legislative Council Proceedings, 1888*, p. C-67.

¹⁸ *Open Despatch from the Governor to the Colonial Office No. 292, June 20, 1888*, paragraph 13.

of the government had to depend on the assistance of headmen, who gave or withheld assistance according to their own interests, for the detection of crime, the arrest of accused persons, and the control of large numbers of Chinese during some temporary excitements such as a riot. Smith urged: "The Government must be the paramount power, and it is not so in the eyes of many thousands of the Chinese in the Straits Settlements."¹⁹

Smith, therefore, framed the Societies Bill to suppress dangerous societies altogether. Briefly, the main features of the Bill were:

- (1) No society could register without the previous approval of the Governor in Council;
- (2) No society could lawfully exist unless registered;
- (3) The Governor in Council could order the dissolution of all the existing secret societies; and
- (4) Arrangements were made for the prosecution of unlawful societies and their office-bearers and members.²⁰

When the Bill became known in government circles, the Protector of Chinese and the Inspector-General of Police voiced their opposition. Pickering alleged that neither he nor Dunlop had been consulted in the drafting of the Bill, although Smith claimed that they had held many discussions on the subject. In July, 1888, Pickering and Dunlop wrote a joint letter of protest to Knutsford, stating that their chief objection to the Bill was that, if it were passed as it then stood, they would lose all control over the 165,000 registered members of Chinese dangerous societies. The Bill did not provide for an alternative to the "control already existing." Pickering and Dunlop suggested some amendments which would make the Bill workable, and a later date when total suppression could be attempted.²¹

Their protests however did not deter Smith from proceeding with his scheme. Knutsford regretted that Pickering and Dunlop "have somewhat modified the view which they formerly expressed on this subject"; but, apart from informing Smith to "carefully consider the best means of dissolving the societies . . . and before taking action decide upon the measures to be adopted after suppression, for the management of that portion of the Chinese population which require control,"²² Knutsford took no further notice of the letter. For this treatment, Pickering and Dunlop could only blame themselves for the inconsistent advice they had given the government over the last few years as to the best means of controlling the societies. At one time they had advocated complete suppression; now their stand had

¹⁹*Ibid.*, paragraph 12.

²⁰The above principal points of the Bill were mentioned in *ibid.*, paragraph 14. There is no trace in government records of this Bill or of the amendments suggested by Pickering and Dunlop, nor of other amendments made before the Bill became law.

²¹Pickering and Dunlop's letter to the Colonial Office dated July 9, 1888, enclosed in *Governor's Despatch No. 347*, July 30, 1888. In January, 1889, while on sick leave in London, Pickering wrote a long, not very coherent letter (enclosed in *Confidential Despatch from the Colonial Office to the Governor*, January 25, 1889) against the Bill, but the Colonial Office did not pay much attention to it.

²²*Colonial Office Despatch No. 342*, October 22, 1888.

changed, and they were content to advocate a long-term policy of gradual abolition, spread over a number of years, and the continuation of the system of registration and control. In contrast to this vacillating attitude was Smith's consistent and definite policy of total suppression.

Knutsford, however, did not accept all that Smith put forward. He thought that the Hong Kong method of legislation was preferable to that proposed by Smith.²³ The Hong Kong Ordinance of 1887 declared dangerous societies to be unlawful while Smith proposed the roundabout process of empowering the government to refuse registration to any particular society, thereby outlawing all unregistered societies. The difference was that under the Hong Kong Ordinance the government had to prove that the character and objects of a society were unlawful to ensure conviction, whereas Smith's scheme threw the onus of proving its innocence on the society itself.

At this time the Attorney-General, J. W. Bonser, was in England on leave. Knutsford learned from him that in his opinion Smith's scheme would be more effective. Knutsford then directed Smith and his Executive Council to consider which procedure would be effective while at the same time producing the least friction and danger of opposition. The Executive Council unanimously agreed that the Hong Kong Ordinance would not be so applicable to the circumstances of the colony as the draft Bill.²⁴

In February, 1889, the Bill was introduced to the Legislative Council. There was a long debate which extended over two sittings. Every member with the exception of the Auditor-General took part. Though all voted against the Bill, the unofficial members did not present a united opposition. Some opposed the principle of total suppression while others approved of total suppression but objected to the manner in which it was to be effected.²⁵ Despite this opposition the official vote carried the Bill.

Before the Bill became law there were some delays caused by the memorial sent by the powerful Ghee Hin Society of Penang to Knutsford, begging his "kind intercession" on their behalf. The memorialists emphasized the good work done by the Society among the poor and sick, but of course ignored entirely their less commendable activities. They claimed that the headmen helped the government control the Chinese population, and they challenged the government to find a better substitute which would help control the masses of the Chinese population. They even went so far as to declare that, legislation or no legislation, the societies would continue to flourish as actively as ever, for "it is in the nature of the Chinese to run together into secret associations," and that the result of suppression would be "the existence of really secret bodies made hostile by legislation,

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Governor's Despatch No. 52*, February 9, 1889.

²⁵ *Straits Settlements Legislative Council Proceedings*, February 7, 1889 and February 8, 1889.

with leaders proscribed and irresponsible to the authorities which [sic] can neither be controlled nor utilized."²⁶

Smith reported on this memorial:

This society is the most dangerous in the whole of the Straits Settlements. The evil influence of the Society is so great that the little good done by its subscriptions to charitable objects must be shut out of all considerations when steps necessary for the peace and good order of the Colony have to be taken.²⁷

Knutsford accepted Smith's representation and gave his sanction to the Ordinance. Thus Ordinance I of 1889, entitled "An Ordinance to Amend the Law Relating to Societies," came into force on January 1, 1890, with six months' grace for the secret societies to wind up their affairs and dispose of their property and funds.

The main provisions of the *Societies Ordinance, 1889* were:

- (1) All associations of ten or more persons were defined as "societies," except companies, businesses, and Freemasons' lodges.
- (2) All societies must be registered to be lawful. Unlawful societies could be prosecuted.
- (3) The Governor in Council could exempt any society or class of societies from registration.
- (4) Approval for registration did not make a society lawful, if the purposes and objects of the society were unlawful.
- (5) The Governor in Council could order the dissolution of any registered society by *Gazette* notification.

At the same time the government considered the setting up of a Chinese Advisory Board in each of the Settlements: to take over the useful, beneficial, and unobjectionable functions of the secret societies, such as giving advice and assistance to the government on matters especially relating to the Chinese community; to make known views on any new measure that might be introduced by the government; and to conduct arbitration between members of the Chinese community. Each Board was to consist of an approximately proportionate representation of the various Chinese dialect groups in the Settlement. The Protector or Assistant Protector of Chinese was to be an *ex-officio* member. These Boards were instituted in December, 1889, and proved a great success from the outset. Thus, many among those who had opposed the policy of total suppression were won over. The *Singapore Free Press* in its editorial column said that the confidence of the European population in the expediency of the policy was to a great extent secured by the "apparent alternative and preferable machinery that the new Board gives us."²⁸

In the first report on the progress of the Ordinance, Smith wrote to the Colonial Office that in Singapore the headmen and managers of all the ten

²⁶ "Memorial of the Penang Ghee Hin Society," with covering letter dated December 31, 1888, enclosed in: *Colonial Office Despatch* No. 52, February 15, 1889.

²⁷ *Governor's Despatch* No. 116, March 22, 1889.

²⁸ *Singapore Free Press*, January 13, 1890.

dangerous societies had delivered up their seals, flags, books, etc., and were quietly making plans to dispose of their property. In Penang, too, things went on smoothly. Smith concluded his report rather optimistically:

Thus, in short, all the Dangerous Societies in Singapore and Penang have been suppressed . . . , the operation of the law for suppressing the Dangerous Societies has been satisfactorily carried into effect, and the Colony has, by means of the law and the way it has been utilized, thus got rid of all the secret associations connected with the Chinese which have been for so many years fraught with evil to the public welfare.²⁹

The Annual Reports of the Chinese Protectorate in the years following 1889 also seemed to indicate that all was well, that the Ordinance was working smoothly, and that the condemned societies, after quietly winding up their affairs, were content to disappear altogether.

The above discussion, of course, gives only the official picture of suppression. The real position was far different. By declaring eligible for exemption from registration the societies formed for recreation, charity, religion, and literature, the Ordinance left the dangerous societies a loophole for survival. In the following years many of these apparently innocuous social and religious clubs and associations were really false fronts for underground secret activity. When the illegal nature of such associations was discovered, they were suppressed, but they could always reappear again under a different name or guise, so that a perpetual game of "same-man-different-hat" was played.³⁰

The official dissolution of the dangerous societies led to the breakdown of the large societies into "koon" or small gangs of thugs. Each gang had its own exclusive sphere of operation in which it claimed the sole right to levy tolls, collect protection money, and organize criminal rackets. These were the forbears of the gangs that roam the streets today.

However, it could be asserted that the breakdown of the few large societies into numerous small rival gangs lessened the discipline and power of the secret societies. Eventually, by the early 1920's it could be said that the once mighty Triad had become nothing more than gangs of street hooligans levying petty toll on shopkeepers, hawkers, brothels, gambling and opium dens. Occasional fights over boundaries of a "protection area" broke out, but the large-scale secret-society riots of the pre-1889 Ordinance period were things of the past.

The Societies Ordinance (1889) in force today is still basically the main legislation against secret societies throughout Singapore and West Malaysia, despite numerous amendments. Although it is far from eliminating the secret-society problem, it greatly lessens it. In fact it looks as though no completely satisfactory solution can ever be found. To quote Wynne:

The inherent weakness of toleration is encouragement; of registration, recognition; and of suppression, evasion.³¹

²⁹ *Governor's Despatch No. 111*, March 14, 1890.

³⁰ Wynne, *op. cit.*, p. 429.

³¹ *Ibid.*

AESTHETIC VALUES IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: THE EFFECTS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION AND A CONSUMER ECONOMY ON JAPANESE AESTHETIC VALUES

EDWARD A. OLSEN

ANY ATTEMPT TO MAKE A DEFINITIVE STATEMENT REGARDING CONTEMPORARY Japanese aesthetic values will necessarily contain flaws. Such a statement about Japan's aesthetic heritage can be relatively clear-cut, differing only in nuance with other opinions. However, the continuing and open-ended state of transformation which has encompassed Japan for over one hundred years and which is far less easy to define or assess, has had and is having an effect on the aesthetic values of the Japanese people. The end result of Japan's state of aesthetic flux can not be foretold; but past and present trends can be noted in the hope that they will provide indices of the overall direction of the process.

To a great extent Japan's aesthetic concepts were symbolized by the statement of Kenko: "In all things I yearn for the past."¹ The form the aesthetic values took when expressed, mattered relatively little. Whether in painting, sculpture, architecture, or the live arts, Japan's aesthetic heritage has been strongly tinged by both past continental influences and by Japan's "traditional" paucity of material wealth. The last one hundred years have served to alter the power of those influences in guiding Japan's aesthetic development. Western traditions, introduced in package form with early industrialization and modernization, have affixed themselves onto the structure of Japanese culture and have influenced its aesthetic facets in varying degrees in the different expressive forms.

To a considerable degree the core of Japanese aesthetics has retained its focus on the past. The purist forms of traditional culture—the "traditional" live arts, the martial arts, the tea ceremony, Ikebana, calligraphy, landscaping, and religious and certain categories of secular architecture—have all retained their traditional focus. To a certain, although lesser, extent this can also be said of literature and the plastic arts. However, a distinction must be made between this core and the deviations which surround it. The flower-less schools of Ikebana, or the "ungura gekijo" (underground theater), may well be fads destined to die rapid deaths as their novelty wears off; but the televised dramatic arts and the Western concept of flowery table centerpieces have apparently firmly ensconced themselves on the Japanese

¹ Donald Keene, trans., *Essays in Idleness: The Tsurezuregusa of Kenko* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 23.

aesthetic scene. For better or worse such attributes, and many others, of Westernized modern cultures are now parts of Japanese culture. The question remaining is one of degree: To what extent are the variant forms of aesthetic values achieving dominance over the traditional core?

I believe the best area to seek an answer to this query is within the totality of the contemporary Japanese life style. In looking at that life style I will concentrate upon the life style of Japan's urban population. The non-urban areas, while important, should not be focused upon for several reasons. The non-urban areas are too diffuse, too tied to local traditions, and too heterogeneous, and they look to the urban areas as the epitome of contemporary Japan. The life style of the urban complex is the pace setter of today's Japan. In determining the effect of today's Japanese life style upon Japanese aesthetic values, the home and its components provide excellent indices of trends. This is because the home, as the site of life's principal occurrences, is usually presented as representative of the possessors' desires. It often reflects the aesthetic image the occupant wishes to project.

Okakura Kakuzo wrote in *The Book of Tea* that:

To a Japanese, accustomed to simplicity of ornamentation and frequent change of decorative method, a Western interior permanently filled with a vast array of pictures, statuary, and bric-a-brac gives the impression of mere vulgar display of riches.²

This concept of an ideal, akin to the literary concept of "sabi" — a carefully controlled, subdued taste with overtones of frugal rusticity — is still very much alive in Japan. However, it is confronted by other desires held by today's Japanese which are at variance with it. Idealization of simple, austere, and frugal aesthetic values, although in part philosophical, was in large part a matter of necessity. While the wealthy members of Japan's aristocracy could afford the luxury of looking back at idealized ancestors as being less tainted by vices because of the purity of their simple ways, the common people did so, partly because of emulative social pressures, but more so because their own simple, austere life style was economically unavoidable. While the masses very likely never strongly possessed the refined aesthetic sensibilities for which the Japanese are renowned, they conformed to those ideals and led an idealized life out of necessity. However, industrialization and its counterpart, a mass consumer economy, have drastically altered the situation. This type of economy with its attendant conspicuous consumption threatens the very heart of Japan's traditional aesthetic values.

Arnold Toynbee in his *Impressions of Japan* made a pertinent comment:

In the past, when Japanese families had, on the average, more living-space than they have now, the whole of the space was at the disposal of the human inhabitants because they had few inanimate material possessions to compete

² Okakura Kakuzo, *The Book of Tea* (reprint of 1906 ed.; New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1964), p. 39.

for the space with living human bodies. Nowadays, when a family's living-space is becoming more and more painfully cramped, its possessions are becoming more and more profuse. A family that cannot afford to buy more than a minimum of living-space, which is the dearest of all commodities on the Japanese market, is able to afford to buy the consumer goods — Western-style bedsteads and chests of drawers, pianofortes, transistors — that are now being produced in Japan at a relatively cheap price and in abundant quantities, thanks to the efficiency of Japanese industry. The increase in the amount of consumer-goods that is now being crammed into a Japanese home runs directly counter to the shrinkage of the amount of space that the goods and their human owners have to share between them. The combined effect of these two conflicting developments is literally to drive human beings to the wall.³

This manner of living is quite different from the idealizations of traditional Japan. Toynbee's impressions of Japan's developing life style reflect the conditions of Japan in 1967. Vogel, not quite a decade earlier, wrote⁴ of a suburban life style which was more in line with traditional modes. The residents of Vogel's "Mamachi" possessed few objects of material wealth, had rather sparse furnishings, sought simple satisfaction from their miniature gardens, and perhaps set aside one of their rooms for Western-style objects. The Japanese life style Vogel described still remains, but it is being challenged and replaced by the phenomenon described by Toynbee. Very often the household garden of Japan, symbolizing Japanese desires to live in harmony with nature, has given way in whole or in part to a driveway and garage. In space-conscious Japan spatial priorities are vital. Thus even the open spaces surrounding neighborhood shrines and temples, formerly fulfilling the dual aesthetic function of a religious enclave in a mundane world and recreational open land, have not infrequently succumbed to the ever increasing demand for parking space.

One need only glance at the women's magazines of Japan and the developing trends will become apparent. Such magazines in Japan, as elsewhere, establish the normative aesthetic values of the housewives, who after all create the environment which will most greatly influence the succeeding generations of Japanese. The simple, the frugal, and the austere — all the idealized notions of traditional Japan — are still to be found between the covers of such magazines. However, those values are in the process of being compartmentalized and placed in one room of the home. Thus Vogel's representative Western room is being replaced by a representative Japanese room in an otherwise modern Western home. At the moment the process seems to be at about mid-point with examples of each present, but the trend is toward the latter. A product of contemporary Japan's prosperity and booming consumer economy, one finds numerous examples of articles describing and advertising homes and their attendant life style which, while

³ Arnold Toynbee, *Impressions of Japan* (Tokyo: Kinseido Ltd. and Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 46.

⁴ Ezra F. Vogel, *Japan's New Middle Class* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

vaguely Japanese to the outsider, are essentially modern, Western-style dwellings with one or two rooms designated as representative "wa shitsu" (Japanese rooms). Other common types of feature articles are those concerned with redecorating in Western style. Because of the dearth of space, much attention is paid to compartmentalization of daily functions within the Western format, the everything-in-its-proper-place school of thought, thereby eradicating much of the aesthetic spatial flexibility for which the Japanese are known.

One sure sign of the changes taking place in the Japanese life style has been the entrance of Japan's gigantic industrial combines into the field of producing and marketing the type of home I described above. For example Mitsui Fudosan has operated a well-attended "housing fair" in Tokyo in recent years. These residences, which will very likely help set the trends for developing Japanese modes of living and home-centered aesthetic values, uniformly contained only one or two "wa shitsu" and primarily had "yo shitsu" (Western rooms), often designated as "dainingu ki'chin," "ribingu ruru," or other such Anglicized Japanese terms. With the support of industrial giants, such as Mitsui, this life style will be firmly embedded in the Japanese cultural milieu.

Such changes are definitely occurring in Japan, but they are not evolving smoothly. Often the style of life which is developing appears to be that of a cluttered hodge-podge, frequently lacking both traditional aesthetic values and the aesthetic values which provide the *élan vital* of the life style of Western peoples. After being a "participant observer" in the cramped living quarters of most classes of Japanese society (often nearly glutted with a surfeit of material wealth), after riding the crowded public transportation and driving the crowded highways and surface streets of Japan's megalopolis, after daily seeing, breathing, and smelling the polluted by-products of Japan's industrial and commercial prosperity, one can only hope that the promise held out to the Japanese people by their leaders via the exhibits at Expo '70, will be brought to fruition.

The most striking feature of the life style projected for Japan in the Twenty-First Century is its high degree of compartmentalization. To a certain degree a compartmentalization of energies has been a prevalent characteristic of the Japanese throughout their history. Their selectivity in adapting and rejecting past foreign cultural intrusions, their internalized segregation of tensions, releasing the accumulated pressures in socially acceptable categorized dosages, and their language and thought patterns which mutually compartmentalize all their activities, have all been evident throughout their history. In the past the ability to compartmentalize inwardly and outwardly, has enabled the Japanese to suffice economically and surpass culturally within the harsh bounds placed by nature on her physical and material resources. In the past one hundred years, and particularly within the last ten to fifteen years, the Japanese have finally gained a measure of escape

from their natural handicaps. The price of that escape, an escape marked by great productivity and prosperity and equally great spatial and ecological pressures, has been the threat of the eradication of their traditional aesthetic ideals. Can the Japanese retain their ideal of man living in harmony with Nature, as they become increasingly engulfed in industrial swill? Only the future can answer that question definitely, but I believe they will be able to cope with the problems confronting industrial man to a degree other peoples will have difficulty in approaching. I base my opinion on two factors. The "natural" elements of Japan's physical setting have a markedly man-affected character. What is thought of as natural beauty in Japan often seems to an outside observer to be rather artificial in the sense that man has pruned and directed its development for hundreds of years. This factor of man being amenable to living in harmony with an "artificial" natural landscape, when combined with the factor of that same man's ability to compartmentalize his life style, will permit the Japanese to smoothly enter their Twenty-First Century. Man, in a nearly totally industrialized Japan for the next decades and beyond, may well be able to exist and enjoy life among the excesses of industrialism by compartmentalizing his energies. By channeling their aesthetic urges the Japanese can focus them on a small bit of whatever they conceive to be beauty. Just as increasingly the people of contemporary Japan live in a modernized pseudo-Western dwelling while making concessions to their ideals in the form of a "wa shitsu" or two, they will increasingly live in a massive industrial complex with concessions to the ideals of their agrarian past, in the form of segments of their cycle devoted to representations of those ideals.

In concluding this essay I would like to suggest that aesthetics itself in Japan is becoming compartmentalized. If present trends continue it seems likely that aesthetic values in Japan will become stratified into essentially two levels. At the "highest" and core level one finds the idealized aesthetic values carrying on the traditions of the past. At the very core one would find the ultra-conservative purists. This level of idealized aesthetic values will very likely continue to prevail, at least as a goal, among the wealthy who seek to continue or develop ties to the glories of Japan's past traditions. It will also probably prevail among the remaining rural Japanese who, because of their cultural conservatism and economic lag, will continue to live the traditions which their national ancestors idealized. The other level of aesthetic values would be that of the masses. The aesthetic values of the masses of an increasingly consumer-oriented Japanese economy will probably continue to pay homage to the idealized level in the form of the "wa shitsu" type compartmentalization, but essentially these values will become virtually commonly held with modern advanced cultures of the West. These values may very well be considered the lesser ones by the possessors of idealized values because of their foreignness. They may well be considered lesser values by outside observers as well, to whom they may appear

to be an imitative sub-variant of essentially Occidental values. Irregardless of such liabilities, this variant amalgam of aesthetic values, because of its compatibility with the emerging compartmentalization of Japan's life style, seems very likely to become the dominant type in an industrialized Japanese culture. Whether or not the next century is the "Japanese Century," a la Herman Kahn, these emerging values, compatible as they are with a hyper-industrialized culture, may well be the sources from which other peoples will learn to cope with their ambivalence when confronted by conflicting desires for material "progress" and maintenance of their traditions. In a world forced to confront, adjust to, and manage the excesses of the industrial and post-industrial ages, Japan's admittedly imperfect probable accommodations may well serve other peoples as an example.

ERRATA

Y. Mansoor Marican's "The Genesis of the DMK" and "Political Nationalism in British India: A Review Article" (December 1971 issue)

A. "The Genesis of the DMK"

1. P. 340, par. 3, line 3: literacy
2. P. 340, footnote 1: Dravida Progressive
3. P. 340, footnote 3: R. Bhaskaran
4. P. 342, par. 1, lines 2-3: Representation *was* far below . . .
5. P. 342, par. 2, line 1: H. E. Stokes, *an* Acting . . .
6. P. 344, Table 1.5, Title: . . . According to *Province* . . .
7. P. 346, lines 10-11: It is perhaps worth labouring the point *that ritual and caste taboos were stronger and more deep-rooted* in the South than in other parts . . .
8. P. 352, par. 1, line 6: Tirunelveli (1920)
9. P. 353, par. 3, line 1: . . . political activities *through* one . . .
10. P. 355, par. 4, lines 2-3: . . . important consequence was *that* it led . . .
11. P. 357, par. 3, line 3: the attempts by the DK to glorify *the political and cultural past of the Tamils*, the radical . . .
12. P. 357, par. 3, last line: Anbazhagan
13. P. 360, par. 1, line 2: . . . of power from *the* British . . .
14. P. 360, last par., line 2: However, *within* the DK . . .
15. P. 361, par. 2, last line: "Keep off elections" *sign*.

B. "Political Nationalism in British India: A Review Article"

1. P. 365, fn. 5, line 4: "nationalism" *from* "patriotism".
2. P. 366, par. 1, line 10: . . . the citing *of* objective . . .
3. P. 367, par. 2, line 7: . . . Rejai . . .
4. P. 367, last par., line 3: . . . or no *historical* . . .
5. P. 370, lines 9-10: "microscopic . . .
6. P. 374, par. 1, lines 15-16: . . . argues *that their* common . . .
7. P. 379, par. 2, line 9: this principle is "*not* modernistic . . .
8. P. 365, fn. 6, last line: International *Studies Quarterly*.

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 - v. 7. 1969. April, August & December.
 - v. 8. 1970. April, August & December.
 - v. 9. 1971. April, August & December.
 - v. 10. 1972. April
- (2) Asian Studies Newsletter. Monthly. v. 1, No. 1, June 1964 to v. 2, No. 1, June 1965. (Ceased)
- (3) Lipunan. Annual—1965. v. 1. (Out of print)
Lipunan. Annual—1966-67. v. 2—\$4.00/₱4.00
- (4) Newsletter. Bi-monthly. Pub. by the Asian Center in cooperation with the Committee for Asian Studies Center. March/April 1969; May/June 1969. (Free upon request)

Occasional Publications

- (1) Aspillera, P. S. A common vocabulary for Malay-Pilipino-Bahasa Indonesia. 1964. 101 p. \$2.00/₱5.00
- (2) Monograph series:
 - No. 1—Kanai. A diary of W. Cleveland. 1965. 43 p. \$2.00/₱6.00
 - No. 2—Jocano. Sulod Society. 1968. 303 p. \$5.00/₱15.00
 - No. 3—Lawless. An evaluation of Phil. culture-personality research. 1969. 57 p. \$2.00/₱6.00
 - No. 4—Benitez. Politics of Marawi. 1969. \$2.00/₱6.00
 - No. 5—Majul. Muslims in the Philippines. 1973. \$15.00/₱39.50
- (3) Occasional Paper No. 1—
Saniel, J. M. ed. The Filipino exclusion movement, 1927-35.
\$2.00/₱6.00
- (4) Bibliography series—
 - No. 1—Philippine Evangelical Protestant and Independent Catholic Churches by Robert Von Oeyen, Jr. 1970. 80 p.
\$5.00/₱10.00

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