


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ASIAN STUDIES

Vol. XIII, Number 2, August 1975

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Oriental Studies

August 1975

Vol. XIII, No. 2

CONTENTS

- The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1
Felisa Uy-Etemadi
- The Theoretical Basis of Sexual Equality and Marriage
Reform in China 13
Sybilla G. Dorros
- The "Christian Problem" and the Philippine South 27
Joel de los Santos
- Platforms of Philippine Parties: The Politics
of Expedience, 1902-1913 45
Rawlein Soberano
- North Indian Intellectuals: Perceptions and Images
of Modernization 55
Yogendra K. Malik
- General Characterization of Contemporary Religious Movements
in the Philippines 79
Prospero R. Covar
- The Ritual Music of the Iglesia del Ciudad Mistica de Dios:
A Preliminary Report 93
Ramon P. Santos
- Heaven Sees as the People See, Heaven Hears as the People Hear .. 119
William Henry Scott

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THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION

FELISA UY-ETEMADI

Never before in China's history had the Chinese people practised direct action on such a great scale as they did in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) of the mid-sixties. Its influence has penetrated into every sphere of Chinese life: farm, factories, schools, universities, all the arts and culture, the army, the government, and the Party. Chinese communist commentators underscored this historical episode as "the greatest even" in the sixth decade of the twentieth century¹ yet unprecedented in the history of China.

I

The Cultural Revolution had its conceptual roots in the Marxist analysis of society, refined and developed by Mao on the basis of his long experience in the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China.

Marxist analysis distinguishes between the base and the superstructure of a social system.² The base is a system's mode of economic

¹ Editorial, *People's Daily* and *Red Flag*, January 1, 1967, reprinted in *Peking Review* (PR), No. 1, January 1, 1967, p. 8.

² Karl Marx, Preface to "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy," 1859 in T. B. Bottomore and M. Rubel, eds., *Karl Marx on Sociology and Social Philosophy* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1961), pp. 67-68. ' "

production. Ideas and institutions, laws and politics, and even religious concepts as well as artistic expressions are all parts of the social superstructure. Accepting this dichotomy, Mao expounded on the relationship between the productive forces and the production relations and between the base and the superstructure. In Marxist terms, productive forces refer to the essentials possessed by mankind to carry out material production namely, labor force, object of labor and productive tools. Production relations refer to the relations of men to each other or the places people occupy in the production process.

In his work "On Contradiction" Mao pointed out that in the contradictions between the productive forces and the relations of production, and between the base and the superstructure, the productive forces and the economic base "generally play the principal and decisive role." But "in certain conditions," the relations of production and the superstructure "in turn manifest themselves in the principal and decisive role." "When it is impossible for the productive forces to develop without a change in the relations of production, then the change in the relations of production plays the principal, decisive role." Likewise, "when the superstructure (politics, culture, etc.) obstructs the development of the economic base, political and cultural changes become principal and decisive." Briefly, "... while we recognize that in the general development of history the material determines social consciousness, we also — and indeed must — recognize the reaction of mental on material things, of consciousness on social being and of the superstructure on the economic base."³

Using the theoretical framework of the dialectical relations between productive forces and production relations, and between base and superstructure, Mao analyzed Chinese society. He noted that economically China was technologically backward. It had a predominantly small-scale, low-productive agriculture; its industry was mainly light such as textiles and food production.⁴ The situation was so because the production relations were not in harmony with the productive forces. Feudal landlords monopolized most of the lands while the majority of peasants were either landless or small land-holders or poor tenants who were forced to pay exorbitant rents and taxes.⁵ The bourgeoisie owned and

³ Mao Tse-tung, "On Contradiction," August, 1937 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press [FLP], 1964), pp. 38-39.

⁴ Po I-po, "The Socialist Industrialization of China," *PR*, No. 41, October 11, 1963, p. 6.

⁵ The Agrarian Reform Law of the People's Republic of China (Promulgated by the Central People's Government of June 30, 1950).

controlled factories and mines and other means of production while the workers toiled for the former's benefit; wage-workers were paid only half or even less than half of the full value they produced; the rest went to the capitalists.⁶ From this feudal and capitalist economy emerged a feudal and capitalist culture that served to perpetuate the status quo.⁷

II

Based on this analysis, Mao laid down his blueprint for the Chinese revolution. The establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 marked the beginning of a period of "New Democracy." It was "a united front composed of the working class, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, based on the alliance of workers and peasants, led by the working class."⁸ This was a transitional stage to the period of "Socialist Revolution and Socialist Construction." Until the latter period is achieved, China must undergo a program of economic transformation. At the same time, the new society was to have not only "a new politics and a new economy," but also "a new culture" that reflects and serves "the new politics and the new economy." Consequently, land reform and the step by step process of co-operativization were undertaken to liberate the productive forces in the countryside. China's capitalist economy was transformed through various forms of state capitalism.

Along with the economic transformation were a number of campaigns and drives to make the necessary social readjustments: the Campaign against Counter-revolutionaries, the Three-Anti Campaign (against waste, corruption and bureaucracy), the Five-Anti Campaign (against bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property and of state economic secrets, and cheating on government contracts), the Rectification Movement and the Anti-Rightist Campaign. But it was later revealed that readjustments in the superstructure were not keeping pace with the economic base.⁹ It was in this context that Mao introduced the theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

⁶ Po, *op. cit.*

⁷ Mao Tse-tung, "On New Democracy," January, 1940 (Peking: FLP, 1966), p. 2.

⁸ Proclamation of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China (Read by Mao Tse-tung at a rally on October 1, 1949).

⁹ Lin Piao, "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China" (Delivered on April 1 and adopted on April 14, 1969).

In his speech entitled "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," he pointed out:

The class struggle is by no means over. The class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the class struggle between the different political forces and the class struggle in the ideological field between the proletariat and bourgeoisie will continue to be long and tortuous and at times will even become very acute. The proletariat seeks to transform the world according to its world outlook, and so does the bourgeoisie . . . It will take a fairly long period of time to decide the issue in the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism in our country.¹⁰

Mao put forward more comprehensively this basic line for the period of socialism at the working conference of the Central Committee at Peitaho in August, 1962 and at the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the CCP in September of the same year. He stressed:

Socialist society covers a fairly long historical period. In the historical period of socialism, there are classes, class contradictions, and class struggle, there is the struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road, there is the danger of capitalist restoration. We must recognize the protracted and complex nature of this struggle. We must heighten our vigilance. We must correctly understand and handle class contradictions and class struggle, distinguish the contradictions between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people and handle them correctly. Otherwise, a socialist society like ours will turn into its opposite and degenerate and a capitalist restoration will take place.¹¹

III

For Mao, it is necessary to wage continuous class struggle while building socialism. Otherwise, the socialist revolution may change direction and slide back to capitalism. However, Liu Shao-ch'i, then Chairman of the People's Republic, was said to have challenged Mao with his theory of the "dying out of class struggle." In his speech at a meeting of Party cadres in Shanghai in April, 1957, Liu was reported to have said:

Today enemies inside the country have been basically destroyed. The landlord class has been wiped out long ago, and the bourgeoisie has also been destroyed in the main. That is why we say that class struggle among the principal classes inside the country has basically come to an end. That is to say, the contra-

¹⁰ Mao Tse-tung, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," February 27, 1957 (Peking: FLP, 1966), pp. 37-38.

¹¹ Lin Piao, *op. cit.*

dictions between the enemy and ourselves have been basically settled.¹²

From Liu's point of view, the question of who wins over whom — socialism or capitalism — has been settled in China. Since the revolution has been won, economic development must be given priority.

In the context of Mao's theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was a struggle under socialism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes. It was to settle which line China would follow, the Mao line which stresses continuous class struggle or the Liu line which emphasizes economic development.

As presented by Mao in his essay on "Contradiction," contradictory forces continue to exist in a socialist society. Official pronouncements as contained in the *People's Daily*, or the *Red Flag* editorials claimed that there existed in the years preceding the Cultural Revolution an organized opposition inside the Party apparatus diametrically opposed to Mao. In Mao's own idiom, it was a case of "non-antagonistic contradictions becoming antagonistic."¹³ "China's Krushchev," Liu Shao-ch'i, was the patron of this "black gang." Other "party capitalist roaders" included such prominent figures as Teng Hsiao-p'ing, secretary-general of the CCP (was rehabilitated and is today a vice-chairman of the CCP Central Committee, a deputy premier of the State Council, and the chief of staff, People's Liberation Army); Lu Ting-yi, director of the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee; Chou Yang and Lin Mo-han, deputy directors in the Propaganda Department; T'ao Chu who replaced Lu Ting-yi; Peng Chen, mayor of Peking; Peng Teh-huai, ex-minister of defense; Lo Jui-ch'ing, chief of the general staff of the PLA; Chen Yun, a vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee; Yang Shang-k'un, director of Party affairs; Sun Yeh-fan, director of the Research Institute of Economics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences; Po I-po, director of the State Economic Commission. Also included in Liu's faction were the unreformed capitalists, landlords, unenlightened members of the petty bourgeoisie and intellectuals from the old society, and Kuomintang spies and saboteurs.

¹² "Thoroughly Criticize and Repudiate the Reactionary Fallacy of 'Dying Out of Class Struggle,'" *People's Daily*, August 20, 1967, trans. in *Survey of China Mainland Press* (SCMP), No. 4038, October 10, 1967, p. 6.

¹³ Edgar Snow, *The Long Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p. 20.

The rise and upsurge of the high-level opposition came about as a consequence of the shift in leadership. In the government reorganization which took place with the inauguration of the new Constitution in 1954, Liu Shao-ch'i became the chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, top organ of state authority to which all other organs of government with the exception of the Chairman of the People's Republic, are responsible. The Eighth National Congress held in September, 1956 made Liu senior vice-chairman among the CCP Central Committee's four vice-chairmen. Although Mao retained his position as chairman of the Central Committee and remained concurrently as chairman of the Central Committee's Politburo, he was no longer the chairman of the Central Secretariat. Instead, the congress elected a Secretary-General, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, to handle the daily work of the Central Secretariat. Following the acceptance of Mao's relinquishment of his government responsibilities at the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee in 1958 to devote more time to party theoretical work, Liu was officially elected as chairman of the People's Republic in April, 1959. Thus, a new line of leadership revolving around Liu and Tang dominated the day-to-day affairs of China.¹⁴

IV

Meanwhile, Mao settled back to play a less active and immediate role. His political pre-eminence gradually diminished. "Mao Tse-tung Thought" which had been adopted by the 1945 Party Constitution as the guideline of CCP work was omitted in the new 1956 Party Constitution (to be restored in 1969). From 1961 onwards, some important decisions taken at Politburo meetings and Party work conferences were implemented without consulting Mao. Mao was said to have complained that "independent kingdoms" had existed, that he had not been consulted on many things and that since 1959 Teng Hsiao-p'ing had not discussed nor reported anything to him.¹⁵

¹⁴ Stuart Schram, "Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i 1939-1969," *Asian Survey* (AS), XII (April, 1972), pp. 252-293. Also refer to Howard Boorman, "Liu-Shao-ch'i: A Political Profile," *China Quarterly* (CQ), No. 10 (April-June, 1962), pp. 1-22; Peter Cheng, "Liu Shao-ch'i and the Cultural Revolution," AS, XI (October, 1971), pp. 948-957.

¹⁵ "Selected Edition on Liu Shao-ch'i's Counter-revolutionary Revisionist Crimes," published by the Liaison Station "Pledging to Fight a Bloody Battle with Liu-Teng-T'ao to the End" attached to August 18 Rebel Regiment of Nankai University, April, 1967, trans. in *Selections from China Mainland Magazine* (SCMM), No. 651, April 22, 1969, p. 1.

Furthermore, Mao's domestic policies came under open criticism from Party members. At the 1959 Lushan conference, Peng Teh-huai, then Minister of Defense attacked the "General Line for the Socialist Period" which was known to have been formulated by the Party under the guidance of Mao. These critics attacked the general line as "left-deviation adventurism," the Great Leap as "feverish," and the communes as "premature" and "making a mess of things."¹⁶ Although these "rightist opportunists" were removed from office, the intellectuals came to their defense and continued the attack.

Starting in 1959, Wu Hang, vice mayor of Peking, wrote a series of plays and articles on "Hai Jui" to satirize the dismissal of Peng Teh-huai. His offensive was followed and backed up in 1961 by another series of essays entitled "Evening Chats at Yenshan" by Teng T'o, secretary of the Secretariat of the Peking Municipal Party, and "Notes from the Three Family Village" by Wu Han, Teng T'o, and Liao Mo-sha, director of the United Front Work Department of the Peking Municipal Committee. These men were said to have the support of the Peking Municipal Committee headed by P'eng Chen, mayor of Peking. P'eng Chen was charged with having avoided the real issues at stake and having treated the ideological class controversy as a "pure academic discussion" and as a discussion of "different opinions"¹⁷ as reflected in his "Outline Report on the Current Academic Discussion Held by the Group of Five in Charge of the Cultural Revolution." P'eng was said to have the backing of Liu Shao-ch'i; otherwise, the "Outline" would not have been ratified by the Central Committee.¹⁸ Liu was himself charged with trying to "reverse the verdicts" on the "rightist opportunists." He considered the 1959 anti-rightist struggle as "aggravation," "struggle that has gone too far," "repeating the mistakes of brutal struggle and merciless blows in the history of the Party."¹⁹ And in the 1962 revised edition of his "How To Be a Good Communist," Liu pronounced that "the attitude adopted by the left

¹⁶ "Outline of the Struggle Between the Two Lines from the Eve of the Founding of the People's Republic of China Through the Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth CCP Central Committee," undated pamphlet from the Shanghai *Chieh-fang Jih-pao*, trans. in *Current Background* (CB), No. 884, July 18, 1966, p. 16.

¹⁷ Jen Li-hsin, "'February Outline Report' Is a Sinister Program for Bourgeois Dictatorship," *People's Daily*, June 11, 1967, trans. SCMP, No. 3961, June 16, 1967, p. 5.

¹⁸ Wu Tung-hui, "Destroy the Back Stage Manager of 'Three Family Village'," *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, June 18, 1967, trans. in SCMP, No. 3977, July 11, 1967, pp. 10-16.

¹⁹ "Selected Edition," p. 28.

opportunists within the Party toward inner-Party struggle has shown their mistakes" and that "even when there is no divergence of principle within the Party, they insist on hunting for targets, taking certain comrades as 'opportunists,' as 'straw men' to be shot at during inner-Party struggle."²⁰

V

Liu's dissenting voice against Mao's policies was first aired at an enlarged Central Committee work conference held in January, 1952. He was reported to have said that the general line was "put forward blindly," that the Great Leap was "brought in a rush causing disproportions in the economy;" that the difficulties encountered following the Great Leap were thirty per cent the fault of nature and seventy per cent the fault of man;" that the communes were "set up too early," that if they were not established, things might be in a better shape and that the peasants were not so happy about the communes.²¹

After becoming the Chairman of the People's Republic, Liu instituted major changes in economic policies to overcome the economic dislocations of the "three hard years" (1959-1961) caused partly by such factors as natural calamities, the Soviet withdrawal of technicians and the "mistakes and shortcomings" in the Party's work in the preceding years. In the communes, Liu allowed the operation of a limited free market, the restitution of small plots to peasants, and the contracting of production quota with individual peasant households — the system of "san-tzu-i-pao."²² In industry, Liu supported a wage system encouraging incentive pay, advocated professionalization, profitability of industrial units and decentralization in economic planning giving broad decision-making autonomy to local production units.²³ He in-

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-28. See also Philip Brigham, "Factionalism in the Central Committee," in Jone Lewis, ed., *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China* (Cambridge: University Press, 1970), pp. 203-238; Schram, *op. cit.*

²² "The Struggle Between the Two Roads in China's Countryside," Joint Editorial, *People's Daily*, *Red Flag*, and *Liberation Army Daily*, November 23, 1967 (Peking: FLP, 1968).

²³ "Abolition of Socialist Planned Economy Means Capitalist Restoration," by the Red Guards for Mao Tse-tung's Thought of the "East Is Red" Commune of Shantung Finance and Economics College, *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, July 19, 1967 trans. in *CB*, No. 839, September 25, 1967, pp. 20-24. See also W. C. Adie, "China's Second Liberation," *International Affairs*, XLV (July, 1969), pp. 439-454; Charles Hoffman, "Work Incentive Policy in Communist China," *CQ*, No. 17 (January-March, 1964), pp. 92-110; Gene Hsiao, "The Background and Development of the Proletarian Cultural

sisted that only a few experts — directors, engineers, and technicians can be relied upon for economic construction.²⁴

In Mao's view, these new policies not only constituted a reversal of his whole approach to China's economic development but were also intended to disintegrate China's socialist economy thereby paving the way for capitalist restoration. What had happened in the years following the program of economic liberalization confirmed Mao's suspicion. Commune members were giving in to the capitalist tendencies inherent in the "san-tzu-i-pao." Basic-level cadres were displaying a bureaucratic style of work thus widening the gap between the leader and the led. In Mao's eyes, China was going backward — toward capitalism.

VI

In 1962, Mao conducted the Socialist Education Movement intended to rectify the shortcomings of the basic-level cadres and to strengthen the mass line in rural work.²⁵ This was also known as the Four Clean-Up Campaign — checking on the handling of accounts, warehouses, properties, and work points in the countryside. The movement was later expanded to include cleaning up of politics, economy, organization and ideology. But operationally, the movement did not work out. It was said to have been sabotaged by Liu. Liu played up the mistakes of the cadres to divert attention from the far worse bureaucratic vices of those at the top. He was thus guilty of "hitting hard at many to protect a handful."²⁶ Furthermore, he distorted the nature of the movement by defining the Socialist Education Movement as "The contradiction between the four clean-ups and the four unclean-ups, the intersection of contradictions within and outside the Party, or that of the contradictions between the enemy and ourselves, and contradictions among the people."²⁷ Liu's approaches "do not tell in what society the

Revolution," *CQ*, No. 30 (April-June, 1967), pp. 33-48; Jan Prybyla, *The Political Economy of Communist China* (Pennsylvania: International Textbooks, 1970), chapter 9; Peter Tang and Joan Maloney, *Communist China: The Domestic Scene 1949-1967* (New Jersey: Seton Hall University Press, 1967), chapter 7; Edward Wheelwright, *The Chinese Road to Socialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), chapters 3 and 4.

²⁴ "Two Diametrically Opposed Lines in Building the Economy," *PR*, No. 37, September 8, 1967, pp. 12-17.

²⁵ First Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Certain Problems in the Present Rural Work (Draft), May 20, 1963.

²⁶ "The Struggle Between the Two Roads." See also Richard Baum and Frederick Teiwes, "Liu Shao-ch'i and the Cadre Question," *AS*, VIII (April, 1968), pp. 323-345.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

contradictions exist between the four clean-ups and the four unclean-ups. Nor do they indicate in what Party the intersection of contradiction exist inside and outside. Nor do they say anything about the historical period and the class content of the contradictions between the enemy and ourselves and the contradictions among the people," and where therefore "not Marxist-Leninist way of looking at things."²⁸ The only correct approach was, as suggested by Mao's 23-Point Directive, to define the movement as "the contradiction between socialism and capitalism." Thus, Liu pursued a line which is "left in form but right in essence."

The Socialist Education Movement was later on much radicalized to become the basis of the "Sixteen-Point Decision" of the GPCR proclaimed in August, 1966.

VII

Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in four stages. The first stage was to mobilize the revolutionary elements — workers, peasants, soldiers, revolutionary intellectuals and students, and revolutionary cadres, and to create public opinion. Point fourteen of the "Sixteen-Point Decision" provided that "in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the only method is for the masses to liberate themselves . . . Trust the masses, rely on them and respect their initiative."²⁹ Yao Wen-yuan's attack against Wu Han started the ideological campaign. Subsequently, the *People's Daily*, the *Red Flag*, and the *Liberation Army Daily* carried a series of editorials and articles refuting the "revisionist" line in literature while propagating the official policies regarding the Cultural Revolution.³⁰

The second stage was the exposure and criticism of the revisionists. The May 16 Circular of the CCP Central Committee (issued on May 16, 1966 but was made public only a year later) called on the people to attack "those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have wormed into the Party, the Government, the Army and various spheres." Nation-wide publicity was accorded to the "first Marxist-Leninist" big character poster denouncing the "bourgeoisie royalists" inside the Peking University.³¹ At the same time, Mao extended his "warm support" to the Red Guards

²⁸ Some Current Problems Raised in the Socialist Education Movement in the Rural Areas, January 14, 1965.

²⁹ Decision of the CCP Central Committee Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, August 8, 1966.

³⁰ *The Great Cultural Revolution in China* (Hong Kong: Asia Research Center, 1968).

³¹ "Outline of the Struggle," p. 28.

who had begun to "bombard the headquarters" of the revisionists.³² Factory workers criticized the factory managers for practising "echoism,"³³ that is using wage increases and other material benefits to corrupt the "revolutionary will" of the masses.

The third stage was the seizure of power and the formation of revolutionary committees. An editorial of the *People's Daily* declared that "the basic question of revolution is political power . . . those who have power have everything; those who are without power have nothing . . . Seize power, all the Party power, political power and financial power still held by the counter-revolutionary revisionists."³⁴ Following the seizure of power, a "three-way-alliance" composed of representatives of the army, the revolutionary cadres and revolutionary masses was formed in every unit.³⁵

The last stage was the stage of struggle-criticism-transformation, that still goes on today. Struggle-criticism-transformation means "to struggle against and crush those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic 'authorities' and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art and all parts of the superstructure that do not correspond to the socialist economic base." The main force in this movement was the "Mao Tse-tung Propaganda Teams" composed mainly of industrial workers with the participation of the Liberation Army. Beginning in July, 1968 these teams moved into universities, colleges, middle and primary schools and all aspects of the superstructure.³⁶ This was also the period of consolidating the Party, "getting rid of the stale and taking in the fresh."³⁷ At the same time, the Red Guards and all educated youth were ordered to go to the countryside "to be re-educated by the poor and lower-middle peasants."³⁸ Likewise, cadres who had committed mistakes were sent

³² NCNA-English, Tirana, June 27, 1967, quoted in *The Great Power Struggle in China* (Hong Kong: Asia Research Center, 1969), p. 3.

³³ "Message to All Shanghai People," January 4, 1967, published in *Wenhui Bao*, January 5, 1967, reprinted in *PR*, No. 3, January 13, 1967, pp. 5-7.

³⁴ *People's Daily*, January 22, 1967, reprinted in *PR*, No. 5, January 27, 1967, pp. 7-8.

³⁵ *Red Flag*, No. 5, 1967, reprinted in *PR*, No. 12, March 17, 1967, pp. 14-16.

³⁶ Yao Wen-yuan, "The Working Class Must Exercise Leadership in Everything," *PR*, No. 35, August 30, 1968, pp. 3-6.

³⁷ Joint Editorial, *People's Daily*, *Red Flag*, and *Liberation Army Daily*, January 1, 1968, reprinted in *PR*, No. 40.

³⁸ "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," *CQ*, No. 37 (January-March, 1969), p. 164.

to rural "cadre schools" to reform themselves through labor and close contact with the peasants.³⁹

VIII

The Ninth Party Congress of the CCP opened on April 1, 1969. (The preceding Party Congress had taken place in 1956). It was attended by 1,512 delegates. It was claimed that no previous Congress ever had so many industrial workers, peasants, and women among its members. Mao was elected chairman of the presidium with Lin Piao and Chou En-lai as vice-chairman and secretary-general respectively. At the opening session of the presidium, Lin Piao delivered a political report on behalf of the Central Committee. His report summed up the basic experience of the Cultural Revolution, analyzed the domestic and international situations and outlined the fighting tasks of the Party.⁴⁰ A second communique released on April 14 announced that Lin's report was adopted after "many good proposals for addition to and modifications of the report" had been made by the delegates who discussed it "sentence by sentence." At the same time, the Ninth Congress adopted the draft Constitution of the CCP which reaffirmed "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-Tung Thought" as the theoretical basis guiding the Party thinking and stipulated Lin Piao as the successor to Mao.⁴¹ Mao's theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat was incorporated into the Constitution. Since "the defeated class will still struggle," the task of struggle-criticism-transformation must be continued.⁴² The closing session on April 24 elected a new Central Committee with Mao as its leader and Vice-Chairman Lin Piao as its deputy leader.⁴³ Meanwhile, revolutionary committees have become the new power structure (and are today the people's government at the local level as provided in the new Constitution of the People's Republic of China adopted by the Fourth National People's Congress convened in January, 1975). Education has been reoriented becoming more concrete and pragmatic as it applies to production and work. Political awareness is considerably heightened among the population.⁴⁴

³⁹ *People's Daily*, October 5, 1958, cited in "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," CQ, No. 37 (January-March, 1969), p. 152.

⁴⁰ Press Communique of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Ninth National Congress of the CCP, April 1, 1969.

⁴¹ Press Communique of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Ninth National Congress of the CCP, April 14, 1969.

⁴² Lin Piao, *op. cit.*

⁴³ Press Communique of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Ninth National Congress of the CCP, April 24, 1969.

⁴⁴ Joint Editorial, *People's Daily, Red Flag and Liberation Army Daily*, October 1, 1968, reprinted in *PR*, No. 40, October 4, 1968, p. 18.

THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF SEXUAL EQUALITY AND MARRIAGE REFORM IN CHINA

SYBILLA G. DORROS

Communism is the positive abolition of private property, of human self-alienation, and thus the real appropriation of human nature through and for man. It is, therefore, the return of man to himself as a social, i.e., really human, being, a complete and conscious return which assimilates all the wealth of previous development. Communism as fully developed naturalism is humanism and as fully developed humanism is naturalism. It is the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and nature, and between man and man. It is the true solution of the conflict between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution.¹

Implicit in this definition of communism by Karl Marx is the assumption that there is a fundamental "contradiction within the very essence of things." These contradictions — or conflicts, antagonisms or struggles — propel history forward. For Marx, all nature, "from the smallest thing to the biggest, from a grain of sand to the sun . . . to man, is in . . . a ceaseless state of movement and change."² Change is

¹ Karl Marx, *Early Writings*, quoted in Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx* (Cambridge: University Press, 1970), pp. 277-228.

² Quoted in Samuel E. Stumpf, *Socrates to Sartre: A History of Philosophy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 427.

not mere growth but the emergence of new structures: it is the quantitative alteration of things which leads to something qualitatively new.³

This dialectical development, in which each stage creates the "germs of its own destruction," can be delayed or accelerated but not prevented. History, according to Marx, must follow a lawful and necessary pattern that advances inevitably from phase to phase. These phases he identified as: (1) primitive, (2) slave, (3) feudal, (4) capitalist, and (5) socialist/communist. In each given phase, except the last, society is based on the antagonisms between the oppressing and oppressed classes. In the final phase, however, the contradictions between classes would be resolved and a classless society would emerge.

Within each phase of history described above, the character of each society is determined by the "mode of production" of that age, i.e., the way people satisfy their material needs. The "mode of production" in turn contains two components: the "productive forces" which include such things as available technology, skills, material resources, and sources of energy; and the "productive relations" — that is, the relationship between people engaged in producing material goods. According to Marx,

. . . the totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society . . . the real foundation on which legal and political superstructures arise and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond. The mode of production of material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness.⁴

Within this theory of economic determinism, the key to the relations of production is the status of property or its ownership. The relationship between the owners of the "means of production" and those under the direction of these owners is the basis for the division of society into "classes" through the various phases of history — slave and slave owner, serf and lord, worker and capitalist. As long as the means of production remains in the hands of a few, class struggle will continue inexorably until the contradiction is resolved. For this reason, and as stated in Marx's definition, the first goal of communism is the abolition of private property.

³*Ibid.*

⁴ Karl Marx, Preface of 1859, quoted in Karl Marx, *Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy* (rev. ed., London: Watts & Co., 1961), p. 51.

In order to abolish private property under capitalism — where the classes have been reduced to two basic ones, bourgeoisie and proletariat —, Marx believed that it was necessary to emancipate the workers. Their emancipation was not alone at stake because “the emancipation of the workers contains universal human emancipation — and it contains this, because the whole of human servitude is involved in the relations of the worker to production, and every relation of servitude is but a modification and consequence of this relation.”⁵

Thus at the core of the abolition of private property is universal human emancipation. Marx believed that with the establishment of socialism the history of humanity would enter a new phase and, as earlier indicated, the era of classes would be put to an end. This new society would be free from exploitation. Man would freely join with others to better the lives of all men. As he states in *The Communist Manifesto*, “In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”⁶

I

Included in the exploitation of one part of society by another is the exploitation of women, the relationship between the sexes. As Engels has stated, “The first class antagonism which appears in history coincides with the development of the antagonism between man and woman in monogamian marriage, and the first class oppression with that of the female sex by the male.”⁷ Thus, in Communist ideology, all women — whether they belonged to the exploiting or the exploited class — are oppressed by men in class society.

Although Marx considered relations between the sexes necessary and spontaneous, he also termed them “other-oriented,” i.e., man’s need for a partner in the sexual relationship makes his own satisfaction depend upon another person’s satisfaction.⁸ This relationship has to be

⁵ Karl Marx, *Economic and Political Manuscripts of 1844*, quoted in John H. Randall, Jr., *The Career of Philosophy*, Vol. II, *From the German Enlightenment to the Age of Darwin* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), p. 408.

⁶ Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto*, quoted in Arthur P. Mendel, ed., *Essential Works of Marxism* (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p. 33.

⁷ Frederick Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972), p. 75.

⁸ Avineri, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

reciprocal because if it were unilateral it ceases to be a relationship, degrading the other person to the status of a mere object. In Marxist theory, it was the emergence of private ownership which contributed to the unilateral character of the relationship between the sexes. According to Marx, the nineteenth-century bourgeois world made even the limited reciprocity of family life impossible: "The bourgeois sees in his wife a mere instrument of production."⁹

Since "the modern individual family is based on the open or disguised domestic enslavement of the women . . .,"¹⁰ the first step in the emancipation of the women is a change in the family system. Indeed Marx had little respect for the traditional family structure which he dismissed as "bourgeois claptrap." He believed that the bourgeois family had been romanticized and that society should not be constructed on the model of the family. He envisioned the transformation of the whole social structure as the recognition by men of the universal dependence of man on man, thus making it a conscious principle of human conduct. This possibility was based, according to Marx, on the correct understanding and subsequent transformation of the system of production.¹¹

Changes in the family system which would ultimately emancipate women thus depended on changes in the economic structure and, specifically, on women's participation in economic life. In the words of Engels:

Here we see already that the emancipation of women and their equality with men are impossible and must remain so as long as women are excluded from socially productive work and restricted to housework, which is private. The emancipation of women becomes possible only when women are enabled to take part in production on a large, social scale, and when domestic duties require their attention only to a minor degree.¹²

This belief was reiterated by Lenin who felt that housework "crushes, strangles, stultifies and degrades women, chains them to the kitchen and to the nursery, and wastes their labor on barbarously unproductive, nerve-racking, stultifying and crushing drudgery."¹³ Ac-

⁹ Marx, *The Communist Manifesto*, quoted in Mendel, *Essential Works . . .*, p. 30.

¹⁰ Engels, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

¹¹ Avineri, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

¹² Engels, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

¹³ *Union Research Service*, XIII (October 14, 1958), p. 45, quoted in Lowell Dittmer, "The Chinese Marriage Law of 1950, A Study of Elite Control and Social Change" (unpublished Master's thesis, The University of Chicago, 1967), p. 72.

According to Lenin, in order to emancipate women from this "domestic slavery," it was necessary for the national economy to be socialized and for women to participate in common productive labor¹⁴ To this end, he envisioned the "setting up of model institutions, dining-rooms and nurseries, that will emancipate women from housework."¹⁵

Thus, only when women are liberated from their role as domestic slaves and are no longer regarded as objects by men, can the fundamental antagonism between man and women be resolved. This resolution is communism itself: "the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and nature, and between man and man" and, it could be added, between man and woman.

II

These and other basic Marxist tenets were introduced in China during the New Culture and May Fourth Movements. Marxism was particularly attractive to the Chinese intelligentsia because it seemed to have succeeded in changing Russia, with the Bolsheviks' seizure of power in 1917. In the *New Youth* of November 1918, for example, Li Ta-chao celebrated the anniversary of the October 1917 Revolution and hailed "The Victory of Bolshevism." In May 1919 he edited that journal's issue on Marxism. By mid-1920 both Li Ta-chao and Ch'en Tu-hsiu had wholeheartedly accepted Marxism-Leninism and set up various study groups on socialist theory.¹⁶ Despite the appeal of Marxism to Li Ta-chao, Ch'en Tu-hsiu and other Chinese intellectuals, their understanding of "Marxism" was undoubtedly somewhat limited at that time.

The actual founding of the Chinese Communist Party took place in Shanghai in July, 1921 at a meeting organized by Li Ta-chao and Ch'en Tu-hsiu. The first Communist organization in Shanghai and its various branches elsewhere had been established with the help of an agent of the Third or Communist International, Gregory Voitinsky. His successor, Marin, had assisted at the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. These and other Comintern agents assisted in developing the Chinese Communist Party apparatus and a Communist-led

¹⁴ Quoted in Li Chen, "Women Take Part in Productive Labor," *Peking Review* (March 22, 1974), pp. 17 and 21.

¹⁵ Quoted in Liu Chao, "Safeguarding Women's Interests," *Peking Review* (March 29, 1974), p. 15.

¹⁶ John K. Fairbank, *et al.*, *East Asia: The Modern Transformation* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965), pp. 670-671.

labor movement.¹⁷ Thus, during this period, Chinese Communist ideology was strongly influenced by the leadership in Soviet Russia, to the extent that the first leaders of the Chinese Communist Party were convinced that the Chinese Revolution would follow the Russian "model."

It was not until later that Chinese Communist ideology developed its own individuality, a development often referred to as the "sinification" of Marxism-Leninism. This ideology developed out of the "concrete conditions" which existed in China in the late 1920's. These conditions included the "split" between the Kuomintang, led by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Chinese Communist Party, and the realization by some of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party that its success depended not on gaining control of the urban centers but on amassing support among the peasantry. The first Communist-led peasant uprising in China, the unsuccessful Autumn Harvest Uprising led by Mao Tse-tung, represented a turning point in Communist political and military strategy.

Mao Tse-tung's strategy for revolution in China is revealed in his "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan" (March 1927), in which "the main strength of the revolution" is identified not as the city workers but as the poor peasantry. This strategy is expounded in his later writings and is succinctly expressed in the following quotation:

As every schoolboy knows, 80 per cent of China's population are peasants. So the peasant problem becomes the basic problem of the Chinese Revolution and the strength of the peasants is the main strength of the Chinese revolution.¹⁸

The importance which Mao placed on the role of the peasantry was to prove successful in China, but it was attacked again and again by elements within the Chinese Communist Party, even after the Communists had gained political power. Although Mao's unorthodox methods were not endorsed by Moscow, and he was virtually without power within the Chinese Communist Party from 1927 until 1935, his strategy proved so correct as to make him the indisputable leader of the Chinese Revolution.

Given this leadership position in the Chinese Communist world, the ideology of Mao Tse-tung is, in a sense, "Chinese Communist ideology." In fact, at the present time, the total ideology of the

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 671.

¹⁸ Mao Tse-tung, "On the New Democracy," *The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), p. 367.

Chinese Communist Party is officially described as "Marxism-Leninism and the Thought of Mao Tse-tung."¹⁹ Thus, in any discussion of the Chinese Communist ideology of sexual equality and marriage reform, it is necessary to refer to the writings of Mao Tse-tung to discover the evolution of this ideology.

III

In his "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan," Mao Tse-tung states:

A man in China is usually subjected to the domination of systems of authority: (1) the state system (political authority) . . . (2) the clan system (clan authority) . . . and (3) the supernatural system (religious authority) . . . As for women, in addition to being dominated by these three systems of authority, they are also dominated by the men (authority of the husband). These four authorities — political, clan, religious and masculine — are the embodiment of the whole feudal-patriarchal system and ideology, and are the four thick ropes binding the Chinese people, particularly the peasants.²⁰

It is obvious from these statements that Mao Tse-tung considered women to be the most oppressed of the Chinese people; not only were they dominated by the three authorities which oppressed all Chinese, they suffered an additional domination, namely that of the male. This belief is reiterated in his other works, e.g., "Under feudal domination, marriage is a barbaric and inhuman institution. The oppression and suffering borne by woman is far greater than that of man"²¹ and "We are peasants . . . We are workers . . . We are students . . . we are sunk even deeper in a sea of bitterness . . ."²² For a Chinese woman

¹⁹ Franz Schurmann, "Ideology," *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 23-24.

In the Party Rules adopted at the Seventh Party Congress (April-June 1945), the preamble states, "The Chinese Communist Party takes the theories of Marxism-Leninism and the unified thought and practice of the Chinese Revolution, the thought of Mao Tse-tung, as the guideline for all of its actions." In contrast, the preamble of the Party Rules adopted at the Eight Party Congress (September 1956) states: "The Chinese Communist Party takes Marxism-Leninism as the guideline for its action . . ." Since the latter part of the 1950's, the dualism originally stated in the 1945 Party Rules had been revived, but in stronger form: "Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao Tse-tung." — *Ibid.*, p. 21.

²⁰ Mao Tse-tung, "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan," *Selected Works* . . . , Vol. I, p. 44.

²¹ Mao Tse-tung, "Decree Regarding Marriage," quoted in Stuart R. Schram. *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-Tung* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 228.

²² Mao Tse-tung, "The Great Union of the Popular Masses," quoted in Schram, *Political Thought* . . . (rev. ed. 1969), p. 241.

to be emancipated meant the breaking of the three "ropes" (political, clan and religious authorities) as well as the fourth "rope" (the authority of the husband).

In this context, and consistent with Marxist ideology,²³ the emancipation of the Chinese women becomes an aspect of the class struggle for Mao. The theory of class struggle constitutes the essence of the Chinese Communist world outlook. Although the Chinese Communists have often departed radically from classic Marxist definitions of class, they have consistently regarded all conflict, whether internal or external to China, as of a class nature. Whether a "struggle" between poor and rich peasants in a village, or one between socialism and imperialism, any "struggle" is consistently defined as class conflict.²⁴

In this case — the emancipation of women — the struggle is against the authority of the husband as part of the "whole feudal-patriarchal system and ideology." The patriarchal family represented the mainstay of traditional Chinese society and was, in effect, a feudal institution within a feudal society.²⁵ For Mao, it was thus imperative to transform the entire family system in order for China to evolve as a socialist society. And, as the long-range goal of Chinese Communism is the achievement of a classless society, the emancipation of women may be viewed as an aspect of the class struggle and as a decisive factor in determining the success or failure of the Chinese revolution.

²³ Mao dates his acceptance of Marxism to 1920, seven years before he wrote "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan": "By the summer of 1920 I had become, in theory and to some extent in action, a Marxist, and from that time on I considered myself a Marxist." — Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (New York: Grove Press, 1968), p. 155.

²⁴ Schurmann, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

²⁵ Nida has demonstrated a parallel development of serfdom with the strengthening of paternal power within the family, following Marx's dictum that the family "being related from the beginning to agricultural services contains in germ not only slavery (*servitus*) but also serfdom." The need for a son to obtain permission from his father to set up a separate household is, for instance, equated with the lack of freedom of residence of the tenant-serf. The control of the father and the husband over the family property, the whole status structure within the family, correspond to the control by the landlord over property and freedom of the tenant; the status relationship of the father and son corresponds in some respects to that of the landlord and tenant. — M. J. Meijer, *Marriage Law and Policy in the Chinese People's Republic* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1971), p. 36.

IV

The struggle of the Chinese women is thus directly related to their economic emancipation. Not only do women have to be emancipated economically in order to succeed in their ideological emancipation, the economic participation of women is also essential to the development of China. This view is expressed in the passage from Mao Tse-tung quoted earlier: "Women comprise half of the population. The economic status of working women and the fact of their being specially oppressed prove not only that women urgently need revolution but also that they are a decisive force in the success or failure of the revolution."²⁶

The "whole feudal-patriarchal system and ideology" retards economic growth and marriage reform is thus an economic as well as a political necessity. In the words of Ch'en Shao-yu, drafter of the 1950 Marriage Law:

The marriage system is the basis of the social cell — the family institution. It seriously affects the development of the productive power of society. The breaking down of the old family basis, and the introduction of the new mode of life, are urgent and necessary "especially to promote the growth of the productive power of society."²⁷

It is evident that Mao Tse-tung recognized the economic imperatives for putting his ideology of sexual equality and marriage reform into practice. In one of his essays, Mao argues strongly in favor of making women available for productive labor: "China's women are a vast reserve of labor power. This reserve should be tapped and used in the struggle to build a mighty socialist country."²⁸

Economic development in China, then primarily an agricultural country, meant agrarian reform, especially in the initial stages. In the passage from "Report of an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan," Mao Tse-tung for the first time establishes the relationship between the reform of production relations in the field of agriculture, and family reform.²⁹

²⁶ Quoted in Hsu Kwang, "Women's Liberation is a Component Part of the Proletarian Revolution," *Peking Review* (March 8, 1974), p. 14.

²⁷ S. L. Fu, "The New Marriage Law of People's China," *Contemporary China* (Vol. I: 1955), ed. E. Stuart Kirby (Hong Kong University Press, 1956), p. 120.

²⁸ Mao Tse-tung, "China's Women are a Vast Reserve of Labor Power," quoted in Schram, *Political Thought . . .* (rev. ed. 1969), pp. 338-339.

²⁹ Meijer, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

Mao, accepting the dichotomy of the Marxist view of society, expounded on the relationship between productive forces and production relations and between the base and the superstructure. In his work, "On Contradiction" (August 1937), Mao states:

True, the productive forces, practice and the economic base generally play the principal and decisive role; whoever denies this is not a materialist. But it must also be admitted that in certain conditions, such aspects as the relations of production, theory and the superstructure in turn manifest themselves in the principal and decisive role. When it is impossible for the productive forces to develop without a change in the relations of production then the change in the relations between the relations of population plays the principal and decisive role . . . When the superstructure (politics, culture, etc.) obstructs the development of the economic base, political and cultural changes become principal and decisive. Are we going against materialism when we say this? No. The reason is that while we recognize that in the general development of history the material determines the mental and social being determines social consciousness, we also — and indeed must — recognize the reaction of mental on material things, of social consciousness on social being and of the superstructure on the economic base.³⁰

In other words, in Mao's view, there is a constant mutual interaction between the productive forces and the relations of production, and between the base and the superstructure. Growth in the productive forces induces a corresponding change in the relations of production. Accordingly, the establishment of new relations of production promotes a tremendous growth in the productive forces.³¹ It is this constant mutual interreaction that propels society to move, develop and progress.

Given the dialectical relation between the base and the superstructure, the need for simultaneous change in both aspects of society becomes evident. Otherwise the active development of one and the slower development of the other will cause the latter to retard the growth of the former. Thus, in the case of agrarian reform and marriage reform, both had to occur simultaneously in order to propel, rather than retard, the outcome of the other.

This relationship is confirmed by Keith Buchanan in his evaluation of the economic development of China when he states that social change,

³⁰ Mao Tse-tung, "On Contradiction," *Selected Works* . . . Vol. I, p. 336.

³¹ Felisa Uy, "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: A Study of the Socialist Development in China" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of the Philippines, 1974), p. 9.

and notably land reform, made possible the shaping of a new environment but, at the same time, the very process of re-modelling the environment itself stimulated further institutional change.³² And in the words of a Chinese writer whom he quotes, "As men transformed nature their own way of thinking was transformed too."³³

In this way, land reform constituted one of the first stages in the transformation of China, both as a means of developing the country economically and as a means of destroying the "whole feudal-patriarchal system and ideology." However, it is important to emphasize at this point that Mao Tse-tung, in keeping with the Marxist concept that "change is the condition of life," believed in the necessity of a continuing revolution. Based on this theory, China must go through the stages of development step by step and, regardless of its achievements, there will always be room for further changes.

V

In deciding what direction to take in the initial stages of the Chinese revolution, the leadership was faced with three options: It could follow the Western pattern of free-enterprise development, it could follow the Soviet model of development or, it could pioneer a "Third Way," drawing on the experience of other countries but modifying these models in the light of the social and economic conditions specific to East Asia.³⁴ For obvious reasons, the option of the "Third Way" or what has been called the "Chinese Way" in the field of economic development was shown.³⁵ Thus, as in the realm of political ideology, a similar "sinification" of Marxism-Leninism took place in the economic realm. The Chinese Communists used the model based on the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, i.e., the mobilization of all energies and resources of the country to achieve a single goal — the wiping-out of poverty through the building of a socialist state.³⁶ But, once again, this model was adapted to the "concrete conditions" of China.

These conditions, including an agricultural economy and a peasant population, lead to one solution: agrarian reform. However, in keep-

³² Keith M. Buchanan, *The Transformation of the Chinese Earth* (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1970), p. 124.

³³ Yang Min, *Peking Review* (October 21, 1958), quoted in Buchanan, *Transformation . . .*, p. 124.

³⁴ Buchanan, *Transformation . . .*, p. 105.

³⁵ Gilbert Etienne, *La Voie Chinoise* (Paris, 1962), quoted in Buchanan, *Transformation . . .*, p. 107.

³⁶ Buchanan, *Transformation . . .*, p. 108.

ing with the relationship between the reform of production relations in the field of agriculture and family reform, this was accompanied by the simultaneous introduction of marriage reform. It has been observed that whenever and wherever the Chinese Communists established themselves, they promulgated both a marriage law and a land reform law.³⁷ This happened in the Chinese Soviet Republic in 1931, in the Border Areas and after the establishment of the People's Republic. In fact, land reform provided the basis for the marriage law, because it gave the woman property rights to land. It therefore made it possible for her to divorce her husband without losing her economic independence. This was evident in Chao Chen village in Shensi where many women said, "When I get my share I'll separate from my husband, then he won't be able to oppress me any more."³⁸ The ownership of land also gave the wife equality with her husband during marriage. The fact that even children were allotted land and that a wife at the time of divorce could take the children with her if she wished, provided her with a strong position *vis-a-vis* her husband. For all these reasons, land reform had a profound influence upon the legal relations within the family.

It is interesting to note, in this context, that the Land Reform Law was promulgated only one month after the Marriage Law, on June 2, 1950. The Marriage Law was actually banded together with the Land Law, as is expressed in a pamphlet which was issued together with the English translation of the Law:

As the agrarian reform sets free hundreds of millions landless and land-hungry peasants from oppression by the feudal landlords, so the Marriage Law marks the emancipation of the Chinese women from the feudal marriage system under which they were utterly bereft of any rights.³⁹

The Land Reform Law, aimed at the redistribution of land, had performed its function when the land had been redivided, by the middle of 1953. But the connection between agrarian reform and marriage reform continued, such as in the establishment of the communes in 1958. Each stage of agrarian policy had its repercussions in the interpretation of the Marriage Law.

³⁷ M. J. Meijer, "Marriage Law and Policy in the People's Republic of China" (unpublished manuscript), p. 1.

³⁸ William Hinton, *Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), p. 397.

³⁹ Franz Michael, "The Role of Law in Traditional, Nationalist and Communist China," *The China Quarterly* (January-March 1962), p. 139.

This relationship between agrarian policy and marriage policy has led many writers on the subject of Chinese women to conclude that the Chinese Communist ideology of sexual equality and marriage reform is highly flexible and therefore inconsistent. Examples of these criticisms include the following:

The regime has not been totally consistent on the issue of the role of women. At some times since 1949, women have been urged not to shirk or be dissatisfied with domestic burdens, and publicity has been given to model housekeepers; at other times, this emphasis on the domestic roles of women has been branded as a deviation.⁴⁰

Policies towards women are one aspect of the overall attempt to transform China. Each change in general policy (the mass line) has engendered a concomitant change in the mass line on women . . . Top party leaders have never been united by a common approach to this issue; it has been regarded as subordinate to the primary problems of political control and economic development, and the official policy toward women has therefore fluctuated wildly.⁴¹

The Chinese Communist view of sexual equality and marriage reform, however, has not fundamentally changed in the last fifty years. The policy of the Chinese Communist Party toward women has always followed this view consistently, though the degree to which this policy could be successfully implemented depended on the existing economic conditions. For example, during the period of the Great Leap Forward, women were encouraged to participate in agricultural production. But, because of the economic difficulties encountered in the subsequent years, they were later encouraged to stay at home. This was not a reversal of official policy nor of ideology, but only the accommodation of that policy to existing circumstances.

Thus these apparent "shifts" in Chinese Communist policy toward women represent little more than temporary stages in the overall Chinese revolution. These stages have not been as erratic as the above writers would lead us to believe but have followed the step-by-step development in China's "continuing revolution." Moreover, as successful as has been the Chinese Communist ideology in changing the status of women, this movement — in keeping with Mao's acceptance of "change as a condition of life" — is in the process of continuous transformation.

⁴⁰ Martin King Whyte, "The Family," *China's Developmental Experience*, ed. Michael Oksenberg (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 182.

⁴¹ Shelah Gilbert Leader, "The Emancipation of Chinese Women," *World Politics* (October 1973), p. 56.

THE "CHRISTIAN PROBLEM" AND THE PHILIPPINE SOUTH

JOEL DE LOS SANTOS

Historically, the fact that the people of Mindanao and Sulu were able to successfully resist all attempts to subjugate them only increased the obsession of the Spanish colonial government and of the church hierarchy to conquer the south and to convert the people to Catholicism. Thus was created the "Moro Problem" which, in the mind of colonial officials, was simply the problem of creating effective strategic and tactical programs that would ensure the ultimate subjugation and conversion of the Muslims.

I

The American colonial authorities inherited the "problem" from Spain at the turn of the century. Initially, the Americans resorted to force in their desire to complete the subjugation of the Muslims. In the bloody clashes that ensued, the fierce resistance of the Muslims exacted a heavy toll on American lives. Writing in 1914, an American official confessed that in spite of all their resources, the Americans had not yet been able to establish a decent state of public order in the little island of Jolo. Benefiting from the Spanish experience and realizing the bankruptcy of crude methods of physical force, the American colonial administrators resorted to the use of techniques more subtle and

¹ Worcester, Dean L. *The Philippines: Past and Present*, New York: The McMillan Company, 1914 p. 12.

efficient than guns or bombs. This new orientation was defined by Najeeb Saleeby as follows: "By Moro problem is meant that method or form of administration by which the Moro and other non-Christians who are living among them can be governed to their best interest and welfare in the most peaceful way possible, and can at the same time be provided with appropriate measures for their gradual achievement in culture and civilization, so that in the course of a reasonable time they can be admitted into the general government of the Philippine Islands as a member of a republican national organization."²

All American colonial efforts in Muslimland through such agencies as the Moro Province, the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, and the Commission for Mindanao and Sulu, were geared towards the solution of the Moro Problem, as these were guided by the spirit and the exhortations of Saleeby's definition. This concept, upon closer look, was virtually a go-signal for assimilation because of the four major assumptions that it contained, namely:

1. Christian-dominated institutions were healthy while their non-Christian counterparts were sick. Thus for non-Christians to be admitted into the general government of the Philippines, they first had to "rise to the level" of Christian society.
2. The goal to bring non-Christians into the Christian mainstream presupposed the mainstream as the desirable standard. In pursuance of this goal, programs were designed to provide the Muslims with resources so as to enable them to participate in Christian-dominated economic, social and political structures.
3. Ultimate national unity was envisioned along the line of Christians and non-Christians living together in Christian-dominated communities with the expectation that everyone would conform to the norms of the Christian community.
4. The main barrier to national unity and progress was the inability of the minorities to join the mainstream. For as long as the Muslims would not join the mainstream, the country would always be divided and the Muslim was to be regarded as a social burden and a national problem.

The Saleeby school of thought has unhappily been echoed and re-echoed by Muslim and Christian leaders alike. It was in this light that

² Saleeby, Najeeb M. *Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion*, Manila. Bureau of Printing, 1905 p.

the Commission on National Integration was created. Republic Act 1888 which created the CNI charged it to "effectuate in a more rapid and complete manner the economic, social, moral, and political advancement of the non-Christian Filipinos or national cultural minorities and to render real, complete, and permanent, the integration of all said national minorities into the body politic."

The same regrettable ideas found in Saleeby's definition are implicitly assumed and explicitly reiterated by R. A. 1888. The minorities are still the problem while the desirable mainstream has semantically been replaced by the phrase "body politic." Sadly, the term integration has become a polite euphemism for assimilation. In the past two years the focus on the inability of the Muslims to join the mainstream, and the compelling need to bring them into it, has led to the creation of many government agencies to implement the national integration policy. In spite of all these efforts, the problem has escalated to destructively alarming proportions.³

In the light of the violence and the hostility that continue to exact a lamentable toll in lives and property in Muslimland, we can conclude that government policies and programs have not succeeded in creating a community of understanding between Muslims and Christians.

Many Christians believe that if they could only know what the Muslims want, then the satisfaction of these demands could solve the problem of national unity. These Christians are aware that the government has given many concessions to the Muslims. Consequently, they cannot understand why, in spite of these concessions, there seems to be no end to the tensions and the hostilities in Mindanao. What instead is becoming discernible is an escalation of the conflict. Above all, they cannot understand why Muslims are fighting each other instead of presenting unified demands to the government. If Muslims don't know what they want, how can the government come out with the appropriate response?

This type of thinking can be better understood in the light of the fact that for so many years, Christian Filipinos have been told that they had a Muslim problem. This orientation views the Muslims, not the Christians, as the problem. Christian Filipinos have also been taught that the Philippines is an open society, the show window of democracy in Asia. Any blockage of Muslims from entering the main-

³ Magsino, Florencio F. "Imperatives for Progress in Muslim Mindanao." *The National Security Review*, Dec. 1973 p. 53-56.

stream was not caused by Christian unwillingness but by Muslim inability. A study of history as well as the nature of the relations between the Muslims and the Christians of the Philippines will, however, point to the opposite view. Christian society is deeply implicated in the Muslim problem. Christian institutions created it, Christian institutions maintain it, and Christian society condones it.

It is therefore important that policy makers pay more attention to Christian institutions which are the cause of the problem, rather than to Muslim society, which is the victim of the problem. If national unity has not been achieved, it is not because Muslims did not want it; it is because Christians refused it. In this light, Muslim tendencies toward separation simply recognize a fact, which the Christian community created.

Because of the focus on the Muslim as the problem, millions of pesos have been poured into Mindanao and Sulu with the hope that more schools, more roads, more scholarships and other benefits would hasten national unity. National unity, however, is not a simple question of roads, schools, bridges, and scholarships. The major issue is not whether Christians and Muslims should live together but *on what terms they should live together*. Should it be as equals in an atmosphere of mutual respect, with the common desire to link each other's hopes and aspirations? Or should they live together like wild animals in a jungle where only the strong survive at the expense of the weak?

Finally, because of the view that Muslim society is the fundamental problem, Christian society and institutions do not get the critical attention that they desperately need. Instead they have become the models that minority societies have to emulate. In simple words, programs meant to solve the Muslim Problem failed because they were assimilationist. Whether by ignorance or by design, it now appears that the goal of national integration can only be achieved at the expense of minority cultures. In the area of race and ethnic relations, assimilation as a technique of dominance is well known. In the words of an authority in ethnic relations,

"Dominant peoples, jealous of their way of life and eager to preserve it, have often looked upon assimilation as the solution of their problems, and have sought to impose their culture upon the foreign elements in their midst. Assimilability has thus sometimes been regarded as the crucial test to be applied to those who would enter the society."⁴

⁴ Berry Brenton. *Race and Ethnic Relations*, Boston: The Reserved Press Cambridge, 1958, p. 427.

A review of government policies and programs for Muslim Mindanao would show that many of them were designed by Christians, intended for Muslims in a Christian-dominated set-up. More often than not, the Christian designer does not start his work by clear deliberate recognition and neutralization of his personal involvement in the issue. Thus his researches and generalizations are, from the outset, doomed to be deflections or mere justifications of the point of view and premises of the group with which he identifies himself. It was perhaps the activities of this type of designer that led a respected Muslim thinker to ask the following questions:

1. Why have lands been given to ex-Huks, ex-prisoners, ex-soldiers, etc. in Muslim traditional lands at so much expense to the government but none to Hadji Kamlon and his small band of followers when the problem of Kamlon was itself initially a land dispute?
2. Why did the government have to spend millions of pesos and lose so many soldiers when a few thousands and a two-night trip by boat could have given Kamlon a modest farm in Cotabato?
3. Why was Edcor established in the midst of Muslim communities when it could have been established in Davao or in the eastern part of Mindanao?
4. Why did Christian colonists still desire to go to traditional Muslim areas when there was still room in other parts of Mindanao?
5. Why, during the term of the late President Magsaysay, was there an attempt to have as many Christian officials as possible in predominantly Muslim municipalities?⁵

These questions were answered by a Colonel in an article written for the National Defense College of the Philippines' official publication. He identified as a reason the failure to overcome prejudices nurtured through the centuries as the main cause for the snafu of government programs. This admission, however, shows only a portion of the total picture.

III

Policy-makers on the Muslim problem since the turn of the century may be categorized under two schools of thought, both of which have

⁵ Majul, Cesar A. "The Historical Background of the Muslims in the Philippines and the Present Mindanao Crisis." (Pamphlet printed by the Convislam Press, 1973) p. 16.

not helped the Muslims at all. The first kind, I would call conservative, the second, liberal. Representatives of these two schools of thought can still be found in the many government agencies that are at present concerned with the plight of the Muslims. Unhappily, both species are not yet extinct.

The conservative focuses on Muslim disregard for law and order as the main problem; his response is domination and he tends toward punishment. The liberal concentrates on the inability of Muslim societal institutions to fully participate in a Christian-dominated society. He tends towards paternalism but refuses to acknowledge that a major overhaul of Christian institutions should be done in order to take away the fetters that prevent Christian society from taking in Muslims as peers and equals.

The liberals and the conservatives agree that the major source of Muslim problems is the exploitation by Muslim leaders of the Muslim masses. In their responses, however, they differ in that the conservative would advocate the replacement of corrupt Muslim leaders by Christian officials. Because it was anomalous to allow Christian leaders to rule in predominantly Muslim communities, the conservatives began programs that would bring a lot of Christian settlers into the Muslim areas — the first step towards the eventual taking over of political control from Muslim leaders. Under this scheme, it was envisioned that a time would come when the Muslims would become the numerical minority in Moroland. The stage would then be set for the legitimate take-over of political power through accepted means . . . elections. The liberal would rather develop his own leaders from among the number of ambitious Muslims who are either malleable or unscrupulous. Since the turn of the century, a lot of Muslim leaders have been developed by the liberals. These leaders have risen to the top of Muslim society not because of the support of the Muslim masses but because of the links that tied them to the central authority in Manila. The number of Muslim leaders that were developed was very much more than the number of positions intended for them. A time came when the competition for the same scarce but privileged positions became so intense that these Muslim leaders began fighting each other. Eventually the political picture in each Muslim province was characterized by the emergence of two or more warring Muslim groups. The appearance of these conflicting Muslim groups can be understood in the light of the following observation:

"Domination is made all the easier by the fact that minorities do not present a united front, but, instead are invariably rent by cleavages, jealousies, and rivalries. As a matter of fact, dominant groups are not unknown to make use of such cleavages, and to encourage them, the better to maintain their own position. 'Divide and Rule' is a device well-understood in the area of race relations."⁶

Another problem area that would need re-examination lies in the links that have been effected between government planners and agencies on the one hand, and vested interest groups on the other, in the belief that a combination of public funds and facilities with private expertise, or vice versa, could develop the necessary action programs needed to help the Muslims. The danger in this coalition, however, would lie not only in the biases of these 'experts' but also in the motives of the interest groups involved. In the words of scholars in inter-group relations —

"Yet, not infrequently action groups are interested parties having at least primarily the concern of this or that social group which subsidizes them. Their sense of urgency comes from being so closely tied with the actualities of a living world full of immediate frictions and tensions; they are after immediate short-cut solutions here and now."⁷

This coalition can especially be detected in the field of education where government funds have been used to assist many missionary schools. On the whole, *these schools have tended to reflect rather than to set the norms of society*. Lamentably, Philippine schools still attach a lot of emphasis upon submission to external authority. To my mind, national unity requires a very much higher level of internalized personal controls. For better inter-ethnic relations, it is imperative that the schools develop in the body politic a new orientation toward cultural minorities that is more and more based on internal controls.

Internal controls have been defined as the "internalized patterns that regulate and influence human predispositions and emotions and thereby condition overt behavior."⁸ By external authority I mean institutionalized patterns and structures such as government, that regulate and influence groups as they pursue social values and social goals.

So far I have only dwelt on the involvement of Christian society and institutions. If I have not touched on the Muslim involvement,

⁶ Berry, Grenton. *oop cit.*, p. 441.

⁷ Sherif, Muzafer and Carolyn Sherif. *Groups in Harmony and Tension*. New York: Octagon Press, 1966 p. 9.

⁸ Betelheim, Bruno and Morris Janavity. *Social Change and Prejudice*, New York. The Free Press 1964 p. 25.

it is because this has been the object of national attention for so many years now. At this point of the conflict no one group can claim a monopoly of vices and virtues. It is wise for us to bear in mind that it takes two to have a conflict.

IV

The "Moro Problem" can be better made clear if we view the problem from two inter-related dimensions: the active and the reactive. Conflict usually starts when an individual or group initiates an action against another individual or group. If the latter feels that his interests are threatened by the initial action, he responds with a reaction which is intended to counter the real or imagined threat in order to eliminate it. If either the initial action or the initial reactions does not satisfy the tactical or strategic aims that they originally were designed for, then there is the possibility that the conflict will be continued along more intensified lines and in varying forms. Sometimes a temporary cessation of activities is achieved if an unstable accommodation is reached by the two parties. The accommodation however has to become stable and permanent if a lasting solution to the problem is to be achieved.

The desire to subjugate the Muslims and to convert them to Christianity inspired the successful Muslim effort to resist subjugation and conversion. Spanish military expeditions only triggered off what are now considered piratical raids and retaliations. In the not-too-distant past, it was the influx of Christian Settlers to traditional Muslim lands and their desire to win political and economic power that set the stage for violent confrontations. The Muslims have not emigrated by the thousands to Christian places. The Muslims do not have plantations, mining and timber concessions, and other pecuniary interests in Luzon and the Visayan islands. The Muslims have not established Islamic schools in predominantly Christian towns. It would now seem that those who constantly cry out against Muslim aggression are in the same bankrupt position as the Americans were in Vietnam. Clearly, the Muslim involvement in the Moro Problem is only reactive in nature.

What are the Muslims reacting against?

Muslim representatives in the defunct Congress of the Philippines, past and present Muslim functionaries in the CNI, Muslim student protest groups, as well as Muslim delegates to the recent Constitutional Convention have all singled out unwanted government and societal

practices, lumping all of them under the terms *prejudice* and *discrimination*. Prejudice is a pre-judgment in the sense that it is a judgment concerning objects and persons not based upon knowledge and experience. For those who believe in the decisiveness of economic factors, prejudice has been defined as "a social attitude propagated among the public by an exploiting class for the purpose of stigmatizing some group as inferior so that the exploitation of either the group itself or its resources may be justified."⁹

Prejudice refers to subjective feelings while discrimination refers to behavior which is normally manifested in differential as well as preferential treatment of individuals according to the status that these individuals possess in society.

In a study of ethnic attitudes in five Philippine cities, it was found out that the most rejected people were the Muslims followed closely by the Chinese. According to the researcher, of the relationships that were investigated to which one could accept others, being neighbors was the most open relationship with few being excluded. Chinese however were rejected by 35 percent, while Muslims were rejected by a shocking 54 percent. Other ethnic groups were rejected by between 6 and 24 percent. The study further revealed that lowland Christian groups among themselves make distinctions: Ilocanos are the most potent, Tagalogs the cleanest, Ilonggos the most proud and extravagant, and so on. However, with regard to Chinese and Muslims, the distinctions were much sharper and the discrimination had more emotional weight. Chinese clannishness was strongly rejected. Muslims were accused of not contributing to national development . . . Catholicism (which the Muslim naturally does not share) should be the major source of national pride.¹⁰

The researcher observed that a great gap exists between protestations of national unity, at the level of national or regional leadership, and attitudes of ordinary people across ethnic boundaries, particularly those that set apart Chinese and Muslims. Of the 1,700 samples taken, close to half even refused to recognize the status of Muslims and Chinese as problematic and worth dealing with at the national level. Lastly, the researcher concluded that "if ethnic problems have not impressed themselves on the national consciousness, it is difficult to mount a concerted attack upon them. One can only chip away at bits and pieces in the

⁹ O. C. Cox as quoted by Berry, *op cit.*, p. 378.

¹⁰ Bulatao, Rodolfo A. *Ethnic Attitude in Two Philippine Cities*, QC. The UP Social Laboratory, 1973 p. 169.

psychological walls that divide groups, puncturing a stereotype here and opening a communications channel there."¹¹

It is however in the area of discrimination where both government policy planners and Muslim leaders have over-concentrated their attention and activities. Aside from government neglect in infra-structure projects in Muslim Mindanao, the allocation of government positions to the disadvantage of Muslims have been alluded to in various articles and speeches. "While they have to a certain extent resulted in concessions given to Muslims," these attacks on discrimination have also managed to increase prejudice towards the Muslims. Thus, one constantly hears of Muslims being called 'spoiled' minorities. The concessions rarely directly benefit the common Muslim because of the selfishness of Muslim leaders and because in the feudal set-up in Moroland, the Sultans, the Datus, and their families are given priority even if their need for help is not as urgent as that of the masses. Consequently, whatever manages to reach the common Muslims are just crumbs that fall down from the tables of their more powerful and richer brothers.

This is not to present the impression that all of the concessions given by the government are bad. To the extent that these concessions will help in alleviating the miserable conditions of the Muslim masses, these concessions should be welcomed. Steps should be taken, however, to prevent the development of Muslim physical and psychological dependence upon dole-outs. If Muslims have to be meaningful participants in nation-building, the attitude of self-reliance should be fostered. Objects of national charity are never in a position to positively contribute to the solution of national problems. Instead they become easier prey to exploitation and oppression, not only by their own leaders but also by forces from outside the Muslim communities.

The millions of pesos spent to redress the imbalance caused by discrimination will solve only a small portion of the problem. It is imperative that a bigger amount of money and more attention be spent in order to overhaul the attitudes of the majority and to minimize if not eliminate the prejudices that the majority still harbors for the minorities in their midst. It will be worthwhile for government leaders to direct their attention to Christian society so as to identify and repair institutional points of resistance that continue to defy efforts to forge real national unity. This is not saying that the Muslims do not have

¹¹ *Op cit.*, pp. 172-173.

their prejudices. In any contact-conflict situation, minorities, too, are not without their prejudices.¹²

Because of the long history of conflict between Muslims and Christians in the Philippines, the Muslims have developed their own prejudices toward the Christians. It has been observed that whenever economic, political and cultural interests and institutions of national or ethnic groups clash, a set of negative traits is attributed by one group to the other and is standardized as a result of the conflict.¹³ The stereotype of the Moro as *juramentado* has a counterpart in the stereotype of the Christian as rapacious and opportunistic. Social scientists have however observed that "it is the relationships between groups, and not primarily the truth or falseness, which give stereotypes their functional significance. Once established, stereotypes tend to persist so long as the relationship between the groups in question remains functionally similar."¹⁴

V

Within Muslim society, there are many problem areas that need to be investigated. Because of limitations, I will confine myself to three areas, namely: Muslim institutions, Muslim leaders, and the Muslim masses.

What is wrong with Muslim society? In the observation of Said Halim Pasha which Dr. Mohammad Iqbal concurred, it was deplored that during the course of history, the moral and social ideals of Islam had been gradually de-Islamized through the influence of local character and the pre-Islamic superstitions of Muslim nations.¹⁵ In the Philippines, the process of localization overwhelmed the ethical ideals of Islam to such an extent that today, the Muslim societies of Mindanao and Sulu have institutions that are more Maranao, Maguindanao, or Tausog, rather than Islamic. The feudal relations, the arrogance of power, the indifference to poverty, the widespread existence of usury, the havoc of family feuds, the perpetuation of economic dynasties, the insane obsession with power politics, and many more, are glaring manifestations of un-Islamic patterns that have developed in Moroland. All of these things are blatant negations of Islam.

¹² Melchor, Alejandro. "P406 M for Mindanao." *The Daily Bulletin*, May 25, 1974 p. 1.

¹³ Berry, *op cit.*, p. 375.

¹⁴ Sherif & Sherif *op. cit.*, p. 88.

¹⁵ Sherif & Sherif *op. cit.*, p. 89.

Far from helping the cause of Islam and of the Muslims, these despicable practices have only encouraged vicious attacks from anti-Muslim propagandists who have falsely identified Islam with social, moral, and political degeneration. Some of the detractors of Islam have even gone so far as to identify the cause of social decadence in Moroland with the tenets of Islam itself and thus they claim that Muslims will remain in a state of inferiority so long as they retain their faith in Islam. These malicious attacks have also been unleashed at Muslim societies in North Africa and the Middle East, causing concern among Muslim intellectuals and in some cases driving a few of them to seek refuge behind either the secular thinking of capitalist apologists or the un-Islamic concepts of Marxism.

Discerning Muslim intellectuals have answered these attacks. Far from being outlived, it was claimed that Islam had never been fully lived. Whatever was wrong with Muslim societies was not due to the tenets of Islam but was the direct result of the discarding of its principles of progress and social justice. Said Halim Pasha who, in the words of Iqbal, was following a line of thought more in tune with the spirit of Islam pointed to the inability of the Muslims to accurately decipher their Islamic duties, as the main cause of societal decadence in the Muslim world.¹⁶

The decline of the Muslim world has been deemed to have started when politics was given more important than religion.¹⁷ This hierarchy of priorities lamentably still exists in Mindanao and Sulu. One can only sympathize with the Muslim intellectual who correctly observed that one of the misfortunes of the Muslims in recent years has been that they have more than their normal quota of politicians and only few social reformers.¹⁸

While it is unfair to blame the Muslim political leaders for all the woes of Moroland, we have to admit that they are responsible for many of these ills. The systematic shortcomings of the bureaucracy that they were part of and the predatory values of their native society combined with their own weak characters to make these Muslim leaders guilty of the many crimes that they have so often been accused of. Sadly, the

¹⁶ Iqbal, Mohammad. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Lahore: Javid Iqbal, 1962 p. 156.

¹⁷ Halem Pasha, Said. "The Reforms of Muslim Society," Pamphlet published by Begume Aisha Bawany Wakf, Lahoe, 1967 p. 14.

¹⁸ Greenbarim, G. E. oon. *Modern Islam: The Search for Cultural Identity*, Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1962 pp. 184-275.

admirable concepts of Islamic leadership have only been studied and talked about but never practiced and emulated.

On the other hand, the average Muslim has to free himself from the physical and psychological handicaps that iniquitous social relations and distorted propaganda have burdened him with. He has begun to regard himself as part of a national burden that the rest of the country has to bear. The deeper this idea sinks into him, the greater the chances for him to lose his self-respect. This attitude will lead him to accept a social system which discriminates against him and bestows prestige on some other groups. The many and varied reactions of people to minority status have been studied by social scientists. In these studies, one weakness of minority groups has been identified with the absence of unified demands because of the continuing inability of minorities to forge a united front. For the Muslims of the South, the only road to unity is through a re-discovery of the eternal truths of Islam.

It is now clear that government policies and programs have to undergo a radical re-orientation and to develop new perspectives. Points of institutional resistance to the taking in of Muslim into the country's mainstream as peers and equals, should be identified and either eliminated or minimized. Attempts to end discrimination should go hand in hand with efforts to reduce, if not eliminate prejudice, to transform antipathy into sympathy, and to convert bigotry into benevolence. It is in this area that Muslims and Christians can work together as peers, committed to the solving of common problems within a common framework.

VI

The Moro Problem should be approached from two separate but inter-related dimensions — the active and the reactive. Following this view, Christian strategy and tactics should focus on the active portion of the problem which is in Christian society and culture. Programs could then be designed and put into operation with the end in mind of rectifying the shortcomings in Christian culture. Corrolary to this, Muslim strategy and tactics should be focused on Muslim society with the objective of doing away with the anti-Islamic accretions to Muslim culture, repairing the damaged psychology of the Muslim masses, and doing away with societal obstacles that prevent national unity from becoming a reality.

It is in the solving of the Muslim portion of the problem that inspiration should be drawn from the lofty spirit and the glorious tra-

ditions of Islam. Only on this condition can Muslims participate in the general task of nation-building. In the words of Hakim "the universal brotherhood of men, transcending all castes and creeds and colors, must be striven after. All avenues of economic tyranny must be blocked and social justice restored. The diversity of humanity must be woven into a pattern of unity. The weak must be protected from the tyranny of the strong. There should be justice between employer and employed, between man and woman."¹⁹

For Islam, spirituality has a twofold aspect: it is a personal relation of man to God, but towards humanity and society it signifies social rights and responsibilities. No man is fully spiritual who seeks only his own personal salvation in isolation from society, Religion is not incessant prayers and meditations alone; it is also actual social life lived in accordance with the ideal. Islam therefore seldom deals with the individual as individual; he is always visualized as a member of a family and a community, who earns his livelihood by honest labor.²³

All of the anti-Islamic undertones in the Muslim societies of the South should be done away with. The obsession with and the abuse of power should not be countenanced. The Prophet said that it is the duty of every man to remove evil actively when he sees it and, if he cannot do so, to protect against it in words, and if he cannot do even that, to detest it in his heart, which is the least manifestation of faith. He also said that if in a society some people do evil and others do nothing to prevent it, then all of them would be engulfed in ruin, the good as well as the bad, because the good had only been passively good and had done nothing active to prevent evil.

With regard to the indifference to poverty exhibited by the financially fortunate among the Muslims, the point should be presented that in Islam, the greater one's possessions, the heavier becomes his responsibility. The concept of *Amanah* or trust enjoins him to dispose of his possessions in a manner that would contribute to the better good of the greater whole of society. Property thus becomes theft if the capitalistic explanation of it is accepted, and the use of property on the principle that the owner can do what he desires with it is tantamount to robbery.²¹ In Islam, the mere fact of possession does not confer

¹⁹ Ahmad, Imtiaz. "An Essential Prerequisite," *Seminar*, New Delhi, February, 1974.

²⁰ Hakim, Zhaifa Abdul. *Islamic Ideology*, Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1961 p. XVIII.

²¹ Hakim, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

upon the possessor the right of disposing property in any manner he likes.

The institution of usury which is one of the main pillars of capitalism, is repulsive in Islam and thus forbidden. The Holy Qur-an specifically condemns usury in many verses (3:129), 2:275), (2:276), (2:278-279). The Holy Prophet in his last sermon also declared interest unlawful and as an example, he ordered cancelled the interest due to his uncle Abbas. It was also in this sermon that the vengeance of blood was forbidden (Fyzee, 1963:38-39), a fact that Muslims should give serious thinking to so as to eliminate the destructive and divisive effects of *maratabat*.

The spirit of Islam is against the creation of an anarcho-acquisitive society in which men are left to the promptings of self-interest. To prevent wealth from accumulating in the hands of a few, and to diffuse it before it assumes threatening proportions, *zakat* was instituted. *Zakat*, interpreted either as tax or almsgiving is derived from an Arabic term meaning 'purity'. In the Holy Qur-an (73:20), (9:18), (9:11), (98:15), the commandment to pay *zakat* occurs simultaneously with prayer or *salat*. To underscore the inseparability of *zakat* from *salat*, the Caliph Abu Bakr said in public that he would wage war against those who discriminate between *salat* and *zakat*. Since the main recipients of this institution are the poor, the idea behind it is the spirit of sharing one's blessings with his less fortunate neighbors without creating a feeling of condescension on the part of the giver, or producing a debt of gratitude on the part of the receiver. *Zakat* then should be distinguished from the ostentatious contributions coming from the fat purses of people whose main interest in giving would be the publicity they would receive or the generous tax deductions they would be entitled to, or both. In the light of the foregoing, the economic dynasties that have cropped out in the Muslim South should be condemned as anti-Islamic.

The problems of the Muslim societies of Mindanao and Sulu should be approached from the Islamic viewpoint, utilizing Islamic analyses, and invoking the sanctions of the eternal verities of Islam. The end in mind is the reconstruction of Muslim society along Islamic lines with the idea that only when the Filipino returns to Islam can he participate meaningfully and functionally in the solution of national problems.

In the framework of Islam, the Muslims who live as subjects in a non-Muslim state are deemed to have entered into a tacit contract

with the government of that state and to abide by its laws.²² When the early Muslims were compelled by persecution to migrate to Abyssinia, which was a Christian state, they were ordered to live there as law-abiding citizens. So long as the other party does not violate a covenant and does not intrigue openly or secretly to prepare for aggression against Islam, Muslims are bound to observe and respect the tacit agreement. Hopefully in the Philippine situation, a reconstructed Muslim society and a morally rehabilitated non-Muslim state can join hands together for national progress.

The task of reconstruction in the Muslim south has to be led by a vanguard of Muslim intellectuals who are conscious of the fact that they are participant-observers and parts of the total situation. The observation of Rasheeduddin Khan, Muslim intellectual and Dean of the School of Social Science of the Jawaharlal Nehru University on the problem of Muslim intellectuals in a non-Muslim state can be helpful. He said —

For us, the so called 'neutral', 'quantification-based', and supposedly 'detached' and coldly 'objective' studies are sterile exercises into academic nonsense. These may satisfy the animated ignorance of the outsider and the non-involved indigenous observer. Or it may serve the excited fancy of the highly pampered and the clandestinely financed foreign area-experts and their chameleon charactered local clients justifying their uncritically borrowed models, concepts, categories and tools of research by expensive adventures into dubious and distorted empirical studies."²³

Continuing in the same vein, he maintained that Muslim minorities cannot afford the luxury of wasting precious time, scarce talent, and inadequate resources on social research that is of little or of no value to the challenges of contemporary times. Thus he claimed that Muslim minority intellectuals cannot be mere on-lookers or detached experts because for them, everything going on in their country is part of their experience and an integral component in the very structure of their lives.

For Said Halim Pasha, if the task of modern Muslim thinkers is so far from easy, it is because it calls for a lot of perseverance, self-denial, courage, and above all, faith — a faith that never wavers — in the cause of Islam; a faith ardent and absolute, which shall arm Muslims of intellect to become champions of Islam, with confidence

²² Hussain, Mirza Mohammad. *Islam and Socialism*, Lahore. Muhammad Ashraf, 1947 p. 28.

²³ Hakim, *op cit.*, p. 210.

in themselves which they must have in order to perform their heavy task. Finally, Halim Pasha says that the task calls for high moral qualities without which Muslim thinkers can claim no right to exist at all.²⁴

To conclude, for as long as government policies and programs are instruments of ethnic majority domination, for as long as we cling to our prejudices and stereotypes — for so long will we have a divided country. The national community can survive only if its institutions are changed. It is in this light that the merits of Islam should be appreciated by the leaders of the country because it is only through this avenue that Muslim societies in Mindanao and Sulu can be reconstructed.

²⁴ Khan, Rasheeduddin. "Perspective and Prospects" *Seminar* New Delhi, February 1974 p. 18.

²⁵ Halem Pasha *op cit.*, p. 44.

PLATFORMS OF PHILIPPINE PARTIES: THE POLITICS OF EXPEDIENCE, 1902-1913

RAWLEIN SOBERANO

The termination of American military rule at the turn of the century brought hope to many Filipino leaders that the transition to a civilian form of government would be smooth and easy. What they did not know was that the United States had other ideas concerning the length of time it would take between total American rule and a measure of Filipino self-rule. Within a short time, however, new political parties mushroomed, equipped with various, seemingly divergent platforms, all claiming to promote the best interests of the Islands.

What was responsible for the birth of these political parties? Did they have the welfare of the people at heart? Or did their leaders see them as vehicles to instant fame and fortune at the expense of the honest hopes of their potential supporters? What was the general reaction of the American authorities? Were they enthusiastic about, or suspicious of these parties' goals? These and similar related questions will be the subject of this paper.

The re-election of President William McKinley brought about the formation of the *Partido Federal* (Federal Party) which advocated pacification and annexation of the Philippines by the United States. Its members, who were prominent Filipinos, were convinced that an American civilian government would soon be established in the Islands and some posts would be given to Filipinos to fill. They felt that their

chances of getting these positions were better if they acted as a group than if they were acting individually. After the capture of Emilio Aguinaldo in November, 1901, they petitioned the United States to annex the archipelago as a state.¹ They saw statehood as a means to an end, and not an end in itself. They were certain that annexation would result in the realization of the Revolution's goals, such as the spread of education, modernization, economic growth, and the elimination of social injustices characteristic of colonial relationships.

Although the Federal Party later changed its platform in favor of independence, its new nationalistic stand was still questionable because of its past record of pro-Americanism. The same could not be said of the *Nacionalista Party* which arose as the major political party in the Philippines. The Sedition Law was an obstacle to the strong advocates for autonomy because they had to conceal their aims until the right moment came to organize themselves. After July, 1902, which marked the end of Philippine-American hostilities, several nationalists forwarded a petition to Governor William H. Taft for permission to organize political parties based on the platform of independence. Taft, however, did not approve of their plan, stating that they could be misunderstood for this which might eventually embarrass them. Instead, he counselled them to use the next three years to build the economy of the country.² His successor, Luke E. Wright, was of the same opinion. This discouraging attitude of the authorities killed the launching of the *Partido Nacionalista* and *Partido Democrata*.³ The Nacionalistas could organize only a harmless civic league whose goal was the establishment of a permanent committee in the United States to look after Filipino interests.⁴ As for the latter, Taft described it as a "nucleus . . . for the gathering into one movement of all the lawless, restless, lazy and evil members of society,"⁵ and reprimanded its would-be members:

¹ For further delineation of its platform, see Dapen Liang, *The Development of Philippine Political Parties* (Hongkong: South China Morning Post, 1939), pp. 56-59, 61.

² *Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission*, 1903, pt. 3 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904), pp. 40-41.

³ The *Partido Nacionalista* was founded by Pascual H. Poblete in 1901 and reorganized in 1902 with Dr. Dominador Gomez as president. The *Partido Democrata* was founded by Albert Barreto, Justo Lukban, Leon Ma. Guerrero and Jose de la Vina. Gregorio F. Zaide, *Philippine Political and Cultural History*, 2 vols. (Manila: McCullough Printing Co., 1961), Vol. II, p. 239.

⁴ Liang, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-68.

⁵ Washington, D.C., Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Letter, Taft to Elihu Root, April 3, 1901, *William H. Taft Papers*, Series 8.

The error of your attitude is that you . . . seem to regard it as entirely proper for you to continue an agitation which has devastated your country, and injured your people by dressing it up in a slightly different form.⁶

When the ban on the organization of radical parties was lifted in 1906, almost without delay the *Partido Independista Inmediatista*,⁷ the *Partido Urgentista*, and the *Comite de la Union Nacional* sprang up.⁸ These parties' goals could be classified into various categories. The aim of the *Independistas* was immediate independence by peaceful means, and they were disposed to cooperate with the American government. The *Unionistas* had the same aim, but were less disposed to cooperate with the authorities. They wanted the United States to be specific about its future political policy towards the Philipinés. The *Urgentistas* formed the radical column. Their aim was immediate independence by peaceful means if it were possible, but by violence if it were needed. The *Urgentistas* and *Unionistas* merged to become the *Union Nacionalista* which in turn fused with the *Partido Independista* to form a single party.⁹ This party was the mother of the present Nacionalista Party in contemporary Philippine politics. Among its leaders were Manuel L. Quezon, Sergio Osmeña, Alberto Barreto, Rafael del Pan, Galicano Apacible, Pablo Ocampo, Felipe Agoncillo, Rafael Palma, and Fernando and Leon M. Guerrero.¹⁰ They made clear that their aim was the immediate independence of the Islands under a democratic government.

In the interim, the Federal Party changed its name to *Partido Nacional Progresista* with a message of independence inserted in its platform but restrainedly proclaimed. As its party chief, Juan Sumulong announced:

We, the Federalists, want an independent and at the same time a democratic government, and if, in contending that the people may establish an independent but not a democratic government at least at present, we attract unpopularity, we will face the consequences. We announce as an error or a dangerous imposture the policy of those who believe or pretend to believe that the functions of political bodies or leading elements should be that of yielding to every kind of imposition by the masses.¹¹

⁶ Letter, Taft to Jose de la Vina et al., November 7, 1902, *Taft Papers*, Series 3, Box 74.

⁷ Louis LaRavoire Morrow and Norberto Romualdez, *A Short History of the Filipino People* (Manila: The Catholic Truth Society, 1936), p. 350.

⁸ Maximo M. Kalaw, *The Development of Philippine Politics, 1872-1925* (Manila: Oriental Commercial Co., Inc., 1926), pp. 77-79.

⁹ Liang, *op. cit.*, p. 72. They monopolized the name "Nacionalista" though their interests were far removed from those of the people. Their primary motive was to resuscitate interest in the Spanish system.

¹⁰ Kalaw, *op. cit.*, p. 302.

A positive proof of how election results could affect the chances of a candidate if he did not speak for immediate independence was the case of the same Juan Sumulong who later became a commissioner. In the election for the Assembly in 1907, he was told that if he espoused "immediate independence and some of the tenets of the Nacionalista Party," he would be elected. He refused, and was defeated.¹² Another example is that of Purita Villanueva of Molo, Iloilo who was often heard because she was "a very bright [woman], an actress by instinct, an authoress, newspaper correspondent and assistant editor, and oratress, having made many addresses and of the immediate independence order."¹³

Propaganda was sometimes used to build up hope in the masses for independence as when word was spread that the American troops were leaving the Islands and giving back the government to the natives. In fact, money was raised in various localities in order to send messengers throughout the provinces to disseminate this information.¹⁴ However, during a carnival held in Manila, General William P. Duvall saw to it that the people did not succumb to these false rumors by stationing many troops in different areas for them to see.

The *Democratas* merged with the *Nacionalistas* before the organization of the Philippine Assembly in 1907, retained the name *Nacionalista*, and openly advocated independence. It was now clear that the *Nacionalistas* were the new leaders of the people as shown by the votes cast for the opposing political parties at the election for delegates to the Assembly held on July 30, 1907:

<i>Party</i>	<i>Number of Votes</i> ¹⁵
Nacionalista	34,277
Progresista	24,234
Others — not a coalition (Independent, Catholic, Philippine Church, etc.)	38,385

Upon its organization, 58 delegates declared themselves Nacionalistas, 16 Progresistas, and 6 Independents. But the Americans would not admit that a real change in leadership had taken place. They regarded the

¹¹ *La Democracia*, July 9, 1906, as found in the *National Archives*, Bureau of Insular Affairs, File 6830-8.

¹² Washington, D.C., Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, *Journal of W. Cameron Forbes*, 1st Series, Vol. III, p. 123.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 227.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 345.

¹⁵ *Eighth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission*, 1907 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 9108), p. 203.

results of the first election to the Assembly as an inconclusive index of the relative strength of the political parties.

A question could be raised as to what kind of men were those who proposed independence for the Philippines? Governor W. Cameron Forbes described those "patriots" who clamored for self-rule as wanting it under American protection so that the United States could continue to maintain peace and order, and keep the Germans and Japanese off the area while they robbed and exploited their own people without any outside interference. Money was their principal motive. As he wrote, referring to them:

If they can get office and salary they become forthright Americanistas, otherwise they intrigue for 'independencia.' Their intrigues, if they are left alone, culminate in getting a few guns and a small band of followers, and in levying contributions from defenceless people on threat of murder or torture and on promises of huge preferment in the Philippine Republic.¹⁶

To confirm this, he mentioned the case of Pedro Paterno, the president of Aguinaldo's Congress, who arranged the peace of Biacnabato in which the Spaniards bought off Aguinaldo. The price reportedly paid by Spain was \$1,200,000. Aguinaldo got \$200,000 and the balance disappeared among the officials. It was alleged that \$200,000 went into Paterno's pockets. Forbes deplored such detestable deportment in these words:

It is a pity that the word independence should be used almost wholly by men wishing to become rich without work and who want to wield a little authority.¹⁷

In a visit to Bacolod on November 16, 1904, Governor Forbes told a crowd that "it was time for them to stop talking independence and get to work, and that their business and ours was to say not only 'the Philippines for the Filipinos,' but to make the Philippines worth something to the Filipinos."¹⁸ The crowd's reaction to his speech was total silence, either because they felt autonomy was coming anyway sometime in the near future, or their discretion indicated that it was neither the place nor the time to clamor for it.

Forbes was not against the Filipino aspiration for independence. At one time, comparing the political parties that insisted upon it, he said:

¹⁶ *Forbes Journal*, 1st Series, Vol. I (1904-1906), p. 34.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹⁸ *Forbes Journal*, 1st Series, Vol. I, p. 101.

All parties have independence in their platform, and the difference between them is when — some want it right away, and some, sooner. The platform is about the same: they mean they want the spoils. The difference . . . is simply who will get the spoils . . . They have no particular grievances to remedy, no principle to avow, except that of the desire to manage their own affairs, and one not to be discouraged but fostered.¹⁹

Benito Legarda found the following observation hard to swallow. It was made by Gregorio Araneta who did not believe that Filipinos were capable of independence at the time. Even Quezon and Osmeña felt the sting of its message when they heard it.

There are two parties in the Philippine Islands. The progressistas who do not recognize the capacity of Filipinos to govern themselves and the Nacionalistas or Inmediatistas, who are demonstrating their incapacity.²⁰

Forbes' principal objection to independence at the time was the "lack of an intelligent and trained body of people with the power of the ballot who have had the benefits of good local government long enough to demand and insist on it. This [could] only be obtained by giving them good government and letting them have it long enough to appreciate it."²¹

In trying to contrast the politicians' cry for independence with the simple aspirations of the masses, Forbes wrote:

I want to call attention here to the nature of the requests that kept coming in, which I took as a direct tribute to the policy I had adopted and maintained throughout the islands. It is to be noted that the people asked for things which reflected directly on their material welfare. They wanted roads, bridges, ports, artesian wells, irrigation, municipal markets, school buildings . . . They didn't ask for independence or other kinds of moonshine.²²

However, as the people were getting more and more involved in public affairs, there was a growing criticism of and opposition to Governor Forbes' administration. Secretary of War Jacob M. Dickerson noticed this during his visit to the Islands in 1910.²³ Offering a help-

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. II (1906-1909), p. 39.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

²¹ *Forbes Journal*, 1st Series, Vol. II, p. 264.

²² *Ibid.*, Vol. III (1908-1910), p. 447.

²³ *Special Report of J.M. Dickerson, Secretary of War, to the President on the Philippines*, November 23, 1910 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1910), p. 33.

ing hand, he spoke of the necessity of gaining experience in self-government. He said:

. . . I have . . . gone into this discussion for the purpose of inviting the calm and temperate judgement of those who are asking for immediate independence upon the real character of the problem, and for the purpose of urging that, however loud and insistent the cry for independence may be, no one who has the real welfare of the Philippines at heart will neglect . . . the real substance, which is the development to the highest degree possible under present conditions of everything that will tend to broaden the foundations for future Philippine independence.²⁴

The enmity increased during the remaining years of President Taft's administration. It did not go unnoticed when Professor Henry J. Ford, Woodrow Wilson's special investigator, submitted a report deploring the fact that the Filipino seemed unappreciative of American efforts to help them, and resentful of the latter's domination.²⁵ He ventured to state that an underlying cause of these strains in Philippine-American relations could be traced to the refusal of the Republican administration to grant self-government to Filipinos, coupled with the latter's belief that they would have achieved autonomy had it not been for American intervention.

A case in point was *La Vanguardia*, a Nacionalista paper, which expressed concern over American policy, contending that the longer the Americans stayed in the Philippines the harder it would be for them to get out. However, it found consolation in the thought that nothing was eternal in this world, and hoped that Philippine independence would become a reality with the victory of the Democrats at the polls in the United States.²⁶

At this time the Nacionalistas intensified their demand for independence. Their distinguished spokesman, Sergio Osmeña, Speaker of the Philippine Assembly, the majority of which were Nacionalistas, pointed out in a speech that the aspirations and tendencies of the Assembly were unequivocally clear in the party's declaration of independence of June 19, 1908. It confirmed the same declaration of the Filipino people at the outbreak of the Revolution. Made by the duly elected representatives of the people, it had the same value as the declaration

²⁴ J. M. Dickerson, *Address Delivered at the Popular Banquet Given by the Filipino Reception Committee at the Hotel de Francia, Manila, September 2, 1910* (Manila: n.p., 1910), p. 11.

²⁵ W. Cameron Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928), Vol. II, p. 206.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

of a plebiscite, especially as it was supported by nearly all of the municipalities and other political bodies of the archipelago.²⁷

In order not to be labelled treacherous because of his statements, Osmeña stressed the fact that the term "immediate independence" was not a post-American Occupation invention. It was always the actual longing of the people, a national aspiration soaked with their blood. He indicated that there was no contradiction involved between allegiance to the United States and loyalty to one's national aspirations to be free.²⁸

Among the resolutions adopted on February 3, 1911 by the Philippine Assembly was one which dealt on the independence question. It was in the form of a petition for immediate independence as contained in the platform of the Nacionalista Party of September 1, 1910. Petitions to the United States President or Congress or both for immediate independence were also attached to the resolutions of the Philippine Assembly of October 16, 1913.²⁹ In the conclusion of Osmeña's speech of February 11, 1913 he informed his colleagues of the solemn promise of the Democratic Party made for the third straight election denouncing imperialism and the colonial exploitation of the Philippines. It publicly pledged the granting of independence, once a stable government had been established, and promised to obtain the warranty of its territorial sovereignty from the international powers.

Meanwhile Quezon made haste to lobby for the same goal in the United States Congress as a resident commissioner sent by the Philippine Assembly. In his opening statement to the American Congress, he read a letter of the Nacionalista Party which emphasized independence as one of its platforms:

This party aspires to the immediate independence of the country, because it believes the Filipino people endowed with those conditions necessary to establish and maintain a stable government of law and order as has been proven by the existence of what was the government of the Filipino Republic in the years 1898 and 1899. The period of experiment which has passed during the American sovereignty is ample to demonstrate that the Filipinos know how to make use of civil and political liberty, and to comply

²⁷ Hon. Sergio Osmeña, *Discurso del Speaker de la Asamblea Filipina en San Miguel de Mayumo, Bulacan, P.I.*, 7 de Mayo, 1910 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1911), p. 23.

²⁸ Asamblea Filipina, "La Independencia Como Aspiracion Nacional," *Documento* No. 6753-A3 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1916), pp. 3-4.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-23. The same petitions were attached to the resolutions of January 14, 1914; February 5, 1915; October 16, 1915; and January 25, 1916.

with and to force compliance with the laws, to avoid disorders, to prevent abuses, and live in accordance with the practices of civilized communities.³⁰

Answering the objection that the Filipinos' literacy needed to be improved, he underscored the fact that literacy was in the Islands prior to American Occupation. Private schools, colleges, and the University of Santo Tomas had produced leaders, both secular and religious. As a matter of fact, when the Philippine Congress met at Barasoain, Bulacan on September 15, 1898, of the ninety members, there were forty lawyers, sixteen physicians, five pharmacists, two engineers, and one priest. Many were graduates of European universities.³¹

Arguing against the Filipino's lack of political experience due to the Spanish policy of limited government sharing with the local population, he cited the American example saying:

Experience in life and in business certainly comes in no other manner but in daily contact . . . with the interests which are managed. The United States has not gained experience to manage the affairs of the federation, except since the old Britannic colonies declared themselves independent and constituted such form of government. We are convinced that the Filipinos must likewise expect more complete experience to direct and administer their national affairs after they are independent.³²

The Philippine Assembly praised Quezon's work in the United States, especially his contribution to the final discussion of the Jones Bill in the House of Representatives. A message referring to these achievements was adopted by the Assembly which read as follows:

. . . we send him the warm message of our admiration, congratulation and esteem. He knew how to convey our sentiments and those of our people. He was efficient in his defense, insistent in his petition, understanding towards misconceptions and generous towards all.³³

Why, then, did the identical platforms of the various political parties, with their vote-attracting clamor for self-rule, meet with un-

³⁰ Manuel L. Quezon, "Philippine Independence," *Speech before the House of Representatives*, March 2, 1911 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1911), p. 3. See also U.S., Congress, House, March 2, 1911, *Congressional Record*, XLVI, 3951.

³¹ Manuel L. Quezon, "The Jones Philippine Bill," *Speech before the House of Representatives*, no date (Washington: 1914), p. 23. See also Sol H. Gwekoh, *Manuel L. Quezon, His Life and Career* (Manila: University Publishing Co., Inc., 1948), pp. 65-79.

³² Quezon, "Philippine Independence," p. 19.

³³ *Asemblea Filipina*, "Felicitacion Al Comisionado Quezon," (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1913), p. 4. *Translation Mine*.

satisfactory response of the people? Two reasons predominate: partly because the masses had other priorities than independence, and partly because the politicians themselves did not come up with concrete goals that would follow the attainment of autonomy. Their failure to take a unified stand against the American policy of retention sprang from a jumble of conflicting views and competitive ambitions. Much as the untiring efforts of Quezon and Osmeña are to be commended, the purity of their motives in working for Philippine independence is questionable. On the other side of the ocean, the Republican Party's infatuation with colonialism was still popular with many Americans. Three decades later, just as expediency had characterized Philippine political parties, so now it was the motivating factor that caused the United States to turn over the reins of government to the Filipino people.

NORTH INDIAN INTELLECTUALS: PERCEPTIONS AND IMAGES OF MODERNIZATION*

YOGENDRA K. MALIK

Early studies of modernization placed emphasis on the historical and institutional aspects¹ of societies and divided these societies into "traditional" and "modern" — "modern" being primarily western societies while the non-western societies were termed as "traditional."² But this approach has led to scholarly controversies which have raised serious doubts about the acceptability of the term modernization for a comparative study of societies.³ Consequently, empirical studies of modernization have focused on the attitudinal and behavioral aspects of this process. For example, using social-psychological techniques in the Middle East, Daniel Lerner observed that a modern man is characterized

* This paper is a part of a larger study entitled, "Hindi-speaking Intelligentsia of India: A Sociological Profile." The author is grateful to the Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi for the financial support which enabled him to conduct this research. He is also indebted to his research assistant, Saundra Schneider for processing the data.

¹ Cyril E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York, Harper and Row, 1966). Danwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations* (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1967). Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968).

² Frank X. Sutton, "Social Theory and Comparative Politics," in H. Eckstein and David Apter, (eds.), *Comparative Politics: A Reader* (New York, John Wiley, 1963) pp. 67-81. Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development*, (Boston, Little Brown, 1966).

³ For a general criticism of the concept of modernization see Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered," *Comparative Studies*

by an empathetic attitude. And Lerner states that "empathy . . . is the capacity to see oneself in the other fellow's situation."⁴ An empathetic individual is achievement oriented and has his own opinions on public matters. In another study on modernization, Kenneth Sherill draws from various sources to present ten attitudinal characteristics of a modern political man: identification with national political community, capability to make distinction between personal and political relations, possession of a strong ego, trust in government and people, etc.⁵ And in what is probably one of the most authoritative studies on the subject, Alex Inkeles and David Smith in *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* contend that "employment in complex, rationalized, technocratic, and even bureaucratic organization has particular capabilities to change men so that they move from the more traditional to the more modern role in their attitudes, values and behavior."⁶ Inkeles and Smith believe that modernization is an ongoing process and that individuals continue to acquire attitudes throughout their life cycles. Inkeles and Smith see the openness to new experiences, readiness for social growth of opinion, high level of information, efficiency, planning, calculability, occupational and educational aspirations, etc., as the attitudes of a modern man.

Furthermore, in analyzing the modern process of traditional society most scholars have placed special emphasis on the role of the Western-educated intellectuals and these intellectuals have been termed as the "executants and the spirit"⁸ of modernization. Furthermore, it is asserted that western-educated intellectual elites are committed to cultural values which are not in tune with the traditions of their native

in Society and History, Vol. IX (April, 1967) pp. 292-346. Lloyd and Susan Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1967); and Joseph R. Guesfield, "Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. LXXXII (Jan. 1966), pp. 351-362; and for a general review of the literature on this area, see Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development and Politics," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 3, (April 1971) pp. 283-322.

⁴ Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York, Free Press, 1958) p. 50.

⁵ Kenneth Shril, "The Attitudes of Modernity," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. I, No. 2 (Jan. 1969), pp. 209-210.

⁶ Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1974); p. 6.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-35.

⁸ Edward Shils, "Demagogues and Cadres in the Political Development of the New Nations," in Lucian W. Pye (ed.), *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969) p. 73.

culture.⁹ And because modern values are acquired through a foreign language, values remain "foreign" to these societies.¹⁰

But virtually all these studies have ignored the role of vernacular speaking intellectuals in the modernization process of the new nations. In ancient societies like India, along with the English-speaking intellectuals, there also existed "traditional" intellectuals who expressed themselves through native languages. In such societies, these traditional intellectuals continue to constitute one of the most important links between the western educated intelligentsia and the mass of the people. And it is this group which absorbs the ideas, values and symbols which are borrowed from other cultures and then gradually passes them on to the members of their own societies: they serve as the society's transmission belts.

Because the modernization process involves the interaction between two different types of cultures, the traditional intellectuals act as agents of acculturation. As the ongoing process of industrialization produces a decline of the traditional values and authority patterns based upon ascriptive and sacred norms, numerous discontinuities and tensions in the culture of the society develop. Thus, it is the vernacular speaking intelligentsia which plays a pivotal role in bridging the gaps between the traditional and the modern value systems. But despite their important role, we have only minimal knowledge about the degree of internalization and personalization of modern values of this group.

In accordance with the arguments stated above, I plan to test the following propositions in this paper:

(1) Because of their background in the humanities and their traditional heritage, these "traditional" intellectuals place a greater emphasis on selective borrowing from other cultures. They are likely to be committed to the co-existence of traditional and modern values in the society.

(2) The intellectual's vocation has a significant impact on his perception of modernization.

⁹ Edward Shils, *The Intellectual Between Tradition and Modernity: The Indian Situation Supplement I Comparative Studies in Society and History* (The Hague, Mouton, 1969) p. 10.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

(3) Both the higher level of education and the greater exposure to foreign cultures of these intelligentsia lead to the development of an attitude of ambivalence toward the native culture as well as toward westernization.

(4) Ideological orientations and attitudes toward modernization are likely to be positively related.

(5) The simple acceptance of science and technology is not likely to result in the intellectual's negation of traditional values.

Methodology

In this study, the term "intellectual" is defined in a more restrictive and narrow sense than it is by Edward Shils and others. This study focuses on the "creative intellectuals," the "men of ideas,"¹¹ or what Reinhold Niebuhr has called the "more articulate members of the community, more particularly those who are professionally or vocationally articulate, in church and school, in journalism and the arts."¹² Therefore, we are concentrating on those intellectuals who are engaged in writing, journalism, and research in the humanities or social sciences and who express themselves in the Hindu language.

A list of 350 intellectuals was prepared through the use of *Sahityek Kosh*¹³ (*Directory of Hindi Literatures, Writers, and Journalists*) and through the following criteria: institutional leadership, position, and reputation. All of the intellectuals were contacted; however, thirty forms were returned because some of these individuals had died, others had moved, and some had refused to fill out the forms. Of the remaining 320 intellectuals 161 responded. The author personally interviewed eighty of them and the rest returned the completed questionnaire by mail.

The intellectuals interviewed for this study have been divided into five categories: "creative" intellectuals, college and university teachers,

¹¹ For a discussion, see G. Eric Hanson, "Intellect and Power: Some Notes on the Intellectual Type," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (May, 1969), pp. 311-328.

¹² Reinhold Niebuhr, "Liberals and the Marxist Heresy," in George B. de Huszar (ed.), *The Intellectuals: A Controversial Portrait*, (New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), p. 302.

¹³ O. M. Prakash and Krishna Kumari (eds.), *Sahityek Kosh* (New Delhi, Sahitya Samaroh, 1973).

journalists and editors, and administrators and scholars. However, categories are not mutually exclusive. For purposes of comparison the intellectuals have been divided into different groups on the basis of their areas of specialization. Thus, novelists, poets, short story writers have been classified as creative intellectuals even though they may be employed by universities, newspapers, and government agencies. The university and college teachers include only those intellectuals who have made no significant literary contributions while those intellectuals who are mainly engaged in research and writing, inside or outside of the universities, have been classified as scholars. Those who head academies, government bureaus, and agencies and work in ministries of broadcasting, information and education, but they perform work only in specialized areas relevant to Hindi have been termed as administrators. The category of journalists and editors include only those intellectuals who have produced no works of abiding literary value and who are employed by newspapers. In this classification, I was helped by the respondents themselves, who were asked not only to identify their occupations, but also to group themselves in one of the categories mentioned above. I also used *Sahitiyek Kosh* and other relevant sources to determine their creative activities and occupational classifications.

I preferred to use open-ended over closed-ended questions, though the latter are easier to code and analyze. By using mainly open-ended questions, the respondents were given more freedom to develop their own thoughts on the topics under discussion. At the same time, this technique afforded me an opportunity to use intensive interviewing and to question the respondents in depth where I needed greater clarification. Although the tasks of coding and analyzing data collected from open-ended questionnaires are highly difficult¹⁴ great caution was exercised in coding the data, and the code was formulated only after reading the responses several times. If, however, the findings reported in this study may be termed by a sophisticated methodologist as "suggestive" rather than "definitive" or "conclusive," I have no objection.

¹⁴ On this point, see Heinz Eulau, W. Buchanan, Leroy Ferguson and John C. Wahlke, "The Political Socialization of American State Legislators," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (May, 1959) p. 190 and Robert Putnam, *The Beliefs of Politicians Ideology, Conflict and Democracy in Britain and Italy* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973), p. .

In order to give greater authenticity to the views and greater insight into the thinking of the intellectuals, the first part of this essay will be composed of extensive quotations obtained from the questionnaires. Many of the phrases, remarks, or symbolic expressions cited are provided to give us more insight into the state of mind of the interviewees. This approach of reporting the findings about their subjects has been fruitfully used by Robert E. Lane, Bernard E. Brown, Erwin Hargrove and others.¹⁵ In the second part of the essay, I have presented a statistical analysis of the coded material using the chi square test to test the propositions stated above.

*Varieties in the Images and Perceptions of a Modernized India
Acceptance of Science and Technology*

A careful analysis of the responses show that the Hindi-speaking intellectuals favor the acceptance of science and the adoption of technology to solve the problems of contemporary India. Table I gives the distribution of intellectuals' responses with respect to their images of a modernized India. More than eighty-six per cent of the intellectuals perceive a scientifically and technologically oriented India as their ideal type. And a positive attitude towards the adaptation of modern science and technology to the Indian situation is expressed both in direct and indirect terms. One intellectual offers this opinion:

The modern age is a scientific age. In my view, therefore, modernization means acceptance of science and technology without reservation. If modernization means science and technology, I accept it . . . If, however, modernization means westernization, I reject it without reservations.

¹⁵ See, for example, Bernard E. Brown, "Elite Attitudes and Political Legitimacy in France," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (May, 1969), pp. 420-442. Erwin C. Hargrove, "Nationality, Values, and Change: Young Elite in French Canada," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (April, 1970), pp. 473-499. "Tradition and Change in England: Innovators in Profession and Policy," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (July, 1974), pp. 531-560. And, Robert Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).

TABLE I

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES CONCERNING IMAGES OF A MODERN INDIA

<i>Type of Response</i>	<i>Percentage of the Intellectuals Who Mentioned</i>	<i>Number</i>
Acceptance of Science and Technology	86.3	(139)
Rationalization of Indian Culture	78.9	(127)
India should have its Own Model of Development	57.8	(93)
Rejection of Westernization of India	39.8	(64)
Industrialization of India	37.3	(60)
Synthesization of India and Western Ideas and Values	29.8	(48)
Reassertion and Revival of Indian Values	12.4	(20)
Complete Westernization of India	3.7	(6)
Complete Revolution in India	7.5	(12)

Positive responses such as these are frequent; however, these intellectuals also make a distinction between the use of science and technology for industrial purposes, for the purpose of consumption of industrial products, and for the development of a scientific attitude. The consumption of industrial products, the use of modern gadgets (i.e. televisions, radios and cars), and the adoption of western appearances do not make a man "modern." According to one Indian scholar:

Without adopting a scientific attitude, a rational outlook of life, we cannot achieve modernization of our society.

Following this line, an editor of a monthly literary magazine commented:

Modernity for me does not exist in appearances, dress, or style of living. Living in simple and traditional ways would not contradict modernity. For me, modernity exists in mind and actions. Tolerance of (different) opinions, openness of mind, acceptance of new ideas . . . all these are (for me) elements of modernity. Many industrialists and businessmen (including my employers) are modern only in their living rooms . . . They restrain us from attacking our useless traditions through our articles or literary works . . . They put up industries but do not want to stir up social controversies.

The intellectuals' concern about the attitudinal aspects of modernization has important relevance to the situation existing in India. The new rich class in India is eager to adopt western life styles, but social values and attitudes remain tied to the useless traditions of the past. Because they have not adopted a scientific and rational outlook of life, these intellectuals are afraid that technological achievements may be used to strengthen traditions and may lead to wasteful spending. They also make a distinction between themselves, separating those intellectuals who, despite their somewhat traditional life style, have adopted a rational outlook, and the new rich class of businessmen who appear to have adopted a western life style, but still live in a world dominated by traditional values.

Rationalization of Indian Culture and Social Structure

With the acceptance of science and technology and the adoption of a scientific attitude, it is no surprise to find out that an overwhelming number of intellectuals do not seek revolutionary change in Indian society; they seek rationalization of its structure. They seem to place emphasis on "the principle of selective retention"¹⁶ and do not find any contradiction between "tradition" and "modernity." Actually, they seem to believe that the adoption of modernity along with the preservation of a rationalized structure of Indian traditions and culture is the only type of natural change for the society. According to the editor of the Hindi daily newspaper:

In my opinion, India should stay conservative so that its feet are on the ground, but it should develop a modern outlook. There should come out new leaves out of an old tree, this tree should stay alive; it should not die.

There is a willingness to incorporate new elements from other and more dynamic cultures while not allowing such borrowing from other cultures to destroy the "basic fabric" of Indian society.

One poet commented:

I would like only those changes in our society which do not disturb our basic institutional structure, otherwise we will be faced with an anarchic situation.

¹⁶ For a discussion of this concept, see Donald T. Campbell, "Variation and Selective Retention in Socio-cultural Evolution," in Herbert R. Barringer, George I. Blanksten, and Raymond W. Mack, (eds.), *Social Change in Developing Areas* (Cambridge, Mass., Schenkman and Company, 1965), pp. 19-49.

A desire to rationalize the traditional social structure, in itself, rules out the possibility of a total change in the society. These individuals definitely do not agree with Manfred Halpern who argues that the revolution of modernization "involves the transformation of all systems by which man organizes his society — the political, social, economic, religious and psychological systems."¹⁷ The intellectuals do express a degree of dissatisfaction with the traditional social structure; however, throughout different interviews, I could hardly discern any *total* rejection of the Indian social structure. Further, I noted a strong sense of identification with "things Indian." Even some of the Marxists and progressive authors who prefer revolutionary over evolutionary methods of social change, do not find any contradiction between traditional and modern values. A well-known Marxist literary critic observed:

There is no contradiction between traditions and modernity . . . We should not give up positive elements of our culture. We have long standing traditions of humanistic values, they should be preserved. We should develop India on the basis of our historic traditions.

Referring to Edward Shils' observations about the Indian intellectuals' dilemma as regards tradition and modernity,¹⁸ an historian observed:

An Indian should be truly an Indian. He should be able to remove the distortions which have overtaken us. (M.K.) Gandhi (Balgangadhar) Tilak and (Rabindranath) Tagore were true Indians. They preserved Indian traditions and accepted from West whatever was essential and useful for us. Traditions and modernity are not exclusive. Traditions have their own values. Edward Shils' approach is completely misplaced. Traditions can be reconciled with modernity.

Gandhi, Tilak, and Tagore are seen as "ideal modernizers" because they reinterpreted Indian traditions to meet the challenges of modernity. Furthermore, it is asserted that "they brought out what is the best in Indian culture without the 'perversions' of western life style." In part, these intelligentsia reject Nehru because he, in their opinion, tried to imitate the West. This was also the reason why he failed to use traditional symbols to achieve modern goals, as Gandhi had done.

¹⁷ Manfred Halpern, "Towards Further Modernization of the Study of New Nations," *World Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Oct., 1964), p. 173.

¹⁸ The work referred to is Edward Shils, *The Intellectual Between Tradition and Modernity: The Indian Situation: Supplement I, Comparative Studies in Society and History* (The Hague, Mouton, 1961).

Some of the intellectuals look upon culture as a dynamic process, which cannot remain static. And change is cited as the essential element of the cultural process. One scholar who has recently completed a study of the impact of communication media on folk cultures, stated:

Traditions are being transformed to meet the need of modern times. This process has always been taking place. There has always been an interaction between different cultures and cultures of elites and masses.

This concept of cultural dynamism, as well as the images of a rationalized and secularized India is based upon the values which have been imbibed from western culture. In many ways, these elements have been so internalized that they have come to be accepted as part of the Indian heritage. When the intellectuals remark that India should be free from orthodox and rigid attitudes, that it should have a scientific outlook along with a zest and zeal for inquiry, but that it should have roots in our society, they are using western idioms and rationale to justify the existence of traditions in the society. One intellectual expressed it in this way:

For me, the concept of modernity is based upon rationalism. If an old and traditional element of our culture is rational, it is useful; it should be considered modern and retained. I do not look upon an orthodox and inflexible attitude, whether it is communist or non-communist, as modern.

Further, the application of rationality to the existing structure of Indian society means:

that India should be free from castism, untouchability, and other social evils. (I think of a) modern India which is free from fatalism in which the people are ready to examine the so called superior elements of our culture on the basis of rationality.

In both these statements, the commitment to rationality looks evident but it is used here as a defense mechanism to justify their continued adherence to the traditional aspects of life. This attachment to traditions is so pervasive among the intellectuals that even some of the ideological extremists are not free from it. A Naxalite (Maoist) novelist expresses his view as follows:

You cannot build a new society by completely destroying its traditional basis. Whatever was said, written and practiced since the Vedic period we cannot completely discard them. We will have to sift from them . . . Whatever is useful and rational should be kept. There is a need for synthesization of new and old, traditional and modern. We cannot be created out of nothingness.

Thus, Hindi-speaking intellectuals' commitment to the continuation of the basic values of Indian culture seems very strong, though they are willing to rationalize India's structural framework to meet the challenge posed by more advanced cultures.

Development of India's Own Model of Industrialization

Because India has unique traditions, it has a distinct cultural personality and historical identity. Consequently, it is natural for Indians to seek their own model of industrialization, though there is no consensus among the intellectuals about what the attributes of India's own model of development should embody. Some want to "follow western or Russian models of development." Yet, others feel that we are borrowing the worst elements of both the Russian and western world.

... unless we decide to do the things in our own way, we cannot modernize. In the kind of cultural co-existence which we have accepted the dominant culture will ultimately dominate . . . and we will become a cultural colony either of West or East.

However, the emphasis seems to be on the Indian model of development and not on establishing the life style patterns of affluent societies as these life styles are out of reach. Therefore, the concept of a consumer-oriented society and the political elites' emphasis on investment in building heavy industries should be rejected: industrialization should be directed at meeting basic needs.

Also, concern is expressed about the results of industrialization:

Industrialization is not irrelevant to our (own) model of development . . . but we should have a decentralized system of industrialization . . . There ought to be no foreign capital. We should be self-reliant and should achieve self-sufficiency. All our social and cultural changes should be free from foreign influence. Social change (caused by industrialization) should not lead to alienation. We should not lose our (cultural) identity. We should not copy anybody . . . Copying means loss of roots and identity.

Many of the intellectuals recognize that India, being a primarily agricultural and overpopulated country, cannot think in terms of Russian or western models of industrial development. They reject the idea of a completely mechanized society. Although they seek self-sufficiency in essential goods, these intellectuals want industrial policies to be more relevant to the needs of an agricultural society. They think that Gandhi's ideas are more relevant to the needs of Indian society than the economic development strategies suggested by foreign economists

or Indian planners trained abroad. This group of intellectuals believes that Gandhi's methods of economic development could restore the dignity of labor in India and also avoid the problems created by rapid industrialization.¹⁹

Also this group of intellectuals emphasizes the decentralization of both industrial and political activities and the building of small-scale industries which are relevant to the needs of a rural society. This would prevent a large-scale migration of the rural population to the cities thus preventing the creation of vast slums in the urban population centers. Decentralization of industrial and political activities would promote and protect individual freedom. They believe that the actions of contemporary political elites as well as those of the westernized bureaucrats lead to excessive centralization of political, industrial, and economic powers within India and make individuals and communities dependent upon government help. They contend that since India has longstanding traditions of community action through community associations, these associations once freed from political influence can be mobilized for the proper use of India's immense manpower. Further, they stress that the westernized elite has not been able to make a perceptive and imaginative use of the traditional values of Indian culture to achieve the development goal of the society. Therefore, they believe that in order to limit the demands of the people there is a need to emphasize traditional, ethical virtues of contentment and simple living and at the same time "prohibit a vulgar display of wealth by a few." The contemporary political elite of India, in its quest for "modernity", downgrades traditional Indian values and promises to abolish poverty while indirectly encouraging a vulgar display of wealth on the part of a few.

Rejection of Westernization

The intellectuals who reject the adoption of the western model of development do not express a sense of bitterness towards the West. From an analysis of their expressions, as stated above, they seem to have imbibed many of the basic ideals of western culture. There is, however, a group of intellectuals who do not only emphatically reject

¹⁹ For a summary of Gandhi's political views, see D. Mackenzie Brown, *The White Umbrella: Indian Political Thought from Manu to Gandhi*, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1953). K. G. Mashruwala, *Gandhi and Marx* (Ahamedabad, Nivjivan, 1951, and J. P. Narayan, *A Picture of Sarvodya Social Order*, (Tanjor, Sarvodya Prakashan, 1955).

westernization, but also express feelings of hostility toward western values and life styles. Certainly, the degree and level of this hostility differ from one group of intellectuals to another. The comments of a young poet and an editor of a prominent Hindi weekly emphasize this hostility:

The so-called modernization is responsible for the trouble which we are presently facing in India. I reject the term modernization itself, it is a defective, rather a dangerous term. We are creating conflicts within our society by adopting the western model (of economic development) and life style. The history of western civilization is based upon the destruction of other nations. They have destroyed other nations to build themselves. Today, they are trying to destroy other (people's) cultures. We can solve our problems through the use of our own values and institutions . . . I am not ashamed of my poverty and simple living. I have a sense of contentment and satisfaction in my life . . . I resent identification of modernization with westernization . . . I am opposed to both communist and capitalist methods of industrialization.

On the other hand, some intellectuals reject western ideas and values because they think that "they are not relevant" and that "any effort to incorporate them in our value system would be self-defeating." Some intellectuals reject westernization because they think that the "west is materialistic," and that India has "spiritual traditions." They feel that because of the "bankruptcy of western culture, many of the westerners are developing counter cultures, seeking peace through meditation, or adopting and accepting non-western religions." The negativism towards westernization was expressed in the opinions of various types of intellectuals. However, the most emphatic rejection of westernization was expressed in negative opinions about the adoption of western life styles in specific sections of Indian society.

Synthesization of Indian and Western Values

There is another group of intellectuals who are more than willing to accept science and technology from the west. This group feels that not only is it possible, but it is also desirable to have a synthesis between western and Indian values and life styles. According to a university professor:

We should accept modern values of life; those western values which are useful for us should be accepted without reservations . . . We can graft new ideas on old traditions.

These intellectuals point out that historically the greatest strength of the Indian culture has been its capacity to absorb foreign ideas and values without losing its own identity. They assert that by accepting science and technology, basic elements of western life are already being adopted. Resistance to the introduction of western ideas and values into the Indian culture is useless; synthesization of western and Indian values and ideals will save Indians from developing split personalities. Therefore, the best strategy for Indian development is to "save whatever is best in our culture and synthesize it with the dynamic values of (the) west." Thus, "we can remove our backwardness and become a modern society."

Other Perceptions and Images of a Modernized India

The revival and reassertion of Indian values is also mentioned by some intellectuals in their image of a modernized India. However, this revivalism is stressed more in terms of the reassertion of moral, spiritual, and ethical values and it should be taken as a reaction against the adoption of the "western life style" by the upper strata of Indian society. Also, they express concern that the Indian youth, educated in urban-based large universities, identify "modernity" with "westernization," and that they are becoming alienated from Indian culture and its value system. Therefore, they feel that the reassertion of traditional Indian values through the system of education and other means of communication will help stop this drift towards rootlessness and anomie.

Complete westernization and revolutionization of Indian society is another image projected by a small percentage of intellectuals. Acceptance of science and technology and the consumption of industrial products without complete acceptance of western values and life styles are creating conflicts within individuals and are leading to the development of social tensions. In the words of a well-known novelist:

India has accepted modernization freely and fully as far as the use of industrial products is concerned, but internally (in its outlook) it almost remains unchanged almost as it was before it came in contact with Europe . . . Frankly speaking, any person in India who is aware of a force like modernization is leading a double life. I would prefer to have India completely modern . . . I would welcome European or American models of modernization minus those elements which lead to exploitation of man by man.

This group of intellectuals believe that with an increased pace of industrialization and with the introduction of electrical appliances into the home and other places, Indians would ultimately adopt western life styles. All these would lead to an increased freedom for women, equality of the sexes, the establishment of individual dignity, and a general decline in outdated traditions and age-old moral standards, resulting in an overall liberation of Indian society.

In the following pages, I propose to test the propositions stated at the beginning of this essay. Table II provides a general picture of the intellectuals' attitudes toward science and technology and toward complete westernization on the basis of their vocations. This table suggests that there is almost a complete consensus among intellectuals as to their willingness to accept science and technology and to apply it to the situation existing in India, although they also have a high degree of negativism toward the complete westernization of society in India. More important, however, this pattern is also repeated in their attitudes toward Indian culture and tradition. Almost 80 per cent of the intellectuals from all categories (except the creative intellectuals), seek to rationalize the Indian social structure and culture, while only 12 per cent of the creative intellectuals seek revolutionary or total change in India. This supports the hypothesis stated earlier that Indian intellectuals, because of their closeness to the cultural heritage of India, are likely to be positively disposed towards science and technology; while at the same time, they seek to preserve the basic cultural values of their society.

TABLE II

TYPES OF INTELLECTUALS AND THEIR PERCEPTIONS AND
IMAGES OF A MODERNIZED INDIA

<i>Types of Perceptions</i>	<i>Types of Intellectuals</i>				
	<i>Creative Intellectuals</i>	<i>University & College Teachers</i>	<i>Journalists & Editors</i>	<i>Administrators</i>	<i>Scholars</i>
Complete Westernization	6.3	4.8	X	5.3	X
Acceptance of Science & Technology	90.6	85.5	81.0	73.7	96.3
No Perception	3.1	9.7	19.0	21.0	3.7
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
No. of Cases	(32)	(62)	(21)	(19)	(27)

My next concern is to analyze the impact of an intellectual's vocation on his perception of modernization. Contrary to my proposition, and as shown in Table III, an intellectual's vocation is not significantly related to his perception of modernization, except in one instance. There is disagreement among the intellectuals as to the emphasis that should be given to the synthesization of Indian and western ideas and values and over India's need to have its own model of economic and political development. On one hand the creative intellectuals show a greater willingness to accept a synthesization of Indian and western values; they also place less stress on India's need to have its own model of development. It appears that they show greater flexibility and receptivity towards the ideas and values of other cultures than the editors and journalists. On the other hand only about 10 per cent of the editors and journalists mentioned the need for synthesization of Indian and western values while 28 per cent wanted to revive Indian cultural and ethical values. However, the importance of the findings reported in Table III are diminished in view of their low level of statistical significance.

TABLE III

TYPES OF INTELLECTUALS AND THEIR PERCEPTIONS
OF A MODERNIZED INDIA

<i>Types of Perception</i>	<i>Types of Intellectuals</i>				
	<i>Creative Intel-lectuals</i>	<i>University & College Teachers</i>	<i>Journalists & Editors</i>	<i>Adminis-trators</i>	<i>Scholars</i>
Synthesization of Eastern & Western Ideas	40.6	29.5	9.5	31.6	33.3
India Should Have its Own Model of Development	50.0	60.7	57.1	57.9	63.0
No Perception	9.4	9.8	33.3	10.5	3.7
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
No. of Cases	(32)	(61)	(21)	(19)	(27)

Number of Missing Observations — 1

Significance $p > .10$

The inverse relationship between an intellectual's exposure to the cultures of non-Hindi speaking areas through travel and residence and his reaction toward westernization is statistically significant ($p > .05$). Almost 33 per cent of those who have travelled outside of Hindi speaking regions reject westernization, in contrast to 6 per cent of those who have had no such experience, but still reject such westernization. Also, intellectuals exposed to foreign cultures are less enthused about the revival and reassertion of the values of Indian culture. It appears that a greater degree of exposure to foreign cultures and a higher level of education generate increased feelings of alienation among intellectuals from western cultures and life styles as well as from their own native culture. Intellectuals with no college education and with almost no intercultural experience develop an ambivalent attitude toward western as well as their own cultures. This proposition is confirmed in Table IV. It is the less educated and less foreign-travelled intellectual who is less hostile towards westernization and, at the same time, who places a greater stress on the reassertion and revival of the values of Indian culture.

TABLE IV

IMAGES AND PERCEPTION OF A MODERNIZED INDIA ON THE
BASIS OF LEVEL OF EDUCATION

<i>Type of Perception</i>	<i>Level of Education</i>			
	<i>No College</i>	<i>B.A.</i>	<i>M.A. & Other</i>	<i>Ph.D. or D. Lit.</i>
Accept				
Industrialization	40.0	33.3	39.0	36.3
Reject				
Westernization	26.7	33.3	35.6	47.8
Reassertion of Indian Values	33.3	22.2	8.5	8.7
No Perception	X	11.2	16.9	7.2
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
No. of Cases	(15)	(18)	(59)	(69)

Significance $p > .01$

This paradoxical situation may have more than one explanation. It could be suggested that a higher level of education and intercultural experience may lead to the development of greater intellectual sophistication. Therefore, this group might have developed a higher capacity

for "selective retention;" whereas, the second group may not have developed this kind of sophistication making them unable to detect contradictions in their attitudes toward the two cultures. It is also possible to suggest that a greater exposure to western cultures and life styles through a system of higher education and foreign travel might have created a sense of rootlessness in this group — they react negatively towards the west and become alienated from it. In the pre-independence colonial world, English-educated intellectuals frequently expressed "anti-western" attitudes; India was no exception. Therefore, it is possible that these pre-independence attitudes may have been carried over to the present situation. Furthermore, it is even possible that these intellectuals who seek rationalization of Indian culture and who express negative reactions against the West may be expressing a form of militant nationalism. The intellectuals with a lower level of exposure to western cultures do not seem to have developed this kind of rootlessness, alienation from local cultures, nor militant nationalism.

The intellectuals' perceptions and images of a modernized India were also compared to various background factors such as caste, place of birth, sex, religion, and age. None of these variables are significantly related to the intellectuals' attitudes toward different aspects of modernization.

Political Ideology and Perceptions and Images of Modernized India

Political ideology has a definite impact on the intellectuals' perceptions of different aspects of a modernized India.²⁰ As evidently shown in Table V, there is a consensus among intellectuals as to the acceptance of science and technology on the basis of ideology. However, with the exception of a small number of socialists and Marxists, no other group mentions complete westernization of India as a desirable goal. This is not unexpected in the case of Gandhists and Hindu nationalists, both of whom have placed greater emphasis on the cultural virtues of a traditional India. But, surprisingly liberal and conservative intellectuals who have expressed support for the western values of rationalism, individual freedom, and ideals of democracy did not mention a completely westernized India as their ideal type.

²⁰ Ideological classification of intellectuals is based on the basis of their response to the following questions:

- (a) In your opinion, what are the political values which should be emphasized in the politics of our country?
- (b) What kind of political system would you be willing to recommend to the new nations of the world?
- (c) Can you briefly describe your personal political ideology?

TABLE V
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND ATTITUDE TOWARD ACCEPTANCE
OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

<i>Type of Attitude</i>	<i>Political Ideology</i>					
	<i>Gandhism</i>	<i>Democratic Socialism</i>	<i>Marxism</i>	<i>Hindu Nationalism</i>	<i>Democratic Liberalism</i>	<i>Others</i>
Complete Westernization	X	10.4	5.0	X	X	X
Acceptance of Science & Tech.	81.5	81.3	95.0	84.2	95.8	87.0
No Perception	18.5	8.3	X	15.8	4.2	13.0
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
No. of Cases	(27)	(48)	(20)	(19)	(24)	(23)

Ideological orientation becomes a more statistically significant variable when we look at Table VI where the largest percentage of intellectuals seeking complete social and cultural revolution in India are the Marxists. On the other hand, a complete revolution in Indian social structure is rejected both by the Gandhists and Hindu nationalists.

TABLE VI
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS RATIONALIZATION
OF INDIAN CULTURE

<i>Type of Attitude</i>	<i>Political Ideology</i>					
	<i>Gandhism</i>	<i>Democratic Socialism</i>	<i>Marxism</i>	<i>Hindu Nationalism</i>	<i>Democratic Liberalism</i>	<i>Others</i>
Rationalization of Indian culture	77.8	75.0	75.0	94.7	83.3	73.9
Complete Revolution	X	8.3	25.0	X	4.2	8.7
No Perception	22.2	16.7	X	5.3	12.5	17.4
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
No. of Cases	(27)	(48)	(20)	(19)	(24)	(23)

Significance $p > .05$

The intellectuals professing faith in Gandhism (Table VII) are the most traditionalist group among the Hindi speaking intellectuals. Not only does this group contain the smallest number of those who clearly mention industrialization as one of the important aspects of a modernized India, but a majority of them reject the westernization of India.

Thus, this group expresses the highest degree of hostility towards western life style and places the greatest emphasis on the reassertion and revival of traditional Indian values. It should be pointed out, however, that there is a qualitative difference in the revivalism stressed by Gandhists as compared to that stressed by Hindu nationalists. Intellectuals professing faith in Gandhism are more interested in the revival of ethical values of traditional India, and they place greater stress on the traditional concept of *Nishkam Karma* (actions without a desire for material rewards), on self-negation, and on social and community services. In contrast to the Gandhists, Hindu nationalists wish to revive the traditional Hindu social system based upon *Varnasharm Dharma* (assignment of duties on the basis of four stages of life and the caste system).²¹ The Gandhist intellectuals emphasize the reassertion of humanistic traditions of Indian culture, and the reconstruction of Indian society, where the self-governing, autonomous village and decentralized political system become the center of social life. Hindu nationalists are more positively oriented towards industrialization, urbanization, and a centralized political system and they seek a revival of the glories of an imperial India.²² Also, unlike the Gandhist intellectuals, they express less hostility towards the West.

TABLE VII

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS WESTERNIZATION

Types of Attitude	Political Ideology					
	Gandhism	Democratic Socialism	Marxism	Hindu Nationalism	Democratic Liberalism	Others
Acceptance of Industrialization	11.1	45.8	70.0	36.8	33.3	26.1
Reject Westernization	51.9	37.5	30.0	42.1	41.7	34.8
Reassertion of Indian Values	29.6	6.3	X	15.8	12.5	13.0
No Perception	7.4	10.4	X	5.3	12.5	26.1
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
No. of Cases	(27)	(48)	(20)	(19)	(24)	(23)

Significance $p < .10$

²¹ For a representative presentation of these views in Hindi, see Gurudutt, *Dharma Sanskriti aur Rajya* (New Delhi, Bharati Sahitya Sadan, 1966).

²² Balraj Madhok, *Bharatiyakaran* (Delhi, Rajpal and Sons, 1972), and J. A. Curran, *Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics: A Study of the R. S. S.* (New York, 1951).

Compared to the Marxist socialist and liberal intellectuals, Gandhists and Hindu nationalists place a greater emphasis on India's need to have its own model of development; Gandhists and Hindu nationalists show less concern for a synthesization of Indian and western values. Consequently, Socialist, Marxist, and liberal intellectuals more frequently mention the synthesization of Indian and western values, and thus demonstrate a greater willingness to incorporate western values into the Indian culture, than do Gandhist and Hindu nationalist intellectuals (see Table VIII). It is possible to conclude from our analysis that the ideological orientations of an intellectual do play a significant role in determining his attitude towards the modernization of India.

TABLE VIII

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND PERCEPTION OF INDIA'S OWN MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT

<i>Types of Perceptions</i>	<i>Political Ideology</i>					
	<i>Gandhism</i>	<i>Democratic Socialism</i>	<i>Marxism</i>	<i>Hindu Nationalism</i>	<i>Democratic Liberalism</i>	<i>Others</i>
Indianization of Western Values	14.8	39.6	40.0	22.2	37.5	17.4
India Should Develop Its Own Model	77.8	45.8	45.0	66.7	54.2	69.6
No Perception	7.4	14.6	15.0	11.1	8.3	13.0
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
No. of Cases	(27)	(48)	(20)	(19)	(24)	(23)

Attitudinal Configuration and Images of Modernization

My final concern is to test the proposition that the simple acceptance of science and technology by an individual may not bring about fundamental change in his attitude towards his native culture; the acceptance of science and technology may not result in a complete rejection of traditional cultural values. The findings reported in Table IX provide support for this hypothesis. A comparison of intellectuals seeking westernization of Indian society against those who accept only science and technology reveals highly significant differences in their attitudes to-

wards Indian culture. Of those who accept only science and technology, an overwhelming majority (82%) seek to rationalize the Indian social structure while only 5 per cent endorse the need for a revolutionary change. On the other hand, the westernizers, by a large majority (68%), seek revolution in India's social structure, while only 33 per cent are favorably disposed towards its rationalization.

TABLE IX

ACCEPTANCE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BY ATTITUDE
TOWARDS INDIAN CULTURE

<i>Attitude Towards Indian Culture</i>	<i>Images of Modernization</i>		
	<i>Complete Westernization</i>	<i>Acceptance of Science and Technology</i>	<i>No Perception</i>
Rationalization of Indian Culture	33.3	82.0	68.8
Complete Revolution	66.7	5.1	6.2
No Perception	X	12.9	25.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Significance $p < .001$

Similarly those who want India to have its own model of development have a higher level of negative attitudes towards industrialization as well as westernization of Indian society. Yet, the intellectuals place greater emphasis on the reassertion of Indian cultural values. In contrast, those who seek synthesization of Indian and western values are more positively disposed towards industrialization and are less negatively oriented towards westernization. Also, those advocating such synthesization do not place any meaningful emphasis on the revival of values and traditions of Indian culture. And there is a significant difference between the attitudes of the group ($p < .001$).

Evidently, the simple acceptance of science and technology does not change an individual's attitude towards his culture and social structure. The evidence presented here suggests that such an individual is far more traditionalist and conservative in his attitude than those individuals who advocate a complete westernization of India or a synthesization of western and Indian values. It is important to note here that

a large majority of intellectuals in this study seem to be committed to the idea of the co-existence of traditional and modern values.

Summary and Conclusions

Following the presentation of various approaches to modernization, specifically Lerner, Sherill, Inkeles and Smith, I have tried to probe into the intellectual's perceptions and images of modernization. However, unlike Lerner and Inkeles who studied the attitudes of the common man, my focus has been on a sophisticated group of intellectuals — the cultural elite of North India. The findings reported in the preceding pages demonstrate that the Hindi-speaking intellectuals, who inherited the traditions of sacred and traditional intelligentsia of North India, have successfully assimilated and absorbed many western values. They are gradually being integrated into the cultural fabric of India through their creative writings. By expressing and advocating modern values and attitudes, these intellectuals have also assumed the role of a secular and modern intelligentsia. Rather than providing a basis for the organization of a revivalistic and reactionary force, they have become a vital force in the acculturation process.

This analysis does not support the common assumption that non-western intelligentsia seek to cast their system in the image of the West.²³ Despite their absorption of western ideas and values and their acceptance of modern science and technology, they prefer to develop their own model of industrialization. Yet, the findings reported above do support the proposition that non-western intellectuals do emphasize the process of selectively borrowing from other cultures, while at the same time are keen to preserve the basic fabric and value system of their culture. They express strong criticism of the development strategies adopted by the political elites in the post-independence period, seeking a greater balance between the adoption of modern technology and the needs of a primarily agricultural society. By rejecting the image of a consumer-oriented society and by stressing the need to revive the traditional cultural values of contentment and simple living, the Indian intellectuals advocate the voluntary containment of "individuals" during the period of industrial take-off. The blending of traditional

²³ For a critique of this assumption, see Peter C. Lloyd, *Classes, Crises, and Coups: Themes in the Sociology of Developing Countries* (New York, Praeger, 1972), pp. 67-69.

and modern values is stressed by these individuals to achieve the goals of modernization. These Indian intellectuals suggest that the post-independence political elites have failed to achieve their goals because of their efforts to mold India in the image of affluent societies.

This study also suggests that the various demographic factors such as religion, caste, sex, etc. are not significant in determining an intellectual's image and perception of modernization. While occupation does have some impact, the intellectuals' exposure to non-Hindi speaking or western cultures, level of education, and political beliefs and ideological commitments have a far more significant impact on their perceptions and images of a modernized India.

GENERAL CHARACTERIZATION OF CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES

PROSPERO R. COVAR

Three distinct religious traditions in the Philippines can be reckoned with easily. They are: (1) Roman Catholic tradition. (2) American Protestant tradition, and (3) Filipino anitismo tradition. The first two traditions did not grow in the Philippines in their pure forms. In the process of taking root they were indigenized.

In numerous instances, the three religious traditions are blended into a new whole. This new blending is reflected in many contemporary religious movements in the Philippines. In particular, I refer to a religious organization or movement that is local in origin and maintaining itself as an autochthonous unit. It is neither a schism from the Roman Catholic nor is it associated with any American Protestant denomination or other foreign missions. It draws its central doctrine from the mainspring of Christian teachings — the Bible or *Pasyon* (Christ's Passion), tempered by Filipino parables and *salawikain* (proverbs). It believes in "anitism" — congeries of beliefs and practices related to the *anito* and lower creatures. It indulges in spiritism and faith-healing. It manifests a kind of nationalist orientation that is inspired by the writings of Rizal and other heroes of the Philippine Revolution. It utilizes either the Roman Catholic hierarchy of positions or the American Protestant council of elders as a structural model upon which it patterns its leadership set-up.

The proliferation of religious movements in the Philippines is staggering. Religious schism, either because of personality conflict or differences in doctrinal position, contributes a sizeable number to the growing list of religious groups. Visionary experience interpreted as a divine commission has propelled some local prophets to strike on their own. In a number of cases, miraculous recovery from serious sicknesses, accidents, or life crises deepens a life-long devotion to serve God by organizing a religious sodality as a vow. Surprisingly, atonement for an injury or an offense committed does not seem to spark a religious movement.

Reaction to Christianity

The reaction to the introduction of Christianity in the Philippines has been varied. For instance, the *Sapilada* religion in the Bontoc area is a combination of various Christian and lowland Ilocano practices with pagan Igorot beliefs and activities. The Tungud movement among the Manobos of Mindanao was precipitated by a prophet who returned from the dead after a severe illness and subsequently preached the imminent destruction of the world. The Isneg in Kabuwan, Kalinga-Apayao, neglected their mountain rice fields for about two years. Instead of farming, they devoted their time to the holding of community feasts, *sayam*, to await the coming of the people from Unto who would lead them to an everlasting, labor-free existence.

On the foothills of Mt. Banahao between Laguna and Quezon, a number of religious colonies believe in the mystical transfer of the Holy Land to the *tierra sagrada*. Traditional Christian landmarks in Old Palestine are alleged to be enshrined in the many spiritually charged natural formations such as rocks, streams, caves, and hills. It was there in 1841 where Apolinario de la Cruz led the Cofradia de San Jose.

These local reactions to the introduction of Christianity may be characterized as: accomodative, nativistic, millenarian, messianic, and syncretistic. Whatever the label is, the effort to mobilize human resources, i.e., the fusion of elements from several cultural systems into a coherent new whole, is indeed creative.

Normative Ideological Themes

The belief in the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of men is shared by all religious movements in the Philippines. They differ in their treatment and elaboration of the Holy Trinity, Holy Family,

deification of Rizal and other culture heroes, and the use of the Bible and/or *Pasyon* as a source of spiritual strength. Incisive knowledge of the lives of saints and miracles associated with them are indications of spiritual depth and virtuosity. Theological insights and ethical pronouncements expressed in the traditional lingo and style and charisma manifested by otherwise not formally educated persons make men followers of a *sinusunod* or *patron*. Religious symbolism, displayed in many altars, and play of words and letters in various prints, are allegedly endowed with mysteries and potency. They always await possession of those found worthy.

Emmanuel Salvador del Mundo

A little boy whose circumstance of birth is unknown in Magdalena, Laguna was engaged by a man to a show of spiritual prowess before an eagle-eyed crowd composed mostly of *mga naghahanap*. The man claimed that God is with him. The little boy instead of accepting the challenge asked the man who (the boy) was. Since he alleged that God is with him, he ought to know. The man was tongue-tied. The precocious little boy asserted. "I am Emmanuel Salvador del Mundo." This is not an isolated case. The Philippine countryside is replete with many Emmanuel Salvador del Mundos. At the time of this writing, an eleven-year old boy has been creating quite a stir in Lucena City, Pateros, Rizal, and Sta. Cruz, Laguna, healing the sick and making the crippled walk. He does not charge any fee. He only encourages people to pray.

*Iba ang Nagliliwanag kaysa Naliliwanagan.
Iba ang Binhi kaysa Pinagbibinhian.*

Jorge Reyes of the Samahan ng Tatlong Persona Solo Dios is the head of the *balangay* in Bailen, Cavite. He aptly described his joining as, last among the first and first among the last. He was 36 years old when he joined the organization. He was in search of the truth or the light. He started his search in Tore. The leader in Tore is Ka Pinong. In Tore, he heard a voice asking him why he came. Mang Jorge replied impulsively, "I want to know if there is a God here. If there is, appear." The voice called out his name thrice. The third time he did, light suddenly struck. The glare of the rays knocked him down. Apparently he was not convinced. Later, he articulated his joining the *samahan* in these terms, "*iba ang lumiliwanag kaysa naliliwanagan, iba*

ang binhi kaysa pinagbibinhan." His conviction is that the Samahan ng Tatlong Persona Solo Dios has the Light and is the Beginning.

Tapos na ang Misteryo.

Kailangan na lamang ang Papuri.

Aling Bibing is a member of the Sagrada Familia de Rizal. She was a favorite of Inang Adarna, a venerable old women from Oliveti, Bongabon, Nueva Ecija. From Nueva Ecija, Aling Bibing joined the group led by Danny Bibat. They settled in Ilog na Metung at San Isidro, San Luis, Pampanga for four years. This was to fulfill the prophecy of Felipe Salvador. From Ilog na Metung they were instructed by Danny Bibat to proceed to Calamba and see Apo Asiong, a religious *supremo*. Apo Asiong advised them to settle in a place where, "doon kayo magluluto sa ibabaw ng tubig." They wandered far and wide until they followed a ray of light which led them to Ronggot. Ronggot is a swamp full of *tikiw* along the shore of Laguna de Bay. They managed to clear and convert the swamp into rice paddies where they now draw their subsistence. In the chapel which they call *daong*, I asked Aling Bibing if they celebrate mass or similar rituals. She said, "*Tapos na ang Misteryo. Kailangan na lamang ay papuri. Kami'y naghihintay na lamang.*"

The Holy Trinity

The Bathalismo Inang Mahiwaga has anthropomorphized the Holy Trinity. Jehovah, Jesus, and Jose Rizal correspond to God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit, respectively. In some cases, God the Mother is added to form the Holy Family. Contrary to the Christian tradition, the Holy Family does not refer to Joseph, Mary, and Jesus. In any event, it is argued that since every person should carry a name, the Holy Spirit which is the third person must bear a name, too. Jose Rizal who is considered as the Christ of the Tagalog, happens to have his name spelled with a letter "J" which parallels those of Jehovah and Jesus. Moreover, Jose Rizal is latinized as Jove Rex Al which is translated as God King of All. The following poem expresses succinctly the doctrinal posture of many Rizalist groups.

Jose Jesus at Jehoba

Ama po't itulot mo mangyaring dalitin ko
Tanging kapangyarihan mo pagtubos mo sa tao
Ikaw po ang Jehoba ang Dios "J" ang ngalan mong puspos
Na walang nakatatarok ng hiwaga mo pong lubos.

Nanaog ka po sa lupa sa tao ay pagkaawa
 Nagkatawan tao ka nga nagtiis ng dalita
 Nagngalan ka po ng Jesus "J" ang ngalan mong puspos
 Nagmukhang tao kahit Dios upang kami ay matubos.

Nguni't ikaw po ay pinatay niyong mga tampalasan
 Ang akala'y taong tunay ikaw Amang walang hanggan
 Muli ngang ikaw ay nanaog dito sa mundong mabilog
 Nagngalan kang Joseng bantog "J" ang ngalan mong puspos.

Nguni't ikaw ay pinatay din niyong mga taong taksil
 Pagtubos mo po sa amin tutuong pagkaalipin
 Jose Rizal kang pinatay pagtubos sa kaapilinan
 Bayani ka nga pong tunay Cristo ng katagalugan.

Jose Jesus at Jehoba kayong tatlo ay iisa
 Ngala'y pinag-iba-iba upang huwag makilala
 Jehoba Jesus at Jose lumalang ng buong Orbe
 Bathalang makalawingi huwag mo po kaming iwaksi.

Pinagpupuri kang walang tahan ng iyong mga hinirang
 Amin pong inaasahan Buhay na walang hanggan.

The iconography of the Holy Trinity as worked out by a Bathalismo artist shows a very striking similarity with the backdrop of the altar of the Samahan ng Tatlong Persona Solo Dios at Kinabuhayan, Dolores, Quezon. As a matter of fact Agapito Ilustricimo was a founding member of the Board of Directors of the Bathalismo which was established sometime in 1938.

*The World Has Four Corners
 and Five Crosses*

In the book entitled, *Karunungan ng Dios*, a compilation of "lihim na karunungan" by Melencio T. Sabino, the world is believed to have four corners. Each archangel holds a corner. Each corner has a cross. In the middle of the world is also a cross. Every cross is named. Each name consists of four letters. These four letters also form a cross.

			S					
			O	A	R			
			T					
	R		T			O		
A	O	S	T	E	T	R	P	A
	T		N				E	
			A					
			P	R	O			
			E					

The names of the crosses above are: SATOR, TENET, AREPO, ROTAS, and OPERA. These five crosses may be arranged in such

a way that if one reads them horizontally or vertically; forward or backward; and up or down, he comes up with the names of the crosses.

S A T O R
A R E P O
T E N E T
O P E R A
R O T A S

The name of each cross is an acronym. The elements of the acronyms are:

	S—ALUTATOR	
	A—ADAM	
	T—RAGUELA	
	O—RSUM	
	R—AVET	
R—OTATEM	T—RAMENDA	O—NATOR
O—PSCULUM	E—NSIUUVABIT	P—OPULATOR
T—EMPILARITATOR	N—OTAMBAT	E—MMANUEL
O—DONAY	E—STUTUM	R—UMACAT
S—ABAO'H	T—ENETILSUM	A—MPILATOR
	A—LAGATUM	
	E—AMAEL	
	E—XTACSUT	
	P—ERULATOR	
	O—NABELEM	

At least four in the above roster, namely: Salutator, Notambat, Ampilator, and Extacsut were identified by Jose Baricanosa of the Iglesia Watawat ng Lahi as kings of time. The angels of these kings send the message of man through a medium known as *Schemhamporas*. Through the recitation of a divine formula by an invoker the message can be transmitted through a *Banal na Tinig, poder* or *kapangyarihan*.

Recitation of Divine Formulae or Oraciones

The recitation of a divine formula has to meet certain strictures. In the first place, the formula or *oracion* should be fed with prayers (*pinakakain ng dasal*) to maintain its potency. The time of feeding is observed faithfully. How it is fed is meticulously followed. The formula should always be used as a last resort; in self-defense, or to help someone who needs it very badly.

The basic principle which underlies the use of divine formula may be described as functional replication. It is said that when God created the universe or when Jesus Christ exercised his healing power, divine words were uttered and accompanied by certain gestures. The association of words and gestures is functional. The efficacy of the formula depends upon how faithfully it replicates its initial use. *Ora- ciones* have a wide range of application such as against physical dis- comforts, propitiation of malevolent spirits, or to attain invincibility.

Ora ciones Against Physical Discomforts

1. Physical Dislocation

QUEM QUÆRITIS SUSUBANI EGO SUM HOMO
Mauli ang sirang buto
CRIATUM HOMO QUIS LOVEL, PHU PHU PHU . . .

2. Fever due to Bad Air

(Whisper the following to the hand that will be used for rubbing and to the water that the patient will drink).

ATME HUIB RESEOC

3. Headache

(Whisper the following to the handkerchief that shall be used as a headband).

MATAM MAUM-RUM MOUN BEM

Ora ciones Against Malevolent Spirits

(Whisper the following all over the body of the patient, the oil that shall be used for rubbing, and the water that shall be taken in).

- a. BENEDICTAM REENADICTAM BENITE
MACULATAM
- b. LODEAM HOLECAM SOPECLAM
- c. MICOLAM SODICAM NICLAM

Miraculous Acts of Jesus Christ Which Can Be Replicated to Produce Identical Results

1. He walked on the water.

MEMENTOMO HOMO TUIS PEBOESEMPO
BESPO SUO BARES

2. Protection Against Enemies

COVERATIS VERBUM EGOSUM, EGOSUM
 NAZARENUM TITULOS PALMUS SANTO DE
 SANTO IMMORTAL LIBRAME DE TODO MAL

3. Feeding the Five Thousand with Five Loaves of Bread
and Two Fishes

MAO-EO MUM-EM ME-IA FA-AO FEO FA-EO

All these *oraciones* are considered to be very personal properties. They cannot be duplicated and shared. Once handed down to another person, the receiver becomes its sole keeper. There is no guarantee that it shall remain with the recipient. If not well taken cared of, the *oraciones* may leave the steward through mysterious circumstances.

Superficially considered, the instances cited seem unconnected and a jumble of meaningless bits. Underlying these cultural expressions, however, are normative ideological themes which in the cultural realm form a coherent system of value. Emmanuel Salvador del Mundo epitomizes the efficacy of how closely one is related to the source of spiritual power. Spiritual potency is sustained by sharing it ungrudgingly with one's fellowmen.

The case of Jorge Reyes underscores the importance of how closely one is identified with a given tradition — a tradition that is the source of truth or light. *Tapos na ang misteryo* expresses the periodicity of religious rituals. A religious practice is viewed as a step closer to eternity.

The indigenized conceptualization of the Holy Trinity mirrors the structure of the Filipino nuclear family. The positions of father, mother, and children in the Filipino family are well-defined. The exercise of control is graded and handed down from father to mother to children according to seniority and opportunity (*kapanahunan*). Normatively everyone has a chance to exercise authority and control. In the context of Honorio Lopez's astrology (*Dimasalang Kalendariong Tagalog*), *lumipas na ang sa Ama, ngayon namá'y ang sa Anak*.

The exercise of authority and control is not viewed to dominate or to overwhelm. It is more to harmonize. "The world has four corners and five crosses" is an attempt to unravel the mysteries of the world. The world is ordered and patterned. To understand the internal patterning is to behave appropriately according to it. The recitation of *oraciones* is intended to elicit highly predictable result. The

set of strictures associated with its stewardship is a built-in mechanism to avoid the exploitation of nature. In a very general way, what I have done is to map out the the normative ideological system of Philippine religious movements. I shall now deal with the patterning of its organization.

Organizational Patterning

The organizing principle of Philippine religious movements is harmony of *loob*. It is a unity. The material is not opposed to the spiritual. The priesthood is not set apart from the laity. Revealed knowledge and knowledge from books are two sides of the same coin. Even as the normative ideological theme refers to a state of becoming, the patterning of organization relates to a state of position. There is gradation but no opposition. Dualism is perceived as a unity.

The universe consists of the material and the spiritual. They are dealt with separately yet they form a whole. The *pangulo* handles business affairs. The *sinusunod* concentrates on spiritual matters. Raising funds, putting-up a chapel, paying bills, determining where to direct mission work, providing food and shelter when the flocks are gathered — these and similar activities are the immediate concerns of *mga pangulo*. On the other hand, the *sinusunod*, *taga-tawag*, *patron*, or *talaytayan* leads in the prayer, exhorts the members, treats and heals the sick and the infirm, and maintains himself or herself spiritually charged.

The *pangulo* is an organization man. He directs, supervises, and pushes. In contrast, the *sinusunod* is *charismatic*. He is reserve, cool, and persuasive. His presence alone overwhelms. Even his rustic deportment is awesome. People are drawn to him. Both types of leaders complement each other, rather than compete.

The organizational set-up of Filipino religious movements is cast into this material and spiritual unity. The unity may be invested in Apo Berto, Ama Lakay, Inang Adarna, Nana Teta, Maestro, Supremo, Ilustricimo, or Patriarchal Archireus. It may be parcelled out to a Board of Trustees, Directors, Presbyters, or Advisors, or to a Council of Elders, Executive Cabinet, Supreme Executive Staff, Standing Committees or Holy Synod. Whatever are the format and the number of offices, the areas of responsibilities and concerns, i.e., the material and the spiritual, are well recognized and delineated.

The Social Ranking Within the Movement

"Everyone is a potential instrument of Jesus Christ. We differ in levels of learning." This is the claim of Catalino Agna, *pangulo* of In Hoc Signo Vincas, Centro San Mateo, Camaligan Camarines Sur. He underwent seven sacrifices to attain the status of a *talaytayan*. He does not cure the sick, only the spirit does. He only shares (*nakiki-bahagi*) in the spiritual power of Jesus. He does not preach (*nangangaral*). There is only one *guro*, that is Jesus Christ.

Among Philippine religious movements spiritual virtuosity takes several forms. The Iglesia Watawat ng Lahi has an invoker (*tagatawag*). He performs the necessary ritual to establish direct communication link between the *Banal na Tinig* (Holy Voice) and the congregation. The Sagrada Familia de Rizal has a *medium* who goes into a trance before spiritually being possessed. The voice of Apo Asiong who had left them (not died, it was emphasized by Aling Gloria) sometime ago, speaks through her. The Union Cristiana Espiritista has a *talaytayan* who performs the function of casting out devils and healing the sick. The Samahan ng Tatlong Persona Solo Dios, and Rosa Mistica have *supremas* (priestesses) — ritualists who say mass and lead during religious ceremonies and rituals. The Kapatirang Pag-ibig sa Dios; Sambahang Kaamaamahan at Kainainahan; and Bathalismo have Nana Teta, Inang Adarna, and Inang Mahiwaga, respectively to bless and enlighten the believers.

In addition to these local prophets who serve as direct links with God, there are workers of lower *antas* who are known as *misyoneros*. They go around and spread the good news. Below this group are the *kapatiran* who are the initiated and had gone on many *atas* (mission). A *sacrificio* is a form of *atas*. It may be continuously praying from sundown to dawn, atop big boulders in Mt. Makiling, Mt. Banahao, Mt. Arayat or San Mateo, or in an isolated cave of Montalban or Tanay, Rizal or worshipping in such big churches like Espiritu Santo, Sto. Domingo, Quiapo, or Baclaran, attired in a special manner, walking barefoot all the way, amidst the jeers and ridicule of jeepney drivers and curious on-lookers. Outside the "fellowship" are the *mga naghahanap*. These are the seekers of *katotohanan* or *liwanag*. Below this group are the unbelievers.

The gradation of social ranks is a matter of degree. Conscientious study of *lihim na karunungan* makes an individual a different person. Every man is a potential priest. A priest has a higher *antas sa pag-*

aaral. To recall, the internal social ranking of the many religious movements in the Philippines consists of six titles or vocative referents, *misyoneros*, *may-atas*, *kapatiran*, *naghahanap*, and *walang sampalataya*.

*The Relationship of the Believers
with the Unbelieving*

On October 13, 1973, I went up to Orani, Bataan to look and see for myself what is happening at Paraiso. Paraiso is a small barrio just across the municipal cemetery of Orani. It is here where the main chapel and *tuluyan* of the *Kapatirang Pag-ibig sa Dios* are located.

The *Kapatirang Pag-ibig sa Dios* is a religious sodality that believes in Jesus Christ. They call Him *Apo*. The followers are called *Ma-ka-Apo*. The sodality was organized by a certain *Nana Teta* from Morong, Rizal. She went to Los Baños and there she took a bath. She proceeded to Castillejos, Zambales, stayed there for a while, and finally settled in Orani, Bataan.

The route taken by *Nana Teta* is imputed with religious symbolism. Morong is claimed to have been derived from Moro (unbaptized; Muslim Filipinos). *Nana Teta*, while in Morong, was less than a Christian. Los Baños is translated into English as bathrooms. That is where she was baptized. Zambales is a contraction of *sasamba* (to worship) and *aalis* (to leave). This is the reason why *Nana Teta* conducted her mission in Zambales for a short time only and subsequently left the place. Likewise, Orani is a contraction of *oras na sa pag-uwi* meaning it is time to go home. Fittingly, Paraiso is a home away from home.

In the evening of October 13, 1973, Carling the *misyonero* and an elderly man who was a former municipal treasurer of Nueva Ecija visited me in a house which is about fifty meters away from the main chapel. I was with a small group of devotees brought along by *Inang Ester Angeles* who has been commissioned by *Nana Teta* to take care of her flock in Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija.

It was about eight o'clock in the evening. We had just finished our supper. Carling started to work on me. He said, "*Batid namin na mataas ang inyong pinag-aralan. Kami rito'y pare-pareho, walang marunong, walang mayaman. May kasabihan, kung nasa Roma ka, gawin mo ang ugaliin ng mga taga-Roma. Sa iyong pagpasok dito sa Paraiso, marahil ay lalong mainam kung ang iyong kasuotan ay iwanan mo sa kampo santo.*" I perfectly understood what he was driv-

ing at. All through the night he discussed a lot of things, mostly his personal testimonies and those of others about the *kahiwagaan* (they emphasized that what is happening in Paraiso is not *milagro*) of the Apo — none other than Jesus. Jesus Christ in various transfiguration is said to have been physically experienced and talked with personally by numerous witnesses. Others spoke of a luminescent cross that flutters around the black shrouded room where about three dozen icons of different sizes, makes, and shapes are enshrined.

In quite a different occasion, sometime in 1960 while I was doing my fieldwork in Lecheria, Calamba, Jose Baricanosa, sensing my unbelief about the presence of the national heroes in a room adjacent to where the congregation is assembled, mentioned to me in passing the case of a man who expressed the same unbelief. This man challenged the leadership of the Iglesia Watawat ng Lahi to present to him personally the national heroes. They agreed under one condition, that is, he should offer his life to the service of the organization forever if he comes face to face with the *Banal na Tinig*. The deal was accepted. The man was brought into the room where the heroes were allegedly present. Pushed against the wall, the man found out later that serving the organization entailed a lot of sacrifices. As the pangulo pointed out, "*hindi ako maglilingkod ng ganito katagal sa Samahan kung hindi ito totoo.*"

To cite another instance, it was one afternoon of February 1973 when a resident of Camaligan, Camarines Sur directed us to the house of Catalino Agna. My research assistant and I did not know anything about him and his organization. While we were explaining our purpose, Catalino Agna retorted, "I know that your intentions are holy, that's why you found me."

Whether it be "come as you are, nude and simple," or, "we dare your challenge," or, "I understand your good intention," each of these instances defines the relation of the believers with the unbelieving. One distinctive characteristic of Philippine religious movements is its emphasis on believing (*sampalataya*) in contrast to the Protestant gospel-oriented message of the forgiveness of sinners.

General Summary and Conclusion

By way of summary, what I have indicated in this study is that Philippine religious movements are a fusion of three distinct religious traditions. They are: (1) the Roman Catholic tradition, (2) the American Protestant tradition, and (3) Filipino anitismo.

The base culture, to borrow the concept from Dr. F. Landa Jocano, of what I call Philippine religious movements is Filipino animism. The other two traditions contribute their respective focal expressions such as the Roman Catholicism's celebration of Mass and devotion to numerous saints; and the American Protestantism's emphasis on the Gospels and salvation by Grace through Jesus Christ. These cultural dimensions were not accommodated in their own terms. They have been selected and cognized in accordance with the Filipino traditional system of belief and social relationship.

Finally, Philippine religious movements are anchored on the efficacy (*bisa*) of beliefs, rituals, or practices rather than a belief in a god who would forgive sins or who has redeemed the world of its sinful ways. The belief in saints and deities revolves around the consideration that they can attune themselves to them — harmony of *loob*. To emulate the life of a saint or to follow the life style of a *sinusunod* is to functionally replicate his or her religious potency. Rituals and ceremonies are instrumental culture to assuage, appease, and to share in divine power rather than to reciprocate an *utang na loob* because Christ died on the Cross.

Every religious movement in the Philippines has a set of moral dicta to be followed. Its morality is practised to enhance the efficacy of belief whether it be a belief in *anting-anting*, the Bible, *Pasyon*, *lamang lupa*, *aswang*, Virgin Mary, or Jesus Christ. It is necessary to lead a moral life to maintain one's potency or the potency of his *agimat*. This is in contrast to another religious group which exhorts its followers to lead a moral life as an atonement for offense committed and wrongs done.

Finally, religiousness in Philippine social movements is reckoned with in terms of the maintenance of religious potency. Efficacy requires religious observance of rites and rituals, and leading a moral life. Churches are neither for sinners nor for believers. They are the wellsprings that nurture religious potency and efficiency.

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THE RITUAL MUSIC OF THE IGLESIA DEL CIUDAD MISTICA DE DIOS: A PRELIMINARY REPORT

RAMON P. SANTOS

The Iglesia del Ciudad Mistica de Dios is one of several religious colonies found at the foot of Mount Banahao in barrio Santa Lucia, Dolores, Quezon. Hundreds of pilgrims from distant *balangays* of the different religious sodalities around Luzon still flock to its many shrines (*puwesto*) during the season of Lent in the Philippines. The pilgrims believe in the mystical transfer of the Holy Land to this area and accordingly observe the rites and rituals propitious to the occasion.

The following report is a descriptive analysis of the ritual music of the Iglesia del Ciudad Mistica de Dios. The recordings contained in two cassette cartridges taped along the way to the shrines and in the Mistica de Dios compound included: (1) a part of a *pasyon* singing (Tagalog version of Christ's Passion) by Santoyo's group, (2) a hymn sung by a group of pilgrims from Batangas before the Piedra Mental, a large rock at the Sta. Lucia shrine, (3) another *pasyon* singing at the Prisintahan, and (4) an evening procession music and four early morning hymns of the Mistica de Dios. All together, these musical pieces constituted the raw data of this study.

The recording were totally improvised. There was no specific plan as to where or when the music would be recorded. What follows then is a random collection of musicological data. While it is true that not all the recorded music in tape were transcribed completely, this explor-

atory fieldwork nevertheless yielded substantial information regarding the nature of the ritual music of the Iglesia del Ciudad Mistica de Dios.

General Remarks

The ritual music of *Mistica de Dios* is purely vocal and is quite western in orientation. The hymns are set either in major or minor modes. These are also performed in harmonized texture, mostly in thirds and occasionally in fourths or in full triadic structures. There is a predilection towards the $\begin{matrix} 3 & 2 & 3 \\ 1 & 5 & 1 \end{matrix}$ harmonic progression whenever

applicable, which partly indicates a rather sophisticated harmonic sense. While there seems to be an awareness of the vertical sonority among the singers, the tendency is to be more conscious of individual lines, thus preserving the polyphonic aspects of the hymns. Although there is no definite choral organization, the singers seem to have absorbed the harmonic content of the hymns. They can sing any of the voices in the two-part and sometimes three-part textures.

The congregation, always singing as a group, is led by one or two presentors or leaders. The leaders appear to have three principal functions in the musical liturgy: (1) to sing the first part of the lines in responsorial settings, e.g., in the Litany of the Saint; (2) to sing the first motivic line in order to start a hymn or a phrase and (3) to maintain a certain continuity in the singing either by sustaining phrases, or by immediately starting the next major formal division, almost creating an overlap with the previous phrase or section. The *cantors* maintain a certain control of the tempo, the movement, and the formal structure of the performance. They almost function as conductors.

The use of the Latin text (in the Litany of the Saints) points to a Roman Catholic orientation in the liturgy. Some of the chant formulas have been adapted and transformed. The misplaced word accents give evidence to the probable adaptation of the text of pre-existing tunes. The style of singing is characterized by *portamentos* and occasional subtle turns, which tend to moderate the speed of the hymn in general.

*Analytical Description of the Music**Hymn 1 (early morning service)*

The opening hymn is a hymn of praise and thanksgiving and is sung at the beginning of the early morning service that starts at 5:00 a.m. The meter is in four-four time although just like in the other hymns, this is not strictly followed in the singing. This discrepancy is due to the sliding style of singing, the irregular pauses and the non-coincidence of verbal stresses to the musical accents.

The tempo in the first few bars of the recording (which is about the middle of the entire hymn) is rather slow. When the refrain is reached, however, the tempo becomes faster until towards the end of the first part of the refrain (l.13m.4). The slow pace is kept until the end.

The leader or *cantor* consistently sings the first word or motivic line of the strophes (l.6 ms. 4-5) while the refrain (l. 11 m.4) is sung by the entire congregation.

The harmonic texture in this particular hymn is articulated more than in the other hymns because all the so-called consonant intervals (3rds, 4ths, 5ths, 6ths) have been represented. Some full triadic structures, as in ll. 5-6 have also been noted.

Hymn 2

The full text of this hymn is rather unclear. However, some of the recognizable words indicate that the hymn is one of thanksgiving and is addressed to the Mystical Rose (Blessed Virgin Mary). The text also contains the liturgical Greek text of "Kyrie Eleison" and some Spanish-sounding words (l.15 and l.17).

The music is in the style of a kundiman, set in slow triple meter and in a minor key. The phrases are more clearly delineated and are a little bit more symmetrical than those found in the other hymns. The harmonic content is again characterized by independent linear parts, resulting in a variety of intervallic structures.

At the end of each verse, there is an ornamental 4-3 suspension figure sung by the leaders. However, this is treated more as a textual ornament rather than a dissonance as a consequence of a linear progression. This gives further evidence to the possibility that the hymn was initially learned as a fully harmonized composition.

Hymn 3

The musical character is similar to that of a chorale. It is very homophonic and the phrases are very assymetrical. The verses are hard to distinguish from one another because of the continuous style of singing. The breath pauses do not seem to fall on standard cadence points. The emphasis is not on linear polyphony but rather on sonority. The main harmonic interval is the third above the melody. The movement is almost recitative-like, slow and full of *portamentos*.

Hymn 4

The final hymn of the early morning service is almost the same as Hymn 3. It assumes the character of a chorale recitative. The phrase divisions are likewise asymmetrical and the harmonization is simple, using the third as the main interval. Unlike the previous hymn however, the main melody of this hymn is in the top voice. Another point of difference is that the phrases are longer than those of Hymn 3, resulting in a more lyrical setting.

The phrase *mamahay ka* are two of the words that are closely recorded. It is interesting to note that the same words appear in the closing hymn of the evening service. This fact implies that the same sentiment is felt at the end of a worship service — an appeal to God to dwell in their hearts. This also seems to indicate that the *Mistica de Dios* group has specific hymns for specific purposes in their ritual.

Litany of the Saints and Responsorial Hymn

One of the most striking features of the procession is the singing of the Litany of the Saints. This is significant because the series of responsories in this litany is broken up by interpolated verses taken from another hymn. The practice is very similar to medieval troping where a standard chant is broken into sections by interposing new bits of melody and text. The only difference is that in medieval troping whatever was interposed is related in meaning to the chant. In this case, the music and lyrics added do not necessarily complement the meaning of the original text. The litany proper is sung in Latin while the interpolated verses are sung in Tagalog. After the entire Litany, a concluding prayer is recited and the entire hymn (together with the interpolated verses) is sung.

The hymn is made up of ten verses, the last verse being a repetition of the first. Each verse is made up of six lines. The first line contains five to nine syllables, and the rest have eight syllables each. The refrain is made up of two lines that are repeated; the first line contains eight syllables while the other has ten. This is best illustrated by the sixth verse which came out as one of the few verses whose text was clearly recorded:

O kamatayang mararahas (9)
 Sa ulan at bawa't kidlat (8)
 Itong siphayo ay lunas (8)
 Higit na inililigtas (8)
 Na ang sino mang Kristiyano (8)
 Na may dibosyong totoo (8)

Refrain

Angeles saka ng koro (8)
 Pr'in (purihin) natin ang Bathalang totoo (10)

The first verse and the last have only four lines instead of the usual six.

Purihin ka naming totoo (9)
 Ng sanlangitan Ama ko (8)
 Pinupuri k'namin totoo (8)
 Sa sanlangitang mana ko (8)

Refrain

Angeles . . .

The formula for the tune of the responsorial hymn may have been derived from the Gregorian chant:

a. Gregorian chant

Omnes sancte innocentes O - ra - te pro nobis

b. Mistica de Dios melody

Omnes sancte innocentes O - ra - te pro nobis

c. Harmonized version of the Mistica de Dios melody

Omnes sancte innocentes O - ra - te pro nobis

The *Mistica de Dios* melody is merely a third above the original Gregorian chant (transposed to a) with a little embellishment in the cadence point. A further harmonic elaboration is then added as illustrated in c.

The performance variates some motivic lines of the hymn verses, such as those found at the beginnings of the refrains. Much of the melodic alterations result from the length of the text, i.e., when some lines contain less or more syllables than the standard count of eight. This is quite apparent at the beginning of each verse and the fifth line of the third verse (see 1.32 and 1.67). Slight harmonic variations also occur especially in the refrains.

There are a number of word contractions and the seemingly misplaced normal word accents in relation to the musical accents. This means that the music and the text had been composed independently of each other. In the refrain for example, the word *purihin* is sung as pr'in on an eight-note.

Hymn 2

This hymn is sung in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary at the end of the evening service. This is probably the principal hymn of praise of the congregation to the object of their veneration. Its place in the evening service — it is sung as a final hymn — lends credence to this assertion. The ministerial role given to the women in the community, the blue ankle-long skirts worn by the women, all point to the Blessed Virgin Mary as the focal point in their liturgical worship. Maria Bernarda Balitaan (MBB) was the founder of the samahan.

Hymn 2 is sung a little faster than the other hymns and with a general feeling of duple meter. The phrases are a bit irregular at the beginning of each verse. The leaders inject a kind of improvisory melisma to these verses (see 1.3). A melodic motive of the first verse is also variated in the succeeding verses:

Verse 1 

Verses 2
3
4
5 

This particular hymn also shows some polyphonic improvisations in the lower voice(s): 1.1 m.3; 1.3 ms. 6 and 7; 1.4 m.6.

The singing is continuous. There is hardly any gap between the verses — the leader immediately starts the next verse after reaching the final note of the previous verse.

This preliminary report points to several interesting data regarding the character of the ritual music of the *Iglesia del Ciudad Mistica de Dios*. The most significant is perhaps its close affinity to the Roman Catholic liturgical music. Some of the essential aspects of both music and practice of the orthodox churches have been preserved. On the other hand, the character of the music itself is of a more recent vintage, being based on the major and minor modes. While it is evident that the basic polyphonic and harmonic organizations had been formally composed, the music in general still preserves an individual quality as a result of the spontaneous fusion of western musical structures and local style of performance and musical articulation.

EARLY MORNING SERVICE

HYMN 1

Original Key: D major

♩ = c. 100

1

2 **Faster ♩ = 120** **REFRAIN**
 kanyang panga-lan pu-ri-hin tin siy'ay pu-

3 ri-hin any ngalan niyay pu-ri-hin a-ting ga-win la-ging ga-

4 win any ngalan nya ay pu-ri-hin pu-ri-hin tin sydy pu-

5 ri-hin any ngalan nya ay pu-ri-hin a-ting ga-win solo a-

6 ting ga-win any ngalan nya ay pu-ri-hin kalul-wa

7 **koro**
 ay magpasa-la-mat kay bat-ha-lang ma-

8 gi-ging manga ma-saya na kanyang pa-ki-ki-

9 ta ta-yo ay mag-pa-sa-la-mat kay Bat-

10 ha-la sa bi-ya-ya at pay-i-big

REFRAIN

11 Ranyung paki - ki - tal pu ri -

12 'tin syay pu - ri - hin ang nya-lan n'ya ay pu - ri - hin a- slower

13 ting ga-win laging ga-win ang ngalan n'ya ay pu - ri -

14 hin pu - ri - hin 'tin syay pu - ri - hin ang ngalan n'ya ay

15 pu - ri - hin ating ga-win any laging ga-win any ngalan

16 nya ay pu - ri - hin.

EARLY MORNING SERVICE

HYMN 2

Original Key: f-sharp minor

1 may-papasa-la-
 2 mat
 3 tang'ing pana-ta sabi-hin
 4 ng bu-ong bi-ya-ya ma-
 5 hal
 6 ng di-wa
 7
 8 i-nang na-min
 9 Ma-ri-a ay umi-yak
 10 ng Ro-sa mistika Bu-laklak

11

12 dala #aito su ligaya

13 i - na ko ang na-ti-

14 ra i - tong

15 Ky - ri - e e - le - i - son # puri - hin

16


17 Ky - ri - e e - le - i - son a los tempes horror.

EARLY MORNING SERVICE

HYMN 3

Original Key: D major

$p = 75$
 solo cresc
 1
 2 na ka-to-to na nan
 3 ay i-yong
 4
 5
 6
 7 i-na ma-i-
 8 pa
 9 pa-nahen mag - pa - ka-i - lan man na
 10 ka-mu ma-ma - tray

11  ta-o pag-i-big na tu-nay na i-a-

12  lay sata — o pag-i-big na tu-nay.

Detailed description: The image shows two staves of musical notation. Staff 11 is a treble clef staff with a key signature of one sharp (F#) and a 2/4 time signature. It contains a melody of eighth and quarter notes with lyrics 'ta-o pag-i-big na tu-nay na i-a-'. Staff 12 is also a treble clef staff with the same key signature and time signature. It contains a melody of eighth and quarter notes with lyrics 'lay sata — o pag-i-big na tu-nay.'. The lyrics are written in a handwritten style below the notes.

EARLY MORNING SERVICE

HYMN 4


Original Key: C major

♩ = 60


R0r0 r3-7

-3-7 7

ging ma-nga-li-ya-ya nya-yon na ang naysa tu-wi ma-ma-hay ka o ta-ngi sa po-on na ta-han

11  *a-king*

12  *do*

13  *hi-nal*

14  *ma-hal ko ang panga-lan sa pu-ri'ng*

15  *ngalan bu-hay*

16  *ma la-gi*

17  *walang hang-gan.*

EVENING PROCESSION and CHAPEL SERVICE

LITANY OF THE SAINTS

P = c.76

1 kanang ko-ro prin natin ang Bathalang toto-o; angheles atsaka-

2 nang ko-ro prin natin ang Bathalang to-to-o Omnes sancte Evange-
apostoli et

3 lis-tae ora-te pro no-bis

4 Omnes sancte in-nocen-tes o-ra-te pro nobis

5 kamatayang mara-ra-has sa ulan, at bawat kid-

6 lat i-tong siphayo ay lu-nus higit na i-ni-li-ligtas REFRAIN

7 na ang si-no mang Kristyano na may di-bos-yong to-too ang-heles

8 sa-ka nang ko-ro prin natin ang Bathalang toto-o; Ang-he-

9 les sa-ka nang ko-ro prin natin ang Bathalang toto-o

10 [m = inaudible]

11 pag pa-naw para-an i-yong tunay kumiwang

REFRAIN

12 di na naitalo sa ating hamak nata-o Anyheles --- [etc.]

13 ng pag

14 ang sabi mo'y yong kasama-han i-tong bin-ya-

15 gan ang ka-away na i-to sa takot ay tu-matakb

16 REFRAIN sa han
Anyhe-les su --- [etc.]

17 di-to samundong ibabaw at doon sa ka-langi-tan

REFRAIN

18 bu-ong bayan ko ang pagpa-ra-ngal sa i-yo Anyheles --- [etc.]

19 ng sanlangit nang A-ma ko i-tong
REFRAIN

20 tutu-nyo sa sanlangit nang A-ma ko, Ang-he-

21 ies sa-ka nang ko-ro prin natin ang Bathalang to-to-o

22 Anyhe-les sa-ka-nang ko-ro prin natin ang Bathalang

23 toto - o

24 Sinote Anto - ni o - ra pro nobis

25 - kaw Bathala na i sa tat - lo sa pagka per -

26 so - nu ti - nu - tawagkanatin tu - wi - na katawan sa

27 'ming dara - tal yamung any ka - a - wuan mo maki - ta do - on sa ta -
REFRAIN

28 c Anyheles 'sa - ra nang ko - ro prin natin any Bathalang toto - o

29 Anyheles 'sa - ra nang ko - ro prin natin any Bathalang toto - o

30

31 mahal da - langinun namin

32 ut yang di mano ka - no si - no ka ba - yang to - to - o; Anyheles --- [etc.]
REFRAIN

33

34 REFRAIN
Angheles... [etc.]

35 ngit la- ngi

36 tan lu- han sa kapangya- ri- han ng manya di- mon- yong hung-

37 hung at ang pagpi- pu- ring i- to Kalasag sa di- lang tukse

38 REFRAIN
Ang- heles... [etc.] Propi- ti- us es- to parce nobis Domi- ne
Propi- ti- us es- to exaudi nos Domi- ne

39 Repeat lines 5, 6, 7, 8, 9

40

41 Ab- en- ni- ma- lo li- be- ranos Domi- ne → In die judicii... [etc.]

42 karaga- tan ng lupat ka-

43 so- na daan si- yang tu-

44 REFRAIN
nuy di ka magpa- ya sa a- ting hamak na ta- o
Angheles su- Ru nang Ro- ro prin natini ang Bat ha- lang

45 to-to-o Ang-heles sa-ka nang ko-ro pr'in natin
 46 any Bathalang toto-o. Pecca-to-res te rogamus audi nos
 47

48 ut nobis indul-ge-as te rogamus au-di nos → Fili Dei... [etc.]
 49 kata-as-ta-a san na kay Bathalang katwi
 50 ran ay da-ti min'nyong kasamuhun na mangga binyagan
 51 REFRAIN

51 baya-an ka-amay na i-to sa takot ay tumatak-bo; Ang-he-
 52 les sa-ka nang ko-ro pr'in natin any Bathalang to-to-o
 53 Anyheles sa-ka-nang ko-ro pr'in natin any Bathalang toto-o.
 54

55
 Agnus Dei qui tollis peccata mundi; parce nobis, Domine
 Agnus Dei, qui tollis peccata mundi; exaudi nos, Domine
 Agnus Dei, qui tollis peccata mundi; miserere nobis

56 Ang subi ng kagali — nyan ay aminy i — na — a — sa —

57 han di — to sa mundong iba — baw at doon sa Ra — langi — tan

58 at ko ang bayan ko ang pagdara nyal sa i — yo Angheles... [etc.]

59 Pu — ri — hin ka naming toto — o ny

60 sanlangit ang A — ma ko pi — nu — pu — ri ri naming toto — o

61 sa sunlangi — tany manuk ko Anghe — les... [etc.] Pater noster

62 [prayers] nos — trum, A — men

HYMN 1

64 Repeat "Purihin" 59-61

Repeat "Bathala na ita" 25-29

65 Ang kagali — nyan

66 i — pi — naykali — ob sa mahai Runy i — pi Ra — gali — nyan ng bi —

67 **REFRAIN**
 ya-ya di mangag Rano pina-ka-ka sa ta-o Angheles... [etc.]

68
 Ayas si-si-nu-lat ng propetang si E-la-ya

69
 nay sa langit nauna ya

70
 ng tu-la-ran na-tin di-
REFRAIN

71
 to nu nana-mu-yan sa mundo Angheles 'sa--- [etc.]

72
 Pri-sa-yong mahal sa awit ng sangka-la-ngitan


73
 na ukol sa kapangya-ri-han sa munga di-mon-yong hung hung
REFRAIN

74
 at ang pagpupit-ring i-to kalasag sa di-lang tukso: Angheles... [etc.]

75
 Repeat "O kamatayang" 5-9

76
 sa kara-ga-tan na lubhang

77
 pagpa-pu-naw po. i-yang tunay kawin nang

78 
di na nayta-lo sa aming hamak na tuo Anyheles...-[etc.]

79 Repeat "Kataastasan" 49-53

80 Repeat "Ang sabi" 56-58

81 Repeat "Purihin" 59-61

EVENING PROCESSION and CHAPEL SERVICE

HYMN 2

1 sa ma-hal ^o I-nang Bir-hen Ma-ri-

2 -a banal na-iwang mali-ga — ya

3 nak sa la-hat ang i ang a ^{yong a}

4 nak nak

5 u-u-gan ng i-yo pung si

6

7 sa a-ming da-ing namahay a-

8 [#]ro ay sa a-min mamahay Ra kung i-

9 -kaw na-i-wan sa

10 pu-so ny ka-la-ha-tan li wanag [#]i-i-ral li-

11 wanag mi ang i — i — ral

RITUAL MUSIC OF IGLESIA DEL CUIDAD MISTICA DE DIOS 117

12 sa la-hat pa-tu-loy na

13 walang hum—pay ng do-on. sa manga na-i-du-

14 yan wa-lang hang-gan.

The image shows a handwritten musical score for three staves. The first staff (labeled 12) contains the lyrics 'sa la-hat pa-tu-loy na'. The second staff (labeled 13) contains 'walang hum—pay ng do-on. sa manga na-i-du-'. The third staff (labeled 14) contains 'yan wa-lang hang-gan.'. The music is written in a treble clef with a key signature of one flat (B-flat) and a 3/4 time signature. The lyrics are written in Tagalog. There are some musical notations such as a sharp sign (#) above a note in the first staff and a triplet of notes in the second staff.

**HEAVEN SEES AS THE PEOPLE SEE,
HEAVEN HEARS AS THE PEOPLE HEAR***

WILLIAM HENRY SCOTT

“Heaven sees as the people see, Heaven hears as the people hear.”

This is a quotation from Mencius which illustrates the Confucian view of the people's primacy in the universal order of things. The people is the instrument by which Heaven withdraws its mandate from one dynasty and gives it to another: it rouses them up in rebellious rage to overthrow a corrupt ruler and set up a nobler one. The people is a sea on which the ship of state floats — and the sea can sink the ship. Confucian China always held that in the final analysis the will of the people was irresistible. When Commissioner Lin Tse-hsu on the eve of the first Opium War in 1839 wanted to invoke his ultimate threat against the recalcitrant British, he warned them that he would stir up a peasant militia that would swarm all over them and drive them from China's shores forever. Three years later the Canton authorities sought to drive the point home by opening a recruiting station just opposite the British *bodegas* where local roughnecks qualified for enlistment by lifting a 50-kilo weight. And when, in 1870 after 25 years of humiliating unequal treaties, an undisciplined mob broke into a French convent in Tientsin and killed a dozen nuns, a grateful intelligentsia concluded

* Lecture delivered at the First Diliman Forum on the People's Republic of China, Center for Ecumenical Studies and Action, University of the Philippines, September 1, 1975.

that at last the people was roused up and would accomplish what an ineffectual military and corrupt bureaucracy had been unable to do.

The Chinese government itself maintained a healthy respect for this popular power, and this was especially true during the last dynasty before the Revolution which brought the empire to an end. When local governments would group ten families together for mutual responsibility, and then ten groups of ten, and then ten groups of hundreds, it was the rule that their overall leader must not be a member of the *ilustrado* gentry. The government knew it had to keep the intellectuals and the peasants apart if it was going to control either, for it was the educated elite that could unleash the revolutionary power of the masses. This was a truth still recognized by a non-Confucian elite in the 20th century. Professor Li Ta-chao of the University of Peking, China's first Marxist, compared the power of an aroused peasantry to a roaring ocean wave, and one of his library assistants, Mao Tse-tung, in his famous 1927 "Report on the peasant movement in Hunan Province," likened the same power to the irresistible force of a typhoon.

I cite these examples as a few of the thoughts I would like to put forward the general question: how did the world's most conservative culture produce the world's most radical revolution? I am not going to suggest that Confucianism produced Marxism. Anybody who has been reading the foreign press lately knows that Confucian elitism is anathema to the government of the People's Republic of China — as well it might be — and that the name of that Mencius whom I quoted earlier has been vilified for another of his quotations, one that runs, "Those who work with their minds, govern, those who work with their hands are governed." But I am going to suggest that Confucian China had no institutions or power blocks — what we would call vested interests — capable of resisting the imposition of radical changes from above, and that Confucian China would not find the idea of a highly centralized, authoritarian, thought-controlling regime so strange or oppressive as we might.

I suppose I am safe in referring to pre-Communist China as the world's most conservative culture for no other reason than that it was conservative longer than any other culture. For two thousand years, China consciously resisted change in government and society, and the significant changes that did take place were those that were too subtle or gradual to attract outright attack by a powerful scholar bureaucracy. Indeed, it might be better to say "preservative" than "conservative," for

Chinese leaders were not merely conservative by temperament but preservative by design. Confucius himself considered that all the problems of his day stemmed from aberrant departure from the customs of a happier day of ancient sages and sage-kings, and the curriculum prescribed for the Chinese civil service was nothing more than a canonized collection of historic documents believed to preserve the glitter of that Golden Age. Or perhaps even "preservative" is too pale a term, and I should say "restorative" instead. For, during 2500 years of the recorded history of revolutions which overthrew dynasties with an average frequency of once every three centuries, the first thing each new regime tried to do was to recreate the image of the old regime as faithfully as possible.

Nor do I probably have to belabor the point of how radical the present Chinese revolution is. Confucius said, "There has never been seen a tree with its branches in the ground and its roots in the air," but that is just the kind of change envisioned in the People's Republic, and the vision is rapidly being realized. Marxist revolutionary theory starts not with economics or politics, but with man alienated from himself, and its goal is not an improved economic base but a sociological superstructure resting on that base in which the New Man will enjoy his true nature. I have called the Chinese Revolution the world's most radical revolution because I believe that China has moved farther along the path toward that goal than any other revolutionary society. Before the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966, Mao Tse-Tung told his comrades, "Unless a man is completely born again, he cannot enter the door of Communism," and all of China's agricultural and industrial miracles have been worked under the rhetoric of selflessness and service. The green seeds of Marxism dropped into China's ancient soil seem to have produced a sturdier plant with more fragrant blossoms and lusher fruit than in any other socialist land. The question is, what made the soil so fertile?

In the first place, China has always had a strong central government exercising control over a culture area larger than any other nation until modern times. If we superimpose the map of China on a map of Europe, we will see that the distance from Canton in the South to Mukden in the North is the same as the distance from Sicily to Leningrad, and from east to west, Shanghai is as far from Chungking as Istanbul is from Paris. At no time in history has a government in Paris been able to collect taxes in Istanbul, or an emperor in Leningrad to issue orders to a governor in Sicily in a language common to both

of them. Yet this has been the situation in China during more of its long history than not, and it is the situation today. This control has traditionally been exercised through an efficient body of civil servants rendering more loyal fealty to one common culture than to any provincial feudal lord, and willing to be assigned to the outermost reaches of the realm at the government's pleasure or emperor's whim.

I have been referring to the territory under this control as a "culture area" to make the further point that the Chinese government has always been, in the words of one western sinologist, "coterminous" with Chinese culture. The government was the arbiter and propagator of social norms, and the head of state was the embodiment and chief exemplar of the ideal national character. When I was first learning to write Chinese calligraphy, one of the models I copied was the handwriting of a Sung dynasty emperor, and engraved in stone in the mortuary shrine of a national hero who had died defending the town in which I lived was an enlarged copy of his last letter to his wife in his own hand. So, too, not far from that spot today there stands in the Yu Hua Tai memorial to 120,000 activists executed during the Kuomintang regime, a stone marker displaying an edifying comment on the blood of martyrs done in the brushwork of the present Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Tse-tung.

Of course, with our modern communication systems, even a comparatively decentralized government nowadays looks more centralized than the government of Confucian past. But the power of the Confucian government was reinforced by the absence of competing power blocs or institutions which westerners and western students of history take for granted — vested interests, that is, capable of influencing, obstructing or even overthrowing central authority. By way of illustration, I will single out four which appeared in Europe and the New World from the time of the Roman Empire to the present — the military, the Church, the business world, and the intelligentsia.

In the West, from the time of the barracks emperors through centuries of countermarching nationalist armies to the dictatorships of the present century, governments have had to confront an often independent military profession. And not only in the West: in South America and the Far East today more nations are under the control of martial law or military regimes than are not. China never had such a military profession nor even a standing army, as we know it. Internal dis-

turbances that called for coercive action by the state — and there were plenty of them — were expected to be put down by peasant militia organized on the spot by the local gentry. North and northwest of the Great Wall, of course, were those enemy barbarians whose hankering to invade China's more comfortable civilization had to be controlled by military means. But the unlucky troops who manned these frontier garrisons provided the subject matter for two millenia of poems bewailing their impressment, hardships, and broken romances. And their commanders were most likely civil officials out of favor with the state. When actual invasions or revolutions required real generals in the field, scholar bureaucrats were expected to exchange the pen for the sword and take to the field, returning to their more genteel calling once the emergency had passed. The soldiers themselves were either conscripts or men who could find no other way to make a living. Even as late as my own day in China, one of the first popular sayings a newcomer learned was, "*Hao tieh pu ta ting, hao jen pu ta ping* — You don't use good iron to make a nail, you don't use good men to make a soldier."

China never had a church. Neither her Taoists nor her Buddhists created organizations with popes or caliphs sanguinary enough to attack one another or powerful enough to influence or subvert the designs and interests of the state. Buddhism did have a profound effect on Chinese culture, but not in the political sphere. It never produced those contentious Japanese monks who brawled in the streets of Nara and Kyoto, much less Christian abbots who rallied belly-slashing Crusaders on to victory with the cry, "*Deus vult* — God wills it!" The state religion, Confucianism, aimed at social order in this world rather than reward in the next, and taught the faithful to respect ancestors and render unto Caesar. Individual emperors occasionally patronized Buddhism or embraced Taoism, but scholar officials always castigated such faiths as abject superstitions fit only for ignorant peasants. There is a classic memorial studied as a model essay by all students of Chinese literature entitled, "The bone of the Buddha." It inveighs against the official reception of this Indian relic at court. Religion has always rested lightly on Chinese shoulders, especially scholar shoulders, whether in the 1940's or the 940's. Any Christian missionary working in a Chinese university on the eve of the Liberation will recall that few students would have found it necessary to be liberated from what the present government calls the opiate of the masses.

Big business was never a political factor in Chinese history, as surprising as this may seem to Filipinos who consider their Chinese

compatriots businessmen *par excellence*. China, of course, never had an industrial revolution, nor even a mercantilist overseas empire, and so did not produce such spectacles as an English East Indies Company colonizing a whole subcontinent or a Central Intelligence Agency overthrowing the government of a modern state at the behest of an American multinational corporation. Overseas trade China always had, but in view of her literal self sufficiency, this trade was seen by the government either as tribute typified by such exotica as Sulu pearls or Bornean bird's-nests, or as Chinese benevolence toward benighted lands languishing for want of tea and silk. But the merchants themselves always occupied the bottom rung of the Chinese class structure.

At the top of the social ladder were the scholar gentry who supposedly dedicated themselves to the service of the state at altruistic self-sacrifice, and below them came the peasantry which supported the land by the honesty of its sweaty labor and was the proper object of both the government's and Heaven's concern. Still lower came the craftsmen: they, too, worked with their hands, but their labor was less arduous and their products more efete. And at the very bottom came the merchants — parasites who neither dedicated themselves to public service nor labored to feed their fellow men, but rather, producing nothing, lived by their wits to reap dubious profits for their personal gain. When British merchants in their early 19th-century ghetto outside the gates of Canton attempted to attract official attention to the dishonesty they felt they were suffering at the hands of their Chinese counterparts, the Emperor was unmoved by any sympathy for their plight. After all, if they chose to make their living by such unprincipled means as trade, how could they expect to deal with more principled men, and if they were out-shylocked by their Chinese competitors, what grounds did they have for complaint?

Not only were merchants scorned and their commerce deprecated, but the real economy of the land was considered a direct concern of the government. No decrees were supposed to be promulgated which would interfere with the people's livelihood; quite the opposite, their hunger or suffering was ultimately the responsibility of that imperial father figure who was answerable to Heaven for their welfare. The failure of an incompetent emperor or corrupt court to maintain public works could lead to floods which would create famine which would produce brigands who would gather together in outlaw bands to become rebels. And the Chinese assessment of the real blame in such cases is indicated by their expression, "driven to the hills," for the English,

“take to the hills.” In our own Old Society, newspapers used to speak of Filipino youth “taking to the hills” in the Sierra Madres, but in the *Shui Hu Chuan*, a picaresque novel which is one of Mao Tse-tung’s favorite sources of quotations, the outlaw bands that gathered around a mountain called Liang are spoken of as “*pi hsiang Liang Shan* — driven to Mount Liang.” The fact that failure to control the Yellow River did actually lead to such sequences of floods, famines, brigandage and revolt has suggested to some that the reason an area the size of Europe remained a united nation for most of two millenia was that its dependence on irrigation and flood control made a strong central authority absolutely necessary. This is an unacceptable oversimplification, of course, but it does suggest a line of reasoning which persuades many economists today that China’s millions can never be adequately fed without a pooling and redistribution of their total resources by some central government powerful enough to do so.

Chinese scholarship boasts a long and brilliant history, and an outsider might expect it to have sparked the sort of dissent characteristic of intellectual communities in the West. Yet the Confucianist community never mounted any Renaissance or Reformation to undermine a Thomistic worldview or any French Enlightenment to unleash the forces of revolution, nor even provided any campus seedbeds to nurture protest or revolt. The reason is probably quite simple: the intelligentsia *was* the government. Chinese bureaucracy was nothing more nor less than the body of those who passed the government examinations — that is, what we would call degree-holders. There were no professional degrees like engineering or medicine. All majors were in the field of Confucian philosophy and statecraft, and led straight to employment in the civil service. The holder of, say, a BA degree was guaranteed a job in the government; an MA could be expected to lead to something like a governorship; and a PhD promised nothing less than such eminence as advisor to the Emperor himself. No nation ever had so profound or comprehensive a system of scholar rule. True, it was a system that produced not a few suicides among those who flunked and a virtuosity in cheating that survived into the 20th century to become a target for some of Chairman Mao’s sharpest sarcasm. But it didn’t threaten the state.

I must admit that the four aspects of Chinese culture which I have just singled out as being significant to the history of the Chinese Revolution escaped me when I began to study Chinese history and culture thirty years ago. I think the reason for this failing on my part — and,

I console myself, on the part of my mentors, both Chinese and foreign — was that during the first half of this century, China was trying hard to project the image of a western nation. National holidays celebrated the promulgation of a non-Confucian constitution being held in abeyance during a period of non-Confucian political tutelage to prepare the masses for participation in non-Confucian popular elections. Nowhere did the new look more completely disguised the past than in the intellectual community. China had never known that western ideal of the university campus a *san arena* for the exchange of ideas where posters advocating *ibagsak* something-or-other could appear alongside others crying *mabuhay* the same thing. Yet from the time of the first World War until well beyond the Second, Chinese campuses might have served as models of the sort of academic freedom which begins in the classroom and ends in the streets.

This was utterly heterodox, of course, for the Chinese academic tradition was based not on the pitting of thesis against antithesis to discover a true synthesis, but upon the mastery of a canonized body of orthodox doctrine. Indeed, Chinese education began with the literal memorization of that authorized canon, a technique which continued into my own day. When I was teaching in China, I was the only person in the classroom with a textbook — my students all memorized it and reproduced it, word for word and comma by comma, on their exam papers. I hasten to point out, however, that it is not true that people who memorize can't think. It is simply that when they do, instead of running to the library to look up reference data, they just consult the same data in their heads where it has been committed to memory.

It would be hard to overestimate the role this un-Chinese sort of student activism played in the Chinese Revolution. Looking back at it now with the advantage of hindsight, I interpret this deviation from Confucian norms as part of a kind of western-inspired interregnum between the final decay of traditional Chinese society around 1900 and a new Chinese-designed society around 1950. As far as the educational scene is concerned, I might even date the end of that interregnum with the year 1958 when the government brought the Hundred Flowers period to an end by uprooting all those "poisonous weeds" that had appeared among the more acceptable blossoms. The invitation to let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend had itself been reminiscent of that Confucian world in which the intelligentsia was expected to offer serious criticism of the government. In the Con-

fucian bureaucracy, the highest ideal was the courageous scholar official who risked his neck — and often paid the full price — by criticizing the behaviour of the imperial court and even the Emperor himself. But it was never intended that such criticisms should recommend changing the institutions of the state itself, or that suggestions should stray beyond the confines of the official state doctrine. But that is precisely what happened in 1958 and it was no more welcome then than it would have been under the Emperor. Since that date, I assume, the older Chinese concept of higher education has been restored to all campuses in the People's Republic — that is, they have become exercise grounds for mastering an orthodox canon, not arenas for testing the validity of that canon.

To illustrate my thesis that since this half-century interregnum the Chinese people have reverted to certain concepts more congenial to them than western alternatives, I will mention simply their attitude toward legality and morality. Confucius spoke not of civil rights but of human relationships, and his concept of justice was really one of harmony. The western bogeyman of a totalitarian regime running roughshod over individual human rights probably never greatly disturbed the Chinese imaginations. Confucian China had no notion of human dignity as dependent on public law as is so dear to the heart of western democratic tradition, and neither does Communist China. True, the People's Republic does have a constitution and law codes — Marxism, after all, is a product of Western bourgeoisie intellectualizing and so carries such traditional paraphernalia with it. But I doubt that the weight of constitutional law rests any heavier on Chinese shoulders in the new society than religion did in the old. Crimes are committed not against the law but against mankind, and guilt is a moral matter not a legal decision. This is probably reflected in the terminology of "thought reform" and "education through labor" which modern China attaches to penal procedures and which outsiders often dismiss as a deceitful jargon. That is, true correction requires a sense of guilt, and guilt arises from moral rather than physical pressure.

Confucian China never framed any law codes, nor did it have any legal profession. Such laws as existed were intended for criminals and evil-doers, not responsible citizens. One did not appeal to the law, but fell into its clutches; one did not take a case to court, he was dragged before a judge. Only men unable or unwilling to settle their grievances like gentlemen even attracted the attention of law, and once they did, it was the magistrate's duty to ascertain the circumstances under which

they had committed the crime of which they were already guilty, and assign a fit penalty. Dignified citizens would ordinarily engage one of their peers to render an equitable decision between them. Such a private arbiter, a certain Mr. Chi, still used to set sipping tea alone in a teahouse I frequented, available to clients who would wine and dine him for such services. At the less dignified peasant level, cases were settled by elders of an extended family in a local clan temple, and the social stigma attached to crimes that sullied the family name is reflected in some of the draconian decisions handed down. One of the accomplishments of the peasant movement in Hunan listed by Mao Tse-tung in 1927 was their eradication of such penalties as drowning and burying alive.

But one legal principle Confucian society did insist on, and that was that no crime should go unpunished. The guilty would be punished if he were available, but otherwise his son or brother or neighbor or the next most responsible person. There were thus cases of unsolved crimes but no unpunished crimes, a state of affairs the Chinese considered satisfactory on both practical and metaphysical grounds — it discouraged further crime, and it maintained the cosmic harmony of the universe. Such group responsibility may not be so unfair as it might appear to a western jurist. In a closed society, it is unlikely that the theft of a sewing machine in a barrio, let us say, could be accomplished in complete secrecy, and those who shared the secret might well divulge it before accepting punishment in the thief's stead — or might even prevent him from doing it in the first place.

So, too, in the People's Republic, the principle of group responsibility is an accepted norm. Not only is no man an island, he is never even alone. State proclamations constantly refer to the group, unit, team or organization to which the individual citizen is responsible. A 1957 law, for example, established corrective reform through manual labor for vagrants and idlers. These are categories that would be difficult to establish by due process, but they are probably easy to establish among comrades. It is also noteworthy that this law specifically states that no criminal liability is incurred in its application — that is, the penalties are applied to persons who have been convicted of no crime.

Both Confucianism and Communism speak more in terms of ethics and morality than of law and civil rights. Those of us who are neither Marxists nor revolutionaries are inclined to listen with smug bemusement as Communist converts describe their position as a strict science untouched by any emotion or sentiment. For, although they cherish

the concept of that pure economic determinism that has won them the sobriquet of "godless materialists," in actual fact, Marxists must rank among the most idealistic people in the world. They writhe with the agony of other men, and they speak of laying down their lives for a cause that will not benefit them personally. From Founding Father Marx himself to his humblest disciple at a barrio teach-in, their voices tremble as they anathematize the man-distorting greed and brutalizing oppressiveness of their opponents. Just so, the sort of criticisms and self-criticisms which were welcome alike to Censors of the old Imperial Court and planners of the Hundred Flowers experiment in the People's Republic were precisely those which identified moral shortcomings like greed or arrogance which might pervert social order or circumvent national goals.

And more than moralistic, Communists and Confucianists are downright puritanical. Hot-hearted revolutionaries are constantly decrying the decadence, depravity and lewdness of the society they seek to replace, while the Chinese themselves have long had a reputation for primness and a reluctance to display the human body naked. They have their share of green jokes, of course, and have produced passable pornography — but the former have always been considered fit for the lips of rickshaw-pullers, boatmen and village toughs, while the latter has been the favorite explanation by dynastic chroniclers for the downfall of the preceding dynasty. I have been told that the budding cordiality between the People's Republic and Castro's Cuba was nipped off soon after Cuban representatives appeared in the streets of Peking unshaved and rumpled, and pinching the behinds of their female Chinese comrades. And just last week I heard that during the recent Philippine trade mission to China, a Filipino delegate asked an interpreter one evening about the possibility of procuring some chicks, inspiring a confused conversation about the bureau in charge of poultry.

In both ancient and modern China, then, the proper ordering of society was based not on rights and duties before the law, but on social responsibility and human relationships. Of course, the relationships themselves were very different then from now. Confucian China had a neat listing of five — those between man and wife, between parent and child, between elder and younger, between governor and governed and between friend and friend. In socialist China, on the other hand, the relationships are such as those between comrade and comrades, man and his neighbor, or a person and the people. But there is also one relationship — or "contradiction," as Mao Tse-tung calls it

in a famous essay on the subject — which has an especially Confucian ring — that between leader and led. For the Communist leader at every level of Chinese society today is expected to set the example for his followers by his own conduct. As any student of Confucius knows, the Master said that man is by nature good and that he needs only a good example to be led into right conduct, and to be corrected when he is wrong, not punished. That 1957 law about reform through manual labor is intended for application to those who obstinately and repeatedly turn a deaf ear to the good advice offered them. And they include not only vagrants, idlers and the lazy, but those who are uncooperative or unproductive of the total goals of society, or who refuse to go where they can best contribute to the construction not only of a new society but of a new environment.

I think Confucius would have liked that law. For Confucius held that human morality affected not only man's immediate environment but the entire cosmos of which he was but a small part.

When I first started studying the Chinese Classics, I was rather swept off my feet by Confucian philosophy. But that concept of universal harmony as being locked in with human behaviour was always a stumbling block to me. Even the two elementary essays, the *Ta Hsueh* and the *Chung Yung* — the Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean — presuppose a chain of cause and effect that runs to such sequences as

- If a man cultivates himself, his household will be well ordered;
- If households are well ordered, proper human relationships will be observed;
- If proper human relationships are observed, the state will be well governed;
- If the state is well governed, the nation will be at peace;
- If the nation is at peace, universal harmony will be established;
- If universal harmony is established, Heaven will be pleased.

Now, Heaven's way of showing its displeasure is by sending down plagues of locusts, famines or floods. It therefore follows that if Heaven is pleased, there will be no plagues of locusts, famines or floods. Yet even the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company knows that earthquake, fire and flood are all acts of God, not the results of human immorality. Or at least so I thought 25 years ago. But now I am not so sure. Plagues of locusts are evidently no longer acts of God: they are now caused by birdless summers brought on by man's dumping too much DDT into his eco-environment in the hope of gain. Accidents don't

happen any more, they are caused — especially if they involve fire insurance — and even earthquakes are nowadays set off by profit-motivated men pumping out natural reservoirs of oil.

And who does not remember that series of disastrous floods right here in the Philippines three years ago, and the impassioned speculation on the causes? Some thought they were caused by a greedy person who stole an image from a church, others, that they were caused by a greedy corporation that cut all the trees off the Gran Cordillera Central, and still others that they were caused by a greedy nation seeding clouds in order to oppress the people of Vietnam. So it seems that nothing but the eruption of volcanos is left to the will of God alone. Or can we expect to wake up tomorrow morning and read that volcanologists have just discovered that Lake Taal is heating up again because of human greed?

In short, was Confucius right after all in thinking that human immorality is one of the cosmic forces of the universe? Or, to put it another way, is it possible that we live in a godless universe controlled by man's insatiable appetites which are progressively untuning all harmony out of the natural world around us?

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