Asian Studies

Asian Studies
(ISSN: 0004-4679)

April-August-December, 1977 Vol. XV

contents

ASIAN STUDIES is a journal of research studies and analysis on subjects of intellectual and cultural interest in Asia. The views expressed in its pages are those of the authors who are also responsible for the accuracy of the facts and statements contained therein.

Material published in the ASIAN STUDIES may not be republished without permission.

Managing Editor:
Benito Lim

Issue Editor:
Nancy Naromal

PRINCIPALES, ILUSTRADOS, INTELLECTUALS AND THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT OF A FILIPINO NATIONAL COMMUNITY*

Cesar Adib Majul

Introduction:

The concept of a Filipino national community was initially verbalized in the 1880's by the *ilustrados,* the educated elite which emerged from the *principalia* class in native society after the educational reforms of 1863. This concept was a function of native response to colonial and ecclesiastical domination as well as the result of an interaction between the different social classes in the colonial society. The Philippine Revolution of 1896 and 1898 aimed, among other things, to concretize the concept. This was unlike the earlier twenty-five or more major uprisings in the colony which were mainly based on personal, regional or sectarian motives.

This paper aims to present a conceptual framework to understand better how the concept of a Filipino national community was the inevitable consequence of certain historical events. It attempts to elicit further the significance of such events by relating them to each other. It will also indicate certain continuities in Philippine history, a hitherto neglected aspect, while belying an oft-repeated statement that the history of the Philippines during Spanish rule was mainly a history of the colonials.

I. Spanish Conquest and Consolidation

When the Spaniards came to the Philippines in 1565, they had the following major aims: the conversion of the natives to Christianity and the extension of the political domains and material interests of the Spanish monarch. What they found in Luzon, the Visayas and parts of Mindanao was a constellation of widely scattered settlements called *"barangays".* These consisted of families which numbered from a dozen to more than a hundred. Each *barangay* was normally under the leadership of a chief or *datu.* In the Philippine South, however, a few dozen barangays, due to Islamic influences, had already welded themselves under the leadership of a central authority known as *rajah* or *sultan.*

By means of superior technology and force and, in some cases, by friendly gestures and gifts to the chieftains, the majority of the *barangays* fell under Spanish sovereignty. But it was extremely difficult for a few hundred Spanish soldiers and friars to govern and indoctrinate about 750,000 natives who were living in dispersed communities. It consequently became imperative to resettle them into larger population centers called *"pueblos"* (towns). Thus were the

*Paper prepared for the Second National Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia, May 14-18, 1978.

beginnings of urbanization introduced in the Philippines to serve colonial interests. In effect, the *pueblos* became the effective centers for the religious indoctrination of the natives and to check on and ensure their loyalty.

The process of resettlement was not without great difficulties and suffering on the part of the natives. Many fled to the mountains or interior parts of the islands. Up to the eighteenth century, there were cases of Spanish friars trying to persuade such *remontados* to come down and settle in the *pueblos*. In any case, by the first quarter of the seventeenth century, *Filipinas,* the Spanish colony, had already scores of well-organized *pueblos* which at the same time constituted parish centers.

II. The *Principales*

The Spaniards did not do away with the old nobility. On the contrary, they strengthened the powers of the *datus* over their former followers. Whereas in pre-Hispanic times the *datus* held to their power mainly by consent and through constant consultation with the elders or heads of families, under the Spanish regime they became officials in the colonial bureaucracy. The *datus* of the *barangays* became the *cabezas de barangay* when the *barangay* was transformed into a subdivision unit of the *pueblo.* Up to 1785, the position of *cabeza* was hereditary. When some form of elections for a three-year term were later on instituted in certain municipalities, the position remained, in any case, among the families of the old nobles. By then, the eldest sons of the *cabezas* had acquired such vested claims that they often succeeded their fathers.

In the *pueblo,* the *cabezas* collectively formed the *principalia* or "principal men (of the town)". By the seventeenth century, they elected from among themselves the head of the *pueblo* who was called the *gobernadorcillo* or "little governor". Later on, another name was applied to him. This was *capitan municipal* or simply *capitan.* During the nineteenth century, the number of electors for the *gobernadorcillo* was limited to thirteen. Six of these had to be actual *cabezas,* six had to be ex-*gobernadorcillos* or ex-*cabezas,* and the last had to be the outgoing *gobernadorcillo.*[1] In brief, the position rotated among the members of a well-defined class. To be a *cabeza de barangay* or *gobernadorcillo* was the highest political position which a native or *indio* could aspire to.

In a restricted and administrative sense, the term *principalia* referred to all *cabezas* and *gobernadorcillos,* whether incumbent or not. In a more general and social sense, it denoted such officials as well as their families who also supplied the lower municipal offi-

[1]One of the earliest treatments on how the old chiefs or *datus* became *principales* as well as on their functions and powers is found in Antonio de Morga, "Events in the Philippines Islands", Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898* (Cleveland, Ohio: 1903-1909), Volume XVI, pp. 155-157. For a convenient summary of the functions, powers and elections of *cabezas* during the middle part of the nineteenth century, see *ibid.,* Volume XVII, pp. 324-333.

cials. The *principalia* represented the upper crust of the native society.

As the *pueblos* grew, the number of *principales* and their retinue also increased. Sir John Bowring, who was in the Philippines in 1858-1859, wrote that the *principalia* who came to pay their respects to him in a town he visited numbered more than seventy persons.[2] At around this time there were at least 627 *pueblos* in the Philippines with a total population of about 3,345,790.[3]

It is difficult to guess whether it was originally intended by Spanish officialdom to let the *principalia* play a transitional role or not. In any case, for the most part of the Spanish rule it was not possible to do away with them. In fact, the *principalia* played an important role as the intermediary between Spanish officials and the bulk of the native inhabitants. It collaborated and cooperated with the Spanish government in implementing its ordinances while, at the same time, bringing to the ears of the government the difficulties of the people.[4] It was the *principalia* which prevented an undesirable or radical social dislocation in the lives of the natives, while maintaining a continuity with the pre-Hispanic political leadership. Actually, the *datus* and later on their descendants were the very tools utilized to persuade their followers to resettle in larger communities. The traditional prestige of their leaders as well as habits of obedience, led many natives to follow them to the *pueblos* where the former were often tempted with residential lots near the *plaza* or center of the *pueblo.*

The official duties of the *cabezas* were numerous. They collected the tribute for the government and the *encomenderos.*[5] They harnessed the manpower needed for the Spanish armed forces and for the forced labor (*polo).*[6] They had judicial functions, albeit limited. They were charged to cooperate with the parish priests in all matters pertaining to public worship and religious instruction and festivities. The *gobernadorcillo* was also empowered to temporarily occupy the position of the *alcalde mayor* (governor of the province) when vacant, although this position was strictly reserved for Spaniards.

But the *cabezas* had many privileges also. They, their wives, and eldest sons were exempted from the tribute. They were also exempted from the *polo* and could even grant exemptions to others. They could

---

[2]John Bowring, *A Visit to the Philippine Islands* (Manila, Filipiniana Book Guild, Inc., 1963), p. 54.

[3]Census taken in 1833. Quoted from Paul P. de la Gironiere, *Twenty Years in the Philippines* (Manila: Filipiniana Book Build, 1962), pp. 203-204.

[4]Onofre D. Corpuz, *The Philippines (*New Jersey; Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 28.

[5]Every male native from 20 to 60 yars of age and every female from 25 to 60 years of age, or earlier if she married, had to pay tribute. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the tribute amounted to 8 *reales fuertes.* Chinese *mestizos* had to pay twice this amount. Spaniards, Spanish *mestizos,* and Europeans were exempted. In 1884, the tribute was replaced by a *cedula personal* which also served for identification purposes.

[6]In the first centuries of Spanish rule, every male native and Chinese *mestizo* from the age of 18 to 60 were liable to perform 40 days of work every year in communal projects like the building of churches, ships, bridges, roads, etc. In 1884, this was reduced to 15 days.

impose modest taxes to enable them to maintain the dignity of their office. Moreover, there were external symbols signifying their prestige. For example, they were entitled "Don". During Mass, they sat on the front rows. Their uniforms, top hats, tassels, canes, etc., enhanced their differences from the bulk of the native population.

The traditional prestige of the *principalia* which was due to their descent, official functions, and privileges provided them many opportunities for graft and corruption. For instance, they committed graft in the collection of tributes especially those in kind. In return for gifts or other personal favors, they often granted tax as well as *polo* exemptions. Some would even get part, if not all, of the wages of *polo* laborers. In the compulsory sale (*vandala)* of farm products to the colonial government, some *principales* would grant loans to farmers at interest—thus forcing the farmers to further depend on them.[7]

Some writers have commented that the *cabezas* and *gobernadorcillos* "did not count for much in the eyes of the Spanish colonial community" and that they often stood in fear of the Spanish friar serving as parish priest. Moreover, they were often taken advantage of by the Spanish *alcalde mayor* and other Spaniards. Nevertheless, these did not reduce the prestige of the *principalia* before their fellow natives.[8] There is a great deal of truth in these observations especially in the first two centuries of Spanish rule. But as the official functions of the *principalia* and their economic base increased in the next century, some of them would begin to evince actions which many Spaniards considered presumptuous or arrogant. Often, *principales* would hold meetings in the absence of the parish priest or even refuse to stand up in the presence of Spaniards.[9] They were out to maintain the dignity they believed was an integral part of their office. They did not hesitate to complain to the King or to the highest Spanish officials that they deserved more respect than what was actually accorded to them by Spanish parish priests and officials. In particular, the *principales* complained that they were not allowed to sit down in the presence of a Spanish friar and were often made to serve the friars at meals. Consequently, Spanish monarchs had to issue orders for *principales* to be accorded the respect due to them.[10] At bottom, a great deal of the attitude of the *principales* demonstrated that they still considered themselves the nobility of the country with vested rights due their ancestry and office. It was an attitude not entirely unaccom-

---

[7]Comp. Robert R. Reed, *Hispanic Urbanization in the Philippines: A Study of the Impact of Church and State* (Manila: The University of Manila. 1967), p. 153. For a long list of the abuses and exactions of *cabezas,* see "Character and Influence of the Friars" from Volume II of Sinibaldo de Mas's *Informe sobre el estado de las Islas Filipinas en 1842* in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.,* Volume XXVIII, pp. 248-252.

[8]Cf. O.D. Corpuz, *op. cit.,* p. 27.

[9]Sinibaldo de Mas, *Report on the Condition of the Philippines in 1842,* Secret Report (Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1963), Volume III, pp. 157-158.

[10]Feodor Jagor, *Travels in the Philippines* (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1965), pp. 92-93.

panied with resentment towards an alien rule judged by them as intrusive as well as onerous at times.

III. *Principales,* Friars and Native Priests

One of the earliest avenues opened to members of the *principalia* families to further increase their power and prestige was through the priesthood. Nearly all of the first Christian missionaries who came to the Philippines were members of the regular or friar orders. Due to the chronic lack of Spanish secular priests, most of the parishes had to be administered by friars. The claim of the Manila Archbishop, and later on those of bishops, to visit the parishes under their jurisdiction was bitterly opposed by the friar parish priests who claimed they were subject not to the Archbishop but to their own superiors. Whenever the Archbishop insisted on his episcopal rights on visitation, many of the friars would threaten to abandon their parishes—a situation that would have created havoc in the religious indoctrination of the natives. Since Spanish secular priests proved hard to get by, the obvious solution to the above problem was to ordain native secular priests. The friars were not initially against the principle of having native priests, but they fiercely opposed letting native secular priests serve as parish priests. What was then the "visitation controversy", gave rise to the "secularization controversy".

The development of a native secular clergy faced many obstacles. Among these were: the division of the eccleciastical territory of the Philippines among definite religious orders; and the opposition of colonial officials to enforce even the half-hearted attempts of the home government to secularize the parishes since they often suspected native priests as not having much love for the mother country.[11] Some Archbishops, in their eagerness to immediately fill empty parishes, hastily ordained native secular priests. The fact was that it was often difficult for the native clergy, many of whom were poorly trained, to immediately take over the majority of the parishes.

The secularization controversy degenerated to such a low level that both friars and native priests started to accuse each other of greed, incompetence, immorality, etc. Some sympathizers of the friars' cause went as far as to remark that such was the eagerness of the Archbishop to have secular native priests ordained that even Manila rig drivers and cargomen were recruited to study for priesthood. However, this remark, possibly made in malicious humor, is not really true. According to the testimony of the Jesuit priest, Juan Delgado, written around 1751, all the natives studying for priesthood in the four colleges in Manila were sons of *principales* and not of those non-nobles who descended from the pre-Hispanic freemen or serfs. The *principales,* he asserted, had kept their noble status—something which the Spanish King could not take away from them even if he wanted to. Moreover, he continued, the *principales* and

[11]Horacio de la Costa. "The Development of the Native Clergy in the Philippines." ***Studies in Philippine Church History*** Ed. Gerald H. Anderson (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1969), p. 104.

native priests were very much esteemed and respected by the native population.[12]

The candidates for the native clergy would normally originate from the families of the *principales.* This can be explained by the fact that the *principalia,* being the most aggressive and relatively most literate segment of the native population, would covet the position since it carried with it civil, economic, and religious power. Actually, the Spanish parish priest was a watchdog on the *principalia.* The latter was required to consult him on practically all official matters.

It was probably the powers vested on the parish priest that made it quite difficult for the friars to easily abandon their parishes to the extent that they had to vilify the character and competence of native priests to keep their posts. The powers and functions of parish priests were numerous and went beyond the purely religious ones. The testimony of Juan Villegas, a friar who had served as parish priest for about twenty years, before the Philippine Commission in 1900, revealed some of the actual powers and duties of the parish priest. According to Villegas, the parish priest had supervisory powers on education, taxation, and sanitation. He had responsibilities on the census and other statistics. He issued certificates of character and civil status. He had something to do in the drawing of lots for those who were to serve in the Army. He had to be present at the election for municipal offices and served as adviser to the municipal council. He was president of the prison board as well as member of the provincial board. He was a member of the board for the partitioning of Crown lands and often served as auditor at the provincial level, etc.[13] Although some of the above powers were relevant only in the nineteenth century, many others were found as far back as the early days of the conquest. In any case, the bulk of historical evidence points to the friar parish priest as the real ruler of the *pueblo.*

The extensive powers of the parish priest would have reduced the political powers of the *principalia* to a cipher unless either those of the parish priest were reduced or the parish priest came from its ranks. In effect, if the parish priest came from the families of the *principalia,* the *principales* would have almost fully controlled the *pueblo*, and their power over the bulk of the native population better secured. This would explain, to some extent, why colonial officials in general were not very much in favor of the secularization of parishes regardless of their possible lack of sympathy for friars.

Native priests bitterly complained that in spite of their increasing numbers the ratio of parishes held by them was very much smaller than they deserved. The distribution of the parishes were as follows:

---

[12]Fr. Juan Delgado, S.J., *Historia General Sacroprofana, politica y natural de las Islas del Poniente llamadas Filipinas* (Manila: 1892), pp. 293-294.

[13]*U.S. Senate Document No. 190, 56th Congress, 2nd session, 1900-1901,* (Washington Printing Office: 1901) pp. 64-66.

Year	Regular	Secular
1750	427	142
1842	287 (487 ?)	198
1852	528	191
1870	611	181
1897-98	672	157

In 1870, out of 792 parishes (excluding 10 mission parishes of the Jesuits), 181 or 23% were under secular native priests. Whereas, the parishes under the friars averaged 6,000 each, those under the seculars averaged 4,500. In the 196 parishes controlled by the Augustinians, the average went as high as 10,000. In 1880, when the number of native priests rose up to 748, the number or proportion of parishes held by them did not increase but actually decreased. In 1898, there were 746 regular parishes, 105 mission parishes, and 116 missions, or 967 in all. Of this, 150 parishes, representing about one-seventh of the Christian population, were ministered by the secular clergy (nearly 100% natives).[14] The fact that the number of parishes under the native clergy had been reduced in proportion to those held by the friars can be explained by the fierce opposition of the friars and their support from colonial officials against the secularization of the parishes. That there were about 600 native priests in 1898 as against 825 in 1890 may signify that there were other alternative avenues, like the professions, attracting the ambitious sons of the *principales*.

In 1870, Gregorio Meliton Martinez, the Archbishop of Manila and a well-known sympathizer of the aspirations of the native clergy, wrote a lengthy letter to the Spanish Regent where he exposed what he believed constituted injustices to the native clergy and a concommittant increase of resentment against the friars. He warned that continued official support of the friars would transform the resentment of the native priests into an "anti-Spanish sentiment"—a sentiment that would eventually be shared by their parents, relatives, and finally by the "whole Filipino people, with whom they are in closer contact than are the regulars, with the result that the danger would assume a grave character." The Archbishop then noted that the conflict was rapidly assuming a racial tone.[15] True enough, in 1873, when three native priests were executed by the Spanish government for alleged complicity in a mutiny of native troops, their families and friends judged the execution as the result of a collusion of colonial officials and friars to do away with them because they were well known as champions of the native clergy and the secularization of the parishes. People began to call them "martyrs". Significant about the outcome of

[14]All the above figures on parishes and priests have been based on: James A. Le Roy, *The Americans in the Philippines: A History of the Conquest and First Years of Occupation, with an Introductory Account of the Spanish Rule*, (Boston and New York: 1914), Volume I, pp. 60-61; Jesus Ma. Cavanna y Manso, *Rizal and the Philippines of his Days* (Manila: 1957), pp. 127-130; and *U.S. Senate Document No. 112, 56th Congress, 2nd session*, p. 23.

[15]For the complete text of this letter, see Nicolas Zafra, *Readings in Philippine History* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1956), pp. 485-598.

the above mutiny was that many *principales* and priests were exiled from the Philippines on the charges that they were also involved. Being a native priest, regardless of the sincerity of his vocation, could make a person suspect of disloyalty to the government. The antagonism between the friars and the secular native clergy eventually transformed itself into a racial issue and then finally, a national one.[16] It cannot be overemphasized that the blocking of the aspirations and expectations of the native secular clergy also served to frustrate those of the *principalia* families from which they originated.

IV. *Principales*, Commerce, and Land

During pre-Hispanic times, agricultural lands were held in common. The *datus* supervised the planting, harvesting, and distribution of the products of the land. Forest products were accessible to anyone. In the first century of the Spanish conquest, there was no systematic plan to exploit the natural resources of the colony. Spaniards were even prohibited from owning landed estates in the provinces. The so-called *encomenderos* did not own land but only had the right to collect the tribute from certain well-defined territories. Most of the Spanish civilians lived in Manila where they speculated in the Galleon trade. However, even from the earliest times, friar corporations had began to take possession of large tracts of land especially in the provinces.

About the middle of the eighteenth century, farsighted Spanish officials commenced to recommend the expansion of trade with Asia and Europe, the exploitation of Philippine resources, the reformation of the Galleon trade, the settlement of Spaniards in the provinces for agricultural and trade purposes, and government expropriation of the landed estates of the friar corporations.[17]

In 1781, the Governor-General created an Economic Society to promote the cultivation of export products and the establishment of industries. The next year, the tobacco monopoly was instituted. This brought about some financial independence to the government and soon it became independent of the annual Mexican subsidy.

The ensuing abolition of the Galleon trade in 1815 as well as the severance of trade with Mexico due to the latter's independence in 1820, forced Manila authorities to liberalize some of its previous

---

[16]Cf. Horacio de la Costa, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

[17]One of these officials was Francisco Leandro de Viana the royal fiscal at Manila. He wrote a lengthy memorial to the Spanish Court where he explained how the colony could support itself by the development of its natural resources, the creation of industries, the building of shipyards, the intensification of trade with other countries especially the neighboring ones, the increase of the tribute, etc. For the complete text see "Viana's Memorial of 1765", Blair and Robertson *op cit.*, Volume XLVIII, pp. 197-338. Another official was Simon de Anda y Salazar who also wrote a memorial to the Spanish King in 1768. In it he accommodated some of the ideas of Viana Simon de Anda who also recommended a systematic operation of mines, revision of commercial rules, and reforms in the Galleon trade. However, most of the memorial is concerned with the abuses of the friars. For the complete text see "Anda's Memorial, 1768", *ibid.* Volume L, pp. 137-190.

restrictive commercial policies. Spanish ports were opened to Philippine products and factories were officially authorized to be created. This was also a time coincident with the spread of the *laissez faire* policy in Western Europe. All these led to the opening of Manila officially as a free port in 1834 to European traders. Soon a few provincial ports were also opened to world trade. Residents were also allowed to trade in any European port and this served to boost commerce. In spite of government restrictions, however, trade progressively fell into private hands.

The acceleration of exports can be seen in the following figures: In 1831, hemp exports amounted to only about 346 tons. In 1837, it rose to 2,585 tons and in 1858, it rose up to 27,500 tons—two-thirds going to the United States. Also, in 1782, about 30,000 piculs of sugar were exported. This increased to 146,661 in 1840. It became 566,371 in 1854 and, in 1857, the amount rose to 714,059.[18] With an increase of exports (including tobacco, copra, coffee, and rice), many Spaniards and affluent natives began to invest in many of the foreign commercial firms.

Previously, as long as the agriculture of the colony generally remained on the subsistence level, serious agrarian troubles did not appear in the agricultural estates. However, it was during the beginnings of the export economy and much more later on during its acceleration that agrarian disputes began to become really serious. Among other reasons, like the increase of population and farm hands, this could imply that the ordinary tiller of the soil had come to feel that he also ought to be a beneficiary of the increased production of the land. This situation was mostly true in friar lands.

Although the Spaniards recognized the existence of communal land in the colony, they introduced alongside it the notion of private property as a source of wealth. As early as the seventeenth century, the *principales* and their relatives had already started to "assume the formal ownership of that portion of barangay land which their dependents ordinarily cultivated (as communal land)".[19] This tendency increased as the years went on. Agrarian troubles, especially on friar lands, had assumed such alarming proportions that the Spanish government started to seriously encourage the application for land titles—something the friars opposed. In 1880, the government tried to further push land registration; but this well-intentioned law only served to enable the *principales* to strengthen their economic base for they were in the best position to know more about the requirements of the law and take advantage of it. This action of the *principales* to get titles

---

[18]Conrado Benitez, *Philippine Progress Prior to 1898* (Manila: Philippine Education Co., Inc., 1916), p. 70.

[19]John Leddy Phelan, *The Hispanization of the Philippines* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1959), p. 117. For cases of *principales* selling or donating former communal lands to Augustinian friars during the seventeenth century, see Nicholas P. Cushner, S.J., "Meysapan: The Formation and Social Effects of a Landed Estate." *Philippine Historical Review,* (Volume VI), 1973, pp. 153-156. Later on, in 1745, the tenants of Meysapan rose against the Augustinian owners claiming that the estate was their ancestral land and that they wanted it back. *Ibid.,* p. 164.

to many former *barangay* lands extended up to the eve of the Revolution of 1896. All these explain what happened to the descendants of the old *maharlika* or freemen and "serfs" of pre-Hispanic times. The majority of them progressively became tenants or sub-tenants in the lands where their ancestors once worked on.

The relative absence of agrarian troubles in *principalia*-owned lands can be partly explained by the fact that, unlike the friars who lived far from their lands which were left to the charge of impersonal administrators, the *principales* lived on or near their lands and had familial or at least familiar relations with their tenants. Actually, some *principales* had also ended up as tenants in friar lands, but they often contested the claimed ownership of the friars by asserting that the land once belonged to their ancestors as far back as the ancient days. In any case, the fact that *principales* had strengthened their economic base by the acquisition of land explains why they came to be often called "caciques".

The commercial prosperity of the colony brought about by increased production and the export economy did not directly benefit the common tiller of the soil. What ensued was that the *principales* became one of the major beneficiaries. They were now building better and more permanent houses; the most affluent of them also having well-furnished homes in Manila. Manila had now began to acquire progressively the characteristics of an urban and commercial center—improved roads and more bridges, better mail services, more commercial firms, increased government offices, additional courts, an expanding civil service, new printing presses, and so on. A rising middle class composed of Spaniards, *mestizos* (both Spanish and Chinese), and enterprising natives began to be noticeable. Many *principales* from the provinces started to visit Manila for business and other purposes. Their children went there, too, to get a better education. Soon, some of them would sail to Europe to further their studies.

V. *Principales* and *Ilustrados*

Coincident with the rising commercial prosperity came educational reforms. On December 20, 1863, a Royal decree provided for a system of compulsory primary education with free instruction for the poor and for the establishment of a normal school to graduate teachers for primary schools. Some of the reasons for the decree were: to propagate the Castilian language, to more effectively teach the Christian religion, and to raise the standard of civilization of the natives. Before 1863, the kind of primary education provided for the natives did not go beyond the parochial catechetical level.[20] Although there were colleges already opened to the natives who were studying for priesthood, there were, for all practical purposes, no chances for other natives to pursue higher education which was reserved

[20]Cf. Domingo Abella, "State of Higher Education in the Philippines to 1863—A Historical Appraisal", *Philippine Historical Review* (Volume I, No. 1), 1965, pp. 23 and 26.

mainly for Spaniards, and Spanish *mestizos* to some extent. Up to the 1860's, the most educated segment of the native population were the native secular priests.

The Royal decree of 1863 stipulated that every town was to have at least one school for primary education (Article 3). Attendance was to be compulsory although instruction to the poor was to be free (Article 4). Primary education was to include reading, writing, Christian doctrine, Castilian language and grammar, arithmetic, history of Spain, geography, practical agriculture, rules of courtesy, and vocal music. Primary schools fell under the supervision of parish priests while the normal school was to be managed by the Jesuits.[21]

Significant to note in the decree was that graduates of the normal school were to have certain privileges while exercising their profession. For example, they were exempted from forced labor, and if they had rendered services for 15 years, they were to be completely freed from it. Those who had taught for at least five years were privileged to be called *"principal"* (Article 12).[22] This means that they could vote for municipal officers or serve as such. Moreover, teachers with at least ten years experience were to be given opportunities to easily enter the civil service (Article 14).

The *gobernadorcillos* were charged to help in the implementation of the educational decree. For example, it became their duty to publicize the opening of classes, to issue certificates to those who could or could not pay, to see to students' attendance, and even to help in the giving of examinations. However, laws were also issued to prevent them from abusing their function in issuing certificates of poverty to students exempting them from paying the tuition fees.[23]

Whereas some Spaniards did not fear the strengthening of the *principalia* families through education, since they assumed that this class was allied to them, other Spaniards were optimistic that the emergence of an educated segment in native society would eventually displace the *principalia.* Obviously, the families of the *principales* were in the best position to take advantage of the decree; and opportunities to enter the normal school would generally be confined to them. In 1864, the normal school in Manila started to function. Apparently there were natives with enough educational background to enter it. The fact was that there were many native families who made it a point to teach literacy and other forms of education in their homes.[24] In time, more normal schools in the colony would be opened. Manila alone graduated an average of 60 *maestros* up to the end of the Spanish regime. Being a teacher was in some way an alternative to that of being

---

[21]A copy of this educational decree is found in "Primary Education", Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.,* Volume XLVI, pp. 76-118.

[22]*Ibid.,* p. 83.

[23]This function is found in *ibid.,* p. 98. The parish priest could refuse to approve such certificates. See *ibid.,* p. 135.

[24]Cf. Vicente Barrantes, *Apuntes interesantes sobre las Islas Filipinas por un español* (Madrid: 1869), pp. 46-47.

a priest regarding education as well as holding a position of dignity and prestige.

In 1864, primary schools also started operating in many towns, especially those around Manila. In 1870, there were around 1,779 primary schools in the colony with an attendance of about 385,907 students of both sexes although less than three percent of the students had an adequate mastery of the Castilian language.[25] In this same year, there were 2,300 secondary students all over the colony. In Manila, there were 1,883 such students of which 1,421 were natives and *mestizos* and 462 were Spaniards (both *insular* and *peninsular).* Santo Tomas, the pontifical university in Manila, had 40 secondary students (all Spaniards) and 580 students enrolled in higher education.[26] It is probable that these students were mostly Spaniards, Spanish *mestizos,* and native priests.

In 1875, another Royal decree established a faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy in Santo Tomas, although selected courses in both fields were offered a few years earlier. In the next year, courses in notary public were offered. Consequently, natives who had been able to consistently take opportunities of the decree of 1863 and then studied in the colleges were able to enter the university. Out of this first batch, were men like Jose Rizal and Marcelo H. del Pilar, who initiated the movement for reforms in the colony.[27] A succeeding group consisted of Apolinario Mabini and Emilio Jacinto who were to play leading roles in the ensuing revolution.

Enemies of the friars asserted that the opening of professions to natives at the university level was designed by the friars to prevent the sons of well-to-do families from going abroad where they might be infected by liberal or anti-clerical ideas. In any case, the growing population of Manila and the increasing urbanization of the city made imperative the offering of certain professional courses.

The educational reforms as well as the opening of the professions to natives caused the emergence of the *ilustrados.* The fact that the *principales* had the best chances to get an education led ordinary natives to equate the term *ilustrado* with *principal.* However, in its more restricted and correct sense, the term *ilustrado* referred to a person who had a profession, spoke and wrote Castilian well, and had been educated in any of the colleges. Colloquially, the term as a collective did not denote any Spaniard, however cultured or educated he might have been.

The *ilustrados,* as can be seen, were the educated elite that emerged from the *principalia* class. As such they began to enjoy a special prestige among the native population. Thus, among the natives,

---

[25]"Public Instruction", Blair and Robertson, *ibid.,* Volume XLV, pp. 299-300.

[26]Domingo Abella, *op. cit.,* Appendix A, p. 29.

[27]For example, Jose Rizal enrolled in Santo Tomas in 1877 for a medical career while Marcelo H. del Pilar finished his law in the same university in 1880. Graciano Lopez Jaena, another reformer, tried to work for a medical career in the same university at the time Rizal was there but was not accepted due to his lack of a Bachelor's degree.

prestige along educational lines had ceased being confined generally to the priests. The *ilustrados,* considering that many Spaniards in the colony were illiterate or uneducated, were able to demonstrate what achievements natives were capable of. They would soon verbalize the aspirations of the *principalia* for a greater share in determining the destiny of the colony.

VI. *Ilustrados* and Intellectuals

Educational and municipal reforms, the opening of Manila to world commerce, political changes in the mother country, the coming of Spaniards with liberal ideas, and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 dramatically lessened the intellectual and religious isolation of the Philippines. Political changes in Spain could not but affect events in the colony. The September Revolution of 1868 which enabled Spanish republicans to echo ideals of the French Revolution made it possible for Carlos Maria de la Torre (1869-71) to serve as Governor-General of the Philippines. Deeply imbued with republican ideals, he generated aspirations and expectations among native priests, the rising middle class in Manila, and Spaniards of like mind. The Spanish Republic of 1873-74, although short-lived, nevertheless made inevitable the accommodation of further liberal ideas in Spain's political and social structure. Thus the return of the Bourbons the next year did not endanger republican gains. Actually, the Spanish constitution of 1876 accommodated many liberal principles. Furthermore, not a few ministers, noted for republican sympathies, served in various ministries.

All the above events affected the self-image and role of the *principales* and their families. They welcomed municipal and educational reforms and increased facility to enter the civil service, for they stood to gain from them. The majority, in particular, wanted to have the colony assimilated by Spain so they could be considered Spanish citizens with the same rights and privileges as any Spaniard. But they desired at the same time a status superior to that of the Chinese. There was nothing revolutionary or ideological in their aspirations. However, they were, in effect, out to control as much as feasible the colonial bureaucracy or state machinery by virtue of their noble descent, the claim that they were the true *naturales,* and their presumed loyal services to Spain. Needless to say, such claims were not permitted to go uncontested and actually provoked a strong reaction on the part of local Spanish colonials and friars.

Spanish colonial officials feared that the strengthening of the *principalia* would eventually lead the colony to follow the way of the Spanish colonies in the Americas towards independence. Spanish friars feared the loss of their ancient privileges and predominance as well as the eventual disappearance of the religious motive in native society which they had worked so hard to nurture. Spaniards born in the Philippines (Filipinos, *creoles*) realized that their chances to hold political or civil positions would be lessened; they had already resented

the arrival of other Spaniards from the mother country as presenting the same danger. The fact was that the highest and choicest offices of the bureaucracy was often given to *peninsulares.*[28]

Opposition to an influx of *peninsulares* as well as rivalries between them and the *insulares* can be better appreciated in terms of the following figures. In 1864, there were 4,054 Spaniards. Of these, 500 were priests, 270 were businessmen and proprietors, and 3,280 were government officials, Army and Navy officials, etc.[29] In 1870, there were 3,823 *peninsulares* (1,000 priests, 1,000 members of the Armed forces, and 1,800 civil officials and others). The number of *creoles* and Spanish *mestizos* was 9,710.[30] In 1876, the number of Spaniards *(peninsulares* and *creoles)* doubled. Indeed, the *creoles* and their progeny would have liked to occupy most of the offices held by the *peninsulares* in the same manner that the families of the *principales* desired it for themselves. Obviously, too, the *peninsulares* and *insulares* would combine to prevent the natives from holding such coveted positions. The population of the Philippines in 1871, according to the *Guia Official,* had reached 5,682,012.

In the face of hostility to their aspirations, the *principalia,* especially those in the *pueblos* near Manila, often resorted to various tactics to asserting their rights while harassing the friars. For examples: a *gobernadorcillo* would be elected over the candidate of the friar parish priest; the *principalia* would refuse to allow its tax list of *cedulas personales* to be compared or checked with the parochial list; in religious festivities of the Chinese in Binondo, the *principales,* as civil officials, claimed precedence over the friars. In addition, the *principalia* demanded the right to supervise cemeteries. *Principales* would often issue *manifestos* favoring the retention of Spanish officials believed by them to be anti-clericals while boldly demanding the expulsion of friars. In a subtle gesture to contest friar parish priest

---

[28]When the Spaniards came to the Philippines, they called the natives *"indios".* Later on this term was confined to the Christianized natives since the Muslims came to be called *"moros"* and the pagans *"infieles".* The term "Filipino" was reserved for Spaniards born in the Philippines who were also called *"creoles".* Spaniards who were born in Spain and came to the Philippines were simply called *"españoles"* or *"peninsulares".* Often to distinguish the Spaniard born in the Philippines from the *peninsular* the former was called *"insular".* However, around the middle of the nineteenth century, some Spanish writers had used the term "Filipino" to denote *"indios".* To avoid confusion, however, they made a distinction between *"españoles europeos"* and *"españoles filipinos",* the latter referring to the *creoles* or Spaniards born in the Philippines. In general, *indios* who went to study in Spain were called there "Filipinos" since it appeared that the term *"indio"* had acquired a derogatory connotation. However, during the Revolution in 1896, and even earlier, many educated *indios* had already started to call themselves "Filipinos", to the chagrin of some *españoles filipinos.*

The term *"mestizo",* without any qualification, referred to Chinese *mestizos* or Chinese half-breeds. When qualified as *mestizo de español,* it denoted Spanish half-breeds. When Jose Rizal was called *"mestizo"* in his trial in 1896, it referred to his Chinese ancestry and did not mean that he had a Spanish father. Rizal was also called an *indio.* By the beginning of this century, the term *mestizo* came to be technically confined to children who were half-white and half-Filipino. Colloquially, however, there were cases when the term was extended to refer also to any white person or one with strong European features.

[29]Edward Gaylore Bourne, "Historical Introduction", Blair and Robertson *op. cit.,* Volume I, p. 60.

[30]"Le Roy's Bibliograpnical Notes, *ibid.,* Volume LII, footnote, pp. 115-116.

supervision of schools, *principales* often volunteered their willingness to contribute to the establishment of schools—presumably to be under their direct control. In many ways, these demands and actions of the *principales* were based on certain interpretations of the laws. This led Spanish officials to suspect that they were being well-advised by recently graduated native lawyers.[31] In any case, for once *principales* had began to contest friar prerogatives in a more sophisticated and determined manner.

Friar retaliation and colonial repressive measures were severe. Any questioning of the *status quo* was often labelled as *filibusterismo* or subversion. Many scions of the best native families and Spanish *mestizos* left to study in Spain not only to escape harassment but also because they were not satisfied with the nature of instruction and the curricula in the colony. This steady stream became more noticeable in the early 1880's. Many of these students and others who joined them had a fair mixture of Chinese blood while a few had Spanish blood.[32] In Spain, they joined the colony of some exiles, professionals, and students who had gone there earlier. There, they were able to breathe in the relatively freer political atmosphere while having more access to political literature.

Initially, these *ilustrados* worked in a desultory manner when they exposed what they believed were wrong in the colony and suggested how to attain greater progress in its social and economic institutions. However, it would not be long when they would start organizing and coordinating their activities to generate the so-called Propaganda Movement, which was, in effect, a movement for reforms in the colony.

What the reformers voiced first of all was the assimilation of the colony to Spain or making it a province of Spain. This would have given the natives the same political rights enjoyed in Spain or at least it would have made the Spaniards and natives in the colony equal before the law. Some reformers postulated that equality before the law implied that all offices in the colonial bureaucracy (excepting those of the Governor-General and heads of the various ministries) were opened to anyone. Nevertheless, they suggested that this be made through a system of competitive examinations. They also asked for the change of the military regime into a civil one. This would have made more operative the enjoyment of civil rights. Representation of the Philippines in the Spanish Cortes was also demanded. This would have made it easier to voice the aspirations of the natives while exposing in

---

[31]A narration of such harassments is found in John N. Schumacher. *The Propaganda Movement: 1880-1895* (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1973), pp. 96-114.

[32]The *principales* since the earliest times were strengthened by the blood of the thrifty Chinese. This enabled them to acquire the skills for entrepreneurship and industry in the urban areas. Some Chinese *mestizos* were able to become *principales*, possibly by virtue of the status of their mothers. The *principalia* was also strengthened by the blood of the prestigious Spaniards who started coming in relatively bigger numbers around the middle of the nineteenth century. With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, more Spaniards came.

the mother country any violation of laws or rights. Another demand was for the secularization of the parishes and the expulsion of the friars, who, unlike the ever loyal natives, were charged as merely working for the interests of their religious corporations as against those of Spain. This charge was to do away with a clerical force which consistently opposed reforms in the colony while at the same time enabling natives to occupy the post of parish priest with all of its powers and privileges.

All these demands revealed that the *ilustrados* believed that they could hold their own against the Spaniards in intellectual matters and in holding important political as well as ecclesiastical positions. They were asserting that as *naturales* they had a right to have a more involved participation in the determination of the direction of their country. They were also claiming for a greater share in the economic and social benefits of the colony.

Spanish colonial officials and friars contended that the demand of the reformers did not truly represent the aspirations of the majority of the native population who were asserted as content with the *status quo.* The reformers were judged as ungrateful for it was the very education they had imbibed in the colonial regime that enabled them to demand a change in it. To belie the above contention, the reformers, through speeches, *manifestos,* articles and books tried to disseminate their ideas. A newspaper, *La Solidaridad,* was published in Spain. Many copies of the newspaper and other printed materials were smuggled to Manila where they were avidly read by discontented *principales,* native petty officials in the civil service, and members of a rising working class consisting of printers, petty clerks, artisans, etc. Many affluent *principales* as well as native priests supported the movement financially and even helped to distribute the printed materials. It should also be mentioned that the *ilustrados* in Spain were in close contact with, and even encouraged in their work by not a few Spanish officials and Masons. Many of the *ilustrados* joined Masonry as a means to get more sympathy from liberal thinkers who happened to be Masons. This organization could have led some *ilustrados* to become not only more anti-friar but anti-clerical as well. This, however, did not make them cease to voice the aspirations of the native secular clergy— for some time at least. Significant about some of the books and articles published by the *ilustrados* was their attempt to resurrect legends and other matters dealing with the Pre-Hispanic epoch. This, in an important manner, reflected pride on indigenous elements while consciously belying the assertion of friars that before the coming of the Spaniards, the natives were doomed to perdition and that there was nothing for them to be really proud of.

Crucial to note is that among the *ilustrados* there were a few who could be termed "intellectuals" in the exact sense of the word. Besides a profession, they had a well-grounded liberal education, and were good writers. They were the first to realize that in the historical stage the

Spaniards found themselves, they would not be able to consider the natives as persons that ought to or could be considered their equals. They concluded that since it was the essence of colonialism to have both exploiters and exploited, what they conceived as constituting the good life could never be realized in the colonial setup. The native intellectuals were the most sensitive to acts of humiliation and racial discrimination or prejudice. Comparing themselves with Spaniards with lesser intellectual accomplishments, they were frustrated when they were not given similar rights and courtesies as those towards the Spaniards in colonial society. They were thus led to conceive of an alternative community where what they believed to constitute the good life could be made operative. It was to be a community where man's potentiality for the development of his intellectual and moral virtues could be actualized, and where there was an absence of humiliation, exploitation, and special classes. The logic of such an alternative system was that it would eventually be independent.

The first intellectual to conceive and verbalize such an alternative system was Jose Rizal. In his two novels, the *Noli Me Tangere* and *El Filibusterismo,* he demonstrated, by means of well chosen characters, narration and analysis of certain social situations, that the Philippines under the structure of colonial and ecclesiastical dominance, could not really progress educationally, socially, economically, and morally. To him it was imperative to have the people slowly but surely develop a form of social consciousness with national overtones such that they would eventually form themselves into a national community where *national sentiment* (a concept akin to Rousseau's general will) would pervade. Although greatly influenced by many ideas of the French Revolution as well as the liberalism then found in Spain, he had to resurrect indigenous traditions, emphasize certain elements like a common racial ancestry and a history pre-dating the Spanish conquest. He believed that should the natives become more aware of their past history and racial ties, emancipate themselves further from individual and sectarian interests, cultivate a high degree of social consciousness, develop their native languages, and feel confident in their inner energies and appreciate more the products of their labor, while all the time distinguishing themselves from the Spaniards, they would eventually form themselves into a national community. It was a community which the Spaniards had to face eventually and grant political independence unless it was willing to face dire consequences. Before writing his novels, Rizal once wrote that what was wrong in the Philippines was that, there, "a man is only an individual; he is not member of a nation." What he implied here was that the individual became more significant and more capable of developing his potentialities in a social system that was national in character. The people, too, were not to be tools of other nations. They had to act in a corporate capacity and their gains were to be sought for along communal and not individual or partisan ends.

But Rizal did not stop with mere writing. He organized the *Liga Filipina* as a tool to hasten the emergence of a national community.[33] The national community was to be called "Filipinas" and to be owned by the natives who were now asserted to be the real Filipinos. Rizal's antagonists clearly saw that the success of his ideas would leave no place for Spaniards in Filipinas. They realized that the national community would finally erode the colonial system. Their attacks on him increased with the result that he and those who came to imbibe his ideas became further alienated from them colonial rulers.

Eventually, the intellectuals among the *ilustrados* had to fight the conservatism of the majority of the *principalia* while resenting those *principales* who were closely identified with the colonial regime. These intellectuals well perceived that there were *principales* merely interested in augmenting their privileges and powers if not eventually aspiring to inherit the colonial mantle. To such intellectuals, the substitution of an oppressive native dominance for a foreign one would not represent any improvement from both the human and moral point of view. In the same manner that they were against "economic and administrative caciquism", they would also be against native ecclesiastical dominance.[34] Thus the reform movement which initially begun as a movement in behalf of *principales* transformed itself into a movement in behalf of the whole people.

VII. Reformers, Revolutionaries, and *Principales*

The ideas of the reformers eventually seeped into the urban working class in Manila and Tondo. When the work of the reformers were then correctly seen to be doomed and the repressive measures of colonial officials and friars became increasingly unbearable, a new leadership from the above class emerged. Thus was the *Katipunan* association born with the aim of attaining a national community by revolution. Its founder, Andres Bonifacio (b. 1863) was a clerk in a foreign commercial firm. He was taught reading and writing at home and built himself up through self-study. Bonifacio and his advisers were deeply influenced by Rizal who was now seen by them as a man who had emancipated himself from a class bias and who had conceived of a national community along moral principles.

Because of its nativistic appeal and promise of a better future for the people, thousands in the provinces joined the *Katipunan.* Among these were members of messianic groups that were peasant-based, a common feature in Philippine history, who were just waiting for such an organization to appear.[35] The vague understanding of Spanish officials of the nature of such messianic groups, many members of which joined or at least sympathized with the *Katipunan,* led them to

---

[33]A detailed analysis of Rizal's concept of a national community and how the *Liga* could serve as a tool to realize it, is found in the author's monograph, *Rizal's Concept of a Filipino Nation* (Quezon City; 1959).

[34]Cf. James A. Le Roy, *Philippine Life in Town and Country* (New York and London G.P. Putnam's Sons 1905), pp. 180-181.

[35]The works of David R. Sturtevant and Reynaldo C. Ileto offer deep insights into such messianic movements.

report varying estimates of *Katipunan* membership ranging from 100,000 to 400,000. *Principales* and native priests soon started joining it. Kinship or racial ties, patriotism, sheer desperation, hatred of Spaniards, wish for a better social system, or hope to profit from the revolutionary movement might all have entered into the total picture of membership.

When the actual uprising took place in 1896, many conservative *principales* as well as *ilustrados* recoiled in horror at the very thought of blood and violence. Nevertheless, some of them were arrested and even executed by Spaniards who never thought that a revolution could emanate from another yet humbler segment of the native population. Eventually, the leadership and organization of the revolution fell into the hands of the *principales.* An index to this was the Tejeros Assembly held on March 22, 1897, where revolutionary leaders met to form a new revolutionary government. Emilio Aguinaldo, who had studied in one of the colleges in Manila to become a teacher and who like his father had once served as *capitan municipal* in Cavite province, was selected President. Even the selection of Bonifacio as Director of the Interior was protested by a *principal* who haughtily asserted that "The position of Director of the Interior is very great and should not be occupied by one who is not a lawyer." He then suggested another person who has a law degree. The meeting was marred by factional squabbles and regional differences. The government it established officially replaced the *Katipunan.* Bonifacio, who had left the meeting angrily with his loyal followers, was eventually executed by orders of a military court controlled by the faction opposed to him.

It was through the intermediacy of other *principales* that Spanish government officials and leaders of the Revolution were able to ink the Pact of Biak-na-Bato in December 1897. In the resumption of the Revolution in 1898, the role of the *principales* became intimate and important. It was clearly seen by the revolutionary leaders that the struggle for independence had greater chances of success with the support of the *principales.* To gain legitimacy as well as support for the revolutionary government, it was essential for the municipal officials of different towns to ratify a previous declaration of independence. It is significant to note that the Revolutionary Congress, with an original number of nearly 90 members, which set out to frame a constitution for an independent Filipinas was composed of 40 lawyers, 16 physicians, 5 pharmacists, 2 engineers, one priest, with the rest consisting of businessmen and landowners. Many of the provisions of the constitution which was promulgated had reference to the sanctity of property.

When in 1898 the prospects for the success of the revolution was high, some affluent Manila *ilustrados* wanted to form a bank and take advantage of the revolutionary government. They were blocked by other *ilustrados* of relatively humbler origins like Apolinario Mabini who, like Rizal, was also an intellectual.

Many of the generals of the revolutionary army were either *ilustrados* or at least *principales.* However, as to be expected, the bulk of the revolutionary army was composed of the ordinary *tao*—most of them descendants of the once proud *maharlikas* or freemen who were now converted into tenants, sub-tenants or mere peasants. With the success of American arms against the revolution, many *principales,* lured by promises of offices in the new regime or to protect their properties and vested interests, accepted American sovereignty. Among them were former members of the Revolutionary Congress. All of these were happening while a guerrilla warfare supported by the peasantry and messianic groups increased in intensity. This warfare suggests that agrarian unrest has been a continuing part of a historical pattern in the Philippines even before the Revolution. It was the *principales* who cooperated with the Americans to reestablish law and order in the country. The majority of the members of the first National Assembly came from their ranks and they were the first to agitate for a peaceful movement for independence. All of these, nevertheless, reflected the assertion of native leadership on the part of a special segment of the native population.

The problem still facing the present national community that has come to be in the Philippines is whether it has within it the will, and the structure under a dedicated and emancipated leadership, to accommodate further many of the elements that characterized its original conception—elements referring to the intrinsic worth of an individual as such, the avoidance of all forms of exploitation, and the principle that the social and economic benefits of the nation ought to redound to the good of all and not solely to those of special classes.

INDIAN PENETRATION OF PRE-SPANISH PHILIPPINES: A NEW LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE

Malcolm H. Churchill

Introduction

In discussions of Indian cultural and religious penetration of Southeast Asia, the extent to which the Philippines came under such penetration is commonly dismissed as having been peripheral. Identifiable Indian influences in Philippine culture, which are considerable, are attributed to secondary influences rather than to direct penetration of Indian thought, religion, and customs in the process of cultural diffusion recognized in other areas of Southeast Asia.

The absence of a more profound Indian cultural impact is generally attributed to the Philippines' location, being at the end of the line, so to speak, the most distant area of Southeast Asia from Mother India. The Philippines, it is commonly said, was both distant and of little commercial or political importance and thereby, largely unreached by those who bore Indian beliefs and cultures to adjacent lands.

The author would like to suggest that the Philippines, though distant from India, was not in fact divorced from the life and trade of the region. The view of the Philippines as isolated in relation to historic developments in Southeast Asia may be attributed to two features of the Philippines as viewed by 20th century observers: the real isolation of the Philippines during much of four centuries of Spanish and American rule, and the paucity of evidence of Indian penetration in the form of several elements found commonly in other Indianized states of Southeast Asia.

To take the latter aspect first, there are in the Philippines no Hindu or Buddhist temples or monuments. There are no Sanskrit documents. There is no mention in early Spanish accounts of Indians or reference to religions as being other than Islam and heathenism. There are no dances or "wajang" performances based on the Indian epics. Philippine names are Hispanic or Malay, not Indianized, and there are no pockets of remnant peoples practicing religions that are identifiably Indian-animistic mixtures. In short, there are none of several of the highly visible identifying features of Indian civilization which one would ordinarily expect to find in an area which had been strongly influenced by Indian culture.

This paper will suggest, however, that the Philippines, which was integrally joined with the region in pre-Spanish trading relations, received therefore the stimuli of Indian influences common to the region. The absence of the elements discussed above can, it is felt, be explained by the low level of population density in the Philippines and the interposition of the Christianizing Spanish impact. If this is the case, this paper will suggest that the Indian influences which have been identified in the Philippines can be better explained as the consequence of the absorption of an Indian religious/cultural system by

the early Filipinos, rather than as dimly understood, secondary influences. The author does not mean to suggest that the influences were necessarily borne to the Philippines by Indians; their relevance is equally great if borne to the Philippines by Indonesians or other Southeast Asian bearers of Indian culture.

Patterns of Contact

Philippine scholars are inescapably conditioned in their approach to regional contacts by nearly four centuries during which it was easier, psychologically and in many cases physically, to journey to Mexico, Spain, or the United States than to travel south to Indonesia or Borneo. While the existence of historically long-established contact between Muslim Filipinos and their brethren in Indonesia and Malaysia is recognized in present-day provisions for barter trade and border crossing arrangements, such contacts have little present-day relevance for other Filipinos. The flow of communication stops in the south.

The dominant Christian Philippine culture has, moreover, been engaged almost continuously since its inception in an expansionary drive which has encountered its most formidable check in the Muslim south. Muslim incursions of prior centuries notwithstanding, the dominant expansionary impetus has in modern times run from north to south. The Muslim south has thus, from the viewpoint of the Christian center, constituted the periphery and a barricade to the outward flow of people and ideas. A reverse flow of ideas and cultural features from the Muslim south to the rest of the country is an alien concept to the twentieth century Filipino.

Yet it was not always so. Islam itself was borne northwards by cultural contact in the immediate pre-Spanish period, and the earlier trading contacts which brought Indian elements to the rest of Southeast Asia embraced the Philippines as well.

The image of the Philippines as a peripheral area, too far removed from Southeast Asia to share in its cultural evolution, is dubious even from a geographic standpoint. The distance from Manila to North Borneo is about the same as the distance between Singapore and Jakarta. From Manila to Jakarta is about equal to the distance between Jakarta and the Vietnamese areas of Champa and Tongking with which the Javanese were in contact more than one thousand years ago. The distance from either Manila or Sulu to Champa is considerably less than the distance between Java and Champa.

The magnitude of the trading contacts within Southeast Asia and between Southeast Asia and China is well-documented, with much of the trade carried out by Malayo-Polynesian people.[1] It requires a con-

---

[1]See, for example, O.W. Wolters, *Early Indonesian Commerce.* Chapter 10, "Shippers of the 'Persian' Cargos," discusses in detail the early entry of Indonesian traders into regional trade.

siderable stretch of the imagination to suppose that these trading ties would extend west as far as India, north as far as China, east throughout the Indonesian archipelago including Borneo, but would stop at the border of the Philippines.

An extensive Chinese trade with the Philippines is, of course, well established, by early Chinese accounts, early Spanish accounts, and the wealth of Chinese porcelain. But tangible evidence of extensive and long standing non-Chinese trading exchanges with the Philippines is not entirely absent.

Early Chinese accounts describe trade in the third century between Funan, centered on the lower Mekong, and the islands of Chu-yen and Tan-lan. These islands, north-east and north-west of Chu-po, which has been identified as north-eastern Borneo, are believed to have been in the Philippines. The Tan-lan islanders brought iron to Funan, while the Chu-yen sailors brought large shell cups.[2]

Subsequently, the Malay state of Champa emerged in central Vietnam, to the north of Funan. Like Funan, this state also appears to have maintained regular contact with the southern Philippines. Professor Otley Beyer describes an early Sulu traditional history which relates how Orang Dampuan, men of Dampu, established settlements in Sulu. Dampu, after allowing for sound shifts, is quite probably Champa. According to the traditional account, the Dampuans built several towns in Sulu but eventually had a falling out with the local inhabitants and after a bitter war withdrew, burning their towns as they left.[3] That Champans might travel such a distance to colonize Sulu is not as surprising as it might at first seem, in view of the Chams' language affinity and their considerable contact with more distant Java and Sumatra.

Early Sulu manuscripts also record traditions of contact with Borneo, Sumatra, and elsewhere. Beyer cites one of these early manuscripts as claiming that in the century before the arrival of the Spaniards, some four hundred to five hundred junks arrived annually from Cambodia, Champa, and China.[4] Although these figures may be greatly exaggerated in order to bolster Sulu's claim to be a great trading center, they nevertheless provide further evidence of familiarity and contact with Southeast Asia.

The archaeological evidence is also suggestive. While Chinese traders might conceivably have brought to the Philippines all of its Southeast Asian porcelains as well as its Chinese porcelains, as suggested earlier it would be improbable in view of the extensive trade by Southeast Asians themselves. And by the beginning of the 15th

---

[2]R.A. Stein, "Le Lin-yi, sa localisation . . .," *Han-hiue,* Vol. 2, nos. 1-3, pp. 120-122, as cited in Wolters, *op. cit.,* p. 52.

[3]H. Otley Beyer, *Pre-Hispanic Philippines,* p. 7.

[4]*Ibid.,* p. 8.

century, according to an estimate by Robert Fox, exported Siamese wares in the Philippines reached approximately twenty to forty percent of the total southern trade.[5]

The most graphic account of pre-Hispanic linkages between the Philippines and neighboring Southeast Asian countries comes from Tome Pires, a Portuguese apothecary in Malacca from 1512-1515.

Describing Filipino traders and settlers in Malaya, Tome Pires wrote as follows:

> The Lucoes are about ten days' sail beyond Borneo. They are nearly all heathen; they have no king, but are ruled by groups of elders... They take the merchandise to Borneo and from there they come to Malacca.
>
> The Borneans go to the land of the Lucoes to buy gold and foodstuffs as well, and the gold which they bring to Malacca is from the Lucoes and from the surrounding islands which are countless; and they all have more or less trade with one another...
>
> The Lucoes have in their country plenty of foodstuffs, and wax and honey; and they take the same merchandise from here as the Borneans take. They are almost one people; and in Malacca there is no division between them...
>
> In Minjam there must be five hundred Lucoes, some of them important men and good merchants, who want to come to Malacca, and the people of Minjam will not grant them permission because now they have gone over to the side of the former king of Malacca, not very openly. The people of Minjam are Malays.[6]

A further interesting observation on early trade contacts was made by Pedro Chirino in his account of the Philippines in 1600:

> Added to all this wealth (of the Philippines) is the proximity of China, India, Japan, Malacca and the Moluccas... From India, Malacca and the Moluccas came slaves to Manila, male and female, white and black, children and adults... There also came drugs and spices, precious stones, ivory, pearls, pearl seed, rugs and other rich merchandise. And from Japan much wheat and flour, silver, metals, niter, weapons and many other rare goods. All of which has made and makes living in this land profitable and a matter of envy...[7]

Spanish-era accounts of regional trade are, of course, both more plentiful and less relevant to the period in which we are interested. It is, nevertheless, interesting to note how farflung were the contacts. The Englishman Thomas Forrest, writing of the Maguindanaos and Sulu-

---

[5]Robert B. Fox, "The Philippines in Pre-Historic Times," p. 17 in *Readings: Cultural History of the Philippines,* compiled by Teodoro A. Agoncillo.

[6]Armando Cortesao, "Suma Oriental of Tome Pires," vol. 1, pp. lxiii, lxxxi, and xxviii, as quoted in *Travel Accounts of the Islands (1513-1787),* The Filipiniana Book Guild, Vol. XIX, pp. 1-2.

[7]Pedro Chirino, S.J., *The Philippines in 1600,* pp. 242-243.

anos in the mid-1700's, observes that their vessels sailed to, and frequently plundered, Halmahera, Sulawesi, Java, Borneo, and other smaller islands in what is now Indonesia.[8]

In summary, then, there seems every reason to suppose that the Philippines, far from being isolated, participated actively in the early trade of Southeast Asia. We can even surmise that the major trading and population centers may have been Manila and its environs; the Sulu/western Mindanao area; the Puerto Galera area of Mindoro, midway between the first two and a site not only of extensive porcelain discoveries but of a fourteen-foot thick stone fortification overcome by Juan de Salcedo in his 1570 expedition; Cebu City and southern Cebu; and Butuan, a port of call for both Chinese and Muslim Malay merchants when the Spaniards arrived.[9]

The Indianization of the Philippines

The process by which Southeast Asia may have been Indianized is described with great clarity by G. Coedes in *"The Indianized States of Southeast Asia."*[10] The penetration of Indian culture and religion can be likened to a grafting process in which Brahmanic bearers of Indian culture expanded their presence as trading relations expanded, marrying into the native nobility. The adoption of Indian culture by the elite altered only slowly the cultural and religious patterns of the masses so that indigenous beliefs and customs persisted long after the new ways and thoughts had been adopted in the palaces.

The early settlers of the Philippines may have been, in some cases, members of groups in which this process was already underway. Whether or not this was the case, later trade contacts were unavoidably with peoples who were themselves Indianized, even if Indian Brahmans did not themselves visit the Philippines. It can hardly have been otherwise, for the conversion of Hindu Indonesia to Islam was a comparatively late development. When Marco Polo visited Sumatra in 1292, only the little town of Perlak on the northern tip of Sumatra had been converted to Islam. While the coastal areas of Sumatra were converted during the following century, it was during that century that Madjapahit in Java reached the peak of its power. Not until the early 1400's did Malacca become Muslim, the conversion of Java begin, and the rapid spread of Islam throughout the archipelago take place. Thus, until little more than a century before Magellan's arrival, Philippine contacts with Southeast Asia could, for the most part, only have been with Indianized states, and in areas such as the Celebes, Islam's arrival was even further delayed.[11]

---

[8]Captain Thomas Forrest, *A Voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas, from Balambangan: Including an Account of Maguindanao, Sooloo and Other Islands,* as found in *Travel Account of the Islands,* pp. 224-228, 235, 240, and 315.

[9]H. de la Costa, S.J., *Readings in Philippine History,* p. 13.

[10]G. Coedes, *The Indianized States of Southeast Asia,* pp. 14-35 and 247-256.

[11]Bernhard H.M. Vlekke, *Nusantara, A History of Indonesia,* pp. 66-67 and 80-84.

Inasmuch as the Philippines seemingly shared in the trading relationships of Southeast Asia, and since during all but the last 100 years before the Spanish these contacts were largely with areas which were bearers of Indian culture and religion, there would seem to be strong presumptive evidence that the Philippines was exposed to the same influences which ultimately produced Hindu or Buddhist societies in the rest of Southeast Asia.

Probable Features of an Indianized Philippines

Based on religious and cultural features common to other Indianized states of Southeast Asia, we can identify a number of features which one might expect to characterize the Philippines in the 16th century if it was indeed Indianized to an appreciable extent. These are:

1. A degree of familiarity with Indian religious concepts and terminology. Because the exposure to Indian religious thought would in all probability have come through intermediate countries, and because of a century of absence of contact with an Indian source as Islam intervened, a blending with native religious beliefs might well have blurred the clarity of Indian concepts. Nevertheless, they should still have persisted in recognizable form.

2. The use of Sanskrit as a religious language.

3. A writing system derived from Sanskrit and used to record religious scripture and ritual.

4. The absorption directly into individual Philippine languages of Sanskrit words.

5. Incorporation of the Ramayana tale into the local literature.

6. The existence of Indian religious images.

7. The adoption of various Indian customs.

It is the author's contention that such evidence, as does exist, is consistent with the presence of each of these elements. To understand this, it is necessary to say a word about evidence and the problem of interpretation.

We know, to cite one feature as an example, that the Spaniards destroyed thousands of idols in the Philippines, striving to totally eradicate all vestiges of a pagan religion. We also know that very few Buddhist or Hindu images have been found in the Philippines. If the idols which the Spaniards found were Buddhist or Hindu images, and if they sought to destroy them all, then we would expect to find very few today. On the other hand, if there were very few Buddhist or Hindu images when the Spaniards arrived, we also would expect to find very few today. Most scholars have interpreted the paucity of Hindu or Buddhist images in the Philippines as meaning that such images were never plentiful. But logically, a few surviving images could be equally consistent with the existence formerly of a great many such images. The difficulty is that the existence of a few images does not constitute proof that there were once many. The present existence of a few

images is consistent with the former existence of many, given the known behavior of the Spanish, but it is not a proof.

I have sought to overcome this problem by examining the totality of Indian features which might once have existed and then seeking to determine whether such evidence as does exist is consistent with the existence of an Indian religion. The result is not positive proof that the Philippines was once a Hindu or Buddhist country, in the sense that a Buddhist scripture or a Hindu temple might constitute proof. But a consistent pattern does, nevertheless, constitute evidence. It makes it incumbent upon those who believe that Indian religion were not present in the Philippines to prove that the existence of evidence consistent with Indianization is not in fact indicative.

Bathala

That the Tagalog term for the Supreme Being is *Bathala* is well established by early Spanish accounts, and that the word is Sanskrit is also well known. But there seems to have been relatively little examination of the significance which may be embodied in the existence of this term.

According to Juan Francisco, the Sanskrit word *bhattara* means "noble lord or great lord."[12] The word has been borrowed by a number of Malay languages, those listed by Francisco being Tagalog, South Mangyan, Maguindanao, Javanese, Balinese, Malay, Visayan, and Pampangan. However, the meaning of the word differs from language to language among the borrowing languages, and it is the evolution from its meaning in Sanskrit to its meaning in Tagalog which appears significant to our study.

Although *batara* appears in Malay and Indonesian, the Malay-Indonesian word for Supreme Being is *Tuhan,* and *batara* retains a meaning similar to the original Sanskrit. *Batara*, in Indonesian, has two meanings: deity or lord and, as the title of a monarch.[13]

But in Bali, unique in that it remains Hindu, the word evolved, and *battara* today is the "Holiest of Holies," the "Supreme Being." In Balinese temples, one finds in the innermost courtyard elevated seats believed to be resting places of Shiva, Vishnu, and Brahma, but the holiest of all is the seat of *Battara.*

The author is not a Balinese scholar, and his attempts to elicit in Indonesian on a brief visit to Bali an explanation of *Battara's* place in Balinese Hinduism confronted difficulties similar to those which must have confronted the few early-day Spaniards who attempted to understand the unfamiliar Filipino religion. Also, there appears to be little available in the way of written explanations of *Battara* in relation to Balinese beliefs. *Battara* apparently is abstract, non-personal, and relatively distant from human beings, being apparently the Great Spirit of

---

[12]Juan R. Francisco, "Indian Influences in the Philippines," *Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review,* Vol. XXVIII, Jan.-Sept. 1963, Nos. 1-3, p. 31.

[13]John M. Echols and Hassan Shadily, *An Indonesian-English Dictionary,* p. 39.

which Shiva, Vishnu, and Brahma are the most powerful manifestations.

As shown below, the Tagalog concept of *Bathala* appears to have been closely akin to that of the Balinese. Significantly, however, in Visayan, the word is of secondary importance, meaning only "idol".[14] This would suggest that the word entered these languages either from different sources or at different times if from a single source. It strongly suggests that the Tagalogs, at least, had extensive contact with East Indonesia, which lends support to the supposition, discussed subsequently, that the pre-Spanish Philippine writing system was borrowed from South Sulawesi.

Turning now to the early Spanish accounts of *Bathala*, Juan de Plasencia says, "Among their many idols there was one called *Badhala,* whom they specially worshipped. The title seems to signify 'all powerful,' or 'maker of all things.' "[15]

Francisco Colin's account of *Bathala* is similar to that of Plasencia. "Among their gods is one who is the chief and superior to all the others, whom the Tagalogs call *Bathala Meycapal,* which signifies 'God' the 'Creator' or, 'Maker.' "[16]

The *Boxer Codex* expands on this:

> The Moros (i.e., Tagalogs) of the Philippines have (the belief) that the earth, the sky and everything therein were created and made by only one God, which they call in their tongue *"Bachtala napal nanca calgna salahat,"* which means God the Creator and preserver of all things. They call him by the other name of *Mulayri.* They say that this their God was in the atmosphere before there was sky or earth or other things, and that it was eternal, and not made or created by anybody and that he alone made and created everything we have said solely on his own will to make something as beautiful as the sky and the land, and that he did it and created from the earth a man and a woman from whom all men and generations in the world have descended.[17]

Miguel de Loarca relates the following:

> According to the religion formerly observed by these Moros, they worshipped a deity called among them *Batala,* which properly means "God." They said that they adored this *Batala* because he was the Lord of all, and had created human beings and villages. They said that this *Batala* had many agents under him, whom he sent to this world to produce, in behalf of men, what is yielded here. These beings were called *anitos,* and each *anito* had a special office . . .

---

[14]Francisco, *op. cit.,* p. 31.

[15]Juan de Plasencia, O.S.F., *Customs of the Tagalogs,* in Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson, *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898,* Vol. 7, p. 186 (hereafter referred to as Blair and Robertson).

[16]Francisco Colin, S.J., *Native Races and Their Customs,* in Blair and Robertson, Vol. 40, pp. 69-70.

[17]Carlos Quirino and Mauro Garcia, "The Manners, Customs, and Beliefs of the Philippine Inhabitants of Long Ago; Being Chapters of 'A Late 16th Century Manila Manuscript', Transcribed, Translated and Annotated," *The Philippine Journal of Science,* Vol. 87, No. 4, December 1958, pp. 419-420 (hereafter referred to as the Boxer Codex).

> When the natives were asked why the sacrifices were offered to the *anito,* and not to the *Batala,* they answered that the *Batala* was a great Lord, and no one could speak to him. He lived in the sky; but the *anito,* who was of such a nature that he came down here to talk with men, was to the *Batala* as a minister, and interceded for them.[18]

Discovering the Filipino Belief Structure

Bathala was the pinnacle of a Filipino belief structure, and in seeking to reconstruct additional elements of this belief structure, one must keep in mind the way in which Brahmanic religions were spread in Southeast Asia. As noted earlier, Brahmanic religions seem invariably to have entered through the nobility, who valued the presence of Brahmans for their aid in matters of ritual, magic, and ceremony. Through intermarriage, the elite became increasingly Indianized in belief and outlook, while the masses only slowly altered their original belief patterns.[19]

Buddhism frequently provided the initial exposure to Indian religions, through its association with maritime activities, but the subsequent Brahman immigrants brought Sivaite conceptions expressed in the cult of the royal linga.

> . . . we have seen that, in many cases, the most ancient evidences of Indianization are the images of the Dipankara Buddha, who enjoyed great favor with the seamen frequenting the southern islands. The role of Buddhism is undeniable; it seems to have opened the way, thanks to its missionary spirit and lack of racial prejudice. But most of the kingdoms founded in farther India soon adopted the Sivaite conception of royalty, based on the Brahman-Kshatriya pairing and expressed in the cult of the royal linga.[20]

In scrutinizing the early Spanish accounts for indications that such a process took place in the Philippines, one must bear in mind that Spanish writings reflect the difficulties of understanding an alien religion through the medium of an alien language. But equally important, the Spanish writers were handicapped in their sources. The more distant from the noble or priestly class was the informant, the more likely were his religious concepts to reflect indigenous beliefs. And the closer to the priests or nobility was the informant, the less likely was he to reveal in any depth his true beliefs, in part because knowledge of certain aspects of Brahmanic religions was reserved for initiates and in part because Spanish opposition to the practice of "paganism" made a policy of minimum disclosure wise.

In scrutinizing the Spanish accounts, one can see that despite the considerable volume written on religion, the Spanish accounts relate largely to external characteristics. They discuss ceremonies, burials, idols, places of worship, priests, and supernatural creatures

---

[18]Miguel de Loarca, *Relacion de las Yslas Filipinas,* in Blair and Robertson, Vol. V, pp. 171-173.

[19]Coedes, *op. cit.,* in particular, pp. 14-35.

[20]*Ibid.,* p. 23.

such as *aswangs.* These are all, including *aswangs,* closely related to observed behavior about which an outsider might elicit a considerable amount of information without penetrating deeply into the internalized belief structure supporting the external manifestations.

By gleaning the Spanish commentaries, one laboriously discovers that the Filipinos had a body of religious writing, ceremonies conducted in a foreign language, and epic religious tales related in night-long performances. Because the Spaniards ignored the contents of these writings, ceremonies, and epics, modern scholars have given their existence scant notice. Yet their existence cannot be ignored. And if one seeks to take them into account, one can hardly conclude other than that some, at least, were Indian-related. To conclude otherwise is to conclude that though the Philippines adopted an Indian writing system and Hindu concepts like "Bathala," it avoided incorporating in its religious writings and ceremonies the ideas and beliefs which invariably accompanied Indian writing systems and religious terminology elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

Absence of a God-King Concept

Before proceeding further, it is worth commenting on the apparent absence of the concept of a Shivaite god-king in the Philippines. Elsewhere in Asia the coming of Brahmans to the service of the chiefs led to the establishment of kingdoms in which godliness became associated with royalty. Although the Philippines did have distinct social classes, similar to the caste-influenced structures which evolved elsewhere, and although from some Spanish accounts it appears that Filipino chiefs did believe that their ancestors were deified after death,[21] large kingdoms headed by a god-king did not develop.

However, for kingdoms to develop, a fairly dense population seems necessary, and this the Philippines seems not to have had.

But in the Tagalog area at least, there are signs of Shiva worship. Moreover, paramount chiefs were recognized, and not on the basis of force of arms, but on the basis of lineage and wealth.

On Laguna de Bay there is a barrio named Linga. Adjacent to it is Pinagbayanan, whose name signifies the town center. Pottery phallic symbols have been found in graves in Pinagbayanan.[22] For the inhabitants to have named the barrio Linga indicates clearly that they associated the term with the phallic symbols found nearby and that they attached significance to this Shivaist concept. (The term *linga* may well be embodied also in the name Lingayen in Pangasinan).

[In passing, it is also worth noting that there is in Magsingal, Ilocos

[21]See, for example, Chirino, *op. cit.,* p. 297. One might also note that a Tagalog term signifying nobility, *"lakan,"* was used in the names of several of the secondary gods.

[22]Leandro and Cecilia Locsin in their introduction to Rosa Tenazas' "A Report on the Archaeology of the Locsins University of San Carlos Excavations in Pila, Laguna," Sept. 4, 1967-March 19, 1968, cited in E.P. Patanne, *The Philippines in the World of Southeast Asia,* p. 340.

Sur, a museum-park owned by Mr. Angel Cortez in which there is a large *linga.* Mr. Cortez claimed to the author in April 1974 to be excavating the *linga's* female counterpart *(yoni)* from the same nearby site in which he claimed to have found the *linga.* The author has examined the *linga* but is not qualified to evaluate its authenticity.]

A governmental structure under the direction of a paramount chief enthroned on the basis of wealth and lineage is described in detail by Loarca. Loarca's account is all the more interesting for the fact that he asserted earlier that the Tagalogs lacked government:

> In the villages *(pueblos),* where they had ten or twelve chiefs, one only—the richest of them—was he whom all obeyed. They greatly esteem an ancient lineage, which is therefore a great advantage to him who desires to be a lord. When laws were to be enacted for governing the commonwealth, the greatest chief, whom all the rest obeyed, assembled in his own house all the other chiefs of the village *(pueblo);* and when they had come, he made a speech, declaring that, to correct the many criminal acts which were being committed, it was necessary that they impose penalties and enact ordinances... Then the other chiefs replied that this seemed good to them; and that, since he was the greatest chief of all, he might do whatever appeared to him just, and they would approve it. Accordingly, that chief made such regulations as he deemed necessary; for these Moros possess the art of writing, which no other natives of the islands have... Immediately came a public crier, whom they call *umalahocan*... he took a bell and went through the village *(pueblo),* announcing in each district *(barrio)* the regulations which had been made... Thus the *umalahocan* went from village to village *(de en pueblo en pueblo)* through the whole district *(destrito)* of this chief; and from that time on he who incurred the penalties of law was taken to the chief, who sentenced him accordingly.[23]

Ceremonies, Scriptures, and Epics

Ritual chants and incantations were important in the Philippine religious observances, and the *Boxer Codex* reveals that these were in a foreign language. The validity of this highly significant observation is substantiated by the existence in Tagalog and Pampangan of the word *mantala,* of Sanskrit origin and meaning "prayers and mysterious words." Indian *mantras* may be described as magic formulas or prayers, to be repeated for their efficacy even though not fully understood. Interestingly enough, the word *mantra* has entered Visayan as well, but with an alternative Sanskrit meaning of "advise, counsel."[24]

In addition to the *Boxer Codex,* Plasencia's account of ritual chants portrays a similar ceremonial approach:

> Their manner of offering sacrifice was to proclaim a feast, and offer to the devil what they had to eat. This was done in front of the idol, which they anoint with fragrant perfumes, such as musk and civet, or gum of the storax-tree and other odoriferous woods, and

[23]Loarca, *op. cit.,* pp. 175-177.

[24]Francisco, *op. cit.,* p. 37.

> praise it in poetic songs sung by the officiating priest, male or female, who is called *"catalonan."* The participants made responses to the song, beseeching the idol to favor them with those things of which they were in need... .[25]

The *Boxer Codex* account is as follows:

> Of these (priests), there are men and women who they say do so; that is, say certain prayers or secret words, with some food or liquid offering, asking for the well-being of he who makes that sacrifice...
>
> Those suffering from deadly herbs or poisons, or those with abscesses or ill with some dangerous disease, are cured with words understood only by those who keep the law of Mohammed in the island of Borney, where they were drawn up. While uttering these words, they crush a herb they call *"buyo";* those administering the cure have such faith in these words, as well as the sick ones, that it is a marvelous thing to find the patient later getting well just by hearing them.
>
> The oil of the sesame seed which they use for treatment is made by a certain incantation in the manner of a blessing, using Burneyan words which they carefully guard in order to cure the illnesses described above. They likewise use these words or incantations to make cocks valiant and invincible.
>
> They also use some incantations for their love making, that they might be well loved or that they might not be seen or suspected by their husbands in their courtships, nor by any other person except those whom they want, and for this purpose bring with them the corresponding magic script...
>
> They use supernatural amulets... Finally, they do a thousand and one things in this fashion, and in some cases utter incantations in the Burneyan language, and all of this they value highly.[26]

It seems virtually certain that the "Burneyan language" discussed in the *Boxer Codex* was not in fact from Boneo. There is no precedent for a Bornean language being used as a religious language by other language groups, and no plausible explanation as to how the Tagalogs might have come to use such a language. Of the two remaining possibilities, Arabic and Sanskrit, it seems unlikely that Arabic could have assumed this importance among a superficially and recently Islamic people. Therefore, the foreign language would seem almost certainly to have been Sanskrit.

There is an excellent parallel for this among the Baduis of West Java. The Baduis are a Sundanese-speaking, Hinduized remnant group which withdrew to the interior with the coming of Islam and established a domain from which outsiders are barred. In 1967, the writer was one of a four-man group to visit the Badui area, and one member of the group, a Sundanese-speaking Javanese, was accorded the rare privilege of being taken to the innermost Badui area. In the religious ceremony in which she participated, the priest used a non-Malay ritual language which

---

[25]Plasencia, *op. cit.,* p. 190.

[26]*Boxer Codex,* pp. 420 and 435-436, with the final paragraph modified by translation from the Spanish original on p. 380.

appeared to be Sanskrit, still vital after several hundred years of isolation.

It seems clear from the *Boxer Codex* that the Philippine ritual language was also used for religious writings, which could be understood only by specially educated priests:

> They say further that when their ancestors had news of this God which they have as for their highest, it was through some male prophets whose names they no longer know, because as they have neither writings nor those to teach them, they have forgotten the very names of these prophets, aside from what they know of them who in their tongue are called *"tagapagbasa nan sulatan a dios;"* which means "readers of the writings of God", from whom they have learned about this God, saying what we have already told about the creation of the world, people, and about the rest. This they adore and worship...[27]

As literacy was widespread, the inability to read the "writings of god" seems understandable only in terms of the language used being foreign.

Although some Spanish writers denied that religious writings existed, this appears to reflect a desire to deny the existence of what was not approved. Chirino, for example, asserts in one passage that Philippine writing was used only for correspondence, not for religion or government, but elsewhere he states, "But to return to the Indians, two of them were at this time most fortunately saved from perdition... (O)ne, who possessed a book of a certain kind of poem which they call *'golo,'* very pernicious because it expresses a deliberate pact with the devil, voluntarily gave it up for burning, which was done."[28]

That the body of religious writing was a large one is suggested by an observation of Beyer as to the extent of destruction of religious writings by the early Spanish priests. Though not indicating his source, Beyer reports that, "one Spanish priest in southern Luzon boasted of having destroyed more than three hundred scrolls written in the native character."[29]

Wang Ta-yuan's *"Tao I Chih Lueh"* of 1349 is also worth noting in that he says that in Malilu, which has been tentatively identified as Manila, widows of important leaders spent the rest of their lives poring over religious texts if they could not remarry a man of equal rank.[30]

The contents of the epics of the pre-Spanish Filipinos are much more an unknown than even the religious writings. For though they were of the same genre as the great Hindu epic, the Ramayana, whether

---

[27]*Ibid.*, p. 420.

[28]Chirino, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

[29]Beyer, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

[30]William Henry Scott, *Prehispanic Source Materials for the Study of Philippine History*, p. 74.

the resemblance carried beyond form into substance is impossible to say. The present-day Maranao "Maharadia Lawana" and Maguindanao "Indarapatra and Sulayman" clearly owe their origin to the Ramayana tale.[31] This is significant in the sense that it demonstrates conclusively that, upon exposure to Indian religious/cultural elements, the borrowing process operated as readily in the Philippines as elsewhere in Southeast Asia. However, the Maguindanaos and Maranaos have been in continual close contact with peoples who retained the Ramayana story even after Hinduism lost its force. The tale's existence in the south cannot, therefore, be used as direct evidence of its probable existence in other regions of the Philippines.

Our knowledge is limited, then, to form. Father Francisco Alzina, who came to the Philippines in 1632 and spent 40 years in Samar and Leyte, listed six literary forms among the Visayans. One of these, the *siday,* he regarded as being the most complex and difficult for Europeans to understand, as it abounded in allusions to mythical heroes. The *siday* was an extended narrative, recited or sung, which was presented to enthralled audiences in hours-long evening performances.[32]

Knowing that the Ramayana story is presented elsewhere in Southeast Asia in all-night performances, one can say only that the Alzina account of the *siday* would fit the Indian epic was well as indigenous epics.

The Ramayana story is also an integral element in the dances of Indianized Southeast Asia, which utilize the graceful and symbolic hand movements we have come to associate with Thai and Indonesian dancing. With respect to the dancing, it seems much more likely that a Spanish account of Visayan dancing is describing the classical Indian dance movements. As related by Francisco Colin, the dances were danced to metal gongs, fluctuating from warlike to passionate to measured,

> and interposed are some elevations that really enrapture and surprise. They generally hold in the hands a towel, or a spear and shield, and with one and the other they make their gestures in time, which are full of meaning. At other times, with the hands empty they make movements which correspond to the movements of the feet, now slow, now rapid. Now they attack and retire; now they incite; now they pacify; now they come close; now they go away: all the grace and elegance, so much, in fact, that at times they have not been judged unworthy to accompany and solemnize our Christian feasts.[33]

The Writing System

A central fact concerning the Indian-derived Philippine writing

[31]Juan R. Francisco, *Maharadia Lawana,* p. 2, and Juan R. Francisco, *The Philippines and India,* pp. 118-127, *passim.* Though Francisco has not analyzed the latter epic in the same depth that led to his explicit statement of Ramayana derivation for "Maharadia Lawana," the Indian connection seems evident.

[32]Miguel A. Bernad, *The Christianization of the Philippines: Problems and Perspectives,* pp. 151-152, quoting from an unpublished manuscript by Father Francisco Alzina.

[33]Colin, *op. cit.,* pp. 67-68.

system is that it was remarkably widespread. The early accounts also agree that the widespread literacy included the women as much as the men. Typical of the accounts is that of Chirino, who wrote as follows:

> All these islanders are much given to reading and writing, and there is hardly a man, and much less a woman, who does not read and write in the letters used in the island of Manila... They easily make themselves understood and convey their ideas marvelously, he who reads supplying, with much skill and facility, the consonants which are lacking... They used to write on reeds and palm leaves, using as a pen an iron point; now they write their own letters, as well as ours, with a sharpened quill, and, as we do, on paper.[34]

Besides attesting to the high degree of literacy, the Chirino account also identifies reeds and palm leaves as writing materials. Other accounts corroborate this. Dr. Antonio de Morga states, "The common manner of writing among the natives is on leaves of trees, and on bamboo bark.[35]

Colin states:

> Before they knew anything about the paper (and even yet they do in places where they cannot get it), those people wrote on bamboos or on palm leaves, using as a pen the point of a knife or other bit of iron, with which they engraved the letters on the smooth side of the bamboo. If they write on palm leaves they fold and then seal the letter when written, in our manner. They all cling fondly to their own method of writing and reading. There is scarcely a man, and still less a woman, who does not know and practice that method, even those who are already Christians in matters of devotion.[36]

The use of palm leaves as a writing material is highly significant. Modern-day writers have sometimes sought to promulgate the clearly erroneous idea that the Filipinos had no equivalent of papyrus and that Filipino writing was therefore a laborious process of inscription on bamboo which precluded any but the briefest items.[37] In the source area of the Filipino writing system, Indonesia, religious writings were inscribed on *lontar,* a palmyra palm, the leaves of which are used as papyrus. If Filipinos did not have the *lontar,* they obviously used similar materials, and from a technical standpoint there appears to be no reason why Filipinos were precluded from religious writings any more that were the Indonesians.

Thus, there can be no question that it was the systematic destruction of Filipino writings by the Spaniards, as described earlier, and not a non-existence of significant writings because of inadequate writing materials, which explains the absence of any surviving examples today.

---

[34]Chirino, *op. cit.,* pp. 242-243.

[35]Dr. Antonio de Morga, "Sucesos De Las Islas Filipinas," Blair and Robertson, Vol. XVI, pp. 115-117.

[36]Colin, *op. cit.,* p. 51.

[37]Bernad, *op. cit.,* pp. 150-151.

The Filipino writing system was commonly used for at least two hundred fifty years after the coming of the Spaniards. The first book printed in the Philippines, the *Doctrina Christiana,* was printed in 1593 in Tagalog in the Filipino script. Dozens of signatures in the script from legal documents have been preserved, primarily in the archives of the University of Santo Tomas. A Spanish writer in 1751 observed that almost everybody in the Visayas could write in the native script. Some thirty years later spelling reform for the native script was a current issue of the day.[38] One of the participants in the 18th century reform debate recalled the Filipino reaction to a similar proposal made one hundred fifty years earlier. The Filipino reaction demonstrated that the writing system was of considerable cultural significance, rather than being merely an insensate tool. The lighthearted description of the earlier rejection of reform was as follows:

> They, after much praising of it and giving thanks for it, decided it could not be incorporated into their writing because it was contrary to the intrinsic character and nature which God have (*sic*) given it and that it would destroy the syntax, prosody and spelling of the Tagalog language all at one blow, but that they did not mean to give offense to the Spanish lords and would be sure that special use would be made of it when writing words from the Spanish language in Tagalog script.[39]

The probable origin of the Philippine script seems to have been South Celebes in east Indonesia.[40] South Celebes fell within the suzerainty of Madjapahit, which reached its peak from 1350-89,[41] and Islam did not come to the Celebes until the 1500's. It was not until 1605 that the prince of the kingdom of Gowa (adjacent to Macassar) took the politically significant step of adopting Islam.[42] Thus, if the Philippine script came from South Celebes, there seems little question that its introduction occurred at a time when the bearers of the script were actively Hindu.

The Linguistic Record

With respect to Sanskrit borrowings in the Philippine languages, much discussion has centered on whether the borrowings were directly from Sanskrit or from an intermediate Malay language. This misses the point; the significance of the Sanskrit borrowings lies in the nature of the words themselves. To use an analogy with Spanish borrowings by Tagalog, it is of absolutely no significance for the Tagalog belief structure that the Tagalogs borrowed the Spanish words *mesa* for "table" and *silla* for "chair." The Spaniards could have been Christian, Muslim, or pagan; the Tagalog belief structure would have remained the same.

[38]Scott, *op. cit.,* pp. 57-59.

[39]*Ibid.,* p. 59, quoting Cipriano Marcilla y Martin, *Estudio de los antiguos Alfabetos Filipinos* (Manila, 1895), pp. 93-94.

[40]*Ibid.,* pp. 60-64.

[41]Coedes, *op. cit.,* pp. 239-242.

[42]Vlekke, *op. cit.,* pp. 83-84 and 105-106.

By contrast, it was of great significance that the Tagalogs borrowed the Spanish word *Dios* for "God." Belief words are neither easily introduced nor easily displaced. The acceptance of *Dios* was the outgrowth of a prolonged educational and missionary effort on the part of the Spaniards to instill a new set of religious beliefs. Without this major effort, the word would never have gained preference over *Bathala.* And despite four hundred years of Christianity, the old word *Bathala* still lives on in the current vocabulary.

In short, the introduction and internalization of Sanskrit belief and value words would have required extensive and prolonged contact with those from whom these words were acquired.

Approaching the matter from this standpoint, it is the northern and central Philippine languages which are of significance in the study of Indian religious beliefs in the Philippines. Recent glottochronological studies by David Thomas and Alan Healey suggest that the northern Philippine languages separated from the "Chamic" languages (which includes Malay) at about 700 B.C., and that the central Philippine languages separated at about 100 B.C.[43] Since these languages separated well before the introduction of Sanskrit into their areas of origin, the religious words seem unlikely to have been ancient borrowings whose full significance was lost in the course of migrations to the Philippines.

In other words, the borrowed words would almost certainly have been absorbed directly from possessors of a living Hindu tradition. Further confirmation of this supposition is shown by the fact that only ten percent of Sanskrit words listed by Juan Francisco in his "Indian Influences in the Philippines" are common to all three of the major languages: Tagalog, Visayan, and Ilocano.[44] Thus, the borrowings would have had to have taken place after the three languages had differentiated and their speakers were, presumably, in their present geographical areas. Moreover, though Tagalog on the basis of Francisco's analysis has more Sanskrit words than do Visayan or Ilocano, each of these languages has Sanskrit words not found in the others. Thus, the borrowings must have taken place by direct contact of each of the language groups with a non-Philippine source, and not through diffusion from Tagalog.

Among the more significant Sanskrit borrowings, as selected from Francisco,[45] are:

Bathala — "Supreme Being" in Tagalog and other languages; "idol" in Visayan; [fr. Sans. *bhattara,* "noble lord, lord, great lord"]

Diwata — "Supreme Being" in Visayan; "spirits" in Tagalog; [fr. Sans. "divine beings, divinity"]

---

[43]Teodoro A. Llamzon, S.J., "In the Beginning Was the Word," in *Filipino Heritage: The Making of a Nation,* Vol. 2, p. 398-399.

[44]Scott, *op. cit.,* p. 53.

[45]Francisco, "Indian Influences in the Philippines," pp. 31-38.

diwa — "soul" in Tagalog, Visayan, Ilocano, and South Mangyan; [fr. Sans. *jiva* "living, alive, existing;"]; in Bicolano, means "semi-divine beings" [probably comes fr. Sans. *deva* "goddess," rather than *jiva.]*

lingga — phallic symbol representative of Siva, [fr. Sans. *linga.]*

likha — Sanskrit term *(lekha)* for "god"or "deity," which Tagalogs applied to the carved statues of stone, wood, gold, or ivory which they kept in their homes.

mantala — "prayers and mysterious words"or "enchantment formula" in Tagalog and Pampangan; "advise" or "counsel" in Visayan; [fr. Sans. "verse or formula of enchantment, instrument of thought, sacred texts, consultation, counsel."]

karna — Ilocano for "soul" (obsolete), "vigor, force, strength, energy;" [fr. Sans. *karma,* "action, deed" (it is one's *karma* which in Hinduism determines the soul's station in its subsequent incarnation)].

muksa — Tagalog for "death" or "to die," [fr. Sans. *moksa,* "final delivery, exemption from bodily needs and miseries of life, spiritual salvation" (the more common Tagalog word for "death" or "to die" has an entirely unrelated base)].

sampalataya — Tagalog for "faith, trust, and belief in God;" [fr. Sans. *sampratyaya].*

dupa — Tagalog for "incense" and/or "perfume," [fr. Sans. *dhupa,* "incense, aromatic vapour, fumigation"].

manalagna — Visayan for "one who tells the horoscope or destiny of a person;" [fr. Sans. *lagna,* "horoscope, an auspicious moment or time fixed upon as lucky beginning to perform anything"].

patianak — in Tagalog, "an evil spirit which is believed to cause miscarriage or abortion;" in Visayan *sangputanan* is "doom, gloom;" [the Visayan and perhaps the Tagalog is fr. Sans. *putana,* the female demon which kills children or infants, or causes a particular disease in children].

hari or ari — "king" in various Philippine languages; [fr. Sans. *hari,* "king," name of Indra, king of the celestials] [fr. Sans. *sri,* placed before names of persons as a sign of respect, or "lord".]

si — Tagalog honorific placed before names of persons;

[fr. Sans *sri,* placed before names of persons as a sign of respect, or "lord"].

maharlika — Tagalog for "a free man, rich. he who is not a slave;" [fr. Sans. *maharddhika,* "rich, he who has great talent or knowledge"].

Though there is little in the Spanish accounts, except in the case of "Bathala," to illuminate the religious philosophy which would have accompanied the linguistic concepts, there is in the *Boxer Codex* an account of a belief in transmigration which may be relevant to this study. According to the account, souls die seven times, which could correspond to Buddhism's seven heavens, and some of those who die return to life in a manner reminiscent of Buddhist *"bodhisattvas."*

> In the past and at present, they have known that they have a soul which, on leaving the body, goes to a certain place that some call *"casan"* and others *"maca."* This, they say, is divided into two large towns with an arm of the sea in between. One, they say, is for the soul of mariners, who are dressed in white; the other is for all the rest, who are dressed in red for greater attraction. They say that the souls which inhabit these places die seven times, and some return to being alive and suffer the same travail and miseries that they suffered in this world in their bodies, but they have the power to take away and give health, which they cause to happen by means of the winds; and for this reason they reverse and ask of them for help by holding drinking feasts.[46]

It should be noted in this regard that in Indian literature, the Gods frequently call upon the wind for assistance.[47]

Indian Customs

There are a number of present-day Filipino customs which appear to be of Indian origin. While a number of writers have pointed this out,[48] there does not appear to have been any systematic attempt to develop a comprehensive and authoritative enumeration. Elements which are coincidentally similar to Indian customs should be eliminated from consideration, as well as pre-Hindu cultural elements common to the region but not associated with the diffusion of Indian scholars for evidence of Indian practices no longer evident today.

For example, among the Filipino customs which the Spaniards encountered was what appears to have been the Indian form of greeting, now vanished from the Philippines though common elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Chirino states that, "The mode of salutation upon entering or meeting anyone is as follows: "They drew the body together and make a low reverence, raising one or both hands to the face, and placing them upon the cheeks."[49]

---

[46]The *Boxer Codex,* p. 429, modified by the writer's translation from the Spanish, p. 374.

[47]Francisco, "Indian Influences in the Philippines," pp. 141-143.

[48]See, for example, Patanne, *op. cit.,* pp. 372-376.

[49]Chirino, *op. cit.,* p. 240.

Illustrative of present-day customs or beliefs which appear to be Indian-derived[50] are that of eating in silence and leaving a small portion of food on the plate, not sleeping with wet hair because of the belief that it will cause sickness, the idea that a major construction work requires a human sacrifice, and throwing of water on passers-by on particular religious days (the feast of St. John the Baptist). A devotional area in the home for family worship before a religious image is a Hindu practice which parallels the practice of the early Filipinos, as described in particularly clear detail by Chirino,[51] and which has been perpetuated in many Catholic Filipino homes.

The Archaeological Record

The Spaniards destroyed hundreds of "idols" in converting the Philippines to Christianity, and for many decades after the country was nominally Christian, Spanish priests were still ferreting out idols hidden away by secret practitioners of the old religion. Indeed, as late as 1773, a church synod in Pangasinan discussed means of putting a stop to the secret practice of ceremonies of the old religion.[52]

Those "idols" not destroyed by the Spaniards would have been carefully hidden away, perhaps to be forgotten and thereby lost permanently or perhaps to be eventually destroyed by their owners as the old religion became a shameful vestige from the past.

One would, in light of the Spanish destruction, expect a limited archaeological record of religious statuary. Because of this, the few Indian images thus far discovered in the Philippines can with considerable logic be considered a representative of a once-more-prevalent category of object instead of as isolated curiosities. Certainly, their existence cannot be lightly dismissed, particularly when some were crafted locally. Moreover, with each additional discovery the significance of the total grows, particularly when one contemplates the much greater rarity of non-Indian religious statuary discoveries.

Perhaps because there has not previously been a comprehensive listing of Indian origin items discovered in the Philippines, the extent of the findings does not appear to have been fully appreciated. It is therefore worth listing the discoveries to date, partly in the hope that others will come forward with additions to what is in all probability an incomplete tabulation.

1. The Golden Image of Agusan

This is the figure of what is probably a female deity, which was found on the left bank of the Wawa River in Agusan in 1917 after a storm and flood. It is now in the Chicago Museum of Natural History. It is seated cross-legged, is made of twenty-one carat gold, and weighs nearly four pounds. It is probably a Mahayana Buddhist goddess from the late 13th or nearly 14th centuries.[53]

---

[50]Patanne, *loc. cit.*

[51]Chirino, *op. cit.*, pp. 298-301.

[52]Bernad, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-192.

[53]Francisco, *The Philippines and India*, pp. 38-46.

2. Buddhist Clay Image from Calatagan, Batangas

This is a clay medallion discovered during an archaeological dig in 1961. It is locally made, 2.6 inches high and 1.9 inches wide, with a low relief image of the Mahayana Buddhist Boddhisattva Avalokitesvara. The site dates from the late fourteenth or early fifteenth centuries.[54]

3. Mactan Avalokitesvara Icon

Excavated about 1921 by Professor Beyer from a site in Mactan, the image is known only from a photograph. The statue is bronze and may be a Siva-Buddhist blending rather than being purely Buddhist.[55]

4. Mactan Ganesha

This is a crude copper Ganesha excavated about 1921 from the same Mactan site as number 3 above. It is known only from a photograph. Because of the crude workmanship, it is undoubtedly locally made.[56]

5. Bronze Lokesvara

This was found in Isla Puting Bato, Tondo, Manila. *Lokesvara,* Lord of the World, is the Southeast Asian name for *Avalokitesvara.*[57]

6. Puerto Galera Ganesha

This is pictured, without additional explanation, in Patanne's book.[58]

7. Bronze Ornament of Indian Design from Rizal.

This is pictured, without additional explanation, in Patanne's book.[59]

8. Golden Garuda Pendant from Brooke's Point, Palawan.

This was a family heirloom, purchased from a family in Brookes Point and now at the National Museum of the Philippines.[60]

9. Gold Ornaments of the Arturo de Santos Collection.

According to Robert Fox, the gold ornaments in the collection are thought to be largely of local manufacture or traded in from Indonesia, for Indian design elements are readily apparent in most items.[61]

10. Miscellaneous.

Beyer stated that there were minor finds of coins, pottery, etc. with

---

[54]*Ibid.,* pp. 47-53.

[55]*Ibid.,* pp. 55-58.

[56]*Ibid.,* pp. 58-60.

[57]Juan R. Francisco, "Indian Imprint," in *Filipino Heritage: The Making of a Nation,* Vol. 3, p. 577.

[58]Patanne, *op. cit.,* p. 366.

[59]*Ibid.,* p. 367.

[60]Juan R. Francisco, "Reflexions on the Migration Theory Vis-a-vis the Coming of Indian Influences in the Philippines," *Asian Studies,* Vol. IX, No. 3 (December 1971), p. 312.

[61]Robert B. Fox, "The Archaeological Record of Chinese Influences in the Philippines," *Philippine Studies,* Vol. 15, No. 1 (Jan. 1967), p. 49.

the Mactan images which were relics from the days of Madjapahit; Fox stated in passing in an article in which the Agusan image was discussed that there were other bronze images of the same period recovered in Davao; as mentioned earlier, *lingas* were found in Pinagbayanan, and there are the possible *linga* and *yoni* from Magsingal, Ilocos Sur; there reportedly are recent excavations on the eastern shores of Laguna de Bay which have allegedly revealed evidence of cremations.

Conclusion

The available evidence appears consistent with the contention that the upper layers of Philippine society were Indianized at the time of the arrival of the Spaniards. There was an Indian-origin writing system and widespread literacy; priests who were "readers of the writings of god" and keepers of the religious traditions and who performed religious ceremonies in a foreign language that was most probably Sanskrit; images for worship that were designated by the Sanskrit term *"likha,"* "god" or "deity," a cosmology in which the Supreme Being was the same Supreme Being, *"Bathala,"* found today in Hindu Bali; and languages which had borrowed extensively of Indian religious and ethical terminology.

Moreover, the belief structure was amazingly persistent, despite the introduction of Christianity, a persistence analogous to the persistence of Hindu beliefs in nominally Muslim Java. This persistence even contributed in one region to flight to the interior, by inhabitants from areas surrounding Mt. Banahaw. Even today, Mt. Banahaw is regarded as a sacred mountain, the object of annual pilgrimages by numerous religious sects, some of which retain elements apparently attributable to practices and traditions preserved from the early beliefs. The concept of a mountain as sacred, the dwelling place of the gods, is itself a Hindu belief, observable today not only in Balinese cosmology but also in an annual pilgrimage up Mt. Bromo in East Java. The same pilgrimage tradition, incidentally, is said to be associated with Cuyo, Palawan, where three little mountains dominate a plateau. Gold ornaments and numerous porcelain objects are also reportedly discovered there after rains.[62]

Viewing the totality of pre-Spanish Philippine society, it seems likely that we of the twentieth century have projected four hundred years into the past the present-day absence of pervasive Indian elements and concluded that what is not today could not have been then. The evidence suggests that we should reexamine this view and revise our conclusions about pre-Hispanic Philippine society.

---

[62]Alfred Marche, *Luzon and Palawan*, p. 218.

BIBLIOGRAPHY—WORKS CITED

Bernad, Miguel A., S.J. *The Christianization of the Philippines: Problems and Perspectives.* Manila: The Filipiniana Book Guild, 1972.

Beyer, H. Otley, "Pre-Historic Philippines." *Asia,* Vol. 21 (October and November 1921), pp. 861-866, 890, 924-928, 964, 966, 970.

Chirino, Pedro, S.J. *The Philippines in 1600.* Translated from the Spanish by Ramon Echevarria. Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1969.

Coedes, G. *The Indianized States of Southeast Asia.* Translated from the French by Susan Brown Cowing and edited by Walter F. Vella. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1968.

Colin, Francisco, S.J. *Native Races and Their Customs.* Translated from the Spanish, edited and annotated by Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson and published in *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898,* Vol. XL—1690-1691, pp. 37-98. Mandaluyong, Rizal: Cachos Hermanos, Inc., 1973.

De la Costa, H., S.J. *Readings in Philippine History.* Manila: Bookmark, Inc., 1965.

Echols, John M., and Shadily, Hassan. *An Indonesian-English Dictionary.* Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1963.

Filipino Heritage: The Making of a Nation, Vols. 2 and 3. Manila: Lahing Pilipino Publishing, Inc., 1977.

Fox, Robert B., "The Archaeological Record of Chinese Influences in the Philippines." *Philippine Studies,* Vol. 15, No. 1 (Jan. 1967), pp. 41-62.

_____. "The Philippines in Pre-Historic Times." *Readings: Cultural History of the Philippines,* compiled by Teodoro A. Agoncillo, pp. 1-19. Quezon City: University of the Philippines, Division of Social Sciences, 1961-62.

Francisco, Juan R., "Indian Influences in the Philippines." *Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review,* Vol. XVIII (January-September 1963), Nos. 1-3.

_____. *Maharadia Lawana.* Quezon City: Philippine Folklore Society, 1969.

_____. *The Philippines and India.* Manila: National Book Store, Inc., 1971.

_____. "Reflexions on the Migration Theory vis-a-vis the Coming of Indian Influences in the Philippines." *Asian Studies,* Vol. IX, No. 3 (December 1971); pp. 307-314.

Loarca, Miguel de. *Relation of the Filipinas Islands.* Translated from the Spanish edited and annotated by Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson and published in *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898,* Vol. V-1582-1583, pp. 35-187. Mandaluyong, Rizal: Cachos Hermanos, Inc., 1973.

Marche, Alfred. *Luzon and Palawan.* Translated from the French by Carmen Ojeda and Jovita Castro with Preface by Pierre Revol and Introduction by W.A. Burke-Miailhe. Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1970.

Morga, Dr. Antonio de. *Succesos De Las Islas Filipinas.* Translated from the Spanish, edited and annotated by Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson and published in *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898,* Vol. XVI-1609, pp. 27-209.

Patanne, E.P. *The Philippines in the World of Southeast Asia.* Quezon City: Enterprise Publications, Inc., 1972.

Plasencia, Juan de, O.S.F. *Customs of the Tagalogs.* Translated from the Spanish, annotated by Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson and published in *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898,* Vol. VII—1588-1591,

pp. 173-196. Mandaluyong, Rizal: Cachos Hermanos, Inc., 1973.

Quirino, Carlos, and Garcia, Mauro, "The Manners, Customs, and Beliefs of the Philippine Inhabitants of Long Ago: Being Chapters of 'A Late 16th Century Manila Manuscript', Transcribed, Translated and Annotated." *The Philippine Journal of Science,* Vol. 87, No. 4 (December 1958), pp. 325-454. Commonly known as the *Boxer Codex.*

Scott, William Henry. *Prehispanic Source Materials for the Study of Philippine History.* Manila: University of Santo Tomas Press, 1968.

Travel Accounts of the Islands (1513-1787). Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1971.

Vlekke, Bernhard H.M. *Nusantara, A History of Indonesia.* The Hague: W. Van Hoeve Ltd., 1959.

Wolters, O.W. *Early Indonesian Commerce.* Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967.

BIBLIOGRAPHY—WORKS USED BUT NOT CITED IN TEXT

Anonymous, *Relation of the Conquest of the Island of Luzon.* Translated from the Spanish, edited and annotated by Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson and published in *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898,* Vol. III, 1569-1576, pp. 141-172.

Anonymous. *Relation of the Philippine Islands.* Translated from the Spanish, edited and annotated by Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson and published in *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898,* Vol. XXXIV, 1519-1522; 1280-1605, pp. 316-324.

Artieda, Captain. *Relation of the Western Islands Called Filipinas.* Translated from the Spanish, edited and annotated by Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson and published in *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898,* Vol. III, 1569-1576, pp. 190-208.

De Jesus, Fray Luis. *General History of the Discalced Religious of St. Augustine.* Translated from the Spanish, edited and annotated by Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson and published in *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898,* Vol. XXI, 1624, pp. 191-259, "Early Recollect Missions in the Philippines."

De Rada, Martin. Letter to the Marquis de Falces. Translated from the Spanish, edited and annotated by Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson and published in *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898,* Vol. XXXIV, 1519-1522; 1280-1605, pp. 223-228.

Echevarria, Ramon. *Rediscovery in Southern Cebu.* Cebu: Historical Conservation Society, 1974.

Hassel, Elizabeth L., "The Sri-Vijayan and Madjapahit Empires and the Theory of Their Political Association with the Philippines." *Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review,* Vol. XVIII, No. 1 (March 1953), pp. 3-86.

Ileto, Reynaldo Clemena. *Maguindanao, 1860-1888: The Career of Datu Uto of Buayan.* Ithaca, New York: Data Paper: Number 82, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University (October 1971).

Kobak, Cantius, O.F.M., "Alzina's *Historia de las Islas de Indios de Bisayas... 1668,* A translation of the Lenox Text." *Leyte-Samar Studies,* Vol. III, No. 1, 1969, pp. 14-36, and Vol. IV, No. 1, 1970, pp. 17-27.

Legaspi, Miguel Lopez de. *Relation of the Voyage to Luzon.* Translated from the Spanish, edited and annotated by Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson and published in *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898.* Vol. III, 1569-1576, pp. 73-104.

_____. *Relation of the Voyage to the Philippine Islands.* Translated

from the Spanish edited and annotated by Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson and published in *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898,* Vol. II—1521-1569, pp. 196-216.

Mirandaola, Andres de. Letter to Felipe II. Translated from the Spanish, edited and annotated by Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson and published in *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898,* Vol. XXXIV, 1519-1522; 1280-1605, pp. 200-206.

Pigafetta, Antonio. *First Voyage Around the World.* Translated from the Italian, edited and annotated by Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson and published in *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898,* Vol. XXXIII, 1519-1522, pp. 27-366. Mandaluyong, Rizal: Cachos Hermanos, Inc., 1973.

San Nicolas, Fran Andres de. *General History of the Discalced Augustinian Fathers.* Translated from the Spanish, edited and annotated by Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson and published in *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898,* Vol. XXI, 1624, pp. 111-185. "Early Recollect Missions in the Philippines." Mandaluyong, Rizal: Cachos Hermanos, Inc., 1973.

THE DATUS OF THE RIO GRANDE DE COTABATO UNDER COLONIAL RULE*

Jeremy Beckett

Introduction:

The local elite, whether indigenous or creole, is a problematic element in any colonial system. To the extent that it controls the lower orders it may be either an ally of the regime or its enemy. And to the extent that it exploits them it may either be a partner or a competitor. Whichever course it follows there are dangers. If it is defiant it risks destruction, and at the least jeopardizes the protection given by its masters. If it is compliant it may jeopardize its legitimacy among the common folk. Either way it risks displacement by an alternative elite, more responsive to the situation. Elite groups and families, then, are sensitive indicators of changing conditions; and their fluctuating fortunes deserve close attention.

The Philippines is a particularly interesting case, in this respect, because, despite four changes of regime in the fifty years between 1898 and 1948, its elite remained substantially intact. The degree of continuity among the Principalia from the conquest to the early nineteenth century is hard to establish, but it seems that thereafter the growth of export industries caused a good deal of upward and downward mobility.[1] In Pampanga, for example, Chinese mestizos who had prospered in the burgeoning sugar industry either displaced or married into the old landed elite.[2] What Owen has called the Super-Principalia attained in Bicol, as in Pampanga, is a level of affluence far greater than their predecessors had enjoyed.[3] The Revolution, the American take-over, the explosion of public education, even the Japanese occupation, seem by comparison to have caused little mobility. Individuals rose and fell, but the family coalitions that dominated the early years of the Republic were in many cases the same that had composed the elite of the late Spanish period.

The Muslim areas of the South had a different history. Maintaining a fierce resistance, they managed to remain outside the Spanish pale until the second half of the nineteenth century. Even by 1898 the ordinary *tao* were barely integrated with the rest of Philippine society.

---

*Research in the Philippines was supported by the University of Sydney. Sponsorship in the Philippines was provided by the Philippine National Museum in 1971, and by the Ateneo de Manila's Institute of Philippine Culture in 1973. In the course of my research I have been intellectually and personally indebted to Datus Nasrullah Glang and Modamad Mamadra, Attorneys Michael Mastura, and Corocoy Moson, and Governor Sandiale Sambolawan. However, they are not responsible for anything written here.

[1]See, for example, Renato Constantino, *The Philippines: A Past Revisited* (Quezon City: Tala Publishing Services, 1975), pp. 127-8.

[2]John Larkin, *The Pampangans: Colonial Society in a Philippine Province* (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1972).

[3]Norman G. Owen, "The Principalia in Philippine History: Kabikolan, 1790-1898, *Philippine Studies 22*, No. (1974), pp. 297-324.

but certain of their datus had found a foothold in the colonial order. By the end of the American period, these same datus had come to occupy much the same position as the big landlords of Luzon and the Visayas, despite continuing cultural differences.

Islam and Malay versions of Islamic political institutions were established in the South by the time the Spaniards came. Majul has argued that these provided the framework for resistance on a scale far greater than non-Muslim Filipinos could achieve.[4] Exploiting their position on the peripheries of several colonial domains, the so-called Moros were able to carry on a profitable commerce with European and Chinese merchants. This they augmented by yearly raids on Spanish occupied territory. Maguindanao and Sulu became centres of sufficient importance to support sultanates with more than a semblance of centralization and hierarchy.[5]

As the nineteenth century wore on, Spain's naval blockade deprived the sultans of their economic support; then, in the second half, she began undermining their authority through a series of military and diplomatic campaigns. By 1898 they were effectively neutralized, but this did not mean the end of indigenous leadership. The sultanates had always been segmentary states, in which a good deal of the power remained with local datus.[6] These now had to choose between defiance and compliance, with the latter proving the wiser course in the long run.

In Cotabato, particularly, the Maguindanaon datus used their client connection with the colonial authorities to legalize traditional land rights, turning their followers into tenants and themselves into landlords. As such they were able to take advantage of the development of commercial agriculture. In the same way, having first option on positions in local government, they were able to reconstitute their traditional authority. They were thus well placed to take command when independence came.

An elaborate ideology of rank, grounded in Islamic belief, supported political authority, and the historical record suggests that the power holders and leaders usually were of the nobility, until the Spanish invasion. The upheavals of the late Spanish period broke the connection, however, leaving the new generation of datus to command recognition on pragmatic grounds such as the use of force and access to the colonial authorities. With the years, certain datu lines acquired a born-to-rule reputation, but still without the old trappings

---

[4]Cesar Adib Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973), p. 78.

[5]For an account of Maguindanao in the seventeenth century, see Francisco Combes, *Historia de las Islas de Mindanao, Iolo y sus Adyacentes* (Madrid: 1897). For an account of Maguindanao in the eighteenth century, see Thomas Forrest, *A Voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas, from Balamabangan* (London: 1779).

[6]For an analysis of segmentary state systems, see J.M. Gulick, *Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaysia, L.S.E. Monographs,* 17 (London: Athlone Press, 1958). Also Thomas Keifer, "The Tausug Polity and the Sultanate of Sulu: A Segmentary State in the Southern Philippines", *Sulu Studies* 1(1972) pp. 19-64

of rank and title. The literature on the Christian Philippines is remarkably vague on the subject of political legitimacy and ideology, but there would appear to be little more than personalistic ties of the patron-client type.[7] The new Maguindanaon datus, however, were in some sense heirs to the old; moreover they were Muslims who stood between their people and alien domination.

An understanding of the contemporary situation, and of the people's perception of it, could only be achieved through an investigation of the historical record. This paper is an outcome of these investigations, a historical account informed by some first hand acquaintance with the Maguindanaon and their oral traditions.

Documents and Oral Sources

The sources on Cotabato history are extensive. Apart from the Spaniards, who assiduously gathered intelligence from the late sixteenth century, the British and Dutch had a passing interest in Maguindanao and sent home occasional reports. A good deal of this material was published, either at the time or subsequently, though there is no telling what remains undiscovered in the archives.

At the beginning of the American period, Najeeb Saleeby produced his *Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion,* based on an examination of Maguindanaon manuscripts, but thereafter, published sources yield little of consequence besides statistical data and short routine reports.[8] There is more to be got from the papers of General Wood and Royston Haydon, but Cotabato engaged their interest less than Sulu or Lanao, perhaps because it was the most peaceful of the Moro provinces.[9] Karl Peltzer, the geographer, carried out a study of Christian settlement in Cotabato in 1940,[10] and Chester Hunt, a sociologist worked in Cotabato City in 1953;[11] Otherwise there was little academic interest until the end of the 1960's when there was a sudden, though uncoordinated burst of activity. Majul's *Muslims in the Philippines,* though only published in 1973, was the fruit of many years of research.[12] Pressing its inquiry back to the pre-Spanish period, it traced the history of the Maguindanaon and Sulu sultanates through to their collapse in the mid-nineteenth century. Meanwhile Reynaldo Ileto

---

[7]See particularly, Carl Lande, *Leaders, Factions and Parties: the Structure of Philippines Politics. Yale Southeast Asia Studies,* 6, (Newhaven: Yale University Press, 1965). Also, James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (Newhaven: Yale University Press, 1977).

[8]Najeeb Saleeby, *Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion: Ethnological Survey Publications,* 4, Pt. 1 (Manila: Bureau of Public Printing, 1905).

[9]*Joseph Ralston Hayden Papers,* Michigan Historical Collections, Ann Arbor, Michigan. *Leonard Wood Papers,* Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.

[9]*Joseph Ralston Hayden Papers,* Michigan Historical Collections, Ann Arbor, Michigan. *Leonard Wood Papers,* Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.

[10]Karl Peltzer, *Pioneer Settlement in the Asiantic Tropics: Studies in Land Utilization and Agricultural Colonization in Southeastern Asia* (New York: American Geographical Society 1948) pp. 127-159.

[11]Chester L. Hunt, "Ethnic Stratification and Integration in Cotabato," *Philippine Sociological Review,* 5, No. 1 (1957) pp. 13-38.

[12]Majul, *op. cit.*

had completed a study of the final phase of Maguindanaon resistance to Spain, during the second half of the nineteenth century.[13] A little earlier, in 1968, Peter Gowing completed a study of the American administration of the 'Moro Provinces' up to 1920;[14] and a little later, Ralph Thomas carried the story through to 1946 focussing on the theme of national integration.[15] At about the same time, Samuel Tan was exploring the particular theme of *Muslim Armed Resistance* between 1900 and 1941.[16]

Based on field research, aside from the studies made by professional historians whose names have already been cited, this paper attempts an overview of the colonial period from the vantage point of contemporary Cotabato.

The Region

The region known to the Spaniards and the Americans as Cotabato occupies almost the whole of southwestern Mindanao. The Pulangi River or Rio Grande valley almost bisects the region, separating the coastal Cordillera or Tiruray Highlands from the Central Mindanao Highlands. Wernstedt and Spencer describe it as follows:

> This extensive, low-lying, swampy plain...includes a lowland area of well over 1,000 square miles. Recent uplift across the mouth of the river, which has formed the low Cotabato and Timaco hills, has resulted in the impounding of river waters and the creation of two large swamp areas, the Libungan Marsh and the Liguasan Swamp. Together these two swamps cover a combined area of 450 square miles during normal water levels; however, the swamplands expand well beyond these limits when heavy seasonal rains and river floods inundate additional areas of the valley floor, and indeed, during heavy rains, all of the lowland downstream from Lake Buluan looks like a vast lake from the air.[17]

This valley is the homeland of the Maguindanaon ethno-linguistic group, the name referring, appropriately, to its tendency to flood. At various times in the past small numbers have settled along the coast, or pressed on into the Koronadal valley, but only until the recent build up of population through immigration did they occupy the uplands. These were populated by Muslim Iranon and Maranao in the North, and by pagan groups such as the Tiruray, Manobo and Bila'an in the coastal and central parts.

---

[13]Ileto *op. cit.*

[14]Peter Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland: the American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899-1921.* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1957).

[15]Ralph Benjamin Thomas, *Muslim But Filipino: the Integration of Philippine Muslims, 1917-1946.* Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. (University of Pennsylvania, 1971).

[16]Samuel Kong Tan, The Muslim Armed Struggle in the Philippines, 1900-1941, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, (Syracuse University, 1973). Alunan Glang's *Muslim Secession or Integration* (Quezon City: R.P. Garcia 1969) includes some historical pieces, based on the published sources, but is mainly concerned with contemporary problems. Michael O. Mastura's study, *The Condition, Status and Destiny of the Muslim South (Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug) 1880-1871*, is in preparation.

[17]Frederick L. Wernstedt and Joseph E. Spencer, *Philippine Island World: A Physical Cultural and Regional Geography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 545.

The indigenous population was for the most part agricultural, but there was no shortage of land until large scale immigration began towards the middle of the twentieth century. When the Americans conducted the first census, in 1903, they reported a total of 125,875, of which 113,875 were Muslims and the rest pagan.[18] This was a sparse population for a region of some 8,800 square miles, and inevitably posed the possibility of immigration from the overcrowded islands, once peace and order could be established. Christian immigrants and their descendants now heavily outnumber the indigenous peoples, but at the last American census, conducted in 1940, Muslims numbered 162,996 out of a total of 298,935, and pagans 70,493.[19] Cotabato City remains the only settlement of any size, with a population of some 60,000.However,it amounted to only a few hundreds at the beginning of the century and had reached only 10,000 by the end of the American period.

Maguindanaon Political Organization

Although the Sultans of Maguindanao have their pride of place in the historical record, they were not the only title holders in the valley. As Ileto notes, the upper valley Rajahs of Buayan were probably of more consequence when the Spaniards first visited in the late sixteenth century; and even at its height Maguindanao did not claim sovereignty over them.[20] As it slid into decline through the eighteenth century, several of the Rajahs assumed the title of sultan, as though to assert equality.

The notion of sultanate is, in any case, an inadequate tool for understanding Maguindanaon political organization, referring as it does to form rather than reality. The centralization it suggests could scarcely be realized among a homesteading population, widely dispersed over difficult terrain, with primitive communications.[21] While a sultan might have sanctity, magical powers and exalted rank, he was just another datu when it came to politics. The basic building blocks of the system were local datudoms, autonomous in theory, but often dependent on others for access to resources such as salt and iron, and intermittently articulated into wider alliances for attack or defense.

The primary meaning of *datu* for the Maguindanaon is ruler, one who controls his people, but also protects them against abuse by other datus.[22] For this a datu must be *mawalao,* the meaning of which lies

---

[18]*Census Office. Census of the Philippines Islands Taken in 1903* (Manila: Bureau of Printing 1904). The estimates, particularly of the pagan population, were probably below the actual figure.

[19]*Philippines Commonwealth, Census of the Philippines,* 1939. (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1940). See also Frederick L. Wernstedt and Paul D. Simpkins, "Migrations and the Settlement of Mindanao," *Journal of Asian Studies,* 25 (November 1965) 83-102.

[20]Ileto *op. cit.*, 2.

[21]Although the river was navigable for some 100 kilometers, such a journey would take several days paddling in a banka.

[22]For an account from the Maranao perspective, see Melvin Mednick, "Some Problems of Moro History and Political Organization," *Philippine Sociological Review* 5, No. 1 (1957), pp. 39-52.

somewhere between the English brave and aggressive. The size of a datu's following depended on this capacity combined with control of some economic resource. The importance of the upper valley datus seems to have been based on rice production, part of which was exported, through the exploitation of slave labour, the taking of dues from Muslim peasants, and of tribute from upland pagans. As one proceeded down river, however, the exploitation of trade became increasingly important, with datus controlling strategic points from which they could exact tolls. The Sultans of Maguindanao derived their unusual importance from their control of the region's principal entrepot, just inside the northern mouth of the river. The same location served as the rallying point for the large fleets that raided the Spanish Philippines, year after year, under the Sultan's aegis. Ileto shows how Maguindanao declined with the reduction in raiding and trading, while the upper valley prospered on the traffic in slaves taken from the pagan groups. It is difficult to assess the size of a datu's following, which no doubt varied a good deal; in the 1870's, two upper valley datus, Utu of Buayan and the Sultan of Kabuntalan, were each reported to have several thousand slaves, apart from other followers.[23] However, as Datu Piang explained in an interview early in the American period, such estimates varied according to whether one included the followers of lesser datus who attached themselves to the more important ones.[24]

At one level one could regard the Maguindanaon as living in a state of perfect political competition for followers, slaves and resources. And to judge by the accounts of petty feuding and confrontation, this was indeed a tendency within the system; but it was mitigated by certain ideological principles.

The secondary meaning of *datu* was one entitled to rule on account of his descent from datus. Not all such datus would in fact rule, but their *maratabat* gave them something to live up to.[25] Thus certain ruling lines were associated with a particular place, called *ing'd,* a title or *grar,* and servile groups called *ndatuan.*[26] Commoner

---

[23]Ileto *op. cit.,* p. 35.

[24]Datu Piang formulated this principle in an early interview with American personnel.

[25]Like the Mediterranean notion of honour (c.f. John Peristian ed. *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965). *Maratabat* is inherited in varying degree but must also be vindicated by action whenever the occasion arises. The greater the hereditary *maratabat,* the more jealously must it be defended. See also, Mamitua Saber, Mauyag Tamano and Charles A. Warriner, "The Maratabat of the Maranao," *Philippine Sociological Review* 8, nos. 1-2 (1960).

[26]Unlike the Tausugs and Maranaos, but like some other lowland Philippine groups at first contact (c.f. Frank Lynch: "Trend Report on Studies in Social Stratification and Social Mobility in the Philippines," East Asian Cultural Studies 4 (1965), pp. 163-191.) The Maguindanaon recognized a four tier stratification: 1) *datus;* 2) commoners, 3) *ndatuan* or serfs; 4) *baniaga* or chattel slaves. There were also *olipun* or bond slaves whose condition was created by debt, the clearance of which released them—at least in theory. They emanated from, and presumably might return to any one of the four strata. Membership of the four strata was hereditary, but groups acquired their status through a variety of historical or pseudo-historical events. Thus the cadet branch of a datu line might opt for commoner status. Certain servile groups were descendants of Visayan captives and still called *Bisaya.* Others were associated with certain occupa-

groups or *domato* might also be linked to it, either through a traditional agreement or as cadet lines of the one stock.

In the absence of a rule of primogeniture, the succession to a title was a matter for competition. No doubt the datu qualities of the claimants, who might be numerous, given the prevalence of polygyny, were a major consideration. But here again ideological principles reduced the element of conflict. By taking into account the status of the mother as well as the father, it was possible to make fine distinctions of *bansa.*

The ranking system is complex, but it can be summarized by reference to the charter legend of Sarip Kabongsoan. The *Sarip,* which is the local form of the Arabic *sharif,* was the son of an Arab who had married the Sultan of Johore's daughter. Chance brought Kabongsoan to the mouth of the Rio Grande, where he began preaching Islam. He took wives from his converts, thus establishing a local stock that could claim descent from the Prophet Mohammed. The Sultans of Maguindanao claimed descent from a son of Kabongsoan; the Rajahs of Buayan from a daughter, and most of the other Maguindanaon datus claimed membership of one or other of these stocks, and in some instances both. The Maranao datus also claim descent from the Sarip, while more elaborate versions of the legend assert a common origin for all the datus of Brunei, Sulu and Mindanao. Their relative nobility was assessed in terms of the number of links they could trace with the Sarip, and any datu line of consequence kept a written genealogy or *tarsila* indicating these links.[27] The Sultans of Maguindanao seem to have been credited with the purest breeding, and reference is made to their light complexions and aquiline features as evidence of their Arab ancestry.

The legend not only provides a charter for the ranking system, and so of political authority; it also presents a model of political articulation through the transmission of nobility in marriage. It describes how a high born stranger marries the daughter of a local chief, founding a line that is far superior in *maratabat* to any of the others, and so entitled to rule. The wife's kin gain from this arrangement a more prestigious line of rulers and connection with the nobility elsewhere. According to the *tarsila,* young datus often followed this strategy, probably after failing to gain the family title. The legend also describes Kabongsoan bestowing his daughter on a Rajah of Buayan, ennobling his descendants, though in a lesser degree since women transmitted less

---

tions such as potting. The *baniaga* seem mostly to have originated as captives from the pagan groups.

[27]The term *tarsila* comes from the Arabic *silsilah,* which means a chain or link. Saleeby, *op. cit.,* copied a number of such documents concerning the principal lines of Maguindanao. However, I have transcribed a number of documents relating to other branches of the Buayan line. I have also seen booklets, printed in Arabic, outlining the legendary origin of the Sultans of Sulu, Maguindanao, Maranao and Brunei. For a discussion of the analysis of such documents, see Cesar Adib Majul, "An Analysis of the Genealogy of Sulu", Paper prepared for a Filipino Muslim History and Culture Seminar-Workshop, Department of History, University of the East, Manila, 20. 10.77.

nobility than men. As Mastura has shown, marriages were regularly arranged in the process of alliance formation.[28]

Such marriages were governed by a complex calculus, for it was on such occasions that the respective parties brought their respective claims to nobility openly. The degree of nobility conferred by the bride, relative to that of the husband, determined the size of the bride price but also the importance of the alliance. Basic to the system was the principle of hypergamy, according to which a woman might marry a man of equal or higher, but not inferior rank. A man, on the other hand, might marry beneath him; indeed an important datu had wives of every degree, including concubines who were slaves. The sons of these unions were to be called *"datu,"* but they were not all of equal standing, and probably only a few would be entitled to claim the succession. In the same way, the rank of daughters varied, which was an advantage to their father since he could always find one to bestow on an ally, however low born. Because of her connection with himself, he could claim a high bride price, but because of her mother's status, he could claim she was not marrying beneath her.

The centralizing tendencies displayed by Maguindanaon society at certain points in its history are to be understood in terms of an interplay between economic and political factors, on the one hand, and ideology on the other. It would seem that when material conditions became favourable the hierarchical forms that came with Islam were there to give structure and legitimacy, lending themselves to elaboration as centralization continued. Among the Maranaos, there was no tendency to centralization, although the forms were present, presumably because the material conditions were lacking in their landlocked situation.[29]

A reading of Maguindanaon history indicates that power and nobility tended to coincide. And while the system no doubt provided loopholes for *post hoc* ennoblement of the powerful, it nevertheless seems that society did focus on the sultanates of Maguindanao, Buayan and, from the eighteenth century, Kabuntalan. At the same time, it is inconceivable that the highest born *datu* was always the bravest; indeed the histories indicate that the title holder was often either a child or an old man, leaving the real power in the hands of a close kinsman of lesser rank. The focus of political organization, then, was not so much the title holder himself as the line to which he belonged.

The existence of a *datu*-category had the effect of identifying those who were in reality powerless and dependent with the powerful. In the same way, commoners could identify with a line of datus by

---

[28]For an analysis of political marriages during the dynastic wars of the eighteenth century, see Michael O. Mastura, "The Maguindanao Core Lineage and the Dumatus," *Notre Dame Journal 7,* No. 2 (1977).

[29]Melvin Mednick, *Encampment of the Lake: the Social Organization of the Moslem-Philippine (Moro) People, Research Series 5, Philippine Studies Program* (University of Chicago, 1965).

claiming descent from a cadet line that voluntarily 'gave way' in the succession. For the lower orders the idiom was one of voluntary support. However, in assessing the factor of ideology, it must be remembered that those who were most exploited lived, or came from, outside the boundaries of Maguindanaon society. The followers of a forceful datu, even his slaves, might share in the plunder and captives taken from Christian settlements, or exact tribute from a group of pagans.[30] Moreover, they could expect to receive back a portion of the produce they yielded up to him.

The Datus Under Spain

Although Spain did not establish a presence in Cotabato until 1851, she had played a hand in Maguindanaon affairs from the outset. The sultanates were segmentary states, intermittently capable of uniting for offense or defense, but always liable to internal dissension. In conflict, factions readily accepted outside help, even from Holland and Spain.[31] The problem was, however, to prevent the allies from becoming masters, and it was just such a miscalculation that enabled the Spaniards to occupy the delta in 1861, without a shot being fired Securing the upper valley was a less easy matter, requiring a series of campaigns over the next twenty-five years. Once again Spain exploited internal divisions, and as she demonstrated her superiority in the field, more and more datus joined her camp. But when the last of her enemies had made his submission, she was left with allies whom she could scarcely control, and whose loyalty was very much in doubt. She had brought down the old political order, but a new style of datu had emerged in place of the old.

Spain's first target was the Sultan of Maguindanao. Having reduced him to penury by naval blockade, she set about determining the succession by exploiting dynastic rivalries. When the old sultan, Kudarat II, died in 1857—under suspicious circumstances, so it is said—his nominee, Makakwa, succeeded. He it was who invited them into the delta, presumably to shore up his own insecure position. In doing so he alienated what remained of his support, becoming largely dependent on the pension Spain allowed him. Spain may have intended to use the sultan as an instrument of control, but she succeeded only in neutralizing him. He and his successors spent much of their time in the old tributary of Sibugay, in Zamboanga del Sur, avoiding involvement in the upheavals along the river.

Meanwhile in the upper valley, a powerful alliance was forming around Utu, high born datu of the Rajah Buayan line. However,

[30]The following judgment of Datu Utu could in fact be applied in greater or lesser degree to any datu. "In effect his natural talent, his prestige, his riches, his supporters and above all his fiery despotism, had created around him a certain air of glory which made him like a feared idol or the compelled leader of whatever action took place in the basin of the Rio-Grande." Pablo Pastells, "Memoria de R.P. Pablo Pastells," *Cartas de los Padres de la Compania de Jesus de la Mision de Filipinas,* 9 (Manila: 1877-1895) p. 615. Translated by Ileto, *op. cit.,* p. 35.

[31]Tan *op. cit.,* pp. 132-133. Majul 1973 *op. cit., passim.*

resistance to the Spaniards could only be sustained at the cost of severe strain: manpower losses were unprecedently heavy; pagan groups suffered repeated raids for slaves, to be traded for guns; ties of kinship and affinity were stretched to breaking point. Utu's unique reputation in the folk memory for cruelty and caprice was no doubt earned through his use of terror to shore up the crumbling alliance.[32]

By 1888, Spain had broken the alliance, but did not attempt to remove Utu from his place in the upper valley. In 1890, however, he came down river to spend his last years under Spanish protection. According to tradition, he woke one morning to find that his followers had all deserted during the night, seeking the protection of his one time lieutenant, Datu Piang.[33] Piang was a Chinese mestizo with no claim to nobility, but he nevertheless replaced Utu as the most powerful datu in the upper valley, forming an alliance that included Utu's nephew, Ali, and several other members of the Rajah Buayan house. He does not share Utu's reputation for cruelty, but he was no less ruthless in dealing with his enemies.[34]

Piang's alliance was not subjected to the strain of a war with Spain, however. Indeed, he declared himself her friend, and Saleeby supposed that his overthrow of Utu was effected with the approval of Spain. He certainly enriched himself by supplying food to the up-river garrison at Reina Regente, but also established useful ties with Chinese traders at the river mouth. Saleeby reported that "at the time of the Spanish evacuation he [Piang] had become the richest Moro in Mindanao and the most influential chief of the island."[35]

Despite her superior firepower, Spain could scarcely have defeated Utu without Maguindanaon help. She needed not only additional manpower, but local knowledge, particularly of how to win over Utu's restive supporters. The Sultan and his kinsfolk either could not or would not intervene, but others came forward, most notably Datu Ayunan.[36] Ayunan seems to have been the first of his line to assume political importance but he does not seem to have been of the high nobility. His base, a point of minor strategic importance some twelve miles up-river, became the front line when the war with Utu began; but instead of fleeing he chose to stay, becoming the leader of a powerful alliance. He engineered a number of

---

[32]For a general discussion of the kind of conditions under which Utu was operating, see E.V. Walter, *Terror and Resistance: a Study of Political Violence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

[33]Regarding Piang's early career and overthrow of Utu, see Pablo Pastells, *Mision de la Compania de Jesus de Filipinas en Siglo XIX* (Barcelona, 1916-1917) Vol. III pp. 215; 262. (See also Ileto *op. cit.*, p. 63). According to this account Piang and others broke with Utu following a dispute over arms. According to oral tradition, which is still current, Utu's followers deserted him when he refused to open his granaries during a time of famine. See Captain C. Mortera, "The career of Bai Bagongan of Buluan, Cotabato", Ms. (1934) in *Hayden Papers op. cit.*

[34]*Reports of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War,* 9 (1902) p. 481; also Appendix 12, p. 578.

[35]Najeeb Saleeby, *The History of Sulu* (Manila 1908), p. 262.

[36]Ileto *op. cit.*, pp. 61-3.

defections from Utu's ranks, and may have been behind the revolt of Piang, who had become his son-in-law. Spain viewed his aggrandizement with unease, and while conferring on him the title *gobernadorcillo,* took steps to curtail his influence once Utu had been defeated. He died in 1898, on the eve of the Spanish withdrawal, passing his title on to his brother Balabaran.

When the Spaniards withdrew at the beginning of 1899 they left Cotabato under a triumvirate, composed of Datu Piang, representing the Maguindanaon, Ramon Vilo, representing the 600 Christian Filipinos now living in the delta, and another, representing the Chinese trading community.[37] Within a few months the men of Piang and Ali had invaded the lower valley, seizing and later killing Vilo. The Chinese remained under Piang's protection, but the Filipinos were subject to various outrages, and several datus, unfriendly to Piang, were forced to flee. Among these was Balabaran, who suggested that Piang had taken over what remained of his brother Ayunan's old alliance. In any case, when American troops arrived at the end of the year, the up-river datus promptly withdrew, offering their services to the new regime.

Although the Spaniards maintained sizeable garrisons on the coast and smaller establishments in the interior, they made little attempt to administer the population outside the small delta settlements at Tamantaca and Cotabato. Pursuing a 'policy of attraction', they avoided interference in religious practices or the datus' rights over their followers. They formally abolished slavery, and a Jesuit establishment offered sanctuary to Utu's runaway slaves, but many datus still had theirs when the Americans arrived. In the lower valley even the high born had dwindled into local dignitaries, and a number were seeking escape in opium and gambling. Political marriages were still contracted, but within a narrow span. In the hinterland, however, political alliances were still important, and reinforced by marriage, though the ranking system was already in disarray.

The Datus under the United States

The Maguindanaon offered only one serious challenge to American rule, under the leadership of Datu Ali in 1903.[38] Ali was defeated and killed in the following year. Thereafter Cotabato was the most peaceable of the Moro provinces, with only occasional and localized outbreaks of disorder. Continuing the Spanish 'policy of attraction', the Americans left the datus as they were, making friends out of former enemies.[39] But the end of fighting meant the end of alliances. The way to prosperity was now through cultivating the favour of the

[37]R.P.C. 9 (1902) pp. 522-4.

[38]Gowing *op. cit.* pp. 151-4; Tan *op. cit.*, pp. 35-38.

[39]This is particularly apparent in the case of Datu Alamada, who carried on a local resistance in the interior up to 1913, and Datu Ampatuan who briefly defied the regime in the same year. (Tan *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38; 62-148). Both leaders subsequently became part of the governmental system.

administration, or through participating in the development of the province as a major producer of rice and corn.

Ali mounted a brave resistance to the Americans, which took guerilla form after his defeat in a major encounter. But there was no question of his becoming another Utu. Piang, the real power in the upper valley, refused to support him, and indeed supplied the Americans with intelligence as to his whereabouts. It may also be true, as tradition says, that he simultaneously warned Ali to move on, and he would surely have given support had the Americans shown signs of weakening. But in the event Ali's death saw him on the winning side and the authorities in his debt.

Piang had impressed the Americans from the outset.In 1902. the following report was forwarded to the Philippine Commission:

> He is very shrewd, has brains and is self made, being now quite wealthy and a power in the valley, as he controls all of Datu Ali's influence over the tribes and adds to this his own brain. He is the only prominent Moro who seems to appreciate what the American invasion means and the business opportunities it brings with it. The Chinese blood in him makes him a shrewd businessman, and he has accumulated quite a fortune and is daily adding to it. He practically controls all the business of Cotabato, especially exports, through his Chinese agents in that place; has complete control of the Moro productions, and working with the Chinese merchants makes it practically impossible for a white firm to enter into business in the Rio Grande Valley, even with much capital behind them.[40]

At an interview, he [Piang] guessed that he might have 15,000 people, but could not be sure because the followers of the up-river datus were all his followers since their masters were his friends.[41] Another military observer reported that:

> ...the control of Piang over his people is absolute and complete. All know the refusal to work or fetch materials as ordered would have resulted in a swift and sure chastisement which might be limited to a flogging with rattan, but possibly would not stop short of beheading.[42]

Although the Americans at various times declared their determination to break the hold of the datus, Piang retained much of his power to the end. In 1926, when he was in his late seventies, an American observer described him in the following terms:

> In late years younger datus have striven to displace him, but although no longer supreme, he is still easily first in the valley... His slaves still surround him, his word is still law, and it is said, although probably could not be proved, that in accordance with the old Maguindanao code he still has recalcitrants of certain sorts cast to the crocodiles. I know that he recently put an influential datu on the wood pile for two months for crossing him. Also the old fox has accumulated much wealth during the three or four decades of his power: 42,000 coconut trees (they are good for $1 per tree each year) thousands of carabao, thousands of hectares of rice, land, horses, cattle, build-

---

[40] *R.P.C.* 9 (1902) p. 528.

[41] Interview with Datu Piang *R.P.C.* 8 (1901) p. 105.

[42] General G. Davis, "Notes on the Government of the Country Inhabited by non-Christians in Mindanao and the Neighbouring Islands", Ms. (1902) in *Dean Worcester Collection,* (University of Michigan Library), p. 256.

> ings, boats, and what not—to say nothing of the tithe paid him by his loyal subjects. He is also reputed to have a huge hoard of gold coins . . .[43]

What the observer said for Piang went for other datus in lesser degree. He had retained his slaves and followers, his hold over land and those who cultivated it, and his control of both force and legal sanctions.

At the outset it looked as though the American administration would break the power of the datus; instead it came to rely on them. Cotabato's quiescence, compared with the other Moro provinces, was largely due to the influence of Piang and his associates.[44] Moreover, he was ever responsive to American programs.[45] He led the way in developing commercial agriculture. He supported modern education to the extent of sending his own sons to study in Manila, one becoming an agriculturist, another an educationist, and a third the first Muslim attorney. He gave his backing to settlement of immigrants from the Visayas, and in the face of nationalist opposition, to a proposal for massive American investment in Mindanao. The pro-Americanism of Piang and the other datus, and their hostility to Philippine nationalism also proved an asset in the earlier years, though something of an embarrassment later, when independence had become a firm prospect.

The datus, for their part, found themselves well placed to take advantage of the economic and political changes that were taking place. In the economic sphere this meant intensifying the production of rice and corn. The Maguindanaon had, of course, long lived by commerce; and while raiding and toll-taking might have been more important sources of wealth at certain periods, agricultural products had always been more important, particularly in the upper valley. With raiding suppressed and the toll posts increasingly by-passed by the new overland routes, and with the demand for forest products declining, they later became of prime importance. The datus' task was to adapt their traditional rights over land and people to meet modern conditions.

Spain's policy had been to choke off Maguindanaon commerce with other countries, but not to stop trade as such. Ileto notes that the need of her establishments for supplies stimulated local trade, and that rice and high quality cacao found their way from the upper valley to Manila and Sulu, through Chinese intermediaries.[46] In 1901, the Americans found some 204 Chinese in the town of Cotabato, mainly engaged in the sale of rice, wax, coffee, rubber and guttapercha, which last they sent to Singapore.[47] They estimated the aggregate of exports at about $150,000 Mexican. The bulk of these products came from the

---

[43]Letter, J.R. Hayden to Dr. Barr, 12-9. 1926, *Hayden Papers op. cit.*

[44]See Thomas, *op. cit.* p. 103; Tan *op. cit.*, p. 148.

[45]See, for example, the report on Abdullah Piang's death in the *Philippine Herald,* 10. 12. 1933. Thomas *(op. cit.,* p. 129) notes Piang's support for American investment, as proposed by Congressman Bacon in 1926.

[46]Ileto *op. cit.*, p. 23.

[47]*R.P.C.* 8 (1901) p. 111.

upper valley, and so were under the control of Datu Piang, who also had close ties with the Chinese traders. He, however, seemed to be the only datu to engage in commerce, the rest confining themselves to primary production.

Economic statistics occur irregularly. In 1908, the Governor of Moro province reported the establishment of saw and rice mills, and exports to the value of ₱21,246.50.[48] By 1919, the figure had reached ₱760,428, exceeding imports by more than ₱200,000.[49] Rice had become the most important item, with copra coming second and corn third. In the years that followed, the area under rice increased from 1,864 ha. in 1920 to 24,630 ha. in 1935.[50]

In this rapid development of agriculture, Cotabato's problem was not land but people. The population had always been sparse, particularly in the south of the province, and had been further reduced by the cholera epidemic of 1902. It may have been on this account that the datus were prepared to accept Christian immigrants, seeing them as potential followers and payers of tribute. Meanwhile their relations with their Maguindanaon followers underwent certain changes.

The description of Piang's domain in 1926, quoted earlier, suggests that at least some datus kept their slaves, although the institution had been abolished and slaving outlawed. In the long run, however, slaves became servants, bodyguards, tenants or labourers, without their relations with their masters changing a great deal. Muslim farmers, like the Christians, needed protection from the depredations of bandits and cattle-rustlers, and this dependence gave the foundation of need to traditional loyalty.

Given the abundance of land and the critical importance of having followers to occupy it, little thought was given to the drawing of boundaries or the establishment of claims—except where ancestral graves were situated *(pusaka* land). The Americans began a cadastral survey, and introduced procedures for registering claims, but these lagged far behind the taking up of land, and widened the scope for land grabbing. Maguindanao farmers who put faith on their traditional rights, sometimes found that their land had been registered by Christian immigrants, or even their own datus.[51] A new type of tenant appeared, paying a third of his crop to the owner, although the rate of tenancy remained relatively low, even in 1971.[52]

---

[48]*Annual Report of the Governor of Moro Province. For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1908* (Zamboanga, 1908).

[49]*Reports of the Governor-General of the Philippines Islands to the Secretary of War,* (Washington, 1909) p. 81.

[50]P.J. Webster, "Mindanao and Sulu Archipelago: Their Natural Resources and Opportunities for Development," *Bureau of Agriculture Bulletins,* 38. (Manila 1920) p. 41. *Statistical Bulletin of the Philippine Islands,* 1935.

[51]For an account of agrarian conditions in Cotabato during the American period, see Peltzer *op. cit.,* pp. 127-159.

[52]In 1939, the date of the earliest estimate, 23% of farms were operated by tenants; in 1960 the percentage of a very much larger total was 26%. It is

While the mass of Maguindanao farmers remained where they were, a number, as in the old days, followed young datus to set up new settlements, either taking up virgin lands or displacing pagan *kaingeros.* In later years these were to provide the springboards for a number of political careers.

The Americans' policy of attraction entailed some recognition of Moro customary and religious laws. This arose from the difficulty in getting Moslems to bring their cases to court rather than to the datus, and also in separating religious from secular cases.[53] There is little data on this topic from Cotabato, but it is suggestive that as late as the 1970's, cases of murder were being settled by datus informally rather than in the courts. However, a circular from Governor Guttierrez, dated 1935 reveals further complexities.[54] He complained that in certain districts, provincial and municipal officials were adjudicating "so-called religious cases", appropriating the fines imposed and making prisoners work for their private benefit. An examination of the names of municipal presidents and other officials indicates that the datus monopolized these positions.

The American authorities were slow to give Muslims responsible political office; no Maguindanaon served as provincial governor until the Japanese occupation, though there was usually one on the provincial board. Piang was for some years a member of the national legislature, but all that most datus could hope for was a municipal district presidency, an office carrying less power and reward than a full municipal presidency and a great deal less than a mayor under the Republic. Nevertheless, these administrative divisions placed a limit on the dominance of figures such as Piang by reserving office for local datus.

Until the 1930's all offices were appointive, so that advancement depended on the favour of the governor rather than ability to rally support. As long as he lived, Piang had first call on it, but he died in 1933 and his eldest son Abdullah, who had taken his place in the National Assembly, died a few months later. There were four other sons, well qualified in terms of education to succeed, but they now had to compete with Sinsuat, son of Balabaran, who had stood second to Piang for some years. He had already had some experience of national affairs when he was appointed senator in 1935.[55] Then in the first election for the National Assembly in 1936, he defeated Attorney Menandang Piang by 312 votes to 128. Ugalingan Piang regained the seat in the next election, when there was a franchise of more than 20,000 votes.[56] With this election Maguindanaon politics once again

doubtful whether these estimates took into account traditional relationships through which a datu received a percentage of the farmer's crop. *Philippine Statistics: 1969 Yearbook.*

[53]Gowing, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-192. Thomas, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-70.

[54]Provincial Circular, 98. (15.1.35). *Hayden Papers, op. cit.*

[55]*Directorio Oficial de la Asemblea Nacional* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1938) pp. 143-144.

[56]*Directorio.* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1940) pp. 149-150.

became a matter of large-scale alliance formation, though the contest did not begin in earnest until after the Japanese occupation.

The American records have surprisingly little to say about Sinsuat Balabaran.[57] Born in 1864, he had grown up during the ascendancy of his father's brother Ayunan. His father, Balabaran, succeeded to the title of *gobernadorcillo* on the eve of the Spanish withdrawal, and also proclaimed himself sultan, but evidently lacked Ayunan's political strength for he was forced to flee Taviran for the delta in 1899 and again in 1901, for fear of Piang's men. A subsequent marriage between Sinsuat and the daughter of the Sultan of Kabuntalan suggests a recovery, but Balabaran died soon after and the importance of such alliances declined with the end of fighting. Later, Sinsuat himself retired to the family bailiwick, where he was appointed Municipal President. Between 1923 and 1931, he served as special adviser to Governor Guttierrez, having already represented Mindanao and Sulu in the negotiation of the Jones Act of 1916. Throughout this period he must have been consolidating and extending his political base, for in a *'Who's who among the Datus'*, dated 1927, he is described as "controlling territory from Tumbao to the southern mouth of the river, and having great influence over the Tiruray in the adjacent mountains."[58] Evidently he was also acquiring large tracts of land, worked by tenants, while his many brothers and sons were pushing back the frontier, establishing themselves along the coast and even in the growing town of Cotabato. Sinsuat's own move to the outskirts of town reflects his increasing rapport with the Governor and other Christian settlers, which was later to place the mayorship under family control.

Also of note was Ampatuan, who, being of Arab descent, was entitled *Sarip* and accorded equal status with the descendants of Kabongsoan.[59] A former lieutenant of Datu Ali, he had been won over by Piang, whom he succeeded on the Provincial Board in 1917. He is described as controlling 1,500 families in the upper valley.[60]

Compared with these three, the representatives of the royal houses were at best local notables. A few, like Datu Dilangalen, retained sizeable followings. Others were left with little but their nobility. There was still a sultan in Kabuntalan, but no one claimed the title in the upper valley. Mastura, son of Kuderat II, became *Sultan sa Maguindanao* as a very old man in 1926, but when he died a few years later, the title was claimed by Ismail of the Sibugay line over the protests of the Cotabato line.

---

[57]Thus, Bureau of Insular Affairs Chief, Frank McIntyre, wrote, "...our record of Datu Sinsuat and my memory are not so detailed." Memorandum of 16.8.26, *Bureau of Insular Affairs,* U.S. National Archives, 5828/42.

[58]Major Carter, "Who's Who Among the Datus" Ms. (1927) *Bureau of Insular Affairs,* U.S. National Archives, 5075-147.

[59]According to local sources, Ampatuan's great grandfather was an Arab immigrant. However, neither he nor the intervening descendants are mentioned in the Spanish records. From this, it may be concluded that Sarip Ampatuan was the first to assume political importance.

[60]Major Carter, *op. cit.*

Piang and Sinsuat also saw to it that some of their sons took advantage of the American education program. Menandang Piang became the first Maguindanaon attorney, closely followed by Duma Sinsuat and Salipada Pendatun. The last was the orphaned son of the upper valley *Sultan sa Barongis,* but owed his advancement to the patronage of an American teacher, Edward Kuder. Some of the old nobility also sent sons to school, but many rejected education as covert Christianization—as indeed it had been under the Spanish regime. The mass of the population likewise remained illiterate and ignorant of English, so that they were dependent on their leaders in any dealings with the government.

The Japanese Occupation and After

The Japanese period is poorly documented, but the oral record is relatively fresh.[61] In many respects it recreated the conditions existing during the late Spanish and early American periods, with the invaders controlling the delta and a few centers up-river, and obtaining the cooperation of the datus thereabouts. In the hinterland, Maguindanaon guerilla groups were in control, nominally under American military direction, but in practice independent of it and of each other for much of the time. Salipada Pendatun, Gumbay Piang, Luminog Mangilen and Mantil Dilangalen were the principal figures, emerging as political leaders in the liberation period. However, none of the collaborators suffered any lasting penalty.

One important consequence of the Japanese period was the release of large quantities of arms, which were never taken in after the war, and the formation of private armies. These became a major factor in the turbulent electoral politics of the Republic. It is not entirely fanciful to see this as a revival of traditional political forms; however, just as outside connections were important in the proto-colonial period, so connections with one or other national party were important under the Republic. Success depended on a combination of high level connections in Manila and widely ramifying alliances in the provinces. These alliances increasingly included Christian immigrants, who were soon to outnumber the Maguindanaon. It is a tribute to the skill and tenacity of the Maguindanaon politicians that they were able to keep hold of the principal positions until 1971.

Politics under the Republic proved a more difficult and costly business than it had been under the Americans, though the rewards were also greater. A number of notable families were eclipsed, most notably the Piangs, with the death of Congressman Gumbay in 1949. They retained control of their home municipality, but it was several

[61]Edward Haggerty describes a brief visit to Cotabato in his *Guerilla Padre in Mindanao* (New York and Toronto: Longmans Green and Co., 1946.) A mimeographed newspaper, *Mount Peris Echo,* under the editorship of Gumbay Piang, has yet to be traced. Ralph Thomas has summarized the Japanese sources in "Asia for the Asiatics?" Muslim Filipino Responses to Japanese Occupation and Propaganda during World War II. *Dansalan Research Center Occasional Papers,* No. 7, May 1977. Also in *Asian Forum* (July-September, 1972).

times subdivided to make room for expansive neighbours such as the Ampatuan family.

Salipada Pendatun remained Cotabato's principal representative in Manila up to the suspension of parliamentary government in 1972, first as senator, later as congressman. This removed him increasingly from provincial affairs, but his interests were protected by his brother-in-law, the resistance veteran Datu Ugtog Matalam, who held the governorship. Their control was repeatedly challenged, by the Sinsuats and Ampatuans, and various Christian aspirants. The Sinsuats gained the congressional position only once, in 1949, narrowly losing it in 1969. However, they have always retained their hold on their home municipality, which was recently subdivided, and only lost the predominantly Christian Cotabato City in 1968.

In 1978, Datu Blah Sinsuat was among those elected to the new national body, or the *Interim Batasang Pambansa.* The record of this family is particularly remarkable, running as it does from the beginning of the Spanish period through to the present. However, it is not unparalleled. For example, an appointed governor of one of the new provinces into which Cotabato has been divided was the great grandson of Sultan Mastura.

New Datus for Old

The Spanish occupation of the delta in 1861 presented the Maguindanaon datus with the critical choice between defiance and compliance. Those who chose defiance were eventually broken, but they remained a threat long enough for the complaint to make themselves indispensable to the colonial regime, and so retain a fair measure of autonomy. With the American take-over the sequence was quickly repeated, after which they settled down to converting their domains into agricultural estates. As effective controllers of the Muslim masses they were duly appointed to local government, and having acquired the necessary connections, moved in due course into the national arena.

However, the datus could not maintain a complete hegemony in the rapidly developing regional economy. Increasingly they found themselves part of a composite elite, in which they enjoyed a near-monopoly of political office and controlled wide lands, but left commerce to the Chinese and public administration to Christian Filipinos. Despite the Piangs' example, few established outside connections necessary to commercial enterprises, or the educational qualifications for entry into the upper levels of the public service. Their strength lay in their monopoly of access to the Muslim masses.

The datus' relation to the masses was now very different from what it used to be. With an end to raiding and reduction in toll and tribute taking, they had fewer rewards for their followers. Such patronage as they could dispense took the form of access to land and the occasional use of influence with the authorities. The nature of their

legitimacy had also changed. If Spain had failed to destroy datuism, it had nevertheless, destroyed the traditional order. Whether compliant like the Sultans of Maguindanao, or defiant like the Rajahs of Buayan, the high nobility had been the principal casualties of the period. They survived as dignitaries, perpetuating their rank through appropriate marriages, but without even the semblance of political authority outside their immediate domains. Power had passed to a new style of datu.

The permanent separation of power and rank was made clear in 1902, when Datu Utu's death made a widow of the high born Raja Putri, daughter of Sultan Kuderat II. The American authorities were given to understand that she would marry either Datu Ali or Datu Piang, but the former was not of equal rank while the latter was not of the nobility at all.[62] Rather than break the rule of hypergamy, she married the current Sultan of Maguindanao, Mangigin, who was of appropriate rank but a political cipher. There were occasional marriages between the old and new datus, but this was no longer a basis for alliance, and the rising generation were more likely to take Christian wives.

Earlier, it was suggested that *datu* had "ruler" as a primary meaning and, "descendant of rulers" as a secondary meaning. The latter, however, provided the basic principle for a notional order that bore some resemblance to reality before colonial rule. Spain destroyed that order and created a new crop of datus who formed part of the colonial order. In fact their place in that order, between the infidel invader and the Muslim masses, was profoundly ambiguous. Seen from above, they mediated the policies of the colonial regime; viewed from below, they provided a defense against alien forces. Thus situated they prospered and their power became entrenched. The datus of the Spanish period had created their own *maratabat;* by the end of the American period they were once again inheriting it, not unlike the old datus, but also not unlike the elite families of the Christian Philippines.

---

[62] *R.P.C.* 9 (1902) p. 528. The rumour that Datu Utu was the real father of Piang is not without significance in this respect.

JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINES: FROM TRADITIONAL TO MODERN SOCIETIES*

Josefa M. Saniel

Most economically developing countries are undergoing transformation from traditionally-structured agricultural societies to post-traditional ones as they move into the technology oriented world. Practically all Asian countries, except Japan, have been experiencing this difficult process since the end of World War II. Japan pursued the first stage of its modernization in the nineteenth century.

This paper attempts to compare the early phase of the modernization of Japan (1868-1898) and that of the Philippines (1945-1972). It focuses on the innovations introduced by the Japanese and Filipino political leaders into their political systems. To appreciate the changes made within each country's political system during what is considered here as the first stage of modernization, spanning roughly a generation, a brief discussion of certain historical facts in the preceding period will be presented first. Meaningful social changes, it is here suggested, were subsequently made within the framework of existing institutions both in Japan and in the Philippines. In other words, tradition was used as a tool of modernization or development.

This paper will also deal with Japanese and Filipino family systems —i.e., their respective social organizations and value systems—and their impact on the functions of their political systems during the first stage of modernization of development.

The functions that these institutions perform require fundamental adaptation to the growth of knowledge of a society's diverse social institutions "that were in existence when man's greatly enhanced capacities gradually began to make themselves felt in recent centuries."[1] The question that can be posed here is: would structural transformation be an imperative in the modernization or development of a society so that it can make such fundamental adjustment? Can not change take place within social structures by using tradition as an instrument of modernization or development? It is submitted in this paper that by mobilizing traditional institutions and values, a society or polity can adjust itself to various changing conditions—internal and/or external—and maintain its boundaries with the help of adaptive political elites.[2]

Tradition is viewed here as a reservoir of the most central social and cultural experience prevailing in society. It is the most enduring

---

*Paper read in Panel VI (Comparative Political Modernization: Japan and Southeast Asia), Section B (Comparative Politics), 30th International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa, Mexico, D.F. August 3-8, 1976.

[1]C.E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 46.

[2]S.N. Eisenstadt, "Some Observations on the Dynamics of Tradition", *Comparative Studies on Society and History,* Vol. VII, no. 4 (October 1969), 464.

element in the collective social and cultural construction of reality—a framework without which cultural creativity is not possible.[3] Briefly, tradition is the source of motivation or the mainspring of action in society. Adaptive political elites are the power-holders in the political system of a society, those who can easily recognize and respond to threats to their society posed by changing conditions within and without it. In the Philippines and Japan during the periods considered in this paper, the adaptive political elites were mainly congruent with the socio-economic elites or were the latter's allies.

Historically speaking, the dominant adaptive elites and the government have been responsible for the modernization of society in its beginning stage. The people constituting the base of society join the effort owing to the influence of these elites, and only subsequently do the majority of the people become an additional determining group.[4]

Within this context, modernization or development will be viewed as the transformation of a traditional agricultural society into a modern industrial one. This transformation is achieved by selectively applying accumulated knowledge in the form of technology (conceived broadly as man's capacity to control, influence and manipulate his environment) to the different activities of men within the pre-existing political, economic and socio-cultural sectors of a society for the purpose of attaining what that society conceives as the "good life" (initially the conception of the adaptive elite.). In other words, ideally, social welfare or the welfare of everyone (not only of a privileged group) should be the goal of modernization or development. This involves the betterment of material life as well as the improvement of the intangible, the psychological dimension of living or the sense of personal and social well-being.

I

Some Historical Facts

It is possible to compare certain historical facts gathered from a study of social developments in Japan and the Philippines before the periods between 1868 and 1895, in the case of Japan, and within the period, 1946-1972, in the case of the Philippines. Starting in 1868, with the restoration of the emperor to full sovereign, the period for Japan ends in 1895, the year of its victory in its war with China. For the Philippines, the period begins with 1946, when the nation was declared independent by the United States, and ends with 1972, when martial law was declared by President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Because the periods being considered are not contemporaneous, there cannot be a one-to-one correspondence of their chronological settings. Nor can there be an equation of the content of the historical facts within each country, owing to the differences in their historical and socio-cultural expe-

[3]S.N. Eisenstadt, "Intellectuals and Tradition," *Daedalus* (Spring, 1972), 3.

[4]See S.H. Alatas, "Erring Modernization: The Dilemma of Developing Societies," paper read at the Symposium on the Developmental Aims and Socio-Cultural Values in Asian Society sponsored by the Asian Institute for Economic Development and Planning, Bangkok, 3-7 November, 1975 (mimeographed).

riences. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made to compare the historical facts before the periods covering the early stage of modernization delineated for Japan and the Philippines, when Japanese and Filipinos constituted the political leadership in their own countries.

The political system in which these leaders played their roles before 1868 in Japan and before 1946 in the Philippines can be described as "centralized feudalism." Japan had the *baku-han* system[5] in which the shogun's overwhelming military as well as economic might (including those of his allies, the *fudai daimyo)* and other clever devices of checks and balances, like the *sankin kotai* (the hostage system),[6] enabled the shogun to hold the balance of power among the heads of the *han* (domain)— the *daimyo.* But the position of the shogun had to be legitimized by the imperial institution. In this system, the daimyo's leadership and house laws, not the shogun's, were the most possible content of the political experience of the people at the base of Japanese society. The people must have conceived the shogun as someone distant and the emperor even more remote. The shogun's income from his domain, which was in the selected quarter of Japan's territory, together with the *daimyo's* tribute in *koku* (roughly five bushels of rice), was used to fund the shogunate.

The Philippines before 1946, had a Commonwealth government that had administered the country since 1935. Interrupted by the Japanese occupation in 1941-1945, the Commonwealth government was essentially the Spanish political system modified by the Americans, mainly at the central and provincial levels of administration. The major innovations included the creation of a Filipino legislature which in 1935 became the Philippine National Assembly;[7] a judicial system theoretically constituting one of the three branches of government; and the introduction of guarantees of civil liberty. Under the Commonwealth government, a Filipino assumed for the first time the Presidency. Though practically independent from American supervision, the Commonwealth government continued to receive a High Commissioner, who represented the government of the United States. As the final authority on questions dealing with foreign affairs and currency, the American government also retained the final judgment on cases falling within a number of specified categories. To a certain extent, the first President of the Commonwealth, Manuel L. Quezon, like the shogun, was the first among political leaders and their allies. Quezon's social prestige and political power, along with those of his political and/or wealthy allies, enabled him to hold the balance of power among the significant, usually wealthy, power groups of Philippine society. He developed the Presidency into a very powerful office that appears to

---

[5]See J.W. Hall, *Japan, From Prehistory to Modern Times* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1968), 160-177.

[6]The outstanding control measure of the Tokugawa shogun which obliged all *daimyo* to reside part of the year in the shogun's capital of Edo and leave his wife and children behind when he travelled back to his domain.

[7]For a discussion of the Philippine political system, see R.E. Agpalo, "The Philippine Political System in the Perspective of History," *Silliman Journal* (First Quarter, 1972), 1-27.

have rendered it difficult to operate the principle of separation of powers which the Americans introduced. It was not beyond Quezon to make the elites around him pay for whatever he needed to keep him in power.[8] National laws reached the municipal level of government. Below it, what was meaningful to the people who composed the base of Philippine society, was the law of the powerful landlords and/or local political bosses who could dispense largesse bargained for ultimately from the Commonwealth President.[9] Within this system, it is conceivable for the larger sector of the population to think of the Commonwealh President as someone distantly located and the American High Commissioner as even more removed from them, if the people were at all aware of his existence. To the end of the American colonial administration in 1946, the Philippine economy manifested "economic backwardness" which had been its lot since the beginning of the American period. For example, overdependence on a few exports which contributed the larger part of the revenues required to support government operation and other public services.[10]

To man the bureaucracy developed by the *Tokugawas,* the shogun depended on the Neo-Confucian-trained *samurai* as did the *daimyo* in their *han.* Similarly, the Commonwealth President relied on the *ilustrado,* or the intellectual elite educated in the American ideas and ideals of democracy, to administer the bureaucracy, a product of the successive Spanish and American colonial administrations.

Tokugawa Japan's society had a rigid class structure (which relaxed at the end of the Tokugawa period), composed of the nobles, the *samurai,* the farmers, the artisans, the merchants, and the class formed by those who did not fall under any of the above categories, such as the *ata* (outcast minority group). With the blurring of class lines as the Tokugawa period wore on, Japanese society became divided into two classes: the class of elites who held power as an accedence of status (e.g., the nobles, the *samurai)* or by virtue of wealth (the merchants and

[8]For instance, Quezon asked his affluent allies to arrange the purchase from Don Vicente Madrigal, owner of the D-M-H-M *(El Debate-Mabuhay-Herald-Monday Mail)* of the chain of newspaper publications, which he intended to use as a means of counteracting any criticism made of his administration published by Don Alejandro Roces' T-V-T *(Tribune-Vanguardia-Taliba)* chain, which supported Osmeña, Quezon's opponent in connection with the passage of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. For more on Quezon as a political leader and how he operated with, or among, his allies, see T. Friend, *Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines, 1929-1946* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 115; *passim.*

[9]Demands from the people or the local land-owner (if he was not the local political "boss") was first made on the political "boss" at the lowest level of government administration, i.e., the municipal level. The political "boss" on this level, bargained with the provincial political leader(s) or directly with political leaders on the national level—the legislators or government bureaucrats. Because the Commonwealth President, Quezon, exercised enormous power over the items of the budget and its disbursement, both legislators and bureaucrats ultimately had to bargain with him for largesse benefiting the people at the base of society.

[10]For more details on the "economic backwardness" of the Philippine economy during the American period, see N.G. Owen, "Philippine Economic Development and American Policy: A Reappraisal, "*Solidarity* (September, 1972), 49-61. See also F.H. Golay, *The Philippines Public Policy and National Economic Development* (3rd printing; Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1968).

the artisans); the rest of the population, which made up the lower and larger base of Japanese society at the close of the Tokugawa period. By that time, political power had devolved into the hands of the lower-rank *samurai*—bureaucrats in the *bakufu* and in the *han,* particularly those from the *tozama* (outside) *han*—Satsuman, Chosu, Hizen and Tosa. Together with some nobles in the imperial court, they planned and executed both the Restoration and the changes aimed at transforming the existing society into something similar to those of the intrusive Western powers which were then pressuring Japan to open relations with them.

By 1946, Philippine society was practically a two-class society: the upper class, to which were co-opted those from the lower class who had acquired education or wealth; the lower class, which was made up of the larger sector of the population. Political power was controlled by the land-owning elite either directly or indirectly by supporting a political leader. For instance, President Quezon depended largely on the support of his affluent political allies from the landed elite, e.g., those belonging to the sugar bloc who were, at times, also engaged in business.[11] The political elite who inherited the leadership from Quezon, who died as President of the Commonwealth government in exile in the United States, were among those that can be considered second-in-command surrounding him before the Pacific War broke out. They planned and executed the development scheme intended to modernize and industrialize the country in the immediate postwar period.

Even before the first year of modernization in Japan and the Philippines, the leaders of each country had sought foreign advisers to help them plan the modernization or development of their societies, particularly the establishment of profitable industries and a strong military organization. The Japanese and Filipino leaders were assisted by foreign advisers in modifying their political systems to make them work as effectively as modern political systems are perceived to function in the West. Unlike the Philippines which depended largely on American advisers and assistance, Japan had a diversified list of foreign experts.[12] Because of their jealous concern over their own identity, the Japanese placed these advisers in administrative offices under Japanese supervisors, thereby relegating them to subordinate positions within the administrative hierarchy.[13] Understandably the Filipinos could not place their American advisers on a similar level.

Supporting the political system of a society is its economic system. The Japanese economy before 1868 was basically agricultural. But during the early Meiji period, there were already long-term economic developments favorable to the rationalization of the economic system and the application of Western technology. These developments included the rise of rural capitalists with experience in invest-

[11]See Friend, *op. cit., passim.*

[12]They were the German, American, British, French and Italian experts, among others. See Hall, *op.cit.,* 287.

[13]*Loc. cit.*

ing accumulated capital in such productive enterprises as small-scale industries; the emergence of institutions that functioned like banks which made possible flexible financing; the existence of the cash nexus; and the standardization of certain products, a precondition for the introduction of the one-price system, a universalistic norm of modern society.[14]

Also predominantly agricultural, the Philippine economy before 1946 had undergone considerable changes, which were consequences of the following historical developments: the Manila-Acapulco trade, which contributed to the rise of Manila as a primate city; the agricultural and commercial "revolution" in the country during the late eighteenth through the nineteenth centuries;[15] and the free-trade arrangement between the Philippines and the United States focusing on production of cash crops like sugar, abaca (Manila hemp) and coconut products, in the first half of the twentieth century.

In both Japanese and Philippine societies, landlordism and tenant agriculture had become prevalent. Some landowners became money lenders and merchants; a number of them, especially the Japanese merchants, invested in small-scale industries.[16] Unlike Japan, which lacks large areas of tillable land, the Philippines before 1946 had plantation agriculture, as in the sugar plantations in Pampanga and Negros Occidental. The Filipinos were traditionally interested in investing surplus wealth not only in land but also in houses, jewelry and other conspicuous-consumption goods, while the frugal Japanese invested their savings in productive enterprises, including land. Indigenous capital was therefore readily available in Japan for investment during the first stage of modernization; the same was not true of the Philippines, which depended heavily on American economic assistance funds.

Traditional handicrafts and cottage industries, though declining, continued to operate in the Philippines alongside the extractive, though not the manufacturing industries.[17] Manufacturing for the local market could not compete with the goods produced by the large-scale and

---

[14]For details related to these developments, see J.M. Saniel, "The Mobilization of Traditional Values in the Modernization of Japan," in *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia,* ed. by R.N. Bellah (New York: The Free Press, 1965), 134-135.

[15]See H. de la Costa, S.J., *Readings in Philippine History* (Manila: Bookmark, 1965), Chapters VIII and IX, 121-164. See also B. Legarda, Jr., "American Entrepreneurs in 19th Century Philippines," *Bulletin of the American Historical Committee of the American Association of the Philippines,* Vol. I, No. 1 (June 1972), 25-51.

[16]See T.G. Smith, *The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959), Part II, 67-213. See also O.D. Sheldon, *The Rise of the Merchant Class in Tokugawa, Japan, 1600-1868* (New York: Published for the Association for Asian Studies by J.J. Augustin, Inc., Pub., 1958).

[17]The extractive industries processed the products of mine, field, forest and sea. For examples: sugar milling, abaca (Manila Hemp) stripping, production of coconut oil and desiccated coconut, manufacturing of cigars, processing of gold and other minerals, production of lumber, furniture and plywood. See J.J. Carroll, S.J., *The Filipino Manufacturing Entrepreneur: Agent and Product of Change* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1965); 30.

efficient American manufacturers and imported tax free into the Philippines. The Filipino taste for American consumer goods was thus developed to the detriment of local small-scale producers like the weaving industry. The Pacific War in 1941 prevented implementation of an industrial program geared to the local market, in which government corporation were expected to play an important role.[18]

In Japan in the early Meiji period, small-scale industries supplied the consumption goods required by the people whose taste for them were reinforced by more than two centuries of isolation under the Tokugawas. Small-scale industries, especially silk, also contributed to economic development; their products composed Japan's main exports during the early Meiji period. Therefore, Japan could use scarce foreign exchange for importing the capital goods and technology[19] to meet her development needs.

Both Japan and the Philippines had over two centuries of prior socio-politico-economic development. Together with the two countries' traditional institutions and values, this prior experience predisposed their political leaderships to select the particular aspects of modern society to which their societies were initially to respond.

Though at the beginning of the first phase of their modernization, the Japanese and Philippine societies and cultures had reached more or less comparable levels of development, yet the ability and rate of change taking place during one generation within each of the two countries' pre-existing traditional society differed. Among other things, this can be accounted for by the difference in their family systems, the core of social organization in both Japan and the Philippines.

II

The Japanese Family System

The basic unit of the traditional social organization in Japan is the *ie* (house or household). Sometimes referred to as the family system, the *ie* and not the individual is of primary importance. Generally comprising the house head's family members, it at times includes other members. The *ie* is a corporate residential group; it is also a managing body in agriculture or other similar pre-modern enterprises.[20] Hierarchical in its internal relationships, human interaction within the household is the primary and basic attachment and is taken as more

---

[18]For more details on the development of the Philippine economy, see A.V.H. Hartendorp, *History of Industry and Trade of the Philippines: From Pre-Spanish to the End of the Quirino Administration* (Manila: American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, 1958). See pp. 49-63 for the "synoptic list of government-oriented and controlled corporations and business agencies." See also L.E. Gleeck, Jr., *American Business and Philippine Economic Development* (Manila: Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc., 1975).

[19]W.W. Lockwood, *The Economic Development of Japan, Growth and Structural Change, 1868-1938* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), 34.

[20]Chie Nakane, *Japanese Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 14. See also T. Koyama, "Changing Family Structure in Japan," in *Japanese Culture, Its Development and Characteristics,* ed. by R.J. Smith and R.K. Beardsley (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1962), 47-49.

important than all other relationships.[21] The *ie* is paternalistic and strongly male-oriented. And it is goal-and-achievement-oriented. The crucially significant bonds within it are those between father and son, usually the oldest one, who, until the post-World-War II Civil Code was enforced, inherited from his father (by the principle of primogeniture) both the headship of the house and its property. In this way, loyalty to the head of the *ie* appears to have been a status rather than a personal loyalty. Such a social organization has generated what may be described as the collectivist norms and group consciousness of Japanese society. Outside the *ie,* kinship is comparatively weak. For instance, a married sibling who lives in another household is considered as some kind of an outsider. It is said that in rural Japan "one's neighbour is of more importance than one's relatives."[22] On the other hand, the adoption of a son-in-law, especially the adoption of a talented person, again suggests tendencies away from personal to status loyalty which can perhaps be viewed as "generalized particularism."[23]

The foundation of the individual's total emotional participation in the collectivity is the *ie's* cohesive sense of group resulting in the building of a closed world characterized by strong group independence or isolation and developing in the consciousness of "us" among *ie* members as contrasted to "them." In this way, "Japanese group affiliations and human relations are exclusively one-to-one: a single loyalty stands uppermost and firm."[24] The head of the *ie* represents it in its contacts with those outside the group; when a member of the collectivity interacts with those outside the social group, he always conceives himself as part of his *ie.* In cases of membership in more than one group, only one is clearly preferred, e.g., the *ie,* and the others are considered secondary. Because the Japanese emotional participation within the *ie* involves the individual "body and soul," there is no room for serving two masters.[25] This total emotional involvement promotes a sense of unity which further strengthens group solidarity.

To keep the cohesiveness of the *ie,* the pre-World-War-II family code provided that in the following instances of adoption—i.e., a family's adoption of a male (in the absence of a male heir) or a female (on her marriage), or a male child (in the case of adoption of a young boy)—the one concerned had to remove formally his/her records from the family register of his/her original family and enter them in the register of his/her adoptive family. Adoption is thus a family mechanism which reinforces group loyalty because it promotes a single channeling of loyalties upwards to house head.

---

[21]Nakane, *op. cit.,* 5.

[22]*Ibid.,* 5-7.

[23]Saniel, *op. cit.,* 126.

[24]Nakane, *op. cit.,* 21.

[25]*Loc. cit.* The socio-psychological dimension of Japanese group cohesiveness is explained in C.T. Hally, "The Impact of Japan's Social Value System Upon Asia," *Publications Sud-East Asiatique et Extreme Orient.* Centre d'Etude Orient, November 24, 1970, 14-15 (mimeographed).

The continuity of the family system is the main function of a woman in the *ie.* When a woman is married into the *ie,* she occupies the lowest status within it. She is considered a full member of her family of procreation after she bears a child, whom she views as her only possession,[26] perhaps, as a psychological compensation for her inferior position in the *ie.* Therefore, she tends to develop in the child a feeling of dependence upon her. This phenomenon, which is an aspect of Japanese group orientation and strengthens it, is referred to as *amae* (noun of *amaeru).* It is defined by T. Doi as "to depend and presume upon another's benevolence."[27] What is important is the cultural idealization of the mother, who is regarded as a given, expecting no reward,[28] a selfless benefactor. In a male-dominated society, the mother, who is not only a sacrificing individual but also a member of the inferior sex, helps dissociate the *on*—bestowal from superiority in status.[29] This view of a Japanese mother's role within the *ie* seems to have contributed to the feeling of belonging to one group and one group alone in the Japanese psyche. The mother's role appears not to have caused any deviation of the house member's loyalty and filial piety away from the house head in so far as decision-making of the *ie* is concerned.

Another factor reinforcing Japanese group cohesiveness is the *on.* The concept (translated as "love" and "devotion" generally to a hierarchical superior) is a set of obligations passively incurred, since it is said that every Japanese conceives himself as "debtor to the ages and the world." Through one's contacts in his life, *on* can be received from one's superior—the emperor, an individual's parents, his lord, his teacher, sometimes one's equal, and so on.[30] "From this debt his daily decisions and actions must spring."[31] Each person is obligated to return an *on* in that *on*-receiving suggests either *gimu* or *giri. Gimu* corresponds to a limitless *on; giri,* to a limited, repayable *on.*[32] This underscores the dominant value held by the Japanese which emphasizes togetherness and solidarity. While the *on*-receiver is expected to be dependent on the *on*-giver, the latter is presumed to be dependable. "It is not only that demonstration of dependability is normatively required but that to be depended upon is also emotionally

---

[26]Y. Nojiri, "Japanese Woman in Family and Society—Autonomy and Dependence," Lecture sponsored by the Philippines-Japan Ladies Association, June 22, 1976, Makati, Rizal, Philippines.

[27]T. Doi, "Amae: A Key Structure for Understanding Japanese Personality Structure," in Smith and Beardsley (eds.) *op. cit.,* 132. For a full discussion of the concept of *amae,* see Doi's book translated by J. Bester. *The Anatomy of Dependence* (2nd ed; Tokyo: Kodansha International Ltd., 1974).

[28]T. Sugiyama Lebra, "Reciprocity and the Asymmetric Principles: An Analytical Reappraisal of the Japanese Concept of *on,*" [reprinted from *Psychologia,* Vol. XII (1969), 129-138] in T.S. Lebra and W.P. Lebra, *Japanese Cultures and Behavior, Selected Readings* (An East-West Center Book; Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1974), 199-200.

[29]*Ibid.,* 200.

[30]R. Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946), 98.

[31]*Loc. cit.*

[32]*Ibid.,* 114-132.

desirable."[33] Reciprocals of *on,* which are two forms of unconditional repayment of *on (gimu),* are: *chu,* repayment of one's *on* to the emperor or loyalty to the emperor; *ku,* repayment of one's *on* to one's parents or filial piety to one's parents, values stressed in the early stage of Japan's modernization process.[34]

Within the family system as its core, the social organization of Japanese society and its values provided a basis for the development of an effective, centralized state administrative system capable of extending down to the household level. This will be discussed in more detail after considering the family system in the Philippines, which also constitutes the core of the country's social organization.

The Filipino Family System

The basic unit of the Philippine social organization is the nuclear family. Among the Filipinos of the villages who make up the larger sector of the Philippine population,[35] and to a certain extent those of the urban areas, the Filipino family can be graphically described as making up the core or the inner circle of three concentric circles. The second one around it is composed of a wide range of symmetrically recognized extended bilateral family kin—relatives of father and mother. The third is formed by ritual kin—e.g., kin acquired through such mechanism as the *compadrazgo*[36] or the use of kinship signals (in the superordinate-subordinate relations of members of the domains family with the ritual kins of the third circle), in the process of expanding the family links to include friends, partners, employers and so on, with whom a member (or members) of the family is (are) interacting or intend to relate more intensely to enhance the nuclear family's interest(s). Because of this third circle of kins, the Filipino family system may be viewed as multilateral.

A system of alliances is provided for by the expanded kinship structure. "But being a relative (other than a member of the nuclear family) does not necessarily mean being an ally, although the relationship provides one avenue for becoming allies. Once the alliance has

---

[33]Sugiyama, *op cit., 199.*

[34]For details regarding *on* see Benedict, *op. cit.,* 198-232. See also Sugiyama Lebra, *op. cit.,* 192-204. For an expanded discussion on the mobilization of the traditional values of loyalty to emperor and filial piety to parents in Japan's modernization process, see Saniel, *op. cit.* 124-147. See also Saniel's article on "Communication and National Development in Japan," in *"Communication and National Development in Southeast Asian Countries,"* 3 vols. (Quezon City: Institute of Mass Communication, University of the Philippines, [1967(?)], Vol. 45-102 (mimeographed).

[35]Castillo comments: "Until today, the Philippines is essentially a nation of villages and the typical Filipino is 'taga baryo' (from the village)." See G.T. Castillo, *The Filipino Woman as Manpower: The Image and Reality,* (College, Laguna: University of the Philippines in Los Baños, March 1976), 25 (mimeographed).

[36]The establishment of relationship between parents and their children's godparents are basically by means of the Roman Catholic rituals of baptism, confirmation and marriage or some other means.

been formalized, roles and relationships are more or less defined."[37] It is however hard to trace the line of authority nor the status of the ties within the expanded circle of kin because the center of authority varies with different circumstances and situations at various spans of time. The extension of kin relationship beyond the nuclear family results in overlapping kinship status and roles among relatives; this complex network of kinship relations could involve an individual in entangling alliances and conflicts of interests and loyalties, especially in the absence of a dominant leader.

Within this extended kinship structure, an individual classifies and differentiates his kinsmen according to their position in the three circles of relatives: consanguineal (blood relationship), affinal (relationship through marriage), and ritual (relationship based on rites) kins. Superimposed on each structure linking the individual to relatives from each category of kin, is the generational pattern, which is defined in terms of the vertical positioning of individuals according to their order of descent. Recognition of relatives based on this arrangement generally covers three generations in the ascending level, while it reaches down to the fourth generation in the descending order. This long line of relatives is generally increased by the wide extent of recognized collateral relations extending to as far as third degree cousins of both father and mother as well as ritual kin. In this context, the Filipino social structure is both vertically and horizontally formed.

Faced with so many kins, a child eventually learns how to maneuver himself among them—in fact, how to manipulate them for his own benefit. Through this process, an individual learns how to play politics within the family system, especially with kins in the second and third circles of kins where the time-span of alliance groups are temporary and at times unpredictable. Thus there seems to be more room for creative individuals to develop within the Filipino family system than in the Japanese.

On the other hand, because of the value of authority, respect and reciprocity, as well as the insecurity of the alliance system, the individual is always concerned with the feelings of others *(makiramdam).* In other words, he has to develop a very sensitive "cultural antenna" which can monitor the feelings of people around him so that he can be guided in his relations with each of them within a particular situation and a particular moment of time. This concern perhaps accounts for the traditional Filipino hospitality, which generally impresses foreign visitors. *Makiramdam,* a mechanism which can be traced to the Filipino individual's need to be loved by others (synonymous to the fear of rejection), becomes the basis of the person's self-esteem *(amor propio)* when fulfilled. Since the principal rule is not to offend, its first requirement, therefore, is to be sensitive to the reaction of others. Highly valued are the traditional tools in the culture such as *pakikisama* (to get along with), *hiya* (shame), *utang na loob*

[37]J.J. Carroll, *Changing Patterns of Social Structure in the Philippines, 1896-1962: An Outline Survey* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1968), 35.

(to be grateful or to bear a "debt of gratitude"), *delicadeza* (to be cautious), *mapagbigay* (to be generous), *makiramay* (to share), *pagtitiis* (to endure) and *pagtitimpi* (to suppress).[38] These cultural mechanisms appear to have prevented the Filipino from becoming a "rugged individualist" and Philippine society is characterized by accommodation rather than confrontation in the interaction between or among individuals.

The significant interaction patterns in the bilateral kinship system, based on the nuclear family, stem from the values of authority, respect and reciprocity. While authority is an important aspect of family system in other societies, it is a value stressed in the Filipino family system. It is based on age rather than sex. The comparative egalitarianism of Philippine society is rooted in pre-Spanish times, when women could inherit property and succeed to the headship of the *barangay*.[39] Respect is a function of the generational pattern in an individual's interaction with kinsmen. And reciprocity, or the mutual give-and-take relationship, is mainly a kin-group affair, since related families are expected to help one another in times of crisis and to mutually share blessings in prosperity.

The value of *utang na loob* and its sanction, *hiya,* is rooted in this kinship value of reciprocity. The concept, *hiya,* in Tagalog appears to be evident among people in practically all of the Philippines. In the broadest sense, it is best defined as "self esteem" *(amor propio). Hiya* seems to be one of the most important concepts in the Filipino social psyche because it reflects most of the aspects of Filipino value and motivation.[40]

Paternalism, familism and personalism characterize the relationship within the nuclear family, the frame within which a Filipino's orientation in his society and culture is initially guided and continuously influenced. The hierarchically vertical structure of relationship and what many observers describe as the authoritarianism of the head of the family have generated a certain amount of conformity, which has limited some kind of bargaining or "politicking" by individual members of a family for support and reward within the family. This has perhaps been so because the pattern of generational respect in Filipino society has given decision-making power to the head of the family or older individuals, in the absence of a father or mother. Sometimes the head of the family may be an older sibling—whether brother or sister, or a relative of either parents who can take care of the children left parentless. In a fatherless family, it is generally the mother who acts as

---

[38]L.V. Lapuz, M.D., *A Study of Psychopathology* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973), 244.

[39]A *barangay* was a pre-Spanish socio-politico-economic collectivity based on kinship, consisting of 30 to 100 families. According to A. de Morga, if there were no sons, the daughers succeeded to the position of chief of *barangay* with the oldest daughter given the priority to succession. See A. de Morga, "Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas," in *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898,* ed. by E. Blair and J. Robertson, Vol. XIV (Cleveland, Ohio: A. H. Clark and Co., 1903-1909), 126.

[40]R.B. Fox, "Generalized Lowland Philippine Social Organization," 10 (mimeographed).

the head. For, unlike the Japanese, the Filipino female wife shares authority with the head of the family.[41] The Filipino's loyalty and obedience to the head of the family also differs from the Japanese family in that it is person—rather than status-oriented.

The "line of authority in the Filipino family is difficult to define and delineate with precision... Available materials on the *Filipino family* suggest that functionally, it is *more supportive... than authoritarian* [italics mine]."[42] The family extends support and protection to its members when required "even if such need arose out of deviant behavior and contrary to the expectation of the majority of the family members."[43] This is because the family—the nuclear and, to a certain extent, the bilateral family—and its members are concerned with avoiding "loss of face" which would cause *hiya.* The reputation or the "good name" of the family has to be maintained by all means and at all costs. Basically, the nuclear family and, to some degree, the extended bilateral kinship structure provide a Filipino with a high sense of security and "belonging." A Filipino Psychiatrist, L.V. Lapuz writes:

> A person grows up in the Filipino culture with one paramount assumption: that he belongs to someone. When he presents his self to others, it is with his family that he is identified. He belongs to the family as a whole as well as to its members. Whatever honor, glory, infamy or disgrace he gains is shared by them. In good fortune and bad, his family is the first to know and participate.
>
> Within the family, such belongingness becomes more finely delineated. One belongs to one's parents, or to whoever assumes or sustains meaningful authority and responsibility in their absence... The feeling of belongingness assumes an additional meaning aside from shared participation, as in the context of the family, in that inter-personal belongingness stresses allegiance, loyalty and a sense of obligation. The importance of parents particularly the mother, appears to be that of keeping the family intact, so that the feeling of belonging may continue. The absence of the parents (authority figures) makes the solidarity of the family difficult to maintain.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Between the parents, there is a further choice as to whom one belongs. Almost always, it is to the mother. The loyalty, allegiance

[41]For more details on Filipino women's role in Philippine society see G.T. Castillo and S.H. Guerrero, "The Filipino Women: A Study in Multiple Roles," *Lipunan,* Vol. III (1968-1969), 16-37. See also Castillo, *op. cit.;* I.R. Cortes, "Women's Rights under the 1973 Constitution," (Professorial Chair Lectures; Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1975); Y.Q. Javellana, *Women and the Law: Round Table Conference: Achieving for Women Full Equality Before the Law.* Printed from *Philippine Law Journal,* Vol. XL, no. 1 (February 1975).

[42]P.P. Mendez and F. Landa Jocano, *The Filipino Family in Its Rural and Urban Orientation: Two Case Studies* (Manila: Centro Escolar University Research and Development Center, 1974), vi.

[43]*Loc. cit.*

> and sense of obligation are stronger with her than with the father. One must never cause her hurt or displeasure. The greater attachment to the mother is, of course, inevitable not only because of biological circumstances, but also because of the prolonged intense emotional nurturing received from her. Here is where to belong gains the meaning of to be loved, cared for and protected... Father is no less important, but love and loyalty accorded him arise mostly from what he does for the family as a whole; he provides its material needs and spearheads family activity in society. His relationship with the children is also influenced greatly by how mother presents his image to the children. Sadly sometimes, father does not have much of a role aside from being the bread-winner; he may then seek attachments which are more emotionally satisfying to him outside the family [which perhaps explains the prevalence of the *querida* (mistress) in Philippine society].
>
> The Filipino woman portrays quite often the quientessence of this attachment to the mother... Even after the daughter's marriage, the mother can still be a fount of strength, especially in times of stress... her family of orientation comes first as far as a sense of belonging is concerned, rather than her family of procreation.[44] [underscoring supplied.]

The mother is the "broker" between her children and father; she negotiates with him for whatever a child needs. The father sometimes assumes the role of negotiator between his children and their mother. But because the mother generally holds the purse strings and ideally represents love and is the dispenser of *awa* (pity or compassion,[45] which implies concessions), she is powerful. (From the viewpoint of Western norms, however, the concept of *awa* can be interpreted as encouraging tolerance of corruption and condoning deviant behavior even when illegal.)

A person's feeling of belonging to someone can be taken as the extension of one's self, for "to belong" is to be "part of" someone.[46] It is in this context that mother's feeling of belonging to her husband perhaps motivates her to project, for instance, his image in the public mind as a successful businessman, a civic leader, an economic thinker and so on—on the strength of her talent.[47] Because she belongs to her

---

[44]Lapuz, *op. cit.*, 236-237.

[45]The use of *awa* is culturally sanctioned to relieve an individual from any burdensome guilt feelings. Forgiveness is forthcoming when an individual throws himself at the mercy of the aggrieved, and then undergoes a period of contrition and repentance. In this way, guilt does not stay very long. Guilt is dissipated through "blaming" and blame-shifting which simultaneously releases hostile impulses. Guilt in the context of Philippine culture is synonymous with "blame" and is another form of social control to discourage those who may become too aggressive or ambitious. Lapuz, *op. cit.*, 248-252.

[46]*Ibid.*, 237.

[47]For example, besides the Filipino women's active participation in business activities, there are others who manage their husband's property while "he dreams or dances his life away," or is the mind and the dedicated worker

children as they do to her, she also projects herself in their achievements.

From the foregoing discussion, it is easy to observe that "to belong to" or "to be part of" someone is the basic need of a Filipino. "It transcends the need to be dependent or to be interdependent or to be socially liked, accepted or approved of. When he knows whom he belongs to, then he knows that here is where his emotional and material security lies. He knows also that there is where he owes loyalty and allegiance, and this knowledge guides his behavior accordingly. This is his assurance against an unpredictable fate."[48] And in the Filipino family, it is the mother who claims priority to the loyalty of its members, although the father is theoretically the ultimate decision-maker and authority. The realities and dynamics of the Filipino family system therefore preclude the direct channeling of loyalties from the members of the nuclear family to the head of the family as compared to the auomatic siphoning of loyalties to the head of the *ie* as in the Japanese family.

How are relations between kin and non-kin pursued within the Philippine social organization? Social distance marks the relations between members of the nuclear and expanded kinship collectivities, on the one hand, and non-kin on the other. This relationship is sometimes described in contemporary studies of anthropologists and sociologists of Philippine social organization as the *sila* (they)-and-*kami* (we) complex since primary social intercourse of Filipino society is basically centered on obligations to the nuclear family and then to the expanded kin group, if at all.

This kinship orientation of the Filipinos has brought about such values as *tayo-tayo* (lit. "we" or "among us"), related to the concept of *kami,* to include members of the kin group *vis-a-vis* non-kin, and *pakikisama,* values used to avoid conflicts within the family or the kinship group. In Filipino social relations, confrontation is avoided in favor of accommodation. Relationships with non-kinsmen are "delicate and insecure." Social patterns have however evolved "to bridge this social distance between kin and non-kin... hospitality, politeness of speech, indirection of interpersonal behavior."[49]

Because of the individual's allegiance to his family and its welfare, he operates within a cultural setting of personal connections and transactions that could threaten but not always violate the merit principle. One instance is the appointment of qualified relatives to positions of responsibility within the bureaucracy. From the point of view of

---

behind a prominent businessman, a successful politician and the like which, according to Legarda, "are sometimes difficult to document but remain in the realm of 'what every woman knows.'" See B. Legarda y Fernandez, "Our Growing Entrepreneurial Class," quoted in H. de la Costa, *op. cit.,* 1965), 289.

[48]Lapuz, *op. cit.,* 137.

[49]R.B. Fox, "The Study of Filipino Society and Its Significance to Programs of Economic Development," *Philippine Sociological Review,* Vol. VII, nos. 1-2 (January-April 1959).

the Western merit system, this could be considered nepotism. To a Filipino, however, he is guided not only by the traditional norm of family obligation but also the pragmatic need of having someone in the administrative system on whom he can rely more fully than non-kin. This is not to say that appointments of undeserving relatives to government positions were not made by government officials. In this instance, however, Filipino society has its instruments of social control.

Filipino society's instruments of social control seem to be reinforced by the use of the direct method of criticism or gossip to level down a person and check his aggression and hostility. The ambition or achievement of an individual is sometimes debased; "blaming" is used as a force to maintain "equality" among members of social groups (like the nuclear family or the extended kinship group) and to serve as a threat to those who openly seek positions of power and advantage; the expansion of his social responsibilities toward the rest of his social group has a leveling effect on a successful individual. Such social controls exert pressure on an individual to conform with the norms, for instance, of a small, relatively cohesive nuclear family and to be loyal to it rather than to the larger social groups or the still larger social system—Philippine society. Intense loyalty by an individual toward his family, especially when headed by a strongly dominant person, can partly explain political killings that had taken place. It has also resulted in the segmentation of Philippine society.

Outside the nuclear family, kinship structures and loyalties are brittle. This can perhaps partly explain the ease with which Filipinos have accommodated selected foreign cultural traits. Since there was no possibility of a strong opposition against the external group bearing a foreign culture, these traits from abroad were accepted but modified to meet local needs. Nor was there initially any significant destruction or disruption of the Filipino nuclear families by the colonizing agents or agencies as did take place, for instance, in Central and South America. In other words, Western practices have been refashioned by Filipinos in the comparatively well-knit nuclear family to fit their own values and cultural demands.

We shall now turn to a consideration of the impact of the family system of Japan and the Philippines on each society's political system during the early stage of modernization.

III

In the period immediately before 1868 in Japan, and 1946 in the Philippines, the authority of the state or the formal government did not reach down to the people, who made up the base of each of these societies, i.e., the political systems that can be described as "centralized feudalism."

During the period considered in this paper as the first stage of modernization for each country, the initial goal of the political leaders of both countries who adopted certain cultural traits from the West was to mobilize and rationalize their society's resources to achieve a political system characterized by greater control over the society and

greater efficiency in attaining the goals they recognized as those of the "good society" that they wished to establish. Each of the two countries' political systems was geared toward attaining a single center of authority. However, the achievement of a modern political system initiated and led by the traditional but adaptive political elite, would result, as it did, in the conservation or protection of the role that these elites assumed in their society (therefore, their power).

In Japan the adaptive political leaders of the traditional government itself recognized that the country might succumb to the foreign challenges it then faced unless it introduced reforms that could at least attain the facade of a modern state. This perceived danger compelled them to immediately institute reforms which were designed not to transform the traditional social system but to strengthen it against foreign pressures. Thus Japan's modernization has sometimes been described as "defensive."

On the other hand, the Philippines, which was subject for over 300 years under Spain and the United States (including a brief period of Japanese control) was successively dependent on these colonial powers for its political cohesion. The challenge faced by the Philippine political elite (who inherited the authority of their colonial rulers) was the need to establish a cohesive political system that could assert Philippine socio-politico-economic independence in the face of internal threats (e.g., the Communist-led *Hukbalahaps*[50]) and what has been referred to as the "cold war"—the post World War II power rivalry between the "free world," led by the Philippines' last colonial tutor, and "the Communist world." The political elite appear to have realized that the immediate introduction of reforms into Philippine society was necessary if it was to survive as a truly independent state.

During the period (for each society) covered by this paper, the political leaders of Japan and the Philippines worked for what seem to be the universal goals of both developing and developed nation-states: security and prosperity of their societies. Because the two countries aimed at achieving these general goals within their traditional social organizations (in which they were enculturated) as they moved towards becoming a modern state, the political system that evolved in each society, their specific goals, and the means used by the Japanese and Filipino political leaders differed.

The Modernization of Japan's Political System: The Politics of Authoritarianism

Unlike contemporary developing societies, Japan in 1868 had a strong national group consciousness or identity and solidarity. A country with a common language and culture which escaped Western

[50]Abbreviation of "Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon" (literally, Army of the Country Fighting Against the Japanese). It was formed in 1943, in Central Luzon, and continued to exist during the period of the Philippine Republic as a rebel group aiming at dislodging the government.

colonization and which was practically closed to the world for more than two centuries before its modern period, Japan did not have to confront such difficulties as present-day modernizing post-traditional societies now do. The first stage of the modernization of Japan's polity was the creation of a centralized system, including the successful adjustments of centrifugal feudal loyalties to the center of the political system. The immediate goal of the nation-state was to recover full sovereign power, which was being infringed by "extraterritoriality" and the uniform five-percent (5%) *ad valorem* tariff enjoyed by the Western powers, under the so-called "unequal treaties" negotiated by them with Japan in the nineteenth century. In other words, Japan aimed at attaining equality with the Western powers.

The centralization and integration of the Japanese political system was accomplished through authoritarianism based on the concepts of the emperor and the family system with their undergirding Confucian values of loyalty and filial piety. Such values were powerful sources of motivation for conscious and purposeful action towards certain ends.

The restoration of the emperor to this theoretical place at the top of the political system in 1868 facilitated the transfer of allegiance from the feudal lords to the nation-state—a process usually requiring time—by substituting for abstract idea of nation-state the concrete notion of the emperor as the father of the nation. The father image of a divine emperor also provided the Japanese people with an unchanging, fixed source of authority, which aided the centralization of political control. The subject incurs duties toward his emperor as does a son to his parents and owes loyalty to the emperor who is responsible for his well-being. Within this context, the emperor system is the political expression of the Japanese family system, although the full notion of the family state only became explicit toward the end of the Meiji era. Besides projecting the emperor as the father of the nation, the imperial house being the main line and the other Japanese families its branches, the emperor system (on the basis of Shintoist and Confucian values) includes the concept of a divine emperor (the imperial sovereign) descended through an unbroken lineage from divine ancestors. He is also co-terminous with polity *(kokutai).*[51]

The emperor system was reinforced at the base of Japanese society by strengthening the family, which constituted the lower echelon of the vertically hierarchic society and its political and economic subsystems. In this way the family served as the keystone in a state which was also thought of as a large family headed by the emperor.[52] Thus society and polity were conceived as one.

---

[51]The concept of *kokutai* is explained by Aizawa Seishisai, one of the scholars of the Mito school of Tokugawa Japan. See R. Tsunoda, *et. al.* (comps.), *Sources of Japanese Tradition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 222-227; 288-289.

[52]Saniel, Mobilization . . . , *op. cit.,* 125, 126.

To mobilize support from the base of the population, Japan's innovative political leaders translated the nation's goals into a traditional language of loyalty and obligation—the language of feudal and family ethics expressing ideas central to the experience of practically all Japanese.[53] By maintaining the socio-political, but not in certain instances the economic, e.g., the conditions of the peasant, the creative and pragmatic Meiji statesmen established a reliable and stable base of political support in the countryside. While the peasants' material welfare was not always taken care of, the Meiji political leaders at least gave them civil order and political security. They were not uprooted from their cherished way of life by enforced industrialization. Instead, the Meiji modernizers systematically preserved and integrated the pre-existing traditionally organized small and middle industrial sectors (whose structure, therefore dynamics, was patterned after that of the family system), into the state of economy in such a manner as to complement the production of the new large-scale industries, the organization of which was also patterned after the family system.[54] It was possible for the Meiji modernizing elites to make the government initially capitalize and manage the large-scale strategic industries[55] because they had at the government's disposal a "solidified" national income as a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1873. The law, which stabilized revenues from agriculture at a certain level, largely supported the government for 40 years.[56] In effect, Japan's industrialization during the first stage of its modernization was paid for by the agricultural sector. Gradualism, which characterized the modernization of the agricultural sector, preserved the continuity and stability of the Japanese village, while rapid and major social changes were taking place in other sectors.

Rapid industrialization first strengthened authoritarian rule by providing new instruments for concentrating power and wealth. Other instruments like banks and shipping companies were increasingly controlled by financial and shipping companies, which partly depended on government subsidies and contributed in no small measure to the national power of the new autocracy.[57] As industrialization continued, an increasing number of persons came to possess the economic and social perquisites for participation in politics.

---

[53]T.C. Smith, *The Agrarian Origins . . . , op. cit.*, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959), 205.

[54]See T. Bisson, *Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), 9-10.

[55]See T.C. Smith, *Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: Government Enterprises 1868-1888* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1955), 97-98. See also E.H. Norman, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State, Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period* (I.P.R. Inquiry series; New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), 117-135.

[56]See W.W. Lockwood, "Economic and Political Modernization in Japan", in R.E. Ward and D.A. Rostow (eds.), *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Studies in Political Development; Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), 118-120. See also B.K. Marshall, *Capitalism and Nationalism in Prewar Japan: The Ideology of the Business Elite, 1868-1941* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, ca. 1967).

[57]Lockwood, "Economic and Political Modernization . . . ," *op. cit.*, 120-145.

The high rate of population growth of modernizing Japan caused the persistence in the Japanese scene of small shops with less than five workers, which were rooted in the Tokugawa artisan tradition.[58] A number of them continued to produce traditional consumer goods to meet the essential needs of the Japanese people. The rest of these small concerns subsisted entirely on subcontract from large-scale industries, between which was a hierarchically structured relationship. Bimodality, or dual structure, of the Japanese economy characterized the industrial sector.

Affecting all aspects of Japan's transition into a modern state were the measures adopted to raise, equip, train and manage military forces. The centralizing of military power was connected with the political unification of the nation.[59] Raising a conscript army was one of the reforms changing the country's institutional structure. Among other things, universal military service helped reduce class lines, promoted social mobility and raised the level of general technological education. Imparting a sense of involvement in national affairs, universal military service heightened the feeling of identification with the national polity. While they trained, the conscripts acquired new skills, gained stronger orientation to the advantage of superior performance and achievement and were exposed to ideology tending to strengthen nationalism.

Along with Shinto beliefs, *bushido*, a status ethics systematized during the Tokugawa period and emphasizing loyalty, became the code of the national army. It made for the strength and cohesiveness of the modern Japanese army and was an effective means of directing all loyalties toward a deified emperor.

Within the military establishment, a conscious move was made to use the family as a model of social organization which aided in drawing easily the conscripts' loyalty and eased their adjustment to military life, where interpersonal relations of their villages were duplicated. The Tokugawa legacy of military leadership helped Japan to confront the international realities of the nineteenth century. Among the Meiji statesmen, it was the military or *samurai* who realized that it would be meaningless for Japan to confront the powers on an equal basis without military strength and power comparable to the West. In 1895 Japan won the first of the wars—the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)—it fought within the next 50 years. War was closely associated with the entire process of political modernization because it enhanced the sense of patriotism and sense of mission of the country through government procurement of war needs and other expenditures. War eventually gained for Japan its goal of equality with the Western

---

[58]I.B. Taeuber, *The Population of Japan* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958), 38-45. See also Lockwood, *The Economic Development. . . , op. cit.*, 34.

[59]This part of the paper covering the military organization of Meiji Japan is based mainly on R.F. Hackett, "The Military Japan" and N. Ike, "War and Modernization," both of which are published in R.E. Ward, *Political Development in Modern Japan* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), 328-351 and 189-211 respectively.

Powers in the twentieth century. Moreover, in the 1890's, the Sino-Japanese War kept at bay the politicians in the Diet whose opposition to the political leadership of the oligarchs became stronger especially as it concerned the expansion of the military budget. By 1895, the political parties in Japan were visible and "felt" mainly because of their "noise" function.

In Japan's modernization process, communication was a basic ingredient in nation-building, especially since it created a climate within which modernization or development could take place.[60] During the early years of modernization, the convergence of the socio-politico-economic hierarchies facilitated the communication from the top down to the lowest social unit (i.e., the family) of messages pertinent to the transformation of Japan.

Traditional norms of social processes were the major support of the modernizing policies of Japan's political leaders. Traditional Japanese expectations of socio-politico-economic behavior remained valid. Specialization and social interaction within the vertically hierarchical social, political and economic groups were still traditionally Japanese. The people continued to give loyalty and filial piety to their superiors who played traditional roles in new ways. Modern functions were grafted into their traditional roles. For instance, the functions of the first perfectural governors of Japan were grafted onto their roles of *daimyo*, or the role of the head of the Mitsui holding company grafted into his role as head of the Mitsui house. Traditional cognitive habits and roles as well as opinion-reaction relationships continued to be practised rather than unlearned. Within these social relations, therefore, acceptance of social changes necessary for modernization meant compliance with the prescription of the hierarchy.

Modernization, planned at the top of the political hierarchy, was transmitted through a communication system which coincided with the social hierarchical system downward through an all-encompassing bureaucracy to the informal communicator at face-to-face level in the smaller social groups, ultimately to the family, and accepted by the people as a matter of accedence to rank.

The new national system of education and mass media (at that time, including the newspapers and various types of literary works) greatly influenced the informal or face-to-face communicators who transmitted information on the modernization of the Japanese society.

As a response to the dysfunctional effects of Western influence on early Meiji Japan, the country's statesmen in 1885 turned to the educational system to counteract what was perceived as an imminent disruption of the social system and, ultimately, of the political and economic systems. They tapped the deep roots of native culture to vitalize the educational system of the state and make it more effective and hence meaningful to the people. By requiring that all important

[60]This part of the paper covering communication and modernization in Japan is based mainly on the author's earlier work, "Communication. . .," *op. cit.*, 45-102.

aspects of the Education Ministry be approved by the Privy Council, which was controlled by the modernizing elite, it became easy for the oligarchs to manipulate the educational system so that it would assist the state when facing serious problems.

By 1890 the Imperial Rescript on education was promulgated to reinforce the concept of the emperor system and its underpinning values of loyalty and filial piety and the Confucian virtues of diligence, public spirit, respect for law and willingness to die for the emperor in battle. The Rescript was soon described as "the basic sacred text of the new religion of patriotism" which guided Japan's educators. By the turn of the century, the Imperial Rescript and the ethics or morals courses firmly set the pattern of Japanese ideological education which directed Japanese thought and action until the last war.

Like the educational system, the mass media were generally controlled by the political system. Nevertheless, the Japanese press, in its struggle for greater freedom of expression from the time it appeared during the period covered by this study, oftentime assumed an anti-government posture. Because of the language barrier, the Japanese people experienced the initial modernization process under conditions of relative isolation from information coming from the outside world. What the Japanese learned about the world community was mainly what the Meiji modernizing elite wanted them to know.

Briefly, the changes introduced into Japan's political system, supported by the economic, military and communication subsystems into which were also introduced innovations during the first stage of the country's modernization, suggest the capacity of the leadership elite to use selective elements of the past. The elite employed to the maximum certain built-in resources of Japanese society for the purpose of modernization. All these account for the relatively rapid and smooth process of Japanese modernization. Within a generation, patriotism had been implanted on the consciousness of every citizen and only a few peripheral elements of society tended to question state values and institutions.[61]

While the politics of Japan's modernization may be described as the politics of authoritarianism, it was not without its weak points. One of them was the development of a political system that could easily be manipulated by the top political leaders to fight one war after another and to concentrate part of the attention of the political, economic and communication subsystems during the interwar periods, on the preparation for another war. But this is beyond the purview of this paper. Let me point out here, however, that the authoritarian political system of Japan faced the Satsuma rebellion in 1877, the only major threat to the modernizing political system, which was successfully quelled by Japan's new conscript army. And as Japan's economic system underwent change, the authoritarian government of the early Meiji period was confronted with a series of agrarian or peasant

[61]R.A. Scalapino, "Environmental and Foreign Contribution, Japan" in R.E. Ward and R.A. Rostow, *op. cit.*, 67-86.

uprisings between 1873 and 1881.[62] At the end of the period under study, even if Japan was unable to remove "extraterritoriality" and uniform tariffs, its political leaders by 1895 were at least successful in negotiating treaties with some of the leading Western powers containing a promise of withdrawal of "extraterritoriality" in 1899. Japan also gained the respect of the powers after its victory in the Sino-Japanese War.

All this argue for the conceptualization of the modernization of Japan's political system in 1868-1895 as the result and the adoption of the politics of authoritarianism.

As for the personal and communal well-being of the Japanese people during the first stage of modernization within an authoritarian political system, let me quote W.W. Lockwood, a noted economic historian of Japan:

> What actual improvements came about in the material well-being of the Japanese population during this early period is difficult to determine. Some advance in living standards is evidenced in the decline of mortality rates, in increased per capita consumption of food and clothing supplies, and in the growth of public service of various kinds —especially in the cities. Most of the rise in total national income, however, seems to have been absorbed in supporting the growing population. Capital formation and arms absorbed additional amounts of the increment... it points to the formidable obstacles, both social and technological, which stood in the way of real improvements in in the lot of the peasant and worker, despite the notable growth in the scale and productivity of the Japanese economy.[63]

The modernizing oligarchs of the early Meiji period, however, assured the people at the base of the Japanese society of civil order and political security. In terms of the psychological dimension of living, the peasants continued to live within their cherished way of life. Because the workers in the city operated within a social structure and interacted in social relations patterned after the family's, they also continued to enjoy the warmth of reified kinship relations, at least, within the period covered by this paper.

Was the modernization of Japan's political system and its consequences comparable to those in the Philippines in 1946-1972? A discussion of the process of political modernization in the Philippines is in order.

The Modernization of the Philippine Political System: The Politics of Patronage and Incorporation

Unlike the Japanese who emerged at the first period of modernization (1868-1895) with a strong national group consciousness reinforced

---

[62]See N. Ike, *The Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1950), 72-86.

[63]Lockwood, *The Economic Development...*, *op. cit.*, 34.

by a common language and culture, the Filipinos had to hurdle the additional challenge of a country divided into numerous islands and several major languages. Like Japan in 1868, the Philippines in 1946, was not effectively linked together by a network of transportation and communication system. (In fact, during World War II, the country lost a large part of its infrastructural services.)

However, the belief of practically all Philippine ethnolinguistic groups in the values rooted in the family system (the core of Philippine society's social organization) suggests a factor of cultural unity among Filipinos in general. Yet, during the period covered by this paper (1946-1972), the dynamics of the family system described earlier did not generate cohesive political unity among components of Philippine society; neither were the people at the base of Philippine society directly involved in politics except as electoral moral suporters of their patrons, usually wealthy and socially prestigious persons who were also either political leaders or supporters of a political leader.

Within this socio-cultural context it seems evident that political unity could be achieved only when a clever, dynamic and strong but benevolent leader occupied the top position of his alliance system, which makes it possible for him to become national leader at the center. Such an individual is referred to as *pangulo* (literally, one who plays the role of leader) in terms of pre-Spanish indigenous value which survived through the first period of Philippine modernization delineated in this paper. This value views the family, society and polity operating as a human body, with head, eyes, ears, arms, legs, fingers and toes.[64]

> ...Its law is the logic of interdependence, symbiosis, and cooperation. In the body the head...is superior and paramount, it being the seat of intelligence and wisdom, all other parts of the body are subordinate to the head in varying degrees, depending upon their position and relation to the body. Thus the family, a society or polity must have a head, and the other members of these units must subordinate themselves to the head. The value of organic hierarchy is clinched by the folk saying: "*Ang sakit ng kalingkingan damdam ng buong katawan,*" (The pain suffered by the little finger is suffered by the whole body.) [This suggests that the head bears the responsibility of always looking after the well-being of the body, his welfare function.][65]

Obviously, this model is not only organic but also hierarchical. Only a dominant head, or *pangulo,* with talent, political ability and resources could cope with the socio-political fragmentation of Philippine society

---

[64]The organic-hierarchical model of Philippine society and polity was presented by R.E. Agpalo, Manuel A. Roxas Professor of Political Science, College of Arts and Sciences, University of the Philippines System, in his first Professorial Chair lecture entitled "The Organic-Hierarchical Paradigm and Politics in the Philippines" (Professorial Chair Lecture Series, Monograph No. 1; Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973).

[65]R.E. Agpalo, "The Political Elite in a Post-Traditional Society: The Case of the Philippines," paper read at the Seminar on "Elites and Development" sponsored by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bangkok Office, held in Bangkok, May 12-18, 1975, p. 20 (mimeographed).

as represented by the varying competing family alliances, each led by a leader from a dominant political family, usually also a socio-economically dominant family.

Fragmentation in Philippine society can perhaps be viewed as the consequence of the brittleness of kinship relations outside the nuclear family within a basically agricultural society. To become the leader of an alliance group within his community, an aspiring head of a nuclear family—usually a strong father figure—has to mobilize the support of other families or individuals to form a faction or alliance. Such faction reveals the convergence of political and the socioeconomic groups within a community. A faction has "a range of concern and activity for exceeding the sphere of politics proper [or] the contest of public offices and debate on how the powers of government are to be employed."[66]

The role of the nuclear family, which is the core of a faction or an alliance in Philippine society, as perceived by Filipinos, is revealed in the following articles of the Philippine Civil Code.[67]

> Article 216—[The] family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.
>
> Aricle 220—In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.

As mentioned earlier, the father in the Filipino family is the authority figure and exercises a vast amount of familial power, although he shares authority with the mother, as supported by Article 311 of the Civil Code. She exercises her authority subtly because she is a symbol of love and compassion. The father's position of authority in the Filipino family is reinforced by the principle of *bono pater familia* (the "good father") in Roman law, which was applied in the Philippines during the Spanish period and is now embodied in the Philippine Civil Code. Article III of the Civil Code states: "The husband is responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family . . ."[68] This provision immediately places the mother legally at a lower level of the hierarchic structure of the family than her "provider" husband, although she enjoys actual "partnership" with him in the social interaction or dynamics within the family system. The superordinate position of the father as legally stipulated is further supported among others, by

---

[66]C.N. Lande, *Leaders, Factions and Parties. The Structure of Philippine Politics* (Monograph Series No. 6; New Haven, Conn.: Southeast Asian Studies, Yale University, ca. 1965), p. 16. See also M.R. Hollnsteiner, *The Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Municipality* (Quezon City: Community Development Research Council, University of the Philippines, 1963).

[67]See Philippine Republic Laws, Statutes, etc., *Civil Code of the Philippines* (Manila: Central Book Supply, 1949), 50.

[68]*Ibid.*, 31. See also I.R. Cortes, *Women's Rights Under the 1973 Constitution* (Professorial Chair Lectures Monograph No. 10; Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1975), 14-15. L.R. San Diego, "Women in the Family," in Y.Q. Javellana, *op. cit.*, 42-43.

Article 311 of the Civil Code: "The father and mother jointly exercise parental authority over their legitimate children who are not emancipated. *In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail,* unless there is a judicial order to the contrary" (italics mine.)[69] The father's role as a "provider"—the beneficent and generous authority figure—emphasizes his welfare function. This is also an inherent function of the mother who, in the perception of the children, also symbolizes love and compassion, since she shares authority with the father.

In this connection, an additional source of the mother's hidden power lies in the fact that she generally is the family's treasurer. Furthermore, the prior affective attachment of the children to the mother(in terms of the concept of "belonging") continues even after the children are married. This is especially true of daughters who persist in seeking their mother's advice, help and support, especially in times of crisis. Daughters perceive their family of orientation as claiming priority in allegiance before their families of procreation. Hence, it is conceived that the mother holds a key position in affinal alliances formed for political and other purposes within the Philippine social organization.

Fairly unstable and fluid, such socio-political alliances or factions on the municipal level in the Philippines are usually bifactional within each community.[70] These two factions can be viewed as the faction in power (or the "in group") and the faction out of power (or the "out group"). Each faction, which is amorphous rather than discrete,[71] is led by a political leader, generally a wealthy individual occupying a high social status within his community. He is generally someone who has developed his bargaining or politicking skills, which he initially learned as he interacted with the members of his family system. His base of power is his nuclear family and the cluster of families he and members of his family are able to mobilize around him from among members of their extended kinship or family system and even those outside it, if any.

> .....The membership of the typical faction, being bound not by categorical ties but by a network of individual dyadic relationships between patron and client, landowner and tenant, or leader and follower, will usually be a cross section of the community with representatives of every social class occupation, religious affiliation, and point of view. These circumstances all but preclude the formation of ideological distinguishable groups.[72]

The dyadic, or patron-client relationship described above as linking the components—individuals or families—into one or the other of the

---

[69]Philippine Republic, Laws . . . , *op. cit.*, 66.

[70]Lande, *op. cit.*, 18. Bifactionalism, according to Lande, antedates the national two-party system which first appeared in the Philippine scene in 1907 and persisted when the Nacionalista Party dominated the political scene, except in the elections of 1938, when the leaders of the dominant party imposed a single slate of candidates.

[71]*Ibid.*, 16.

[72]*Ibid.*, 18.

bifurcate socio-political alliances or factions was also apparent on the provincial and national levels of the political system. "It is important to recognize . . . that local factions [also provincial factions], though imbedded in, and taking much of their shape from social alignments peculiar to each [local or provincial] community, are also imbedded in, and in part shaped by the nationwide two-party system"[73] which re-emerged in 1946 as a consequence of the split of the immediate pre-World War II dominant party—the Nacionalista Party.

Patronage, requiring bargaining skills, is manifest in politicking for support or incorporation of individuals or families into one of the two factions or alliances on every level of the political system's hierarchy. It is a means by which a patron shares with his followers or clients the economic and other advantages of power on whatever level of the political system he plays his leadership role. In exchange for the support the clients give to the political leader in his drive for power and status, the clients receive patronage of various kinds, most of which are personalistic and particularistic in nature. Examples of these are aid for medical, legal and funeral expenses, recommendation for a job, a bank loan, a contract or franchise and so on.[74]

Within this socio-cultural context there is need for every patron, who is the political leader of a faction, to have an open communication system so that he can constantly receive messages regarding his constituency and the situation among political leaders at the higher levels of the political system, especially at its center. He has to be especially aware of messages channeled through his community's built-in social control system. These messages would help him decide how patronage can be used at any given time with maximum benefits, i.e., the maintenance of the viability of his alliance group or faction and therefore his continuance in power.

The politics of patronage and incorporation becomes extremely complex at the center or on the national level. The President—the *pangulo*—has had to bargain continuously (by sharing largesse or using his power) not only with his own party or alliance system but also with the opposition in an attempt to incorporate its members to strengthen his base. Those who cannot be incorporated are purged, rejected, destroyed or neutralized because they are perceived as "destructive or cancerous."[75] Briefly, in order to maintain political leadership of an alliance system from the national to the local levels of government, the *pangulo,* possessing a strong and dynamic personality, besides being a clever or skillful politician with resources of his own, must also continue strengthening his faction by preventing defection and, when necessary, incorporating additional dominant socioeconomic or politically dominant families into his group. He must also destroy or neutralize those factions that are inimical to his interests and which cannot be incorporated in his alliance system.

---

[73]*Ibid.*, 15.

[74]Agpalo, The Organic-Hierarchical . . . , *op. cit.*, 3.

[75]*Ibid.*, 4.

The patron-client relationship is akin to that between benevolent father and children, a characteristic of the Filipino family. If this is so, then one can view the Philippine political system as composed of a hierarchy of "good fathers" serving as political leaders on the municipal, provincial and national levels of government. But one should readily add that the concept of a "good father" applies mainly to the perception by clients of their patron—the political leader. The concept holds true for as long as the leader continues to exercise his welfare function beneficial to his clients by means of patronage.[76]

Unlike the Japanese pyramidical political system, which has the emperor at its apex (behind whom the Meiji oligarchs planned and decided the modernization of Japanese society), the Philippine political system may be conceived as consisting of tiers of a pair of pyramids representing the "in" and the "out" factions on every level of the political administrative divisions linked upward with counterparts through the political leader who occupies the top of each pyramid. Such conceptualization does not preclude a leader on the lower levels from approaching the *pangulo* directly, if he has access to him. Nor does it prevent the *pangulo* from directly interacting with allies at the lower levels of the political system. Individuals had in fact gone to the *pangulo* to convey personally their needs or complaints. Presidents Magsaysay and Macapagal, for instance, had a day set aside to listen personally to the people's needs or complaints. In addition, each President had some kind of "complaints committee" to which individuals could address their request for help, their complaints and the like through personal interviews, letters, telegrams, and so on. This process reinforces the image of the *pangulo* as a benevolent head behaving like a generous and understanding father toward his children, seeing to it that "the hurt suffered by the little finger" is immediately relieved.

The control of the locus of power within a national alliance system —whether of the "in" group or the "out" group—depends on the continuing control by the political leader (the *pangulo,* in the case of the "in" group) of his allies who play leadership roles of the smaller alliances on the lower levels of the political hierarchy. Such alliances reveal dyadic relationships in the transactions between the leader of the alliance with ranking members or families within the alliance who could also carry on dyadic relations with those members and families of lower social status and so on. Therefore, patronage—as a tool for the exercise of a political leader's welfare function toward his followers or clients—has to be dispensed, if he wants to remain in power, whether on the national, the provincial or the municipal levels of the political administrative units. Patronage on the levels below the national level depends both on the largesse dispensed by the *pangulo* and on the political leader's own resources.

It was within this political system that the Filipino political elite undertook the first steps toward modernizing Philippine society. The ultimate goal of the modernization or the introduction of changes

[76]This is explained in more detail in *ibid.*, 3.

within Philippine society was the survival of the Philippines as a truly independent state that could channel cohesive social action toward the attainment of perceived social goals, which were the goals of the polity. Because society and polity were conceived as one, and because Philippine society was led by members of a minority socioeconomic political elite, these social goals were those articulated by the adaptive political elite. It was they who responded to domestic challenges as well as those coming from outside the society. Like the Meiji oligarchs', the Filipino adaptive elites' response, was intended to strengthen the *status quo* as they pursued the goals of their perception of a "good society" through the politics of patronage and incorporation.

Philippine politics remained elitist in 1946-1972, the period covered by this paper.[77] The prewar one-party system was transformed into a two-party system—the Nacionalista and the Liberal parties—which remained cadre parties, composed of notables, many of whom kept political power within their family for generations—the so-called family dynasties.[78] The larger sector of the country's population, including farmers and workers, continued to be unrepresented in the small group of political elite.

Patronage was apparent in the civil service system. A study of the administrative elite conducted in 1960 indicated that although the response of higher civil servants showed a preference for "merit methods" in the selection process, the pervading influence of patronage and the "charity" concept was revealed in the continued appointment of non-eligibles to "emergency positions." According to the study, high unemployment, generating pressures on politicians to provide livelihood to members of their constituency and the nature of the family relationships in Philippine society, appear to have been the barriers to the effective application of the merit system.[79] The same study however suggests that

> ... both merit and patronage systems have their share of virtues and faults. They are merely tools to be used in the attainment of stated goals. The issue at stake is how both systems may be used properly to enable government to accomplish its goals.[80]

---

[77]Unless otherwise indicated, the discussion on the post-independence politics in the Philippines is mainly based on an unpublished typescript of R.E. Agpalo entitled "Society and Politics in the Philippines."

[78]The term "family dynasties" refers to the families within the elite or *principalia* class (the socio-economic dominants in Philippine society) who were more politically active than others of the class and have produced a succession of political leaders, sometimes not only during two or three decades but, in many cases, even for generations. Such political dominance has been enhanced by intermarriage. See D.C. Simbulan, "A Study of the Socio-Economic Elite in Philippine Politics and Government, 1946-1963," (Ph.D. Dissertation, The Department of Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, May 1965), 124, 203-204. See also L. Guevarra, "Political Dynasties" (Point of Order), *Manila Times*, January 20, 1963. 4; "The New Look' in Political Dynasties," September 14, 1963, 4; "Political Dynasties Must Go," *Weekly Nation* (Editorial) July 13, 1970, 1.

[79]G.A. Francisco, Jr., *Higher Civil Servants in the Philippines* (Manila: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, ca. early 1960's), 191-192 (mimeographed).

[80]*Ibid.*, 187.

Between 1946 and 1972 the politics of patronage was also exercised by presidents, senators and representatives, who provided patronage to all their allies and to the people in general; the people as a reciprocal gesture, supported their patrons. As they did in the past, the political elites, continued to incorporate emerging social forces into their ranks. For example, the industrialists in the 1950's, the technocrats in the 1960's and the students in the late 1960's. So did the counter-elite attempt to absorb some of those constituting the new social forces, especially the students.

Alongside these continuities there were observable changes between 1946 and 1972 which contributed to the modernization of the political system as a result of societal changes.[81] Among them were: the expansion of the electorate, which indicates that the common man at the base of Philippine society had become more mobilized politically in 1972; and the proliferation of interest groups, including technocrats, students, industrialists and religious groups, which increased popular participation in the political system and broadened their world view as well as articulated their interests with other groups or with the government. Moreover, the literacy rate expanded, a result of the pre-independence American educational policy promoting universal education. It also meant the common man's liberation from ignorance and parochial moorings. Within the same period, his occupation was qualitatively changed, as indicated by the decrease in the number of people engaged in occupations classified as farmers, fishermen, hunters, loggers and related workers. On the other hand, there was an increase in those engaged in professional, technical and similar services, as well as those engaged in transport and communication. The number of clerical workers also increased. Life expectancy lengthened with the improvement and expansion of public health and education. (The latter presented the political elite with the problem of a "population explosion.") The number of radios used in the Philippines rose, though there was only modest progress in the expansion of areas with electrical service.

These changes suggest that whatever were the weaknesses of the Philippine political system and its political leaders, between 1946 and 1972, the political elites performed their welfare function, which was usually done with the extension of patronage to their followers or clients. Their motives of course, can be questioned. Generally the competition between two strong factions within a community during an election year yielded benefits to the people like the building of health centers, churches, parks, basketball courts and the like. Sometimes these were accomplished through the use of the political leaders' own resources although, usually, they were charged against public funds, e.g., the "pork barrel" especially when the political leader is part of the "in group."

A student of Philippine political elites observes:

> An examination of elite public pronouncements and writings would suggest a deep commitment to libertarian—even egalitarian—

[81]The statistical data supporting these generalization are found in R.E. Agpalo, "Society and Politics . . ., *op. cit.*, 19-25.

> principles. There is an apparent sense of social consciousness and responsibility, of solicitous regard for the toiling "downtrodden" masses. The pattern has been set by Quezon.[82]

Roxas, Osmeña and other Filipino presidents and politicians, says D.C. Simbulan, have followed this style of rhetoric. Yet, "elite values reflected empirically in elite actions and attitudes and identified in the manner in which they 'experience, perceive and interpret the concrete situation which they confront in life,' may not necessarily correspond with their publicly proclaimed goals and ideas."[83] The latter are only political formula, ritual symbol and slogan which the political elite create to elicit support from the base of the population. President Magsaysay, for instance, started in 1953 the so-called grassroots technique of campaigning, a change from his predecessors' reliance mainly on their provincial and local leaders to deliver the votes.[84] This was an innovative attempt of the *pangulo* to link the center and the periphery of power, an approach which Magsaysay's successors followed. Thus the larger sector of the Philippine population was finally in face-to-face contact with candidates for elective positions, including those aspiring for the Presidency. Although their voting record continued to be influenced by their patron—the political leader they supported.

As a result of the foregoing developments, in the second half of the 1950's and in the early 1960's, the people at the base of Philippine society, with the help of emerging innovative and adaptive political elites, worked for the legal linkage and autonomy of the *barrio* (a social collectivity which was previously a subdivision of the municipality) to the political system through a series of laws.[85] These laws appear to have been the logical culmination of the various community-oriented development projects sponsored by both the public[86] and private[87] sectors of Philippine society which focused on the *barrio.* By 1963, the

---

[82]Simbulan, *op. cit.,* 321.

[83]*Ibid.,* 326-327.

[84]*Ibid.,* 328.

[85]R.A. 2711 Art. 9, Section 2229 1/2 (Revised Administrative Code) in 1955; R.A. 2379, Barrio Chapter, which was signed in 1959 but implemented only the following year; R.A. 3590, amending R.A. 2370, in 1963. See Congress of the Philippines, Joint Local Government Reform Commission, *Municipal and Barrio Law of the Philippines: A Compilation of General Permanent Statutes Relating to Municipal and Barrio Governments* (Manila, 1970).

[86]For instance, the community-centered projects, including youth programs of the Bureau of Public Schools, Bureau of Agricultural Extension and the Department of National Defense. The last one was inevitably involved in the various post-World War II resettlement projects of the government, especially during Magsaysay's Administration. The same President also mobilized the armed forces to assist in the improvement of rural conditions by fielding them in the rural areas to build roads, especially feeder roads to link isolated barrios to the main road, artesian wells, etc. It was during Magsaysay's Administration that the Presidential Assistance for Community Development was established to coordinate development projects in the rural areas.

[87]For example, voluntary agencies and organizations formed to assist in rural reconstruction, like the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM), and the Philippine Rural Community Improvement Society (PRUCIS).

barrio acquired a corporate personality, became legally autonomous from the municipal government which previously supervised it, and had elective officials who were given some power to tax and certain privileges like government insurance coverage. Within an elite-operated political system, this development in the *barrio* suggests the possibility of the emergence of *barrio*-level administrative elites who initially would play politics in terms of the politics of patronage and incorporation in the manner they were enculturated.

Most of the community-development projects in the barrio underwritten by both the public and private agencies depended largely on foreign funds and consultants. A number of Filipinos involved in the projects were trained abroad with foreign funds. A major contributor to these projects during 1945-1972 was the United States government, which has long ago considered the Philippines important in the free world's defense against what was then viewed as the Communist threat to Asia.

Considerable funds from the American government were channelled into the political, economic, military and communications systems of Philippine society. They were in the form of rehabilitation or economic and/or technological and cultural assistance funds. From 1956, the year the Japanese Reparations Agreement was ratified, Japanese capital, technology as well as economic and cultural assistance were increasingly extended to the Philippines.[88] It can therefore be pointed out here that foreign aid, a factor in the Philippines' first stage of modernization, is absent in Japan's experience. Japan's is an example of modernization that relied mainly on the country's own resources; it even limited the amount of foreign loans it incurred during the first period of modernization.

The President—the *pangulo*—and his allies at the center of the political system (including the legislators) decided the allocation of both government and foreign assistance funds channeled through the government poured into the rural areas, especially during the Magsaysay administration. Generally, assistance to the private sector was directly given to them. Within the cultural context of Philippine social organization, such funds could have been perceived as largesse that was being shared by the *pangulo* with the lower political leaders and the people. Similarly, foreign aid could have been viewed in this manner by political leaders at the lower echelon of the hierarchy and by the people.

Government subsidies such as incentives given to industry were also used by the *pangulo* and by his "in group" allies so that they could best assist the former in maintaining themselves in power. Foreign assistance extended to the Philippines as aid in the industrialization of the country was also used by the political elites to bargain for the commercial elite's cooperation and loyalty to the "in group." To prevent the balance-of-payments from deteriorating further in 1949, the govern-

---

[88]See Hartendorp, *op. cit.*, *passim*. See also his book entitled *History of Industry and Trade of the Philippines: The Magsaysay Administration* (Manila: Philippine Education Co., 1961), *passim*.

ment imposed import and exchange controls. This system of controls was used by the political elite on the national level "to favor Filipino over alien manufacturers, and one's friends, relatives and political supporters over others,"[89] as their support is necessary for the political survival of those at the top of the political system. Incorporation into the "in group" of the head of a commercial or industrial family would often mean the incorporation of the other members of the nuclear family of the commercial or industrial elites.

Preferential trade relations under the Philippine-American Trade Agreement of 1946, later revised by the Laurel-Langley Agreement, which was implemented from 1956 to 1976, favored families who were landed but who were at times also commercial or industrial elites. Among them were families engaged in the production of cash crops like sugar, abaca and coconut. Because the production of cash crops require bank loans—a form of government subsidy—and because their export to the American market called for allocation of the total amount of each agricultural product that could be so exported, a political decision, transactions on subsidy and allocation between the President and his allies at the apex of the political system, on the one hand, with the landed or commercial/industrial elites, on the other, partook of the politics of patronage and incorporation.

The family is usually the basic unit of urban corporations. Its structure therefore emphasizes support of the family and loyalty to it, not to the larger collectivity, such as the economic subsystem of Philippine society or Philippine society/polity, itself. It can be said that the motivations which bring Filipinos into commercial, financial and manufacturing entrepreneurship have their origins in features of Philippine social behavior and organization stemming from the family system and its social values. All these generate, among other possibilities, what is referred to as "economic personalism" within the Philippine economic collectivities.

> . . . Filipino economic personalism provides the social cement which helps overcome lack of trust and weakness of institutional facilities. In the Philippines, entrepreneurship is to a significant degree an activity involving personal manipulation and social organization. Economic success depends importantly upon social alliance, technical competence is less crucial than social competence, and legal-rational "efficiency" is subordinate to personal loyalty and trust.[90]

It is obvious that "personalism" within Filipino organizations contrasts with the impersonal and rational traits of Western economic organizations.

A sociologist J. J. Carroll, observes that "the family enterprise is still the rule in the Philippines: a major share of the original capital for the enterprise was provided in most cases by either the entrepreneur

---

[89]Carroll, *op. cit.*, 34.

[90]J.N. Anderson, "Buy-and-Sell and Economic Personalism: Foundations for Philippine Entrepreneurship," *Asian Survey*, Vol. IX, No. 9 (September 1969), 641-668.

himself or his family; the entrepreneur or his relatives held the office of chief executive at the beginning and performed key management functions in most cases; and in the relatively short histories of most enterprises studies, financial control and the office of chief executive have tended to remain in the family of the entrepreneur. On the other hand, the heavy capital requirements of a number of the recent enterprises. . . have apparently forced some entrepreneurs to obtain most of their capital outside the family."[91]

In the last instance, the family usually seeks government assistance by applying for reparations allocation. Other industries, like the textile, flour and canned milk using cotton, wheat and powdered milk, respectively—work for government allocation of these raw materials sent to the Philippines as part of the American economic relations. Under this arrangement, there is a considerable risk in tying Philippine industrialization to the availability of surplus commodities from the United States.[92] And it is such capital-intensive industries that depend on government help and, therefore, on political connection, which are "monopolized by Filipinos."[93]Thus, they are referred to sometimes as the "political industries."[94]

It is at this point where the family owning or managing a manufacturing enterprise uses its wide network of kinship relations—consanguineal or ritual—and friends who work with politicians so that the family corporation could secure the allocations, loans, guarantees and the like from the government agencies concerned. Who gets what amount is mostly a political decision which corresponds to the decision of the "in group" led by the *pangulo.* This situation was partly responsible for the overcrowding of industries, especially during the 1950's and the 1960's, when the government had apparently no consistent policy in regulating and giving assistance to the private sector. That most of the manufacturing corporations are owned by a single family or by a small number of closely related families explains why these corporations are not purely economic institutions which aim to maximize the rate of returns and their purpose has been to enhance the welfare of the family members and the family. Thus it is hard to estimate the rate of returns in terms of comparable measures used in developed countries in the West where management and ownership are separate. Nor in terms of Japan's where loyalty to such a larger entity as the nation-state, takes precedence to loyalty to the smaller collectivity.

Within the Filipino corporation, the report of rate of return is usually low. One reason is the unnecessary costs for foreign travel once or

---

[91]Carroll, *op. cit.,* 158. Carroll's findings are based on his study of 92 manufacturing enterprises.

[92]F.H. Golay, *op. cit.,* 303.

[93]Yoshihara, "A Study of Philippine Manufacturing Corporations," paper read at the Conference of Agriculture and Economic Development held in Tokyo and Hakone, September 6-10, 1971, sponsored by the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University (The Japan Economic Research Center; Kyoto, 1971), 12. Yoshihara's sample consisted of the 254 largest manufacturing corporations in the Philippines.

[94]*Ibid.,* 18.

twice a year, large salaries for the owner-manager, his wife, (who is usually the corporation's treasurer), and other family members, expenses for family automobiles, food, restaurant and nightclub, prestige items like helicopter and airplanes. They are all charged to the corporation though they are not strictly needed for the business, and not considered part of corporate earnings. In this connection, the government loses both ways: on taxes collected from the corporation which reports a low income, and on taxes collected from the family or family members, who likewise report lower profits than they actually enjoyed. Though illegal, there has also been underdeclaration of earnings by both Filipino and foreign corporations.[95]

While ownership and management have not been separated in the post-war Filipino manufacturing corporations—a factor sometimes cited to account for the comparative inefficiency of these corporations—there is a possibility that it has been this merger of ownership and management under a family, which has enabled these corporations to survive the first stage of industrialization. However, their comparative success as family enterprises can be viewed as having fragmented the country's efforts toward industrialization. This is because loyalty within a family enterprise is given first to the family rather than to the country. This conclusion, based on insights into the Filipino family system and values as well as on impressions from readings of newspaper reports and other sources of information, has to be validated through empirical investigation.

In a society, like the Philippines, which stresses the family to a pronounced degree, the preceding description of a family corporation argues the essential relationship between the management of a family corporation with the social system—its organization and values.

Philippine society has values that militate against boundaries and emphasize unity of society and polity. Therefore, increasing differentiation would upset this unity and lead to issues that divide the people. Before 1972 two projects of the Marcos Administration which helped him win an unprecedented second term as President were: the rice program and the infrastructural development program. Their success appear to support the hypothesis that for economic development projects to succeed in Philippine society, it is desirable to diminish the boundaries between society and polity.

In the case of the rice program, the Rice and Corn Productivity Coordinating Council, which was established in 1958, was an inert body until 1966. In that year, Marcos, through Executive Order No. 50, vested it with power and responsibility to implement the program thus centralizing a function that had been divided among a number of agencies. The then Executive Secretary was designated Rice Action Officer, a position that was never formalized. An innovative member of the adaptive elite, the Rice Action Officer was goal-oriented and had authority and influence. He pursued his task by a "process of short-circuiting the bureaucracy."[96] This he accomplished through the use of

[95] *Ibid.*, 19.

[96] B.A. Aquino, "The Philippines: Development in the Context of Two

his authority and personality to mobilize the bureaucracy. He went to the field, visited those engaged in the program and worked through an underlying network of alliances. "In the actual workings of coordination, the informal, personalistic staff and advisory relationships exert as much, if not more, influence than the formal chain of command usually outlined in the organizational chart of an agency. . . "[97]

A similar strategy was used for the second program—the infrastructural development program for the construction of roads, bridges, ferries, schools, hospitals, power and irrigation facilities and other physical amenities. The President placed this function as a responsibility solely of the Infrastructure Operations Center under the leadership of the Army. It then monitored all infrastructural projects throughout the country and mobilized the Engineering Corps for road-building and repair. This approach reveals considerable ingenuity in mobilizing the Army's strong potential for modernization.[98] The two programs indicate that modernization and development can be achieved in the Philippines by using the firm basis of the basic pattern of cooperation that underlies the whole functioning of the administrative system: the social alliance or the network of alliances in Philippine society. This principle seems to have been intuitively, although perhaps not consciously, recognized by the Presidents who had instituted the following approaches of economic planning in the Philippines after the National Economic Council (NEC)—considered the main economic planning agency of the government—was handicapped in carrying out its economic-policy planning for lack of direct implementing powers to enforce even its own plans and policies.[99]

An innovative way of planning the country's economic policies more effectively was tried by President Magsaysay, who empowered the Budget Commission to prepare and implement a "Five-Year Fiscal Plan" which actually short-circuited the NEC. It is conceivable that the implementation of the plan could be better undertaken because of the power of the President, the *pangulo,* in whose office the Budget Commission functioned. Likewise, in 1962 President Macapagal set up a Program Implementation Agency, which was composed of a technical economic staff directly under the Office of the President.[100] These competent, high-level technicians, or technocrats, seem to have served the President well, not only as economic planners but also as "trouble shooters" in the implementation of plans. Similarly constituted was the

---

'Colonial Hangovers' ", unpublished typescript, December 3, 1969, 21. The analysis of the two projects included here are mainly based on this paper.

[97]V. Arcega, "How The RCPCC Beats the Bureaucracy" (Los Baños, University of the Philippines, 1968), mimeographed.

[98]Aquino, *op. cit.,* 24-25.

[99]*Ibid.,* 17.

[100]C.S. Alfonso, "Organization for Economic Planning: The National Economic Council; The Presidential Economic Staff, The Budget Commission and the Central Bank," in *Perspective in Government Reorganization,* ed. by J.V. Abueva (Manila: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1969), 179.

Presidential Economic Staff, which was created by President Marcos in 1966 and reorganized into the Development Management Staff (DMS) in the early 1970's. These organizations employed not only civilian technocrats but also members of the armed forces. Such groups of economic planners, implementors, if not managers, of economic projects which were usually intergovernment agencies projects (thus hurdling bureaucratic differentiation) performed better than the powerless NEC.

Within an economic system where the family and the network of alliance (mainly familial) were involved in the policies of patronage and incorporation, Philippine society in 1946-1972 survived two crises in its balance of payments—one, in 1948, and the other, in 1969. Although Philippine economic trends in the early 1970's were thought of as bleak by some people, the economic system proved viable and, having survived, continued to sustain some amount of growth (though not too significant to meet the growing needs of an "exploding" population), a rate of increase of more than three per cent.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), through its members who were recruited in the planning and implementation of economic-development plans contributed to the Philippines' economic survival during the period covered by this paper. Comparatively monolithic in an alliance ridden society, the AFP, by training, is oriented to the service of and loyalty to the nation-state and the President of the Republic who, under the Constitution, is its Commander-in-Chief. Because special training and qualification are required of members of the AFP, it was relatively untouched by the politics of patronage and incorporation as say, the civil service system. Politically, therefore, it was comparatively neutral, so far as the "in" and "out" groups are concerned; the AFP is ready to serve any *pangulo.* The national military system thus became the most nation- and goal-oriented as well as rational of the various subsystems within Philippine society. The AFP reinforces and assists in the maintenance of a *pangulo's* power as head of government for as long as he occupies the position.

Composed of survivors of the Philippine Army and guerrilla units who fought the Japanese in the last war, the AFP was expanded, since 1946, with American military assistance. This came in the form of military equipment, technology and training coordinated by the Joint Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG).[102] In exchange, the Philippine government granted the Americans the right to establish military bases in the country, which also involved the grant of extraterritorial rights. American guarantee to protect the Philippines became more binding[103] after the victory of the Communists in China in 1949 and the outbreak of

---

[101]See J.H. Power and G.P. Sicat, "Industrialization in the Philippines," Discussion Paper No. 70 (Quezon City: School of Economics, University of the Philippines, April 24, 1970), iv.

[102]The Philippine Military Assistance Act of 1946, later extended to July 1953.

[103]Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty (1951) between the Philippines and the United States of America, Department of Foreign Affairs, *Treaty Series,* Vol. 2, January 1953, 14.

the Korean war in 1951. JUSMAG took care of administering the millions of dollars of military assistance to support wide-range purposes, like the training of Filipino jet pilots in Clark Field, the delivery to the Philippines of mine sweepers and ammunition, as well as the improvement of airfields and the construction of warehouses and divisional training sites in the country,[104] all of which appear to point to the need of securing the Philippines from exernal threats. It was believed that the Philippines which was then referred to as the anchor in a chain of islands or offshore bases running from Japan in the north, through Okinawa and Taiwan, constituted the first line of defense in the American held Pacific islands, including Hawaii.

American military assistance also contributed funds, advice and equipment to the struggle against the HUKS conducted by the Philippine army and the constabulary. In addition Magsaysay—then Secretary of Defense—initiated the "land for the landless" program, in which he involved the AFP. Military men served as managers of the farm resettlement program of the Economic Development Corporation.[105]

Magsaysay's twin strategy of "all-out friendship and all-out force" brought the military face to face with the people at the base of Philippine society. The first strategy succeeded in reducing the Huk threat to the Philippine polity; the second through "civil action" by the soldier, contributed to the restoration of the people's faith in their government and the armed forces.[106]

President Garcia's Socio-Economic Military Program (SEMP) authorized the AFP Chief of Staff "to employ without prejudice normal military operations, military personnel for public works construction, food production, land resettlement and rural development," and appears to have distinguished the objective of the armed forces civil action activities from their military purposes.[107] The diversification of the socio-economic projects of the armed forces not only expanded but deepened the AFP's interaction with the larger base of the people at the periphery,[108] thus linking the latter to the center of the political system of which the AFP was its protector. Among the later developments of the socioeconomic projects of the AFP was the latter's involvement in the first Civic Action Center established by President Macapagal to assist in the implementation of his land-reform program.

---

[104]G.E. Taylor, *The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 149.

[105]R.E. Rueda, Jr., and E.R. Ermita, "The National Program in Food and Agricultural Production," paper presented during the National Seminar and Convention on "The Role of Broadcasters in Rural Development and Food Production" organized and hosted by the Agricultural and Rural Broadcasters Organization, Inc., Manila, December 13-15, 1971. The theme of the Seminar was "Look to the Farmer—A Strategy for Plenty."

[106]R.M. Ileto, "The Role of the Military in Modernization," lecture delivered at the ASEAN Seminar on "The Role of the Mass Media in the Development of South East Asia," Manila, June 18-25, 1971, 10-12.

[107]It was a rider to the General Appropriation Act for FY 1958-1959 (R.A. 2080). Since then, the item became part of each succeeding appropriation act of the Philippines. See *ibid.*, 10-12.

[108]Ileto, *op. cit.*, 11.

President Marcos integrated the civic action program into the four-year socio-economic development program of the Philippines. He also enlarged the AFP Corps of Engineers into nine Construction Battalions, one Pioneer Engineer Battalion, one Engineer Forestry Battalion and other special units such as the Engineer Company in charge of topography mapping, which is necessary for the cadastral survey of the large unsurveyed part of the country, if land reform was to be implemented as fast as possible.[109]

Moreover, President Marcos increased the number of the Home Defense Centers/Community Relation Units of the AFP (formerly the Civic Action Centers). He also set up Community Offices in all provinces and created the Rural Service Volunteer Program as well as made the AFP participate in the First Lady's Green Revolution Project, the Central Luzon Development Program, and the Commission on National Integration's Agro-Industrial program. All these projects and their activities were coordinated at the top by the Department of National Defense,[110] whose head is a member of the President's Cabinet.

At the turn of the seventies, the contacts of members of the AFP with the people at the base of Philippine society, especially in critical areas, were increased through their function as consultants to the Barrio Self-Defense Units. Created under the authority of the Barrio Councils, these temporary civilian organizations were composed of volunteers who had banded together for self-defense. Their primary function was to defend and secure the *barrios* and *sitios* against dissident attacks.[111]

Unlike Japan's military system during the first year of modernization, the Philippines did not have a conscript army requiring more than one year's training. Instead, Philippine society had less than a year of training for 18 year old male citizens. There were also those who underwent a pre-Military Training (PMT) at the secondary school level and the Reserve Officer's Training Corps on the tertiary level. Different from Japan's, these training courses were focused only on military technology.

It can therefore be said that by September 1972, the military system, through its involvement in various activities at the base of Philippine society, contributed to the linkage of the peripheral larger sector of the population at the base of society to the center of the political system. In this way, the AFP contributed to the modernization of the political system. But the existence of American military bases enjoying extraterritoriality in 1972 circumscribed the efforts of the adaptive political leaders.

Less obvious was the effect of Western-oriented education on the elite in circumscribing their ability to perceive the needs and

---

[109]Rueda and Ermita, *op. cit., passim.*

[110]*Ibid.*

[111]"The BSDU's are Legal, Sol. Gen. Felix Q. Antonio" (A.R. Mutuc, My Neighbor and I), *Weekly Nation,* August 24, 1970, 4.

interests of the people constituting the larger base of Philippine society. The Filipino elite may therefore be viewed as a culturally alienated minority group in search of its identity during the postwar period. For, historically, the people at the base of Philippine society had kept the integrity of their culture through more than 300 years of colonial rule. This was partly because the colonizing powers, at the time they exercised control over the Philippines, generally avoided the destruction of the native collectivities or their social organization. They also did not have enough colonial administrators and priests (in the case of Spain) to be fielded among the larger sector of the population. Instead, these succeeding colonial powers, including the Japanese during the last war, co-opted some members of the native elite to act as "brokers" or "mediators" between them and the people. For instance, the *barangay* chiefs, in the case of Spain; the municipal head (the first election allowed by the Americans took place early in the 1900's on the municipal level). in the case of the American colonial rule and the Japanese military occupation.

Provided the Filipino ruling elite performed the functions they were assigned to do by the colonial administrators, including the delivery of taxes, recruitment of labor for public works and the maintenance of peace and order, no intrusion was made into their cherished way of life. For these new functions were grafted into the political leaders' traditional roles in their communities, so traditional cognitive habits and roles continued to be practised. To a certain exent, this situation continued through the period 1946-1972, despite the penetration into this society by the armed forces by means of their military and civic action functions. (In this connection, it should be pointed out here that the civic-action component of the military men's activities in the *barrio* during the same period was a graft of a new function onto military functions of protecting and securing society.)

Thus the people at the base were left to depend on their own resources and to function within their precolonial traditional social organization, basically guided by traditional values and norms derived from the family system. It was in fact because of the preservation of the indigenous culture among the people at the base of Philippine society that Western institutions—like Spanish catholicism and American democracy were accommodated into the Philippine culture, therefore "Filipinized."

It may thus be deduced that the cultural gap between the elite and the people at the base of Philippine society was widened by the Western-type education developed by the succeeding colonial powers, to which only the Filipino elite had access. Though the American educational policy aimed at universal education, only a comparative few of the people at the base of Philippine society could hurdle their handicaps. And those who did were co-opted by the elite. This was

[112]The Presidential Commission to Survey Philippine Education, Education for National Development (Manila: The Presidential Commission to Survey Education, December 1970), 68.

because the former lacked the means for education beyond the four-year primary level of education, which was free during the American administration. A high dropout rate was evident in the public school system; literacy achieved at Grade IV was only 50% in the vernacular and successively lower for Pilipino (the national language of the Philippines) and for English; at Grade VI, literacy was 75% in Pilipino.[112]

Because of the destruction of lives and property during the last war, the Philippine educational system lacked teachers and physical plants; problems aggravated as the period wore on owing to increasing population. Moreover, because of the disruption of the civil service system, the postwar period witnessed the employment of "emergency teachers," which, like the "emergency workers" or casuals" in the governing bureaucracy during the period following the last war, often called for family connection with the "in group." Again, links of the teacher's family with those of the "in group" were important in gaining employment.

The family continued to be the main source of financing an individual's education on the tertiary level.[113] And *the maintenance of family solidarity* continued to be among the development goals of Philippine society.[114]

> There is a tremendous pressure of social demand for a university or college education which has swollen enrolments through a system of open entry regulated to a large extent by the ability of parents to pay fees. . . resulting in unemployment and underemployment of educated manpower. . . a shortage of technicians and well-trained professionals.[115]

Since only a few families could send their children to college, tertiary education widened the socio-cultural gap between the elite and the people at the base of Philippine society. Tertiary education also produced trained individuals who did not meet the manpower needs of a modernizing Philippine society because elite values did not stress the value of vocational or technological competence.

Unlike in Japan, the first stage of modernization in the Philippines did not result in educational training nor in the dissemination of social values that met the needs of a modernizing society. Moreover, the mass media—the print and broadcast media[116] which were also run by the

---

[113]In 1961, 77% of students in college were financed by their families. See *ibid.*, 50. There is reason to believe that the situation did not change by 1972 as there continued to exist more private rather than public colleges or universities serving the needs for tertiary education in the Philippines.

[114]Among the educational goals formulated by the Board of National Education found in its report to the President in 1957, is the following: "A.4. To maintain family solidarity, to improve community life, to perpetuate all that is desirable in our national heritage and to serve the cause of world peace." *Ibid.*, 58.

[115]*Ibid.*, 97. G. Sicat, however, comments that the "mismatch between job requirements and available graduates should not predicate a helpless situation since those with any formal training may have the required flexibility to make job adjustments." See G. Sicat *New Economic Directions in the Philippines.* (Manila: National Economic Development Authority, 1974), 36.

[116]For details on Philippine mass media, see G.D. Feliciano and C.J. Icban, Jr., *Philippine Mass Media* (Quezon City: Capitol Publishing House, Inc., 1967).

educated Filipino elite, appear to have generally failed to transmit messages which could enhance cohesion among the people rather than divide them. In fact, before 1972, the messages received by the people through the mass media were mostly divisive because they mainly served the interests of those who owned the newspapers, radio and television stations,[117] and those of their political patrons. Having gained the reputation of being one of the "freest" in the world, the Philippine mass media, as manipulated by their owners, seemed to have abused their freedom, especially during the biennial elections when they channeled invectives against individuals, scandalous and slanderous gossips, and so on. This was because the mass media in the Philippines, except those owned by the government, were owned by the socioeconomic elite who supported politicians. The politicians in turn protected the former's business and their other interests.

Before September 1972 it appeared that owners of the mass media allied themselves with the *pangulo's* (the President's) " in group" or with the "out group" alliance. Those who joined the *pangulo's* alliance system were in turn protected by the *pangulo's* office by way of meeting their needs and interests. Those who joined the "out group" did so because they wanted to replace the incumbent *pangulo* with someone who would be more sympathetic with and protective of their interests.

In view of this, messages channeled through the mass media before September 1972 gave prior support to either the main faction of the alliance in Philippine society, depending on which side the owner of the mass media favored rather than on the basis of protecting the society's interests.

At the end of the period, messages supporting the "politics of revolutionary agitation" and then the "politics of violence" were increasingly channeled through the mass media. According to a Filipino political scientist, R. E. Agpalo, these two types of politics were the consequences of

> . . . the modernization of Philippine society which caused the development of a circular process of the people revolutionizing the counter-elite and the political elite and the revolutionizing counter-elite and the political elite further revolutionizing the people. The overall result of this circular process was politics of revolutionary agitation that developed in the Philippines during the post-independence period.[118]

Then he continues,

> . . . By the mid-1960's the politics of revolutionary agitation was becoming more organized, making use of black propaganda, so-called "goons" and enormous amount of money. And by the later 1960's, for the first time in Philippine history, organized groups attempted to sabotage the constitutional ritual of the President delivering the

---

[117]For a list of radio stations in 1971 and their operators, see Republic of the Philippines, Department of Public Works, Radio Control Office, "List of Standard Broadcast Radio Stations as of September 1970-71." See also the "List of TV Stations as of June 30, 1971, prepared by the same office.

[118]See Agpalo, "Society and Politics. . .," *op. cit.*, 37.

> state-of-the-nation address at the Congress of the Philippines and even . . . assault[ed] . . . the First Lady of the Republic. After this critical date, the politics of revolutionary agitation . . . [was] transformed to a politics of violence . . .[119]

The response of the President—the *pangulo*—to this "politics of violence" was Proclamation No. 1081, signed on September 21, 1972. The proclamation of martial law was announced to the people only on September 23, 1972, the terminal date of the period that this paper covers.

At this point the socioeconomic-political developments in the Philippines had already transformed the society into a post-traditional one by the linkage (though not yet effectively) of the people at the base of society with the center of the political system. Even if modernization did not uproot the larger sector of Philippine society from its cherished way of life and had practically left unchanged its basic pattern of social behavior rooted in family values and norms, the various interest groups—including students and church groups of various ideological persuasions—transmitted messages to them in an attempt to gain the support of the base. At times such messages might have been competing and confusing to the people. As this kind of politicizing was something novel to them, it is possible to speculate, on the basis of their enculturation, that their responses were varied. But whatever they were, it is not difficult to imagine that the people at the base of society did turn to their reliable nuclear family to cope with the new social phenomenon confronting them. Their prior loyalties, it can also be surmised, generally belonged to their nuclear family. This is not to say that there were no exceptions to this type of behavior.

In any case, a scholar on Philippine society writing at the end of the sixties comments:

> . . . one of the most basic realities of Philippine social structure today is precisely the economic dependence of the many on the few. For the rural Philippines as a whole, this is documented with the finding that in the course of a year almost half of farm households obtained loans, 45 per cent of cash loans and 72 per cent of loans in kind being for immediate family needs. [The Philippine Statistical Survey of Households Bulletin, Series No. 12, Borrowing Practices at Farm Households, May 1961," 1963, pp. xi-xv.] Intensive studies of specific areas indicate that perhaps 75 per cent of rural families live in conditions of chronic economic insecurity which breeds dependence on others.[120]

On the basis of the dynamics of the alliance system and the societal-control mechanism of Philippine society, such dependence is not a one-sided but a reciprocal relationship. There has been a draining of material resources from those "who have" by those "who have not". Such process can be described as some kind of leveling of the haves by

---

[119]*Ibid.*, 38.

[120]J.J. Carroll, S.J., "The Traditional Philippine Social Studies," *Silliman Journal*, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (First Quarter, 1972), 82.

the have nots, a process which cannot be quantified or statistically accounted for. On the other hand, the have-nots support and protect the interests of the haves. Otherwise, the relationship between the two individuals or their families (a patron-client relationship) would cease. If it did, the client's loyalty, together with that of the other members of his family, could be moved to another patron with whom the reciprocal relationship between patron and client would be established. Such changes alter also the structure of both the alliance groups: the one from which an individual(s) moved away; the other, into which he (they) has (have) moved into. The point of authority of an alliance group is fluid, depending on the changing situation of the dyadic relationships within the group.

Briefly, the people at the base of Philippine society by 1972 were self-reliant and lived their life within the intensely personalistic and familial relationship of a community. And it is possible that this kept the psychic well-being (though not necessarily the quantity of the people's material possessions) at the base of Philippine society. It also maintained the stability of Philippine society at a time when changes were taking place in its upper sector. When the incumbent President (the *pangulo)*, the one responsible for siphoning loyalties upward (through his alliance system) to the center of the polity (also the center of Philippine society) decided to lead the "revolution from the center," the people at the base, in general, seem to have continued accepting his leadership.

IV

Summary:

In this paper, an attempt was made to present the pre-existing conditions in Japanese and Philippine societies before the periods delineated as their first phase of modernization—1868-1895 in Japan, 1946-1972 in the Philippines. Within the period in each country, the modernization of the political system was achieved in Japan by means of the politics of authoritarianism and, in the Philippines, through the politics of patronage and incorporation. The people at the base of each of the two societies were linked to the center of the Japanese and Philippine political systems, respectively, by means of the two types of politics. However, there was a difference in the rate of changes towards modernizing each of these societies.

In a single generation, Japan was not only able to centralize the political system but also earned the respect of the Western powers as a rising and modernizing power, after the Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese political system strongly controlled the economic, military and the communication systems which, in turn, reinforced and strengthened it. Thus, by 1895, Japan was successfully industrialized and controlled directly by the political system. The communication system was similarly controlled. The military system, also controlled by the political system, was in turn, reinforced by the communication system.

On the other hand, the Philippines was able to develop some kind of a participatory political system through the alliance system domina-

ted by the politics of patronage and incorporation. The modernization of the political system—the linkage of the periphery (the people at the base of Philippine society) to the center of the political system—took sometime. It was the result of changes in style of the political leader playing the politics of patronage and incorporation to control or to maintain control of an alliance system that would allow him to win the highest position of the land—the Presidency. For example, campaigning for the Presidency or other elective positions among the people at the base of Philippine society. The use of the interagency task force to implement a project, also directly linked the population at the base of Philippine society to a leader who represented the *pangulo* at the center. The increasing involvement of the armed forces in civic-action work, in addition to their military function, also contributed to mobilizing the people constituting the larger sector of the population to participate directly in the political system. The military system appeared to be the most monolithic of the subsystems within Philippine society and the most rational as well as goal- and nation-oriented. On the other hand, the economic and communication systems were usually family-oriented because they were generally controlled by elite families who, in some way or another, divided Philippine society instead of contributing to its cohesion. So the modernization of the Philippine economic system and the gearing of the messages channeled through the communication system toward the nation's goals appear slower than Japan's during its first phase of modernization.

This paper tried to analyze the development of the social organization of Japan and the Philippines, based on their family systems, and the rate of change in each society. It showed how authoritarianism in the Japanese family had diffused into the political system in such a way that it strengthened the system's capability to initiate and sustain the first phase of Japanese modernization. In the Philippines, during the same phase, the Filipino family partly brought about the politics of patronage and incorporation. Such politics was derived from the alliance system that the Filipinos had created within their extended kinship structure. This difference between the Japanese and Filipino family systems and the politics each system generated account for the discrepancy in the rate of social change taking place during the first phase of modernization within each society.

The transformation of the Japanese and Philippine societies during their first phase of modernization was undertaken by adaptive political leaders who intended to strengthen rather than change the family systems while they initiated innovations to modernize their societies. This strategy of change preserved the social organization—therefore the psychic well-being of the people at the base of each of these societies—rather than increased their material possessions. This suggests a crucial question that a people must answer should they decide to modernize their country within a generation: should modernization result in a people's "being" or "having"?

RECOGNITION POLICIES TOWARD CHINA: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY

Herbert S. Yee

Canada announced in October, 1970, its establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (hereafter referred to as China). Canada was the first country to establish diplomatic relations with China after the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution in that country. Its move was thus significant in breaking the log-jam regarding the recognition[1] of China, and its position to "take note" of China's claim to the territory of Taiwan without specifically endorsing that claim proved a workable formula and was subsequently adopted by some other nations which followed Canada's step. More than fifty nations recognized China during the five-year period after Canada's recognition, leaving the United States as the only major Western power without formal diplomatic relations with China. Close to one hundred countries had diplomatic relations with China (up to July 1, 1975), while only some thirty countries still refused to recognize China and maintained diplomatic relations with the government of the Republic of China in Taiwan (hereafter referred to as Taiwan).

The rush of nations to establish diplomatic relations with China has been in part attributed to China's softening attitude towards external relations after the turmoil of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution. The Chinese government has since become much more diplomatically approachable. More significantly, China is no longer regarded as the "outlaw" of the international community. Its admission to the United Nations in 1971 indicated the acceptance of China by the world community. Finally, President Nixon's trip to China in February, 1972, apparently freed some of the U.S. allies to negotiate diplomatic relations with China. Indeed, some of the U.S. allies such as Japan and West Germany, felt that they had been up-staged, or betrayed, by U.S. overtures to China and that they, therefore, had to readjust their policies quickly to a new international environment. Thus, some of the important obstacles inhibiting moves to recognize China were either removed or had subsided by the beginning of the seventies.

It is important also to note that there were positive factors motivating the rush to recognize China stemming from anticipated benefits of recognition. An immediate concern of nations recognizing China appeared to be increasing their share of China's international trade. Canada sent its first trade mission to China in the fall of 1971, less than a year after its recognition of China, and held one of the largest Canadian trade fairs abroad in Peking in August, 1972. Italy followed Canada's example and held a trade fair in Peking two months later. When Japan (September, 1972), West Germany (October, 1972) and

[1]The term "recognition" is used interchangeably with the term "diplomatic relations" in this study, although a few countries, such as Israel and the United States, have "recognized" the Peking regime without formal diplomatic relations.

Australia (December, 1972) established diplomatic relations with China, trade agreements were signed simultaneously. Apparently, linkages with China through trade agreements had some influence in the decisions of many governments to establish diplomatic relations with China, but the problem is how to assess the weight of trade considerations amongst the many factors that contributed to the individual decisions of states to establish diplomatic relations with China. To wit: how was a nations's decision to recognize China affected by its decision-making environment?

The purpose of this study is to delineate the groups of nations encountering similar patterns of influence from the environment. This is a qualitative report based on an earlier study.[2] It includes Canada and the subsequent nations which recognized China in the first half of the 1970s. Other countries such as Britain, France and the United States are included for the purpose of comparison. For example, were factors which had important influence on a nation's policy of recognition in the seventies also important in influencing the British (1950) or French (1964) recognition? Are they useful in explaining the current U.S. China policy? There are few, if any, attempts to use a systematic framework to compare policies of different countries toward China. In the concluding chapter of a book edited by himself, Halpern attempts to compare China policies of different countries.[3] However, Halpern does not use any theoretical framework of comparison and is merely concerned with summarizing some of the differences that tend to underlie policies toward China. In effect, this lack of a systematic approach has in part contributed to the disagreement which exists among scholars on the relative significance of various factors in influencing policies of different countries toward China. In an attempt to fill the above gap in the literature, the present study has endeavoured a systematic comparison of recognition policies from various countries toward China in the first half of the seventies. It then traces the developments of policies of those countries back to the early fifties. In order to achieve a more systematic consideration of the factors involved in influencing the recognition decisions, the conceptual framework of this study relies heavily on the decision-making approach in the study of foreign policy.[4]

---

[2]An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 18th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, St. Louis, March 16-20, 1977. Any reader who is interested in the methodology of this study may request a copy of the above paper from the author.

[3]A. M. Halpern (ed.), *Policies Toward China: Views From Six Continents* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).

[4]See, for example, Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin (eds.), *Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1962); Michael B. Brecher, Blema Steinberg and Janice M. Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 12 (March, 1969), pp. 75-101; Patrick J. McGowan and Howard B. Shapiro, *The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973); and Stephen J. Andriole, Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Gerald W. Hopple, "A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy Behavior," *International Studies Quarterly* 19 (June, 1975), pp. 160-198.

It adopts Brecher and his associates'[5] distinction between external environment and internal environment, or Snyder and his associates'[6] internal and external settings. As interactions between nation-states become more complex it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish the impact of the external and internal environments on foreign policy decision-making. The distinction between external and internal environments in this study, therefore, is arbitrary and is so designed as to facilitate the collection of relevant data. The external environment in the present study consists of seven factors: (1) global system, (2) regional system, (3) Asian system, (4) U.S. influence, (5) U.S.S.R. influence, (6) Taiwan influence, and (7) linkages with China. The internal environment also consists of seven factors: (1) public opinion, (2) interest groups, (3) opposition party elites, (4) establishments (military and civilian), (5) foreign policy groups, (6) individual influence of decision-makers, and (7) long-term foreign policy goals.

Most of the factors or variables used in this study should be self-explanatory.[7] It is important, perhaps, to note the difference between the "regional system" variable and the "Asian system" variable. The former is defined as the regional system within a geographic region (with or without contiguous memberships) in which the country making the decision to recognize China is a member; the latter refers to the influence of the regional system of the target state (i.e., China). The distinction between the two regional systems is necessary since the attitudes of those states neighbouring the target state may be widely different from that of those states within the same regional system of the country making the decision.

The primary technique used in this paper was that of consultation with a panel of expert judges. The chosen panelists were highly qualified specialists in the specific country or area studies. The experts were judges of the impact of environmental factors on the policies of recognition in those countries which belonged to their respective areas of expertise. According to a seven-point scale, ranging from very constraining (1) to very facilitating (7) the expert was requested to rate the relative influence of the environmental variables as to how the variables were actually perceived by the decision-makers in facilitating or constraining their country's policy to establish diplomatic relations with China at the time the decision was made and over time (i.e., the twenty-seven year period from the establishment of the regime in Peking in 1949 to July, 1975). The survey was conducted in the summer and autumn of 1975.

Since the purpose of consulting experts was to obtain high quality data regarding a specific country's policy of recognition toward China, the selected experts therefore must have at least some knowledge

---

[5]Brecher et al, *op. cit.*

[6]Snyder et al, *op. cit.*

[7]A detailed explanation of the manner in which these variables have been applied in the present study was given in the author's Ph.D. dissertation, entitled "Decisions to Establish Diplomatic Relations with China: Environmental Variables in Foreign Policy Decision-Making," University of Hawaii, 1976.

in this respect. The criterion for judging the expertise of specialists in this study was based primarily on the manifested knowledge of the specialists as indicated by their publications. Specialists who had published books or articles directly or indirectly related to a country's policy of recognizing China were thus selected regardless whether they were academists, journalists, government officials or ex-officials.[8] In addition, qualified specialists were selected regardless of their nationality and place of residence.

A total of four hundred and twenty-four questionnaires were sent out to specialists on fifty-two nations' foreign policies and politics. After one follow-up mailing, the response rate was 40.4%. A total number of one hundred and fifty-two completed or partially completed questionnaires were received by the researcher.[9] This is not at all a disappointing return rate, if one considers the length (it could take an hour or more to complete the eight-page questionnaire) and the nature of the questionnaire, that is, the fact that it demanded a high degree of expertise.[10] As a result of uneven response rate, some small nations failed to return a single completed questionnaire. The majority of them (forty-two), however, returned at least one completed or partially completed questionnaire. In order to obtain better quality results, only nations with complete information on all variables under consideration were included for further analysis. In addition, nations with information based on opinion from only one expert were excluded. As a result the original sample of forty-two nations was reduced to twenty five (see Table 1). This certainly increases our confidence in the results from the following analysis.

THE GROUPS OF NATIONS ENCOUNTERING SIMILAR PATTERNS OF INFLUENCE FROM EXTERNAL AND DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTS

Four distinctive clusters of nations were delineated by statistical techniques during the recognition year:[11] (1) developing nations, (2) developed nations, (3) allies of the United States, and (4) a group of nations headed by the United States. It is significant to note that neither Britain nor France formed a unique group different from the other nations, despite the fact that these two nations recognized China more than a decade before the others. This tends to support the temporal validity of the environmental variables, at least from the experts' point of view.

---

[8]For some small nations, however, the author did not succeed to find any specialists whose work was directly or indirectly related to a country's policy of recognizing China. As a result, specialists whose interests were related to a country's domestic politics or other areas were thus selected.

[9]In addition to the completed questionnaires, eighty-seven respondents (20.5%) replied and declined to participate; forty-eight questionnaires (11.3%) were not deliverable; and one hundred and thirty-seven receivers (32.4%) of the questionnaires did not reply.

[10]This is supported by the reasons given by those refusing to answer the questionnaires. Insufficient knowledge was given by close to 60% of the experts as the major reason for not filling out the questionnaire.

Table 1

Nations Included For Analysis

Country	*Date Diplomatic Relations Established (or resumed) with PRC*
Argentina	February 19, 1972
Australia	December 21, 1972
Brazil	August 15, 1974
Britain	January 6, 1950
Burundi	October 13, 1971 (resumed)
Cameroun	March 26, 1971
Canada	October 13, 1970
Chile	December 15, 1970
France	January 27, 1964
Germany (West)	October 11, 1972
Ghana	February 29, 1972 (resumed)
Greece	June 5, 1972
Iran	August 16, 1971
Italy	November 6, 1970
Japan	September 29, 1972
Malaysia	May 31, 1974
New Zealand	December 22, 1972
Nigeria	February 10, 1971
Philippines	June 9, 1975
Sierra Leone	July 29, 1971
Thailand	July 1, 1975
Tunisia	October 8, 1971 (resumed)
Turkey	August 4, 1971
United States	(No formal diplomatic relations)
Zaire	November 24, 1972 (resumed)

Sources: *Jen-Min Jih Pao (The People's Daily),* September 28, 1974; *Peking Reviews,* 1970-1975; A.M. Halpern (ed.) *Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 496-499.

Analysis on nations over time delineated different patterns of nation grouping. Most significant is the disappearing of the developed-developing dichotomy in the years prior to recognition. This suggests that a distinctive third-world policy toward China emerged only in the seventies. Nation groups in the fifties and sixties are difficult to identify, although regionalism appeared to be one of the characteristics of nation groups. A group of Asian nations consistently formed a distinctive group in the fifties and early sixties. European nations, African nations, and Latin American nations, however, appeared only once as distinctive groups over time. Regionalism was thus not a dominant factor in formulating recognition policies toward China. Instead, unidentified nation groups were increasingly common over time. This tends to reflect the multi-polarity structure of the global system since the early sixties. Table 2 summarizes nation groups delineated over time. It illustrates the lack of any consistent nation groups over time (as indicated by the data for the years of 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965 and 1970). The presence of a significant number of unidentified nation groups suggests that conventional grouping of nations into geographical regions, socio-ecological groups, or organizational alliances are not adequate for grouping nations in the present study.

The results suggest that there were probably more similarities than differences in patterns of influence from the environment among nations. In the year of recognition, the negative U.S. influence and Taiwan influence had become irrelevant for almost all nation groups; the domestic environment was in general favorable toward recognition of China. They were also motivated by positive Chinese attitudes toward diplomatic relations. There were some significant differences, however, which characterized nation groups. For example, the developing nations' (e.g., Brazil, Cameroun, Ghana, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Senegal, Tunisia and Zaire) decisions to recognize China, according to expert opinion, were influenced chiefly by the favorable attitudes in the global system, regional system and the individual influence of decision-makers. The developed nations (e.g., Britain, Canada and France), on the other hand, though equally influenced by the attitudes of their decision-makers, tended to be more concerned about their own long-range foreign policy goals and least affected by conditions in the global and regional settings. This finding could probably be explained by the tendency of developing nations to identify themselves with China as third-world nations and hence anticipated a favorable international condition by establishing diplomatic relations with China.

A distinctive nation group consisting of U.S. allies (Australia, West Germany, Japan, Malaysia and Thailand) also appeared in the year of recognition. Similar to the developing nations, this group of nations were influenced by favorable climate in the international and

[11]That is, the specific years in which the individual countries under consideration recognized the People's Republic of China. This covers the period from 1970 to 1975 for all countries, with the exceptions of Britain (1950) and France (1964).

Table 2

The Groups of Nations Encountering Similar Patterns of Influence From Environmental Factors Over Time*

Recognition Year	*1970*	*1965*	*1960*	*1955*	*1950*
1. Developing nations	1. Canada	1. Afro-Asian nations	1. Asian nations	1. Asian nations	1. Asian nations
2. Developed nations	2. U.S. allies	2. Canada	2. Greece	2. Canada	2. Latin American nations
3. U.S. allies	3. European nations		3. African nations		3. Iran
4. United States	4. United States				4. Turkey
	5. Argentina				

*Unidentified nation groups are named after the nations that have the most representative characteristics of their respective groups.

regional systems. This could be explained by the U.S. withdrawal from Indo-China and gradual global disengagement from containing Communism. The world was no longer a bipolarity (from the diplomatic point of view) controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union. Close U.S. allies might have conceived diplomatic relations with China as a counterbalance to U.S. and Soviet influence, as suggested by some experts on West German and Japanese recognition policies. The group of U.S. allies is also distinguished by the remarkably favorable domestic attitudes toward the policy of recognition. This suggests that in some of these countries opinion in general regarded the issue of recognizing China as a demonstration of independence from the United States interference in foreign policy decision-making. People in these countries probably hoped that their respective governments could recognize China ahead of the United States. On the other hand, economic interest groups in this nation group, according to expert opinion, were eager to trade with China. They urged their own countries to sign some trade agreements with China before the United States, a potentially strong trade competitor in the China market, and other nations. Indeed, nations from this group (West Germany, Japan and Australia) established diplomatic relations and signed simultaneously trade agreements with China less than a year after Nixon's visit to China.

The last group of nations delineated from the recognition year data is represented by the United States[12] (other members of the group

[12]The United States has not yet "formally" established diplomatic relations with China. The data for the U.S. "recognition" was based on the 1975 data,

include Australia, Britain and Chile[13]). The noted characteristics of this nation group are the exceptionally favorable Soviet factor, the negative Taiwan factor, and the irrelevance of influence from individual decision-makers. This suggests that nations in this group tended to conceive diplomatic relations with China as a counter-balance to the Soviet influence, which was such an important foreign policy goal that it would be pursued regardless of the beliefs or attitudes of persons in power providing that the Taiwan problem could be resolved.

By comparison, a generally cautious attitude prevailed across nations (with the probable exception of the group of nations headed by Canada) in the beginning of the seventies regarding recognition policies toward China. In the 1970 data (see Table 2), the group of nations represented by Canada consists of nations most of which either recognized China in that year or were going to recognize China in the following year (e.g., Chile, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia and Turkey). Thus, its profile is different from other groups by its favorable disposition towards recognition. Decision-makers from this nation group, according to expert opinion, tended to ignore the negative U.S. and Taiwan influences; they tended to identify themselves with their own nations' foreign policy goals (e.g., an independent foreign policy) which were favoring recognition. The group consisting of U.S. allies (Australia, West Germany, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand and Thailand), on the other hand, was constrained in 1970 by the negative external environment and the generally negative or indifferent domestic environment, with the notable exception of the favorable attitudes among the opposition party elites. This suggests that U.S. allies were cautious in approaching China in the late sixties and the beginning of the seventies in order to avoid direct confrontation with the United States, when the latter was still actively involved in the Indo-China. The group of nations represented by Argentina (other members include Chile, Iran and the Philippines) was also cautious in approaching China in light of generally negative or indifferent attitudes in both the external and domestic settings. Compared to the U.S. allies, however, the Argentina group was constrained by an extremely unfavorable regional system; their respective domestic settings including decision-makers and opposition party elites were in general indifferent to the issue of diplomatic recognition of China.

In contrast to the above three nation groups, the group of European nations (West Germany, Greece and Italy) and the group of nations represented by the United States (which includes Cameroun, Senegal and Sierra Leone) encountered a generally indifferent environment in 1970. European nations apparently intended to wait for a more favorable global environment and a change in U.S. China policies. The U.S. group of nations were simply not yet ready to establish diplomatic relations

---

which indicated the latest developments in the Sino-American relations when the research of this project was being conducted.

[13]The reader may note some overlappings of nations in different groups. This could happen when a nation's China policy had had characteristics in common to more than one group of nations in a particular year.

with China; they encountered no negative influence from the environment, and some positive motivations from the environment thus might result in diplomatic relations.

If "caution" was the mood of the late sixties, suspicion of aggressive Chinese intents dominated the international climate in the first half of the sixties (as indicated by the 1965 data). Both the Afro-Asian nations (e.g., Australia, Burundi, Japan, Sierra Leone and Thailand) and the group of nations represented by Canada (other members include Argentina, Chile, Mexico, the Philippines and Senegal) delineated from the data for 1965 were constrained by the negative international setting from recognizing China. The suspicion of Chinese involvement in the Vietnam War and its border dispute with India probably cautioned nations which intended to show friendly gestures to China. There were, however, also significant differences in profile between the two groups of nations. The opposition party elites in the Afro-Asian group favored recognition, but the government bureaucracies and decision-makers were strongly opposed to the policy of recognition. Opposition factions in some of these Afro-Asian nations were apparently aspired by China's revolutionary course or its development model. Decision-makers and the government bureaucracies in the group of nations represented by Canada, however, were indifferent to and hence less inclined to oppose the policy of recognition despite or because of the unfavorable international environment.

The emergence of "Asian nations" (core members of this group consist of Japan, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) as a distinctive group in the fifties was the most outstanding feature of data in the years of 1950, 1955 and 1960. In 1960, its profile was marked by a highly unfavorable international environment and negative attitudes among the government bureaucracies and decision-makers. Nations from the Asian group were particularly concerned about the tension in their regional system, apparently aroused by Chinese endeavours in the Taiwan straits and Tibet. China was generally perceived as an aggressor by decision-makers of its neighbours. The concern about national security (i.e., invasion from China) was real in some of these Asian nations, according to expert opinion. It was thus highly unlikely that the question of recognition would ever be considered during this period of time. The opposition party elites in these nations, however, apparently disagreed with their respective governments' policies of non-recognition and tended to favor recognizing China. The African nations (e.g., Nigeria, Tunisia and Zaire), on the other hand, were less constrained by the regional systems and the domestic environment. The group of nations represented by Greece (other members are Chile, Italy and Turkey) was least affected by the Asian system, but affected greatly by the negative U.S. China policies. Its domestic environment was particularly hostile, more opposed to the policy of recognition than the other two groups. Finally, the influence of the Soviet factor and of Chinese attitudes toward foreign affairs were by and large neutral for all groups of nations in 1960.

From a sample size of seventeen, only two nation groups have been identified in the 1955 data (see Table 2).[14] Similar to the 1960 pattern, the nation group dominated by Asian nations (non-Asian nations in the group consist of Brazil, Italy, Greece and Mexico) encountered an unfavorable international environment and negative attitudes from the government bureaucracies and decision-makers. The Asian regional system, however, was less constraining than in 1960, probably because China's performance at the Bandung Conference had some positive influence on the decision-makers' attitudes among this group of nations. Yet governments from Asian nations hesitated to approach China for diplomatic recognition. The opposition party elites among these nations alone tended to favor a policy of recognition. By comparison, the group of nations represented by Canada (other members include Argentina, Chile, France and Mexico) was even less constrained by the Asian regional system. Compared to the Asian nation group, this Canadian group encountered indifferent attitudes from the domestic setting including the opposition party elites. Decision-makers from the Canadian group were not opposed to nor favoring recognition; their foreign policy goals were also neutral toward recognition. Nevertheless, the two groups of nations were almost equally constrained by the unfavorable global system, regional system, and U.S. policies. The strength of the hostile international climate in constraining recognition policies, the negative U.S. China policies in particular, is demonstrated by an abortive Canadian attempt to recognize the People's Republic in the mid-fifties. When Ottawa appeared to be eager to negotiate with the Peking government on diplomatic relations in the mid-1950s, the Canadian leaders were told very forcibly by the U.S. President and his Secretary of State that they remained opposed both to recognizing the Peking regime and to its admission to the United Nations. This incident probably deterred the Canadian government from taking any initiative to recognize China in the fifties and early sixties. The "Bandung Spirit" apparently had little impact in changing the prevailing attitudes in the global system and U.S. policy toward China.

The same number of nations in the 1955 data formed four groups of nations in the data for 1950. The nation group dominated by Asian nations (France, Italy and Mexico could also be classified under this group) was marked by an extremely unfavorable international environment and a generally negative domestic setting. The notable exceptions were the Soviet Union and opposition party elites factors, both of which had a somewhat favorable influence regarding recognition. Like the Asian group, the group of nations represented by Turkey (which includes West Germany and New Zealand) also encountered an extremely hostile global environment and some pressure from opposition party elites to change from a policy of non-recognition to recognition. Unlike the Asian group, however, the Soviet factor had a

[14]The size of the sample in the fifties is considerably smaller than the original sample for the recognition year because most African nations achieved independence only in the sixties and hence were not included in the data for the fifties.

negative effect on the Turkist group's policy of recognition. Because of the close alliance between the Soviet and the Chinese in the early fifties, countries from this group were probably concerned that diplomatic relations with the Peking government would lead to increasing Soviet influence in their respective regions and thus upsetting the balance of power between the two blocs. On the other hand, the Latin American nations (i.e., Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico) encountered unfavorable conditions in both the international and domestic settings, including negative attitudes from the opposition party elites. By contrast, the group of nations represented by Iran (others are Canada, Japan and the Philippines) encountered indifferent attitudes among various domestic sectors. As in the 1955 data, nation groups in the 1950 data were also almost equally constrained by the unfavorable global system, regional systems, and U.S. China policies. A majority of experts cited the Korean War as the most important event which had affected many nations' policies toward China in the early fifties and beyond.

To sum up, there appear to be more similarities than differences in profiles among nation groups over time. Nations were constrained by the unfavorable conditions in the global system, regional systems, and U.S. China policies in the fifties and sixties. The Taiwan factor, with the probable exception of the Asian nation group, was never a serious obstacle to recognition over time. The international climate in the fifties and sixties was largely conditioned by the Korean War, Cold War, and the Indo-China War. It was only in the early seventies, as illustrated by the data in the recognition year and 1970, that nations began to perceive differently influences in the international setting. The influence of the Soviet factor and of linkages with China were remarkably constant among different nation groups over time; their impact was by and large either neutral or favorable to recognition. The domestic factors thus played a key role in distinguishing the profiles among nation groups over time, especially the opposition party elites, government bureaucracies, and decision-makers. In some nation groups such as the Asian nations and U.S. allies, the opposition party elites consistently advocated a policy of recognition while the government bureaucracies and decision-makers were opposed to the change of policy from non-recognition to recognition. By comparison, the domestic environment in some nations such as the European nations in the late sixties and the beginning of the seventies was indifferent with regard to the recognition of China. Finally, the domestic environment in some nation groups, namely, the nation group represented by Greece in the early sixties and the Latin American nations in the early fifties, had a negative impact on their policies regarding recognition.

CONCLUSION

Based on expert-generated data, the present study has attempted to determine systematically those environmental factors which led Canada in 1970 and the subsequent countries to recognize the Peking Government. It has demonstrated that expert opinions could be

meaningfully used for cross-national analysis of this kind. Results suggested that there were more similarities than differences in policies among nation groups in the fifties and sixties. In the first two decades after the establishment of the Peking regime, many nations were constrained from recognizing China by the unfavorable conditions in the international environment. The domestic environment thus accounted for the differences of China policies among nation groups. This changed, however, significantly in the beginning of the seventies. Nations began to perceive or experience different forces in the international setting. A distinctive Third World China policy emerged; developing nations tended to identify with China as Third World powers. This momentum was re-inforced when domestic pressure mounted in the early seventies amongst U.S. allies demanding early recognition of China (i.e., recognition ahead of the United States as a demonstration of independent foreign policy). To many nations, the beginning of the seventies had marked a new era in their respective policies toward China.

A WORLD INHUMAN IN ITS POVERTY

N. de Young

> *The mass of the people struggle against the same poverty, flounder about making the same gestures and with their shrunken bellies outline what has been called the geography of hunger. It is an underdeveloped world, a world inhuman in its poverty. But also it is a world without doctors, without engineers and without administrators. Confronting this world, European nations sprawl, ostentatiously opulent. This European opulence is literally scandalous, for it has been founded on slavery, it has been nourished with the blood of slaves and it comes directly from the soil and from the sub-soil of that under-developed world. The well being and the progress of Europe have been built up with the sweat and the dead bodies of Negroes, Arabs, Indians and the yellow races. We have decided not to overlook this any longer.*
>
> Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*

Any discussion of President Carter's foreign policy based on human rights, must be placed within the context outlined above in *The Wretched of the Earth.*[1] Without this perspective, we could lapse into a liberal dream-world, grateful that a president of a superpower speaks out against human torture, political imprisonment or censorship. Fanon, however, reminds us of the underlying causes of the violation of human rights: colonization and its heir, neo-colonialization. Underdevelopment, the child of neo-colonialism, breeds repressive governments, since revolution waits in the wing. If you cannot feed the people adequately, you must restrict their movements, lest there be mass uprisings. The industrialized nations have never accepted the responsibility for underdevelopment. The emotional invoke Malthusian arguments that poverty is self-inflicted; the academe attribute the cause of lack of development to the immaturity of their political institutions; or presidents hide behind demands for human rights. What is missing in Carter's cry for liberty is an even more basic demand—equality.

In the same year *The Wretched of the Earth* was written, Raul Prebisch warned the first conference of UNCTAD that in 1964, the Third World received $3.6 billion dollars less in 1962 than in 1950 for the same volume of exports.[2] Even the World Bank's study on world income distribution conclude that:

> The frightening implication of the present work is that hundreds of millions of desperately poor people have been hurt rather than helped by economic development. Unless their destinies become a major and explicit focus of development policy in the 1970's and 1980's, economic development may serve merely to promote social injustice.[3]

---

[1]Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (London: Maggibon and Kee, 1965), p. 76.

[2]Tony Smith, "Changing Configurations of Power in North-South Relations Since 1945," *International Organization,* vol. 31, no. 1 (Winter, 1977), p. 21.

[3]*Ibid.*, p. 17.

Put more graphically, half of the world population of 3.9 billion people, earn less than $200 per year and the Third World has decided "not to overlook this any longer".

The manifesto of the Third World, as *The Wretched of the Earth* has been called, bore fruit in a conference in Algiers in 1967, attended by 77 Third World countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Charter of Algiers adopted a common position on economic affairs. The major demands were for more favorable prices through organized commodity agreements, preferential access to the markets of the rich countries, greater aid through the IMF and greater control of multinationals. The Third World was looking for a more "just" international order. Their discussions and debates culminated in the Declaration of the New International Economic Order adopted by the 6th Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, in April, 1974. The Third World (the South) faces the North (the industrialized world).

> The new cold war is neither essentially ideological nor fully system-oriented. It is, for the most part a simple bread-and-butter issue in the fundamental sense of the word.[4]

What the Third World wants is a share in the industrial world's economic growth and technological superiority. It is a demand for international justice and equality in global resource allocation and income distribution. Amuzegar commented that in the last four years, some primary commodities have risen four times or more in price, only to drop to one-third or less within a few months and

> Only a Neanderthal free enterprise, or an economic Nihilist can honestly deny that such widely isolated gyrations, coupled with subsequent deterioration in terms of trade, make a shambles of national planning and domestic growth.[5]

The New Economic Order will be forged through a dialogue between the North (industrialized nations) and the South (the less developed nations). This dialogue wished to end the causes of the cold war by changing the world from an East-West cold war battle ground into a North-South dialogue. In January 1975, the U.N. supported President Echeveria of Mexico's Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. Article II of this Charter expresses clearly one such right:

> Every state has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activity.[6]

It is the less developed countries' right to demand this new order and the duty of the industrialized nation to jointly implement it. These are the rights that humans from the South ask for. A world "inhuman in its poverty" demands the rights and the means to be human.

---

[4]Jahangir Amuzegar, "The North-South Dialogue: From Conflict to Compromise," *Foreign Affairs* (April, 1976), p. 557.

[5]*Ibid.*, p. 559.

[6]Smith, "Changing Configurations," p. 5.

The Old Economic Order

It was necessary to introduce the idea of the New Economic Order in this study of human rights for two reasons: firstly, because it is an expression of the less developed countries' right to share in the world's wealth. (This is their perception of the meaning of human rights); secondly, the acknowledgement by the United Nations Assembly that there is a need for a new Economic Order, reflects the changing global patterns of international relations. This acknowledgement indicates that there has been a change. What then was the old economic order? Does it create the need for a new foreign policy based on human rights as Carter's perceptions dictate?

The basic characteristic of the old economic order was in America's willingness to lead and in the other nations' impulse to follow. The leadership involved the U.S. as the principal backer of such institutions as the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, and the World Bank. As the leading capitalist nation, the U.S. made sure that the exchange currency for international trade was measured in U.S. dollars. With the insurance of economic stability and backed by the approval of members of the UN, the U.S. assumed sole responsibility for defending the order against any communist advance. World War II left the allies in a devastated state and none could challenge the power of the U.S.

Two events in the 70's occured, thus, undermining U.S. hegemony. The currency crisis of 1970-1,which forced Nixon to renege on the negotiability of the dollar, vitiated the latter's infallibility. Moreover, the U.S. debacle in Vietnam raised doubts as to whether the U.S. could or even should defend the 'free world' against Communism. The Nixon Doctrine, a do-it-yourself plan for Asia, signaled the beginning of the U.S. acceptance that it could no longer play the role of world policeman. There were other powers waiting in the wing to fill the vacuum. The economic recovery of both West Germany and Japan, as part of the U.S. strategy to instill life into the capitalist world after the war, now proved rival to the U.S. economic superiority.

In this scenario came the oil crisis in 1973. The Middle East cartel showed the way towards a new economic order. By raising the price of oil, the Third World members of OPEC created havoc in the old order. A new weapon had been unleashed. The effect has been aptly analyzed by Boumediene of Algeria:

> The OPEC action is really the first illustration and at the same time the most concrete and most spectacular illustration of the importance of raw materials price for our countries, the vital need for the producing nations to operate the levers of price control, and lastly the great possibilities of a union of raw material-producing countries. This action should be viewed by the developing countries... as an example and a source of hope.[7]

It soon became obvious that the unity of the industrialized nations was ripped apart. Instead of cooperation, it became a question of every nation for itself. Britain and France opposed any common EEC alloca-

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

tion scheme for oil and blocked the already existing scheme. Instead they both sent bilateral missions to the Middle East to swap arms and industrial products for oil. France made a bilateral agreement with Saudi Arabia. Italy, in 1974, reached an agreement with Libya. West Germany discussed increasing investments with Iran. In 1974, the overall EEC exports to the Middle East increased by 85%.[8] In December 1974, the EEC supported the Resolution of November 6th, calling upon Israel to give up its occupied territories. Kissinger was furious at Europe's presentation to the U.S. of a *fait accompli* and at its decision to "elevate refusal to consult into a principle defending European identity."[9] But Kissinger had forgotten that the U.S. had, in fact, made Europe dependent on oil from the Middle East. In the early 50's, 90% of the energy needs of Europe were met by their own coal industries. But the dumping of oil and the regulating of the price of coal by the U.S. changed the energy situation in Europe so that, by 1973, Europe was 60% dependent on oil from the Middle East.

Japan, on the other hand, was in a tighter spot. Almost all of the country's essential oil was imported—90% of it from the Middle East, with only a 45-day stock supply. The same oil history as in Europe had taken place. In the '50s, 60% of energy was supplied by coal. By 1970, oil accounted for 70%. The U.S. had forced upon the Japanese oil agreements, giving the U.S. oil companies permanent rights to supply crude.[10] Taro Yamashita (the first president of Japan's Arabian Oil Co.) warned:

> Think of the Pacific war. It's cause was the blockade or prevention of movements of only some two million tons of oil. It is oil that dominates the world.[11]

The crisis of 1973 led to Japanese bilateral agreements with Saudi Arabia and to the cooperation with the USSR in developing the Tyumen oil fields in the Soviet Far East and the coal fields of the Yakutin region.[12]

The oil crisis led to the break up of the alliance of the industrialized countries. The old order based on U.S. hegemony as the unifying power, was no longer considered legitimate. Old relations would no longer work. Free trade, the bastion of capitalism, became expensive. Protection tariffs began to emerge, particularly in the U.S. who, even by 1971, had a trade deficit with Japan amounting to $3.2 billion. The tidy economic system envisioned by the authors of the Bretton Woods Agreement had not foreseen that competition could in fact destroy it. The crisis is described by Gunder Frank as a crisis of accumulation since the process of accumulation (development or growth) "no longer

---

[8]Wilfred L. Kohl, "The U.S., Western Europe and Energy Problem," *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 30, no. 1 (Spring-Summer, 1976), p. 89.

[9]*Ibid.*

[10]Malcolm Caldwell, "Oil Imperialism in South East Asia" in M. Delden (ed.), *Remaking Asia* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), p. 26.

[11]*Ibid.*, p. 26.

[12]Boris Slavinsky, "Soviet Far East and International Trade," *Asian Survey*, vol. XVII, no. 4 (April, 1977). p. 327.

functions as it has before and requires far reaching readjustments in order to make it function again in the future."[13] The Third World believes the solution lies in establishing a new economic order. President Carter however, has a different solution.

Carter's Solution

These lessons were not lost on Carter when he became President. His closest adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski had already labelled the situation as an "isolated America in a hostile world."[14] In his major foreign policy speech at Notre Dame (May 22, 1977), Carter spoke of a "new world that calls for a new American policy." A new perspective is needed:

> It is a perspective which recognizes the fact that we alone do not have all the answers to the world's problems. Our mutual survival depends on our mutually solving problems.[15]

Instead of a world dependent on the U.S., now proven incapable of a solo world leadership, interdependence was now to save the world. Cooperation, not competition, was to be the solution. No longer would the U.S. engage in unilateral action. Consultation and dialogue with its allies would preface any major foreign policy decision. Carter believed this cooperation possible only if the doctrine of Trilateralism were accepted and put into practice by the industrialized nations of the world.

Trilateralism is a belief in the continual "trialogue" among the three most industrialized geographical areas of the world: Western Europe, Japan and the United States. The "ism" refers to the belief that no one section can do without the others and, therefore, it condemns any unilateral action. As one spokesman of trilateralism Richard Ullman wrote in *Foreign Affairs:* "Further American unilateralism would fuel a spiral of defensive reactions that would leave all the Western economies worse off."[16] It, therefore, has two faces, says Ullman: an inward and an outward one. Inwardly, it seeks to preserve industrialized societies by pursuing common policies and preserving liberal political values. He justified this by pointing out that:

> The demise of liberal democracy in society after society outside the trilateral geographical sphere has made this aspect of trilateralism's "inward face" seem especially urgent.[17]

The outward face looks to the "needs" of the poorer nations.

According to this view, the nations involved in trilateral discus-

[13]Andre Gunder Frank, "Economic Crisis: Third World and 1984," *World Development,* vol. 4, no. 10 and 11 (October, 1976), p. 854.

[14]Zbigniew Brzezinski, "America in a Hostile World," *Foreign Policy* (June, 1976), p. 65.

[15]Jimmy Carter, "Special Address to Foreign Audiences," *U.S.I.S. News Release* (Manila, January 22, 1977), p. 3.

[16]Richard H. Ullman, "Trilateralism: Partnership for What?," *Foreign Affairs* (October, 1976), p. 3.

[17]*Ibid.*, p. 5.

sions feel they are the sole representatives of liberal democracy (note the absence of any reference to egalitarianism) and that, together, they must protect its establishment by unifying their policies. Democracy has failed in "society after society" outside their circle and the trilateral countries must stand fast. Communism is not the only threat then. The Third World, having failed to become liberal democracies, could become the enemy. Ullman even goes so far as to say that "the primary reason for Northern unity is to be able to negotiate more effectively with the South."[18]

By saying this, Ullman acknowledges the change in international relations outlined above. The capitalist industrialized nations have, for a long time, lived with the threat of Communism. They now face the threat of the South. It was fear of the Arab boycott, says Ullman, not the Soviet military which "led the Western Europeans severely to limit American ability to operate from their territories in support of Israel during the October 1973 War."[19] The call to unity as the only means of maintaining their leverage against the South is unmistakable. Oil had been the source of the division in the trilateral countries. The OPEC action triggered off the divisive response of the industrialized nations and a counter-offensive became necessary. The North-South dialogue takes on aspects of a North-South confrontation, with the North realizing it had better consult and agree among each other before confronting the South's demands. Ullman sums up his definition of trilateralism by saying, "it is not an end in itself, rather an approach, an arena for problem solving." The process of trialogue is

> To prevent any one of the poles to doing mischief to either of the others. In such a framework, the Nixon shock of 1971 would be impossible.[20]

An association was started in 1973 in order that these discussions could take place. Under the auspices of David Rockefeller, the Trilateral Commission was set up, funded by the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. With offices in New York, the Commission has a membership of 200, from business, politics, academe and publishing communities of the trilateral world. One former director, Zbigniew Brzezinski, now Carter's National Security Advisor, views the result of trilateralism as a "community of developed nations." The path to the community runs through "intensive, regular and even more formal political consultations."[21] There should be "common planning with regard to problems or arenas of mutual interest," in order to achieve a "shared political perspective among the governmental bodies of the three trilateral units.[22] George Ball, a former U.S. Secretary of State and now one of Carter's advisers, in

---

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

[21] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "U.S. Foreign Policy: the Search for Forces," *Foreign Affairs* (July, 1973) p. 724.

[22] *Ibid.*

an article entitled "Trilateralism and the Oil Crisis," endorses the aims and says the basic purpose of trilateralism should be: "instead of a mutually defeating contest for positions of special advantage, they should design a broad program of common action."[23]

Trilateralism and Human Rights

A precise description of the Trilateral Commission comes from one of its more prominent members, Jimmy Carter, who when Governor of Georgia, was invited to join the Commission. In his biography, *Why Not the Best?,* Carter gives us his appreciation of the Commission:

> In order to insure the continuing opportunity for penetrating analyses of complicated, important, and timely foreign policy questions, there is in operation an organization known as the Trilateral Commission. A group of leaders from the three developed areas of the world meets every six months to discuss ideas of current interest to Japan, North America and Europe. Subjects like the world monetary system, economic relations between rich and poor nations, developed countries, and other possibilities for international understanding and cooperation are first studied by scholars, then debated by members of the commission, and finally analyses are published and distributed to world leaders. Membership in this commission has provided me with a splendid learning opportunity, and many of the other members have helped me in my study of foreign affairs.[24]

This "splendid learning opportunity" provided Carter with the framework for his foreign policy. The framework of trilateralism furnished the perspective Carter spoke of in a *Special Message to Foreign Audiences.* It was a perspective that "recognizes the fact that we alone do not have all the answers to the world's problems."[25] It should be pointed out that these words were part of an address given immediately after his inaugural address. In a most unusual occurence in the annals of presidential precedence, Carter spoke to the friends of the U.S. immediately after he had spoken to the American public. The point here is that Carter sees trilateralism as the key to maintaining the unity of the industrialized world and wanted the world to know it. It might also be pertinent to mention here that several of Carter's advisers were also past members of the Trilateral Commission: Cyrus Vance, Mondale, Woodcock and of course, Brzezinski. As many as ten leading U.S. administrators are members of the Commission.

Trilateralism becomes Carter's solution to salvaging the divisive world of capitalism. The fact that world leadership is now a multipolar structure makes management of the system more difficult. Fred Hirsch wisely points out that "the dominant partner reaps more of the benefit from a favorable group outcome than any one of a set of equal partners, and is thereby motivated to be more group-minded "[26] Group-

---

[23]George Ball, "Trilateralism and the Oil Crisis," *Pacific Community,* vol. 5, no. 3 (April, 1974), p. 340.

[24]Jimmy Carter, *Why not the Best?* (Hong Kong: World Today Press, 1977), p. 129.

[25]See p. 8, note 3.

[26]Fred Hirsch, "Is There a New International Economic Order?" *International Organization,* vol. 30, no. 3 (Spring, 1976) p. 523.

mindedness then consists in stressing similarities rather than differences. The divergence of interest must be refocused by stressing themes of unity. Underneath the interest of the nation-states of the capitalist world lie common values, traditions and philosophies. These must be emphasized and the conflicts de-emphasized. At the London Conference in May, 1977, Carter began to put this plan into action. He told the participants that any country that acquires a special competitive advantage at the expense of the other industrialized nations, would ultimately weaken the whole system. He pointed out that one country's surplus is another country's deficit. OPEC's $45 billion dollar surplus is the rest of the world's deficit. The weakness must be turned into a strength. This is the strategy of Carter's solution. As Ball said in his essay:

> What the oil crisis had shown is that though the industrialized nations differ in the details of their individual situations, their levels of natural resources, their geography and their political relationships, the common interests are far more important than the differences.[28]

Thus, besides indicating the larger economic common interest, Carter must go deeper and emphasize the common interest in the ideological realm. Ball, the apologist for trilateralism reveals the key:

> What must never be overlooked or disregarded is that the United States, Western Europe and Japan share a distinguishing common value: they are all committed to standards of personal liberty and the freedom of individual initiative quite unknown in Soviet Union or China.[29]

The U.S. must then use "personal liberty" to distinguish itself from Communism—a system most Westerners believe necessitates the sacrifice of the individual. Carter then uses the theme of human rights to remind the industrialized nations of their common values.

The interlinking between the goals of trilateralism and the theme of human rights is well illustrated by Carter's major foreign policy speech at Notre Dame. In defining U.S. policy, Carter says that it should rest on five cardinal premises. The first two are:

> First, our policy should reflect our people's basic commitment to promote the cause of human rights.
>
> Next, our policy should be based on close cooperation among the industrial democracies of the world—because we share the same values and because, together we can help to shape a more decent life for all.[30]

Premises 3 and 4 deal with the need for a more comprehensive and more reciprocal disarmament agreement and the need to reduce the

---

[27]"A World Safe For Business," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (March, 25, 1977), p. 39.

[28]Ball, "Trilateralism and The Oil Crisis", p. 341.

[29]*Ibid.*, p. 345.

[30]Jimmy Carter, "America's Goal: A Foreign Policy Based on Moral Values," *United States Policy Statement Series—1977* (U.S.I.S.), p. 6.

chasm between the world's rich and poor, respectively. Premise 5, then tells how the free world can achieve these goals:

> Finally, our policy must encourage all countries to rise above narrow national interest and work together to solve formidable global problems, as the threat of nuclear war, racial hatred, the arms race, environmental damage, hunger and disease.[31]

The interconnection then is very closely spelled out—human rights becomes defined as a shared value. This shared value of human rights should help to solidify the industrialized world, "where freedom of expression is taken for granted."[32] Carter then tries to reinforce the notion that the value is not shared in the communist world:

> The leaders of totalitarian countries understand this very well. The proof is that words are precisely the action for which dissidents in those countries are being persecuted.

What separates East from West, according to Carter, is the value of human rights, and what unites the West is its common value of human rights.

A Question of Legitimacy

The theme of human rights has two other important uses. The first is directed towards the American people in an attempt to use it to work a therapeutic miracle in a disillusioned public as a legitimatizer of a continued American involvement abroad. Carter knew well this disillusionment and saw it as a crisis involving the belief that the U.S. was unable to lead. The government had suffered damaging blows from the excesses of the Vietnam War which had engendered a powerful opposition to the war. The anti-war movement begun in the middle 60's served to radicalize the youth. Their opposition widened to include basic criticism of capitalism and the U.S. role as an imperialist power. This counter-culture began to question the fibers of the social system, then aggravated by the Watergate incident. The government's "honest image" was shattered. Even the people outside the counter-culture found it difficult to rationalize the President's motives. Economic recession loomed endlessly and the unemployment figures rose yearly. Clearly a domestic crisis in the realm of morale was obvious. The young nation, believing so much in the worth of its idealism, now had to face the truth.

Carter saw this and began to echo the need for truth. His whole campaign revolved around the restoration of fundamental values and truths. His campaign image was one of a home-spun, deep-rooted, back-to-the-farm philosophy. In his book, *Why Not the Best?,* we find him answering the question: Can our government be honest, decent? Quoting the Bible, he said, "If the trumpet gives an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself for the battle?", and reasoned then that the uncertainty must be exchanged for goals of a clear vision of what is to

---

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

be accomplished.[33] Clearly, he was trying to reestablish faith in the American system. Without the faith which presidents have used to marshall the spread of the American way all over the world, the American people would easily revert to isolationism.

In his Notre Dame speech, we find Carter's attempt to revitalize the American idealism:

> We have reaffirmed America's commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy. In ancestry, religion, color, place of origin, and cultural background, we Americans are as diverse a nation as the world has ever known. No common mystique of blood or soil unites us. What draws us together, perhaps more than anything else, is a belief in human freedom. We want the world to know that our nation stands for more than financial prosperity.[34]

The implication is, of course, that the American people should support a government, based on the pursuit of human rights, that has an obligation to "persuade and to lead" the rest of the world.[35]

Needless to say, Carter had hit the enduring American attachment to idealism. Support for this program was overwhelming. In an interview with *Newsweek,* Patt Derian, the new Human Rights Coordinator at the State Department, was asked why the President so deeply believes in the Cause, whereupon, she replied: "Because it's the right thing to do."[36] *Newsweek* then comments *"that,* may be the clearest and simplest explanation of how Carter really feels, and why a great many people around the world agree with him."[37] Indeed, Carter received tremendous support from the American people.

Secondly, the theme of human rights has its own implications for the Third World. The Third World, encouraged by such events as the OPEC oil confrontation and the defeat of the U.S. in Vietnam, saw the old order crumbling and presented their vision of the new economic order as an alternative. The vision, as Ali Mazuri points out in *Beyond Dependency: The Developing World Speaks out,* is one of an emerging "new egalitarian morality". This morality is not immediately interested in personal liberty but rather, in the more basic human survival rights. In a world where half of the total population of 3.9 billion make less than $200 a year, freedom of speech and other civil liberties are not the most important issues. It might be worthwhile to point out that when Carter first spoke about human rights, he was referring only to civil rights. The outcry against this, however, promoted a widening of the definition. *Newsweek* verifies this by saying:

> One change is that Washington has adopted a broader definition of human rights. Food, shelter, health care and education—the rights the Soviets like to boast they are best at providing—have now been added to Washington's lists, along with such traditional U.S. con-

---

[33]Carter, *Why not the Best?* p. 154.

[34]Carter, "America's Goal: A Foreign Policy Based on Moral Values," p. 7.

[35]*Ibid.,* p. 5.

[36]"The Push for Human Rights," *Newsweek,* (June 20, 1977) p. 14.

[37]*Ibid.*

> cerns as free speech, the right to travel and freedom from torture and arbitrary arrests.[39]

Once this was added to the definition, human rights could be used to remind the Third World of the attractiveness of the capitalist's protection of the individual vis-a-vis the socialist's abuse of it. Carter means to show this world that the U.S. "stands for more than financial prosperity." And,

> from free and open competition comes creative change in politics, commerce, science and the arts. From control comes conformity and despair.
>
> The great democracies are not free because they are strong and prosperous. I believe they are strong and prosperous because they are free.[40]

This argument is supposed to convince the Third World, which is locked into a dependence relationship with the industrialized nations, that continuing with this dependency will lead to prosperity. That it would be dangerous to upset the industrialized nations through exaggerated South demands. This view finds a staunch supporter in Daniel Moynihan, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, who said:

> The world economy is not nearly bad enough to justify the measure proposed by the (Third World) and yet it is much worse than it would be otherwise in consequence of measures the (Third World) has already taken.[41]

In present day colloquiallism, "don't tinker with the establishment for it is protecting you;" thus, perpetuating the "old protection racket." It is actually the same cold war under a new guise. For if the cold war issue (containment of communism) is dead, then the East-West dialogue turns into a North-South dialogue. The old order might have to be replaced by the New Economic Order. But the human rights issue continues the East-West confrontation, focusing on the need for 'free-world' including the Third World, to resist the communist advance. In other words, the old order, albeit modified to include the newly emerging industrialized nations, still stands. The U.S. has acknowledged its new obligation to consult the other trilateral members before it acts, and it may even have to listen to the demands of the Third World, but the old order is still "calling the shots."

"Calling the Shots"—Human Rights

Critics of American foreign policy have long focused on the hypocrisy of supporting Third World dictators. Roosevelt's answer to their accusation became the traditional response. Speaking of Raphael Trujillo, Roosevelt said, "he's an s.o.b., but, he's my s.o.b." Carter, however, now says;

> Being confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate

---

[39]*Newsweek* (June 20, 1977), p. 13.

[40]Carter, "America's Goal: A Foreign Policy Based on Moral Values," p. 7.

[41]Daniel Moynihan, "The U.S. in Opposition," *Commentary* (March, 1975).

> fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joins us in our fear. For too many years we have been willing to adopt the flawed principles and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our values for theirs.[42]

Foreign aid was now to be drastically reduced in those countries where human rights were violated. The U.S. Congress revised the Foreign Assistance Act 1961, to contain Section 301 (a) which now made this a law. The Office of the Coordinator of Human Rights helped prepare a 141-page report on the human rights situation in 82 countries.[43] Each country was given a rating like "free," "partly free" or "not free." Seven countries were immediately deemed unworthy of aid—Mozambique, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia and Cuba.[44] The fact that they are all socialist countries should not go unnoticed.

In the 'free world,' the decision is not as arbitrary. In actual fact, there has been a 78% increase in military aid to South Korea, deemed "partly free." Indonesia ("partly free") was granted a 24% increase. Malik, in an interiew with *Newsweek,* said that "great strides have been made in the area of human rights: Ten thousand political prisoners have just been released."Asked how many remained in jail, he said, "not more than 30,000."[46] Argentina, where there are currently 10,000 political prisoners, has received only "some cuts" in their military aid. The President of Argentina, Messendez, said that "he was prepared to kill 50,000 more people to stabilize the country." Iran, a country labelled "not free" has just been given $1.2 billion dollars worth of Airborne Warning and Control Systems.[47]

What is this 'selective morality' all about? None of the dictators of the non-socialist world have been refused aid. Is human rights merely rhetoric? Is it not to be taken seriously? It should be taken seriously, but should not be viewed as a complete departure from previous U.S. foreign policies. The dictators of the Third World have been told to "shape up", not to "get out".

And yet, the U.S. is aware, as Carter says, of the "reality of a politically awakening world."This world has the potential for revolution. A strongly repressive dictatorship would produce this violent reaction. Therefore, the dictators have been told to ease up, to prevent any uprising that would seek to overthrow a friend of capitalism. This is the use of human rights in the third world diplomacy.

Prisoner's Dilemma

None of the gross violators of human rights, like Chile have been touched. The countdown after the 1973 coup is: 30,000 people killed,

---

[42]Carter, "America's Goals: A Foreign Policy based on Moral Values," p. 3.

[43]*Far Eastern Economic Review* (March 25, 1977) p. 37.

[44]U.S. Department of State, *Human Rights Reports,* submitted to Sub-Committee on Foreign Assistance, U.S. Senate, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977).

[45]*Daily Express* (Manila, July 6, 1977), p. 4.

[46]*Newsweek* (June 20, 1977) p. 8.

[47]Richard E. Ward "The Developing World, *The Guardian* (July 6, 1977), p. 10.

150,000 arrested, 1,200 disappeared and 6,000 currently imprisoned for political reasons. Gunder Frank deems it the "Chilean model" where wages have been reduced by 50% in order to keep foreign investment flowing into the country.[48] And aid continues to flow. The old order continues while the Third World finds itself in a trap. In game theory, it is called the prisoner's dilemma, when a solution can only be found through explicit cooperation.

On the one hand, the oil crisis stimulated a call for a new economic order but, on the other hand, the non-oil producing countries of the Third World suffered the most from the oil shortage and price increase. In 1973, non-oil producing countries registered a deficit of $2.5 billion; in 1974, $17.5 billion; and, by 1975, $27 billion.[49] In order to balance this deficit, aid is necessary. As a result, they become prisoners of a system that only increases their dependency.

Their response, the call for a new economic order is, however, also a call from their jails. This new order is not to be brought about through a total revolution against the system. They have chosen to remain *in* the system and desire only to make functional changes. The IMF is not attacked. They instead demand a code of conduct for multinational corporations, debt rescheduling and increase in the capital base of the World Bank. They will be able to force some changes, but compliance with the system necessitates compromise. This is the prisoner's dilemma.

---

[48]Frank, "Economic Crisis", p. 855.

[49]Smith, "Changing Configurations of Power," p. 11.

Bibliography

Amuzegar, Jahangir. "The North–South Dialogue: From Conflict to Compromise," *Foreign Affairs* (April, 1976).

Ball, George. "Trilateralism and the Oil Crisis," *Pacific Community* Vol. 5, No. 3 (April, 1974).

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "America in a Hostile World," *Foreign Policy* (June, 1976).

_____. "U.S. Foreign Policy: The Search for Forces," *Foreign Affairs* (July, 1973).

Carter, Jimmy. "America's Goal: A Foreign Policy Based on Moral Values," Notre Dame University, May 22, 1977. *United States Policy Statement Series—1977.* U.S.I.S., 1977.

_____. *Inaugural Address.* U.S.I.S. News Release (January 22, 1977).

_____. *Why Not The Best?* Hong Kong: World Today Press, 1977.

Fanon, Franz. *The Wretched of the Earth.* London: Maggibon & Kee, 1965.

Frank, Andre Gunder. "Economic Crisis: Third World and 1984," *World Development.* Vol. 4, Nos. 10 & 11 (October, 1976).

Hirsch, Fred. "Is There a New International Order?" *International Organization.* Vol. 30, No. 3 (Spring, 1976).

Kohl, Wilfred L. "The U.S., Western Europe and the Energy Crisis," *Journal of International Affairs,* Vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring-Summer, 1976).

Selden, Mark. *Remaking Asia.* New York: Pantheon Books, 1974.

Slavinsky, Boris. "Soviet Far East and International Trade" *Asian Survey,* Vol. XVII, No. 4 (April, 1977).

Sibler, Irwin. "Can Carter's 'New' Foreign Policy Save Imperialism?" *The Guardian* (June 1, 1977).

Smith, Tony. "Changing Configurations of Power in North-South Relations Since 1945," *International Organizations.* Vol. 31, No. 1 (Winter, 1977).

Ullman, Richard H. "Trilateralism: Partnership for What?" *Foreign Affairs* (October, 1976).

U.S. Department of State. *Human Rights Reports.* Compiled for Sub-Committee on Foreign Assistance, U.S. Senate. Washington: U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, 1977.

"From 'Tribes' to Peasants and Entrepreneurs: A Study of the Buhid Differential Responses to Change"*

Violeta B. Lopez

Introduction:

Traditional description of the *Mangyans* highlight their practice of shifting cultivation, subsistence economy and their relative autonomy and isolation from other groups. Conklin, in his pioneering ethnographic study, referred to the Mangyans as "forest-dwelling, non-Christian groups (who) live in small scattered settlements, speak mutually unintelligible languages, have little direct contact with each other or with the coastal Christians, and are loosely organized politically" (Conklin, 1957). Such a description needs revision for the said ethnic community has since then undergone some structural transformations that render traditional categorization of them as a "tribal, isolated community" rather obsolete.

In contradistinction to Conklin's observations in the early 50's, most Mangyans now live in fixed settlements which feature different forms of linkages with the town areas (i.e., social, political, economic, and religious), maintain diverse forms of exchanges with the other Mangyan ethnolinguistic groups, and use *filipino* as *lingua franca.* Thus, although the term *"Mangyan"* has a long history of usage, it is only within the past decade and a half that the people referred to by this name have become more accurately identified and "de-mystified".[1]

More significantly, a substantial number of Mangyans have shifted from purely subsistence production to partial cultivation of cash crops. On the other hand, government restrictions on the making of new *kaingin* from existing forest reservations have led the Mangyans to intensive cultivation of their swidden fields. Concomitant to this, a significant change in their mode of production has taken place. For instance, the control of their vital means of production, i.e., land, has been re-oriented to individualized landholdings. Moreover, their technology has shifted from the singular use of the bolo to plough agriculture. Specifically, one group of Mangyans known as the *Buhids,* who dwell in the peripheral areas of the towns, now feature two main production spheres: the first type revolves around traditional swidden activities and production in the *iyab,* the plot set aside for the cultivation of root crops and vegetables for daily consumption; the

*This is a preliminary finding from my field research among the Buhids in Southern Oriental Mindoro, for my Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Toronto, Canada. The research is supported by a grant from the NSDB-Assisted U.P. Integrated Research Program.

[1]To this day, there are lowlanders who believe stories about the tailed Mangyans of Mindoro. Other residents of the island and even a PANAMIN regional officer claim that a "white race" of Mangyans, believed to be descendants of a shipwrecked English ship in the 19th century, live deep in the interior.

second type features the production of cash crops by way of using plough and carabao. Alongside this change, the institution of different forms of land allocation led to the establishment of new forms of social relations for the *Buhids*. The penetration of capital in the *Buhid* region for instance, has definitely enhanced the growth of stratification within the indigenous society, hence, there is a growing differentiation in terms of possessions and access to key resources within and outside the community.

To provide greater substance for my subject discussion, I intend to focus on a microcosmic setting which typifies the transformations cited earlier. This will be mainly about the Buhid community, their lifestyle, and their response to the external forces that confronted them. I have chosen to concentrate on the Buhids as they occupy a strategic position among the Mangyans found in central and northern Mindoro. Furthermore, no ethnograhic study of this group has yet been made. Except for Conklin's cursory reference to them in his works as *Hanunoos,* no systematic and extensive study of the Buhids exist to this day.

The first section of my paper gives an overview of the people and the diverse historical forces that moved these hill dwellers to opt for partial incorporation to the lowland structure. The succeeding parts identify the socio-political and economic factors which have led to peasantization and the emergence of incipient forms of entrepreneurship among the Buhids.

I. The Buhid Community: An Overview

As has been established in previous studies (Tweddel, 1970; Lopez, 1976; Barbian, 1977), the term *"Mangyan"* actually refers to six or seven ethnolinguistic groups in Mindoro.[2] Based on the latest census data from Barbian's 1977 linguistic survey of Mindoro, the hill-dwelling groups' population is estimated at 22,000. Roughly around 6,000 of the total population is said to be composed by the *Buhids,* the group under study. However, based on my own survey, and the corroborating reports of Buhid informants from the different areas, the Buhids number less, and would not probably exceed more than 4,000.

The central area of my field work is a key Buhid settlement called Batangan,[3] located in the frontiers of southern Oriental Mindoro. Batangan is sufficiently representative of the Buhid ethnic group as a substantial number of its residents come from the interior Buhid

[2]Actually, there are only six ethnolinguistic groups namely, the Iraya, Alangan, Tadyawan, Tawbuhid, Buhid, and the Hanunoo or Mangyan-patag. The Ratagnons which are supposed to be the seventh are still ambiguously identified since they speak *Cuyanon,* a Bisayan dialect not indigenous to Mindoro, (cf. Tweddel, 1970).

[3]The name Batangan is derived from the main body of water in the area, i.e., the river Batangan. The tributaries that flow into the main stream are Matahos, Madling, and Baboy rivers.

regions. It is one of the region's major sources of a number of agricultural produce such as corn, calamansi, bananas, gabe, coffee, and cacao. The area also serves as a major linkage between the more interior Mangyan ethnolinguistic groups and the lowland government and entrepreneurs. Within the barrio, one finds a cross of Buhids from the generally identified Buhid ethnic zone in the peripheral areas of the towns of Roxas, Bongabon, and Mansalay in Oriental Mindoro, and San Jose in the Occidental part of the island.

The Buhid Settlement

The Buhids are traditional inhabitants of the hilly and mountainous regions of southern Mindoro. The indigenes have adopted the name "Buhid" because in their language, it appropriately describes them as "hill" or "upland" dwellers. Those who occupy the flat lands or coastal areas in Southern Mindoro namely, the Mansalay and Bulalacao areas, call themselves "Mangyan-patag" for the same reason that their name denotes, i.e., *"patag"* meaning "flat" or "plain." Such apt description of their groupings tell us that the different ethnolinguistic groups name themselves according to the distinguishing characteristic qualities of their respective ethnolinguistic settlements. (The term *"Hanunoo"* which Conklin popularized is virtually meaningless to the Buhids and the Mangyan-patags as well).

To this day, the Buhids continue to occupy their traditional ecological niche in the upland regions of Mindoro. In one of those hilly areas, between the towns of Bongabon and Roxas, lies Batangan, the focal point of my research.

As of the last barangay census in 1967 and my own household survey in early 1979, 600 individuals were counted to be permanent residents of the area. For the Buhids, the choice to reside in fixed settlements as one already mentioned was but a rational response to some of the diverse external forces which threatened to dispossess them of their land. Other intervening forces aside from the Bisayan migrants, included missionaries as well as designated local government officials. In the following discussion, we shall try to see how the Buhids coped with the incursion of the said external elements.

External Influences Affecting the Buhids

In the early 50's, evangelical missionaries came to Mindoro and introduced to the Buhids (as well as to the other Mangyan groups) the Christian faith. It was the early missionaries who first tried to persuade the Buhids to depart from their traditionally scattered pattern of settlement and move into the flatter regions of Batangan in order to form closer and larger settlements. This was encouraged by the missionaries in order to facilitate the instruction of the Christian faith and thus, carry on with the establishment of a local congregation in the area. The Buhids, in turn, were receptive to the missionaries' suggestion. Some of them who dwelt in the interior areas transferred to the central region of Batangan and cooperated with the Christian missionaries.

Through the organizing zeal of the Protestant missionaries, the Buhid "converts" from different areas were formed into a local *samahan* and then later, into a pan-Mangyan evangelical churches' association or the *Samahang Pangtribo ng mga Iglesyang Mangyan.* The establishment of this supra-Buhid linkage later became an effective channel through which other forms of exchanges, apart from spiritual concerns, were established among the different Mangyan communities. For example, a Mangyan-patag convert in need of cash may earn his money by rendering wage labor for a Buhid *faduwasay* or spiritual brother. Thus, a harmonious relationship between the different ethnolinguistic groups came about through their newly formed brotherhood.

Later, the influx of Bisayan migrants from the neighboring islands of Romblon and Masbate into the Buhid settlements in Mindoro brought a wave of disturbance in the community. Plunder or *fanunulis* suddenly became rampant whereby the Bisayan migrants forcibly extracted resources from the Buhids through the outright seizure of tools, food, produce, and animals. This, however, did not drive the Buhids away but rather, strengthened their resolve to stay in fixed and lowland-linked communities. As months passed, both the Buhids and the Bisayan migrants developed a trade relationship between them which involved the exchange of non-equivalents, as for example, a cheap *balukas* or blouse for one-half sack of milled corn.

At about the same time, the government included in its program for development the penetration of ethnic communities. Thus, at the time the government entered the Buhid region, the Buhids were ready to accept the political patronage of the town officials. This they favored to protect themselves from the increasing number of lowland migrants who, through cunning and force, divested them of their resources, mainly, land. As a protective mechanism for survival, the Buhids resolved to establish trade as well as political linkage with the lowlanders.

The linkage with the lowlands brought further ramification when the regional government appointed a "Mangyan governor" in the late 50's. This move was made to minimize the destructive effects of a Buhid shifting cultivation as perceived by the central power. For the purpose of creating a settled and government-incorporated community, the Mangyan governor, himself a lowlander, tapped the leadership of an already emergent Buhid leader, a widely travelled man within and around the surrounding islands of Mindoro. The said Buhid, named Yaom, was then appointed *"Mangyan tinyente"* who later, has become one of the number of links in the hierarchy of government officials acting on the Buhid community.

The pioneering expansion of the town and regional government into the Buhid ethnic zone was later superseded by the entrance of the CNI or the Commission on National Integration in 1957. The creation of this agency made available to the Buhids and other ethnic groups government resources not within their reach. These resources primarily consisted of legal support, the extension of public education, and the

introduction of government political machinery for them. One of the immediate programs sponsored by the CNI was the institution of a local barrio council, independent of the Tagalog and Bisayan barrios in their region. Yaom, the previously appointed Mangyan *"tinyente"*, won the election and thus, became the first, and continuing *"Kapitan"* of the Buhid barrio. This title gave him official sanction to act as liaison officer for both the Buhids and the townspeople. His leadership gained a broader base when he was elected *"presidente"* of the pan-Mangyan council or *samahan* established by the CNI. Though the *samahan* did not last long, it gained a new role for the Buhid leader as a political and economic broker of the southern Mangyan groups. To this day, the broad leadership of Yaom extends through to the peripheral and interior domains of the towns of Bongabon, Roxas, and Mansalay of Oriental Mindoro. Despite the existence of barangays in respective barrios, most Buhids continue to elect Yaom for their mediator. He is recognized by all Buhids and even some Bangon Mangyans as their *"Meyor"* or immediate political patron.

Aside from the "mayorship" of Yaom, there exists a *"konsehal"* in each of the dependent Mangyan settlements. His office provides the means of linkage with the Buhid *sentro* in Batangan. He is appointed by the Buhid mayor on the basis of his perceptible leadership in his community. This intra-group political linkage also extends to the economic sphere, with the *konsehal* acting as the Buhid mayor's *"agente"* or local purchaser of goods. Through the development of socio-political and economic linkages, closer ties between the other Mangyan communities and Batangan, the Buhid *sentro,* are thus fostered.

Thus, despite the abolition of the CNI which officiated Yaom's legal authority, the Buhid 'mayor' still has adroitly maintained his key role as interpreter of the cultural dilemmas of the Mangyans in his area of jurisdiction. The institution of the *"Bagong Batas"* or the New Order which brought about certain changes in the Buhid way of life has all the more emphasized the importance of Yaom's strategic function as mediator between the Buhids (and the other Mangyans as well) on the one hand, and the town officials and entrepreneurs on the other. His expertise in town matters, his strong sense of leadership, and his reliability in settling disputes have very effectively validated his position of authority among his people.

II. The Socio-Economic Transformation

The establishment of political linkage with the regional and national government through the CNI ushered in structural changes in the Buhid mode of production. These changes came about as a result of the reallocation of existing land resources thus, making possible the introduction of techno-economic innovations in the Buhid region.

Because of the growing number of Tagalogs and Bisayans encroaching the traditional Buhid ecological niche, the surveying of land in the Buhid ethnic zone was proposed by the CNI regional office

to pave the way for individual land declarations. This was eagerly subscribed to by the Buhids as a protective measure against the rampant grabbing of land by the lowland migrants. In effect, this led to the individual partitioning of the officially listed forest reservations whereby pioneer settlers of the area were given the largest land shares. (Without the active collaboration of the Buhid mayor with the government agents from the CNI and the Bureau of Forestry, the whole project would not have been as successful as it already was for the Buhids.) Thus, the move to have the land area surveyed and partitioned opened for the Buhids a new way of looking at things, especially in their holding of land.

Buhid Landholding System: Past and Present

Traditionally, the Buhids sharply distinguished *daga* or land from *it natubo* or wild vegetation. Greater differentiation was made between land and *tanum* or cultivated crops. Land, in the traditional Buhid thinking, could never be individually or corporately owned, alienated, or controlled. It was seen as a free good outside the control of humans. Only the *afu-daga,* the master or spirit of the land, had marginal control of it and from time to time, he was believed to display his powers in nature. Land erosion, which takes place during heavy rainfall and typhoons, was taken to mean an act of wrath by the *afu-daga.* To appease him, a ceremony requiring a meal offering of *nasugba-baboy* (i.e., slaughtered pig singed over fire) and *fafa-fayay* or boiled rice had to be enacted. An antithesis to this view is the prevailing concept that most forms of vegetation and all crops can be possessed, alienated, and controlled by the individuals of the primary kin group. However, in the case of wild-growing plants (*it natubo),* ownership can only be claimed when they fall within the range of one's own clearing and swidden field, otherwise known as *insakup* among the Buhids.

During the past two decades, however, increased pressure on land brought about by migration *en-masse* of Bisayan migrants caused many changes in the Buhid outlook. Some were driven to the more interior parts of southern Mindoro as their swidden fields were seized by the lowland migrants. Others later resolved to restructure their traditional concept of landholding by favoring the adoption of private ownership of land. This latter move proved more feasible for the Buhids that a high percentage of government effort was positively received by them. It must be pointed out however, that a tiny segment of the Buhids refused incorporation into the evolving system. This small section remain in the interior parts to this day and continue to practise shifting cultivation. Yet, this has not prevented the rest of the Buhid populace to adopt new innovations introduced to them. The comparative speed with which they willingly modified their traditional methodology of appropriating from nature came as a result of the initial impetus given by the Commission on National Integration. The government, on the other hand, continued to initiate community projects for the Buhids and other Mangyan groups in its aim to motivate the indigenes to coordinate with them. This can be seen in the way people regard the strong leadership of Yaom, a very clear example of the beneficial effect with which his subscription to the 'New Order' has brought him.

Until the past decade, the Buhids had been ignorant of the bureaucratic process involved in the legalization of land ownership. But because of the effective patronage system between the local town officials and the Buhid leader, a network system with the government has been established by the Buhids to avail themselves of important information for the protection of their land. Yaom, the Buhid mayor, wisely conceded to become the forestry officials' "informant-and-guide" in the interior that eventually, he won them as his *sandugo*[4] or regular exchange partner. For this reason, the Buhids have the largest land shares in forest reservation areas in Mindoro, and the only Mangyan group with the least land problem.

In contrast to the Buhid situation, the Mangyan-patags or Hanunoos have lost their lands and have become absorbed into incipient forms of tenancy and wage labour because of the unscrupulous maneuvering of the legal system by the lowlanders. These lowlanders, now possessing the titles of Mangyan land properties, have ironically claimed to become *amos* or masters of the same people they have dispossessed. The natives, on the other hand, had no choice but to serve as *tauhan,* i.e., either as tenants or hired farm hands.

Reacting to the Mangyan-patags' absorption into the lowland economy as *tauhan* or *pastores* of Tagalogs, the Buhids have prided themselves to be the only Mangyan group without any *amo.* As one Buhid informant put it: *"Kaming mga Buhid ay hindi kagaya ng mga Mangyan-patag na may mga among pinagsisilbihan"* or, "We Buhids are unlike the Mangyan-patags who have masters to serve."

This distinctiveness over land control, however, have made the Buhids careful in their tributary relations with the government. Many of them believe that the stability of their status as "landowners" can only be preserved through religious payment of *buwis* or taxes. They have observed how their possession of some government papers such as tax receipts and land declaration forms have warded off unscrupulous Tagalog and Bisayan land grabbers. This has all the more encouraged them to pay their dues to the town government annually.

Howbeit, the lawfulness of their tax payment is rather questionable. While it is true that local forestry officials have surveyed and partitioned land among them, there is no legal proof to their ownership since the Buhid *posisyon* has not been officially released. Moreover, the annual Buhid income from their cash cultivation does not really warrant tax deduction because it falls below the average taxable income. Despite all this, tax consciousness among the Buhids is widespread. The annual tax paying event in the Buhid *sentro* has evolved into some kind of a fiesta or a grand market day. It is marked by the visit of the heavy turnout of payers. To this day, this enthusiastic response to tax payment continues despite repeated urgings by the PANAMIN

[4]This word literally means "blood-brother". Its modern meaning however, has no basis on the ancient rite associated with the blood-brotherhood of pre-Spanish Filipinos.

(Presidential Assistance on National Minorities) to stop the said practice.

From another perspective, the Buhids seem to look at the annual tax-paying event as some kind of a ritual where they pay tribute to a great *"afu"* as represented by the *Gobyerno.* Thus, for the Buhids, the need to pay such annual tribute is necessary to insure their continued hold on the and and maintain the protection afforded by the Gobyerno's representatives in the towns.

On the part of the town government, one observes a contradictory policy of wanting to conserve and at the same time dissolve the indigenous or internal Buhid structure. The government's effort to restructure the non-capitalist Buhid form of production, for example, is partly a dissolving of the Buhid internal structure, while subordinating this transformed institution to the predominant town capitalist relations is a way of conserving it. This extractive hold of the town government leaves room for the maintenance of the basic Buhid subsistence with a little additional surplus in order that these people may reproduce their existence. An example of this is the practice of the Bongabon local government of giving back ten per cent of the collected annual Buhid tax to the said group for financing of their various community projects, as in the construction of water tank for their water supply.

Moreover, the establishment of linkages with the town and regional government of Mindoro led to the penetration of capital in the Buhid areas. Through the effective mediation of the Buhid 'mayor', town entrepreneurs eager to expand their market operations met with local cultivators and engaged business with them. The Buhid 'mayor' conveniently became their middleman through whom the entrepreneurs pass various sums of money as capital for the purchase of local Buhid produce. Such practice later spread out to other enterprising Buhids who, upon knowing, acted as *agentes* for the town merchants.

The creation of market demands for Buhid produce made significant changes in the Buhid agricultural production. For instance, the whole annual cycle of Buhid production was restructured to accommodate the partial production of each crop. As a result, the marginal production of certain crops was intensified at the expense of other traditional crops. An example of this is the intensification of corn cultivation (which formerly was only a peripheral crop), and the abandonment of palay production. In fact, there is almost a complete shift of production from rice to corn, since the former commands a higher price in the market and takes lesser time and energy to produce. However, with this shift in production and the increase of cash flow in the Buhid region, there is also a proportional increase in rice consumption among the Buhids. Most of their production earnings are used to buy rice from the lowland sundry stores in the vicinity.

With the incorporation of local producers in the town and regional markets, the Buhid agricultural production was expanded to allow the cultivation of permanent crops as coffee, cacao, calamansi, and

coconut. This has resulted in the economic prosperity of the Buhid region.

From Bolo to Plough Agricultural Production

With the introduction of surplus production, many Buhids have adopted the use of lowland agricultural implements such as carabao and plough. This was partly due to the influence brought by the lowland Bisayan migrants in the region who traded their ploughing skills for cash or loan of land from the Buhids. Later, because of government restrictions on the traditional slash-and-burn practice among the Buhids, plus increased land pressure on the growing Buhid population and the influx of lowland migrants in the area, the technological shift to plough and carabao was all the more hastened. The Buhids themselves explain that the scarcity of swidden and forest areas allowable for clearing has made them turn to ploughing and therefore to an intensive cultivation of the available land. Those who have shifted to this technology point out that they use ploughing or *adadu* only for swidden patches taken over by cogon grass. It is likewise confined to the production of corn, their primary cash crop.

All these techno-economic changes have generated new modes of recruiting and organizing labor outside the household, leading to the use of wage labor. In the past, the traditional Buhid swidden or *iyab* is confined to the clearing and cultivation of a comparatively small tract of land, i.e., approximately thirty feet in width and two hundred feet in length. In this rather small area, the Buhids planted their basic subsistence, consisting mainly of sweet potatoes, yam, taro, cassava, plus a few varieties of vegetables, occasional fruit bearing trees (as one or two coconut trees), a few stalks of sugar cane and, on a seasonal basis, rice and corn. This manageable size of the *iyab* did not therefore call for great use of labor resources. After the initial felling of trees, slashing of undergrowth, burning and clearing, the task of looking after the *iyab* is usually left to the woman who does mainly the planting and weeding. Thus, the size of the cleared land for cultivation, as well as the actual bulk of work involved did not warrant the existence of labor exchange system beyond the *talahanan* or household.

Later, however, with the emergence of lowland market demand for Buhid produce and the consequent linkage of their economy with the town structure, the establishment of supra-family labor exchange system has become co-extensive. This is done to facilitate the cropping activity. Wage labor is also resorted to in the harvest of other cash crops such as calamansi, coffee, and cacao, particularly among those with sizeable fields. In the lowland linked Buhid settlement, types of labor distribution vary between *sadili,* which employs the use of one's own labor, and *sul-ugan,* which features a reciprocal exchange of labor by a task group that works on rotation basis, eventually resulting in the creation of a mobile labor cooperative. The latter also includes *igsaduhan* or shared meals. Wage labor, on the other hand, vary between *tangdanan,* which pays the individual worker on a daily basis, and *pakyawan,* which agrees on a wholesale labor arrangement for the completion of a specific task. Other forms of labor exchange

include *tarugbungan,* an organized labor group for projects benefiting the whole community, and the *tugbong,* a token service for individuals premised on the notion of delayed reciprocity. Both feature non-immediate forms of payment.

On the whole, the development of techno-economic changes in the Buhid community reduced the sharp division between the sexes. There is much more interchangeability in production roles among the Buhids. Thus, a Buhid man would sometimes take care of all the cooking for the *igsaduhan* or shared meal in a *sul-ugan* while his wife would busily sow corn along with other men recruited for the reciprocal labor exchange group. This freer exchange of roles in production among Buhids may be inferred from the fact that in the organization of task groups, whether on a reciprocal cooperative basis, or by wage labor, sexual status is not given any importance in the recruitment of laborers. It is thus quite common to see women working alongside men in the fields and doing the same bulk of work in clearing and cutting undergrowth, burning, planting, etc. Only in the area of ploughing do men seem to have developed specialization and monopoly of skill. Although a few Buhid men have learned ploughing, expertise in the said agricultural method is given an important value in the Buhid community. Anyone possessing such skill receives a comparatively high remuneration in the Buhid region, as a day of ploughing using one's own tools would cost thirteen pesos in contrast to the ridiculously low priced labor in *gamasun* (slash and cutting of undergrowth) which pays only three pesos. Possession of carabao, plough, as well as ploughing skills has therefore generated extra source of cash and thus surplus income for the Buhids. Such surplus has been used by a few in small-scale business investment as the opening of sundry stores. Other Buhids have invested their surplus in buying local produce and selling them at profit to regular *sukis* (buyers) in the town market. Those with larger surplus have turned to buying lands and livestock as other forms of investment. Other Buhids who have greater boldness and willingness to experiment in relationships and strategies have invested in merger forms of entrepreneurship. These higher aspirations for economic growth and prosperity were also largely shaped by given socio-economic opportunities within their environment. An example of this is the Buhid mayor's successful manipulation of all the resources within his disposal, i.e., his position, political connections, information networks and partnerships with both town and regional merchants which have given him ample resources to accumulate capital and expand his economic activities. In consequence to his efficient action in the past, Yaom today enjoys comparatively larger resources, a higher living standard, and prestige in his own community.

Summary:

As I indicated at the outset, my aim in this paper is to identify the point of articulation between Mangyan local structures and the regional structure in Mindoro. I have tried to do this by focusing on a microcosmic setting, that is, in taking the Buhid socio-economic

structure and studying how it is linked with the wider regional structure through the activities of key men in the area.

The techno-economic, political, and social changes which have been identified all lend support to my contention that the Buhids, like many of the traditionally classified "tribal", "traditional", "pre-industrial" groups often studied in an "as-if" state of autonomy, could be more appropriately classified as peasants. The Buhids as well as other Mangyans share the same Janus-face peasant quality of having one foot in the past and another in the present, i.e., an ambivalent response to the state and the dominant economic system. To put it in another way, the internal Buhid structure shows both accommodation and resistance to the town and regional structures. While various forms of linkages exist between the town and the Buhid settlements, these people have maintained a certain degree of resistance or autonomy. This is seen clearly in the persistence of their subsistence production alongside their cultivation of cash crops. As such, the Buhid economy gives them leeway to survive outside the market system. For instance, in the series of typhoons which devastated their cash crops last year, the Buhids' cash economy suffered, but not their basic subsistence. These people simply tightened their belt, shifted back to their root crop diet of camote, gabe, and ube and easily survived the adverse effects of typhoons.

The relative autonomy of the Buhids may also be observed in other areas of their socio-cultural life. This is evident in the persistence of traditional folk medicine even to this day (as in cases of giving birth, in sickness, and in death). Despite the relatively easy access to lowland medicine, the ordinary Buhid normally turns to *iglahi* i.e., an expert in chanting and driving out of *labang* or evil spirits (which are believed to be the root cause of illness). In case of failure, the Buhid turns next to *langamlang,* i.e., a specialist in skillfull massaging, which aims to draw out of the body foreign objects which could be the source of a person's illness. Most Buhids therefore turn only to imported medicine when traditional ways of coping with sickness fail.

Aside from withstanding the influence of modern science and technology, the Buhids' cultural resistance is also reflected in the persistence of their language which in fact serve as a medium for communication between them and their client group, the Bangon.

On the whole, I have tried to show that the outcome of government intervention and capitalist penetration in the so-called traditional communities do not necessarily result in the breakdown of the indigenous social structure which threatens an outright assimilation of the indigenous group to the center. Such traditional models of change are rather simplistic and they fail to see the inner agents of the dynamic of societies that would selectively adopt and resist change acting on them.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barbian, Karl-Josef. *The Mangyan Language of Mindoro: A Comparative Study on Vocabulary, Phonology, and Morphology.* Cebu City; University of San Carlos, 1977.

Conklin, Harold C. *Hanunoo Agriculture: A Report on an Integral System of Shifting Cultivation in the Philippines.* Rome: FAO, 1957.

Lopez, Violeta B. *The Mangyans of Mindoro: An Ethnohistory.* Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1976.

Tweddel, Colin E. "The Identity and Distribution of the Mangyan Tribes of Mindoro, Philippines." *Anthropological Linguistics* 12 (6). 1970.

The Contributors

CESAR ADIB MAJUL is Dean of the Islamic Institute and Professor of Islamic philosophy at the University of the Philippines. He has published a good number of books, one of which is *The Muslims in the Philippines* (1973).

MALCOLM CHURCHILL is at present First Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Canberra, Australia.

JEREMY BECKETT is Professor of the Department of Anthropology, Sydney University.

JOSEFA M. SANIEL is Dean of the Institute of Asian Studies and Professor of East Asian Studies at the University of the Philippines. She authored the book *Japan and the Philippines, 1868-1898.* She has also written several articles about Japan, some of which were translated into Japanese and published in Japan.

HERBERT S. YEE is Visiting Research Fellow at the Department of Political Science, The University of Calgary, Canada.

NANCY DE YOUNG graduated from Manhallanville College and took up her masters in Georgetown University. She was formerly enrolled at the Political Science Department, University of the Philippines.

VIOLETA B. LOPEZ is instructor and coordinator of the Asian Studies program at the University of the Philippines extension at Clark Air Base, Pampanga. At present, she is finishing her Ph.D. dissertation in Anthropology at the University of Toronto, Canada.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

SERIALS

1. **Asian Studies**
   (published three times a year: April, August & December)

   Vol. 1—3 (limited stock available)
   Vol. 4—1966
   Vol. 5—1967
   Vol. 6—1968
   Vol. 7—1969
   Vol. 8—1970
   Vol. 9—1971
   Vol. 10—1972
   Vol. 11—1973
   Vol. 12—1974 1, 2 & 3
   Vol. 13—1975
   Vol. 14—1976
   Vol. 15—1977
   Vol. 16—1978

2. **Lipunan**
   (published annually)

   Vol. 1—1965
   Vol. 2—1966-67
   Vol. 3—1967-68

OCCASIONAL PAPERS

1. The Filipino Exclusion Movement, 1927-1935
   by Josefa M. Saniel

MONOGRAPH SERIES

1. A Diary of William Cleveland; Captain's Clerk on board the Massachusetts
   by Madoka Kanai

2. Sulod Society
   by F. Landa Jocano

3. An Evaluation of Philippine Culture-Personality Research
   by Robert Lawless

4. The Politics of Marawi
   by Teresita V. Benitez

5. Diego Silang and the Origin of Philippine Nationalism
   by David Routledge

BIBLIOGRAPHY SERIES

1. Philippine Evangelical Protestant and Independent Catholic Churches
   by Robert R. Von Oeyen

2. Directory of Research on Malay and Other Southeast Asian Cultures (Part I: The Philippines)

3. Modernization in Asia
   by L.E. Dimalanta, et al

4. Resources for Asian Studies in Selected Libraries in the Greater Manila Area: A Survey
   by Violeta Encarnacion

5. Graduate Theses in Philippine Universities and Colleges, 1908-1969
   by Catalina Nemenzo

BOOKS

1. A Common Vocabulary for Malay-Pilipino Bahasa Indonesia
   by Paraluman S. Aspillera

2. Muslims in the Philippines
   by Cesar Adib Majul

3. Nationalism in Search of Ideology: The Indonesian Nationalist Party 1946-1965
   by J. Eliseo Rocamora

4. Philippine Prehistory: An Anthropological Overview of the Beginnings of Filipino Society and Culture
   by F. Landa Jocano

5. Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899-1920
   by Peter Gordon Gowing