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contents

DIPLOMACY IN EAST ASIA: AN EXPRESSION OF GENERAL WORLD VIEWS

by

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Diplomacy always reflects underlying philosophical concepts of different theories of government and of international relations. In order to understand the diplomatic history of East Asia, one must understand the prevailing world views of the major powers involved. It seems to me that in the modern period, say 1600 to the present, it is possible to discern a number of perceptions which are responsible for the shaping of the history of East Asia.

The oldest of these is the world view embodied in the traditional Confucian system of international relations as practiced by the Chinese. This diplomacy of cultural imperialism was expressed in the Chinese tributary system. Its fundamental premise was that of an ethnocentric Chinese view of the world, in which China was indeed the sole source of civilization and culture, a view which currently corresponded to historical reality for all of the many centuries from the Ch'in unification to the Manchu dynasty. In this view, China was perceived to exercise a civilizing mission for a vast segment of the world on the basis of her actual power and cultural splendor. That same ethnocentric view was again put forward today, when the leadership of the People's Republic advanced its claim that only the Maoist example of revolution, based on the peasant masses, can bring about the ultimate victory of Socialism in all the underdeveloped areas of the world, be they in Asia, Africa or Latin America. [1]

China's traditional diplomacy of cultural imperialism, reflecting the ideas of Confucius and his great disciples, expressed a view of the world based upon the concept of a pre-ordained natural order in which all things were arranged in a hierarchical fashion. Confucius himself had stated that all society was governed by the classic five fundamental relationships between superior and inferior, namely those between a man and his wife, father and son, elder brother and younger brother, friend and friend, and sovereign and minister. All of these rested upon the key notion of inequality, which was an inherent fact of nature, and indeed was a necessary one lest society would be plunged into disorder and confusion. The maintenance of such inequality, and hence of order and stability, depended upon following the rules of proper procedure or etiquette, *li*. Since there existed only one world order, there logically could exist only one world empire; and since the central portion of the globe was occupied by China – the Middle Kingdom – all men beyond its bounds were considered to be more or less barbarian, lacking culture by not understanding the rules of *li* or proper conduct. If men wanted to be civilized, it was assumed that they would naturally abide by the rules of proper conduct, causing them to emulate the Chinese and to be influenced by Chinese civilization.

The central assumption of Chinese cultural imperialism was then the belief that China was the center of the universe, the fountainhead of all virtue and the possessor of all culture to which inferior nations would look naturally for inspiration and civilization through the adaptation of Chinese ideas and institutions. Chinese influence, one would argue, would flow naturally from the core outward to the barbarian fringes, and China would control the world not by a series of wars of conquest but by the example of her superiority. These basic philosophic assumptions eventually were translated into a diplomatic system, that of the tributary missions. In this system, the payment of tribute by an inferior nation to the Son of Heaven was a ritual performance, in return for which the Chinese government bestowed a series of privileges and boons upon the inferior. Symbolically, this was expressed most importantly by the inferior nation's acceptance of the Chinese calendar and a seal of investiture. In addition, the tributary system also included a very effective carrot, an economic incentive, a form of hidden trade, whereby the Chinese returned presents, after the tribute had been paid, whose value far exceeded that of the tribute offered.

In periods of great Chinese strength, the Manchu empire of the seventeenth century for example, the tributary system embraced a very wide area of the East Asian world, including Korea, the Li-ch'iu islands, Annam, Laos, Siam, Burma and portions of Northwest Asia. When the system was working well, it gave China peace and security along her borders, providing a system of national defense.

This Confucian world view came to be pitted eventually against the views of the European maritime trading powers, whose interests were in trade and the spread of their national power, especially that of Great Britain who clearly occupied a position of preeminence. Before the English, there had been Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch sea barbarians, but it was the Anglo-Chinese confrontation in

the 19th century which best illustrated the clash of two fundamentally opposed world views.

British considerations for her overseas trade and markets were augmented, after Waterloo, by her government's insistence on being recognized for what she was, the greatest global power of the century, and the very embodiment of the newly risen forces of the Industrial Revolution. The resultant clash between the Chinese and the English, with their two totally different perceptions of the world, ushered in a period of revolution for the Chinese which has lasted until the very recent past. The result was the complete collapse of the old order, and a period of chaos and anarchy eventually terminating in the victory of Chinese communism. The history of this conflict is part of the well known story of the Canton system, the ensuing Anglo-Chinese wars (the "opium war", so-called, and the "Arrow" war), and the imposition of unequal treaties by the victorious Western powers, Britain always in the lead, upon the unfortunate Chinese.

It is important to remember that, until the very last decade of the 19th century, the European policies toward China remained satisfied with China's acknowledgement of Western superiority and, above all, with the right, proclaimed divine by Manchester liberals, to trade freely everywhere. In other words, within the concept of a diplomacy of trade and national power, there were no attempts at territorial acquisition by any of the major nations, excepting areas at the fringes of the Chinese empire which had formerly belonged to the Chinese tributary system such as Burma. Until 1895, all powers operated under the diplomatic assumptions characterized by the slogan: "to trade, but not to govern."[2]

The year China suffered a most degrading defeat by Japan, 1895, marked the beginning of a totally new era, that of the diplomacy of imperialism.

Imperialism may be defined as a system of political and economic control by which one state imposes its will upon another, a process which may lead to the establishment of a protectorate, and, eventually, to the dismemberment of the victim. As there are many forms of imperialism, so too, there have been many theories explaining it. Certainly one of the foremost of these is the Marxist theory of imperialism, propounded by no less a figure than Lenin himself, and such Marxist scholars as Hobson. Here, it is argued that imperialism is the necessary last stage of capitalism searching for overseas markets for its products and abundant supplies of cheap labor. Critics of the Marxist approach must include Schumpeter, in his brilliant study "Marxism, Socialism and Democracy."

Another approach to imperialism might be called the bourgeois-liberal one. Here, the phenomenon is seen as primarily a political one, a question of power, prestige and, sometimes, of a civilizing mission. The imperialism of Great Britain under Disraeli, or the French missionary impulse in North Africa and Indochina would fall into this category. Kipling, proclaiming the white man's burden and talking about the lesser breeds before the law, remains as the great popularizer of

such sentiments. Social Darwinism, too, many have been an important influence in the shaping of Imperialism.

Some recent writers have declared imperialism to be some form of social atavism, or yet again, have looked upon it as a necessary safety valve for domestic politics. Bismarck's actions, for example, have served to **illustrate** the thesis that he chose imperialist policies as a way which would release social and psychological pressures in Germany's domestic situation.[3]

Be that as it may, in East Asia, imperialism and its diplomacy threatened to do to China after 1895 what had been done to Africa in the preceding decades, that is to create a map resembling a crazy quiltwork pattern in which varying color denoted areas of different foreign domination. In the "scramble for concessions," or the "cutting of the Chinese melon," imperialist thinking of such diversified powers as the Germans, the Russians, the British, the French, the Japanese and, eventually, the Italians, dominated all diplomatic moves in East Asia.

One good example, among many, may serve to illustrate this point. It deals with the German interest in China, which eventually produced the Triple Intervention against Japan in April, 1895. As I have shown elsewhere,[4] it was originally believed that the prime mover in the Triplice was the Russian state, but, in fact, it was the German desire to obtain for herself an Asiatic base for her Far Eastern squadron which led to this development. Germany had attempted to mediate between China and Japan during the course of the hostilities, with the aim of getting a reward for her services; and, after surveying a series of alternative courses, the German government had concluded that if it were to act on behalf of China, it stood a better chance of being rewarded with the long sought after naval base. When Japan refused to consider German mediation, the Germans intervened over the Liaotung issue, suggesting to the Russian government a diplomatic intervention which the latter was only too happy to support, given its interest in Southern Manchuria with its warm water ports. The French joined in the Triplice as the result of the Franco-Russian alliance, illustrating, thereby, how great power politics on a global scale had now come to permeate East Asian affairs. The Triple Intervention, thus, serves as a fine example of the diplomacy of imperialism, by which China eventually became the real loser, and by which Japanese thinking, in the new ideology of Nipponism, was influenced in its belief that the only thing that really mattered was a powerful armed establishment serving the needs of militant expansionism.

The diplomacy of imperialism may be said to have been the basic framework on which diplomatic events took place from the days of the Triple Intervention to World War I; but, then, new ideologies began to emerge, first in China and later in Japan, which provided a new outlook on international affairs and shaped a different world. These were the ideologies of nationalism, first observed in China at the time of the Versailles settlement.

To define nationalism is in itself not an easy task. Carleton Hayes in his

"Essays on Nationalism" defined it as an intellectual development, an ideological fact, a condition of the mind. Nationalism, having roots which go back to the European middle ages, is, however, essentially a modern phenomenon and term, a by-product of the French revolution. The concept of a French nation, powerfully stimulated by the *levee' en masse,* and Napoleon's European warfare with its reaction by other European nations against French control, are the immediate ancestors of modern nationalism. The concept is based upon the idea of nationality, wherein there exists a group of people sharing a common language, history and culture, and nationalism may be defined as the process by which these nationalities are established as political units, together with the intensification of their consciousness of nationality and the rise of the political philosophy of the national state. Or, to use a somewhat different terminology, nationalism is a condition of the mind among members of a nationality in which loyalty to the ideal or fact of the national state is superior to all other loyalties, together with price and belief in its intrinsic excellence and mission.

Nationalism, then, is different from Imperialism, which had been the philosophy characterizing the conduct of diplomacy in East Asia before 1918. Nationalism believes that each nation must constitute a united, independent and sovereign state, and that it expects and requires of its citizens unquestioned obedience and supreme loyalty. Finally, there is in nationalism also the idea of an unmistakable faith in each nation's surpassing excellence over all other nationalities and pride in its unique destiny. Unlike the traditional Confucian world empire, it poses a doctrine at once more narrow and more intense. Its ingredients include geographical unity, racial unity, separate language, religion and tradition and contact with the past.

China's successful nationalist revolution, based upon the principles of Sun Yat-sen and his Kuomintang, soon produced a nationalist form of diplomacy, the "rights recovery" movement, which was directed against foreign Imperialism, whether British, French, Russian or Japanese. Demanding and obtaining, for the greater part, the abolition of the unequal treaties, it also led to clashes in Manchuria and, thus, to a collision course with the nationalism of Japan, and, sharper yet, the ultranationalist conception of the Japanese extremists in the armed forces which culminated, after a series of previous incidents such as the one at Tsinan, the blowing up of Marshall Chiang Tso-lin, and the Nakamura case, in the famous Mukden incident of September 1931.

In Manchuria, the Chinese nationalist diplomacy, which had begun to make moves such as the building of new ports (Hulutao) or the construction of new railroad lines in competition with the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian railroad, squarely came up against the most virulent form of nationalist diplomacy, that of ultranationalism.

This movement, ultranationalism, combined the concept of a militant, aggressive nationalism abroad with program of a radical Social Revolution at home. Its

ideological proponents were writers such as Kita Ikki, Okawa Shumei and Gondo. Its most fervent disciples came from the ranks of the "young officers" in the Japanese military. It was these military extremists who engineered the Manchurian incident, who kept up unrelenting pressure – politically, economically and territorially – against the Chinese Nationalist government in north China and who incited the Marco Polo incident of July 1937 and the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese war, a wearisome and unprofitable struggle.

Japan's inability to settle the China incident (since she was never free to launch all her manpower and resources against the Chungking government because of the formidable shadow of renewed Soviet power to the North) also led the Japanese government into a series of major diplomatic blunders. Matsuoka, then Japan's Foreign Minister, and no enemy to ultranationalism since he himself was the product of the Japanese regime within Manchukuo, led Japan in her opposition to the West. He initiated the conclusion of the Tripartite pact of 1940, a pact which had grown out of some earlier agreements with the Axis (the Anti-comintern pact of 1936 f.i.); thus, aligning Japan with Germany and Italy.

Japan's attempt to convey Hitlerite Germany and Facist Italy into ideologically suitable partners merely demonstrated the egocentricity of the aims which bound the three nations together. To serve their own interests, the Germans for instance, were quite willing to ignore Japan's animosity to the Soviet Union and to enter into a truce with the latter. So much so that when Nazi Germany, by 1938 and 1939, changed its policies to face the West and to settle the Polish problem, a change which resulted in the German-Russian non-aggression pact, Japan was never informed. The Japanese, likewise, were quite willing to sacrifice important German interests in China which conflicted with Japan's aim to totally dominate China. When Germany in 1940, pressed Japan to take the initiative against Britain by attacking Singapore, and recommended, in 1941, an attack against the Soviets in the Far East, the Japanese demurred. However, the worst mistake of Matsuoka's policy, that of ultranationalism, was the failure of the Tripartite Pact to deter the United States in its growing opposition to Japan's continental expansion. As a result of her alliance to the Axis powers, Japan merely alienated American opinion, in Congress, the press and the public, which, in turn, led to America's unyielding insistence, in the fall of the 1941 Hull-Konoye negotiations, that Japan would have to abandon all of her ill-gotten gains in China before the American economic embargo (July 1941) could be lifted.

In like manner, the Soviet-Japanese Non-aggression pact of April 1941, ultimately led to disaster for Japan and ultranationalism. It gave Stalin the badly needed freedom of facing the German onslaught with a secure rear. However, it did not deny the Soviet Union the opportunity, of which she made free use in August, 1945, of attacking Japan when she was ready to do so. Ultranationalism had then resulted in a diplomacy leading to the fatal decision by Japan to enter World War II, a direct consequence to the use of the first atomic weapons, and to her crashing defeat.

The end of the second World War in East Asia reduced Japan to a state of helplessness, and China to a nation torn by civil war, and beset by economic chaos. Ironically, nowhere else on the globe had the polarization of power become more obvious than in East Asia, with the emergence of two superpowers, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., after 1945. At the Yalta conference, early that year, a clear attempt was made to maintain a balance of power between these two, in which a newly defined role assigned Russia control over Manchuria (a fact of life which could not have been prevented by the Allies in any case,) and the United States the undisputed control over the whole of Japan and half of Korea.[6]

The spectacular rise of the Soviet Union into a formidable power, not only in East Asia but in all areas of the Eurasian continent adjacent to her boundaries whether in Europe with pressure upon Greece and Turkey or in Iran in the Near East, led the United States to formulate, out of feelings of frustration and a powerful fear of Soviet expansion, the famous containment policy first posited by Kennan, a policy originally applicable only in European conditions, and then embodied in the Truman doctrine. With this doctrine was the onset of the Cold War and its diplomacy. The Russians forced no crisis in Japan, nor in South Korea, and both powers carefully abstained from taking any position of confrontation on the issue of the Chinese civil war.

By 1950, the diplomatic situation in East Asia had begun to change. On the one hand, there had emerged a newly unified China, an active ally of the Soviet Union while on the other, there was Japan, which had been built up, to be an active agent of the United States.

In June of that year, the invasion of South Korea was launched by North Korean forces, well equipped with Russian military material and advised by Soviet military advisors. The Korean invasion most likely was designed to test the United States, to check the growth of American power and to redress what in Russian eyes seemed a loss in the balance of power which resulted from the crumbling of the Yalta equilibrium and the Russian loss of Manchuria which was taken over by the Chinese Communists. To the United States, this invasion was a direct challenge, and South Korea speedily became a symbol of Western strength and determination in this contest between the two superpowers. The Americans argued that to abandon that unfortunate country would indicate to the world at large the American lack of will and confidence. At the same time, the Americans also began to plan a war which eventually saw UN forces going beyond the original line of division of the Korean peninsula, pushing deep into North Korea all the way to the Yalu river into a Soviet zone of global strategy, thus presenting a real threat to the Soviet Union. In addition to this, the United States interposed its Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland providing a powerful shield for the Island, in violation of the Yalta agreement that Taiwan would go to China. More fateful in the long run was the United States involvement, after 1950, in Vietnam where the French were being hard pressed by a nationalist Communist movement.

The immediate result of the Korean invasion meant the end of the Yalta

system, a diplomacy based upon the concept of the balance between two superpowers, and led the United States to a line of thinking which argued that Communism's global challenge (of a monolithic nature given to Moscow-Peking axis) would have to be met everywhere. The result was not only a revitalization of Japan, but also a much more vigorous American policy in the whole of Asia, especially in Southeast Asia. Despite these developments, however, both superpowers in the cold war year, carefully managed to avoid a global confrontation which might have led to an atomic war.

The last twenty-five years or so to the present (1976) was a period in which East Asian diplomacy ceased to be dominated by the will and actions of the superpowers and during which, gradually at first and then more rapidly, East Asian nations and their conceptions of the world again began to occupy the fore-front of the stage. This was evidenced by the emergence of the People's Republic to full power and its formulation of a special Maoist Chinese type of diplomatic thought. Japan, at this time too, was beginning to occupy a more powerful position in the Far East, at first with its incredible economic performance, and, lately, with its growing political power. Thus, East Asia today is an area of multi-polarity, in which there exists a finely honed relationship between four powers, the P.R.C, the U.S.S.R., Japan and the United States. One may argue with the proposition that such a situation makes for greater stability; one cannot argue, however, with the clear evidence that both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are today much less effective in East Asia than before 1950. The U.S. met its doom in the vain attempt to stem Maoist diplomacy in Vietnam, while the U.S.S.R. shared a similar fate in its relations with Peking and later with Japan.[7]

The United States looked upon the diplomacy of a Maoist China as one which combined many aspects of the past, notably the belief in Chinese superiority and ethnocentrism with an active call for world revolution which was to be accomplished by the mobilization of the rural, not the industrial, proletriat. The rural proletariat was to serve as the vanguard of revolution in all of the underdeveloped areas of the globe. In this global struggle, where the "the city and the countryside" will be pitted against each other, wars of national liberation would take place, expelling once and for all Western imperialism and influence. To Americans who oppose this ideological view, it seemed that the United States must rise to combat this form of Asian communism, by becoming the standard bearer of Western values and ideas. In this sense, in East Asia as well as Southeast Asia, diplomacy will cease to be a realistic and pragmatic means of conducting international business, but instead will be carried out with moralistic and ideological fervor.

It had not always been that way. In the days of Franklin Roosevelt, American thinking had always been opposed to colonialism, especially that of the French. However, by the time of Truman, the world had seemingly changed. A monolithic bloc of aggressive communisms organized challenges against the West on all fronts (in Iran, Turkey, Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia), and a policy of containment seemed necessary. Unfortunately, America's first serious response to this development had been Dean Acheson's argument that anti-communism was

more important than anti-colonialism and support to nationalist communism (it had not always been this way, i.e. American support given to Sukarno against the Dutch).

American aid to the French in Vietnam proved useless. The Geneva Conference following France's defeat, seemed to many, above all to Dulles, but a step toward the unification of all Vietnam under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh and the Communist, since it provided for the promise of elections which Ho was bound to win. This brought about the American support for a separate nationhood for the South, and assistance given to Diem who was, admittedly, a poor choice. By 1960 the Kennedy administration had begun to look upon Vietnam as a country which justified unlimited American involvement because it would demonstrate that a war of national liberation could be defeated with the use of new means and new techniques, i.e., the lavish use of helicopters and the green berets. Since what was about to take place in Vietnam could also take place in Bolivia or Tanzania, a military situation which may be a precedent for similar incidents all over the world, Washington followed the recommendations of Maxwell Taylor and increased its participation. The sequel to this American decision – the rapid expansion of the war and its Americanization by Johnson, the extension of the conflict by Nixon into Laos and Cambodia and the final, and rather humiliating, American withdrawal – are only too well remembered parts of a sordid story.

By 1972, American diplomacy had learned its lesson, and was ready to return to a more pragmatic and realistic approach, resulting to the Nixon visit to China that year and a willingness to recognize, and make use of Chinese power. This move together with the pragmatism and realism of Chou En-lai, in turn caused the creation of a triangular power relationship between Moscow, Peking and Washington.

The Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-American detente finally permitted a more powerful Japan to emerge, as a vital, although not equal, component. Prime Minister Tanaka's visit to Peking (September 1972) resulted in a very definite rapprochement between Japan and the People's Republic, making possible progress toward a satisfactory Sino-Japanese peace treaty. On the other hand, Japanese relations with the Soviet Union encountered new obstacles. The Russians proved wary of a large scale Japanese involvement in the Siberian oil exploitation, while remaining adamantly opposed to the restoration to Japan of the "northern territories", the southernmost Kurile Islands. Gromyko's recent visit to Tokyo (January 1976) further added to Japan's frustration over these issues, and confirmed her distrust of Russian motives. This strain in the Soviet-Japanese relations stimulated, on the other hand, an even closer and more effective mutual defense tie between Japan and China.

What appears to have taken place, at present, is that East Asian diplomacy is again conducted primarily by the Japanese and the Chinese, rather than the Russians and the Americans. Such an arrangement is probably more feasible.

FOOTNOTES

[1]For an excellent presentation of the Confucian world view see: Fairbank, J.K. ed. *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. Other good accounts include Fairbank, J.K. *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast, 1842-1854.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953; and for present ideology based on the past Mancall, Marc "The Persistence of Tradition in Chinese Foreign Policy", in Joseph Levenson, ed., *Modern China, an Interpretative Anthology,* London: MacMillan, 1971.

[2]See Wakeman, Frederic "The Opening of China", in Joseph Levenson, ed., *Modern China, an Interpretative Anthology,* London: MacMillan, 1971.

[3]Among the many excellent studies of imperialism the following are especially recommended. Fieldhouse, D.K. *The Colonial Empires from the Eighteenth Century,* New York:Dell, 1965; Golfwitzer, Heinz, *Europe in the Age of Imperialism 1880-1914,* London: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969; Robinson, R. and Gallagher, J. *Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism,* Garden City, N.Y.. Doubleday, 1961: Semmel, Bernard *Imperialism and Social Reform, English Social and Imperial Thought,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960; and Wehler, H.U. *Bismarck un der Imperialismus,* Cologne: Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1959.

[4]See my article: "The Triple Intervation: Japan's Lesson in the Diplomacy of Imperialism", Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. XXII, No. 1, p. 122-130.

[5]On Nationalism see Carleton Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism,* New York: MacMillan, 1926 and *The Historical Evolution of Nationalism,* New York: MacMillan, 1931, as well as Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism,* New York: MacMillan, 1944. On Japanese ultranationalism see George Wilson, *Radical Nationalist in Japan, Kita Ikki,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969. Robert Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of the War,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, and S.M. Ogata, *Defiance in Manchuria, the Making of Japanese Foreign Policy,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964. Very useful also are Y. Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, and Akira Iriye, *Across the Pacific,* New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967, and his *After Imperialism,* New York: Atheneum, 1969.

[6]On the cold war in East Asia see especially Akira Iriye, *The Cold War in Asia,* Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1974.

[7]For the diplomacy of the People's Republic of China see Harold Hinton, *Communist China and World Politics,* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966; and also W. Chai, *The Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China,* New York: Putnams, 1972, as well as K.C. Chen, The Foreign Policy of China, *Roseland, N.J.: Seton Hall University Press, 1972.*

Contemporary Existentialism and the Concept of Naturalness in Taoism and Ch'an(Zen) *

by

Robert K. Lin

Introduction

Eminent historian-philosopher, Arnold Toynbee, after a most sweeping critical survey of human records, lists Laotse and Gautama Buddha, along with only a few others, as the world's greatest benefactors to mankind since the dawn of civilization.[1] This extremely small number of people were instrumental in shaping mankind's thought and behavior for centuries and responsible in making the human society as it is today. Laotse and Buddha, respectively, represent the two most influential philosophical systems in Asia: Taoism and Buddhism. Though arising from completely different social and cultural settings, Taoism and Buddhism (especially as expounded in its Ch'an Sect) share many common views. The affinity between Taoism and Ch'an (Buddhism) is so striking and close that questions have often been asked as to whether Ch'an(Zen) is the higher form of Gautama Buddha's true teachings or it is purely evolved out of Chinese Taoist tradition. Scholars differ sharply over this matter, and it probably will never be settled to the satisfaction of all.

*Ch'an(Zen) is used here to mean Ch'an(Zen) Buddhism exclusively throughout this paper; and Taoism is used here to mean philosophical Taoism.

Both Taoism and Ch'an Buddhism see man's salvation in *wu-wei* (i.e. non-action),[2] advocating the doctrine of returning man to his original naturalness (self-so-ness). Both are mainly a way of life, rejecting philosophising. It is believed that conceptual thinking is putting a barrier between oneself and Tao (Ultimate Reality). They both reject verbal teaching and distrust logic. Often the Taoist and Ch'an ideas are so similar that it is hard, if not impossible, to tell which is which. For example, even the doctrine of sudden enlightenment (*tun-we*, in Chinese) had already been formed during the period of Disunity (c. the 4th and 5th centuries).[3] Professor Hu Shih concurs that it was Tao-sheng who first taught the idea of sudden enlightenment.[4] Arthur Wright agrees with Demievilles that:

> (Ch'an Buddhism) was a peculiarly Chinese reaction against the prolixity of Buddhist writings, their attenuated chain reasoning and their scholastic rigor of demonstration.[5]

It is no surprise that Humpreys declares that Taoism is the Godfather of Ch'an-(Zen).[5]

On the other hand, however, the Japanese view tends to consider Ch'an(Zen) to be rather a return to Gautama Buddha's authentic teachings. For example, Suzuki sees the Ch'an movement in the light that the Sixth Patriach, Hui-neng, and other Chinese Ch'an masters merely revived the enlightenment experience,[7] though he also writes:

> Zen (Ch'an) is really a great revolutionary movement in the world history of thought. It originated in China, and, in my opinion, could not arise anywhere else."[8] and,
> Zen (Ch'an) movement is a logical Chinese response to the over-speculative and over-otherwordly system which is so alien to Chinese tradition.[9]

As for the doctrine of sudden enlightenment, Suzuki asserts that it is also the very essence of Buddha's teachings.[10] Alan Watts sees in Vimalakirti Sutra, one of the earliest sutras translated into Chinese, the first clear and unequivocal exponent of the doctrine of sudden enlightenment, though he admits that Tao-sheng, and other Chinese masters could also have been tributaries to the stream of Ch'an-(Zen).[11] Vimalakirti Sutra accords well with indigenous Taoist (and Confucian idealistic wing) belief that human nature is originally good. This sutra also shares the distinct Chinese (both Taoist and Confucian) this-wordly outlook.[12] Vimala-kirti says:

> "Perfect awakening (salvation) is consistent with the affairs of everyday life."[13]

This same view is also expressed in another important Buddhist canon, Lanka Sutra.

> "Nirvana is not to be found in contradiction to birth-and-death or Samsara. . . it is to be found where there is the identity of Nirvana and Samsara."[14]

In these sutras, dualism between here and thereafter, this world and other world, is denied. All these similarities and parallels only serve to add fuel to the contro-

versy over the origins of Ch'an. Prof. Ames seems to take a more neutral stand, though leaning toward the Japanese view:

> "Zen(Ch'an) in China was more a slow-won recovery of essential Buddhism than a departure from it. But Chinese soil of Confucianism and Taoist naturalism help and spur this development."[15]

From the brief survey above, it is rather clear that as far as origins of Ch'an is concerned, the case can be made either way. But at least we can say that many important ideas shared by Taoism and Ch'an were independently developed. However, as to the development of Taoism and Ch'an after the initial stage, it was never quite independent of each other. On the contrary, these two systems of ideas were intertwined to a considerable extent after their contact around the first century A.D. There were numerous borrowings and corresponding influence between Chinese secular literati (often Taoists) and the Buddhist monks; "pamphlets were passed about, formal debates held, new views adumbrated, or old views maintained or refurbished."[16] This partly explains the increasing affinity between Taoism and Ch'an in later years.

For example, the Ultimate Reality, i.e. Tao in Taoism, is all phenomena knit together and regarded as a seamless web of interacting forces both visible and invisible, and interwoven with this is the idea of ceaseless flux.[17] This notion of Tao is close to that of Suchness or Buddha-nature (i.e. Tathata in Sanskrit) in Buddhism.[18] Taoist view of the Ultimate Reality, Tao, is compatible with the Buddhist view of Reality as impermanance or emptiness; therefore, it is no surprise that Tao is used by Chinese Buddhists as a synonym for Voidness, Suchness or Buddha-nature.[19] Accordingly, both Taoism and Ch'an see a Unity Behind all the diversities, and view man as a part of this organic whole of the Reality and recognize the inter-relatedness of all things. This outlook of Oneness more than any other thing, sets Far Eastern mind apart from the Judeo-Christian tradition which is among others anthropocentric and considers Nature as an alien, hostile being to be conquered and exploited. Taoism is to a great extent closely identified with primitivism in that individual man and society will fare better if they return to a state of primitive simplicity, with a minimum of differentiation, of intellection, of purposive activity.[20] And only then, it believes, can man act spontaneuosly and naturally. Ch'an(Zen) ever since the Sixth Patriarch, Hui-neng, has continued to be concerned with the same naturalness.[21] All these seem to indicate that naturalness (self-so-ness or *tse-jan* in Chinese) is probably the most important concept in both Taoism and Ch'an(Zen) Buddhism, and hence the subject of the investigation of this paper.

The Concept of Naturalness in Taoism and Ch'an(Zen)

First of all, to be natural is to forsake conventional accumulative knowledge, which is not only regarded as artificiality but also a human bondage. This knowledge only serves to complicate things and multiply human miseries. Rejecting

knowledge, both Taoism and Ch'an(Zen) hold that Truth or enlightenment comes only by intuition rather than intellection. Both distrust the cerebral-intellectual values and powers, on the one hand, and emphasize the visceral-intuitive apprehension of Truth by direct experience, on the other.[22] For Reason gives a false picture of the world and is unable to understand life, making people believe the imperfect image of the world reflected by the intellect to be the Absolute Truth.[23]

It is an almost universal assumption of Western philosophy (and most Asian philosophy as well) that the solution to the great problems of human existence can be arrived at if we carry our rationality far enough, if we try hard enough and make sense of existence, uncover its intrinsic reasonableness; we have the illusion that we will escape if we can only make the system more subtle and complex.[24] Actually, to Taoists and Ch'an followers, human reasoning is faulty and philosophy itself is a disease. To attain enlightenment, the functioning of the totality of our psychic consciousness is required.

Anti-intellection finds ample expressions in Taoism and Ch'an. Laotse condemns conventional cleverness, and advises: "The Wise Man's policy, accordingly, will be to empty people's hearts and minds, to fill their bellies, weaken their ambition. . . to keep them uninformed."[25] He also says: "Abandon sageliness and discard wisdom (knowledge); then the people will benefit a hundredfold."[26] It should be pointed out, however, that Laotse's idea is not to reduce the human mind to a moronic vacuity, but to bring into play its innate and spontaneous intelligence by using it without forcing it. Making and studying books only serve to strangle and suppress the innate intelligence.

From a different perspective, Chuangtse warns: "Your life has a limit but knowledge has none. If you use what is limited to pursue what has no limit, you will be in danger. If you understand this and still strive for knowledge, you will be in danger for certain."[27] In Ch'an (Zen) anti-intellection is even more pronounced and drastic, and is occasionally carried to the extreme.

The Sixth Patriach, Hui-neng, probably the best known and revered figure in Ch'an sect, has been for centuries widely known as an illiterate from a barbarian region in south China.[28] The fact that Hui-neng, an illiterate rice-pounder, was selected over the most learned monk, Shen-hsiu, as the Sixth Patriach clearly underscores and highly dramatizes the insignificance and irrelevance of conventional learning in achieving enlightenment, emancipation and happiness. The import of the fact that a barbarian or semi-barbarian has a potential as great as a most learned man to become enlightened can be better appreciated if viewed against the long revered tradition of learning in China, where learning and learned men had long been honored and awarded the highest place ever since Confucius' day, if not earlier.

Ch'an's anti-intellectualistic stand unequivocally expressed in one of its four

famous statements which characterize this school of thought: "Not to rely on words."[29] Appropriately, Ch'an is dubbed as a wordless sect of Buddhism. Huineng made light of all the ink in the universe and left no writings: "To write with all the ink in the universe. . . none of these can compare with a life of non-activity (*wu-wei*) and infinite love."[30] Non-activity (*wu-wei*) is the key concept in both Taoism and Ch'an and it is incompatible with accumulating knowledge and intellection. Understandably, eloquence and disputation are also discouraged. Laotse says: "Those who speak do not know; those who know do not speak."[31] Chuangtse has less paradoxical statement about the futility of disputation.[32] In the "wordless" Ch'an, which maintains that transmission of Truth is from mind to mind, the use of words is kept to a minimum.

When language is absolutely unavoidable, it is often used not as it means, as in *KOAN* cases, but what it does. For example, when a disciple asks his master, "What is Buddha?", the reply could be "Three pounds of flax.[33] This kind of seemingly illogical *koan* or *mondo* (question and answer) is primarily designed to jolt people out of the rut of conventional logic and faulty dualistic thinking pattern. As Alan Watts points out: "Zen (Ch'an) is above all a process of unlearning, of abandonment of ideology, of all fixed forms of thought and feeling, whereby the mind tries to grasp its own life."[34]

What concerns Taoism and Ch'an is not the dualistic, relative, analytic knowledge, but the innate prajna-intuition (or Buddha-nature in Ch'an terms) which is believed to be originally existent in every sentiment. Since it lies inside oneself, he does not seek it outside; "By directly pointing into the mind one gains sudden enlightenment." Ch'an offers a way that is direct and immediate. Truth must be seized with bare hands, with no gloves on.[35] Broadly speaking, Ch'an masters despise those who indulge in word - or idea-mongering,[36] which only serves to trap life in a metaphysical net. In Taoism and Ch'an, there is a strong preference for living life rather than talking about it. This tenet is best expressed in Kaplan's statements: "The wise man does not pursue wisdom but lives his life, and therein precisely does his wisdom lie."[37] Naturalness means, among other things unlearning; "truly to know is not to know".[38]

Secondly, to be natural is to follow Nature and to live in harmony with it. It is fundamental to Taoist and Ch'an (and the idealistic wing of Confucianism) belief that Nature is good and to be trusted. This concept, however, is quite alien to the Judeo-Christian beliefs and tradition. "Christianity, in absolute contrast to ancient paganism and Asia's religions . . . insisted that it is God's will that man exploits Nature for his proper ends."[39] Christianity sees the world consisting of two opposing forces, the human and the non-human, and holds that the non-human world is inferior to, and existent for, the human world. It fails to recognize "the unity of life in all its forms".[40]

Taoism and Ch'an had long taken an organic view of Nature (the Universe or the Reality) which rejects the human/non-human dichotomy. In Taoism, man is not the center of the world, but he is just a tiny part of the whole organic Nature.

He seeks not to dominate but to live in accord with the movement of Tao (naturalness) and keeps intimate touch with it.

Chinese people have been very much conscious of, and concerned with, myriad natural forces and sceneries; they have developed both a fear and respect for Nature, which is best manifested in their age-old belief in Feng-shui (literally, winds and waters).[41] Chinese paintings, being deeply influenced by Taoist outlook, predominantly feature scenes of majestic and mysterious 'mountains and waters', and man, if included in the painting at all, is often relegated to the side, enchanted and immersed in Nature. Such paintings strongly express the theme of the unity of man and nature in Taoism (and Ch'an).

Ch'an follows Mahayana Buddhism, denying the existence of an individual soul or self. It holds that each is a part of the Great Self which is the only Reality and which inter-connects all the things of the phenomenal world. The existence of the individual is merely an illusion: "We are one with Nature; and non-I are One. Our inner nature is an extension of the outer Nature."[42] The union of the nature within a man and the nature without is the aim of both Taoism and Ch'an.[43]

Nature is regarded as amoral. To follow nature means being willing to accept her support (food, etc.) and her cruelty (floods, etc.) as one. The Taoist accepts death, as he does life, as part of the natural process. Laotse counsels how to live out one's natural life, whereas Chuangtse regards death as part of the continuing transformation and equalizes death with life. Therefore, he found cause to celebrate the death of his wife by beating the drums. Ch'an, on the other hand, takes life calmly as it comes, transcending life and death, and thus offers a way to live without fear and naturally. In Ch'an, life, castles, and virtually everything else in the world are recognized as impermanent or empty; and its followers do not suffer from the craving to keep forever things which are essentially empty.[45]

In following Nature, we should desist from making ingenious devices to defy Nature, because such defiance will eventually, though having their short term effectiveness, backfire. For instance, medical science and the latest stunt of heart transplant which may prolong human life may also lead to over-population and increase conflicts and killings among men; other technologies ease the task of making a living, but pollute the human habitat.

As Toynbee observes, we have not increased happiness in 2000 years of 'progress'; the Palaeolithic hunter lacked all our present-day material amenities, but he was probably happier than we are.[46] The Tasadays, the recently discovered stone-aged tribe in the Philippines, offer a living testimony to Toynbee's observation. Their happy, peaceful, unharried life has nothing to do with any theories and inventions made by men in all fields in the past 2000 years in their ceaseless push for 'progress'.[47]

The fact that the happy existence of the stone-aged men contrasts sharply with the myriad ills and anxieties of modern men calls into question our age-old

notion of "progress". The paradox makes the greatest mockery of human intellect. As Paul Goodman points out.

> "There is now widespread conviction that beautiful advances in genetics, surgery, computers, rocketry, or atomic energy will surely only increase human woe."[48]

This painful lesson seems to confirm well the validity of the doctrine of following Nature and being natural.

Thirdly, to be natural is also to mean to have no-mind or no-thought (*wu-shin* or *wu-nien* in Chinese).[49] No-mind or no-thought does not mean the absence of consciousness, neither does it mean the numbness of mind. Rather it means a non-abiding mind (i.e. *wu-chu* in Chinese) – freedom from any form of attachment. It is like a mirror rejecting nothing, showing no preference and keeping nothing.[50]

> 'The perfect man employs his mind as a mirror. It refuses nothing. It receives, but does not keep".[50]

No-mind does not mean not to think of anything at all, nor complete expulsion of thought. No-mind means to "move with life without trying to arrest and interrupt its flow" and it is "an immediate awareness of things as they live and move, as distinct from the mere grasp of ideas and feelings about things which are the dead symbols of a living reality."[51] If life can be compared to a piece of symphony, no-mind means to hear the symphony as it is being played out and keep one's mind continuously in the same rhythm. Any attempt to analyze or dwell on certain notes would mean losing contact with reality.

No-mind is a state of wholeness in which the mind functions freely and easily, without the sensation of a second mind or ego standing over it with a club."[52] Naturalness cannot flourish until one can let one's mind alone so that it functions in the integrated and spontaneous way that is natural to it.

Fourthly, to be natural means to be, and to borrow a contemporary existentialist term, AUTHENTICALLY EXISTING. That is, one should exist as a true and whole human being, unfettered by unnatural restrictions or inhibitions of internal or external origin.

Lastly, to be natural means to be even not thinking of naturalness. This is the highest meaning of naturalness and the last stage to attain (or not to attain, according to Ch'an logic). The whole system of Ch'an disciplines is a series of attempts to be free from all forms of bondage.[53] If we set our minds on naturalness, then we will find ourselves clinging to the notion of naturalness and become naturalness-bound. This is not complete emancipation, non-attachment or naturalness. Total naturalness is total non-attachment and total freedom; the attempt to work on naturalness is a vicious circle -- we would be replacing one bondage with another.[54] The state of mind of a fully natural man with respect to naturalness can be described in Suzuki's words, "being unconsciously conscious".[55]

Since thought is father to action (or activity), no-mind *(wu-hsin)* is, therefore, the highest sense of Laotse's doctrine of non-action (non-activity, or *we-wei* in Chinese). In other words, naturalness is simply ordinary-mindedness or doing nothing we would be unnaturally conscious of. Naturalness lies in one's going about his daily routine business (i.e. self-activity in Marxian terms). In the final analysis, naturalness is nothing other than *we-wei:* doing nothing that is unnatural. This is what Dr. Hu-Shih means by "Ch'an is no Ch'am" and "the true practice of Ch'an is no practice at all;"[56] or what a Ch'an master would mean by "to attain is not to attain". This is also exactly what Watts means by "being a Buddha without intending to be a Buddha."[57] Naturalness is finally forgetting naturalness and we have come a full circle.

Naturalness in Taoism and Ch'an vis-a-vis Authentic Existence in Existentialism

The Taoism-Ch'an stance against intellection and conceptualization recalls the contemporary existentialist distrust of the intellect. Gradually and belatedly, the West has come to the realization that the power of reason and its resultant science and technology have their serious limits. As Ames observes:

> Americans believe in the pursuit of happiness. They have declared independence of gloom and doom. By and by through factory they have made a high standard of living, first for a few then for many, they have more and more machines, goods, services, time off. But not more happiness. Often they have less. They have more nerves, cancer, heart trouble.[58]

Reason and knowledge has not increased the happiness of mankind; on the contrary, it has endangered the habitat of man and human existence. The technologically advanced is only beginning to reap the ravages of subdued, conquered and ruthlessly exploited Nature.

Modern society with its extreme specialization only exacerbates the sense of separation and alienation among men. The contemporary existentialist movement represents a reaction to this alienation and rejects the supremacy of reason.[59] Existentialists declare that the mysteries of life cannot be fathomed or explained by rational thought.[60] Their chief spokesman, Sartre, takes a dim view of human intellect and speaks with Taoist-Ch'an ring. "Knowledge. . . is empty."[61]

Naturalness (self-so-ness) in Taoism and Ch'an has a close affinity with the doctrine of AUTHENTIC EXISTENCE as expounded by Heidegger, Sartre, and many others.[62] Martin Heidegger, after reading Suzuki's works on Ch'an, remarked: "If I understand this man correctly, this is what I have been trying to say in all my writings."[63] Doubtless, to some extent, Taoists and Ch'an followers can certainly be called existentialists. In contemporary existentialism, one should be free to choose, to decide and to act, since the individual is the final judge.[64]

In Ch'an history, the practice of appointing a Patriach was discontinued

with the death of the Sixth Patriach, Hui-neng, simply because dogmatism was not in keeping with Ch'an belief that the teachings of all the Buddhas originally exist in one's own mind.[65] As Watts puts it, "we are each the Lord in hiding."[66] In Taoism, the doctrine of *wu-wei* (non-activity)[67] condemns interference on the ground that each individual, if left alone in its natural state (self-so-ness) can take care of itself. As briefly mentioned, the notion of authentic existence denies external authority. It is, therefore, iconoclastic. But it is not iconoclastic for the sake of iconoclasm. As Paul Tillich explains it, a Deity deprives man of his subjectivity because He is all powerful and all-knowing.[68] Or as Nietzche sees it, "God. . . is not freedom for man. He is the domestication of man, the end of the "homo creator" . . . Man is turned from a wolf into a dog, into a domestic animal."[69] and only the death of God can make possible the advent of a new humanity.[70] This humanistic and iconoclastic stance of contemporary existentialism recalls many Ch'an teachings which stress the point that every man is a potential *Buddha* (The Enlightened One). For example, Lin-chi, a renowed Ch'an master, declaimed:

> "O You followers of Truth! If you wish to obtain an orthodox understanding of Zen(Ch'an), do not be deceived by others. Inwardly or outwardly, if you encounter any obstacles kill them right away. If you encounter the Buddha, kill him; if you encounter the Patriach, kill him; kill them all without hesitation, for this is the only way to deliverance. Do not get yourselves entangled with any object, but stand above, pass on, and be free!"[71]

The Buddha is often spoken of as a 'dry stick of dung'; "All the Buddhist teachings as propounded in the *sutras* and *sastras* are treated by Zen(Ch'an) as mere waste paper."[72] Hence, a famous Ch'an story relating a monk burning wooden figures of the Buddha to keep warm. Another famous 13th century Chinese painting by Liang K'ai has a monk none other than the Sixth Patriach tearing up a *sutra*.[73] The message of all these iconoclasm is rather clear, that the emancipation of man and the maintaining of authentic existence demand the death of the Buddha and the abolition of all authority. Iconoclasm can be traced back to Gautama Buddha's teaching. "Be a lamp to yourself."[74]

According to the existentialists including Laotse, Hui-neng and Sartre, conventional morality and institutions tend to inhibit innate spontaneity and suppress the Buddha-nature. Existentialists of almost every hue are irrationalists, rejecting the supremacy of cold reason. They never take the objective world very seriously, they make fun of the cumbersome intellect and of all forms of conventional wisdom and pomposity.[75] Karl Marx was an existentialist cousin, holding a sympathetic view of authentic existence.[76] Marx's humanism holds that man's ultimate end is simply to become fully human,[77] which cannot be so long as he remains alienated from himself in religious fantasies or self-realization.[78]

The fantasy life of religion is a pseudo-self-realization. Man does not become himself, he merely dreams about it. So the life of man in religion is an acceptance of the shadow of self-realization in lieu of the substance, the seeming in lieu of the being.[79] In believing god of one kind or another, man forsakes part of his hu-

manness and autonomy, which are basic ingredients of man's naturalness and spontaneity. The more one trusts Buddha, God or any other supernaturalness and spontaneity, the less human he remains. To Marx, Hui-neng, Sartre and Laotse, especially the former, the abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of man is a demand for their real happiness and their real humanness,[80] on which man's naturalness is predicated. Religion, according to Marx, is not simply a consolation for man's poverty but it is a consolation for his-non-humanity, a surrogate for being man.[81] Marx called religion the opium of the people, and regarded it as "the holy form of human self-alienation."[82]

An alienated man is not wholly human, much less a natural man as understood in Taoism and Ch'an.

Marx also saw man's essence and naturalness threatened in economic life. He carried Hegel's spiritual alienation in division of labor and specialization, which is, especially in post-industrial society, increasingly man's humanness and original spontaneity. For Marx the aim of human development is that of the development of the total, universal man who holds all his faculties in harmonious balance.[83]

Marx' concept of socialism is the emancipation from alienation, the return of man to himself as a whole human.[84] With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, the worker sells his labor in a factory assembly line where he finds no outlet for expressing his personality and giving free play to his creativity. The worker is related to the product of his labor as to an alien object and his essence (humanness) is taken away from him (i.e. alienated) by the employer.[85]

Marx envisioned a society (communist) where a man can express his individuality in his daily activities and is not forced into alienated labor or submersed in lifelong occupation.

> ". . . in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic."[86]

This Marxian vision tends to be pastoral and rustic, and free, and it accords well with the lifestyle of Taoists and Ch'an followers. The social and political conditions of such a society are conducive to one's becoming natural and permit him to lead a truly human existence. Only under such free conditions can one expect to hear of such a society are conducive to one's becoming natural and permit him to lead a truly human existence. Only under such free conditions can one expect to hear such a happy utterance from the contented resident. "In carrying water and chopping wood there lies the wonderful Tao."[87]

Marx believed that the goal for man is to realize his humanity and, at the

same time, to achieve the unity of man with Nature. Fromm believes that "the thinking of Marx is closely related to the thinking of Zen(Ch'an) . . . Only when man can relate himself to Nature humanly, can he overcome self-alienation."[88] Marx's concept of socialism is a protest, as are all existentialist philosophies, against the alienation and dehumanization of man, and it is also a protest against man's exploitation of man, and his exploitativeness toward Nature. An un-alienated man, according to Marx, is "the man who does not 'dominate' Nature, but who becomes one with it, who is alive and responsive toward objects so that objects come to life for him."[89] And an alienated man works in order to live He does not reckon labour as part of his life, it is rather a sacrifice of his life. The more a worker produces, the less of him remains human. It has become rather clear that a natural man is an un-alienated man (the reverse is not necessarily true), who "feels thoroughly at home with himself, enjoys a sense of voluntary self-determination to action and experiences his energies as his own".[90]

Marx's central theme throughout his life had been how to de-alienate humanity.[91] As mentioned before, for Marx, the aim of human development is to free the total, universal man against specialization and alienated labour (i.e. life-activity, as distinct from self-activity). However, Marx's approach had been mainly the emphasis on the need for a radical transformation of society that would return man to himself and permit him to lead a truly human existence. His argument for violent revolution could, at best, remove one half of the problem of human self-alienation – i.e. the external circumstances. Marx failed to offer cures to solve the problem at the root. After all, "the enemy of human self-alienation is egoistic need, the drive to own and possess things."[92] To possess is, in a sense, to be possessed.

In modern society with all the comforts modern technology can offer, human 'needs' are continually created and yet man can never be satisfied.

> ". . . auto, radio, TV. . . become actual needs for great number of people. . . all this makes for an extraordinary externalization of life in our time."[93]

Through externalization of life, man loses his wholeness, his freedom, and his original naturalness (spontaneity). Admittedly, Marx did recognize that "man is alienated from himself when he produces under the compulsion of "egoistic need," but he failed to trace this egoism to its real source within the personality of the alienated individual himself. Therefore, he failed to understand that it is only there, and by the individual's own moral effort, that egoism can be undone.[94] Naturalness and humanness can only be restored after egoism is undone and the unity of inner nature and outer nature has been achieved. Until external circumstances are altered along with an inner moral revolution, human self-alienation will remain and naturalness in man will not flourish.

It is interesting to note that Ch'an seldom vigorously champions the cause of altering external circumstance while Marx failed to take sufficient note of the problem as pertaining to man's inner world. Hui-neng, on the one hand, proposed

to de-alienate the inner world of man; on the other, Marx proposed to de-alienate the outer world of man. It appears that Marx and Hui-neng complement each other in pointing out the way to a truly human existence and the attainment of his original unadulterated naturalness (spontaneity or self-so-ness). Marx, despite his avowed dialectic materialism, would readily win the hearts of Laotse and Hui-neng by his non-materialistic belief: "The man who is much and has little".[95]

FOOTNOTES

[1]Toynbee, Arnold J., "Civilization on trial", collected in *The Great Ideas Today* 1961 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1961), p. 335. The others are: Confucius, Zoroaster, Jesus, Muhammad, Socrates and the Prophets of Israel and Judah. Lin Yutang even claims: "If there is one book in the whole Oriental literature which one should read above all the others, it is . . .Laotse's *Book of Tao (Wisdom of China and India)* p. 579, published by Random House, 1942.

[2]For the meanings of *wu-wei* see Holmes Welch's book *Taoism: the parting of the way* (Boston; Beacon Press, revised ed. 1965) p. 33.

[3]Chang, Lit-sen, *Zen-Existentialism the Spiritual Decline of the West* (Wenham, Mass,: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1969), p.31. The author quoting Prof. Fung Yu-lan.

[4]Hu, Shih, "Ch'an(Zen) Buddhism in China: its history and method." *Philosophy East and West,* v.3, no. 1 (April 1953) p.7.

[5]Wright, Arthur F., *Buddhism in Chinese History* (New York: Atheneum, 1965), p.48.

[6]Humphreys, Christmas, *Zen Buddhism* London,: Allen and Unwin, 1957), p.217. Prof. Constant C.C. Chang is, however, of the opinion that Ch'an is an combination of activist Confucianism and aesthetic Taoism (see his book *The Story of Chinese Philosophy* Taipeh: Wen-Chien Printing Co. 1960), p.260.

[7]Suzuki, Daisetz Teitaro, *Studies in Zen* (N.Y.: Delta, c.1955), p. 138.

[8]Ibid,. p.155.

[9]Ibid., p.155.

[10]Ibid., p.136.

[11]Watts, Alan, W., *The Way of Zen* (N.Y.: Pantheon, 1969), p.83

[12]The this-wordly outlook of Confucianism is well-known. As for Taoism, there is no thing otherworldly about it. Holmes and Arthur Waley both agree that though seclusion is deemed necessary, the Sage is not a hermit and is very much involved in daily affairs. See Holmes's *Taoism: the parting of the way,* p.81.

[13]Watts, ibid., p. 80.

[14]Ames, Van Meter, *Zen and American Thought* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1962), -.6.

[15]Ibid., p.5.

[16]Link, Arthur E., "The Taoist antecedents of Tao-An's prajna ontology." *History of Religions; and International Journal for Comparative Historical Studies.*, v. 9, 2 & 3 (Nov. 1969/Feb. 1970), p. 183.

[17]Wright, Arthur F., "A Historian's reflections on the Taoist traditions." *History of Religions*, v. 9, nos. 2 & 3 (Nov. 1969/Feb. 1970), p.248.

[18]Watts, Alan W., *The Spirit of Zen: a way of life, work, and art in the Far East.* (London: John Murray, 1958), p. 26.

[19]Creel, H.G., "The Great Clod: a Taoist Conception of the Universe," collected in Chos Tse-tsung (ed.): *Wen-lin: Studies in the Chinese Humanities* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), p.259.

[20]Wright, ibid.,

[21]Watts, *The Way of Zen*, pp. 93-95. Also: Chung, Chung-yuan's *Creativity and Taoism* (N.Y.: Harper, 1970) p.12.

[22]King, Winston L., "Eastern Religions; a new interest and influence." *The Annuals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, v.387, (January 1970), p.66.

[23]Cohen-Portheim, Paul, *The Message of Asia* (N.Y.: Dutton, 1934), pp.150-151.

[24]Kaplan, Abraham, *The New World of Philosophy* (N.Y.: Vintage Book, 1961), p. 311, 313 and 314.

[25]Laotse, *The Way of Life: Lao Tzu* a translation by R.B. Blakney (N.Y. New American Library, 1955), p. 132.

[26]Laotse, *The Way of Lao Tzu Tao-te ching* , translated by Wing-tsit Chan (N.Y.: Bobb-Merrill, 1963), p.132.

[27]Watson, Burton, tr. *Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings* (N.Y.: Columbia Universal Press, 1969), p. 46.

[28]See Chan, Wing-tsit, tr. *The Platform Scripture* (N.Y.: Delta Book, 1967), p.15. The Four Statements are:

A Special tradition outside the scriptures (i.e., sutras), No dependence upon words and letters, Direct pointing at the soul of man, Seeing into one's own nature and the attainment of buddha-hood.

[29](Not indicated. Ed.)

[30]Hu,Shih, ibid., p.10.

[31]Laotse, *The Way of Life: Lao Tzu (Tao-to Ching)*, translated by Wing-tsit Chan, p.199.

[32]Watson, Burton, tr. ibid., p.43-44.

[33]Watts, *The Spirit of Zen*, p. 27-28.

[34]Ibid., p.11.

[35]Kaplan, ibid., 316.

[36]Suzuki, *Studies in Zen,* p. 142.

[37]Kaplan, ibid, p. 311.

[38]Watts, *The Way of Zen,* p. 83.

[39]Linn White as quoted in *Beyond Survival,* ed., by William S. Robinson et al (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1971), p.12.

[40]Cohen-Portheim, Raul, ibid., p. 150.

[41]Murphey, Rhoads, "Man and Nature in China," *Modern Asian Studies,* v. 1, no.4, (October 1967), pp.314-316.

[42]Welch, Holmes, Taosim: the parting of the way (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p. 45. "Our inner nature is an extension of the nature of the universe. To follow one is to be in harmony with the other."

[43]Blyth, R.H., *Zen in English Literature and Oriental Classics.* (Ruland, Vermont: Tuttle, 1957), p.vii.

[44]Welch, ibid., 46.

[45]Watts, *The Spirit of Zen,* pp. 22-23.

[46]Toynbee, Arnold, *Surviving the Future,* (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp.23-36.

[47]Reported in *The Christian Science Monitor* (April 7, 1972), p.3, with the title: "Window open into Stone Age."

[48]Paul Goodman as quoted in the book *Beyond Survival,* p. 10, cf. note 43 above.

[49]Watts, *The Way of Zen,* p. 47.

[50]Ibid., pp. 19-20.

[51]Watts, *The Spirit of Zen,* p. 23.

[52]Watts, *The Way of Zen,* p. 23.

[53]Suzuki, D.T., *The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind (London, Rider, 1970), p. 27.*

[54]The genuine Ch'an values nonattachment and naturalness above anything else; the true practice of Ch'an is no practice at all. Yet in Today's Japan Ch'an followers are strictly required to sit motionless on the wooden platform of the meditation hall; inside the hall whacking and beating is a commonplace. All these seem to be a quiet departure from Hui-neng or Matsu's teachings. cf. Koestler, Arthur: *The Lotus and the Robot* (N.Y.: Harper, 1966), pp.255-257.

[55]Suzuki, *The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind,* p. 57.

[56]Hu, Shih, ibid., pp. 6-7.

[57]Watts, *The Way of Zen,* pp. 93-95.

[58]Ames, ibid. pp. 3-4.

[59]Chang, Lit-sen, ibid., 75.

[60]Ibid.

[61]Sartre, Jean-Paul, *The Philosophy of Existentialism*, (N.Y.: Philosophical Library 1965), p.269.

[62]cf. Takehiko Okada's article "Wang Chin and the rise of Existentialism" in *Self and Society in Ming Thought*, ed. by Wm. Theodore de Bary (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 121-142.

[63]Chang, Lit-sen, ibid., p. 116 & 115: According to Suzuki's analysis: "Zen(Ch'an) diverges from Existentialism in this: There are various brands of existentialsim but they seem to agree that the sea of possibilities opening ahead is frightening. They mean freedom and unlimited freedom means unbearable responsibility. To those thoughts, Zen(Ch'an) is a stranger, because for Zen'(Ch'an) the finite is infinite, time is eternity, man is not separated from God. Furthermore, Zen(Ch'an) does not find anything frightening in infinite possibilities, unlimited freedom, never-ending responsibilities; Zen(Ch'an) moves along with infinite possibilities: Zen(Ch'an) enjoys unlimited freedom, because Zen(Ch'an) is freedom itself; however unending and unbearable responsibility may be, Zen(Ch'an) bears it as if not bearing it at all. . "

[64]Though contemporary existentialism and Taoism-Ch'an agree that the final truth is up to the individual to decide, there is a basic difference, in addition to Suzuki's comparison under note 58, that sets Taoism-Ch'an apart from the former. The difference is: in both Taoism and Ch'an there is no split between oneself and Nature (the objective world) and the nature of the individual is an extension of outer Nature. Therefore to follow one's innate spontaneity (i.e. individual decision) is to follow Tao. Yet this is not necessarily true in the contemporary Existentialism which holds a dualistic world outlook that one's decision could go against Nature. When naturalness prevails @@, the individual, in Taoism and Ch'an, manifests to , which is a microcosm of Tao, cf. Chang Chung-yuan, "Concept of Tao", *Review of Religion*, v. 17, No. 1, (March 1953), pp. 128-129.

[65]Suzuki, Daisetz Teitaro, *Essays in Zen Buddhism* (first series) (N.Y.: Grove Press, 1961), p.214.

[66]Watts as quoted in *Zen-Existentialism*, p.5.

[67]Welch, ibid. p.33. for a good discussion of *wu-wei.*

[68]Chang, Lit-sen, ibid., p. 6.

[69]Kaufmann, Walter A. ed. Portable Nietzsche, p. 198.

[70]cf. Altizer, Thomas J.J.'s *Radical Theology and the Death of God* (N.Y.: Bobbs-Merill, 1966), pp.3-7, for meanings of Death of God movement.

[71]Watts, *The Spirit of Zen*, p. 44.

[72]Chang, Lit-sen, ibid. p. 13.

[73]A reproduction of this painting can be found in, among others, *The Christian Science Monitor* (November 7-9, 1970), p. 9, with an article entitled: "Art and the meaning of Zen" by Susan Bush.

[74]Hu,Shih, ibid, p.19.

[75]Watts, *The Spirit of Zen*, p.. 30.

[76]Tucker, Robert C., *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* (N;.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p.168., This is an excellent book on Marx's humanism and existentialism.

[77]Marx, Karl, *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, tr. by T.B. Bottomore, (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill 1964), p.i-v.

[78]Tucker, ibid., p.99.

[79]Ibid.

[80]Levi, Albert William, *Humanism & Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1969), p.409.*

[81]Tucker, ibid., p.100.

[82]Tucker, ibid., p. 102.

[83]Fromm, Erich, *Marx's Concept of Man* (N.Y.: Frederick Ungar Pub. Co., 1968), p.42.

[84]Fromm, ibid., p.43.

[85]The employer as well as the employee is alienated labour. cf. Tucker, p. 80.

[86]Karl Marx as quoted in Fromm's *Marx's Concept of Man*, p.12.

[87]Tucker, ibid., pp.158-160.

[88]Fromm, ibid., p.33.

[89]Fromm, ibid., p.63.

[90]Tucker, ibid., p.134.

[91]Ibid., p.176.

[92]Ibid., p.158.

[93]Barrett, William, *Irrational Man; A Study in Existential Philosophy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962), p. 31.

[94]Tucker, ibid., p.240.

[95]Fromm, ibid., p.90.

EVOLUTION OF SINO-AMERICAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 1784-1929: A Survey

by

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In Asia, the Far East is one region in which the United States has always taken a great deal of interest ever since it declared its independence from Britain. Its first contact in the region was with China, hence, the commercial contact of the United States with China is as old as the American Republic itself. Its interest in the country was primarily economic. When this economic interest became sufficiently large, the United States started thinking in terms of developing diplomatic relations with China.

It was John Ledyard, an American who accompanied Captain Cook in his voyage to the Pacific (1776-81), who acquainted the Americans with the prospect of a profitable fur trade in the port of Canton.[1] However, owing to internal strife and turmoil during the Revolution, Americans could not pay much attention to the development of trade with China. After the war against England which ended in favour of the thirteen colonies, American trade with Canton began to flourish.

The American struggle for independence freed the colonies from the political yoke of Britain, and this filled the Americans with a sense of self-esteem and honour.[2] This found expression not only in the consolidation and modification of socio-political institutions, but also in the American aspiration to win her rightful place in the international community.

The defeat of Britain had already lifted the trade restrictions against the United States. So, it now embarked on a commercial career which soon aroused the envy of other nations.[3] Commercial voyages were undertaken. New markets and fresh economic contacts were established. It was during this heyday of American commercialism that the *Empress of China*, an American vessel, made the first direct voyage from New York to Canton in 1784; and opened a significant chapter in the history of Sino-American relations.

The *Empress of China* sailed from New York in February 1784 and reached Canton, the only Chinese port open at that time to foreign commerce, in August 1784. Fortunately for posterity, the supercargo of the vessel, the merchant in charge of the adventure, was Samuel Shaw who was a writer. His memoirs give a vivid account of China trade as it was carried out during the first years of the American Republic.[6]

The *Empress* carried fur, raw cotton and lead; but the chief cargo consisted of some thirty tons of ginseng root, considered by the Chinese as having great medical value.[7] The adventure cost approximately $120,000[8], an investment which seemed, at that time, to be quite sizeable. However, when the *Empress of China* returned to New York, fifteen months after her departure, it was learned that Samuel Shaw had succeeded in trading his cargo for 3,000 pieces of Bohea tea and Hyson, 962 pieces of China ware, 24 pieces of nankeens and 490 pieces of silk.[9] According to Shaw, the venture had earned an overall profit of $37,727 or better than 30 per cent of the original investment.[10]

The China trade of the United States, which the *Empress of China* inaugurated, continued with a rapid pace and, before the delegates at Philadelphia had completed the framing of the Constitution, at least nine voyages had already been undertaken to the Far East by enterprising Americans.[11] Soon, the United States emerged as one of the chief trading nations in the Far East. In 1789 the number of American ships in Canton was second only to those flying the British flag.

As the China trade prospered, the Americans encountered difficulties in finding an outbound cargo. In the beginning, they had exchanged ginseng root for Chinese tea and silk which were in great demand in the American market. When the price of ginseng fell in the Chinese market, Americans found the ginseng trade not very lucrative. They turned, therefore, to exporting sea-otter furs and seal peltries, which, at that time, were being supplied by the Russians. Although the Americans had to face strong competition in this trade from the Russians, English, French, Dutch, Portuguese and Austrians, furs and seal skins obtained from the

Northwest Coast and Falkland Islands, respectively, became their principal export items.[13] Fur trade at Canton was supplemented by opium, sandalwood, ginseng and silver. Beche-de-mer, edible birds' nests, and sharks' fins, which were purchased by the Chinese for making soups, also formed part of China-bound cargoes.

The American traders exchanged these items with Chinese tea and silk; and, by 1811, they had become the most serious rivals of the British in the tea trade at Canton.[14] Their ships were neither so large nor so numerous as those of the British East India Company, yet they carried from Canton, in 1805-1806, eleven million pounds of tea in 37 ships, as against British exports of 22 million pounds in 49 ships.[15]

Although the Americans were posing a challenge to British trade at Canton, in certain important aspects, the latter was in a more advantageous position. It is true that the American merchants traded with greater individual freedom. However, they neither had the financial backing and prestige of the East India Company nor any moral protection from their government. Even the American consuls who were appointed at Canton were not consuls in the diplomatic sense of the term. They were usually traders of super-cargoes, honourarily appointed by the Congress. Their success depended largely on their popularity among their fellow American traders. From the appointment of Samuel Shaw in 1786, as the first American consul in Canton, to 1844, when the first Sino-American treaty was signed, this practice continued.

Despite all these disadvantages, the Americans did not feel much need for offical support as long as they traded on equal terms with the British. After 1834, when tensions began to grow between the English and the Chinese, the indifference of American traders to official support disappeared. In May 1839, in the wake of the Anglo-Chinese war, better known as the Opium War and after Lin had forced the surrender of foreign-owned opium, the American merchants filed a petition in the Congress:

> We. . . express our opinions that the United States Government should take immediate measures; and, if deemed advisable, to act in concert with the governments of Great Britain, France and Holland, or either of them, in their endeavours to establish commercial relations with this empire upon a safe and honorable footing, such as exists between all friendly powers; and by direct appeal to the Imperial Government at Peking, to obtain a compliance with the following among other important demands.[18]

In their petition, the American traders demanded that (1) foreign envoys should be allowed to reside in the vicinity of the court at Peking with usual diplomatic facilities; (2) that a fixed tariff should be imposed; (3) that facilities should be provided for the trans-shipment of goods meant for export; (4) that trade in other Chinese ports should be free; and (5) that compensation should be paid for any loss caused by an impediment on legal trade and it should be guaranteed that such impediments should not recur.

It is interesting to note here that, although the American merchants in China asked the United States Government for a well defined China policy, their knowledge about China was quite inadequate. Even the American public, in general, had very vague ideas about China.[20] Out of this inadequate knowledge about China, there emerged an official U.S. China policy which, quite surprisingly, was based on the reality of American interests. This policy remained in force for a century.

Four months after the signing of the Nanking Treaty, President John Tyler solicited the Congress on 30 December 1842 to appoint a resident commissioner in China to safeguard the American commercial and diplomatic interests. Caleb Cushing was chosen for the post and the task of instructing him fell to Daniel Webster, then the Secretary of State. Cushing was given numerous instructions, the last of which was very significant:

> Finally, you will signify, in decided terms and a positive manner, that the Government of the United States would find it impossible to remain on terms of friendship and regard with the Emperor, if greater privileges or commercial facilities should be allowed to the subjects of any other Government than should be granted to the citizens of the United States.[21]

Cushing arrived at Macao in February 1844, and, after a few months, the first Sino-American treaty, known as the Treaty of Wang-hsia or Wang Hiya, was signed on 3 July 1844.[22] According to the terms of the Treaty, it was agreed that any commercial privileges given by the Chinese to other countries were to be extended on equal terms to the United States. Thus, besides Canton, the ports of Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai were opened to the residence and trade of American merchants.[23] [Government support of the China trade that commenced with the treaty of 1844 was to be invoked from time to time.]

While efforts were being made on the administrative level to boost up China trade, a new development in nautical technology was taking place which tremendously galvanized Sino-American commerce. A new type of ship, light weight and with huge sails, was invented. This brought about a revolution in America's Far Eastern commerce. Clipper Ships, as these ships came to be known, "were the nautical marvels of the time".[24]

It is difficult to ascertain when the clipper ships first made their appearance. However, it is generally believed that it was invented sometime in 1830's, and that between 1845 and 1865, it came to have a definite meaning, as swift, sleek ship.[25] With the advent of the clipper ship, American trade with China, particularly the tea trade, received a tremendous boost. Tea which was light in bulk and relatively high in value became the chief American import item.

America soon emerged as the most enterprising challenger to Britain in maritime commerce. The *Oriental* was the first American clipper ship to carry tea from China to Britain. On 22 August 1850, the *Oriental* started from Whampoa and reached London on 4 December 1850. Its speed created a sensation; but what was

probably more remarkable to her captain was a profit of $48,000, a sum that equalled two thirds the cost of constructing the ship.[26] By 1855 the United States came to possess a fleet which was as large as that of Britain and, probably, superior in efficiency. Canton trade came to be dominated by American shipping. In 1855, for example, the total tonnage of foreign shipping was 58,000, of which 24,000 was American and 18,000 was British. The remainder was divided among other nations.[27]

During the American civil war (1860-1865), American commerce was badly affected. The war did enormous damage to the clipper ship merchant fleet and practically ruined China trade. So much so that, until the twentieth century, American exports to China did not exceed that of 1855.[28]

However, after the end of the Civil War, the China trade again began to gain momentum. The unprecedented industrial boom, which the post-Civil War United States witnessed, made it imperative for Americans to begin a search for colonies. To dispose its surplus industrial goods, America needed to open new, and preserve the old, markets.

The economic depression of the 1890's and the offical closing of the frontier made many Americans think of extending the "frontier" further west into the Far East. "We must have the market (of China) or we shall have revolution, cried Senator William Frye. Theodore C. Search, President of the National Association of Manufacturers, claimed that many manufacturers have outgrown or are outgrowing their home markets, and "the expansion of our foreign trade is the only promise of relief."[29]

While economic necessities were pushing the United States on the path of colonialism, the writings of expansionists like John Fiske,[30] Josiah Strong[31], Alfred T. Mahan[32], and the ideas of Henry Cabot Lodge were creating a favourable climate of opinion for it. As a result, by the close of the nineteenth century, American mind was sufficiently made up to launch on a policy that would boost up American foreign commerce, particularly in the Far East.

The only section to which this expansionism did not appear as very attractive was the business class. The businessmen were worried that the cost of an expansionist policy might exceed the benefits therefrom.[33] Their opinion was, however, soon reversed after Admiral George Dewey's victory of May 1898 at the Manila Bay.[34]

The acquisition of the Philippines seemed to open up new prospects for commerce in Eastern Asia. President McKinley believed that the occupation of the Philippines would be of great help to the growing U.S. trade in the Orient, particularly Japan and China.[35] It was against this background of America's desire for a place in the colonial sun that John Hay, the U.S. Secretary of State, proclaimed the doctrine of Open Door, in 1899, which aimed at the preservation of China as a free market.

The doctrine of Open Door, in a way, reasserted American interests in the preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty of China. These objectives shaped America's policy in the Far East for several decades in the twentieth century. At this point, the antecedents of this policy may be briefly discussed.

With the exposure of Chinese weakness after its defeat in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, there started a scramble for concessions and spheres of influence in China among the European Powers. Russia gained a paramount position in Manchuria, France in Southern China, Germany in the Shantung Peninsula and England in the Yangtze River Valley. England, however, was not satisfied. She, alone, carried 65 per cent of the total foreign trade in China; and she was much more interested in a free Chinese market than in obtaining a sphere of influence in the Chinese mainland like the others. She, therefore, opted to preserve the integrity and sovereignty of China; and she sought American support for the realization of these objectives.

Although the China trade formed only 2 percent of the total American foreign trade, forward-looking Americans saw considerable potential in the Chinese market. Even then, when the British government proposed a joint Anglo-American stand for the preservation of the Open Door policy in China, in March 1898, John Sherman, the Secretary of State, rejected the proposal. This was due to the government's apprehension that the American public opinion would not approve of a bilateral treaty between Britain and the United States, which might offend the other powers.

The U.S. official outlook, however, began to change when John Hay became the Secretary of State. Hay who had, previous to his appointment as Secretary of State, served as U.S. Ambassador in London, was a known Anglophile. However, while knowing fully well that America had similar interests in China as the British, John Hay also hesitated to openly support the latter for the same reason which had impeded his predecessor. However, following a plan suggested by John Hippisley, a British citizen who had served as an officer in the Chinese Maritime Customs, Hay wrote notes outlining American policy in China. On 6 September 1899, he sent these Open Door notes to Germany, Russia and England, followed by identical notes to Japan, Italy and France.[38]

The Open Door doctrine, like the Monroe Doctrine, was a political and commercial principle.[39] It declared that (1) all existing treaty ports and established interests in each sphere of interest would not be molested, (2) that the Chinese officials would collect the Chinese tariffs and no others, and (3) that no discrmination would be made in port and railway charges among citizens of different nations conducting business in China.[40]

While diplomats in different capitals of the world were discussing the importance of Hay's circular, events were taking a dramatic turn in China. In 1900, the Boxer uprising erupted. Starting with violent attacks on Christian missionaries in Shantung, the Boxer rebellion turned into an agitation against foreign domina-

tion. When the Boxers reached Peking, the Empress, who had secretly supported them, fled from the capital. The German ambassador was assassinated on the street and all foreign settlements were surrounded.

The United States was afraid that the affected powers, on the pretext of avenging the crimes done their citizens, might strengthen their hold on their respective spheres of influence, thus imperilling the Open Door policy in China. In anticipation of this grave threat to American economic interest, John Hay on 3 July 1900 sent a circular to the Great Powers. American policy, he said, was:

> to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, *preserve Chinese* territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese empire.[41]

Once again the American diplomacy succeeded, and Hay was able to obtain the consent of other powers to his proposal.

The Open Door doctrine, enunciated by Hay, underwent various modifications from 1899 to 1913.[42] While Hay had stood only for equal commercial opportunity, Elihu Root, Hay's successor, stood for investment opportunities in China.[43] At first, American bankers were very much reluctant to risk their money in China. However, after the Russo-Japanese war, when Japan began to acquire monopolistic control over the Manchurian railways and American commercial interests were endangered, reluctance to invest in China gradually disappeared.

Willard Straight, the dynamic U.S. consul general at Mukden (Manchuria) from 1906 to 1908, viewed with mounting apprehension the Japanese economic penetration in Machuria and concluded that, so long as American dollars would not be pumped into capital hungry China, American economic foothold in China would not endure for long.[44] Straight returned to the State Department in 1908 as Acting Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, and, during his one-year stay, he influenced the Taft Administration to adopt an investment policy for China, known as the "dollar diplomacy."[45]

The first venture in this investment programme was the Hukuang Railway project.[46] It was also felt that loans should be extended to the Chinese Government; otherwise, the other nations might take political control over China by doing so, thus, jeopardizing American commerce. Hence, in 1910, the United States joined France, Germany and England to form a consortium, which was later joined by Russia and Japan. The consortium extended a loan of £27,000,000 to China, of which $7,299,000 was furnished by American bankers.[47]

With the coming of the Wilson administration in 1913, American loan policy in China was reversed. Woodrow Wilson, like his Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, had an emotional bias against banking interests,[48] and thought that American loans encroached upon Chinese independence. With the withdrawal of the

United States from the consortium, the dollar diplomacy practically came to its end in 1913.

America's unilateral recognition of the Chinese Republic created the impression among other powers that the United States was posing herself to be the only friend of China. So, they tightened their hold on their respective spheres of influence. At the same time, Japanese economic penetration in China was speeded up. The Wilson Administration soon realized that, if Japan's economic expansion was allowed to grow unabated, the Open Door policy in China might be imperilled. Wilson, therefore, decided to form another consortium to aid the Chinese government, and, thus, check the growing Japanese influence.

While the international consortium was trying to keep the Chinese market open for all countries, Paul S. Reinsch, the U.S. Minister to China from 1913 to 1919, was trying his best to make the Open Door policy work in China.[49] (He had no intention to enter into a scramble for concessions. What he wanted was an economic atmosphere in China where American traders could transact their business profitably.)

Visualizing a rejuvenated China as an advantage to American trade, he worked for improvements in roadways, railways and other public facilities.[50] "To Americans, Reinsch said, "the idea of securing preeminence or predominance is foreign, but from the very nature of their purely economic interest they have to resist any attempt on the part of others to get any rights or a position of predominance, which could be utilized to restrict, or entirely distinguish, American opportunities."[51] This was an excellent summary of American objectives in China, at that time.

The emergence of the United States from the position of a debtor to a creditor nation after the First World War,[52] combined with its massive industrial and economic progress, had a tremendous impact on the U.S.–China trade. In the decade following the First World War, the American trade with China reached an unprecedented height.[53] In 1928, the United States entered into a treaty with China which granted the latter full rights to her tariff. This tariff Autonomy Treaty,[54] which was the first of its kind signed by China with a foreign country, had an extremely favourable impact on China's relations with the United States.

The rapid expansion of US commerce with China is evident from the fact that, before the First World War, America had only 22 commercial establishments in China; whereas, by 1930, she already had 108 such establishments. Of these 108 commercial establishments, some eighteen were founded during the war years and the rest during 1919-30. At the same time, the total ship tonnage of America almost trebled, and its trade with China doubled.[57] In 1919, American ship tonnage to China was only 2,569,887 tons; while, in 1928, it rose to 6,364,102 tons.[58]

In the beginning of the 1920's, the trade was not mostly an one-way traffic, and, as such the balance of trade was not too much in favour of one country. In international trade, if there is a well-balanced trade between the two countries, it is economically beneficial for both the countries. America had certain items to import from and export to China and vice versa. China, for example, had soya beans, raw silk, skin, tea, cereals, raw cotton, metals, coal, silk piece goods, bristles, etc. She owned over 80 per cent of the world output of antimony, and the largest deposits of minerals were in Chinese possession. America had, besides numerous goods and food stuffs, oil which China needed desperately for fuel, light and power.[59]

The barter between China and America was very much evenly balanced. In 1919, the United States exported to China, goods worth Haikwan Taels 100,236,706; while Chinese exports to America were worth HK Tls. 101,118,677.[60] But within a decade after the World War, this even balance swung in America's favour. While American exports to China almost doubled, Chinese exports to America increased only nominally. American exports rose from Hk. Tls. 110,236,706 in 1919 to Hk. Tls. 205,541,351 in 1928; whereas Chinese exports rose only from Hk. Tls. 101,118,677 in 1919 to Hk. Tls. 127,204,573 in 1928.[61]

Although the United States came third in rank among countries trading with China, (Japan and Hongkong being the first and second respectively),[62] she shared 18 per cent of the import trade and 17.1 per cent of the export trade of China.[63] In 1929, the total value of China's foreign trade was Hk. Tls. 2,297,008,000 of which imports were Hk. Tls. 1,281,321,000 and exports were Hk. Tls. 1,015,687,000.[64]

In the post-First World War decade, Japan emerged as a great commercial power in the Far East, forcing Britain to yield her position. It was the geographical proximity of Japan to China that gave her the additional advantage. Although at that time, the United States could not outpace Britain, the former emerged as her strongest competitor.[55]

It is significant to note that while American export to China was touching new heights, American investment in China was also increasing. In 1914, the amount of American property in China was only U.S.G. $59,300,000. Within a decade and a half, it rose to U.S.G. $239,900,000 in 1930.[65] In 1928, of Chinese Government bonds and other securities, American investors held approximately $20,000,000 worth; of railway and similar bonds about $18,000,000. About $30,000,000 more was invested in land, buildings and equipments by banks, trading concerns and others. Moreover, American industrialists and manufacturers had extended long-term credits to Chinese enterprises, and the amount of these outstanding credits was another $10,000,000.

There was therefore, a total of some $70,000,000 of American money in business investments in China.[66] Besides, a large amount of money was also inves-

ted for missionary and other philanthropic activities. Hence, in 1930, the total American investment in China stood at 239.9 million dollars,[67] 155.1 million of this was in industrial and commercial investment, 41.7 million in Government loans and, 43.1 million in missionary and charitable purposes.[69]

Sino American commerce which witnessed a boom in the twenties suffered a considerable shock during the economic depression. This was when the decade commencing with the great depression marked the period of transition in world history when, everywhere, emphasis was shifting from politics to economics.[70] Thus, in 1929, President Herbert Hoover's State of the Union Message to the Congress began with a reference to foreign policy; in 1930, it ignored such significant development in international politics as the signing of the Kellogg-Briand pact, and plunged into an analysis of the economic situation then confronting the United States, in particular, and the world, as a whol.[71] The depression made it quite apparent that human civilization might collapse not from war, a political event but from the calamitous impact of an economic crisis.

The depression which began with the great crash of November 1929 in the Wall Street Stock Exchange[72] lasted for about ten years with varied degrees of intensity.[73] Knowing no geographical bounds, it soon gripped an already delicately balanced international economic order. The United States-China trade, which was a part of the international economic system, was most deeply affected by the depression.

In the United States, the severity of the crisis was indicated by the fact that, throughout the 1930's, its Gross National Products did not reach the level of 1929, except for a momentary rise in 1937.[74] In China, meanwhile, internal political troubles and the calamity of the worst floods in her recorded history were further complicated by the sharp decline in the price of silver in world market,[75] caused by a sudden oversupply of the metal. Consequently, the Chinese currency, which was based on silver, immensely lost its purchasing power in relation to the US gold dollar. American manufactures became too costly for the Chinese to buy. The U.S.–China trade, which had attained an unprecedented height during the 1920s began, therefore, to decline.[76]

The decline itself was so fast that, for a time, it seemed as though the China market was beyond recovery, and that the United States had lost it for good.[77] This anxiety, of course, was not unfounded. Throughout the decades of the 1930s and the 1940s, Sino-American trade remained at a deplorable low point[78] until it was completely cut off after the declaration of China as a Communist state in October, 1949.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Lawrence H. Battistini, *The Rise of American Influence in Asia and the Pacific* (East Lansing, 1960), p. 9.

[2]See Franklin Jameson, *The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement* (Glouces-ter, Massachusetts, 1957).

[3]Ugo Rabbeno, in his book *The American Colonial Policy*, p. 141, writes : "At the end of 1973 the tonnage of the United States exceeded that of every other nation except England; their foreign trade ranked in value next to that of England, and, proportionately to the population, the United States was the first commercial nation of the world." Quoted in Harold Underwood Faulkner, *American Economic History*, Seventh Edition (New York, 1954), p. 220.

[4]James Morton Callahan, *American Relations in the Pacific and the Far East, 1784-1900* (New York, 1969), p. 14.

[5]Edward H. Lockwood, "Americans and Chinese Began Commercial Relations Just 150 Years Ago", *China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), Vol. 70, 8 September 1934, p. 56.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Foster Rhea Dulles, *China and America: The Story of Their Relations Since 1784* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1946), p. 2.

[8]Clarence L. Ver Steeg, "Financing and Outfitting the First United States Ship to China", *Pacific Historical Review* Los Angeles), Vol 22, p.8.

[9]Dulles, n. 7, p. 2. See also Lockwood, n. 5, p. 56.

[10]Ver Steeg, n. 8, p. 21.

[11]Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, *The Rise of the American Civilization* (New York, 1956), Vol. 1, p. 661.

[12]Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Commager, *The Growth of the American Republic*, 2 Vols. (New York, 1950), Vol. 1, p. 324. In 1789 of forty-six foreign vessels entering Canton eighteen were American. See Faulkner, n. 3, p. 145.

[13]Battistini, n. 1, p. 8.

[14]Paul H. Clyde and Burton F. Beers, *The Far East: A History of the Western Impact and the Eastern Response 1830-1965* (New Delhi, 1968), p. 71.

[15]Ibid.

[16]James William Christopher, *Conflict in the Far East: American Diplomacy in China from 1928-1933* (Leiden, Netherlands, 1950), p. 26.

[17]Callahan, n. 4, p. 84. Julius Klein in his article "Booming the China Trade" in *New York Herald Tribune Magazine*, reproduced in *China Weekly Review*, Vol. 46, 17 November 1928, pp. 414-16, argued that the China trade enjoyed backing of the U.S. Government from the beginning. This does not appear to be correct in the light of the situation discussed. Moreover, in 1815 when merchants had petitioned the Congress to establish an efficient and regular consular service in China, the Congress had turned a deaf ear to it. See *Christopher, n. 16, pp. 28-29.*

[18]Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia: A Critical Study of the Policy of the United States with reference to China, Japan and Korea in the 19th Century* (New York, 1922), p. 99.

[19]*Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

[20]See Stuart C. Miller, "The American Traders' Image of China, 1785-1840", *Pacific Historical Review,* Vol. 36 (1967), pp. 375-395.

[21]Quoted in Clyde and Beers, n. 41, pp. 72-73. Here in this instruction to Cushing can be seen some elements of the Open Door doctrine later on enunciated by John Hay in 1899.

[22]Ibid., p. 73.

[23]It is to be noted here that before the Sino-American Treaty was signed in 1844 Commodore Kerney had negotiated for America a similar agreement with China, through Ki-ying, the Viceroy of Canton. The Cushing Treaty was merely its confirmation. See Christopher, n. 16, p. 30.

[24]Battistini, n. 1, p. 15.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Ibid., p. 16.

[28]Battistini, n. 1, p. 17. Also see Charles K. Moser, "Good Neighbours Across the Sea", *China Weekly Review,* Vol. 82, 6 November 1937, p. 209.

[27]Ibid., 1. 17. It may be noted here that in 1830 the British trade was $43,000,000 as compared with U.S. $3,500,000. In 1840 the American exports to and imports from China were only $7,000,000. See Dennett, n. 18, pp. 74-75.

[29]William Appleman Williams. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York, 1959), pp. 30-31.

[30]John Fiske, a historian, was influenced by the Darwinian theory of evolution through natural selection. He believed in the superiority of Anglo-Saxon race. In his essay entitled "Manifest Destiny", he wrote "The day is at hand when four-fifths of the human race will trace its pedigree to English forefathers, as four-fifths of the white people of the United States trace their pedigree today." See Julius W. Pratt, *Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands* (New York, 1951), pp. 4-5.

[31]Josiah Strong , a clergyman, held similar views like Fiske, see Ibid., pp. 5-6.

[32]See Alfred T. Mahan. *Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future* (Boston, 1897) and *Lessons of War With Spain and Other articles* (Boston, 1899).

[33]Julius W. Pratt, "American Business and the Spanish-American War", *Hispanish American Historical Review,* Vol. 14 (May 1934), pp. 164-178. Reproduced in William Appleman Williams, ed., *The Shaping of American Diplomacy: Readings and Documents in American Foreign Relations, 1750-1955* (Chicago, 1956). pp. 387-393.

[34]Richard W. Leopold, *The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History* (New York, 1967), p. 128.

[35]James Ford Rhodes, *The Mckinley and Roosevelt Administration, 1897-1909* (New York, 1922), p. 187.

[36]Nelson Manfred Blake and Oscar Theodore Barck, Jr., *United States in its World Relations* (New York, 1960), p. 406.

[37]Theodore Roosevelt also believed that an Anglo-American joint stand in relation to China

would be advantageous to American commerce in China. Theodore Roosevelt to Charles Arthur Moore, 14 February 1898. Elting E. Morison, selected and edited, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1951), p. 772. Senator Albert Beveridge said in 1900: "Our largest trade henceforth will be with Asia. The Pacific is our ocean . . . And the Pacific is the ocean of the commerce of the future," Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought* (Boston, Mass., 1955), p. 180.

[38]Blake and Barck, n. 36, p. 410. For a history of the Open Door see Earl H. Pritchard, "The Origins of the Most-Favored Nation and the Open Door Politics in China", *Far Eastern Quarterly* (Menasha), Vol. 1, pp. 161-172.

[39]For a detailed analysis of the idea see the Introduction of Mingchien Joshna Bau, *The Open Door Doctrine: In Relation to China* (New York, 1923). American business interest was very much instrumental in persuading the administration to send the Open Door note. See Charles S. Campbell, Jr., "American Business Interests and the Open Door in China", *Far Eastern Quarterly*, (November 1941), vol. 1, pp. 43-58.

[40]For the full text of the Open Door Note see Ruhl J. Bartlett, ed., *The Record of American Diplomacy: Documents and Readings in the History of American Foreign Relations* (New York, 1948), pp. 409-11.

[41]Paul H. Clyde, *United States Policy Toward China: Diplomatic and Public Documents, 1839-1939* (Durham, 1940), pp. 215-216. Emphasis added.

[42]For detailed discussion see Raymond A. Esthus, "The Changing Concept of the Open Door, 1899-1910", *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* (Lincoln, Nebraska), Vol. 46, pp. 435-454.

[43]Ibid., p. 453.

[44]Kenneth Scott Latourette, *A Short History of the Far East* New York, 1951), pp. 447-48.

[45]Dollar diplomacy had already been applied to Latin America. Now for the first time it was being applied to the Far East.

[46]Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (New York, 1958), pp. 531-532.

[47]Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Short History of American Foreign Policy and Diplomacy* (New York, 195), p. 361.

[48]Richard W. Can Alstyne, *American Diplomacy in Action* (Stanford, California, 1947), p. 279.

[49]See Noel Pugach, "Making the Open Door Work: Paul S. Reinsch in China, 1913-1919," *Pacific Historical Review*, vol. 38, pp. 157-175 Also see Paul S. Reinsch, *An American Diplomat in China* (New York, 1922).

[50]Charles A. Beard (with the collaboration of G.H.S. (Smith), *The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy* (Chicago, 1966), p. 186.

[51]Reinsch, n. 49, p. 65.

[52]The United States entered the First World War a debtor to foreign countries to the extent of $3 billion, and emerged as a net creditor, exclusive of Allied debts, to the extent of $6 billion. See Broadus Mitchel, *Depression Decade: From New Era Through New Deal, 1929-1941* (New York, 1955), p. 6.

[53]Between the Years 1913 and 1928, American trade in China increased from Hk. Tls. 34, 427,000 to Hk. Tls. 207,541,351. See Wang-Ai-Tsiang, "Foreign Trade Missions to China: A Chinese Reaction", *China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), vol. 55, 27 December 1930, p. 152. In 1928 1 Tael was equivalent to $0.71. See William W.L Wan, translated, *The Rise of the New People's Democratic Economy, 1927-1937* (Honolulu, 1969), p. 4.

[54]For the text of the Treaty see *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1928* (Washington, 1943), vol. II, pp. 475-477.

[55]Fang Fu-an, "China's Economic Relations with America" *China Weekly Review*, vol. 53, 26 July 1930, p. 311.

[56]Y. H. Moh, "Analysis of Sino-American Economic Relations", *China Weekly Review*, vol. 73, 8 June 1935, p. 68.

[57]Rose Leibbrand, "America's Economic Foothold in China" *China Weekly Review*, vol. 53, 16 August 1930, p. 415.

[58]Ibid. In 1928 exports from the United States to the Kwantung leased territories were G $4,227,000 and the imports G $2,650,000. This was essentially trade with Manchuria and so should also be reckoned in trade with China. See *China Weekly by Review*, Vol. 47, 15 December 1928, p. 34.

[59]China Weekly Review, Vol. 47, 15 December 1928, p. 34 gives a detailed list of articles and their quantum exported to and imported from China to America in 1928.

U.S. Exports to China

Cotton	87,000	bales
Flour	523,000	bar
Donglas Fir	120,394,000	feet
Fuel Oil	710,000	barrels
Gasoline	129,000	barrels
Kerosene	2,992,000	barrels
Lubricating	274,000	barrels
Paraffin	36,000	lbs.
Steel	6,378	$US
Copper	6,132,000	lbs.
Dyes	11,330,000	lbs
Cigarettees	5,965,000	mille
Tobacco	81,627,000	lbs.
Paper and Products	1,254,000	lbs.
Machinery	3,247,000	$US
Silver	68,826,000	ounces
Electric goods	1,519,000	$US
Autos and Trucks	269,086	$US

U.S. Imports from China

Raw Silk	7,484,999	lbs.

Waste Silk	3,439,000	lbs.
Carpet wool	404,249,000	lbs.
Goat Skins	5,745,000	pcs.
Carpet	300,000	yrds.
Wood Oil	79,264,000	lbs.
Bristles	1,939,000	lbs.
Tea	5,185,000	lbs.
Peanuts, shelled	41,144,000	lbs.
Antimony	3,490,000	lbs.
Egg products	4,512,000	lbs.
Furs	14,380,000	$ US
Silk Fabrics	2,407,000	yrds.
Cotton	25,800,000	lbs.

[60]Leibbrand, n. 57, p. p. 415. The Haikwan Tael was merely a "book currency" which did not exist in reality. It was used for the valuation of all Chinese imports and exports. (Gold Parity – 66.85 cents = 1 Shanghai Tael) (No regular parity). See Frederick V. Field, ed., *Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area* (Garden City, N. Y., 1934), pp. 327,320.

[61]Ibid. The total value of Sino-American trade in 1920 was Hk. Tls. 210.3 million. In 1930 it rose to Hk.Tls. 364.3 million. See Harold M. Vinacke, *A History of the Far East to Modern Times*, Fifth Edition (New York, 1950), p. 478. In U.S. $, in 1928 American export trade to China amounted to $138,000,000, see U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States. Colonial Times to 1957.* (Washington D.C. 1960), p. 550.

[62]Benson-Currie, "The China Market – A Survey", *China Weekly Review* vol. 53, 23 August 1930, p. 152. Although Hongkong was the second largest exporter to China yet large portion of its credit went to Britain because Hongkong was a British settlement and the Britishers were the first foreign traders to develop commerce on a large scale in China. See *Leibbrand, n. 57, p. 415.*

[63]Currie, n. 62, p. 152.

[64]Ibid. It gives total volume of trade as Hk. Tls. 1,297,008,000. It should be Hk. Tls. 2,297, 008,000. In 1929 Hk. Tl. 1 was equivalent to $0.64. See Wan, n. 53, p. 4.

[65]Moh, n. 56 p. 68.

[66]Fang Fu-an, n. 55, p. 311.

[67]Moh, n. 56, p. 68.

[68]The following is the list for both secured and unsecured loans to the Chinese Government:

	U.S. Gold ($)
Hukuang Rly. loan	7,994,165
Continental & Commercial Trust & Savings Bank of Chicago Loan	9,130,000
Pacific Development Corporation Loan	9,969,666
Grand Canal Loan	1,656,000
Other Unsecured Loans	146,590

Private Loans from American Commercial firms		11,814,922
Chinese Government Bonds subscribed by American interests (estimate)		1,000,000
	Total U.S. Gold	$41,711,346

Source: Ibid.

[69]Ibid. *Far Eastern Review,* January 1930, gives another estimate. "There are several estimates for American investments in China. Prof. Remer places the missionary investment at $50,000,000 with an annual expenditure for upkeep, of $10,000,000 including the Rockefeller Institute." Quoted in Fang Fu-an, n. 55, p. 311.

[70]Robert T. Ferrel, *American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933* (New Haven, 1957), p. 2.

[71]Ibid., pp. 2-3.

[72]For a graphic description of the wall street crash see John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Great Crash: 1929* (London, 1955), pp. 86-102; Mitchel, n. 52, pp. 28-30.

[73]Galbraith, n. 72, p. 152. Intensity of the depression, however, began to decline after Franklin D. Roosevelt came to the White House and Adolf Hitler to the Reichschancery in Berlin in 1933. See Goronwy Rees, *The Great Slump: Capitalism in Crisis, 1929-33.* (London, 1970), p. 280.

[74]Galbraith, n. 72, p. 152. For a clear picture of the State of American national production see Murray N. Rothbard, *America's Great Depression* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1963), pp. 296-304.

[75]Rees, n. 73, p. 121. The fall in the price of silver also contributed to world-wide depression.

[76]United States trade with China (Five Year Averages; in millions of dollars, and as percent of total Imports and Exports):

	Value		Percent	
	Imports	*Exports*	*Imports*	*Exports*
1910-14	38.5	31.4	2.3	1.4
1921-25	160.7	128.7	4.7	2.9
1926-30	155.9	134.6	3.9	2.8
1931-35	55.5	75.6	3.2	3.7

See Miriam S. Farley, "America's Stake in the Far East, I, Trade", *Far Eastern Survey (New York), vol. V, 29 July 1936, p. 168.*

[77]Similar view was expressed in the U.S. Senate on 10 December 1931 by Senator Key Pittman of Nevada who happened to be the Chairman of a sub-committee of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, appointed to enquire into the causes of decline in the Sino-American trade. See *Congressional Record,* 72, I, 10 December 1931, vol. 75, p. 290.

[78]From 1932 onwards the value of exports (including reexports) of U.S. merchandise to China was always less than $500,000. See *Historical Statistics of the United States,* n. 61, p. 550.

CHANG HSUEH-LIANG ON THE SIAN INCIDENT*

by

Jiu-Hwa Lo Upshur

Introduction

Forty years have elapsed since the Sian Incident, December 12-25, 1936. The event refers to the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and General Yang Hu-cheng. Sian, the site of the incident, was the headquarters of the anti-Communist campaign in Shensi province. Chang was the commander-in-chief of the anti-Communist campaign and his Manchurian or Northeastern troops formed the nucleus of the command. Yang, commander of the Northwestern army, was Pacification Commissioner of Shensi. He also had the task of assisting Chang.

Since the summer of 1936, the Manchurian troops had been reluctant to fight their designated enemies. They were weary with the seemingly endless civil wars and their feelings were shared by others in China. Since 1931, Japan had been relentlessly advancing against China, and with increasing success. More Chinese were concluding that it was time to stop civil wars, unite all Chinese and resist Japan.

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*Translation based on an article by Chang Hsueh-liang originally titled "Sian shi-pien chang-hui-lu, che yao" (A Penitent's Account of the Sian Incident, Summary), Hsi Wang (The Hope Magazine), No. 1, July 1, 1964, pp. 12-16, Taiwan.

The students spearheaded this movement, which became known as the National Salvation Movement. These students found their most ardent supporters in Chang Hsueh-liang and the Manchurian army. They gravitated towards Sian, as did other so-called "anti-civil war, pro-united front" elements.

But Chiang Kai-shek maintained that it was necessary to eliminate the Communists first and only then would China resist Japan. Consequently, Nanking continued its appeasement policy towards Japan while waging war against the Chinese Communists. During the latter part of 1936, Chiang had begun to send his own crack units to combat in Shensi to bolster the faltering efforts of the Manchurian army.

On December 9, 1936, Chiang arrived in Sian, personally to supervise another anti-Communist push. He was deaf to Chang's advice to stop the civil war. Feeling greatly frustrated and also slighted, Chang and Yang decided to kidnap Chiang. In Chinese terms, this was called a "ping chien", the detention of a ruler to force advice upon him. It occurred at dawn on December 12, 1936, when Chiang and his entire entourage were made captives. Most of them remained prisoners until December 25, when as the finale to a fortnight of bizarre events, Chiang was freed, as were his staff, and were flown back to Nanking, accompanied by Chang. Chang went on his own volition, indeed on his insistence, to do penance for his actions. A court martial subsequently sentenced him to ten years imprisonment. Almost immediately, Chiang granted Chang a special pardon but has kept him in protective custody ever since.

The passage of time and other circumstances have removed some of the principals from the living. Among the main participants in the Sian negotiations, five have died. William Henry Donald, the Australian advisor to Chiang, and erstwhile advisor to Chang also, died during the war. He did not publish any notes or memoirs on the incident. Yang Hu-cheng was shot by Kuomintang authorities and in 1949, prior to the Communist victory, T.V. Soong and, more recently, Chiang Kai-shek and Chou En-lai have died. Chou, who represented the Chinese Communist Party in the Sian negotiations, never gave his version of the proceedings. Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang published their official accounts of the events almost immediately afterwards. But what about Chang Hsueh-liang? Except for some communiques issued in his name between December 12-15, 1936, outsiders, for decades, were unable to learn anything directly from him. Some of his former subordinates have later rendered their accounts of what took place in Sian. But these were, at best, peripheral views.

On July 1, 1964, a magazine on Taiwan called *Hsi Wang* published Chang Hsueh-liang's account entitled "A Penitent's Account of the Sian Incident—Summary". The account is important for two reasons. Aside from it shedding light on his personality, conflicts and motives, it also revealed some new material on the background of the incident and the course it took. He also talked about some of the complex personal relationships prevailing at that time—his seemingly filial re-

gard for Chiang; mutual mistrust between him and Yang Hu-cheng; and his fascination with and admiration of Chou En-lai, especially for the latter's skill as a negotiator.

Obviously, Chang did not tell the entire story. He did not mention the contents or substance of the negotiations and did not hint at any concessions and agreements with the Communist Party, either verbal or otherwise, as conditions for Chiang's release. Below is a summary of a 'summary', with much of the author's moralizing and repetitions omitted. The account sheds some light on an interesting man and his role in an important event in recent Chinese history.

A Penitent's Account of the Sian Incident-Summary
by
Chang Hsueh-liang

One of my strongest feelings has been bitter hatred for the Japanese for their aggressions against China. As a child, I witnessed their brutality in Manchuria. As I grew older and became more aware of nationhood . . . the violent end of my father [at Japanese hands] and the brutal September 18th Incident filled me with deep and boundless hatred. Realization of my lack of power and China's weakness led me to think more and more of national matters.

I was compelled to work on projects for which I felt no commitment. My aim in returning to China [in 1934] was to do the preparatory work for a future war with Japan. . .My initial with upon arrival in Shanghai was to be appointed as the chief of the Generalissimo's aide-de-camp corps. My reasons were as follows: I had never worked in a subordinate position to anyone and I wished to learn by working under Chiang Kung.[1] I also hoped that by working under him, we would be able to establish a deeper mutual understanding. In addition, I wished to establish more frequent contact with my colleagues in the central government so that in the event of war with Japan, we would be able to co-operate more fully. . . On my return to China [I also desired], first of all, to disassociate myself with the army and not resume command of the Manchuria troops, so as to sever my private and emotional ties with them. Nor did I wish to participate in any further civil wars. But in the end, my wishes were frustrated.

Chiang Kung gave me two choices: to direct a campaign against the bandit forces of Liu Kuei-tang or to fight the Communists along the border areas of the three provinces.[2] I wished neither. But because of my affection for him [Chiang] and my sense of obedience to a superior, I unhesitatingly accepted the more difficult campaign against the Communists. . . Later, when Chiang Kung ordered me to be in charge of reorganizing the troops, I felt excited as this seemed exactly to coincide with my wishes to prepare for war against Japan. But the appointment did not materialize, which for me was a major blow. When the Communists fled to Shensi, I hoped that my task was at end. I wished to proceed to Hupei for the training of my troops. But order came for me to go to Shensi. . . I indicated to Chiang

Kung my wish to go overseas again; but upon further thought, I decided to go as ordered, as I had come to realize Shensi's potential as a bastion against Japan. I was also swayed by the thought that there were but a few thousand Communist troops under their Shensi leader, Liu Tze-tan, and by the fact that the government leader in Shensi was an old friend, who had indicated his welcome to me already. . .

After my arrival in Shensi, I built hospitals, planned to construct a plant for manufacturing hospital supplies, bought land at Pingliang, and began major building projects, as living quarters for families of the military and a new campus for the Northeastern University. I also organized training schools. I did not ask the government for funds for any of these projects, for they were part of my private plans for future resistance against Japan. My original plan was quickly to deal with the Liu Tze-tan bandit group. But unexpectedly, the whole body of Szechwan Communists began to arrive in Shensi.[3] This was my second disappointment.

I remember one morning in Nanking. During our motor car trip to attend the graduation ceremony at the Military Police Headquarters, I began to tell Chiang Kung about the feelers I have had from the Communists which indicated their willingness to surrender. I wished also to take the opportunity to tell of my meetings with Chou En-lai; but, at that point, we arrived[4] . . . That evening I intended to take up the subject again. But Chiang Kung had already become angered with me over the question of appropriations for the Northeastern Army, had reprimanded me and indicated that I should hasten back to my post. So I did not dare persist and, thus, missed an opportunity. Later, I met Chiang Kung at Loyang together with Mr. Yen Pai-chuan [Hsi-shan]. I had hoped for another opportunity to present my case. But, after inspecting the troops, Chiang Kung had made a speech in which he bitterly castigated the Communists as the greatest traitors and excoriated those who advocated co-operation with them as worse than Yin Ju-keng [the East Hopei quisling leader]. With this dash of cold water, I concluded that my pleas were hopeless. Bitterly disappointed, I returned to my room and wept.

In the period after the Fifth Party Congress [November 1935], what I saw and heard during my stay in Nanking contributed greatly to my emotional turmoil. As I recall them today, they were briefly as follows:

1. The ridicule and admonition of friends.

2. The angry disapproval of the young radical comrades who deplored my associations with the so-called pro-Japanese groups.

3. The actions and statements of Sun Feng-min, who had attempted to assassinate Wang [Ching-wei].

4. The bickerings within the Party, mainly for selfish, rarely for public purposes.

5. My supposition that many of the comrades in responsible positions within the central government were not enthusiastic about opposing Japan, but

were secretly pro-Japanese. It seemed to me that those who were truly dedicated to opposing Japan were either appointed to positions outside Nanking or were not in power at all.

6. I interpreted Wang Chao-ming's [Ching-wei] announced principles of simultaneously negotiating with and resisting Japan as directed against his domestic enemies rather than the external foe.

I returned to Shensi immediately after hearing of the failure of our campaign in the northern part of that province. First to be destroyed [by the Communists] was the 110th Division. Next, the 109th Division was annihilated. Its commander, Niu Yuan-feng, refused to surrender and died. Both commanders were outstanding officers of the Northeastern Army. . . These two bitter defeats redoubled my feelings of misery and bitterness. They reinforced my old conviction of the wastefulness of sacrificing the best officer material in civil wars. Nor did I, as a result, underestimate the fighting abilities of the Communists. From that point, my mind was turned to the strategy of using peaceful methods to solve the Communist problem.

Upon my return to Shensi, I convened a conference. In order to spur on my units to greater efforts, I threatened . . . to resign my command. To my surprise, they . . . became hostile. One group reacted thus: "We, Northeasterners, abandoned our native land and followed you into the Great Walls. In our hearts we all wish one day to return together. Now in times of extreme difficulty, how can you become so heartless as to abandon us to our fates?" Another group said: "You have forgotten your duty to avenge your father and have lost heart on the great anti-Japanese mission. In your blind obedience to superior, you only seek to preserve your personal position. The foremost mission of the Northeastern Army is to fight Japan. But you do not care about the welfare of the Northeastern Army and are heedless about sacrificing them and forcing them to certain destruction."

At about the same time, the Communists began a major propaganda campaign to stop the civil war and to promote united efforts to resist Japan. Their propaganda became increasingly attractive to me and to most of the Northeastern Army, at least to the younger elements in it. Further offensives against the Communists were unsuccessful. I began to ask myself the reasons for the failure and to ask the opinions of like-minded people. I received advice to get in touch with the Communists, to co-operate with Yang Hu-cheng, to stop the anti-Communist campaign and to preserve my real strength and to seek a joint anti-Japanese effort. I cannot shirk responsibility and lay blame on others, for though many of these suggestions came from others, they were also the advice I sought to hear.

Since at that time I did not know the real motives of the Communists, it was necessary to establish contact with them in order to find out their intentions. Since I have had no personal dealings with the Communists, I sent a member of my staff to see Li Tu again and make inquiries.[5] In response, Li sent a represen-

tative to see me. His name was Liu Ting and he said that he had joined the Communist party, been arrested and then released on bond. He said that he was not a pleni-potentiary delegate, but that he could get in touch with responsible persons in the Communist party in Shanghai. Through his introduction, the Communist leaders indicated their willingness to talk to me in person, but said that they dared not come to Sian. Instead I went to Shanghai and met a man at a Western style restaurant at a suburb to the west of the city (he did not tell me his name, but according to Liu, he was probably Pan Han-nien). Our conversation never reached the key issue, probably because of my patronizing attitude, and also his hedging.

The Communists returned most of my officers whom they had taken prisoner. Their declared reason was that they regarded the Northeastern Army as "fellow travellers", since both sides were primarily interested in resisting Japan. . . Then Wang I-che [one of Chang's top aides] telegraphed me to say that the Communists had sent to his headquarters a representative who requested to see me personally. . I flew to Lochuan and met that man. He called himself Li K'e-ning. I did not know then what position he held in the Communist party. The main conditions he raised during our discussions were substantially the same as those raised by the Communist party later. My reply to him was that if his side were sincere, we would be able to accept their terms. But I expressed doubt as to his position and whether he could speak for his party, and asked to see a leader, either Mao Tse-tung or Chou En-lai. He replied that the conditions he raised were all agreed to by the whole leadership and that if I were sincere, he could arrange to have Mao or Chou come to see me. Immediately after our meeting, he returned north and obtained the reply that Chou-En-lai was willing to accompany him on the next meeting, and requested an appointment of location and date. . . I replied with no hesitation, invited Chou to come, and ordered division commander Chou Fu-chen to take charge of the reception.

One night I met Chou En-lai at a Catholic church in Yenan and we talked for two or three hours.[6] I told Chou that the central government was taking active steps in preparing to resist Japan and that Chiang Kung was truly a patriot. We had a prolonged debate. Chou inquired about the Three Principles of Hirota. I replied that Chiang Kung would never accede to them. Chou conceded that Chiang Kung was a patriot and that in order to resist Japan, it was necessary to rally to his leadership. But he expressed doubts about [Chiang's] associates, and vehemently contended that if the central government were really bent on resisting Japan, then why did they persist in trying to destroy the Communist party, the one group that had unequivocably demonstrated its hatred for Japan and its unyielding determination to resist her? He added that, in order to resist Japan, the Communist party had decided to return to its former relationship with the Kuomintang and accept Chiang Kung's leadership. He proceeded to propose the following conditions, roughly as follows:

1. Communist armed units to be reorganized and trained in preparation for resisting Japan.

2. Guarantee of non-fraudulence, no confiscation of weapons.

3. Communist units in Kiangsi, Hainan and Ta Pieh Shan and other locations to be granted the same conditions of reorganization.

4. Abolition of the title of Red Army in return for the same pay and treatment as the national army.

5. Communist party to be forbidden to function in the military.

6. Communist party to cease all class struggles.

7. Release of all Communist political prisoners. Communist party to be allowed freedom to pursue its activities except those of opposing the government and attacking the leader.

8. Non-military [Communist] party members to be allowed to reside in north Shensi.

9. After victory against Japan, the Communist party to be allowed to become a lawful political party as they are in such democracies as Britain and the United States.

Chou further proposed that if I still had doubts regarding their sincerity and honesty, he was willing to submit to surveillance. . . Whereupon, impulsively, I accepted his statements, and added that both on personal and national scores, I would be second to none in coming forth to resist Japan. But since I had superior authorities, I could not make independent decisions. However, I pledged to do my utmost to persuade Chiang Kung to accept these conditions. We, then, made promises not to go back on our words. . .

After this meeting with Chou En-lai, I felt elated, thinking that, henceforth, the nation would enjoy internal peace so that all energies can be directed to resisting Japan. When I recollect these events today, I realize how pitifully naive I was then. As a fervent nationalist, I bitterly resented being the victim of aggression. I was unwilling to accept Japanese oppression, just as I had been unwilling to submit to Russian oppression. Without weighing my strength, I had moved to recover our rights in Manchuria from the Russians [in 1929]. As later events proved, those Communists. . . whom I regarded as patriots against Japan were, in reality and as Chiang Kung had already recognized, "first rate traitors". . .

After my return to Shensi from Loyang, I replied to the Communists that, at present, I was unable to present my plans for a ceasefire to Chiang Kung. After mutual consultations, we agreed on a temporary and partial ceasefire and resolved that I would assume responsibility to explain the situation to Chiang Kung at a later date. The Communists sent Yeh Chien-ying to see me. He brought with him plans for a mutual cessation of hostilities and a letter from Mao Tse-tung in which he pledged to cooperate with me under the urgent cause of resisting Japan, and to put his troops under my directions. I requested that they withdraw further north, so that the two sides are physically separated, to allow me time for the maturing

of my plans. They indicated their need for padded winter clothing and other supplies. . . From my personal funds, I gave them a large sum of money with which to buy the supplies. Thereupon, the Communists evacuated Wayaop'u and marched north in three columns. Around that time, the Communist party established an office in Sian, as did the Salvation League and Student Association . . . I also gave some of my private funds to support the strike of workers in Japanese owned mills in Shanghai. . .

All sorts of unfortunate incidents added fuel to the burning embers. Some of the events which caused static among my troops were: First, our requests [to Nanking] for pensions for widows and orphans, for supplies and for permission to recruit were all rejected. Second, no Northeastern units were included in the relief army for Suiyuan [to aid General Fu Tso-yi's resistance against Japanese and puppet troops]. . . My feelings of dissatisfaction with certain comrades in the central government strengthened my anger and suspicions, and my conviction that I must realize the dreams that were shaping in my mind.

I pursued my goal in the following manner. First, I implored Chiang Kung to adopt what I regarded as my brilliant strategy. I pleaded for the acceptance of the Communist party [by the Kuomintang] as in the days . . . under the Tsungli [Sun Yat-sen]. I believed that this would stimulate the government to renew itself and to create a new image before the people. I also promoted the idea that civil wars should stop and that all should unite to resist Japan. . . I was convinced of the purity and righteousness of my ideals, and this made me determined to realize my goals regardless of the sacrifice. At that juncture, I had formed no plans to resort to kidnapping tactics. . .

In all honesty, it must be said that, in the Sian Incident, Yang Hu-cheng's role was a subordinate one, and that he became implicated in it because of me. But this is not to say that he played no part in its formative stages. Right after the 110th Division met with disaster, plans were drawn up for renewed campaign to surround the Communists. In this scheme, Yang was entrusted with the campaign along the Ichuan front. He vented his disgruntled feelings to me on this assignment. He said that he was receiving neither funds nor succor, and termed the extermination campaign a "life sentence". He added that since even the numerous central units and best Northeastern units were unable to exterminate the Communists, what could be expected of his meager forces? Although, I comforted him with kind words, I indicated that, though sympathetic, I was unable to help him. But, in order to encourage him, I gave him aid to the sum of one hundred thousand yuan. Later, after the defeat of the 109th Division, I also indicated to him my weariness with the extermination business. Just as we were establishing some rapport, a pamphlet appeared, titled *Huo lu.* It advocated cooperation between Northeastern and Northwestern peoples for the purpose of resisting Japan. (This pamphlet was authored by Kao Tsung-min.) Although at this time, I had not told Yang Hu-cheng of my plans of collusion with the Communists, he, at a certain point, became aware of them. As to the real nature of Yang's relationship with the Communist

party and how he came to collaborate with them, I remain ignorant of the details. (At that time, on Yang's staff was a Wang Ping-nan whom I now know to have been a Communist.) Yang was deeply sympathetic to the goals of stopping civil wars, and unity to oppose Japan. He spurred me on to tender this advice to Chiang Kung. . .

I was disheartened and disappointed when I returned from Loyang. I told Yang of my doubts that Chiang Kung would accept our views and of my dissastisfaction with him. I also asked Yang whether he had any good plans for stopping the civil war and converting Chiang Kung to our views . . . Yang asked me in return whether I was really determined to resist Japan. Upon my oath of sincerity, Yang offered that since Chiang Kung was coming to Sian, we could kidnap him, thus, forcing him to adopt our policy. I was startled by the suggestion, and reflecting, did not reply. He began to betray fear, whereupon I assured him as follows: "Fear not, because I do not betray my friends to obtain gains and rewards . . . but as for your plan, I do not think I can comply." He retorted by taunting me and said: "You are emotional and think of private obligations at the expense of public ones." I then said: "Let me consider and think things over. But do not worry, as I absolutely will not tell anyone of your thoughts." When Chiang Kung came to Sian from Loyang, I followed him in and out, as I feared that others might mutiny. Little did I know that I was ultimately the criminal one.

While Chiang Kung was staying at Hua Ching Ch'ih [outside Sian], I had two talks with him, both of which, but especially the one on December 9th, left me emotionally upset. In addition, Chiang Kung had convened several general officers' meetings, to all of which Yang Hu-cheng and I had been excluded. This caused fear in both Yang and me, and I was especially suspicious and fearful lest Chiang Kung no longer held me in esteem and trust. So Yang and I began to consult and conspire to seize him, in order to force him to accept our plans. At this time, we did not seek the advice of, nor did we consult the Communists, and besides Yang, only a few people knew of our plans. It was after the incident had begun that I asked Chou En-lai to come [to Sian]. My main purpose in wanting to consult him in working out a joint plan was due to my realization of the inability of mine and Yang's subordinates, and because of Nanking's course of action.[8]

When Chou and his staff arrived at Sian, he told me that they were extremely surprised when they heard of the Sian Incident. He said that the Communists were split into two camps on this issue ---- the more radical group, and Yeh Chien-ying was among them, advocated a course of action unfavorable to Chiang Kung. Another group, which included Chou, advocated a peaceful solution and personal support for Chiang Kung. He reaffirmed support to our agreement at Yenan, that in case there was no hope of a peaceful settlement [with Nanking], the Communist pledged not to be neutral, but to share our fate, arm their men and obey my overall command. Thus he [Chou] joined our already established council. The slogan then current in Sian, "Three-in-One", referred to unity between the Northeastern Army, the Northwestern Army and the Communists. After discussions, it was decided to hold firm to our eight demands. This was not a propaganda ploy. All we

wanted was that government acceded to our sincere demands. The only point added to our plan was that we would continue under Chiang Kung's leadership. There are records of my speech to the entire staff or the Northwest Bandit Extermination Headquarters and to the public meeting at Hsiching Park which will corroborate my statement here. Also there must be now in Taiwan some of those then in Sian who, unless they have ulterior motives, will bear witness to me, that in my public statements, I advocated giving our support to Chiang Kung as our leader.

Speaking of the Sian events, my heart is filled with regrets. Before the Incident, I did not consult the Communists. When I observed the scene after the Incident began, I felt immensely saddened and remorseful. The incompetence of my staff filled me with bitterness. The indiscipline of Yang's units gave me much disquiet. I regretted my own careless speech and realized our unworthiness vis-a-vis the immense task of resisting Japan and saving our nation. I felt agitated, did not know what to do and had no one to consult. I established two committees and wired Chou En-lai asking him to come to Sian immediately to help find a solution. Two or three days later, Chou and two others came. One of those in Chou's party was Po Ku. The other one I do not recall . . . Chou became respected as the mastermind of events in Sian. . . .

When the time came to discuss Chiang Kung's departure from Sian, Yang Hu-cheng and I began to disagree. I reprimanded Yang and reminded him that our original motive was to sacrifice all to persuade Chiang Kung to lead us against Japan. I said that since we have read his diary and have satisfied ourselves on his determination to resist Japan, and also since he has permitted us to present our other views before the central government, our goals have been achieved. Thus we ought not to shrink from danger or death. I added that, if personal factors were so important to him, he should not have joined the movement in the first place. I became so agitated and abusive that I nearly split with Yang. It was Chou En-lai who broke the impasse. He asked me to take a brief rest and permit him to talk things over. Ultimately, he convinced Yang. To me, since our anti-Japanese goals have been satisfied, other considerations were minor and should not be permitted to cause delays. I also felt that nothing should be allowed to cause backsliding from our initial commitment. . . So I fought for my point of view. My situation, at that point, was extremely difficult. On the one hand, I did my utmost to insure the security of Chiang Kung. But he refused to dissemble and persisted in his determination to die if necessary. He reprimanded us and sternly refused to accept any requests under duress, no matter how legitimate. He also refused any discussions with us. This was my situation vis-a-vis Chiang Kung. I was also concerned with convincing my subordinates and persuading them not to expand the incident. Then there was Chiang Kung's attitude toward me, which was an extremely ambivalent one. On the one hand, he hated me as the bitterest enemy; but it was also clear that he was torn by feelings of love and protectiveness towards me, as though I were his own kin. The complexities of the situation were truly unprecedented. . . .

The most important element in the incident, at this time, was I, myself. I

was filled with fears and worries, yet I was reckless and self-possessed in action and mindless of consequences. I lacked any deep research and accurate knowledge of the Communists. . . And what were my strong points? I was strong in being obsessively worried, very angry, pleasure loving, fearful and suspicious. By natural disposition, I was bold but indiscreet, self-centered, conceited and immature. In the last analysis, these defects in my personality are the root causes of the Sian Incident.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Chiang Kai-shek is referred to as Chiang Kung, an address of respect.

[2]The three provinces referred to are Kiangsi, Fukien and Kwangtung, although Chang does not mention them by name.

[3]Chang must be referring to the entrance to northern Shensi of the remnant Communist troops at the end of the Long March. The choice of northern Shensi by the Chinese Communist Party was partly predicated by the existence of local Communist guerrilla troops.

[4]It is not clear whether Chang is referring to the meeting with Chou En-lai mentioned later in the text as there is no clear time sequence followed.

[5]Li Tu was a Manchurian officer and former subordinate of Chang. When Chang was still in Hupei on anti-Communist campaign, he had sent Li and two other Manchurian officers, in a scheme of Li's instigation, to attempt to enter northern Manchuria from the U.S.S.R.. The aim of this mission was to rally former Manchurian units in northern Manchuria to undertake guerrilla warfare against Japan, and also to establish contact with Communist guerrilla units already active in the area. The scheme failed and the three men went no further than Germany. Chang does not explain whether Li had already developed contacts with the Chinese Communist Party prior to his attempted return to Manchuria.

[6]Yenan was under Chang's control at the time.

[7]The title translates as The Path to Life.

[8]On December 16, 1936, the Nanking government announced the launching of a punitive expedition against Chang and Yang and entrusted its direction to general Ho Ying-ch'in.

Chinese names and terms used:

Chiang Kung	Chou Fu-chen
Ho Li-chung	Niu Yuan-feng
Hot'ao	Pan Han-nien
Hsi Wang	Pingliang
Hua Ching Ch'ih	Po Ku
Huo Lu	Sun Feng-min
Ichuan	Ta Pieh Shan
Kao Tsun-min	Wang I-che

Li K'e-nung

Li Tu

Liu Ting

Liu Kuei-tang

Liu Tze-tang

Lochuan

Wang Ping-nan

Wayaop'u

Yeh Chien-ying

Yen Pai-chuan

Yin Ju-keng

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE PARTY IN CHINA DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD FROM 1967-1976

by

Leo Y. Liu

Introduction

The Chinese Communist leaders have maintained that the Communist Party of China (hereafter, the Party), should always lead the army.[1] As Party Chairman, Mao Tse-tung (hereafter, Mao) said,

> all our officers and fighters must always bear in mind that we are the great people's Liberation Army, we are the troops led by the great Communist Party of China.[2]

During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (hereafter, CR) in China (1965-1968), the above principle was still being maintained!

> Our Principle is that the party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party.[3]

At the same time, the Chinese leaders also fully recognize and appreciate the essential role played by the army. Mao, for example, has pointed out that experience in class struggle "teaches us that it is only by the power of the gun that the working class and labouring masses can defeat the armed bourgeoisie and landlords. In this sense we may say that with guns the whole world can be transformed."[4]

> The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement for the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and for all other countries.[5]

Therefore, the army as an essential instrument must be kept strong:

> According to the Marxist theory of the state, the army is the chief component of state power. Whoever wants to seize and retain state power must have a strong army.[6]

The Chinese leaders further pointed out, "every Communist must grasp the truth, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun".[7]

Furthermore, they do not regard the army as merely a fighting force. To them, the army is also a political force:

> The Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political task of the revolution. . . . The Red Army should certainly not contain itself to fighting; besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength, it should shoulder such important tasks as doing propaganda among the masses, organizing the masses, arming them, helping them to establish revolutionary political power, and setting up Party organizations.[8]

In addition to encouraging the army (i.e., Red Army or the PLA) to become a political force, Mao also urged them to involve themselves with more party work. In 1942, for example, Mao called for the elevation of such militarily responsible persons as commanders, political commissars and directors of the political department in the army to various parts of party organizations.[9] It has become clear here that "political commissars" are part of the "militarily responsible persons".[10]

In the light of the Chinese leaders' emphasis on the supremacy of the party, on the one hand, and their insistence on the essential role of the army, on the other, this paper will examine the relationships between the army and the party in China from 1967 to the present.

This particular period has been chosen for this study because it has witnessed a series of events which seem to be crucial to the relationship between the army and the party. These events, among others, were:

1) The CR which started in 1965 finally came to an end in 1968 after the military intervention in 1967.

2) The Ninth National Party Congress of the Party was held in 1969.

3) A large number of members of the party apparatus were either purged or dismissed between 1967 and 1971. Many key figures were purged, among them Liu Shao-chi, (hereafter, Liu), and Teng Hsiao-ping (hereafter, Teng).

4) Lin Piao, the Defense Minister, and a Party Vice-Chairman, and many key military leaders in the PLA who supported Chairman Mao during the CR (hereafter Lin Piao faction) were promoted to prominent positions. Lin Piao, after the CR, became the sole "Vice-Chairman" of the Party and the officially designated successor of Chairman Mao.

5) The Tenth National Party Congress was held in 1973. At the Congress, the Lin faction was either dismissed or removed from their key positions in both the party and the army. However, the powers of Chairman Mao and his supporters, Premier Chou En-lai (hereafter Chou) and Chiang Ch'ing (Mrs. Mao, hereafter, Chiang), remained intact.

6) In 1975, the Fourth National People's Congress was convened.

7) Finally, after Chou's death in February, 1976, Teng was severely attacked. The campaign against Teng and his faction has since been intensified.[11]

The Emergence of Military Prominence

At the beginning of the CR or before 1967, Mao probably did not plan to involve the army.[12] His initial plan was, probably, to replace the party apparatus which was dominated by the Liu/Teng faction. There was even less evidence that he intended to replace the party apparatus permanently with the military apparatus.[13]

However, in or around 1966, Mao began to experience strong resistance from the party apparatus of all the six Regional Party Bureaus. Consequently, in January 1967, an order was officially issued by the Central Committee of the Party, the State Council, the Military Affairs Commission of the CC, and the Central CR Group of the CC to the Army to intervene in the CR in support of the Maoist faction.[14] The joint order announced the "resolute support of the PLA for the revolutionary masses of the Left."

> The People's Liberation Army is a proletarian revolutionary army personally created by Chairman Mao. . . . In this great struggle of the proletariat to seize power from the bourgeoisie, the PLA must firmly take the side of the proletarian revolutionaries and resolutely support and help the proletarian revolutionary Leftists.[15]

The type of assistance the army was expected to render to the "revolutionary Leftists" was also specified:

> Active support must be rendered to the broad masses of revolutionary Leftists in their struggle to seize power. When genuine proletarian Leftists ask the army for help, the army should send out troops to support them positively.
>
> Counter-revolutionaries and counter-revolutionary organizations who oppose the proletarian revolutionary Leftists must be resolutely suppressed. Should they resort to force, the army should strike back with force.[16]

By the end of 1967, the army had taken over most of the responsibilities which normally belonged to the central and local civilian government and party organization.[17] All provincial and municipal governments were being gradually replaced by the "Revolutionary Committees." Each Revolutionary Committee was required to consist of three groups: The "revolutionary mass organizations (i.e. CR faction)", the PLA (the military faction, mainly Lin's faction), and the "revolutionary cadres (i.e., the Maoist party faction)".[18]

By the end of 1968, all 29 Revolutionary Committees were set up. The military dominated almost all key positions in the Committees. For example, 24 of the 29 Chairmen of the Committees were military cadres, while only 8 were Maoist party faction members.[19] Thus, the military not only directly intervened in the CR to purge the party cadres of the Liu/Teng faction, but also controlled almost all local governments in China.

At the 9th Party Congress held in April, 1969, Lin Piao in his "political report" pointed out that the PLA was "the mighty pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat."[20]

At the same time, a new Central Committee (hereafter, CC) with 170 full members and 109 alternate members, was elected. The military obviously had dominated the CC: (Table 1)

Table 1

Distribution of Power in the 9th CC (%)

	Military Cadres	Maoist Party Cadres	CR Faction Cadres	Total* %	N
Full Members	42.9	34.1	23.0	100	168
Full and Alternate members	44.3	27.5	28.2	100	265

Of the 21 full members of the 9th Political Bureau (Politburo), 11 were from the military (e.g. Lin Piao, Yeh Chien-yin, Hsieh Fu-chih, Huang Yung-sheng).[22]

[Only those members with known background are considered.]

Sources: see note 21.

By August 1971, the re-organization of all 29 municipal Party Committees was completed. The purge of party cadres in the Liu/Teng faction was quite extensive. Of the 67 secretaries and alternate secretaries in the now abolished six Regional Party Bureaus throughout China in 1966, 37 were purged and 17 were either dismissed or suspended.[23] In the local Party Committees, 20 of the 29 first secretaries in 1966 were purged.[24]

In the 29 new Party Committees established in 1971, the army dominated most of the key positions, 22 of the 29 first secretaries were military cadres. (Tables 5 and 7)

Therefore, both during and after the CR, the military appeared to have dominated the party apparatus. It also appeared that the fundamental doctrine that the Party must always command the army had been discarded.

The Maoist faction seemed to have anticipated such a tendency. A closer look at the events which occurred during the CR has indicated that from the very beginning, the Maoist faction already called for the re-building of the Party and its centralized leadership. They have also taken steps to reduce the power of the military. The rest of the paper will be examining these steps during the period from 1967 to the present.

Party Rebuildings and the Promotion of Centralized Party Leadership

As mentioned above, the military intervention during the CR was ordered by the CC of the Party and its Military Affairs Commission. Reportedly, the army intervened in the CR only reluctantly.[25] Moreover, even during the intervention, the army was always under the constant supervision of the party. Thus, in April, 1967, when the army began to antagonize the CR faction, the Military Affairs Commission immmediately issued an order which severely curtailed the power of the military.[26] In March, 1968 while in the midst of the CR, Lin Piao's first lieutenant, Yang Cheng-wu, the Acting Chief-of-Staff of the PLA, was dismissed by Mao. Lin Piao reluctantly complied with the order without any signs of resistance.[27] Furthermore, in 1969, Mao accused Lin Piao and his faction of over-purging the Liu/Teng Faction during the CR and of over-reacting to some of the activities of the CR faction. The army appeared to have accepted these criticisms and admitted their "short-comings and mistakes".[28]

The Party's Order and Supervision of the Military Intervention During the CR

As soon as the Liu/Teng faction was effectively purged, Mao began the task of party-building. The need for the party's centralized leadership was emphasized.

The new party leadership will be based on the following three general and, sometimes, over-lapping groups; the Maoist party faction and the Chou's "faction":

a) Chiang and her "revolutionary masses of the Left" including the Red Guards—the CR faction;

b) the party cadres who had supported Mao during the CR—the Maoist party faction;

c) Chou En-lai, the Premier, and his State Council—Chou's "faction".

(Since Chou did not have a personal power base of his own, the word "faction" is being used loosely here to include some of the members of the State Council such as Li Hsien-nien).

(The combination of these three groups of cadres in this paper is regarded as "the Maoist faction").

The campaign for party re-building was intensified. After the 9th Congress, a joint editorial of the three official organs (People's Daily, Liberation Army Daily, and Red Flag) on June 8, 1969, emphasized the need for internal unity of the party. On July 1 ("the party day"), another joint editorial stressed the importance of centralized leadership of the party and the essential role played by the party in the founding of the country. It also identified the Party as the central leading force in China and pointed out that the PLA as well as other organizations had to accept the centralized leadership of the party. The 1970 new year joint editorial called for firm grasping of the task of party rebuilding. Both joint editorials on the "party day" (July 1) and the "army day" (August 1) in 1971 stressed the importance of the Party's centralized leadership. Other articles in these three organs throughout 1971 made similar statements.[29] A joint editorial of the three official organs on January 1, 1973 specified that the main task ahead was the strengthening of the Party's centralized leadership. The local Party Committees were urged to follow the leadership of the Party's central authority, the Central Committee. In the light of the overwhelming military representation in these Party Committees, the editorial clearly called for the reduction of the power of the military in the Committees.

As the 10th National Party Congress held in August, 1973, Premier Chou, in his "Political Report", declared that the Party was the body which exercises overall leadership over the seven sectors—industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education, the army, the government and the party.[30] The Constitution of the Party adopted at the 10th Congress further confirmed the leadership of the party over the army.[31]

As the purge of Lin continued into 1974,[32] the importance of the army was de-emphasized, while the party leadership was emphasized. Past military victories in China were now attributed to the successful guidance of the Party, and, therefore, were not the achievements of the PLA alone.[33] The army was asked to learn

from the people.[34] It was emphasized that the "gun" had to be held in the hands of the "people", implying that the army should be commanded by the party.

In 1975, emphasis was given to "unity, loyalty, and discipline," presumably with the army in mind.[35] In January, 1975, Chang Chung-Ch'iao, one of the top leaders in the CR faction, in his report on the revised draft of the state constitution to the 4th People's National Congress, reaffirmed the need for the party's centralized leadership.[369]

In summary, since 1967, Chairman Mao, joined by the Maoist party faction, the CR faction and the Chou's "faction", has begun to rebuild the centralized leadership of the party as well as the party apparatus. The launching of the CR and the subsequent military intervention were to eliminate the Lin/Teng faction in the party apparatus. The army was called in by the Central Committee and the Party Chairman to serve as an instrument in the process of party rectification (against the Liu/Teng faction) and party rebuilding (based on the Maoist faction). The immediate purge of Lin and his faction in 1971 when all local Party Committees were established, leave little doubt that the army apparatus was never expected or able to replace the party apparatus on a permanent basis.

The Reduction of the Power of the Military

In August, 1971, Lin was alledgedly killed in a plane crash after an abortive coup against Mao had failed.[37] Many top military leaders in the Lin faction immediately disappeared. By early 1973, at least 57 top military leaders in the Lin's faction were either dismissed or replaced.[38] Between 1973 and 1975, almost all Revolutionary Committees, local Party Committees, Military Regions and Military Districts were re-organized. The State Council and the Party Central Committees were both restructured. These steps were clearly taken by the Maoist faction to reduce the power of the military. They are analyzed separately as follows:

The Reduction of the Power of the Military in the Central Party Organizations

As a result of the Purge of the Lin faction, many members of the 9th CC were not re-elected to the 10th CC. Of the 45 members who did not return, 30 were military cadres, 13 were Maoist party cadres, and 2 were CR faction members. Among the 28 alternate members who did not return to the 10th CC, 22 were military cadres, 4 were Maoist party cadres, and 2 were the CR faction members.[39]

The military representation in the 10th CC has also been reduced. Of the 195 members, 63 are military cadres, 71 are Maoist party cadres, and 57 are CR faction members; the background of 4 of them remain unknown. If both the members and alternate members are considered together, only 100 of the total 310 members and alternate members are military cadres, representing over a 10% reduction from the military representation at the 9th CC: (Table 2)

Table 2

Comparison of Power Distribution Between the 9th CC and the 10th CC (%)

	The Military	PC Faction	Maoist Party	Total * %	N
9th CC	44.3	28.2	27.5	100	(265)
10th CC	33.9	35.3	30.8	100	(295)
change	-10.4	+ 7.1	+3.3		

The 10th Politburo has 21 full and 4 alternate members, the same as the 9th Politburo. Of the 21 members, 6 or 28.57% are miliary cadres, 6 are Maoist party cadres and 8 or 42.85% are CR faction members: (Table 3)

Therefore, although the reduction in membership is not very large, the military was the only casualty in the 10th Politburo. In addition, of the nine members and alternative members who were newly elected to the 10th Politburo, only one was a military strongman (i.e., Hsu Shih-yu)[42].

* [Only members and alternate members whose backgrounds could be identified are considered here.]
Sources: see **note 40**

Table 3

Comparison of the 9th and 10th Politburos (power distribution)

	CR Faction	Maoist Party Faction	The Military	Total *
	N %	N %	N %	N %
9th	4 (20.00)	5 (25.00)	11 (55.00)	20 (100)
10th	8 (42.00)	6 (28.57)	6 (28.57)	20 (100)
Change	+4 (22.86)	+1 (3.57)	-5 (26.43)	

The size of the 10th Standing Committee of the Politburo has been increased from five to ten.[43] Of the new appointees, only Yeh Chien-yin belongs to the

* [including Mao himself]
Sources: see note 41

military. Four of the new appointees belong to the CR faction (e.g., Wang Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-chiao).

The Reduction of the Power of the Military in the Central Government Organization: the State Council

During the CR, especially between September, 1967 and August 1968, the military had actually "taken over" the State Council. Under the order of the Central Committee as mentioned earlier, and the Party Chairman, the military set up a "military control committee" in each department and ministry in the State Council.[44]

After March, 1970, however, the military control of the State Council and other civilian governments began to lessen. The military was urged to withdraw themselves from these organs. Normal government activities were gradually resumed.[45]

In the new State Council appointed in 1975 at the 4th People's Congress, only 9 of the 29 ministers are military cadres. Of the 12 Vice-premiers, no more than three could be identified as military cadres. In fact, in a strict sense, only one of them, namely, Chen Hsi-lien is currently a military strongman. If all the key 42 persons in the State Council are considered together, the Maoist party faction and the Chou faction appear to have constituted the majority. (Table 4)

Table 4

Distribution of Powers in the State Council

	No.	Percentage
The Military	8	19.04
The Maoist Party Faction and the Chou's Faction	23	54.76
The CR Faction	11	26.20
Total	42	100.00

The new State Constitution adopted at the 4th People's Congress contains new provisions to ensure the power of the party. It abolishes the post of Chairman of the People's Republic of China and, as a result, there is no longer a head of state for China. The Constitution has also transferred some of the powers which

previously belonged to the head of state to the Party Chairman. For example, it gives the title "Commander-in-Chief" of the Chinese Armed Forces, which now includes both the PLA and the militia (or the People's Arms Departments) to the Party Chairman.

Regional Commander	Name of Military Region	Date of Appointment
Chin Chi-wei	Chengtu	May, 1973
Wang Pi-ch'eng	Kunning	June, 1973
Yang Yung	Sinkiang	July, 1973
Ch'en Hsi-lien	Peking	December, 1973
Li Te-sheng	Shenyang	December, 1973
Hsu Shih-yu	Canton	December, 1973
Ting Sheng	Nanking	December, 1973
Yang Te-chih	Wuhan	December, 1973
Tseng Szu-yu	Tsinan	December, 1973
P'i Ting-Chun	Foochou	December, 1973
Han Hsien-chu	Lanchow	December, 1973

The Reduction of the Power of the Military in the Regional and District Military Apparatus

There are, at present, eleven Military Regions and 29 Military Districts in China. After the purge of the Lin's faction, a great number of these local military cadres were either purged or were removed from their posts. Py early 1973, more than 25 regional or district commanders and political commissars were removed.[47] At the district level alone, at least 112 or 32% of a total of 358 commanders, deputy commanders, political commissars (1st, 2nd and 3rd), and deputy commissars were either purged or replaced.[48] Such a large turnover has naturally uprooted the power bases of the regional and district military cadres. In 1973, all commanders of the eleven military regions were either replaced or transferred:

Many of these Regional Commanders had been in their "home regions" for quite a number of years. For example, Hsu-Shih-yu, before his transfer to the Canton Military Region, had been Commander of the Nanking Military Region since, 1957; Ch'en Hsi-lien had been in Shenyang since 1959; Yang Te-chih had been in Tsinan since 1958; and Han Hsien-chu had been in Foochow since 1960.[50]

By transferring them to new regions, these Regional Commanders have been uprooted from their power bases. Moreover, when they were transferred, they, as a rule, left their army behind.

Around October 1 (the national day), 1975, a total of 59 District Commanders, regional military leaders, provincial party leaders and senior political commissars were transferred. At the end of 1975, for example, at least 10 of the 29 District Commanders were transferred out of their "home districts". These districts include Kweichow, Yunan, Kansu, Kiangsi, Chekiang, Hunan and Liaoning.[51] Reportedly, there were more transfers between January and June 1976.

[Sources: see note 46]

The Reduction of the Power of the Military in the Civilian and Party Apparatus: the Removal of Civilian and Party Powers from the Regional and District Military Leaders

Before the mass transfers of the military regional and district commanders, a majority of these commanders were concurrently Chairmen or Vice-Chairmen of the Revolutionary Committe. They were also the First Secretaries or the Second Secretaries of the Party Committees of the 29 provinces and municipalities. As a result, these commanders had monopolized all the military party and civilian powers in their hands. After the transfers, however, these commanders were stripped of their party and civilian powers. (See (E) and (F) below.)

[Sources: see note 49]

The Reduction of the Power of the Military in the Civilian and Party Apparatus: the Reorganization of the Revolutionary Committees, i.e., the Civilian Governments at the Local Level

As mentioned above, when the Revolutionary Committees were established in 1968, there was overwhelming military representation. But the purge of the Lin faction and the re-emphasis of the party's centralized leadership have reversed the trend. For example, the number of military cadres who served as Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee was reduced first from 24 in 1968 to 19 after 1971, further to 10 in 1975 and finally to 8 in 1976 (Table 5). On the other hand, the number of Chairmen from the Maoist faction has increased from 5 (17.2%) in 1968 to 21 (72.4%) in 1976. When the number of both Chairmen and Vice-chairmen were considered together, the military accounted for only 102 or 25.6% of the 398 positions in late 1975, while the Maoist party faction accounted for 158 or 39.7% and the CR faction counted for 138 or 34.7% (Table 5).

There were no Military Regional Commanders among these Chairmen. Of the

ten military cadres, at most only two were Military District Commanders: Yu T'ai-chung, Commander of the Mongolia Military District and, possibly, Wang Chia-tao (who may have been purged in early 1976), Commander of the Heilungkiang Military District. They are still keeping their party and civilian titles in addition to their military titles in their respective provinces.

Reportedly, in January, 1976, two of the ten military cadres lost their Chairmanship in the Tsinghai Revolutionary Committee and the Kwangsi Revolutionary Committee, respectively. (Table 5).

An examination of the component of each of the 29 Revolutionary Committees indicates that the military is no longer able to control these Committees. If the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of each Committee are considered, the military is able to claim a majority in only 2 of the 29 Committees. Even in these two committees, the margins that the military enjoyed are quite small. On the other hand, the Maoist party faction is able to claim a majority in 15 and the CR faction 10 of the 29 Revolutionary Committees. (Table 6)

In the light of the fact that the Revolutionary Committees are now the only civilian governments in the 29 provinces and municipalities in China, these changes in the power distribution in the Committees are significant. The reduction of the power of the military in the civilian governments is apparent.

Table 5
Distribution of Powers in the 29 Revolutionary Committees

Title	Approximate Date	Military Cadres		Maoist Party Cadres		CR Cadres		Total Number	Source
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%		
Chairman	September 1968	24	82.80	5	17.20	0	0	29	(1)
Vice- Chairman	Same as Above	58	29.70	54	27.70	83	42.60	195	(2)
Chairman	Before Aug. 1971	21	72.40	8	27.60	0	0	29	(3)
Vice- Chairman	Same as above	90	36.00	80	32.00	80	32.00	250	(4)
Chairman	After Aug. 1971	19	65.60	10	34.50	0	0	29	(5)
Vice- Chairman	Same as above	75	30.00	95	38.00	80	23.00	250	(6)
Chairman & Vice Chairman	November 1975	102	25.60	158	39.70	138	34.70	398	(7)
Chairman	December 1975	10	34.50	19	65.50	0	0	29	(8)
Chairman	February 1976	8	27.60	21	72.40	0	0	29	(9)

Sources: (1) *Asian Recorder* (October 7-11, 1968) p. 8560
(2) *Studies on Chinese Communism* (January, 1976) pp. 21-32
(3) (4), (5), (6), *I.S.* (August, 1972), pp. 10-12
(7) *Studies on Chinese Communism* (December 1975) pp. 43-46
(8) *(Not indicated. Ed.)*
(9) *Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly* (January 1976), pp. 28-29, (February 1976), p. 120.
For other sources, see also *N.Y.T.*, June 3, 1968, p. 4.; June 9, 1968 p. 7; February 1, February 12, 1968. Due to different methods of computation employed in these sources the above figures cannot be used for precise comparison.

Table 6

Power Distribution in Each of the 29th Revolutionary Committees (Chairman and Vice-Chairmen) (Approximate Date: December 1975)

LOCATIONS	Military Cadres		Maoist Party Cadres		CR Cadres		Total
Anhwei	3	20	6	40	6	40*	15
Chekiang	5	38.5	6	46.1	2	15.4	13
Fukien	3	16.7	8	44.4	7	38.9	18
Heilungkiang	7	50.0	6	42.8	1	7.1	14
Honan	3	27.3	6	54.5	2	18.2	11
Hopei	4	33.3	4	33.3	4	33.3	12
Hunan	5	32.2	7	43.7	4	25.0	16
Hupeh	3	17.6	10	58.2	4	23.5	17
Inner Mongolia	3	30.0	5	50.0	2.	20.0	10
Kansu	3	23.0	2	15.4	8	61.5	13
Kiangsi	3	25.0	6	50.0	3	25.0	12
Kiangsu	3	18.7	5	31.2	8	50.0	16
Kiran	4	28.6	5	28.6	6	42.8	14
Kwangsi	3	23.0	4	30.8	6	46.1	13
Kwangtung	4	18.1	12	54.5	6	27.3	22
Liaoning	6	26.0	7	30.4	10	43.5	23
Peking	3	20.0	8	53.3	4	26.7	15
Shanghai	4	25.0	5	31.2	7	43.7	16
Shantung	0	00.00	4	66.7	2	33.3	6
Sinkiang	5	29.4	7	41.2	5	29.4	17
Szechwan	4	28.6	4	28.6	6	42.8	14
Tibet	4	26.7	8	53.3	3	20.0	15
Yunnan	2	18.2	3	27.3	6	54.5	11
Kweichow	3	25.0	5	41.7	4	33.3	12
Ninghsia	2	40.0	2	40.0	1	20.0	5
Shansi	3	20.0	5	33.3	7	46.7	15
Shensi	1	12.5	3	37.5	4	50.0	8
Tientsin	6	40.0	4	26.7	5	33.3	15
Tsinghai	3	30.0	2	20.0	5	50.0	10
	102	25.6	158	39.7	138	34.7	398

*majority

Source: adapted and computed from data in *Studies on Chinese Communism* (December 1975), pp. 43-46.

The Reduction of the Power of the Military in the Party Apparatus: the Reorganization of the Local Party Committees, the Supreme Local Party Authority

At present, the chieftains in the Revolutionary Committees and the local Party Committees of the 29 provinces and municipalities are identical. The Chairman of a Revolutionary Committee is automatically the First Secretary of the local Party Committee of the same locale. Therefore, most of the above findings on the Revolutionary Committee can be applied to the local Party Committee as well. Thus, in December 1975, only 10 or 34.5% of the 29 First Secretaries were military cadres while 19 or 65.5% were Maoist party cadres. (Table 7)

In addition, it has been pointed out that as far as party affairs were concerned, the local Party Committees should have the final authority. In 1971, for example, Mao pointed out,

> Now that local Party Committees have been established, they should be allowed to practice unified leadership. If decisions have already been made by local Party Committees on certain matters, is it not justified to ask military units for further discussion? 52

To this very date, i.e., June 1976, the army has shown no signs of open resistances to these steps which have been taken to reduce the power of the army.

The Expansion of the Military, Party and Civilian Powers of the Maoist Faction

Over the past years, many members of the Maoist faction have been appointed to key positions in both the military and party apparatus. Thus, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao was appointed as the Director-General of the PLA Central Political Affairs Department and Wang Hung-wen, a Vice-Chairman of the Party. Other key Maoist leaders include Tseng Shao-shan (First Political Commissar of the Shenyang Military Region), Li Teh-sheng (Commander of the Shenyang Military Region), Wei Kuo-ch'ing (First Political Commissar of the Canton Military Region), Pai Ju-ping (First Political Commissar of the Tsi-nan Military Region) and Chi Teng-k'uei (First Political Commissar of the Peking Military Region).[53] In April, 1976, Hua Kuo-feng was appointed the Premier of China.[54]

The new "three-in-one leadership" approved in the 1975 State Constitution is particularly favourable to the CR faction in the Maoist faction. It calls for the "unified leadership" among the young, the middle-aged, and the old. Since most of the members of the CR faction are younger cadres, this provision could open up more opportunities for the CR faction, and, therefore, clearly indicates a reduced emphasis on the military. As Wong Hung-wen recently pointed out:

> The cultivation of millions of successors to the proletarian revolutionary undertakings is a great strategic measure and a hundred-year, long-range plan. We must grasp this great work and train successors at various levels. This training of successors has encountered few obstacles in local areas but more in military. I always advocate that we should find several men in their thirties to be the commanders

Table 7
Distribution of Powers in the 29 Local Party Committees

Titles	Approximate Date	Military Cadres		Maoist Party Cadres		CR Cadres		Total No.	Source
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%		
1st Secretary	Before Aug. 1971	22	75.86	7	24.14	0	0	29	(1)
1st Secretary	" " "	21	72.40	8	27.60	0	0	29	(2)
From top position to Deputy Secretary	Same as Above	—	56.00	—	—	—	—	—	(3)
Prov. Comm. Secretaries	Augst 1971	98	62.00	58	32.90	8	5.10	501	(4)
1st Secretaries	Same as Above	22	75.86	—	—	—	—	29	(5)
All Secretaries	Same as Above	95	60.00	53	33.50	10	6.40	158	(6)
New Secretaries	During 1972 (Jan.-Dec.) & 1973 (Jan.-Mar.)	6	19.00	—	—	—	—	31	(7)
1st Secretaries	December 1975	10	34.50	19	65.50	0	0	29	(8)
1st Secretaries	February 1976	8	27.60	21	72.40	0	0	29	(9)

Sources:
(1) *I.S.* (December 1971) p. 53
(2) *Studies on Chinese Communism* (January 1976), pp.9-20
(3) *Current Scene* (December 1975), pp. 12-13
(4) *C.Q.* (July/September 1973) pp. 12-13
(5) *Ibid.*
(6) *A.S.* (December 1972) pp. 1006-1009; (October 1974), p. 881
(7) *A.S.* (April 1974) p. 394
(8) *(Not indicated. Ed.)*
(9) *Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly* (January 1976), p. 28-29; (February 1976), p. 120

[For other sources, see also *N.Y.T.*, May 26, 1971 p. 12; August 29, 1971, p. 18. Due to the different methods of computation employed in these sources, the above figures cannot be used for precise comparison.]

of large military regions.[55]

The Promotion and Restructuring of the Militia, i.e. the People's Arms Departments

The Maoist faction apparently have realized that, in order to ensure their leadership in the party, especially after Mao's demise, it is imperative that they are able to control the Armed Forces. In addition to the above steps, they have taken to control the military, they have apparently decided to establish a force independent from the PLA namely, the militia.[56]

The use of the militia is by no means a new concept.[57] But it was not until 1973 when the Maoist faction began to re-emphasize the importance of the militia. Reportedly, Wang Hung-wen has been assigned to organize the new Militia.

Equally significant is the constitutional status given to the militia in the new Constitution. It stipulates that both the PLA and the militia are the workers' and peasants' own armed forces led by the Party. This device is probably to constitutionally establish the equal status between the militia and the PLA. Previously, the militia was subordinated to the command of the local PLA. Now the PLA has lost the monopolistic status it previously enjoyed. In view of the fact that the Maoist faction has, over the past years, vigorously tried to expand the militia through China, this new provision is of particular significance.[58]

Since 1973, the army, the workers, as well as the party have been urged to either support or join the militia.[59] Attacks were launched against Lin Piao's "military line" which downgrades the importance of the militia.[60]

The Rehabilitation of the Military and Party Cadres Who Were Purged During the CR

Since 1971, but especially after the official purge of Lin Piao in 1973, a large number of the military and party cadres who were purged during the CR had been "rehabilitated" or reinstated. The purpose of this move seems to be twofold: first, the rehabilitated military cadres can be used to counterbalance the Lin Piao faction in the army and, secondly, they can resolve the problem of cadre shortage. The second point requires some explanation.

The dismissals and purges of members of the Liu/Teng faction during the CR, and those of the Lin Piao faction since 1971, have left a large number of positions unfilled. Most members, in the Maoist faction who were recruited during and after the CR are either too young or too inexperienced. The Maoist faction, therefore, have decided to rehabilitate some of the military and party cadres of the Liu/Teng faction (e.g. Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Ho Lung).[61]

The rehabilitation of Teng in 1973 was particularly significant.[62] He was a Vice-Chairman and the Secretary-General of the Party before his purge during the CR. His reinstatement, therefore, could win the sympathy and support of the rehabilitated party cadres for the Maoist faction. At the same time, Teng was a

political commissar in the Second Field Army with a victorious combat record. A large number of the rehabilitated military cadres belonged to the former Second Field Army. In fact, eight of the eleven current Military Regional Commanders are either directly or indirectly related to the former Second Field Army.[63] Therefore, Teng's reinstatement could win the sympathy and support of the military cadres for the Maoist faction to ensure the successful purge of the Lin faction.

Summary

In summary, therefore, the essential role played by the army has long been emphasized and appreciated by the Chinese leaders. The power struggles among the leaders in the past could, by and large, be regarded as a series of struggles for military power, in order to seize the leadership in China. But, as a rule, the Party has so far been able to command the army. Thus, the military intervention during the CR was initiated by the Party Chairman and ordered by the Central Committee of the Party. The military only implemented the order. The Party's central authority was not questioned. In fact, as early as 1967, the Maoist faction had decided to rebuild the Party. Immediately after the CR, when military representation became too overwhelming and when Lin Piao alledgedly became too ambitious, Mao decided to purge Lin and his faction. The purge was carried out gradually, but effectively. In order to ensure effective neutralization of the Lin faction and the smooth transfer of power, Teng and his supporters were reinstated. At the same time, the centralized leadership of the Party was continuously emphasized.

Since 1975, when the Lin faction has, by and large, been either "neutralized" or removed from powerful positions, serious conflicts between Teng and his supporters (hereinafter, the Teng faction), on the one hand, and the Maoist faction, on the other, began to emerge. From January to April, 1976, Teng had been implicitly accused of (1) placing too much emphasis on Party unity and stability while neglecting the more essential task, "class struggle," and (2) attempting to reverse the verdict against those cadres purged during the CR, including himself. Teng was, therefore, indirectly labeled as "revisionist," "unrepentant capitalist roader," and "right deviationist."[64] While it is difficult to verify whether these charges against Teng are true, the timing of Teng's downfall, as mentioned above, seems significant. Attacks on Teng began almost immediately after the transfers of all regional Military Commanders and the purge of the Lin faction were completed. In 1971, Lin's downfall also coincided with the completion of the purge of the Liu/Teng faction.

In April, less than two months after Hua Kuo-feng, a member of the CR faction, was appointed the Acting Premier following Chou's death, the Peking riot took place. On April 5, a crowd estimated at 30,000 to 100,000 people gathered at the Tienanmen Square in Peking, reportedly protesting the passing up of Teng as the Acting Premier. Immediately after the riot, Teng was dismissed from all of his party and government positions including Politburo member, Vice-Chairman of the Party, first Vice-Premier and Chief-of-Staff of the Army. Attacks on Teng have been intensified and Teng's name was, for the first time, mentioned.[65]

At present, the question to answer is whether or not the Maoist faction could again rely on the army to ensure their leadership vis-a-vis the Teng faction. The

Maoist faction could "use" the army either directly (using military intervention as during the CR) or indirectly (using the army as a deterrent) to ensure their control of power. Any attempt to answer this question must, of course, be entirely speculative. But our findings, so far, seem to indicate that either alternative is possible. The events that took place in 1975 and in 1976, so far, seem to further support this assumption. For example, in July, 1975, when there was some unrest in Hanchow, about 6,000 regular soldiers were sent there to restore order immediately. Similar army involvements were also reported in other locales such as Liaoning and Yunan.[66] On February 20, 1976, six directives were issued by the Central Committee urging the army to support the campaign against the "rightists," i.e., the Teng faction.[67] In the same month, soldiers in the Peking Garrison were said to have participated in a campaign against the "unrepentant capitalist roaders," i.e., the Teng faction, in the Party.[68]

In late April, 1976, after the Peking riot, a special ceremony was held to pay tribute to the"worker's militia, people's police, and PLA guards" for their loyal performance of duties during the riot. Except for Mao, almost all top military, party and civilian leaders were represented. In China, such a mass public appearance of leaders always bears special significance. At the ceremony, delegates of the officers pledged their support to the Party and its campaign against the Teng faction. At the same time, they expressed their determination to use "concrete deeds" to defend the Party.[69]

One of the objectives of such a formal ceremony may be to endorse the intervention of these officers at the riot, and to legitimate future or indirect military intervention.

Since April 1976, all party, government, and military leaders have been asked to participate in the criticism of Teng and his faction. From information available to this date (August 1976), no military leaders, including the Regional and District Commanders, have shown any strong resistance, let alone rebellion.[70]

Nevertheless, whether or not the Party can continue to enjoy its command over the army will depend on its ability to maintain its "unified" or "centralized" leadership. At present, the "unified leadership" consists of the Maoist Party faction, the Chou "faction", the CR faction and until recently, the Teng faction. But a series of events which took place in 1976 may have seriously eroded the "unified" leadership of the party beyond the level attained during the CR. These events include the following:

(1) *The deaths of Chou En-lai and Chu Teh (Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 4th People's Congress):* Both leaders have been regarded as veteran and modest mediators or "trouble-shooters" in the Party. Their deaths not only reduce the strength of the Maoist faction, but could mean that a valuable "cushion" between conflicting party leaders has been lost.

(2) *International conflicts within the Maoist faction:* Conflicts among the CR faction, the Chou "faction", and the Teng faction have already begun to emerge especially after the death of Chou and the public attacks on Teng. Furthermore, Wu Teh, the First Secretary of the Peking Party Committee (one of the 29 Party

Committees), has been appointed to succeed Chu Teh.[71] A number of veterans in the Party, such as Tan Chen-lin, Neh Yun-chian, were, therefore, passed up. Since Wu Teh has been a member of the CR faction, other factions within the general Maoist faction are bound to be dissatisfied.

(3) *The Death of Mao:* Due to his personal status and broad power base, Mao had a powerful unifying force in the Party. His demise could create a great deal of uncertainty that no one can predict. At present, there are only, Hua, Wong Hung-wen, Yeh Chian-yin, and Chiang remaining in the Political Bureau. Except for Yeh, all the others are CR faction members. Reportedly, Yeh has also been under attack in recent months. But, it is doubtful that CR faction alone can maintain the centralized leadership of the Party.

FOOTNOTES

[1]For analyses of Chinese military factionalism, see William L. Parish, "Factions in Chinese Military Politics, *The China Quarterly* (hereafter *C.Q.*) (October/December, 1973), pp. 667-699; A.S.H. Kong, "Comradeship in Arms: An Analysis of Power through Associations in the CPLA–February, 1970 to February, 1974," *Asian Survey* (hereafter, *A.S.*) (July, 1974), pp. 663-677; Ellis Joffe, "China's Military Elites" *C.Q.* (June, 1975), pp. 311-317; William W. Whitson, "Statistics and the Field Army Loyalty System" *C.Q.* (January/March, 1974), pp. 146-147; For more background information, see Whitson, *Chinese Military and Political Leaders and the Distribution of Power in China, 1956-1971*, Rand, 1973; and his *The Chinese High Command, 1927-1971: A History of Communist Military Politics*, (N.Y., Praeger, 1973)

[2]Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. 1 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), p. 106.

[3]*Ibid.*, Vol. 4, p. 152

[4]*Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung* (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1967), p. 102

[5]Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Military Writings* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), pp. 242-43

[6]*Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung, Op. Cit.*, pp. 61-62

[7]*Ibid.*, pp. 62-63

[8]*Ibid.*, p. 61

[9]*Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. 1, *Op. Cit.*, p. 106

[10]Warren Kuo, "The Evolution of the Chinese Communist Party," *Issues & Studies: A Journal of China Studies and International Affairs* (hereafter, *I.S.*) (Feb., 1975), p. 8

See also Parris H. Chang, "Regional Military Power: The Aftermath of the Cultural Revolution," *A.S.* (Dec., 1972), p. 1011

See also Chien T'ieh, "The Chiang Ch'ing Faction and Peiping's [Peking's] Military forces," *I.S.* (January, 1976, pp. 12-30; and his "Crisis in the Leadership of the Chinese Communist Armed Forces," *I.S.* (August, 1975), pp. 35-48; Allen S.H. Kong, *Op. Cit.*, p. 674; Fan Chih-yuan, "Chinese Communist Military: Organization and Personnel," *I.S.* (January, 1975),

pp. 42-56

See below, p 8 ff

The political commissars are particularly important to the relations between the army as a fighting force and the army as a political force. They are members of the PLA but at the same time are in charge of the party apparatus in the PLA. Very often, a military commander is concurrently the first political commissar in his commanding unit. A political commissar, on the other hand, can temporarily command the army.

[11]For discussion on the Anti-Teng campaign, see below, p. 37 ff

[12]Byung-joon Ahn, "The Cultural Revolution and China's Search for Political Order," *C.Q.* (April/May, 1974), pp. 269-270. For criticisms on Teng, see *N.Y.T.*, Nov. 2, 1969, p. 1

[13]Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese Army in the Cultural Revolution: the Politics of Intervention, *Current Scene* (Dec. 7, 1970) 1-24

[14]"Decision of the CCP Central Committee, the State Council, the Military Commission [i.e. the Military Affairs Commission] of the Central Committee and the Cultural Revolution Group under the Central Committee concerning the Resolute Support of People's Liberation Army for the Revolutionary Masses of the Left," (January 23, 1967), *CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967* (Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1968), p. 195

See also Fang Chun-kuei, "Military Dictatorship under Mao's Regime," *I.S.* (October, 1971), p. 25

[15]"Decision of the CCP Central Committee, . . ." *Op. Cit.*, p. 195

[16]"Decision of the CCP Central Committee, . . . " *Op. Cit.*, p. 195

[17]*Ibid.*, p. 13; see also *the New York Times* (hereafter, *N.Y.T.*), August 2, 1968, p. 3; March 8, 1970, p. 2; October 26, 1970, p. 6;

The power of the army however was not uninterrupted. On April 6, 1967 for example, an order from the Military Affairs Commission severely curtailed the power of the army. The army was no longer allowed to suppress the Red Guards without the party's approval; see *CCP Documents, Op. Cit.*, p. 409, see also *N.Y.T.*, Feb., 16, 26, and 27, 1974 for recounts. However by early September of the same year, the army regained most of its powers; see *People's Daily*, September 17, 1967

[18]*Red Flag (Hung Ch'i)*, March 10, 1967

[19] "Chronology of Maoist Take-over," *Asian Recorder* (October 7-11, 1968), p. 8560. It is important to point out that the results of computation vary from one source to another. But by and large, the differences are not very significant. For other computations, see Lung Fei, "Personnel Changes in Provincial Revolutionary Committees," *Studies on Chinese Communist Monthly* (in Chinese) (December 10, 1975), pp. 35-46; See also below, p. 25 ff.; *N.Y.T.*, June, 3, 9, 1968

[20]For Further analysis of his report, see Pu Sang, "Studies of Lin Piao's Political Report," *Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly* (in Chinese) (May 1, 1969), pp. 18-22; see also *N.Y.T.*, February 16, 1969, p. 5, February 7, 1971, p. 18

[21]Adapted from "Analysis of the Newly Elected 9th CCP Central Committee," *I.S.* (July, 1969), pp. 33-44; For results of different computations, see "An Analysis of the CCP

9th Central Committee" *Facts and Features: Chinese Communist Affairs*, (May 14, 1969), pp. 12-13; Byung-joon Ahn, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 273-274; Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese army in the CR: the Politics of Intervention," *Op. Cit.*, pp. 21-23; Parris H. Chang "Regional Military Power. . ." *Op. Cit.*, p. 1005; For a complete list of members and alternate members, see "An Analysis of the Newly Elected 9th CCP Central Committee" *Ibid.* See also *N.Y.T.*, April 2, p. 4; April 3, p. 1, 2, 4, 1969; William Brugger, "The Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party," *World Today* (July, 1969), pp. 297-305; *N.Y.T.*, Feb. 16, 1969, p. 5

[22]This study will not attempt to analyze the problem of military factionalism in China. For the purpose of this study, military cadres are divided into two groups, the Lin faction and the Non-Lin faction. For studies of Chinese military factionalism, see Note 1 above.

[23]Parris H. Chang, "Mao's Great Purge: A Political Balance Sheet," *Problems of Communism* (March, 1969), p. 7

[24]Parris H. Chang, "Regional Military Power. . ." *Op. Cit.* p. 1011; see also H.W. Nelson, "Military Bureaucracy in the Cultural Revolution, *A.S.* (April, 1974), p. 374

[25]See above, p. 8 ff; see also Parris H. Chang, "Regional Military Power. . . .", *Op. Cit.*, p. 1003; Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese Army in the CR: the Politics of Intervention," *Op. Cit.*, p. 2; and his "The Chinese Army after the Cultural Revolution: the Effects of Intervention" *C.Q.* (July/September, 1973) 450-77

[26]"Order of the CCP Central Military Commission (April 6, 1967)," CCP Documents. . . *Op. Cit.*, p. 409; see also *N.Y.T.*, August 2, 1968, p. 3; September 1, 1968, p. 1; See also *N.Y.T.*, February 16, 26, 27, 1974 for recounts of the events.

[27]Tang Tsou, "The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese Political System," *C.Q.*, (April/June, 1969), pp. 63-91

[28]Philip Bridgham, "The Fall of Lin Piao," *C.Q.* (July-Sept., 1973), p. 431
The best recount of these events is in "A Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks with Responsible Comrades of Various Places during his Inspection Tour (Mid-August to September 12, 1971)" contained in a highly classified document entitled "Document No. 12 of the CCP Central Committee", reprinted in *I.S.* (September, 1972), pp. 65-71

[29]Joint editorial of the *People's Daily, Red Flag,* and *Liberation Army Daily* on July 1, 1971 (party day), August 1, 1971 (army day); see also *People's Daily*, August 27, 1971; see also joint editorial of the three official organs on January 1, 1970; *Red Flag* (December 4, 1971), and *People's Daily*, August 1, 1971

[30]"Report to the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China" delivered on August 24 and adopted on August 28, 1973, in *The Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents)* (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1973), pp. 1-38

[31]"Constitution of the Communist Party of China" adopted by the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on August 28, 1973," *Ibid.*, pp. 59-74

[32]See *Red Flag*, April, 1974, *People's Daily*, February 2, 1974, see also *N.Y.T.*, July 5, 1973, p. 7; September 2, 1973, p. 2

[33]*Red Flag,* April, 1974; it carried an article on the unification of the six separate countries by Ch'in Shih Huang. In the article, the achievement of the military was downgraded.

[34]"A Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks. . .," *Op. Cit.,* pp. 65-71

[35]*People's Daily,* August 1, 1975; since this was the "army day," the implications were clear.

[36]Chang Chun-chiao, "Report on the Revision of the Constitution", *Peking Review* (Jan. 24, 1975), pp. 18-20, see also *N.Y.T.,* January 18, 19, 1975; "China's Fourth National People's Congress," *Current Scene* (March/April, 1975), p. 8

[37]*Red Flag,* November, 1974 for a recount; see also *N.Y.T.* April 21, 1974, p. 5

All key military leaders in the Lin faction disappeared shortly after Lin's death, see *N.Y.T.* October 18, 24 and 29, 1971; Lin's alleged plot against Mao was announced in 1972; see *N.Y.T.* July 23, 29, 1972

[38]Ying-mao Kau and Perre M. Perrolle, "The Politics of Lin Piao's Abortive Military Coup," *A.S.,* (June, 1974), p. 575; see also Chien T'ieh, "The Chiang Ch'ing faction. . .," *Op. Cit.,* pp. 12-30; Hu Shu-ch'ang, "Personnel Status of the Provincial Military Districts" *Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly* (in Chinese) (Sept. 10, 1974), pp. 30-35; Allen Kong, *Op. Cit.,* p. 663. It was Kong's estimate that at least 32 top military leaders were dismissed at local level.

[39]For data on the 9th Party Congress, see above, p. 11 ff. and Note 28.

For the 10th Party Congress, see Fang Chun-kuei, "An Analysis of the Chicom Tenth Central Committee," *Studies on Chinese Communism* (September 10, 1973), p. 29 Hsuan Mo, "An Analysis of the Chicom Tenth National Party Congress' Political Report, *Ibid.,* pp. 10-15. Hsiao Yeh-hui, "Power Infrastructure of Chicom Top Level Hierarchy and Its Future Direction of Struggle," *Ibid.,* pp. 5-9 K'ung Te-liang, "An Analysis of the CCP's Tenth National Congress," *I.S.* (October, 1973), pp. 17-30. Li Chiu-i, "An Analysis of the Personnel of the 10th CCP Central Committee," *Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly,* (October 10, 1973), pp. 22-36. Lung Fei, "An Analysis of the Personnel of the CCP Tenth National Congress," *Ibid.,* pp. 41-43.

See also *N.Y.T.,* August 20, 21, 1973; for names of key leaders, *N.Y.T.,* August 30, 1973. For a complete list of members, see "List of Members of the Presidum of the Tenth National Congress of the CPC", "List of the 319 Members and Alternate Members of the Tenth Central Committee of the CPC," *Peking Review,* September 7, 1973. Also *The National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Op. Cit.,* Roderick Macfarguhar, "China after the 10th Congress," *World Today* (December, 1973), pp. 514-526.

[40]*Ibid.* The methods and results of different sources vary from one to another. But the differences are not large enough to affect the conclusion. Figures used here are mainly taken from K'ung Te-liang's computation which appears to be more representative.

[41]*Ibid.* Among members of the 9th Politburo, were Hsieh, Lin, Ch'en, Huang, Wu, Yeh, Li and Ch'iu who are purged or dead. The remaining 13 full members in the 10th Politburo include Mao, Chou, Yeh, Liu Po-ch'eng, Chu, Hsu, Ch'en Hsi-lien, Li Hsien-nine, Yao, K'ang, Tung, and Chang.

[42]*Ibid.* Among the military cadres are Li Teh-sheng, Hsu, Shih-yu, Ch'en Hsi-lien, Yeh Chien-ying, Chu Teh, and Liu Po-ch'eng. Many of them are no longer activie, Chu Teh.

[43]Ch'en Po-ta was also purged; see *N.Y.T.*, December 2, 1974, p. 6 for background information

[44]The military takeover of the State Council and other central civilian governments were ordered by Mao implemented by Lin after the Red Guards violently attacked the Council. Although attempts were immediately made to normalize the operation of the Council, military representation remained strong. *N.Y.T.*, March 8, 1970; October 26, 1970; December 27, 1970; February 7, 1972, October 22, 1972; see also *Studies on Chinese Communism* (September 10, 1973), pp. 66-75 for an article on the subject. See also above p. 9 ff.

[45]*Ibid.*; see also "A Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks," *Op. Cit.*

[46]*Ibid.*; see also "China's Fourth National People's Congress" *Op. Cit.*, p. 5. Teng, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Ch'en Hsi-lien have a military background. For a complete list of members of the 4th Congress, see *Peking Review* (January 24, 1975), pp. 10-11; For the text of the 1975 State Constitution, see *Ibid.*, pp. 12-17; for Chang Chun-chiao's "Report on the Revision of the Constitution," *Ibid.*, pp. 18-21; for Chou En-lai's "Report on the Work of the Government," *Ibid.*, pp. 21-25. See also *N.Y.T.*, January 18, January 19, 1975

[47]The eleven Military Regions are: Shenyan, Peking, Nanking, Foochow, Wuhan, Canton, Lanchow, Chengtu, Kunming, Sinkiang and Tsinan. See also Chou Tzu-ch-iang, "An Analysis of the Chinese Communist Military Area System" *I.S.* (February, 1972), p. 39

In total, there are 25 military districts, 3 military garrison commands, 209 military subdistricts and until the recent change, 2,309 People's Arms Departments in the PLA.

[48]Hu Sh-ch'ang, "Personnel Status of the Provincial Military Districts," *Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly* (September 10, 1974), pp. 30-35; by the end of 1973, more members of the Lin faction were purged, see W.P. Ting, "A Longitudinal Study of Chinese Military Factionalism, 1949-1973" *A.S.* (October, 1975), pp. 908-909; *N.Y.T.*, July 5, 1973, p. 7; September 2, 1973, p. 2

[49]Chien T'ieh, "Crisis in the Leadership. . . ." *Op. Cit.*, 35-48; *N.Y.T.*, January 2, 1974, p. 3, p. 6; January 4, 1974, p. 3; March 29, 1974, p. 4, June 11, 1974, p. 14

[50]Allen S.H.Kong, *Op. Cit.*, p. 675

[51]Hsiao Hui, "An Analysis of Local Cadres: Big Switch," *Studies of Chinese Communists* (November 10, 1975), pp. 54-60

[52]"A Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks. . ." *Op. Cit.*, p. 69. Similar calls were made in 1974, *N.Y.T.*, March 21, 1974, p. 40

[53]Other key members in the CR faction include Wu Teh, political commissar of the Peking Military Region and Chairman of Peking Revolutionary Committee, and Mao Yuan-hsin, Political Commissar of the Sheyan Military Region. Many CR faction members were however purged for their support of Lin, e.g., Ch'en Po-ta, T'ao Chu. Some CR key members are dead, e.g. Kuang Seng. Others are too junior, e.g. Chiang Ch'ing.

[54]The announcement of Hua's appointment as Acting Premier was made on February 7, 1976 (People's Daily). Before the appointment he was Acting Chairman of Hunan Revolutionary Committee, the First Secretary of Hunan Party Committee, member of Politburo,

Political Commissar of Canton Military Region and First Political Commissar of Hunan Military District concurrently. For further information on Hua, see "Teng Takes a Back Seat for Hua" *Far Eastern Economic Review* (February 20, 1967), p. 12

[55]"Comrade Wang Hung-wen's Report at the Central Study Class – Restricted" (January 14, 1974)" This document is a "restricted" document circulated within the CCP. Reprinted in *I.S.* (February, 1975), p. 102

[56]Apparently the Maoist faction is still concerned about the remaining members of the Lin faction. It is also concerned about the Non-Lin faction in the PLA which was purged during the CR.

[57]Fan Chih-yuan, "Chinese Communist Military. . .," *Op. Cit.*, pp. 50-51; Yin-mao Kau, "The Politics of Lin. . . .," *Op. Cit.*, p. 384

[58]"China's Fourth National People's Congress," *Op. Cit.*, pp. 1-14; Parris Chang, "The Anti-Lin Piao. . .," *Op. Cit.*, pp. 871-886, see also *Studies on Chinese Communist* (June, 1974), p. 7

[59]F.C. Teiwes, "Urban Militia--A New Force?" *Current Scene* (January, 1974), p. 21-23; for the involvement of the army. For the involvement of workers and party members, see *People's Daily* (editorial)- September 29, 1973

[60]*People's Daily*, February 1, 1975

[61]For a report on the vacancies created by Lin's purge, see *N.Y.T.*, June 11, 1974, p. 14; for a report on some of the cadres who were rehabilitated, e.g. Yang Cheng-wu, former Acting Chief of Staff, see *N.Y.T.*, August 2, 1974, p. 2

[62]For the rehabilitation of Teng, see *N.Y.T.*, April 13, 1973, p. 12; for reports on Teng's rise, see *N.Y.T.*, January, 18, 30, 1975

[63]The commanders who were either directly or indirectly related to the former Second Field Army, are, among others, Li Te-sheng, Ch'en Hsi-lien, Ch'in Chi-wei, Yang Yung, Hsu Shih-yu, Han Hsieh-ch'u, P'i Ting-chun/

[64]*People's Daily*, February 17, 1976. For other accusations and attacks on Teng, see "Setting the Stage for a Showdown," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Januarv 9, 1976), pp. 9-11; "The Charges against Teng Hsiao-ping" *Ibid.*, (February 27, 1976), p. 8; "Enter the Empress," *Ibid.*, pp. 8-10

The promotion of party stability and unity was initiated by Mao in the fall of 1974. But Mao pointed out that the promotion of these must not mean the sacrifice of class struggle. For further discussion on this issue, see *People's Daily*, (February 29, 1976); and "Criticism of "Taking the Three Directives as the Key Link" *Peking Review*, (April 2, 1976), pp. 6-8; see also *Red Flag* (March 1), p. 5

For charges that Teng was attempting to reverse the verdicts, see *People's Daily*, April 18, 1976, February 13, 1976, March 10, 1976

For related articles, see *People's Daily*, February 29, March 3, 11, 1976; see also *Red Flag* (February, 1976), 17-20

[65]*People's Daily*, April 10, 1976; "New Upsurge in Criticism of Teng Hsiao-ping,"

Peking Review (April 23, 1976)

[66]"Long March Anniversary," *Current Scene* (December, 1975) 16

[67]Peking Radio, February 20, 1976, reported in *China Times,* March 3, 1976

[68]The garrison is part of the regular PLA. In this case, their activities were not specified. See *People's Daily,* February 22, 1976

[69]"Leading Comrades on C.P.C. Central Committee Receive Representatives of the Capital's Worker-Militia, People's Police, P.L.A. Guards," *Peking Review* (April 30, 1976), pp. 3-4

[70]*Ibid.* When Ch'en Hsi-lien, Commander of Peking Military Region did not show up in the mass criticism of Teng after the Peking riot, many began to speculate that he could be dismissed; but he later showed up at the ceremony mentioned below. Therefore as of April, 1976, there is no evidence that any of the 11 commanders had refused to participate in the criticism of Teng.

Recently, in July, 1976, Foochou Military Region Commander P'i Ting-chu was reportedly killed "in action." No detail was provided. Whether his death is related to any attempts of the Maoist faction to eliminate possible military dissent remains a mystery.

[71]*Central Daily News,* July 24, 1976

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

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

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1971 - Directory of research on Malay and other Southeast Asian cultures (Part I: The Philippines). Quezon City, Asian Center, U.P., 1971. 300p.
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

Books (Listed by order of publication)

ASPILLERA, Paraluman S. A common vocabulary for Malay-Pilipino-Bahasa Indonesia. Quezon City, Institute of Asian Studies, U. P., 1964. 101p. Size: 6" x 8" (limited copies) ₱5.00/$2.00

MAJUL, Cesar Adib. Muslims in the Philippines. Quezon City, University of the Philippines Press, 1973. Size: 7" x 10"
Available in Clothbound and Paperbound.
(Dealer: U. P. Press/Please send all communication to: c/o Univ. of the Philippines Press, Basement, Gonzalez Hall, U. P. Diliman, Quezon City)

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

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