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THE MAY FOURTH MOVEMENT AND THE ORIGINS OF CHINESE MARXISM

LUIS V. TEODORO, JR.

THE UPHEAVAL that occupied the People's Republic of China from 1966 onwards — an upheaval without parallel anywhere else in the contemporary world because it was an upheaval encouraged and later directed by its own recognized leader, Mao Tse-tung, and by a party in power — was in its early stages depicted in the West as something so utterly out of the ordinary in the context of Chinese events as to be the prelude to the disintegration of the regime which, having come to power on October 1, 1949, had proceeded to embark on the twentieth century's most remarkable experiment in social engineering. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, as it has come to be officially known, was generally presented in the West as if Chinese history, particularly during the twentieth century, had not been marked with even greater disturbances than the controlled phenomenon that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was.

This assumption is of course utterly without basis. It need not be stated here that the history of China in the twentieth century has been one of perpetual change, that the great event of October 1, 1949 was merely the culmination of more than fifty years of great events. I would like to suggest in this paper, therefore, as it has been suggested by other writers, particularly by Mao Tse-tung[1] himself and by Han Suyin,[2] that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is but a continuation of the Chinese cultural revolution against imperialism* and feudalism. The beginnings of this cultural revolution may be found in the events and developments known as the May Fourth Movement, the

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, "The May Fourth Movement," "The Orientation of the Youth Movement," and "On New Democracy." *Selected Works,* Vol. III (London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1954), pp. 9-11; 12-21; 106-156.

[2] Han Suyin, *The Morning Deluge: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Revolution,* 1893-1953 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972), pp. 84-101.

* "Imperialism" is here used in the sense that it has been defined in V. I. Lenin's *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism.*

effects of which extended to the conversion of many Chinese intellectuals to Marxism, and, consequently, the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party.

I

The Confucian view of the immutability of the social and political order was, by the end of the nineteenth century in China, being severely challenged by events. "The ways of heaven," according to Confucian doctrine, "do not change." But, unable to cope with an outside world where tremendous advances in technology and the rise of imperialism had brought about the growth of forces the Middle Kingdom could no longer dismiss as cavalierly as she did in the past, the Empire had suffered its greatest humiliation in 1895, when its armies were defeated at the hands of a modernized Japanese army, which Japan was to use as its main weapon in its search for raw materials and new markets in the Asian continent. This disaster was followed by the near-partition of China among the foreign powers, by the abortive response to imperialism known as the "hundred days' reform" of 1898, and by the Boxer Rebellion of 1899-1900, which had brought armed intervention by the foreign powers in the suppression of what was, after all, an internal Chinese problem.

The twentieth century did not bring relief from domestic difficulties exacerbated by external pressures. Despite the fall of the Manchu (Ch'ing) Dynasty in the Revolution of 1911,[3] hopes for the establishment of a republican regime floundered on the ambitions of politicians and the jockeying among the imperialist powers for positions of advantage in a China without the Manchus.

Yuan Shih-k'ai, who, as Imperial Commissioner in charge of all of China's armed forces under the Manchus had been given the task of saving the dynasty but who had instead collaborated with the rebels in destroying it, was provisional President of China. From all evidence available, Yuan was a self-seeking careerist whose essentially conservative outlook could not be the source of social change in China. The republic-in-name that he now headed had a treasury that was practically empty, and he turned to the foreign powers, which were eager to preserve their treaty rights and special privileges, for help.[4]

[3] O. Edmund Clubb, *Twentieth Century China* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 23-50. Much of the details are from this source.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 44-50.

Though by no means a mass upheaval, the Revolution of 1911 had nevertheless given expression to the spirit of Chinese nationalism, which demanded resistance to foreign impositions and the elimination of domestic autocracy. Yuan's actions revealed very little intention to pursue the former goal, and, though the Manchus had been overthrown, domestic autocracy was soon revealed to be far from ended.

Moving swiftly to consolidate his position, Yuan proscribed the opposition and quickly gained the approval of the foreign powers scrambling for ascendancy in "Republican" China. By 1914, with the opposition silenced, Yuan Shih-k'ai ruling by fiat, and fundamental social reforms nowhere in sight, the impact of the First World War, which had begun in August, was being felt in China.

As the treaty ally of Great Britain, Japan had entered the war against Germany in August and had swiftly occupied the German concession in Shantung and other parts of China as well. Yuan Shih-k'ai protested, but not too strongly.

Taking advantage of the confused international situation, Japan, upon entering the war in August, served an ultimatum on Germany demanding the transfer to Japan of the entire territory of Kiaochow, which had been leased to her by China for ninety-nine years in 1898 after she had seized the area by force, using as pretext the killing of two German Jesuits by disbanded Chinese soldiers. Japan promised the eventual restoration of the area to China, and in the next year, 1915, seized Kiaochow and the greater part of Shantung province, where Confucius and Mencius had been born, taught and died. Japan clearly did not intend to restore the area to China, but had instead used her commitment on the side of the Allies as a lever in a bid to displace Germany in the foreign looting of China.

On January 18, 1915, Japan therefore served on the Yuan Shih-k'ai government the notorious twenty-one demands, which, divided into five groups, sought to subordinate China to Japanese interests. Among others, the demands provided for the confirmation of Japan's newly-won gains in Shantung; Japanese control of Mongolia, China's southeast coast, and the Yangtze Valley; the employment of Japanese advisers in political, financial and military affairs; the right of ownership of land for the building of Japanese hospitals, churches and schools; the participation of Japan in the organization and administration of the Chinese police forces in certain places; Chinese purchase from Japan

of fifty per cent or more of the total quantity of her munitions or the establishment in China of jointly-worked Sino-Japanese arsenals.

Negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese governments dragged on for almost four months, until Japan, on May 7, 1915, presented China with an ultimatum. The Yuan Shih-k'ai government accepted on May 9 the terms set forth in the ultimatum and concluded with Japan a treaty based upon them on May 25. Chinese public indignation, which had been at a fever pitch since the demands were first made known reached its peak upon the Chinese government's acceptance of the ultimatum. Though Chinese officialdom would soon abandon the attempt to regain the territories thus lost and the sovereignty that had been compromised, this event hardened further the spirit of the new nationalism which had been gradually developing among China's progressive intellectuals and other segments of Chinese society, specially the merchants. The cornerstone of this nationalism was the idea that it was necessary to resist such instances of foreign aggression if China was to survive.

Nationalist sentiment was so high that as early as January, 1915, when the demands were first made known, public meetings were already being held to oppose them. A boycott of Japanese goods was soon organized in Shanghai, spreading rapidly to other cities, gaining the support even of merchants specializing in Japanese goods. Though Yuan Shih-k'ai ordered the abandonment of the boycott, it started to spread to the Yangtze ports and to some of the northern cities by April. Though the boycott did not lack further support, spreading so rapidly to the southern cities that a second order for its prohibition had to be issued by Yuan, the treaty had nevertheless been concluded. Many Chinese hoped that the Great Powers would restore the Shantung area to China at the end of the First World War.

II

When the war ended on November 11, 1918, therefore, there was a widespread hope that the national disgrace would also be ended.[5] Chinese intellectual leaders as well as the emerging bourgeoisie hoped that the defeat of Germany had brought about the end of an era of secret diplomacy, intervention in Chinese affairs by the foreign powers, militarism, and dictatorship. They assumed that the territory and in-

[5] Chow Tse-tung, *The May Fourth Movement* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 84-90.

terests seized from China by Germany since 1898 and now controlled by Japan would be restored to her and that the treaty with Japan would be readjusted at the Versailles Peace Conference, which China was attending as one of the victors. China had, after all, supplied the allied powers with the men they needed in their home countries during the critical moments of the war; many Chinese believed that, at least, would be counted in her favor.

Hopes for equitable readjustments were soon dashed to pieces. News from Paris soon reached China that the conference was going to award to Japan the German interests that she had seized in China. During the plenary session of the five Great Powers (the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan) on January 27, 1919, the Japanese delegate announced that Great Britain, France and Italy have signed secret treaties with Japan in February 1917, assuring Japan that after the war they would support Japanese claims regarding the disposal of Germany's "rights" in China. It turned out also that a year later, on September 24, 1918, the Chinese warlord government in Peking (Yuan Shih-k'ai's death in June 6, 1916 has ushered in the division of China into warring warlord fieldoms), had negotiated a secret loan from Japan for the construction of the Tsinan-Shunteh and Kaomi-Hsuchow railroads in Shantung province. On the same day, the Japanese foreign minister had proposed a seven-point agreement concerning Shantung to the Chinese ambassador to Tokyo, who had conveyed his government's acceptance of these proposals, and all arrangements were kept secret until the morning of the meeting on January 28, 1919 of the Council of Ten at the Versailles Peace Conference. The loan for the railroads and the exchange of notes regarding the Shantung question Japan now used as added "legal" bases for her claims on Shantung. Consequently, China lost her case before the Conference, and on April 30, 1919, the Council of Four resolved in secret to transfer all of Germany's "rights" in China to Japan, without any mention at all of Japan's 1914 promise to restore these to China.

Developments in the Conference had been closely followed by China's intellectual leaders and merchants, who were genuinely concerned that the threat and actuality of colonial control should be brought to an end. The first Chinese public reaction to the news of the defeat at the Peace Conference was to demand who was responsible for the disaster. Because the exchange of notes between Japan and the Peking warlord government had been cited as a cause for the failure of China to regain her alienated territories, suspicion grew that it was the Chinese

representatives themselves, with the knowledge and collusion of key government officials, who had sold out the nation's cause. The opinion at home gradually crystallized into the belief that once again China had been victimized, not only by its foreign "friends" but also by the traitors within the warlord government itself.

China's intellectual leaders and her students — particularly those who had been exposed to progressive ideas — were therefore severely disappointed. Many observers[6] noted the unrest among students in Peking, an unrest which clearly indicated that it was only a prelude to other events. By the beginning of May, this unrest had developed into a threat of demonstration against the traitors in the Chinese government and against the shabby treatment the Chinese had received at the hands of the Great Powers at the Versailles Peace Conference.

III

Before the onslaught of the combined forces of foreign imperialism and domestic reaction, Chinese intellectuals, specially those trained abroad, had begun to ask where China was heading, and to look around for the means with which to stave off her march to disaster.[7]

By the turn of the century, most Chinese students abroad were studying in Japan, Europe, or the United States. The ideas these students had encountered were inevitably reflected in their proposed solutions to the Chinese dilemma once they had returned home. It is significant that among the students who had studied abroad, many, including Hu Shih (United States), Lu Hsun and Ch'en Tu-hsiu (Japan) were later to assume leading roles in the May Fourth Movement and in subsequent events in China. Though they were to eventually go along separate paths, there was a general consensus that the country was in a dangerous situation vis-a-vis the foreigners, and that China needed saving.

By the second decade of the twentieth century, therefore, a huge clamor for "new culture," "new learning," "a literary revolution," etc., had arisen among the "new intellectuals" — i.e., those intellectuals who recognized the inadequacies of China's traditional culture insofar as unifying, strengthening and modernizing her were concerned, and who turned instead to Western ideas in order to achieve these purposes. This was aided to no little extent by the return from abroad of numerous

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[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 92-98.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 19-83.

intellectuals. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who was later to play such a prominent role in the early years of the Chinese Communist Party, returned from Japan in 1915. His subsequent establishment of the *New Youth* magazine, which was to become the vehicle for the new ideas that the new intellectuals wanted to disseminate, marked the peak of the cultural reform movement. Hu Shih, who was later to express the American-trained Chinese intellectuals' reluctance to participate in the revolutionary tide sweeping China, also returned from the United States in 1917, and joined the new intellectual leaders. Li Ta-chao, Marxist pioneer in China and one of the Communist Party's first martyrs, returned to China from Japan in 1916.

The situation at home was highly repressive. Specially severe were the laws governing the press, which were in force throughout the reign of Yuan Shih-k'ai and nearly throughout the entire period of the May Fourth Movement (1915-1921). The betrayal of the Republic of 1911 by Yuan Shih-k'ai had assumed an even more glaring form in his effort to have himself proclaimed Emperor; after his death the warlords revealed themselves to be, except in rare circumstances, no less tyrants than Yuan had been. These were manifested in the laws that restricted speech, association and the press, and *New Youth*, therefore, avoided direct political criticism, and declared itself to be committed to the reformation of the thought and behavior of the Chinese youth. Both Ch'en Tu-shiu and Hu Shih, however, no matter how poles apart they were later to be in the latter stages of the May Fourth Movement, believed that the problems of China were rooted in the stagnant traditions and ideology that were the 2,000-year legacy of Confucianism. Both held that it was necessary to destroy these traditions and to awaken their countrymen, specially the youth upon whom they placed their hopes for the building of a New China. Ch'en particularly held that it was necessary to destroy the ideological bases of the monarchical movements, which were using Confucianism in support of their beliefs. *New Youth,* therefore, tried to carry out this program until 1917.

To be sure, the intellectual ferment was not limited to the publication of *New Youth.* In the great cities of China, the pros and cons of using the vernacular, of adapting Western science to Chinese conditions, of the virtues and vices of Confucianism, and other issues, were being debated. Lu Hsun was already writing the essays and stories which were later to earn for him the praise of Mao Tse-tung and the gratitude of the New China. Li Ta-chao by 1918 had expressed his support of the October Revolution in Russia, and on September of the

same year had acquired the services of Mao Tse-tung as his assistant at the Peking University Library, and organized the Marxist Research Society.[8]

It was against this background that the May Fourth Incident of 1919 took place.

IV

The demonstration of May 4, 1919 has traditionally been marked off as the beginning of the May Fourth Movement, which term refers to the series of strikes and other events which followed the demonstration. In a sense, however, the Incident was only the culmination of a series of dissatisfactions and disappointments which had beset China's progressive intellectuals and students. The roots of the Movement may be said to have been nurtured during the period of the twenty-one demands, as a reaction to which an anti-Japanese campaign developed together with a stress on Western ideas of science and democracy, criticisms of traditional Chinese ethics, customs, literature, history, philosophy, religion as well as social and political institutions. Western political and social ideas, including liberalism, pragmatism, utilitarianism, anarchism, and various types of socialism were put forward as yardsticks against which to measure China's traditional culture and as answers to the crisis of Chinese society.

The decision of student organizations in Peking to hold a mass demonstration on May 7, 1919, the fourth anniversary of Japan's ultimatum on the twenty-one demands, indicates that the immediate cause of the demonstration was not only the disaster at the Versailles Peace Conference but also the continuing humiliation that many Chinese felt over the twenty-one demands of 1915.

Events forced the students to advance the date of the demonstration by three days, and on the morning of May 4, student representatives met at the Peking College of Law and Political Science to prepare the demonstration. Representatives from thirteen colleges and universities, including students from the National University of Peking, attended. Of the five resolutions adopted during the meeting, two are of special importance: the decision to undertake efforts to awaken the people of China to the facts of foreign oppression and domestic treachery, and the decision to create a permanent organization of Peking students.

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[8] Maurice Meisner, *Li Ta-Chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. xvi-xvii.

By 1:30 in the afternoon of the same day, over three-thousand students had gathered at the Square of Heavenly Peace (T'ien-an men), representing thirteen colleges and universities in Peking. Though the Peking government had tried to prevent the mass meeting, sending a representative of the Ministry of Education to Peking University at about 11 A.M., the students were not convinced. By two o'clock, therefore. the demonstration had begun moving, with the students distributing leaflets along the way and carrying placards with slogans in Chinese, English and French, the main emphasis of which was the excoriation of the three pro-Japanese officials Ts'ao Ju-lin, Lu Tsung-yu and Chang Tsung-hsiang, and the expression of resistance to the Great Powers. Upon reaching Peking's foreign Legation Quarter, the students were refused entry and the entire procession waited for two hours before being finally told that they would not be permitted to go through the Quarter. The students were attacked by the Quarter police and by Chinese police and troops. The marchers therefore abandoned the attempt to go through the Quarter and instead veered northward, towards the residence of Ts'ao Ju-lin, Acting Minister of Finance of the Peking Government, whom the students considered to be one of the foremost traitors in the Peking Government. The students rushed the house and the police intervened, in the course of which some students were wounded, and some thirty-two arrested. After the arrests, martial law was at once proclaimed for the area surrounding the Legation Quarter. Immediately after the incident, the Peking students began to organize the new intellectuals of the nation in support of their cause. They tried to win the public over through publicity, mass meetings and further demonstrations. In the process they began to establish contacts among the masses of illiterate people and to secure strong support from merchants eager to stave off Japanese competition, and industrialists and workers from the weak capitalist sector of the Chinese economy. The ideas of the student movement therefore spread rapidly throughout the country. "The Movement's aims," as Harvard's Chow Tse-tung has put it, "soon won sympathy from the new merchants, industrialists, and urban workers, and the Peking Government was forced to compromise in its foreign and domestic policies. This victory of the new coalition facilitated the expansion of the cultural and intellectual reforms it advocated."[9]

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[9] Chow Tse-tung, *op. cit.,* p. 1. Much of the details in this section of the paper are from this source.

V

Within two months after the Incident, there followed a series of student demonstrations and strikes, during which the alliance among students, merchants, industrialists and workers was further strengthened. Though it seemed to be, on the surface, purely a student movement, the May Fourth Movement was the logical result of the teachings of the new intellectual leaders, namely the professors, teachers and writers who had provided the inspiration for the movement by stimulating student interest in the affairs of China and the world. The students were enthusiastically supported by the elder intellectual leaders, at the same time that a *de facto* alliance developed between the reformist and revolutionary intellectuals. The new culture movement expanded as a result of this alliance, drawing those hitherto indifferent to it. There was also a rapid increase in the number of new publications and old ones revamped practically overnight along the lines of anti-imperialism that the Movement espoused. A new wave of iconoclasm engulfed the intellectual life of the nation, during which any and practically all ideas which had hitherto been sacred to traditional Chinese culture were questioned.

Political organizations, including the Communist Party of China, developed out of the chaotic period of self-examination that the May Fourth Movement stimulated among the intellectuals. Among those caught up in the tide of the movement was Mao Tse-tung, who became more active in a group called the New People's Study Society. He was editor of the Student Union Publication of Hunan province, which promoted the students' cause and criticized the Government. This publication, a weekly, was consequently suppressed by the military governor of Hunan, which suppression only intensified Mao Tse-tung's activities against the Government and hastened his subsequent acceptance of Marxism by the summer of 1920. In Wuchang, in the fall of 1919, Lin Piao was one of the organizers of the Social Welfare Society and the Social Benefit Book Store. The Awakening Society was founded in Tientsin on September, 1919, and among the most active members was a student newly-returned from France named Chou En-lai.

These developments began to shatter the unity manifested by the diverse forces within the movement. It must be pointed out, however, that the dominant schools of thought that composed the movement derived inspiration from Western ideas, since it was obvious that the traditional ideas that had been held sacred in China for two thousand years had not prevented her humiliation at the hands of the foreigners.

The ideas of liberalism, anarchism, utopian socialism and Marxism therefore gradually divided the new intellectuals into contending factions. "The Movement," again to quote Chow Tse-tung, "gradually became involved in politics, and the united front of new intellectuals collapsed. The liberals (reformists) lost their zeal or turned away from political activity, whereas the left wing (the revolutionary intellectuals) of the Movement took the expedient political step of allying itself with the nationalists to overthrow the warlord Peking regime . . ."[10]

VI

The revolutionary ideology of Marxism was, before the May Fourth Incident, of little interest to the overwhelming majority of the new intellectuals. Li Ta-chao, who was executed by the warlord Peking regime in 1927, just a few months before the Incident, was practically the only partisan of Bolshevism in China. Except for a few of his students, no significant Chinese intellectual had responded to Li's view of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia as the herald of the reconstruction of world civilization,[11] nor to his Marxist view of events. In January, 1919, Li had called on the peoples of Asia to rise against "the European imperialist robbers,"[12] and had written that "only by overthrowing the capitalist classes of the whole world" could the oppressed peoples do away with an international order that permitted the shabby treatment China had received at the hands of the Great Powers. In February of the same year, he had anticipated the outcome of the Versailles Peace Conference, which he called "The European-Division-of-the-Spoils Conference." Throughout all this, many Chinese intellectuals still pinned their hopes on Versailles. The results of the Peace Conference, however, caused many of them to modify, if not totally abandon, their adherence to the theories of Mill, Huxley, Spencer or Darwin. A variety of socialist doctrines, after the May Fourth Incident, began to overshadow those ideas. "The utopian socialism of Saint-Simon, the Christian socialist and agrarian socialist doctrines inspired by Tolstoy, the anarchist theories of Kropotkin and Bakunin, the guild socialism of Bertrand Russell and G. D. H. Cole, and the revolutionary socialism of Marx and Lenin were the ideologies that the new student generation responded to with enthusiasm."[13]

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[10] Chow Tse-tung, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2.
[11] Meisner, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-98.
[12] *Ibid.*
[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

Why, of all ideas from the West, the theories of socialism should have gained more adherents, was only logical. For many Chinese intellectuals, the idea of socialism represented the highest ideals of Western democracy. It rejected, however, the existing political and social order in the West and the exploitative relationship between the Western powers and imperialist Japan on the one hand and China on the other. The adherence of many intellectuals to some variety or another of socialism was therefore a reflection of their affirmation of Western intellectual influence at the same time that it was in harmony with the powerful currents of nationalism and anti-imperialism which the Chinese experience at the hands of the Western powers and of Japan had forced on much of the nation. In a word, socialist doctrines, rather than those of Darwinism, liberalism or pragmatism, were the most adequate in describing the Chinese reality and seemed to offer the most adequate means for the realization of a strong and unified China. This was particularly true of revolutionary socialism: it had just brought the Bolsheviks to power in Russia and had created the first socialist state in the world out of the chaos and ruin of the last days of tsarism in that country.

VII

On the heels of the May Fourth Movement followed the establishment in 1921 of the Communist Party of China and the revitalization of the Kuomintang — the political organizations which were later to battle for supremacy in China for nearly three decades. In 1919, however, the long and bloody civil war that was to come later was still far-off; both parties' leaders — or those individuals who were to become its leaders — sprang from the common soil of nationalism and anti-imperialism.

The emergence of the Communist Party of China on the political platform of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism was foreshadowed by Li Ta-chao. Throughout the months of national uncertainty that had preceded the Shantung Resolution, Li had emphasized again and again the need for Chinese intellectuals to be both anti-imperialist and politically active, at the same time that he exhorted his students to go to the villages to liberate the Chinese peasantry.[14]

When the May Fourth Incident broke, therefore, Li Ta-chao became one of the logical rallying points of the student movement. After the first demonstration, Li's library office at the Peking University,

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 101.

where Mao Tse-tung had worked for a time as his assistant, became the regular meeting place of student leaders who had come under his intellectual influence. The Marxist Research Society, which Li had organized earlier, now sent its members to other Chinese cities to spread the ideas of the Movement.

Li's pioneering work as a Marxist — imperfect though his understanding of Maxism was — reaped impressive results because events had shown that it was only a revolutionary ideology which could save China. In the anti-imperialist atmosphere engendered by the May Fourth Movement, more and more Chinese intellectuals were responding to Marxism-Leninism. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, for example, and many others who were later to become prominent in the Chinese Communist Movement, were drawn to Marxism because the Shantung Resolution had so obviously revealed to them the rapacity and treachery of the imperialist nations.

Ch'en had earlier maintained a posture of political non-involvement, but the May Fourth Movement caused him to abandon that position. So involved in Political action did he become that he was arrested on June 11, 1919 while distributing leaflets in the streets of Peking. He spent eighty-three days in prison, after which he resigned his professorship at Peking University and left for Shanghai, where less than a year later he announced his adherence to Marxism.

Li Ta-chao, on the other hand, had proclaimed his commitment to Marxism before May 4, 1919. But the Incident did strengthen his conviction that only Marxism could save China, and, in a debate initiated by Hu Shih, Li Ta-chao defended his Marxist views so intensely as to suggest the profound effect the Movement had had on him.[15]

The radicalization of many Chinese intellectuals soon began to break down the unity of the Movement. Hu Shih, the American-trained disciple of John Dewey, representing the reformist intellectuals, fired the opening salvo of the intellectual debate. In a series of articles, Hu argued against the adoption of "isms" and doctrines, and instead suggested that what was necessary was the study of practical social problems. Doctrines advocating fundamental solutions to social problems, according to Hu, were not only irrelevant but were also hindrances to their solution.

In a letter to Hu, Li Ta-chao argued that specific social problems could not be solved without the participation of the masses, and that it was therefore necessary to instill among them a consciousness of the

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[15] *Ibid.*, p. 105-106.

problems of society as a whole, to which they could relate their own individual problems. In such a situation, a theory of society was important: it could provide the people with an idealism and a common direction. Li asserted the need for intellectuals to go out and work "in the practical movement," which to him meant the propagation of socialist theory and its advocacy "as a tool to eliminate the non-laboring bureaucratic robbers."[16] More important , Li, even at that early period, foreshadowed the later admonition by Mao Tse-tung for the revolutionary to study the real conditions of the world, and to adapt the theory to those conditions.

The issues were joined: between the conservative view that China's problems could be solved through evolutionary social reform as advocated by Hu Shih, or through revolution. It was obvious, however, that the ideas of John Dewey which Hu Shih advocated were largely irrelevant to China's problems. As Maurice Meisner states in his intellectual biography of Li Ta-chao:[17]

> "Hu Shih had formulated his ideas in terms of the American philosophical and sociological tradition . . . The philosophy and sociology of John Dewey did not need to be concerned with the structure of society as a whole because in the American social context it could be optimistically assumed that the whole world would take care of itself. Dewey's program was essentially conservative, assuming that reform would take place within the framework of existing institutions; but it was a product of a society that could afford conservatism, a society that could solve particular social problems because there already existed a viable social structure and a general consensus on the direction of social progress . . ."
>
> "As applied to China, Dewey's program was neither conservative nor radical but largely irrelevant. After the Revolution of 1911 China was confronted with a crisis of social, cultural and political disintegration of massive proportions. The extreme poverty and widespread illiteracy of the masses of the Chinese people and the lack of even the rudiments of responsible political authority negated the possibility of the general social consensus that Dewey's program presupposed. Because of the overwhelming social crisis within and the threat of foreign aggression from without, the very existence of the Chinese nation was in doubt at the time . . . To advocate the study of particular social problems and to call for social reform (piecemeal) was to assume that there existed or would soon arise a viable social and political structure within which problems could be studied and reforms imple-

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 106.
[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 107-108.

mented. This assumption was unwarranted either by the existing situation or by any realistic hopes for the immediate future. In view of the total crisis of Chinese society, Dewey's program was doomed to failure."

The debate, however, did reveal the imperative of transforming words to action. Marxism is, after all, not simply an intellectual position, but also a guide to action. By mid-1920, therefore, Li Ta-chao and Ch'en Tu-hsiu were ready to assume the leadership of a revolutionary political party. The Communist Party of China was therefore established in July, 1921. Among those present in the founding meeting was Mao Tse-tung, formerly Li Ta-chao's assistant.[18]

VIII

Himself profoundly influenced by the events of the May Fourth Movement, Mao Tse-tung, writing in 1939 in commemoration of its twentieth anniversary, saw it as an indication that "China's bourgeois democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism had reached a new stage."[19] The Movement was an expression of the cultural level of the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution, but it had one important difference from previous cultural revolutions,[20] "As a result of the growth and development of the new social forces in that period, there arose a camp which later became a powerful force in China's bourgeois democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism, i.e., the camp composed of China's working class, student masses and young national bourgeoisie . . . This showed that the May 4 Movement had advanced a step further than the Revolution of 1911 . . ."

The May Fourth Movement was the dividing line between an earlier stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China and a later, higher stage, which saw the emergence of the revolutionary intelligentsia, and an awakened working class in alliance with the progressive bourgeoisie. In the essay "On New Democracy,"[22] Mao asserts that "on China's cultural or ideological front, the period preceding the May 4 Movement and the period following it form two distinct historical periods." Before the Movement, "the struggle on China's cultural front was a struggle between the new culture of the bourgeoisie and the old culture of the feudal class . . . the ideology of the new learning played

[18] Han Suyin, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-116.
[19] Mao Tse-tung, "On New Democracy." *Selected Works* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1954), pp. 143-146.
[20] *Ibid. passim.*
[21] *Ibid.*

the revolutionary role of fighting the Chinese feudal ideology and was in the service of the bourgeois democratic revolution of the old period . . . But since the May 4 Movement, things have gone differently. Since then a brand new cultural force of fresh strength has appeared in China, namely, the ideas of Communist culture guided by the Chinese Communists: the Communist world outlook and the Communist theory of social revolution. The May 4 Movement occurred in 1919, and in 1921 the Chinese Communist Party was founded and China's labour movement actually began . . .

"Before the May 4 Movement, the new culture of China was a culture of the old-democratic character and a part of the capitalist cultural revolution of the world bourgeoisie. Since the May 4 Movement, it has become a culture of new-democratic character and a part of the socialist cultural revolution of the world proletariat . . .

"What is called new democratic culture is the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal culture of the broad masses of the people . . . New democratic culture is, in a word, the anti-imperialist, and anti-feudal culture of the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the world proletariat . . ."

Though some Chinese scholars have taken exception to this view of the Movement,[22] it is true nevertheless that the Movement profoundly affected historical developments in China. It convinced many Chinese intellectuals, rightly or wrongly, that the only adequate response to imperialism was the revolutionary socialism of Marx and Lenin. In a profound sense, the Movement was the training ground, the staging point for the future leaders of the Chinese Communist Movement, and the crucible which convinced them that the main platforms of the Chinese Revolution after 1919 should be the determination to put an end to the twin evils of imperialism and feudalism, which had so devastated and humiliated China that, paraphrasing Maurice Meisner, her very existence as a nation had been placed in doubt.

[22] Chow Tse-tung, *op. cit.* pp. 338-368.

STUDIES OF URBAN POVERTY IN THE PHILIPPINES*

KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID
AND OFELIA REGALA-ANGANGCO

Much of the interest in urban poverty research in the Philippines has been generated by various programs, predominantly by the government, to relocate or resettle the groups of people generally referred to as the urban poor. The first resettlements of squatters undertaken by the Philippine government was in 1930. Actually, viewed within the context of a world system, the Filipinos first experienced resettlement in the latter half of the sixteenth century when because of Spanish colonialism they became squatters in their own land. The Spanish resettlement programs, implemented to ensure efficient colonization, relocated people settled in more or less independent units into larger settlement sites run by the Spanish authorities and specific religious orders. In a sense, the Spanish resettlement programs parallel present-day resettlements and yet in another sense, they do not, because resettlement in those days was aimed at bringing people together in certain areas while resettlement today is more of decongesting already congested sites.

Interest in urban poverty from the ranks of social scientists came more than two decades after the 1930 squatter resettlement. The effects of World War II, the exodus of rural migrants to the big cities in search of opportunities for a better life and the unstable peace and order situation in the countryside saw rapid increases in population in the urban centers. Consequently, focus on these "specialized communities" and the social problems they spawned also increased.

Flora Celi Lansang's "Profile of a Manila Slum," an M.A. thesis submitted in 1951, is perhaps the first attempt to describe a slum -- its physical characteristics, the dwellers and their way of life. This

* The authors would like to acknowledge the help of Socorro de Leon and Mario Reinhold Mapanao, research assistants, in the preparation of this paper.

was followed in 1955 by Fe Rodriguez Arcinas' "A Socio-Economic Study of Manila Squatters" which was a survey of five Social Welfare resettlement and housing projects.

From the middle sixties to the present, studies on this topic have steadily increased both in number and in scope. For example, between 1960 and 1970, eleven studies have been conducted, and from 1970 to the present, twenty-five more studies have been completed. These studies are mostly empirical. The rest are either policy-related articles, reviews of other studies or papers based on existing data.

These studies, however, tend to be focused on particular communities and tend to be isolated from each other, thus the term "urban poverty" as used in these studies automatically conjures a picture of difference in urbanity or urban "normality" with small pockets of urban poverty. However, socio-economic reality in present Philippine society should be viewed more properly as consisting of pockets of urban affluence surrounded by a mass of urban poor. To lose sight of this reality is to study poverty in isolation.

While the task of understanding any aspect of social reality is a continuous process, simply increasing the number of studies as has been the trend, does not necessarily lead to a greater understanding of the topic. This process may in fact over-develop certain aspects and obscure others thereby giving a lopsided picture of social reality. This paper is thus written to critically evaluate urban poverty research in the hope of pointing out certain gaps in the focus of study. Hopefully, this paper aims to contribute to the formulation of a framework through which urban poverty may indeed be more sociologically understood.

Necessarily, therefore, the first and most immediate task is to present the findings of various studies on urban poverty in a fairly organized manner. More than eighty studies both empirical and non-empirical, were reviewed. Of this number, thirty-eight have been taken to form the case for the present paper.

At the outset, it was pointed out than urban poverty is, in a sense, a misleading concept because it presents a picture which does not accurately portray reality. Perhaps a more vivid picture is presented by the word "slum," which in this paper will be used interchangeably with "urban poverty," to refer to the people and their way of life.

I

The setting of urban poverty studies is the slum. While the term is usually applied only to areas composed predominantly of make-shift shanties, the characteristics and consequent deprivations of slum life can also be found in other low-cost housing areas. For the purposes of this paper, the squatters, those who rent plots of land on which to pitch their shanties, those who rent shanties, resettlement sites, government tenement houses as well as low-cost apartment dwellers will be lumped together. Most of the studies, however, are on the first four types mentioned and the latter two are covered only by a few studies.

Slums seem to sprout in the most unlikely places and in most cases expand at an alarmingly fast rate. The typical slum or squatters' area is congested both in terms of houses and people. What pass for houses are often over-sized box-like structures, usually on stilts or set on earthen floors, constructed with both light and strong materials. The former could be anything from flattened petroleum cans to large pieces of cardboard, all of which are scrap materials which can easily be moved or dismantled.

Occasionally, in between the shanties, one finds a comparatively well-built dwelling unit which is equipped with urban facilities such as water, electricity and a toilet. For the average slum dweller, however, these are luxuries. The "affluent" slum dwellers' electrical connections are usually tapped by his neighbors for free. Water supply sources are varied: public faucets, pipes, artesian wells or in not a few cases, water is bought and sold as a prime commodity. Without a steady supply of water, sanitation facilities are almost non-existent. The usual way of disposing waste is the "wrap-and-throw" method. Waste is wrapped in old newspapers and either piled up together with the garbage heap or thrown directly into nearby rivers and its tributaries.

Words can never capture the physical condition in the slums, the congestion, the absence of drainage facilities and the consequent stagnant fetid water which becomes the breeding ground for disease, the never-ending wait for the trickling of water from leaking pipes and public faucets, the shanties which provide the very minimum of shelter, and the people who live through it all. Needless to say, low-cost apartment and tenement dwellers are in a comparatively better position although they still suffer from many of the disadvantages characteristic of slum life.

II

The slum dweller's profile is essentially the same in all studies with minor differences arising only through time, across occupational categories and between the "less poor" and the "more poor". The typical slum dweller is relatively young, usually a migrant, has a meager income, barely possesses an elementary education, is employed in the lowliest occupations and thus, is both socially and economically exploited.

The slum dweller's mean age seems to have progressively decreased. In 1963, Aquino and Lacquian found that roughly fifty-three per cent of their respondents were above forty. In 1966, Arcinas and Angangco found that eighty-eight per cent of the squatter community studied with a total population of 1,065 were below forty years old. In 1968, Lacquian's findings showed that sixty-eight per cent of 2,625 household heads were under forty-two. In the same year, Stone and Marsella in a study of a 200-household squatter community found the average age of male respondents to be thirty-seven. In 1973, Guerrero reported that out of a sample of 200, more than two-thirds were below forty years of age. Another study in the same year by Lopez and Hollnsteiner found the average age to be thirty-nine years for males and thirty-seven for females.

While it may be true that through the years migrants have become younger, based on the findings of various studies, two factors may also account for these differences: the type of occupation and the type of slum area. Certain types of occupations impose constraints on the relative age of the slum dweller. For example, Guerrero found that, compared to other slum dwellers, the hawker is relatively younger with a mean age of thirty-four years. On the other hand, the findings of Hollnsteiner reveal that compared to tenement and apartment dwellers the squatter is younger.

Information on the educational attainment of slum dwellers show that there have been no significant changes from the past to the present. The Arcinas and Angangco study of Pobres Purok in 1966 revealed that the average migrant is relatively well-educated (seventy-three per cent of the respondents had high school to some college education). Lacquian's study in 1968 found that twenty-seven per cent had reached primary school, thirty-five per cent had gotten up to intermediate school, twenty-eight per cent got to high school and five per cent had had some college training. Very few had vocational training. The most

recent studies show similar over-all trends. Within the economic heirarchy of the urban poor, there is a direct relationship between income and education. In addition, Hollnsteiner found that the number of children in a family gets smaller, the higher the educational attainment of the parents.

In terms of the over-all employment picture of the country, the metropolitan Manila area has a higher proportion of unemployed as compared to the rest of the Philippines. Except for Guerrero's finding that fifty-two per cent and thirty-four per cent of her respondents were employed and self-employed respectively, the other studies point to a lower unemployment rate. Many who claimed to be employed were either self-employed or had off-and-on employment. The under-employment rate would therefore be very high.

The slum dwellers' occupations cover a wide range — from white collar workers to blue-shirt wage earners, from skilled craftsmen to unskilled laborers. No single pattern of a predominant occupation emerges, although roughly fifty per cent or more would be skilled workers such as drivers, plumbers, electricians, painters or carpenters. A very small proportion are white-collar workers (managers, small proprietors, sales and clerical workers.) Unskilled laborers would be engaged in such jobs as pier hands, janitors, "peons", factory casuals and the like by a bigger proportion.

Job seekers generally congregate around areas where work is available. This is because of two major reasons: to have a higher probability of employment and to increase one's take-home pay by minimizing transportation costs. Usually, jobs are obtained through the help of relatives, friends and province-mates thus making living in the slum functional for them. Jobs are also abandoned whenever a better-paying and more secure job is in sight.

The empirical studies undertaken indicate that the urban slum dweller is an economically exploited person, oftentimes receiving far less than the minimum wage requirement even if he is fortunate enough to receive a regular income. A cursory look at the income levels reported in studies from 1951 to the present would show that the plight of the slum dweller has become worse with inflation and the rising cost of living.

Out of 264 families studied by Lansang in 1961, only 187 reported a regular source of income. Of these, the average monthly income was sixty pesos. In 1963, twelve years later, the United Nations survey

of squatters noted that only twenty per cent had an income above subsistence which at that time was somewhere between ₱120-180 per month. This finding was consistent with Lacquian's study in the same year which reported thirty per cent having an income below ₱120 per month, twenty-two per cent who worked irregularly and twenty four per cent who could not state their source of income.

Aquino and Lacquian in their 1966 survey of Barrio Magsaysay found twenty-nine per cent of the sample earning below ₱100 a month forty-five per cent earning from ₱100-199 a month and twenty-five per cent in the ₱200 or more bracket. This is consistent with the government Special Committee Report which is based on five studies of different sections of Manila from 1965-1967 which found five per cent of the sample earning less than ₱150 a month. Lacquian's 1967 data also show similar trends with forty-four per cent earning between ₱100-149 a month. Pobres Purok household heads in 1966-1967 had a median monthly income of ₱147.44. Only fourteen per cent of them earned a monthly income above that of the minimum wage law.

The more recent studies showed an increase in monetary income. Hollnsteiner and Guerrero both reported monthly income averages in 1973 of roughly ₱250, although Decaestecker found the monthly income to be ₱121.12.

While income increased from ₱60 in 1951 to ₱250 in 1973, real wages or the buying power of this income has in reality decreased. Had the prices of commodities been frozen, the slum dweller could be said to have improved financially. However inflation has been continuous and the ₱250 income in 1973 was in fact lower in terms of real wages than those in previous years. Slum dwellers each receive an income that is much lower than the various poverty lines that have been set up by different agencies. The fact that an increase in monetary wages does not correspond to greater buying power can be shown through Decaestecker's data where she found slum families spending more than what they earned.

Data show that family and household size varies from four to fourteen member. However, contrary to common belief, most slum families are nuclear rather than extended in nature. On the average, however, families have from six to eight members. This size has not really changed through time. It is significant to note, however, that the higher a family goes up in the educational ladder, the less children it tends to have.

The slum dweller is usually a rural migrant. His place of origin varies primarily because he tends to stay in places where he has relatives and province-mates. Squatter communities have more of his kind than tenement houses which tend to have more of those born in the metropolis.

The rural migrant is usually single, a landless laborer in the countryside who engages in step-migration or movement from village to town to city. According to Hollnsteiner there seems to be three trends in rural to urban migration. The first is the movement to the city of one member of the family, usually the male head, who establishes himself first and then calls for his family. The second trend is where single children go to the city and finding a spouse, eventually sets up a house in the slums. The third pattern involves the migration of young people called to the city by migrant parents.

Based on various studies, migration seems to be due to the following factors:

1. Population pressure upon land resources leading to depletion of natural resources and underemployment in the rural areas;
2. disruption of rural life by war, natural disasters and occasional dissidence;
3. economic opportunities offered by the city;
4. other opportunities, like better schooling, found in the city.

III

Most of the studies with regard to the way people live their lives in the slums seem to be based on the underlying assumption that the patterns of life in the slum are different from those in other sectors probably because of the exigencies of the physical setting and its basic characteristics. The portrayal of slum life, however, runs the entire length from the slum as the breeding ground of evil to the slum as an attractive place to live in.

The economically depressed conditions of slum dwellers impose certain constraints on their way of life. Much of their time is spent earning a living. This includes the children who contribute to the family's meager income by engaging in gainful activities which need minimal or no skills at all like peddling newspapers, sweepstakes tickets and flowers, scavenging and the like. This observation, however, does not conform with actual reports on the employment of minors. Guerrero attributes this discrepancy to the definition of employment which refers to stable or regu'ar work. Children are engaged in jobs which can not be readily classified as such.

Most slum dwellers accept a wide range of low-skilled or unskilled jobs preferably those that are close to their place of residence. Slum dwellers also put in longer hours of work per week. The women, like the children, earn additional income by doing laundry or embroidery work or selling articles and running refreshments stands.

On the whole, the fostering of close kinship ties is prevalent in most slum communities studied. Although in the Pobres Purok study the role of relatives for both initial and present adjustment was not significant since in certain matters relatives could either help bring about positive or negative results, for familial and financial problems relatives were the more frequently consulted. Lacquian maintains that kinsmen are a valuable source of information for available jobs and land to put up houses on. Kinship ties are reinforced by visiting of relatives for different reasons ranging from the purely social to the financial. Guerrero points out that there are two ways of showing concern for one's kin: the "expressive" role, wherein relatives visit each other and the "instrumental" role in which visiting is infrequent but mutual aid is maintained. Both roles are ways of keeping in contact not only with one's kin groups but also with one's hometown. Hollnsteiner supports this by showing that visits to the province by slum dwellers or visits by provincemates are infrequent although in these cases mutual aid becomes the vehicle for maintenance of kinship ties. Again, these patterns of life seem to be predominantly rooted to the economically depressed conditions of the slum dweller.

On the community level, most of the studies seem to point to the fact that being poor encourages a degree of closeness beyond mere sociability, especially when the community is faced with a crisis. Cariño in his study of five slum communities outside the metropolitan Manila area found that a very high percentage of the sample perceived the members of their communities to be cooperative. This is shown through participating in community-wide affairs, extending help during emergencies, forming mutual assistance associations that solicit aid when a member dies or becomes a victim of some calamity as well as obtain assistance from government agencies during emergency situations. Social and religious organizations are also prevalent. These findings are supported by Lacquian's study which point to the importance of the slums in the realm of politics. Their interest in politics, however, is primarily related to their own direct needs that may be satisfied by a winning candidate. Corollary to this particularistic involvement are the various organizations of which the majority

of dwellers in each slum community are members. This is particularly true of more recent years where the threat of eviction and the consequent example of a community's successful fight for their rights has made other slum areas realize the necessity for unity and collective action.

Although the lifestyle of the slum dweller seems to revolve around the task of survival, this does not preclude other activities. However, many of these activities seem to be rooted to their economic necessities. For example, leisure activities are predominantly located in the home. Hollnsteiner points out that slum dwellers stay at home, play with the children, sleep or repair things around their dwelling. Only one out of four reads or listens to the radio, less than one in ten spends his free time drinking, gambling or hanging around. Going to the movies or attending parties is very rare.

This picture, however, is not always consistently presented in all the studies. Jocano for one, describes the slum more in terms of bars and prostitutes, corner stores and street gangs, a picture of hustle and bustle very different from Hollnsteiner's almost pastoral description.

The perceptions of slum dwellers about their way of life as seen in various studies range from very positive to slightly negative — from perceptions of the slum as an almost ideal place to live in to complaints about the inadequacy of essential services and facilities, unemployment and the like. Hollnsteiner says that while outsiders may be critical of Tondo, the resident perceives it in the following manner:

> I was born here, and I intend to live here, raise my children here, and eventually die here. People are very helpful and get along well with one another. I can have the house unlocked with no one guarding it and nothing gets lost. The neighbors will keep an eye on it for you. Furthermore, when a family member dies everyone helps with contributions and other services. Even the rich don't have this advantage. And besides, in Tondo one has no time to be lonely. There are always people in the street . . .

The same author in two other studies finds that the same attitude generally holds true for residents of the slums. Guerrero, Lacquian and Stone and Marsella on the other hand, speak of the common complaints of the urban poor which in effect do not produce as rosy a picture as the previous studies do.

The findings of the various studies on slums for this section are in a sense summarized by Lopez in his study "Living with Poverty" although certain differences will be immediately apparent. As can be

gleaned from the title, the study is concerned with the various ways in which the urban poor adjust to their material deprivation. She lists the following sixteen coping mechanisms:

1. The poor cope with poverty through employment of the household labor force. Of household members in the ten to sixty-four age bracket sixty-four per cent are employed; fifty-five per cent of the households contain two or more working members.
2. The poor put in long working hours beyond the minimum of eight hours per day including weekends..
3. The poor depend on relatives, neighbors, friends, government institutions and civic organizations for aid, repayment of which is not obligatory.
4. Sari-sari store credit is generally utilized as a coping mechanism by the slightly better off among the poor; however, it is generally not available to the very poor.
5. Informal and spontaneous credit mechanisms serve the financial needs of the better off segments among the poor; those at the very bottom have little access to credit.
6. The poor, especially the financially capable, obtain cash by pawning their goods.
7. The poorest restrict expenses to prime necessities and buy in small quantities.
8. The poor avail of low quality, cheap or free goods and services to meet their needs in nutrition and health, housing and utilities, clothing, transportation, and recreation.

   Saving techniques adopted in the acquisition of goods and services:

   a. tolerating low nutrition levels and poor health conditions
   b. accepting substandard housing and utilities
   c. dropping out of school
   d. limiting clothing
   e. minimizing transportation requirements
   f. simplifying recreation

9. The poor move from one place to another within the city, not so much in response to earning opportunities, but for other reasons.
10. The poor hardly avail of extra sources of income through "sidelines" or secondary jobs.
11. Income generating activities are very rarely extended to include minors in the family.
12. The poor do not turn to nature for resources.
13. The poor engage in "games of chance", not to supply additional income, but chiefly for recreation.
14. The poor rarely place dependent relatives and/or children in the care of relatives, friends, government or civic institutions.
15. Only a few of the poor join social groups in the community through establishing organizational membership.

16. A pattern of circular migration is a scarcity, that is, the poor do not go back to the provinces for a temporary respite and subsequently return when they have recovered and prepared themselves for urban life again.

IV

The study and understanding of a peoples' values, attitudes and beliefs, while ultimately rooted to their material conditions, is important if one is to get a total picture of urban poverty. Unfortunately, comparatively fewer studies have concentrated on this topic. Many of the studies to determine and account for the consciousness of slum dwellers do so, only in passing. Furthermore, these studies already assume certain values because the activities of slum dwellers seem to point to them. They take at face value responses of the urban poor to very direct questions with probably fixed alternatives as answers.

An often cited value is that unity. Lacquian attributes this unity to kinship and provincial ties as well as to the common experience of poverty. Disunity, on the other hand, is produced, he says, by gossip, physical proximity of people brought about by congested housing conditions, politics, differences in backgrounds and former closely-knit relations that aggravate feuds. In recent years, the value of unity has been used by social scientists to account for the membership of slum dwellers in various community organizations.

As mentioned in the previous section, the slum dwellers' attitudes towards the community and their neighbors tend to be more positive than negative although very few according to Guerrero are content with their present socio-economic status. It is perhaps this discontent coupled with the reality of their position in society that makes fifty-four per cent of the respondents in Guerrero's study think that they have a fair chance of reaching their aspirations for a better life. Those who are optimistic about the future believe that as long as they keep trying, some improvement in their lives is bound to happen. In addition, education is viewed as one of the primary keys to upward mobility. Those who are pessimistic, on the other hand, complain of the economic conditions, scarcity of jobs or expressed a general feeling of hopelessness. Guerrero, however, says that in general there seems to be no feelings of hopelessness or despair among the poor that she studied.

Despite the multiple problems and expressed dissatisfactions with their present conditions, slum dwellers would rather stay in Manila. Hollnsteiner gives two reasons for this attitude. First, most slum

dwellers have jobs in the city while their hometown offers little or no opportunities. Second, they have become used to life in the slums at the same time that their children go to school in the city. To the slum dwellers then, unless there were jobs, money or capital to start a business with in the province, Manila is the scene where their socio-economic aspirations can be attained.

V

What should be done about the urban poor? The policies of government have changed from resettlement within the city to relocation as close to the city as possible. Many of the studies have focused an evaluating government solutions to the problem of the urban poor while others have tried to come up with recommendations.

Felix, in his study of a government relocation site tried to assess the efficiency of government plans and programs. For instance a clinic was opened and yet it was closed down after a year. The reason was that caring for the physical well-being of people had to be coupled with economic advancement. A man who had tuberculosis was told to rest and to take plenty of milk and eggs. The treatment was obviously impossible since the man was earning two pesos a day. The government then shifted to remedy the economic situation of the people by teaching them skills. Plumbing was taught in a trade school and yet of the fifteen students who started the course only five took the examinations in spite of the incentive of job placement in Manila. The people figured out that the time, effort and money consumed in commuting from the relocation site to the city would eat up most of what they could earn. Even simple programs like home garden cultivation failed because there was hardly any water for irrigation and the people were easily discouraged and bothered by the idea that manual work is menial.

Hollnsteiner says that the basic policy of government is eviction: immediate, imminent or eventual. There are, she says, four strategies which are used. The first is toleration through neglect which only leads to the perpetuation of slums. The second is encouraging slum dwellers to go back to their hometowns. However, as has been mentioned earlier, slum dwellers prefer to stay in the city because they perceive it as giving more opportunities. The third is the multi-storey, low-rent urban housing which people find unattractive because of higher costs, regular payment requirements while their income is intermittent, decrease in neighborliness and interdependence in times of

needs, unfamiliar and threatening physical and social environments and the lure of windfall moving from the sale of rights. Finally, the fourth strategy is relocation to government urban fringe sites which have already been found to fail primarily because squatters were moved into the settlements before services and economic opportunities were available. In fact statistics show that at least fifty-three per cent of relocated families in various government sites left the areas, most of whom returned to the city and its slums.

Social scientists do not agree with government solutions to the problems of urban poverty. This could be seen from the recommendations in their studies of urban poverty which can be categorized to those that deal with solutions on the national level, those that refer specifically to the community level, those that give suggestions for more efficient relocations and those that are relevant to more specific aspects of the problem.

On the national level, a panel of academicians and policy experts an anti-poverty strategies in Asia has suggested the following:

1. To attack directly the poverty of the most deprived and of those below the poverty line by radically overhauling development policies that stress overall economic growth that actually tend to widen income distribution disparities;
2. to modify accordingly the institutional framework, including the structure of government at all levels, the civil service, the planning machinery, as well as the political, economic, and social systems including the channels of production and distribution, in order to meet the essential requirements of the large deprived segments of the population of each country;
3. to bring about the cultural change in the pattern of values not only to promote development but also to sustain it in the interest of the deprived and the dispossessed.

Hollnsteiner maintains that prime solutions to the problem of urban squatting can be achieved by reconceptualizing the legal and social status of the urban squatter, urban land reform, developing a national urban policy and creating sites-and-services communities within the city. Poethig says that the government should take steps to:

1. Build up other centers throughout the Philippines to encourage more even distribution of migration;
2. provide the physical infrastructure programs in these urban centers that would give employment to semi-skilled people and make the areas attractive for the investment of Philippine capital in local industries;
3. develop manpower training programs in these urban centers related to actual job opportunities and to industries that would use the resources of the region;

4. acquire areas close to the cities which can be used for employing and housing low-income people; provide these areas with the facilities necessary to attract industry and to make life livable for the residents . . . ;
5. initiate, in larger urban centers where land for individual house and lot is not possible, a building program of three-to-four storey apartments . . . ;
6. encourage the growth of community organizations among low-income people as a means of developing local participation in the planning process . . . ;
7. discontinue any further relocations of families to resettlement areas . . .

On the community level, Lacquian suggests that a comprehensive urban community development be undertaken which will take into consideration not only infra-structure projects, provision of utilities, beautification and the like but that "its most important contributions are in the fields of social change, especially attitudes, opinions and action changes on the part of community members." Other studies have suggested that what is important is motivational and training programs in order to increase employment. Aside from manpower training programs geared to provide technical as well as managerial skills, it has been suggested that placement bureaus should be established. Small-scale industries should also be established especially in relocation sites. For those who would want to set up or expand their businesses, a system of loans must be established. In addition, to solve the problem of credits, a community emergency fund that would lend money at low interest rates should be established.

Those who view slums as primarily a housing problem emphasize the necessity of taking into consideration certain contingencies which are important to the people. For instance, apart from the usual physical structures, the distance between the residential area and the place of work is an important consideration since transportation costs take up a large portion of their earnings. Guerrero says that another consideration should be the levels of organization and solidarity of communities. She maintains that the more cohesive communities should rate lower in relocation because uprooting these people and thereby disturbing the pattern of social relationships can have serious financial as well as psychological effects.

Finally, there must be a change not only in government policy but the public's attitudes towards slum dwellers. Only if there is a change in the attitudes of the man in the streets can there be a real attempt to solve the plight of the urban poor.

VI

Most of the studies reviewed in this paper start out by answering the question "Who are the urban poor?" Many of the studies end by answering the question "What should be done about the urban poor?" Unfortunately the question, "Why are they poor?," which to us should be the primary focus of any sociological study is rarely accorded as much attention. In fact the answers to this question should give the framework for analyzing the phenomenon of urban poverty and thus dictate many of the things to be studied. At the same time answers to this question should inform the recommendations of social scientists.

Because existing studies generally start and many times end with answers to the question "who are the urban poor?" the studies are predominantly descriptive. General demographic data abound in such studies with successively less data on life patterns and consciousness. It is unfortunate that the last two, especially the latter, have not been treated more extensively because it would be the findings on these topics that could definitely establish whether, in fact, there is such a thing as a culture of poverty distinctly different from the rest of Philippine society.

Apart from the fact that existing studies are generally descriptive, they are studies which exist in isolation both from a historical perspective as well as from the context of the Philippine social structure itself. There have been almost no attempts to establish the historical roots of urban poverty or to compare the slums with other economically different sectors or to see the slums within the perspective of the Philippine system.

What could account for this state of urban poverty research? Perhaps the answer to this question can be found in what seems to serve as the framework of most studies. Some studies say they are primarily descriptive. The other studies, however, imply a certain way of viewing urban poverty from the recommendations that they give as well as from short statements here and there. The reader must be warned, at this point, that what is perceived to be the researchers' framework for analyzing urban poverty is to a large extent an extrapolation.

Existing urban poverty studies seem to view slums and slum life as the outcome of rapid urbanization. This view is however usually subordinated to presenting slum life as a network of adjustive individual behaviours to depressed urban conditions. This leads to studies of coping mechanisms as well as to studies of the way a slum com-

munity hangs together as a social system. The former shows how slum dwellers adjust and adapt to the contingencies of poverty while the latter is interested in the manner in which the slum supposedly generates its own culture of poverty as a response to the exigencies of slum life and how it transmits this to generations of slum dwellers.

There is no intent to minimize the importance of these studies which have not only been the source of collected data on the topic, but also more importantly have brought the phenomenon of urban poverty to the attention of society. However, it would seem that the deeper significance of slum life, escapes consideration when this life is not understood within the context of the larger social reality of which it is a part.

A reorientation of perspective seems necessary. Instead of viewing slums as outcomes of development and consequent government apathy or as individual adjustments to the exigencies of urban poverty, or both, slums should rather be seen as a form of societal adaptation to underdevelopment and poverty. As a societal adaptation, slums are a set of conditions created by society as a consequence of its failure to confront the structural determination of urban poverty. These conditions are brought about by basic contradictions in the system itself. The economic life of the urban areas feeds upon the cheap labor provided by migrants to the city. Yet, the depressed wages with which they are paid are grossly insufficient to take care of their most basic needs. The city, however, must provide a place for these people because they serve a vital function in the productive system.

The basic contradiction mentioned above shows in the manner in which slum life is comprehended. Such patterns which have been variously called in the literature of urban poverty as coping mechanisms, adjustive or adaptive behavior or the culture of poverty are often observed to be functional for the slum dwellers themselves. Slums are condemned on the one hand, yet, on the other, slum dwellers are shown to be well-adjusted to slum life. The slums are even ironically taken as an avenue of social mobility for people who are otherwise disadvantaged in many ways. This is a very curious logic: the adjustments that men make to certain material conditions are taken as evidence that these conditions are functional for the people.

Where men build a whole pattern of life around certain objective conditions, to ask and to marvel at how well this way of life allows men to survive these conditions is to comprehend only half of the

issue. To complete the picture one must also ask what determines these objective conditions and to what extent these conditions are determined by the requisites of the larger whole. Is it possible that the objective conditions are dictated by the necessities of a larger system, both national as well as international? If so, to help people to adjust better to the conditions of slum life, as most of the recommendations seem to suggest, would in fact be to concede the permanence and morality of the objective conditions and thus to postpone much needed structural change in favor of stop-gap measures to cushion the terrible effects of existing reality.

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SOCIAL DISTANCE IN ILOILO CITY:
A Study of Anti-Chinese Attitudes in the Philippines

JOHN T. OMOHUNDRO

In April, 1971, a demonstration by Filipinos in Iloilo City against a raise in gasoline prices turned within a few days into resentment against the Chinese for alleged hoarding of commodities, and culminated in a rock-throwing "riot" that caused one hundred thousand pesos damage to downtown Chinese stores. The Central Philippine region where Iloilo City is located has always been known as an area of relatively amicable relations between Chinese and Filipinos. But that does not mean that there are not serious difficulties in their interrelations. Arriving in Iloilo City soon after the riot of 1971, I repeatedly heard educated, urbane Ilonggos (natives of the region) express blatant, anti-Chinese sentiments.

* * *

"I've heard that when Chinese babies die, the reason they are not buried is because they are used in seasoned salt Chinese make. Is it true?"

* * *

"The solution to the Chinese problem is mass deportation."

* * *

This paper is dedicated to the premise that ameliorating such anti-Chinese attitudes is possible and necessary. But first those who would hope to change those attitudes must more fully understand them. Here, I shall examine the character of Filipino prejudice against the Chinese. I shall also present a survey of anti-Chinese attitudes which partly eliminates the weaknesses of previous studies.

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* This paper is based upon fieldwork in the Chinese merchant community of Iloilo City, Philippines, during 1971-1973, under the joint sponsorship of the University of Michigan and the Institute of Philippine Culture. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the National Institute of Mental Health for this project.

I

Filipino relations with their immigrant Chinese minority have never been smooth. Since the sixteenth century when Spain colonized the Philippines and began to keep records, as well as to influence the relations of Filipinos and Chinese, there have been deportations, riots, restrictions, and occasionally even massacres (Felix 1966). Mass deportation and mass murder are fortunately a thing of the past, but the position of the Philippine Chinese with regard to Filipino culture, politics, economy, and even citizenship is still highly unsettled and a cause for anxiety among the Chinese and outside observers. Disturbingly, this unsettled position of the Chinese provokes little sympathy from the Filipinos (Bulatao 1974), who apparently feel that Chinese economic power in the country adequately compensates them for their handicaps. Instead, the Chinese serve as scapegoats for many of the ills of the country: political corruption, inflation and hoarding, the black market, and communist subversion.

The similarity of the Chinese in Southeast Asia and the Jews in Europe has frequently been alluded to and occasionally analyzed (Eitzen 1968; Wertheim 1964). But the comparison does break down at certain points of importance for this paper. Weightman and Coller have already drawn attention to these differences for the Philippine Chinese. The Philippine Chinese, for example, are immigrants from a nation that is now thriving and (perceived as) a serious threat to the security of the Philippines. This was not the case for the European Jews. There are also qualitative differences in cultures and personalities between the Jews and gentiles in Europe, on the one hand, and the Chinese and Filipinos in Asia, on the other. The cultural differences, especially, may be great enough to require more than one definition of the very nature of the prejudice.

There are many facets to the "dynamics of animosity" between the Chinese and Filipinos. There is both class-hatred and city-hatred in Filipino anti-sinicism. Most Filipinos are poor and rural, whereas most Chinese are middle class and urban. There is even an element of "group self-hatred" in Filipino attitudes. That is, the Chinese are rejected for representing the oriental elements in Filipino culture and physique which must be eliminated in order to be more fully "westernize" (Weightman 1967). For the many educated Filipinos, with their strong sense of nationalism, the Chinese are feared as fronts for and supporters of an imported communism from China. The Chinese con-

centration in the vital and profitable commercial sector of the economy has been somewhat forced on them historically, but nevertheless their success has been an obstacle to a rising Filipino commercial class. Such direct competition, even more than economic dependence, has and will precipitate expressions of animosity.

Not all regions and social strata of Filipinos feel the same way about the Chinese, but there has been little careful inquiry into variation within the country. It is popular knowledge that the Ilocano-speaking regions of Luzon are the most anti-Chinese, whereas the Muslim Filipinos of Mindanao are considered in the main very tolerant. The Ilonggo- and Cebuano-speakers of central Philippines, popularly considered easy-going sorts, harbor less animosity and express it less than the Tagalog speakers of Manila. It remains to be shown that these popular conceptions are a social reality.

Researchers have perpetuated a number of basic errors in examining Filipino stereotypes of Chinese and social distance from them. Sampling was often haphazard and most of the population of the Philippines was never represented. Cities other than Manila have rarely been surveyed. Tests were usually in English and tediously long for the respondents, who were often students in the major universities in Manila. Chester Hunt has argued that these persons represent the decision-makers in the nation's near future. But so large a segment of the Filipino population is omitted by this reasoning that any real understanding of Filipino prejudice cannot be achieved.

Sampling problems are rather insignificant in comparison with the cultural appropriateness of the tests used. Most tests were developed in the United States with white anti-Negro prejudice in mind. George Weightman has consistently called attention to the culture-bound nature of the social instruments, for example. He argues that the particularism of Filipino social relationships makes prejudice more differentiated than in the U.S. The Western paradigms of anti-Negro prejudice do not apply, and the classic Bogardus social distance situations will not scale. Unlike U. S. prejudice patterns, Filipino ethnic animosity against the Chinese for example does not categorically restrict intermarriage between individuals. The social distance situations themselves could be misconstrued completely by respondents in Filipino culture, and the analyst, blithely assuming congruence between Filipino and American prejudice, would falsely interpret results. For example, having other ethnic groups for neighbors is far less noxious to Filipinos than to

Americans because the homogeneous community with residential standards is a rarity; expensive homes and squatters' shacks can be found next door to one another all across the nation. Clearly some care must be exercised in choosing the social distance situations to apply to the Filipino context, and even greater care must be shown in interpreting the results.

II

During my anthropological field work in the Chinese community of Iloilo City, the subject of Filipino anti-Sinicism was constantly before me. I was mindful of the limitations of the attitude tests in the Philippine context, but I felt compelled to make some survey of Ilonggo attitudes toward the Chinese. I chose the social distance test, greatly modified from Bogardus' original design, primarily because I was interested in ranking the social situations in which Filipinos would feel more or less comfortable associating with the Chinese.

The social distance test was modified in several ways to reduce some of its assumptions and methodological flaws. I made no assumptions that the items would scale, instead choosing to let the respondents' results determine the specific ordering of the social distance situations from most agreeable to most repugnant. To ease the "distortion of self-report" (Cook and Selltiz) which would result if Filipinos overemphasized their own animosity or tolerance in paper-and-pencil tests, I included the Filipino Muslims and Japanese along with the Filipinos themselves in the test situations. Ilonggos have a great deal of indirect contact with the Muslims of the south, because many Ilonggos have gone to the south to settle. Much of the fighting between Muslims and Filipinos in Mindanao is between Ilonggo farmers-settlers and Muslims. There was also a great deal of contact with Japanese in the towns during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in World War II. At present, Japanese economic presence in the Philippines is everywhere in evidence, but only inhabitants of Manila have any chance for personal interaction with them. I suspected that Ilonggo attitudes toward both groups would be negative, overall. Comparing these attitudes with those toward the Chinese would give a relative measure of the anti-Chinese sentiment. This could be compared also to the Filipinos' attitudes toward their own ethnic group.

Social distance situations which are particularly inappropriate for Filipino culture, such as dancing and unspecified "partying," have been eliminated. Culturally valued relationships, like ritual godparenthood

(*maninoy, maninay*) have been added. The list of social distance situations included most of the usual marriage, work, and residential situations found in tests to U. S. subjects. These twelve situations were as follows:

1. How would you feel about a member of this group as a next door neighbor?
2. . . . a husband or wife?
3. . . . an important government official?
4. . . . a business partner?
5. . . . your daughter's husband?
6. . . . a Philippine citizen?
7. . . . your employee?
8. . . . your son's wife?
9. . . . your boss?
10. . . . a close friend?
11. . . . the spouse of a kinsman?
12. . . . a godparent?

With the assistance of students in the Social Work Department of Central Philippine University, Iloilo City, four neighborhoods in Iloilo City were selected as representative of the range of urban residents. These four neighborhoods were: an expensive suburban subdivision; a less ostentatious suburban subdivision; an urban street near the downtown business district (where most of the Chinese live and work); and a "slum" barrio near the harbor. Using a questionnaire that could be administered orally or written by the respondent, in either Ilonggo or English, the social work students succeeded in completing twenty-eight to thirty interviews in each neighborhood, after establishing some rapport with the respondents to insure their conscientious efforts to report their true attitudes. Forty per cent of the respondents were men and forty-five per cent were over forty years old. Each interview lasted about fifteen minutes to half an hour, and required the respondent to judge each of the four ethnic groups (Chinese, Japanese, Muslim Filipino, and Filipino) on each of the twelve social distance situations. The project was truthfully presented as the doctoral research of the field workers' American professor. According to the workers' notes, there was extremely little hostility to themselves or the project in any neighborhood except the expensive suburban subdivision.

So for the first time, the social distance test was administered to all ages, sexes, and social strata (with the important exception of rural Filipinos). The interviews were short and in a language comfortable to the respondents. Efforts were made to interest Filipinos in making truthful answers. The social situations were made somewhat less culturally irrelevant and were not assumed to scale.

III

The results of these tests show that Ilonggos hold the Chinese at less social distance than they hold the Japanese, while the Filipino Muslims elicit the most negative reactions. (Table 1). Suburban residents and people of the urban barrios have nearly the same social distance from other ethnic groups. In general, the most negative attitudes are held by Ilonggos living in the urban street.

All Ilonggos rank the social distance situations very much in the same way for all ethnic groups (Diagram 1). They are most willing to have close friends, neighbors, and godparents from other ethnic groups, and least willing to have them as sons-in-law, important government officials, and bosses. There are some notable differences in the ranking of the social distance items: Ilonggos rate intermarriage with Filipino Muslims quite negatively, and they rate themselves relatively undesirable as bosses and business partners. There are differences, then, in the way Filipinos order the social distance items for different ethnic groups. The items do not form a proper scale, so one cannot assume that each item is a marker for a certain level of ethnic animosity. Filipinos seem to be willing to judge each ethnic group in each social situation in terms of itself.

There is no significant difference between Ilonggo men and women in their social distance from the Chinese or from their own self-image. There is also no significant difference between the young and the old concerning Chinese and Filipinos (Table 2). The differences between the sexes and the generations are greater concerning the Muslims and the Japanese. Men and young people are relatively less socially distant from Filipino Muslims and Japanese. Young men in particular stand out: they alone view the Japanese with less social distance than they view the Chinese.

DIAGRAM 1

FILIPINO SOCIAL DISTANCE FROM SELECTED ETHNIC GROUPS
ILOILO CITY, PHILIPPINES, 1972[1]

Social Distance Situations Ranked: (Most Positive to Most Negative)	*Chinese*	*Japanese*	*Muslim Filipino*	*Filipino (Self-Image)*	*Overall*[2]
1.	Close friend	Close friend	Close friend	Close friend	Close friend
2.	Business Partner	Business Partner	Citizen of Phils	Husband or wife	Next Door Neighbor
3.	Next Door Neighbor	Employee	Next Door Neighbor	Next Door Neighbor	Godparent
4.	Godparent	Next Door Neighbor	Godparent	Citizen of Phils	Employee
5.	Employee	Godparent	Married to Relative	Wife of Son	Business Partner
6.	Married to Relative	Married to Relative	Employee	Godparent	Citizen of Phils
7.	Husband or wife	Wife of Son	Business Partner	Employee	Husband or Wife[3]
8.	Boss	Husband or wife	Impt. Gov. Official	Husband of Daughter	Married to Relative[2]
9.	Wife of Son	Boss	Boss	Impt. Gov. Official	Wife of Son
10.	Citizen of Phils	Citizen of Phils	Husband or wife	Married to Relative	Boss
11.	Husband of Daughter	Husband of Daughter	Wife of Son	Business Partner	Impt. Gov. Official
12.	Impt. Gov. Official	Impt. Gov. Official	Husband of Daughter	Boss	Husband of Daughter

[1] Kendall's W. of Concordance for the similarity of ranking these 12 items equals .61, on a scale of 0.0 to 1.0
[2] This is a composite ranking for these four ethnic groups. A sum-of-ranks calculation from Kendall's W. of Concordance.
[3] tied scores.

TABLE 1

SOCIAL DISTANCE OF FILIPINOS FROM THREE ETHNIC GROUPS AND SELF-IMAGE, BY NEIGHBORHOOD TYPE, ILOILO CITY, PHILIPPINES, 1972[1]

	Neighborhood Type				
Social Distance From:	*Upper Class Suburb*	*Middle Class Suburb*	*Mixed Urban Street*	*Urban Barrio*	*Overall Average*
Chinese[2]	2.04	2.03	1.57	1.97	1.90
Muslim Filipinos	1.65	1.90	1.22	1.54	1.58
Japanese	1.75	1.90	1.75	1.75	1.80
Filipinos	2.90	3.15	3.25	3.15	3.10

[1] Average scores on twelve social distance items. Scored from 0 — 4, 0 = most negative, 2 = neutral, 4 = most positive. N = 115.

[2] Kruskal-Wallis One-way Analysis of Variance shows that the differences between the neighborhoods' social distance from the Chinese is significant at $p < .001$.

TABLE 2

SOCIAL DISTANCE OF FILIPINOS FROM THREE ETHNIC GROUPS AND SELF-IMAGE, BY SEX AND AGE, ILOILO CITY, PHILIPPINES, 1972[1]

Social Distance From:	*Sex*		*Age*	
	Male	*Female*	*Oover Forty Years*	*Under Forty Years*
Chinese	1.95	1.88	1.84	1.98
Muslim Filipinos	1.80	1.33	1.47	1.70
Japanese	2.04	1.57	1.57[2]	2.04[2]
Filipinos	3.12	3.10	3.08	3.14

[1] Average scores on twelve social distance items. Scored from 0—4, 0 = most negative, 2 = neutral, 4 = most positive N = 115.

[2] Significant at $p <$.*5, by the two-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test of Significance of Difference of Paired Samples.

Ilonggo social distance from the Chinese compared to their social distance from their self-image is examined in detail in Diagram 2. The Chinese are viewed as undesirable bosses, kinsmen, and even Filipino citizens, but Ilonggos are neutral or slightly positive about Chinese as friends, neighbors, godparents, and business partners.

During the social distance interviews, Ilonggos were also asked what they most liked and disliked about the Chinese. Each person expressed in his own words a most positive trait and a most negative trait. While these responses do not present complete stereotypes, they do suggest the aspects of the Chinese stereotype to which Ilonggos assign the most positive and negative values.

Many Ilonggos admire the Chinese as good businessmen (Diagram 3). This attitude is very much in keeping with their desire for Chinese as business partners and godparents: the Chinese are quite capable of making money. Being friendly and generous to Filipinos is also rated highly. This good image of the Chinese relates to their agreeable manner in dealing with customers and their financial benevolence to the Filipino community through charity and extensive public relations efforts. Chinese loyalty to each other and their ability to cooperate get him high marks from Ilonggos, too. This trait most impresses the urban street and urban barrio dwellers — those who live closest to the Chinese business community and depend most on daily neighborhood cooperation themselves. Two other positive characteristics of the Chinese also relate to their diligence in business: thrift and industry. All Ilonggos admire Chinese thriftiness, but it is primarily the suburban groups who admire Chinese industry, being most influenced themselves by the Philippine cultural variant of the "middle class ethic". For most of these traits there is little significant difference between the sexes or the age groups.

There is a wide range of traits the Ilonggos dislike about the Chinese, though they all generally fall under the category of business practices and clannishness. Surprisingly, the most commonly mentioned fault of the Chinese is that "their wives don't control the family purse-strings." Elsewhere (Omohundro 1974) I have discussed at some length the cultural differences in the way Chinese and Filipino families control money and the attending problems for Filipino-Chinese intermarriage. Wives in Filipino culture can own and control economic resources, whereas in Chinese culture as it is maintained in the Philippines, women are propertyless and relegated to receiving an allowance. The poorer

DIAGRAM 2

FILIPINO SOCIAL DISTANCE FROM THE CHINESE AND FROM THEIR SELF-IMAGE, ILOILO CITY, PHILIPPINES, 1972[1]

	Social Situations Ranked	
	Chinese	*Filipinos*
Positive (Average Score 3-4)		1. Close Friend 2. Ego's Spouse 3. Next Door Neighbor 4. Phil Citizen 5. Son's Wife 6. Godparent 7. Employee 8. Daughter's husband 9. Important Govt. Official
Neutral (2-3)	1. Close Friend 2. Business Partner 2. Next Door Neighbor 4. Godparent	10. Kinsman's Spouse 11. Business Partner 12. Boss
Negative (0-2)	5. Employee 6. Kinsman's Spouse 7. Ego's Spouse 8. Boss 9. Son's Wife 10. Phil Citizen 11. Daughter's husband 12. Govt. Official	

[1] N = 115, 4 neighborhoods, all ages and both sexes.

DIAGRAM 3

FILIPINO STEREOTYPES OF CHINESE,
ILOILO CITY, PHILIPPINES, 1972,
N = 132

Most Positive Trait of Chinese	*Proportion of Responses*
Good at Business	32%
Friendly	17
Generous, Helpful	12
Co-operate with Each Other	11
Thrifty	9
Industrious	5
Other Traits	4
No Positive Traits	5
No Answer	5
	100%

Most Negative Trait of Chinese	*Proportion of Responses*
Wife of Chinese Not Allowed to Handle Money	19%
Stingy, Greedy	14
Treat Their Workers Poorly	8
Clannish	8
Dishonest	8
Have Anti-Filipino Attitude	7
Jealous	6
Engage in Practices Bad for Economy	5
Other Traits	14
No Negative Traits	4
No Answer	7
	100%

Ilonggos are most disturbed by this trait, partly because they are most positive toward intermarriage with Chinese. Intermarriage of one's Filipino daughter to a Chinese man can mean economic security for a number of kinsmen, if only the Chinese husband would recognize the wife's right to aid her kinsmen. Perhaps for this reason, men are more disturbed by this Chinese practice than are women. There is little difference between the attitudes of the young and the old.

Ilonggos also find the Chinese stingy and greedy. This opinion predominates in the lower classes, with little sex or age difference. The barrio residents and urban street dwellers are the Filipinos most economically dependent upon the Chinese, and they resent it. Other negative traits of the Chinese which show class differences are Chinese dishonesty, which bothers the upper strata, and the Chinese mistreatment

of workers, which bothers the lower strata, being those most likely to be the employees of the Chinese.

The cohesiveness of the Chinese business community which was often mentioned as a plus also has its negative dimension. Ilonggo men complain of Chinese clannishness. I interpret the women's complaint of Chinese "jealousy" in much the same way. The younger Filipinos are most sensitive to nationalistic issues, perceiving the Chinese as unloyal, anti-Filipino, and engaging in practices bad for the national economy.

IV

The anti-Chinese attitudes of Ilonggos is apparently not as strong as their dislike of Filipino Muslims and Japanese, with whom their contact has been briefer and more intense. In fact, compared to other groups including Americans, Spanish, American Blacks, and South Asians, esteem for the Chinese have been rising among Filipinos since World War II. In the early years after the war, Filipinos ranked the Chinese below Spanish, South Asians, Blacks, and white Americans (Catapusan 1954; Hunt 1956). Later in the decade, however, more carefully done studies indicated that Filipinos placed the Chinese second only to American whites (Kanwar 1956; Berreman 1958). Apparently, as methods improve and a greater variety of tests are used, relative positions of the ethnic groups will continue to vary. Such results might not reflect a change in attitudes among Filipinos. For example, how is one to evaluate a recent test (Willis 1966) using semantic differentials, wherein the Japanese ranked higher than Chinese, Americans, or even the Filipinos themselves?

In Iloilo City, the highest and lowest social strata rated the Chinese more positively than did the middle social stratum. Filipinos of the middle social stratum have been fairly well established as the most anti-Chinese (Weightman 1964). This group includes a large proportion of people from educator or professional backgrounds, persons who are strongly western- and middle class-oriented. This western orientation is at least as responsible for middle class anti-Sinicism as are economic factors of competition and dependence. Upper class Filipinos, like the colonists before them, have always had a role for the Chinese, and are more tolerant, or at least more pragmatic. Almost one-half of the upper class Filipinos in Mindanao claim to have Chinese friends, and nearly seventy per cent of the upper class in Manila claimed to have Chinese friends.

Ilonggos rank the social distance situations for the Chinese very much like Filipinos in other regions. Throughout the nation, more Filipinos favor Chinese as business partners than oppose the idea (Boy Scouts of the Philippines 1974). All Filipinos are neutral or even positive about Chinese as neighbors and godparents (Kanwar 1956). Overall, Filipinos are negative about Chinese as employees or employers, but about sixteen to eighteen per cent of both ethnic groups have had the experience of working for the other (Boy Scouts 1974). Filipinos also oppose intermarriage with Chinese for themselves, their sons, or their daughters. This attitude clearly clashes with reality, because in Iloilo in recent decades over thirty per cent of the men in he Chinese community have been marrying Filipino women (Omohundro 1974). What is striking is that, of situations where Filipinos view Chinese positively (as business partners), there are no actual cases in Iloilo City of such partnerships. But of situations where Chinese are viewed quite negatively (as daughter's husband) there are numerous examples. For their part, many Chinese try to avoid both of these situations, so it is not Chinese attitudes which have fostered this anomaly. Instead, it is likely that Filipinos are evaluating the social distance situations sometimes not in terms of what they feel about the Chinese *per se,* but in terms of what the social situations would indicate about themselves. That is, Filipinos see business partnerships with Chinese as a symbol of (as well as avenue to) secure financial and social status, whereas intermarriage with Chinese is recognized as a practice of the poorer Filipinos. One responds more favorably to the business partner situation in part because it reflects favorably on one's self-image. The social situations are already culturally loaded with value because of the existing social practices in the Philippines. Thus behavior shapes attitudes, sometimes.

There appears to be a north-south continuum in the Philippines of social distance from the Chinese, with the most negative attitudes held in the north. Ilonggos are less negative toward the Chinese than the Tagalogs are, in just about all social distance situations. In occupational situations, Filipinos in Manila are negative toward the Chinese, whereas Filipinos in Mindanao express more acceptance than rejection. (Boy Scouts 1974). Ilonggos are rather neutral about Chinese in occupational situations. Relative frequencies of social contact with the Chinese also follows this continuum: Filipinos in Mindanao report more social contacts per week than do Ilonggos, and Manilans claim

the least contact of all. This is in contrast to the fact that a majority of all Philippine Chinese live in the north, in Greater Manila and surrounding provinces. Why are relations with the Chinese worse in areas where they are more numerous? I suspect that the answers to this question will be more interesting and complex than a simple reference to the Chinese threat of numbers.

Ilonggo positive and negative stereotypes of the Chinese are very similar to those held by other Filipinos. The Chinese are given high marks for their industry, thrift, and general abilities in business (Tan and de Vera 1969; Willis 1966; Berreman 1958). Their trustworthiness is most suspect, however. Most Filipinos also consider Chinese as rather dirty and weak, but Ilonggos prefer to emphasize their channishness and mistreatment of wives.

Relations with the Chinese appears to be improving on the personal level. That is, younger generations claim more Chinese friends than the older generations claim (Boy Scouts 1974). But this conclusion obscures too much of the complexity of the situation and may be based on erroneous measurements. In terms of their attitudes toward the Chinese, for example, there is no statistically significant difference between the young and the old in Iloilo. Attitudes have not greatly changed, although behavior has. Young Chinese and Filipinos — especially those in Iloilo's colleges — now have many opportunities for socializing and thus for making friends, in theory. The facility of the young Chinese in Filipino language and culture has made for them many acquaintances, but few friends in the strict sense of the word (what the Filipinos call *compare*). This does not mean that relations between the young people in Iloilo are atypiccally hostile: I strongly suspect that many Filipinos in the national surveys exaggerate their Chinese friendships. Without playing in the street as children together, or being classmates in public school, or fighting, drinking, and working together, it is extremely unlikely that Filipinos and Chinese would form close friendships. Few of these activities are shared yet by young Filipinos and Chinese in Iloilo.

A more realistic assessment of the trend in Filipino-Chinese relations is that social contacts are easier and more numerous now, but inter-ethnic attitudes are lagging behind and do not always correlate with actual behavior. In any case, true friendship is one of the most elusive of all events in interethnic relations and should not be used as a basic criterion for their improvement.

Is there a likelihood that Filipinos will become more tolerant toward the Chinese when social contacts between them increase? There is a likelihood, but the evidence is mixed. Filipinos with Chinese neighbors are about twice as positive towards the Chinese as other Filipinos are (Boy Scouts 1974). But in Iloilo City, residents of the urban street nearest the Chinese business and residential concentrations were actually the most negative. Neighborhood in the Philippines does not mean what it does in the U.S.. Other factors besides neighborhood may be responsible for these attitudes toward the Chinese. For instance, Filipinos who have social contacts with the Chinese may be a self-selective group. In Manila, students with past or continuous social contact with the Chinese were indeed the most positive towards them (Weightman 1964). But it was also discovered that these Filipinos by other measures were most universalistic, least like the personalistic norm for Filipino culture. It is possible that social contacts with Chinese have produced universalistic social attitudes, but it is more likely that only certain types of Filipinos are prepared to associate socially with Chinese. Until we know this phenomenon better, we cannot predict accurately whether more social contacts will lead to more harmonious relations.

V

In brief, the Chinese are not as negatively viewed as some Filipino ethnic groups or the Japanese. The western orientation of a social stratum seems to be as big or bigger a determinant of its anti-Sinicism than is economic dependence on or direct competition with the Chinese. In some social and occupational situations Filipinos are quite willing to tolerate Chinese, and may actually seek them out. Filipinos from the south have more social contacts and tolerance of Chinese than do Filipinos from the north. Lastly, social contacts with the Chinese are increasing with time, and anti-Sinicism is decreasing. But these changes are not necessarily large or rapid, and vary in different regions of the country. Interestingly, attitudes toward the Chinese are sometimes in direct contrast with Filipinos' actual interaction with Chinese. It is time to devote more research of anti-Sinicism to explaining how such attitudes relate to actual behavior and how both are changing in recent decades.

Anti-sinicism in the Philippines is more than a psychological sickness, made up of irrational leftovers from childhood, maintained in ignorance, and amenable to change through social contact and adult

rationality. But frequently this is the position articulated or assumed in studies of Filipino-Chinese relations. Filipinos rightly sense some genuine Chinese anti-Filipino attitudes which few surveys have revealed but is clearly present (Tan and de Vera 1969). We must recognize too that the Filipinos' entire cultural pattern of personalism means that they do not feel compelled to view the Chinese-as-a-group with anything remotely resembling the close feelings they may have for Chinese-as-individuals. Economic competition aside, Filipinos cannot help but suspect that some of the chaos and venality in their struggling nation is due to the Chinese, who hold a disproportionate and sensitive economic position and whose dedication to the nation is frustratingly uncertain. Prejudice toward the Chinese as a group, in other words, may be an only slightly corrupted perception of actual economic and cultural disparities. It is to be eliminated as soon as possible precisely because it is a short fuse on real and explosive problems.

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WOMEN OF NORTH KOREA — YESTERDAY AND TODAY

SOON MAN RHIM

The Communist regime has had a profound effect on the lives of women in North Korea. The status of women of traditional Korea is to be compared with that of present day North Korea. By "traditional" Korea, is meant, in general, that segment of population between the two extreme groups known as "nobility class"[1] at the top and the "despised people"[2] at the bottom, during the period of the Yi Dynasty (1392-1910).

Historically, especially during the Yi Period (1392-1910), the feudal Confucian influence had made a tremendous mark on Korean culture. Confucianism played a leading role which has the effect of degrading the women's status in traditional Korean society. Confucius had little enough to say about women. But what he did say was decisive and far-reaching in its effect. David and Vera Mace noted in their book:

> He [Confucius] based his whole teaching about human society upon the patriarchal family, ancestor worship, and the duty of filial piety. The function of the women within this system was simple and clear. It could be summed up in one four-letter word — 'obey.' Woman is a creature born to obedience.[3]

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[1] According to Man Gab Lee, six classes, plus an outcaste group, existed in the traditional Korean social system: the royalty, the nobility (*yangban*), the country gentry (*hyangban*), the middle folk (*chungin*), the illegitimate sons of nobility (*soja*), the commoners, (*sangmin*), and the "humble folk" (*ch'onmin*). *Han'guk Nongch'on-ui sahoekujo* (The Social Structure of Korean Villages), Vol. V (Seoul: Korean Research Center, 1960), pp. 4-5.

[2] This class included Buddhist monks, nuns, shamans, buffoons, traveling dancers, singers and the *Paekchong*; and also included private and public slaves. For a detailed account of the "despised people" see Gregory Henderson, *Korea, the Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 53-55.

[3] David and Vera Mace, *Marriage*: *East and West* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959), p. 67.

Throughout her life her duty was to follow the three obediences:

1. Before marriage to obey the father.
2. After marriage to obey the husband.
3. In the event of the husband's death,
   to obey her son.[4]

The quality of her obedience was to be unquestioning and absolute.

These conservative Confucian ideas came into being toward the end of the Koryo Period (918-1392). Numerous writers and commentators of the Yi Period elaborated upon the theme, and drew up detailed rules for women's behavior. Women were required to accept and maintain all these rules which were based on her inferior status. The patriarchal view of women's inferiority was manifested in many ways. Foremost among these was the traditional marriage system.

I

The traditional marriage system in Korea was very severe. Young people did not dare to choose their marriage partners. It was a special feature of the system that parents alone could arrange the marriage of a boy or a girl. Any romance between a boy and a girl was regarded as disgraceful and sinful, and was supposed to be unfilial to parents — even up to modern times (c. 1919):

> The Code of the Yi Dynasty, which continued in Korea until 1910, declared a love marriage to be illegitimate and subject to punishment.[5]

Girls were usually betrothed in their early childhood by arrangements between parents. Since the fifteenth century, the minimum age of a bride was set at fourteen years. This however, in reality was thirteen years, since Koreans reckon age from conception rather than from birth, as is done in China. In special cases, if the parents were over fifty years of age, or seriously ill, a daughter could be legally married at twelve years (which meant actually eleven years).[6] Public opinion, however, was opposed to these early unions, and the legal age was then changed to sixteen years by the Kabo Reform of 1894.[7] This reform measure also stipulated that a boy may marry when he reached the age of twenty-nine years.

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[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 134.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 201.

[7] The Kabo Reform had the following historical background: In August of 1894, the Sino-Japanese war broke out in Korea, and Japan quickly defeated the Chinese armies. As a result of this victory, Japan

In practice these laws had not been observed. It was not unusual for the girl to marry at twelve or thirteen and for the boy to marry at about ten years.[8] As late as the 1920s, it was found that six per cent of girls under fifteen were already married.[9] In the countryside, it was common practice for a girl to marry the boy who was two or three years, or four to five years, younger than herself.[10] In certain cases, the young bride had to baby-sit her child bridegroom. She became simply one more added hand to help in the backbreaking chores of the family.

The idea of bride price was disliked in Korea. However, among the poorer peasant families, a cash payment was usually made to the bride's family. In P'yongan-nam Province, for example, at the turn of the century, it took an average of 1,000 to 1,300 nyang for a peasant's son to get married.[11] (An'yang' was a 1.325 oz. copper coin.)

Sometimes the purchase price of the bride increased with the age of the bride. Estimating that one year of age would equal 100 nyang, a bridegroom had to pay 900 nyang for a nine-year-old bride, or 1,500

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established a pro-Japanese government in Korea. The king was pressed to make a number of reforms which were designed to modernize the country. These reforms, supported also by Korean reformist factions who were under Japanese influence, were established and became known as the Kabo Reform of 1894. It extended to every field of economic activity, politics, society, and culture. But in the main the reform was not successful because of the lack of the groundwork of education, enlightenment, and propaganda by the government. Furthermore, this reform was unable to convince the citizens of its validity, since it came out of a pro-Japanese government which had emerged suddenly under Japanese military influence. Takashi Hatada, *A History of Korea,* trans. and ed. Warren W. Smith, Jr. and Benjamin H. Hazard (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, Inc., 1959), p. 102. See also, Son Kun Lee, *Han'guksa* (A History of Korea), ed. Chindan Hakhoe, Vol (Seoul: Ulyusa, 1971), pp. 242-245.

[8] Byong Su Lee, *Ch'osenno kongingho* (The Marriage and Divorce Laws of Korea) (Tokyo: Syopungkwan, 1966), p. 56. Regarding child marriage Mr. Nam Hun Paik, one of the prominent leaders of recent Korean politics, described his own experience in his autobiography. In 1894, at the age of less than ten years, he was married to a girl five years his senior. "In those days," he wrote, "child marriage was one of the bad customs of our society. It seemed more prevalent in P'yongan and Hwanghae Provinces, the northwestern section of Korea. Early marriage was more encouraged in well-to-do families with many children. Nam Hun Paik, *Naui ilsaeng* (My Lifetime) (Seoul: Sinthyonsilsa, 1973), p. 51.

[9] Mace, *op. cit.* p. 201.

[10] Byong Su Lee, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

[11] Sin Suk Kim, "Urinara Hyoptongchohap Nongminui Kachokp'ungsup" (Family Life on the Co-op Farm), *Minsokhak Yongu Ch'ongso* (Compendium of Studies on Folklore), Vol. II (Pyongyang: Academy of Science, 1959), p. 45.

[12] *Ibid.*

nyang for a fifteen-year-old bride. This price was paid at the time of betrothal and was called *sonkup-ton* (advance money). A bride's price was often too burdensome for a poor peasant; in which case, he might sell his daughter in marriage in order to buy a daughter-in-law for his son with the money received for the daughter.[12] The practice of the husband's family paying a price for the bride was an influential factor in keeping her in subordinate status. If a family was too poor to raise their daughter, it was preferred that she be brought up by her future husband's parents. The girls' family would rather do this than sell her into slavery or prostitution.[13]

Traditionally, polygamy was practiced by some of the well-to-do to perpetuate the family lineage if the wife had not borne sons. Yet, concubinage was prevalent among those who did have many sons. Here one could observe the deeply rooted human factors: the desire for variegated sex experience and romance that were suppressed in 'arranged' marriages. The practice of concubinage made a woman simply a sex object, besides making her a constant threat to the wife. Many Korean wives must have been quite unhappy. They were required to follow their husbands no matter what their lot. And, even though there was not legal prohibition on remarriage, in the case of a husband's death, yet it was customary under the patriarchal system of Korea to require a widow to remain faithful to one husband and not to remarry.[14] She remained in the family.

The social custom regarding faithfulness of a wife to one husband, was so strong that the mere touching of hands could cause a woman to believe herself unfaithful. This illustration is a true story:

> In 1592, during the Japanese invasion of Korea, an escaping refugee women was attempting to get into a boat. A rower in the boat helped to pull her in by her hand. The woman cried that she had lost her chastity, and threw herself into the river and committed suicide.[15]

If a widow should remarry, she would be considered guilty of an unfilial act against her husband's family. One way in which this sentiment was expressed was to declare sons of such marriages legally unfit to occupy any official position.[16] Even with such restriction, it is interesting to note that "widow abduction" occurred.[17]

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[13] Mace, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

[14] Byong Su Lee, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

[15] Helen Kim, *The Role of Women in the Next Half Century.* (Seoul: Ewha Woman's University, 1968), p. 11.

[16] Mace, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

[17] The *Dong-A-Ilbo,* May 12, 1975, p. 4.

Speaking of the traditional treatment of widows in Korea, the so-called "technical widow" should be mentioned. This was due to the custom of early betrothal. As David and Vera Mace state in their book:

> A widow's troubles could begin early in life. Incredible as it may seem, it was even possible to be born a widow! In Korea, as in China, pregnant mothers sometimes formally betrothed their unborn children. If the boy died before the girl was born, this made her technically a widow. If married later in life, her status would be that of a remarried widow and not a maiden.[18]

It was only in 1894, by the Kabo Reform, that freedom of remarriage, without censure, was accorded to widows.[19]

The traditional idea of superiority of men over women stripped women completely of freedom of divorce in Korea. The right of divorce granted only to men, however, was usually left to the man's parents for taking action. Divorce, therefore, was called *ki-cho,* meaning "abandoned wife."[20] Parents were able to make or break their children's marriage even when their sons and daughters were adults of thirty or forty years of age.

If a son loved his wife, but his parents did not like her, he was compelled to divorce her. In Korea, as in China, it was believed that one of the first duties is toward parents. Consequently, it was much more important for a son to please his parents than to please his wife. Only since 1923, has it been possible for divorce to be granted based on the agreement of the two parties concerned.[21]

There were seven legitimate grounds for divorcing a wife in traditional Korean society: (1) Rebellion toward her parents-in-law; (2) Failure to produce a son; (3) Unfaithfulness to her husband; (4) Jealousy; (5) Had an incurable disease; (6) Given to talebearing and pernicious talk; and (7) Was found to be a thief.[22] However, there were three conditions under which a wife could not be sent away, even though grounds existed for divorce: (1) If she shared with her husband a three-year mourning period for one of his parents; (2) if the husband had become rich or attained a high position since marriage; and (3) If she had no home to return to.[23] These three restraints,

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18 Mace, *op. cit.*, p. 260.
19 Son Kun Lee, *op. cit.*, p. 244.
20 Byong Su Lee, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
21 The *Dong-A-Ilbo,* May 12, 1975, p. 4.
22 Byong Su Lee, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.
23 *Ibid.*, p. 51.

however, could not serve in a case where the wife committed adultery, or had an incurable disease.[24]

If a wife left her husband even with just cause, she could be given punishment of 100 lashes. If she ran away and remarried, the legal penalty was death by hanging.[25] For an adulteress, Korean society appeared to be a little more lenient than traditional Chinese society. The woman was expected to take her own life. And, a wife who committed adultery in Korea, was not put to death, but lost her status as wife and became a slave.[26] She was never allowed to remarry.[27]

In addition to the conditions discussed thus far, there were other inhuman treatments which relate to the low status of women in Korea. In the past, a Korean woman was denied her name for a lifetime. Until marriage she was called simply by her childhood name, such as, *sopunne* (regretable or disappointing), *koptani* (pretty), *poksili* (happy), *k'unnyon* (big) or *chakunnyon* (little one). After marriage, however, even this childhood name was discarded and she was known to the community only by the surname of her husband's family, example, 'Kim-si' (Mrs. Kim), 'Lee-si' (Mrs. Lee) or 'Choi-si' (Mrs. Choi). In the home she was addressed by a kinship term denoting her position in the family organization or by her children's name plus the word for mother, for example, 'Happy's mother'.[28]

With the advent of the feudalistic Yi Dynasty, commoners were granted the privilege of having a name. Still the privilege was not given to women. Even a high government official's wife did not enjoy her own name.[29] As recent as seventy years ago, when women had to appear in court for legal purposes, they were given certain convenient names in order to facilitate court procedures.[30] Only in 1909, in accordance with the census registration law of that year,[31] were they given the privelege of having names for the first time.

Separation of the sexes was another form of mistreatment of women. When boys and girls reached the age of seven, they were not allowed to sit together. In the home, they were not permitted to use the same

24 *Ibid.*
25 Mace, *op. cit.*, p. 248.
26 *Ibid.*, p. 236.
27 Byong Su Lee, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
28 Sin Suk Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
29 The *Dong-A-Ilbo*, May 12, 1975, p. 4.
30 Helen Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
31 The *Dong-A-Ilbo*, May 12, 1975, p. 4.

towels, hangers, or other commodities. They had to use separate items. For example, no girl could use a towel designated for her brother. Even within the household, Korean women were strictly segregated from the men in the family. The arrangement of the household was such that the husband lived in the front room while the wife was closed off in the rear room. On the street, or in public, it was the rule for the wife to walk several steps behind the husband.[32] Men could walk freely on the streets during the daytime; Korean women, however, were not permitted to do so. Certain times were set aside, enforced by curfew, when women could pass through the streets — late evening until dawn. Regarding this women's hour, however, it is interesting to note that:

> During this time no men were permitted on the streets except those who were blind, or public officials. Any male who dared to trespass on the streets during what might be called the women's hour, ran the risk of being caught and having his head chopped off by the public executioner![33]

In case a woman had to go out during the daytime, she was obliged to wear a special jacket, which she drew up to cover her face.[34]

This practice of secluding women varied, however, according to necessity and to the social status of the family. It is reported that:

> Wives of farmers and workmen were obliged to work in the fields and the shops, and of necessity were permitted much greater freedom than their higher-born sisters.[35]

Nevertheless, even in their case, extreme modesty was regarded as a primary virtue.

This rule of separation between the sexes persisted until about the beginning of the twentieth century. With the extreme forms of segregation, women in Korea were neither seen nor heard. Thus, they were inevitably cut off from opportunities for independence in social activties. Women were not only generally denied the benefits of formal education, but also were discouraged from developing any natural ability or talent which might be useful for a career outside the home. "A woman's lack of talent is in itself a virtue," and "If a hen crows, the household crumbles," were frequently used proverbs to check any worldly ambitions of a woman. The result was a general lack of

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[32] *Ibid.*

[33] Hyontay Kim, *Folklore and Customs of Korea* (Seoul: Korean Information Service, Inc, Inc., 1957), p. 90.

[34] The *Dong-A-Ilbo*, May 12, 1975, p. 4.

[35] Hyontay Kim, *loc. cit.*

professional skills among women and an incomparably higher percentage of illiteracy among women,[36] than among men.

For a woman, her most trying period began with her marriage. She was a stranger in the new family, under relentless surveillance and discipline from the parents-in-law, unprotected by the supposedly intimate husband. A woman's first duties were to her husband's parents; only secondarily was she responsible to her husband. "A wife or concubine who made insulting remarks to her parents-in-law could be hanged without delay.[37] She was expected to submit to her husband as she submitted to her parents-in-law. The harshness of the mother-in-law was especially notorious. The only consolation for the daughter-in-law was that one day she could hope to be a mother-in-law herself.

Until she gave birth to a son, a wife felt as if she "sat on a cushion of needles." With the birth of a son, her duty was fulfilled in perpetuating the ancestral lineage and she found protection and security in the future of her son. In case a woman was childless or failed to bear sons, this was attributed to her own unforgivable "sin."[38] Dr. Gale, who landed in Korea as an American Presbyterian missionary during the winter of 1886, spoke of the mother having no son:

> If she has no son, alas for her! better had she never been born. Not only is she condemned by her husband and every member of the clan, but she condemns herself, and no ray of sunshine ever gladdens her broken soul. She is Rachel, and Hannah, and Elizabeth, as they were before joy visited them.[39]

Even the treatment accorded to the woman during the childbearing period accented the difference of the sexes. Giving birth to a son, the young mother was encouraged to lie quiet in bed two or three weeks. However, if the mother bore a girl and lay in bed more than one week, she was put to shame or had to suffer an insult. In the Hamyang district in Kyongsang-nam Province, noted as a stronghold of Confucianism, it was customary for the mother-in-law to prepare a feast

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[36] It is recorded that all women were totally unlettered until the middle of the Yi Period (1392-1910). Even after that, only some privileged women were permitted to read a few books exclusively. The reason given was that women did not need to cultivate the intellect. Sun Dok Yun, "Han'guk Yosong Undong Ui Inyomgwa Banghyang" (The Idea and Direction of the Korean Women's Movement), *Taehwa* (Dialogue), (March 1975), p. 8.

[37] Mace, *op. cit.*, p. 299.

[38] Sin Suk Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

[39] James S. Gale, *Korea in Transition* (New York: Educational Department, The Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., 1909), p. 104.

when the daughter-in-law gave birth to a boy as an offering to the three gods governing childbirth. If, however, a girl-child was born, the mother-in-law immediately left the house and would not return for almost a week, as an expression of regret and disappointment for a newly arrived baby girl. This disappointment was transmitted even to the girl-child by the way she was named *soun* (disappointment), *sopsop* (pity), *put'ong* (anger) or *yukam* (regret).[40] Even a baby crib was a method to show discrimination. A boy had a fancy crib, whereas the girl had a plain one.[41]

In this connection, Dr. Gale said again:

> The woman's place, first as daughter, one of contempt. A missionary's little six-year-old once came to him with tears in her eyes and said: 'Papa, I have a question.' 'Yes, what is it?' 'Are you sorry that I wasn't a boy?' 'Well I should say not, I wouldn't trade you for a dozen boys. But why do you ask?' She said, 'The Koreans were talking just now, and they pointed at me and said, 'What a pity that she wasn't a boy!'[42]

Then Dr. Gale stated, regarding the stark picture of women's status in Korea: "She has been the slave, the dog, the toy, the chattel, the convenience of men, for all past ages.[43] Despite this situation, he did not despair of the future for Korean women. He observed: "Thus was, yes, and still is, the world of woman, but mighty changes are taking place, and underneath the framework of her prison-house, earthquakes are shaking."[44]

II

During the closing years of the nineteenth century, new voices were heard advocating the improvement of women's status. A frontal criticism of the traditional idea of women did begin with the Tonghak (Eastern Learning) Movement. This movement was begun in the 1860's by Ch'oe Cheu, a Korean scholar who attempted to combine certain features of Roman Catholicism with the native Korean religions. The movement spread widely in the southern provinces until 1865, when persecution by the authorities broke out against Roman Catholicism and Ch'oe was executed on the charge that he was an adherent of that faith.

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[40] The *Dong-A-Ilbo*, May 12, 1975, p. 4.
[41] Sun Dok Yun, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
[42] Gale, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-104.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 106.
[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 105-106.

The Tonghak sect, after thirty years of endurance, reappeared under the leading banner of General Chon Pongjun in 1894. It gathered considerable strength as a political reform movement against the corruption of the ruling officials who were ruthlessly oppressing the common people.[45]

What is most significant in the Tonghak movement, in connection with our present study, is to be found in its petition of human rights which may be classified as the claims of (1) human integrity, (2) elevation of the farmers' status in the society, (3) demolition of class society, and (4) equality of sexes.[46] Thus, as in the fourth claim, the Tonghak Movement began to raise social consciousness on the status of women. This is remembered as a very important turning point in the history of Korean women.

As successor of Ch'oe Cheu, Ch'oe Sihyong became the second Tonghak leader. In November 1889, Ch'oe Sihyong announced the six articles of discipline to guide the followers' daily life. According to Article I:

> Revere your wife as a god. Love your daughter-in-law. Love slaves as your own children. . . . If not, Heaven will get angry.[47]

His unswerving devotion to establishing human rights and particularly his efforts for women's enlightenment is amazing, especially in the light of the social milieu of those days. He went as far as to free his own two slavegirls — one became his daughter-in-law, and the other he adopted as his daughter.[48] In addition, according to one of the twelve points proposed by General Chon Pongjun to the government at the time of the Tonghak Rebellion of 1894, it was demanded that young widows be permitted to remarry.[49]

Furthermore, leaders of the Tonghak movement continued their efforts to awaken the awareness of Korean women through educational activities. For example, by taking charge of the Tongdok Girls' School in 1909, they made an important contribution to the development of women's education.[50]

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[45] For a detailed discussion, see Son Kun Lee, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-123.

[46] Bon Ryong Sin, *Tonghaktang Yon'gu* (Some Studies of Tonghak Society) (Seoul: T'amgutang, 1973), pp. 63-67.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 195.

[48] Chong Ch'ang Mun, *Kunseilbon-ui Choson Ch'imt'alsa* (A History of the Modern Japanese Invasion and Assault on Korea) Seoul: Paekmundang, 1964), p. 340.

[49] *Ibid.*, pp. 361-362.

[50] Bon Ryong Sin, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

Another influence in the elevation of women's status in Korea was the Independence Club,[51] organized in 1896 by a group of progressive leaders. The head of the club was Dr. Philip Jaisohn, a Korean statesman educated in the United States and converted to Christianity. In this political reform organization, the problem of the status of women was also actively debated. For example, the *Independent,* the first vernacular newspaper started by Dr. Philip Jaisohn, editorialized on the 21st of April:

> Korean women live a pitiful life. We appeal to the Korean people in behalf of these depressed women. Despite the fact that the woman's life is never inferior to man's life, women have been mistreated by men. It is due to the fact that men are still unenlightened. Instead of becoming reasonable and humane, men try to use only their brawn to oppress women. How barbarous they are! But as the Korean women become educated and well informed, they will come to realize the equality of the sexes and will know how to handle unreasonable men. In view of these facts, we call on the Korean women to be educated so as to become superior to men intellectually and morally, and to claim the rights of women.[52]

Here one can see a strong message calling on the Korean women to be awakened.

In September of the same year, the *Independent* again urged the government to give women equal opportunity with men in receiving education. It stated: "If the government would establish a school for boys, it is only fair to do the same for girls."[53]

A further influence in the elevation of Korean women was that of Protestant Christianity. Only toward the end of the nineteenthe century was the opportunity for education given to women and girls through the first Protestant Christian missions in Korea. Up to that time, the Confucian traditions had kept women within the bounds of the walls of their homes.

In 1886, the very beginning of women's education was started by Mrs. Mary Scranton, a missionary of the Methodist Episcopal Church North. It was established at Ewha (pear flower) with one student.[54]

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[51] For a detailed discussion on the Independence Club Movement, see, Son Kun Lee, *op. cit.*, pp. 830-866.

[52] Quoted in Son Dok Su, "Yosongui Haewa Yosonui In'ganhwa" (The International Women's Year and the Humanization of Women), *Kwangjang* (Forum), March 15, 1975, p. 4. (*Forum* is a periodical published in West Germany, by Association of Reconstruction of Democratic Society).

[53] Quoted in *Ewha Hakpo* (Ewha Review), June 6, 1975, p. 3, a publication of Ewha Women's University in Seoul.

[54] Helen Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

With this small beginning, in less than twenty years, ten other Christian schools for girls were founded by 1904.[55]

It should be mentioned that Korean women were enlightened not only through these schools, but also through the Church Educational Programs of these first Christian missions. Regarding the far-reaching effects of the Church Educational Programs, Dr. Helen Kim, a prominent Christian educator, observed:

> They helped to wipe out illiteracy by teaching women to read the Bible and to sing the hymns. Ideas such as democracy and world brotherhood were introduced to the rank and file of the people through Christian churches. Wiping out superstition, bringing about social class consciousness, and contributing to the women's own discovery of themselves as well as to the raising of their status are contributions brought about by these pioneer Christian missions.[56]

An early Presbyterian missionary in Korea, having seen some changes taking place in the status of women in the church, went so far as to say:

> The Gospel has been a large factor in liberating women in Korea. . . . the Korean women had everything to gain and nothing to lose by becoming a Christian. Her circle of social contacts were immediately widened and enriched. Christianity taught a higher status for women than what she had known.[57]

Although Protestant Christianity had been particularly important in liberating women in Korea generally, its influence was not countrywide but was geographically limited. Increases in membership before 1945 were much greater in North Korea than in South Korea. They were concentrated in Hwanghae and the two adjacent P'yongan Provinces.[58] As Roy E. Shearer said: "The hidden, exciting fact is that Christianity in northwest Korea was a growing and vital force in the society.[59] Consequently, it seems to be reasonable to believe that women in the North as compared to those in the South had much better opportunities to be free from traditional Confucian patriarchalism.

We have discussed thus far a new consciousness of the rights of women that surfaced toward the end of the nineteenth century. Aside from the somewhat better legal protection of women regarding educa-

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[55] Ewha Hakpo, June 20, 1975, p. 3.
[56] Helen Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
[57] Charles Allen Clark, *The Korean Church and the Nevius Methods* (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1930), p. 234.
[58] Roy E. Shearer, *Wildfire: Church Growth in Korea* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1966), p. 103.
[59] *Ibid.*

tion, name, and divorce, the position of women in Korea, however, still was a subordinate one. Nor did women fare any better under the Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945). All these years, according to Dr. Helen Kim, women had been just servants of men. She observed:

> . . . according to Japanese laws, women were treated like people of no importance or value along with children and crazy people.[60]

Under the Japanese rule, the Korean women had to suffer doubly in serving men as well as the Japanese oppressors.

The Japanese surrender in Korea on August 15, 1945, however, brought to an end the long night of oppression, exploitation and enslavement. The populace awoke, as in a daze, from a terrible nightmare. There were high hopes that a new day of peace, prosperity and freedom was dawning. Unfortunately, however, this dream has never come to realization. Korea has been a country divided since World War II into implacably hostile sides, one Communist and the other capitalist. As *Newsweek* recently described, "There is an enormous gulf between the capitalist south and the Communist north, but they remain to this day two halves of a single nation, the matter and antimatter of a divided people.[61]

III

In 1971, the Chinese Journalists' Delegation paid a visit to North Korea. Describing their impression of the women of that country, they wrote:

> At the centre of Korea's heroic capital, Pyongyang, stands the bronze statue of chollima, a winged horse with head high, speeding into the future. Like the man rider, the brave women on the pillion is off with the same lofty aim. Symbolic of the Korean people's revolutionary spirit, it depicts the heroism of the Korean women along with the men.[62]

This valiant image of women is a drastic change, considered in the context of the inequalities and underdevelopment inherited from the past.

Today North Korea, or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (the DPRK), claims that women are "enjoying equal rights as men in the social, political, economic, cultural and other fields of a worthy

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[60] Helen Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

[61] *Newsweek*, June 30, 1975, p. 32.

[62] *The Heroic Korean People* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1972), p. 36.

life as the true masters of the country and society and as happy mothers."[63]

North Korea's commitment to equality for women is spelled out most clearly in the Articles of the Law on the Equality of the Sexes, promulgated on July 20, 1946.[64] In general, they are:

Article 1 Women are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social, and political life.

Article 2 Women, like men, have the right to elect and to be elected in the local and the highest state organs.

Article 3 Women have the equal right with men in labor, equal payment, social insurance and education.

Article 4 Women have the equal right with men in the free choice for marriage. The arbitrary and compulsory marriage which disregards the consent of the parties is prohibited.

Article 5 Women, like men, have the right in freedom of divorce in case the relationship between husband and wife becomes difficult with no hope of continuing relationship.

Article 6 A marriage can be contracted only after the woman has reached 17 years of age and the man 18 years of age.

Article 7 Polygamy and the selling of girls as concubines or wives, which are medieval and feudalistic vestiges, are prohibited as infringement upon human rights of women.

Public prostitution, private prostitution and the institution of "kisaeng" (courtesan) are prohibited.

Article 8 Women have the equal right with men in the ownership of property and the inheritance of land.

By this law, the Communists in North Korea desired to liberate the women who were traditionally subjected to all sorts of humiliation and subordinate positions. Women have been encouraged to play their role in the reconstruction of the country. The government has, therefore, provided conditions and programs which enable women to be free of the work that tied them to their homes, and to take more active part in the general labor force.

Day-care Centers are provided everywhere in the country where children may be enrolled at the age of three months. They are continued to be cared for until they go to kindergarten[65] at age five, and then receive ten years of compulsory school. According to an article in *People's Korea*:

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[63] *The Times* (London) April 12, 1973, Advertisement.

[64] For detailed information, see Byong Su Lee, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-192.

[65] In 1971 it was reported that 2,500,000 children were growing up at the nurseries and kindergartens at the expense of the state. The *Pyongyang Times*, October 9, 1971, p. 2.

> Compulsory 11-year education will be introduced on a full-scale basis throughout the country from September 1, this year (1975).[66]

Mothers are able to leave their children at these centers provided by the state, and enter the labor force. But it appears that the Child-care Center Program has other goals as well. It is used as a program for "an early socialist indoctrination[67] for the younger generation. Officially it is claimed that:

> The public upbringing of children is the most effective and excellent method whereby our youngsters are brought up to become the true men of the communist type.[68]

In addition to this child care program, women in North Korea are given free hospital delivery aid and are granted seventy-seven days paid maternity leave. Mothers who have more than three children are allowed to work six hours a day and get paid for eight hours labour[69] Furthermore, there are catering facilities such as rice-cooking factories, and laundries, established in residential quarters to lighten the household burdens of the women.[70]

At the Fifth Congress of the Workers' Party of North Korea held in November 1970, the emancipation of women from the heavy burdens of kitchen and household work was set as one of the three major tasks of the technical revolution to be carried out in the Six-Year Plan period.[71] In view of these facts, it appears that the society is geared to give support to the working mother and to spare her the double burden which other women have in so many parts of the world.

Today, North Korea claims that women account for nearly half of the labor composition of the national economy. According to Edward Kim who visited North Korea in 1973 as the first American photojournalist:

> Women make up a third of the industrial workers, and more than half of all farm workers. Military service falls equally on both sexes.[72]

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[66] The *People's Korea*, April 16, 1975, p. 3.

[67] Edward Kim, "Rare Look at North Korea," *National Geographic*, Vol. 146 (August, 1974), p. 272.

[68] The *Pyongyang Times*, October 9, 1971, p. 2.

[69] This was made possible in October 1966 by the workday regulation for women.

[70] The *Pyongyang Times*, March 8, 1975, p. 3.

[71] The *Pyongyang Times*, October 9, 1971, p. 2.

[72] Edward Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

While the Supreme People's Assembly, the highest power organ, had seventy-three women deputies (sixteen per cent of the total) in 1967,[73] it has 113 at present.[74] Even with the increased membership, the percentage of women in positions of political leadership appears to be relatively low. It is reported this year:

> More than 900 women work as chairmen of the management boards of co-op farms and many of the directors of modern factories and chairman of county cooperative farm management committees are women. The women engineers, assistant engineer and specialists number 162,567.[75]

Women in the field of education play a very great role. The statistics of 1959 show: eighty per cent in the primary schools, fifty per cent in the middle schools, thirty per cent in the technical schools, and fifteen per cent in the university.[76] More women than men teach in the low level of schools — women predominate in the nurseries and kindergartens. Addressing the National Congress of Nursery School and Kindergarten Teachers in 1966, President Kim Il Sung emphasized:

> Of course, all work in education is important, but above all, that of nursery school and kindergarten teachers who rear the small children is more important.

He continued to say:

> By nature, it is up to the women to bring up children. To make light of such an important and honourable job as the upbringing of our little ones, the successors to our revolution and the reserves of communist builders, cannot be regarded as an attitude worthy of the women of our time who are advancing to Communism.[77]

In addition, we are told that "the textile work force is largely female."[78]

In the light of these facts, it appears that in the distribution of jobs in North Korea, there is some tendency to cling to traditional patterns. Sex role differences still seem apparent and are freely admitted even by the country's president as expressed in his address.

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[73] In Dok Kang, ed., *Pukhanjonso* (Compendium of Works on North Korea), Vol. II (Seoul: Research Center for Far Eastern Affairs, 1974), p. 220.

[74] The *Pyongyang Times*, March 8, 1975, p. 3.

[75] *Ibid.*

[76] In Dok Kang, *loc. cit.*

[77] Kim Il Sung, "The Communist Education and Upbringing of Children is an Honourable Revolutionary Duty of Nursery School and Kindergarten Teacher," in *Kim Il Sung Selected Works*, Vol. IV (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1971), p. 461.

[78] Harrison E. Salisbury, *To Peking — And Beyond; A Report of the New Asia* (New York Times Book Co., 1973), p. 203.

As the North Korean women begin to make their participation in economic production, they appear to have attained a better position in the family as well. To the communists this is a predictable result which is taken for granted. As Engels already declared in the nineteenth century: "The emancipation of women will only be possible when women can take part in production on a large, social scale, and domestic work no longer claims anything but an insignificant amount of her time."[79]

Today we are told that the North Koreans have established new family relationships based on democratic harmony, putting an end to the traditional patriarchal family relationship under which the man oppressed the woman, and the woman relied on the man for her means of life. Both husband and wife are now economically independent. The relationship between them is said to be that of comrades. Also, it is said that a daughter-in-law need no longer be subordinate to her parents-in-law as was the case in the olden days. That is because she, like her parents-in-law, became a member of the socialist workers, contributing to building up a new socialist society. In short, the North Koreans assert that this sort of socialist family is based on love and respect among the members, and each member of the family is fully ensured of equality.[80]

IV

Until the recent past, the women's situation in North Korean cities appears, however, to have differed from that in the countryside. In the cities there were more cultural, educational, medical, and other advantages. Work was more technologically advanced and socialized. And so many women seem to have made more progress in the cities. As late as 1966, *Korean Women,* a publication of the Woman's Union of North Korea, had an article on a city woman crane-operator who married a country farm worker in spite of many unfavourable conditions. This was incomprehensible to ordinary people who usually saw the country girl seeking marriage with the city boy.[81] Women's status in the countryside, however, is said to have changed drastically for the

[79] Frederick Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private and the State* (New York: International Publishers, 1942), p. 148.

[80] See Il Ch'un Kim, "Nongch'on Kunrochatului Saeroun Munhwa wa Saenghawl P' ungsupe Kwanhayo" (On the New Culture and Pattern of Life in Farming Villages), *Compendium of Studies on Folklore,* Vol. II (Pyongyang: Academy of Science. 1959), pp. 22-24.

[81] "Risang'gwa Haenboke Taehan Saenggak." (Thoughts on The Ideal and Happiness), *Chosonnyosong* (Korean Women), May 1966, p. 58.

better with the coming of the cooperative farms since 1954.[82] Today, in North Korea there are some "3,800 collective farms" bristling "with tractors and other machinery."[83]

Harrison Salisbury of *The New York Times,* after his visit in 1972 to the Chongsan-ri collective farm, one of the finest collective farms in North Korea, wrote:

> This is a far higher degree of mechanization than I found on even the finest Chinese communes, and the level would exceed that of most Soviet farms.[84]

Then he added: "To be sure, Chongsan-ri is a model, nonetheless, the other collective farms of North Korea follow its pattern."[85]

We are told that family incomes at the Chongsan-ri cooperative farm ranged in 1973 "from 3,500 won ($1,750) to 8,000 won ($4,000), plus seven to ten tons of grain, depending on how many family members work.[86] Living conditions in this kind of model village is expected to be better than other co-ops were family income averages 2,500 won ($1,250) and five tons of rice a year.[87]

What is important regarding our discussion of women's status in the countryside, however, is that in the cooparative farm each member receives equal pay according to the individual work points, regardless of sex. In North Korea this has been considered a very important factor which place women on an equal footing with men. Because of this, it is believed that even an unmarried daughter no longer depends on her father for a living, and a daughter-in-law need no longer be under the restraints of her parents-in-law.[88]

Now, North Korea's socialist state takes pride in saying that the gap between the countryside and the city is eliminated. A recent *Newsweek* article reports:

> Recent visitors who have seen the countryside was well as the capital say that there is every evidence the North Koreans live well, if simply, and that blatant poverty is non-existent. Most farms have been mechanized and irrigated, and the country recently became self-sufficient in food for the first time in its 30-year history.[89]

[82] Sin Suk Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
[83] Edward Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 260.
[84] Salisbury, *op. cit.*, p. 198.
[85] *Ibid.*
[86] Edward Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 272.
[87] *Ibid.*
[88] Sin Suk Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
[89] *Newsweek,* June 30, 1975, p. 33.

A *New York Times* correspondent earlier wrote in a similar vein, in 1972:

> Although living standards are still low, the sharp disparities between the countryside and the cities that prevail in so many developing countries are being leveled out. Indeed, the cash income of the peasants on the big cooperative farms appears to exceed that of the industrial workers.[90]

In view of these facts, it is assumed that a great change in the women's status of North Korea has taken place both in cities and in the countryside.

Let us now consider marriage and love in connection with the emancipation of women from the traditional patriarchalism. Even though the free choice of partners has been ensured by law, an amalgamation of old tradition (arranged marriage) and modern custom (love marriage) seems to have become a common form of marriage for a number of years. In this respect, a writer in 1964 made the following statement in the *Korean Women*:

> There is no doubt in my mind that the wishes of the two partners should be taken into primary consideration. But at the same time, the opinions of the parents and the family members are absolutely not to be neglected.[91]

In 1966, a local leader of the Women's Union also advised the young people not to neglect parents' wishes regarding marriage. She said in this connection: "It is not right to ignore parents' opinion completely on the ground that the young people are in a new era."[92]

This may be interpreted to mean that the old custom of marriage can hardly be dislodged without resistance, even under the sweeping reforms of Communism. This is especially true in rural areas where the custom had been deeply rooted. It is believed that 'love marriage', western style, may take a considerable time to become a way of life in North Korea.

It seems evident that after marriage, husband and wife are encouraged to engage in economic production and to build up a new society. In other words, personal sentiments of love and mutual at-

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[91] Kap Ki Lee, "Yakhonkwa Kyolhon" (Engagement and Marriage), *Chosonnyosong* (Korean Women), November 1964, p. 47.

[92] Kye Son Kim, et. al., "Nongch'on Ch'onyotului Kyolhonmunje" (On the Problem of Marriage for the Girls in Rural Areas), *ibid.*, May, 1966, p. 57.

tachment must be subordinated to loyalty to the Communist party and its leader and, therefore, to the state. Apparently, the North Korean Communists believe that love is not a personal but a social affair. This theme was repeatedly elaborated on in the column "Love, Marriage and the Home" of the magazine *Korean Women.* A couple of samples of this theme are sufficient to serve our purpose:

> Love cannot be an end in itself, but should lead to a true goal of life and to make it come to realization. Is not that kind of love the most desirable for this revolutionary age?[93]

A correspondent of *Korean Women* describes a 'communist mother' as one

> who finds true happiness through serving others, and gives undivided loyalty to the Party and its leader.[94]

While recognizing the many kinds of affection and loyalties that people have — love between husband and wife, parental love, love between brothers — and their importance, what is stressed is a 'higher form of love' which is expressed through the love of the collective and comrades. This concept was succinctly described by one of the women students of Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang:

> Those who sacrifice their lives for the sake of the collective and comrades without the slightest hesitation are more beautiful and sublime.[95]

In short, we are told that in North Korea, sacrifical love is nobler than personal love. Self-realization appears to matter little. In serving the people, one is said to find a higher happiness.

As has been observed in many other Communist countries, out of this kind of ideal seems to follow a puritanical atmosphere. For example, while the emancipation has freed women in almost every field of activity, no actual sexual freedom seems to have developed. Edward Kim, a *National Geographic* journalist, relates that while strolling along a beautiful beach near the city of Wonsan at the East Sea, he came upon a sign: "MEN" — right on the beach. Then, farther on, another sign: "WOMEN" — also, on the beach. His guide explained, on questioning, that the beach was divided into two sections so that men

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[93] Ung Ho Park, "Chinjonghan Sarangiran?" (What is True Love?), *ibid.,* March 1966, p. 24.

[90] *The New York Times,* June 4, 1972, p. 15.

[94] "Kongsanjui Omoni" (A Communist Mother), *ibid.,* June 1966, p. 60.

[95] Myong Suk Kim, "Urisitaeui Charang Suroun Yongungch'nyo" (Our Proud Heroine in Our Times), *Ch'onrima* (Winged Horse), July 1973, p. 82.

and women could have separate bathing areas because they preferred it that way. The guide then asked curiously, if it was true in the so-called nudist camps in America, men and women do not wear any clothes. It was unimaginable that there could be such a thing in the world — the guide could not really believe it.

Having seen this still prevalent restriction of sexual freedom, Kim commented in his article that: "The 'new morality' of the West has made little impression on North Korea's younger generation. I seldom see expressions of affection in public."[96]

It is a very interesting contrast to see the attitude of sexual restraint that characterized the North Koreans under Communism, and today's sexual revolution under way in the Soviet Union. According to a recent *New York Times* article:

> In the Soviet Union, 27 out of 100 marriages now end in divorce, one of ten births is illegitimate and among younger people premarital and extra-marital sex is becoming the norm rather than the exception.[97]

For the North Korean young people, it appears to be a long way to go for such increasing sexual permissiveness as that existing in some of the Communist countries today.

North Korean Communism appears to have liberated women as well as the young people from the traditional patriarchalism. But they have not been permitted to use their freedom for self-indulgence. We are informed that in North Korea social activities for the young are mostly organized groups, and young adults find mates through work, social, and study programs.[98] The idea of privacy seems unimportant.

In North Korea, "marriage before the age of twenty-five is said to be "discouraged"[99] now. Despite their late marriage, however, birth control methods have not been encouraged. This is interpreted to mean that with only a fifteen million population, North Korea could easily absorb a larger growth in population to strengthen the labor force. As a matter of fact, mothers who have large families enjoy high regard. To the Western observer it may be a mystery what the many unmarried young men and women do to satisfy emotional needs. They seem too busy to waste their time thinking about what we call romance or

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96 Edward Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 267.
97 *The New York Times,* June 17, 1975, p. 2.
98 Edward Kim, op. cit., *loc. cit.*
99 *Ibid.*

immoral sexuality. North Korea today appears to be a cloister filled with the spirit of monastic discipline. As Salisbury puts it, North Koreans are dedicating themselves intensely "to the work ethic."[100] In North Korea today, work seems to be a virtue in the same way that it was in nineteenth-century America.

Today's North Korean women are pictured in newspapers or magazines as tractor drivers, lathe operators, crane operators, university students, railway station operators, textile workers, scientists, professors, members of the Supreme People's Assembly, members of the militia, and members of the army. Women in North Korea are clearly pictured "as proud masters of country and society and dependable builders of socialism."[101]

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[100] Salisbury, *op. cit.*, p. 195.
[101] The *Pyongyang Times*, March 8, 1975, p. 3.

AREA STUDIES: A FOCUS OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES*

JOSEFA M. SANIEL

Since the end of the last World War, social scientists, along with other scholars, moved towards a better understanding of man and his increasingly complex society. One result of this effort has been the development of the pre-war attempts at a multidisciplinary or interdisciplinary approach in the study of human society and the formulation of possible solutions to social problems for purposes of improving the social, economic, political and cultural conditions under which men live. Suggesting greater cooperation, coordination, if not integration, of the social sciences disciplines, this "innovative approach" has been expected to correct what has been a widely held view: that social scientists have been narrowly provincial or parochial in terms of their respective disciplines. Therefore, what has been produced by them has been a disjointed, often seemingly inconsistent, understanding of the problems of man and his society.[1]

If we view all organized knowledge and thought as divided into two large fields, one of them would consist of the social sciences; the other, of the natural sciences. Conventionally classified under the social sciences are such disciplines as Anthropology, Economics, History, Philosophy, Political Science, Sociology and other similar ones. Treating all the activities, achievements and attainments of mankind, the social sciences are as extensive as the scope of human interests and associations. More specifically, they are mainly concerned with, and contribute their respective disciplines' insights on the relation of man to man, man to society, and society to society.

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[1] S. B. Levine, "Interdisciplinary Approach in the Social Sciences," *Social Sciences*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (April 1956), p. 76.

I

Within the last decade or so, the multidisciplinal approach — a move away from specialization toward a more integrated approach in the social sciences — was attempted at three levels in the University of the Philippines. The first one was at the General Education level where the usual introductory course for each discipline was replaced by a general social science course. The second level was tried in relation to the various programs, to produce social sciences majors. Less successful than the first, the majors produced under this academic arrangement were to attempt an integration of various specialization courses in different disciplines toward a hoped-for competency in the social sciences.

The third-level was a try at integration by focussing various social sciences approaches on a specific area or region, such as the Philippines, Southeast Asia, East Asia, or South Asia.[2] Because the essential requirement of the last level of integration is expertness in one of the social sciences or humanities disciplines or the arts, it has been undertaken only on the Master's level. Without a solid disciplinal base, the multidisciplinal approach in the study of an "area" could cause confusion rather than integration in the students' minds. It is to this third level of multidisciplinary approach that we shall later address ourselves, after briefly tracing the beginnings and the other possible foci of this approach.

The initial pre-war attempts at fraternization, if not amalgamation of the social sciences, was encouraged in the United States during the last war. With the help of government and foundation funds, cross-disciplinal studies of Japan and other areas of Asia developed in American universities. "Area Studies" Centers multiplied in the fifties and in the sixties. Such centers were established in various parts of Asia and in Europe. The multidisciplinal approach has helped American policy makers to understand and try solutions to their own country's post-war socio-economic domestic problems, such as the problem of a possible economic crisis following wartime prosperity, the labor problem, especially the problem of unemployment, the Negro problem and the problem of poverty in certain depressed areas of the nation.

Small wonder that, following the war, the move toward the multidisciplinary approach had gained enough momentum to struggle for its reluctant acceptance as a legitimate approach in the social sciences

[2] R. Santos Cuyugan, "Trends in the Teaching of Social Sciences," (1965), pp. 5-6. Mimeographed copy.

within the universities of the United States. Slowly, the initial hostilities of orthodox disciplines to this approach, made way for cooperation and support of, what is sometimes referred to by its opponents, as this new "mongrel" or "super-discipline." Today, though pockets of opposition to the multidisciplinal approach in the social sciences persist, it has been used as a means of coordinating the various disciplines of the social sciences around a focus of study usually organized within the framework of a committee, a center, an institute or a project of the University. At times, one finds it in a disciplinal department like Political Science or Anthropology.

One focus of the multidisciplinal approach in the social science is the study of industrial relations. This focus can polarize social sciences disciplines engaged in the study of the labor field, industrial disputes, economic stabilization, the growth of organized labor and the need for rapid advances in productivity. It is now widely agreed that together with economists the coordinated efforts of sociologists, psychologists, cultural anthropologists, political scientists and others, are needed to achieve full understanding of the problems involved and to develop workable solutions to guide private or public policy.[3]

Such cooperative venture among the social scientists from various disciplines are also evident in post-war historical studies which brought together not only the insights and interpretations of historians, but also of social psychologists, social anthropologists and sociologists, in an attempt to reconstruct and interpret the past.[4] This has been especially true of social histories, histories of ideas, and biographies written after the war.

Community study offered another focus for experiment of multidisciplinary sharing of methodological problems and viewpoints by social scientists in the hope of mutually reenforcing each other's disciplines. Such a group of scholars study the community as a whole thus avoiding some of the distortions common under disciplinary fragmentation. The "Coordinated Investigation of Sulu Culture," of the Notre Dame College of Jolo could be a focus of this kind of multidisciplinary integration.

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[3] Levine, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

[4] *The Social Sciences in Historical Study. A Report of the Committee on Historiography*, Bulletin 64, (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1954) pp. 13-14.

The study of the concept of entrepreneurship has also been found as another focus of multidisciplinary participation. An example is Harvard University's Research on entrepreneurial history.

Cross-disciplinary study can also focus on the conditions and processes of economic development, conceived as involving changes in many non-economic aspects of culture. Examples are studies undertaken by the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Centering on the emerging countries of the underdeveloped world, they have attempted to evolve an answer to the general question: why have the people of some societies entered upon technological progress sooner or more effectively than others?[5] Obviously the problems involved in reaching for an answer call the attention not only of the economists but also of the psycho-analysts, sociologists, social anthropologists, the cultural geographers, the linguists, the historians and the political scientists.

Finally, as mentioned earlier, multidisciplinary cooperation fluorishes in "area studies" whereby increasing members of university historians, political scientists, linguists, economists, anthropologists, geographers, and other professional groups, actively associate with one another in studies of such areas or regions as Southeast Asia, South Asia, East Asia or West Asia. It is this focus of multidisciplinal approach which is used at the University of the Philippines' Asian Center.

II

Primarily a research institution established in 1955, the Asian Center offers an M.A. (Asian Studies) program with a major in an area of Asia. It was intended to promote studies on Asian countries from which the Philippines was isolated during her long years of colonial rule. Nevertheless, the founders of the Institute of Asian Studies and the law changing it into the Asian Center, emphasized Philippine Studies. It was believed that before Filipinos attempted to comprehend the history, society and culture of other Asian peoples, it would be well for us to understand our own first, especially at a time when the search for national identity is crucially important to our young Republic.

Therefore, the Asian Center, has a special area of specialization: the Philippines area, which was the first one opened because of availability of staff, library and other facilities necessary to carry on an M.A.

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[5] E. E. Hagen, *On the Treory of Social Change* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press Inc., 1962, p. ix.

(Asian Studies) program of study. The other areas or regions which can be chosen as a major area are: the Southeast Asia area; the South Asia area the West Asia area and the East Asia area. Requiring the knowledge of, at least, one language of the area, any one of these different areas of specialization could serve as a nexus among the several disciplines by drawing from them scholars who focus on a specific area or region, each in his own fashion, or in collaboration with each other.

These scholars constitute a team of specialists who can contribute their knowledge, methodology and insights to the analysis of problems within the area and attempting solutions to them. In this way, the Center was able to build an "area specialization" which was a "multidisciplinal specialization" on top of a "disciplinal specialization" acquired by a student in his undergraduate study. By using the multidisciplinal approach, the Center has achieved, to a certain extent, cooperation and some kind of integration among specialists from the social sciences and humanities disciplines in the study of a specific Asian area or region.

A pair of courses taken during a student's first two successive semesters at the Center, can be taken as examples of his "organized" exposure to the multidisciplinal approach in the study of a particular Asian area. Those specializing in the Philippine area are made to take the Seminar on the Philippines I and II; those in Southeast Asia, Southeast Asia I and II; those in East Asia, East Asia I and II and those in South Asia, South Asia I and II. A student at the Center has to enroll in any pair of courses on the area he chooses to specialize. They constitute two of four core courses required of M.A. students at the Asian Center. The other two are: Pre-Modern Asia and Modern Asia which are expected to give the students a general and broad Asian background for their study of one of the specific areas of Asia. It is, of course, assumed that these students have had some background in world history or world civilizations in their undergraduate training.

The remaining part of the student's program of study is a combination of courses made up of those offered at the Center, the graduate courses of the major department in which he worked for his undergraduate study or courses from related disciplines in the social sciences or the humanities, (depending on the student's background), his proposed thesis topic and his career plans. This study program which aims at a multidisciplinal combination of courses, could allow a student to strengthen his graduate major discipline, especially if he intends to

become a teacher in any Philippine school which is still oriented towards the traditional disciplines. At the same time, he can have a choice of attending courses in related Asian areas, for instance, a major in the Philippines area can take courses in the larger area of Southeast Asia or *vice versa.* He can also choose to take other courses offered by the Center, such as the "Modernization in Asia" which is useful to a student majoring in any of the Asian areas of specialization.

For an idea of how the basic two-semester, formally-organized multidisciplinal courses for each area of Asia are conducted, a description of the Seminar on the Philippines I, the first of two courses on the Philippines follows:

Like the other two-semester area seminars of the Center, the Seminar on the Philippines I is coordinated by a faculty member of the Asian Center who has a disciplinal major but has developed specialization in an Asian area and a multidisciplinal orientation. The "Seminar on the Philippines I" started as a series of lectures on the Philippines by some six or seven faculty members from the departments of Anthropology, Sociology, Psychology, Linguistics, History, Economics and political Science, aside from the Asian Center. The disciplinal lectures presented the lecturers' views on Philippine society and culture within the framework of their respective disciplinal concepts, methodology and substantive data. Reading assignments were, therefore, a combination of theoretical writings with empirical cases in which theory has been effectively — or at least — interestingly applied to specific social problem. Some narrative or descriptive works were also included. Each lecturer submitted a reading list and an outline of the lecture topics decided upon and assigned to him by the coordinator who also plans out the coverage of the series of lectures, the sequence and schedule of each lecture. The outline and reading list of each lecturer are distributed in advance to the students.

The following year, the coordinator decided to give a more specific focus of the problems touched in the series of lectures; that is, a focus on the problems of integration of Philippine society. During the third year of the experiment, the problems were concentrated on "Transitional Philippines in Asia."

As indicated in the copy of the schedule of lectures and outlines of each specialist's lecture, four or five lectures on the geographic, economic and socio-cultural aspects of our society, are followed by lectures on various problems of "transitional Philippines." Among them,

the problem of ethnic integration, the crime and squatter problems, the population problem, the language problem, the problems of economic development, mass media, education, persistence of pre-Conquest Philippine custom laws, social structure and politics, political ideologies and movements, political elites and policy formulation. Then a series of lectures, mainly given by specialists on certain areas of Asia, project the Philippines against its Asian setting.

The "Seminar on the Philippines I" has drawn together a total number of twenty-three lecturers from fourteen units of the University, including the Asian Center and eight departments of the College of Arts and Sciences. It should be noted here that the students attending the Seminar are not only from the Asian Center but also graduate students from the Departments of Political Science, Sociology, and Anthropology of the College of Arts and Sciences, the Institute of Mass Communication, the Institute of Library Science, the College of Education and others who take Asian Studies as a cognate.

As expected of most graduate courses, a greater part of the work in the Seminar is left to the students. Keeping abreast of reading assignments is essential if the students wish to participate in the discussion and the question-and-answer period following the hour's lecture. They can also learn more from the knowledge and insights of the specialist if they can ask him intelligent questions based on data and interpretations gathered from their readings.

A coordinator of the seminar course is necessary to start and direct discussions or questions to keep the class from veering away from the problem being examined. The coordinator ties in one lecture with the next, or one problem with another. He also takes care of giving and correcting examination and/or term papers.

These written works afford the coordinator an idea about the success or failure the multidisciplinal approach in the social sciences has had upon the student's mind and way of thinking. Some papers are disheartening. But the examination and term papers have increasingly become more satisfying and encouraging: These can be viewed partly as results of the improvement of the course within the four-year experimental period, the more rigid selection of students admitted to the M.A. (Asian Studies) program, and the drawing together into the seminar course of more students from an increasing number of disciplines and units of the University thus forming a multidisciplinal group of students. In fact, a few papers written by seminar participants during

the last semester, manifest the students' ability to borrow concepts and methods from various disciplines outside his own, in the process of analyzing their problems and suggesting solutions to them. The last process is what I prefer to describe as the "interdisciplinary approach" which best takes place "within one skill."[6]

Thus, one will note that the "Seminar on the Philippines I" intends to provide incoming students, who choose to major in the Philippines area, a forum of discussion that will transcend their particular disciplines and specialties. It also introduces them to a wide variety of approaches of the social sciences disciplines in the study of Philippine society and culture so that, hopefully, these students can view the Philippines area as a whole, and its problems within this context.

The primary aim of the seminar is the extension of the range of choice of students by introducing him to concepts and methods that are otherwise too easily missed or overlooked and to which the traditional program of graduate study has seldom given a place. The seminar does not attempt to persuade students of the Center, who are required a disciplinal undergraduate major, to adopt new approaches at the expense of traditional ones. Truth can be fruitfully approached from many angles, and a healthy disciplinal department is one in which a diversity of methods and viewpoints coexist, mutually stimulating and criticizing one another. The seminar does not also try to make students proficient in any one of the social sciences. Instead, it seeks only to expose them to work now being done in the social sciences disciplines most directly relevant to the study of the Philippines area.

One of the benefits of the course has been to allow the students to see the limitations as well as possibilities of "new ways" in his own discipline. In other words, once a student is exposed to the multidisciplinal approach in the social sciences, even when he works out problems within his own discipline, he will tend to seek the other disciplines, especially when he is faced with the limits of his own. In this way, the multidisciplinary approach in the social sciences provides the students at the periphery of his discipline a wider range of choice of concepts and methods in analyzing and solving social problems.

The multidisciplinary approach in the social sciences, as applied in the teaching of a course focussed on the Philippine area, which has been described, is limited only to the "organized" type of this approach.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. x.

The working together of social scientists can, however, take many forms and at various levels. It may occur in the preparation of a social science textbook in which compilations of theories and findings are made without any serious attempt to develop meaningful relationships among them. Or it may take place in faculty meetings of social sciences departments of colleges or universities for such purposes as curriculum planning, support of research and others. Or individual sociologist, psychologist, anthropologist and economist may work up a joint course on research project. Or it may take place in constant consultations or even informal conversations among social scientists based in different disciplines who enjoy each other's mental stimulation. It is this last level which the Asian Center has successfully encouraged. Such joint collaboration may develop in a planned or unplanned fashion.

The point I wish to stress here is that the multi-disciplinary approach in the social sciences, which the Asian Center of the University of the Philippines has utilized, has been a response to a longfelt need of achieving "multi-disciplinarism," both in teaching and research, for increasingly complex problems relating to human behavior within an Asian area. For instance, as we entered into the space age, the problem of the individual's relationship to the organized group within the developing countries of Asia, is not simply a matter of concern of the economist, psychologist, sociologist or political scientist alone. Each has a contribution to make, but no single conrtibution itself has met the problem. Thus, the urgent need for a multidisciplinary approach which is more a means for the internal development of each separate social sciences discipline than it is for the establishment of a unified, integrated, all-inclusive discipline or "super-discipline." It is not an end itself but a tool and a stage.[7] There is need for the continuous development and vitalizing of the basic disciplines in the social sciences, if the multi-disciplinal approach itself is to continue to be a useful and valid approach and if it is to continue stimulating the social sciences disciplines in developing "new ways."

It is too soon to judge the success or failure of the multidisciplinal approach used in the study of an Asian area at the Asian Center. But even though "multidisciplinalinarism" at the Center has not yet achieved the effectiveness that was hoped for, and teamwork in teaching and research leaves much to be desired, the experiment in using the multidisciplinal approach in the study of an Asian area is evidence of growth and of widening awareness at the University of the Philippines of the

broadening problems, methods, and scope of our increasingly complex and confusing world.

III

Now, what are the implications of the area-focussed multidisciplinary approach to teacher-training in the social sciences? First, on the level of training teachers in the social sciences at the elementary and secondary levels, it is recommended that critic teachers in the social studies or those engaged in instructing teachers how to teach social studies effectively, acquire some idea of, if not some exposure to the multidisciplinal approach in the study of an area, especially of the Philippines area. This will give them the necessary background for developing future teachers who can understand human behavior, social values and attitudes within a given society and culture, which are primary concerns of educators and education.

Unlike teachers of the social sciences on the college or university level, whose main goal is the training of specialists in the search of truth and knowledge of facts as facts, the most prominent of the objectives to be achieved by the elementary and secondary school teachers is the training of pupils for citizenship within Philippine society. Teachers at these first two very important and crucial levels of our educational system, carry the responsibility of utilizing materials of the social studies as means of providing the basis for making the country and the world today intelligible to their pupils. Moreover, as teachers in the social studies, they are charged with the training of their students in certain skills and habits as well as inculcating in them attitudes and ideals that will enable boys and girls to take their places as efficient and effective members of our society.

I would like to point out more specifically the responsibilities of teachers in the rural areas where they occupy prominent positions as civic and social leaders. A multidisciplinal area approach on the Philippines in the training of teachers, not only teachers in the social studies, would be a great help to them in understanding and explaining existing conditions within their community in a more realistic way. They can also become more effective inspirations and guides of the residents within the community in improving themselves and their venue so that they can share the responsibility of transforming their country into a viable modern, industrial society. Furthermore, events and develop-

[7] Levine, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77.

ments taking place outside their small world or society can be more validly interpreted by teachers with the goal of integrating their community to the larger one, that is, the nation.

On the college or university level, teachers in the social sciences could benefit from an area-focussed multidisciplinary approach, especially because most social science disciplines in Philippine colleges and universities have been traditionally general in orientation with only an occasional bow to area, specifically the Philippines. Reflecting a consequence of American policy in the teaching of the social sciences, this situation has resulted in a concentration on American materials, subject matter, and models in Philippine institutions of higher learning. Therefore, it is imperative that a deliberate re-orientation in the direction of pre-occupation with Philippine materials, without abandoning universal science and international outlook, be undertaken. This trend was among those recognized and, therefore, adopted by the Romulo administration which set it as one of the new goals for the social sciences at the University of the Philippines and which has been further stressed by the present administration at U.P. Related to making students more aware of the cultural, social and political environment in which they live, this goal parallels the effort of mobilizing higher education toward the attainment of distinctly nationalistic goals.[8]

Moreover, exposure to the multidisciplinal approach in the social sciences in the study of an area, especially the Philippines, will be rewarding and functional to social science teachers in Philippine colleges or universities who are made to teach not only their disciplinal major or minor but also courses in other social science disciplines. Having been exposed to and having acquired some ideas of the concepts, methods and substantive data of the social sciences disciplines, they will be in a more advantageous position to teach courses outside their own disciplinal specialization than a disciplinal major who has not had any view of the multidisciplinal approach in the social sciences.

With a multidisciplinal background, on top of a disciplinal base, a person can easily use this training in any one of the research projects of public and private agencies. The Philippine government has been conducting a number of research projects dealing with economic development, modernization, and integration of Philippine society. These have been undertaken by such agencies as the National Economic Council (NEC), National Science Development Board (NSDB), De-

[8] Cuyugan, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

partment of National Defense, Community Development Research Council (CDRC), which is the research arm of the Presidential Assistance for Research and Development (PACD), and others. Private agencies, like business enterprises, newspaper publishing establishments, and private research corporations, are in constant need for researchers with a good background and understanding of Philippine society and culture, knowledgeable in the social sciences, and, therefore, flexible in their ways of acquiring, interpreting, and integrating data on society and culture which are needed by these agencies.

The multidisciplinal approach in the study of an area is a good training for those who plan to become community development workers. It enables individuals an easier entree into, and operation within the community to which they are assigned. It also permits them to perceive specific social problems within the context of the community and the wider background of the nation.

The content and multidisciplinal approach of studying an area are useful to one who plans to make a career of the foreign service. Although the data used in a course are limited primarily to an area, the multidisciplinary approach of viewing an area can be useful to a foreign service man in studying another area provided he learns the language of the area and gather the data he needs in comprehending the area to which he is assigned. His multidisciplinary training can, in fact, guide him in his choice of data.

Knowledge of the society, culture and language of an area are among the qualifications required of area managers, representatives or agents of business establishments. The possibilities of expanding business activities within an area, for instance, are easier to gauge when one has developed keen insights about it which can be initially gained from a multidisciplinal approach in the study of an area. Businessmen who can converse in the language of their local counterparts and read daily business reports in the local papers or journals are in a better position to make profitable business decisions.

Therefore, for both the specialists and generalists, a multidisciplinal area study offers the satisfaction of research, wider intellectual development and discovery, and functional utility in specific occupations. Again, it is good to remember that whatever be the academic validity and the practical benefits of the multidisciplinal approach in the study of an area, it cannot long survive without the continued existence of well developed and continuously developing disciplines of the social sciences.

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