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THE ASIANIZATION OF ANTHROPOLOGY

P. L. BENNAGEN

The Asianization of anthropology is no longer merely an idea; already, it is a process taking place in many Asian countries. It is expressed in various ways, vaguely perceptible in some, very definitive in others. In any case, from the realities of the Asian world, geographically and culturally defined, a new anthropology is emerging. It is an anthropology the aim of which is no less than to help strengthen Asia's rightful claim to its heritage as well as to its visions of man, society and culture. To be sure, anthropology cannot do this alone independent of the other intellectual traditions and disciplines, the latter also in need of Asianization. Moreover, in the context of the new world-system of interacting and often conflicting polities, economies and cultures, the Asianization of anthropology and other disciplines is only an aspect, but a necessary aspect, of a commercial praxis of autonomy and freedom (Cf. Bastide 1971: 170-192 and Bauman 1973: 118).

In what follows, the Asianization of anthropology will be traced from the origins of anthropology as a discipline and as a profession in the West, to its practice in the colonies, to the radical critique of anthropology by Western scholars themselves and by a few Third World intellectuals, to its indigenization and then to its Asianization. Attempts will be made to discover the various forms of its national expressions, the underlying commonalities and the overall thrust—in a word, its Asianness. For reasons of time, space and limited sources, this effort cannot but be preliminary.

In practice, anthropology flourished in the context of conqueror-conquered relations concomitant with the West's conquest of the non-Western world. This conqueror-conquered relationship made possible the practical and analytic separation between, on the one hand, the native peoples of Africa, America and Asia as objects of investigation, and, on the other hand, Western anthropologists as the investigating subjects.

As a discipline, therefore, anthropology has been pre-eminently the study of other cultures so much so that its claim to being a science has been argued on the basis of its epistemo-
logy of objectivity, possible only because of the subject-object separation that came in the wake of Western imperialism.¹

This is, of course, only part of the baggage of anthropology reflecting in no small measure its colonial legacy. But the conditions that engendered this conception of anthropology have been historically abolished with the emergence of the new nation-states from the ruins of the Second World War and the wars of national liberation.

Indeed, since then, native anthropologists have grown in number. While the overwhelming majority of them learned their anthropology in the West, they have increasingly realized that anthropology needs to assume new forms, this time no longer simply as the study of other cultures but the study of one's culture. In the new nations the anthropologist is at once subject and object.

Moreover, while it was once constituted as praxis in the service of Western imperialism, anthropology today promises to be, for Asians (and for Third World peoples in general), a form of communal praxis (Bauman 1973: 118) in the service of the peoples of Asia.

That this reconstitution of anthropology is taking place is only a part of the larger changes taking place in today's thought-ways. As an intellectual process, and also as praxis, it was preceded by the political and economic changes that engulfed the former colonies during the post-colonial period.

Immediately after the war, the task of national reconstruction, or nation-building, made it necessary to have trained manpower. Men and women were sent to the former colonial countries for the acquisition of skills assumed to be necessary for nation-building. Understandably enough, the plans and programs of nation-building were imported from the colonizing countries. The new nation-states were being reproduced in the image of the “mother country”. While the apparatus of the old-type relations of conqueror and conquered was being dismantled, it transformed itself to other forms.

For most of the former colonies, it took some two decades or so to recognize the fallacy and folly of uncritical adaptation and to realize that the net effect of this has been the transformation of old-type colonialism into neo-colonialism: the colonial powers became “developed” while the colonized became “underdeveloped”. As social structures and processes,

both development and underdevelopment are best understood in each other's terms.

The politico-economic imperatives of the post-colonial world-system made it necessary for the Western countries to preserve their position of dominance over their former colonies. It may be said, therefore, that nation-building, as an instance of uncritical adaptation by the dominated peoples is simply the other side of the continuing imposition of life-styles and thought-ways on the dominated by the dominant.

Indeed, notwithstanding the Third World rituals of independence and the accompanying flags, anthems, slogans and rhetoric of national sovereignty, the former conqueror-conquered relationship has remained essentially a relationship of domination. Power-wielders do not program power-structures to self-destruct.

The global crisis arising from the continuing domination of the underdeveloped countries by the developed countries led to a critique of domination in its various forms. A few Western scholars, both from Europe and the U.S., and Third World intellectuals started to question seriously the wisdom and feasibility of reproducing Western polities and economies—in brief, Western cultures in the former colonies (e.g. Myrdal 1957, and Furtado 1967 [1961]).

Consequently, demands for national self-determination and self-reliance of the new nation-states began to be heard once more, this time, more insistent and more totalizing than ever. In this context, social science knowledge, of which anthropology is a part, began to be perceived as a necessary component of the over-all efforts toward national self-determination and identity.

Meanwhile, in the mid-sixties, perceptive Western anthropologists and other social scientists, reacting to the use of anthropology in maintaining relations of domination, started to raise issues about anthropology. Its epistemology, its research methodology, its ethics and its future, among others, were all subjected to re-examination.

Taking off from Taylor's conclusion of his work *Primitive Culture* (1881) that anthropology as a science of culture is essentially a reformer's science, Diamond (1964) argued for anthropology to be a revolutionary discipline. By becoming revolutionary, "it is more fully a science precisely because it strives toward a more spacious form of knowing, of "sciening", and is, therefore, a most potent tool for cultural criticism." But it could become as such, if, while maintaining its synthetic
and analytic habits, it revitalizes two neglected traditions associated with its ancestry. According to Diamond, one tradition has to do with "the conscious search in history for a renewed and basic sense of the possibilities of human nature and of culture..." (1964: 432). The other is concerned with "the theoretical, instrumental unity of thought and action" (1964: 435).

From Europe, Maquet (1964) noted the need for the decolonization of anthropology as an aspect of the larger decolonization of the former colonies. Moreover, he (1964: 49-50) added that anthropologists' advice about reforms to be at least as destructive to traditional society and as acceptable as possible to the people was in fact conservative in that these reforms helped to maintain the colonial order.

Having recognized that anthropology is an outcome of the "era of violence" whereby one part of mankind plundered the other and made it its object, Levi Strauss (1966) acknowledged the "right of people made aware of their independent existence and originality... to observe their culture themselves, from the inside." For Levi Strauss (1966: 126) it is in this sense that anthropology would "be born again under a new guise."

In the U.S., the involvement of the U.S. government in world events—particularly in the Vietnam War, in counter-insurgency activities in Latin America and in community development in many Third World countries—as well as the threat of a nuclear war created a crisis of conscience among segments of American youth and intellectuals. Among these were anthropologists who were concerned not only with developments in U.S. society, but also with the increasing difficulty of doing fieldwork in the underdeveloped countries due to resurgence nationalism (Gough 1968: 404-405; Nash 1975).

The inquiries of concerned anthropologists and other social scientists into the role of the U.S. government and of the social sciences in the post-colonial world-system led to a number of events that, all told, contributed to a serious re-assessment of anthropology. Notable among these are the following:

1. organizational commitment to the cause of world peace and organizational opposition to nuclear war (AAA 1962: 78);
2. the condemnation by anthropologists of the U.S. role in the Vietnam War during the 1966 meeting of the American Anthropological Association (Berreman 1968);
3. the Current Anthropological Symposium on the Social Responsibility of the Social Sciences in 1968 where,
among other things, anthropology was unmasked as the "child of imperialism";

4. exposé of the Project Camelot (Horrowitz 1967) as an attempt to defuse the revolutionary movements in Latin America.

This initial soul-searching by a few U.S. and Western European anthropologists was elaborated further in the collection of essays, *Reinventing Anthropology* (Hymes 1971). Before long, the indictment of anthropology as part of the apparatus of domination became a part of anthropological self-criticism, not only in the U.S. but also in other parts of the world.

Scholars from the Third World countries joined in what amounted to a world-wide attack on the premises and goals of anthropology. Stavenhagen (1971) made a plea for "decolonizing applied social sciences and in particular, anthropology." Recognizing the dialectical links between social science and society, he pointed out quite correctly that while anthropology and other social sciences have been "handmaidens of colonialist or imperialist domination", it is also out of "the science of society that the most powerful critiques of colonial systems, imperialist domination, totalitarian political structures and burgeoise class society have sprung" (1971: 334).

Stavenhagen argued that a "radical critique [of anthropology] demands a holistic approach in terms of global social units and total societies", and that a critical and committed social science must shift its object [of investigation] from the underdog to the dominant elites as well as the very system of domination.

All in all, this crisis within the discipline reflected the changing relations between subject and object. True, the relationship of domination still exists but the dominated are now asserting their right to know themselves and define the directions of their future.

*Indigenization of Anthropology*

Having undergone some "re-inventing", radicalization" and "decolonialization", anthropology is now being "indigenized".

On July 15-24, 1978, a symposium on "Indigenous Anthropology in Non-Western Countries" was held at Burg Wartenstein, Austria (Fahim 1979, 1980). Among other things, the symposium wanted "to seek systematic and candid discussion of the problems facing local anthropologists of the Third World
and to explore the potential contribution of these anthropologists in relation to global concerns of the discipline . . . (Fahim 1979: 379).

Exploratory in its nature, the symposium somehow brought to the fore theoretical, methodological, pedagogical as well as ethical issues related to indigenous anthropology. In the symposium, indigenous anthropology was taken to mean research conducted by anthropologists within the national boundaries of their countries and would include studies done by anthropologists on their own ethnic groups. The latter type is referred to as native anthropology.²

Conceptual and operational confusion characterized the first organized attempt to examine indigenous anthropology in non-Western countries. As is usual with initial undertakings, there was no agreement as to whether indigenous anthropology would represent an epistemological and theoretical breakthrough brought about by the changes in fieldwork conditions, and especially fieldworkers' roles and perspectives.

At any rate, the symposium gave a name to a process that was long in coming—that of non-Western anthropologists finally questioning the premises, uses and directions of anthropology from the perspective of a social scientist striving to understand his own society while actively participating in its transformation.

Indeed, according to Roy (1977:19), indigenization, as an expression of self-awareness and self-assertion among Asian scholars, was “a product of their experiences with the transnational system of social sciences . . . and the internal pressures for playing a more useful role in nation-building. . . .”

It is further expressed in various ways (Roy 1977:19): “. . . tendency to respect theories and methodologies originating in the West, the felt need to derive them [from] the unique historical experiences of the countries of Asia, and greater awareness of an interest in other developing countries at a similar stage of development.”

Writing on the indigenization of the social sciences in general, Kumar (1976:2-3) points out to the following interrelated aspects of indigenization:³

² For Jones (1970:251), native anthropology is “a set of theories based on non-Western precepts and assumptions in the same sense that modern anthropology is based on and has supported Western beliefs and values.” For purposes of this paper, no distinction is made between indigenous and native anthropology.
³ Kumar (1976:2) refers to these as types of indigenization. Since he also points out that these are interrelated, it might be more appropriate to call these as aspects of the overall process of indigenization.
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1) structural indigenization — “institutionalized and organizational capabilities of a nation for the production and diffusion of social science knowledge”;

2) substantive indigenization — the focusing of a nation’s research and teaching activities on its own social institutions, conditions and problems; and

3) theoretic indigenization — the construction of distinctive conceptual frameworks and meta-theories reflective of their world views, social and cultural experiences as well as perceived goals.

A Canadian sums up the process (Loubser 1977): “Indigenization is the development of national science communities that are self-reliant, self-sufficient and self-directing, in other words, autonomous and independent, with respect to all aspects of the vital functions of the community, including its ability to relate to other communities on an equal, reciprocal basis.”

Viewed as such, indigenization may constitute a revolt against “intellectual imperialism” as a complement of the revolt against politico-economic domination. It is perhaps for this reason that it is most needed in Latin America, Africa and in Asia.

*The Asianization of Anthropology*

It is in this world-wide context of the idigenization of the social sciences and the over-all thrust towards national self-reliance and self-determination that we now turn to an examination of the Asianization of anthropology.

Having different national origins, the anthropologies that developed in the various Asian countries partook, as they still do on lesser degree, of the characteristics of anthropology in the country of origin. Without exception, the anthropology of the colonizer stamped its own brand on that of the colonized. Where no colonization took place, as in Thailand or Japan, anthropology entered as a discipline from the developed countries of the West. In any case, anthropology has been part of the intellectual apparatus subserving the interests of the dominant in the system of domination, whether politico-economic or intellectual, or both. It is sad to note that this is the case not only between nations but also within nations. This is most evident in countries that have not resolved fundamental conflicts concomitant with multi-ethnic and class societies (Bachtiar 1977:38; Bennagen 1979:3).
Be that as it may, there is a perceptive urgency to Asianize anthropology, along with the other social sciences, for its contribution to a fuller and deeper understanding of the Asian countries as well as for its utility in advancing national development efforts, or national liberation movements, or socialist construction.

Thus, the intertwining of intellectual and politico-economic concerns so characteristic of colonial anthropology presents itself in a new anthropological praxis which may be referred to as either the anthropology of national development or the anthropology of national liberation and self-determination.4

In any case, in the survey of the social sciences in Asia, done under the auspices of the UNESCO, one gets an idea of the patterning of the Asianization of anthropology (UNESCO, 1976, 1977, 1977a) in particular, and the social sciences in general. In various degrees, this Asianization reflects each country’s heritage and social realities as it seeks to be responsive to ideological and practical needs and aspirations. Among other things, the survey shows that there is near-unanimity on the need to contextualize teaching and research in the social sciences in terms of each country’s problems, traditions, values and beliefs. This perspective to Asianize anthropology and the other sciences was the logical consequence of the recognition of the inadequacy of Western models, hypotheses and theories.

Country suggestions to nationalize and Asianize the social sciences include the following:5

1) writing textbooks and other institutional materials in Asian languages (UN 1976:13) and relevant to the national conditions (UNESCO -977:90);
2) establishment of research infrastructure supportive of development efforts as well as teaching;
3) surveys of the problems common to all the countries of Asia (UNESCO 1976:21);

4 Anthropology of national development may be reserved for anthropological activities done by anthropologists in the service of national development plans designed by the politico-economic establishment ostensibly on behalf of the people (cf. Cochrane). Anthropology of national liberation and self-determination emerging from the radical critique of Western anthropology explicitly allies itself, under conditions of oppression, with the oppressed. (Current Anthropology Symposium on Social Responsibility; Hymes 1971; Frank 1968 and Stavenhagen 1974).

5 The list is not exhaustive and focuses only on goals directly relevant to Asianization. The various countries included in the survey are: Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Burma, Mongolia, Korea, Japan, Thailand, Malaysia Singapore, Indonesia Philippines and including New Zealand.
4) publication of an Asian Review of the social sciences, and newsletter in Asian and European languages (especially English and French [UNESCO 1976:21]);

5) development of paradigms related to Asian thought and culture (UNESCO 1976:37, 45; 1977a:17-18; 1977:49);

6) research (to include study of culture, literature and ideology of native races) should contribute to the success of socialist construction (UNESCO 1977a:17, 48);

7) development of each social science discipline as a praxiology useful to solving problems (UNESCO 1977a:29);

8) founding a university of Asia for advanced research in social sciences (UNESCO 1976:38);

9) founding a regional (Asia) school for high-level training within the context of local conditions (UNESCO 1977a:33);

10) regional exchange and cooperation between Marxists and non-Marxists in answering such questions as, "What are Asian societies?", "Are there specific characteristics peculiar to Asia?" (1977:47); and doing research projects to arouse common interest among Asian scholars: "the relationship between variation in values and development in various countries; import of dominant religions on Asian development; a comparative survey of some core values among Asian countries."

It is also suggested that organizational links among Asians be made and strengthened even as they exchange and cooperate with non-Asians. In this connection, the contribution of UNESCO has been considerable and by all means should be encouraged. In 1954, it sponsored a Round-Table Conference on the Teaching of the Social Sciences in South Asia (Roy 1977b:13). It has funded surveys of the status of social sciences all over the world as well as supported regional associations such as the Association of Asian Social Science Research Councils (AASSREC). The ASSREC held its Third Conference on 12-17 September 1979 in Manila. An item in the agenda was the indigenization of the social sciences.

Some National Cases of the Asianization of Anthropology

Supportive of UNESCO's efforts are activities being undertaken independently by Asian anthropologists.
Malaysia

In Malaysia, for example, a conference on “The Role and Orientation of Social Sciences and Social Scientists in Malaysia” held in 1974 articulated the need for anthropology to be rethought and made relevant to realities and developmental aspirations of Malaysia. Among the highlights of the conference were the rejection of a value-free social science and the rejection of structural-functional anthropology for its failure to explain the structure of power as a total system in the context of change.

It was argued that anthropologists should involve themselves not only in theory-building, but also in nation-building. Issues were raised about the usefulness of the discipline in helping the objects of anthropological study. Bador (1974:10) pointed out that in the context of developing society, it would be unrealistic to assume a detached position relative to developmental concerns.

The Sociology Division (1974:1) of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of the National University of Malaya while recognizing the role of “foreign experts” as well as “foreign educational institutions” argued that this should only be secondary to the role of Malaysian intellectuals themselves.

Declared the Sociology Division (1974:35-36):

“Whilst we welcome the contribution of our colleagues from abroad who sincerely would like to help and cooperate with us by teaching and developing sociology and other branches of social science in our country, we must at the same time, be very vigilant against the perpetuation of academic imperialism, particularly through such means as the continued reliance on expatriates and other foreign staff who occupy powerful and strategic positions in certain institutions, and who determine their academic policies. Such a thing should no longer be allowed to happen in any university or other institutions of higher learning in our country.”

As a further expression of this intellectual self-determination there are already a number of bilingual (Bahasa Malaysia and English) publications which carry anthropological articles: Manusia dan Masharakat, Jurnal Antropologi dan Sosiologi, Akademika and Nusantaka. And thanks to its national language policy, anthropology, as with other disciplines, is taught in Bahasa Malay. But aware of the probable parochialism that might result from focusing their studies on Malaysian society and culture, Malaysian anthropologists further suggested that
studies be made on countries with which they have close rela-
tionship as well as on Western society.

These are rather dramatic programs for the Malaysiani-
zation of anthropology considering the fact that anthropology
was institutionalized in Malaysia only very recently with the
establishment of the Department of Anthropology and Socio-
logy at the National University of Malaysia in 1970 followed
by the University of Malaysia in 1971.

The Philippines

In the Philippines, social scientists who trained in the
United States and did applied social research in the Philippines
on their return gradually realized the “limits of Western social
research methods in the rural Philippines” (Feliciano 1965:
114-127). Consequently, suggestions were made to develop
methods and techniques (in social research) suited to local
conditions.

An anthropologist, stimulated by, and reacting to, the
works of American anthropologists such as H. Otley Beyer
and Robert Fox, started to re-think Filipino cultural heritage
emphasizing the uniqueness of Filipino tradition (Jocano 1965:
53). Specifically, he elaborated on the insight of Fox in rela-
tion to borrowing and re-shaping of external influences in con-
formity with local realities.” (Jocano 1965:72) A further ex-
pression of this re-thinking is a monograph by Jocano on
Philippine pre-history. A related but different version on the
nationalization of Philippine pre-history and written in Pilipino
is Salazar’s Ang Pagpapakasaysayang Pilipino Ng Nakaraang
Pre-Spaniko. Basically an outline, it promises to be an
important framework for understanding the prehistoric foun-
dations of Philippine society and culture.

In all these efforts, an American himself contributed to a
critique of the inadequacy of Western social science concepts
and methods in understanding Filipino behavior (Lawless
1967).

Carrying the stirrings of Filipinization further, from
academic exercises to praxis, the Department of Anthropology
of the state-supported University of the Philippines spear-
headed in 1977 the formal organization of anthropologists in
a conscious effort to create a more appropriate anthropology,
i.e., attuned to the conditions, needs and visions of Philippine
society (Bennagen 1978:1-2). Since then the organization has
tried to interpret Philippine social and cultural problems from
the perspective not only of national minority groups but also
of the marginalized groups such as peasants and the urban poor. Organizational activities have been held where the powerless could speak their minds to the powerful (Aghamtao 1979).

Another aspect of Filipinization is the increasing use of the national language in instruction and publication at the Department of Anthropology at the University of the Philippines, which is the oldest and leading Department of Anthropology in the country. In this same Department, an introductory text in general anthropology focusing on Philippine society and culture is being tried. As textbook, it has replaced American textbooks which are now used as secondary references.

It is also interesting to note that the graduate program, both M.A. and Ph.D., the latter instituted only in 1978, of the Department of Anthropology has been drawing students from Asian countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Japan, with a few applications coming in from Malaysia, Pakistan and India.

**Indonesia**

Once dominated by the Dutch, anthropology in Indonesia has come under the influence of American anthropology particularly after 1968 when foreigners could once more do research there (Koentjaraningrat 1967:1),anthropology is taking, once more, an applied aspect, this time in various national development concerns such as 1) national integration; 2) population, 3) socio-cultural transformation of the educational system, 4) community development, 6) reorganization of the administration (Koentjaraningrat 1975:252).

In theoretical work, Indonesian anthropologists have gone beyond mere data-gathering and description to the use of sophisticated conceptual framework (Koentjaraningrat 1975:258). As an agenda for Indonesian anthropology, Koentjaraningrat (1975:252) suggests that Indonesian anthropologists “should analyze cultural processes by focusing on the role and status of individuals within the culture. They should also carry out the analysis of system of symbolization through which recognition, identification and evaluation in present-day socio-cultural interaction take place, rather than adopt the normative approach which dominated pre-war Dutch adat law studies and anthropology . . . .”
India

Anthropology has been practised as a study of one's culture by Indian anthropologists for at least seven decades (Sarana and Sinha 1976:209). According to Madan and Sarana (1962:3) anthropology was formally recognized in India as a subject when it became part of the curricula of the University of Calcutta in 1920. Long before that, anthropology was part of Indological studies. Practised as an academic interest as well as for solving certain social problems, its focus has changed over the years. Following the practice of British administrator-anthropologists, Indian anthropologists first focussed their studies on the tribal peoples of India who because they were considered to be separate from the rest of the Indian population could be studied as objectively as the other cultures studied by Western anthropologists (Sarana and Sinha 1976:213-214).

After World War II, foreign anthropologists entered India and studied not only tribal peoples but also caste and lowland villages. Indian anthropologists themselves changed their focus to village studies and only recently, to urban studies.

What Indian anthropologists have been doing all these years, i.e., studying their own culture, may be said to be the early phase of a thorough-going Indianization of anthropology. Aware, nonetheless, of the desirability and importance of studying other cultures but still unable to do it, they feel that "anthropology as self-study should throw light on those aspects of Indian cultures that [they]are more competent to deal with than any foreigner because [they]have learned the goals, values, and ideals of our culture through enculturation" (Sarana and Sinha 1976:216). Part of the indigenization program would be to devise special scheme for holistic description of different levels of organization such as cities, regions, and the entire nation.

The years immediately after Indian independence generated political and economic problems which provided the stimuli for re-thinking the role of anthropologists and other social scientists in national development. Western theories, techniques and other frames of reference were subjected to re-assessment.

Recognizing the inapplicability of many European and American social science concepts, themes and methods to Indian society, Vidyarthi (1978:136) in his Presidential Address at the inauguration of the Xth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences in New Delhi, pointed out
the timeliness and the need for every community of social sciences to determine its own appropriated methodology and models for research. He argued that the Indianness in social science has to emerge with a proper appraisal of [India’s] ancient texts which continue to influence the behavior of Indians.

In a related speech, he (1978a) reiterated the need for Indianization as part of the development of a world-view and social order more comprehensive than those characterizing individual ethnolinguistic groups within the nation. He suggested that this Indianization is important in strengthening an Indianness relative to the international community.

For the practical side and drawing upon the humanistic ideals of Gandhi and Nehru, he (1978:104) issued a call:

Let us take a vow to speak for such unfortunate and primitive tribes who are unable to speak for themselves. May I ask you as fellow anthropologists to take up their case more seriously, and study, speak and act more for these tribes which are politically inarticulate, ecologically isolated and numerically insignificant, but ethnically — and ethically — so important.

Articulated in 1964 (Vidyarthi 1978:132), Indianization already had unconscious practitioners as early as 1945 with the founding of the Ethnographic and Folk Culture Society in Uttar Pradesh by Majumdar and the publication of the Society’s journal, The Eastern Anthropologist, in 1947 (Madan and Sarana 1962:7). Majumdar made contributions in physical anthropology, social and cultural anthropology as well as in applied anthropology. As a member of the Research Program Committee of the Planning Commission (Government of India), “he underscored the role which the anthropologist could play in helping administrators by studying the problems of socially and economically backward peoples, and properly assessing them as well as administrating action (Madan and Sarana 1962:6).

In 1956, he co-authored with Madan a book, An Introduction to Social Anthropology. A collection of essays edited by Madan and Sarana, written in memory of Majumdar, was entitled Indian Anthropology. This work, published in 1962, pointed out that social anthropology in India has maintained its link with developments outside the country even as it has paid attention to the Indianness of its subject matter.

It was in the 1970’s, however, when Indianization became a self-conscious effort. Since then, it has not limited itself to institutional and substantive indigenization. Indian anthropo-
logists have started formulating Indian approaches to the study of man, society and culture in India even as others admit that there is as yet no theoretical formulation on the nature of tribal societies in India (Pathy et al 1976:401).

Agrawal (1978), for example, tried to show how spatial and emic approaches could enhance understanding of Indian civilization. Malik (1976a, 1976b), arguing against the inadequacy of static or equilibrium models in understanding Indian Society, attempted to re-interpret a number of aspects of Indian history and society according to what he called "civilization framework."

Indeed, anthropology in India has survived as an academic and practical activity. As noted by Dube (1962:238), the ethnographies of different tribes and castes in various parts of India, while used primarily for administrative purposes made possible the disciplinal growth and independence of social anthropology.

Similarly, Sarana and Sinha (1976:213) observed that it was colonial administration and not the academic interests of British anthropologists that motivated early studies.

In recognition of the practice-theoretical attributes of the anthropological tradition, Indian anthropologists have persistently called for the conscious linking of theory and practice (e.g., Dube 1967 and 1979; Vidyarthi 1968 and 1978; Varma 1970, and Sarana and Sinha 1976). Dube (1979:7) has cautioned, however, that because anthropology's contribution to national development has hitherto been insignificant, it should be regarded with humility.

People's Republic of China

An instance of an anthropology that has appeared in a "new guise" is anthropology in the People's Republic of China. Institutionally, it is no longer identified as anthropology in the Western sense. Much of the activities that are anthropological in the Western sense are done in a number of institutions none of which goes by the name of anthropology (Braybrooke 1980; Bennagen 1976 and 1977).

Responding to Cooper (1973), some Chinese "anthropologists", two of whom were trained in the West, pointed out that in China "anthropologist" as a label belongs to the past (Fei Hsiao-Tung et al. 1973). They added that a discipline must have a theoretical system and a practical function, which

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6 Other attempts along these lines may be seen in Indian anthropological journals such as Man In India, The Eastern Anthropologist.
to the Chinese is Marxism-Leninism-Mao-Tse-Tung thought (Bennagen 1976).

The transformation of anthropology within the framework of Marxism-Leninism-Mao-Tse-Tung thought may best be understood in terms of what Fei Xiatong (1980) has called "people's anthropology". He elaborated on this during his acceptance of the 1980 Malinowski Award given by the U.S.-based Society for Applied Anthropology: "[G]enuine applied anthropology must be a science serving the interests of the masses. That is what is meant by people's anthropology."

He (1980:119) argued that "only when the truthfulness of theories is being constantly examined in practice can we steadily push research work in a scientific direction and make it a prime mover of social progress."

As to the relationship between investigator and investigated, he (1980:119) claimed that there is no longer a valid distinction between "researchers or investigators" and the "objects of study" or the "investigated":

"Our way of investigation radically changed the relations between investigators and the people under investigation. We carried out these investigations entirely for the purpose of finding the way to bring about equality among nationalities and help the minority peoples forge ahead. This was also what the people we investigated were asking for. So we could be quite frank with them about the purpose of our investigation, and the people investigated already understood what these investigations were for and found them acceptable."

It may be argued that the explicit use of a Marxist framework is a Western import. Koller (1970:275) points out, however, that its expression in China as applied to Chinese conditions and as articulated by Mao Tse-Tung, is in line with "the principles and attitudes of traditional Chinese philosophies."

He (1970:278) commented that: "It would appear . . . that in his metaphysics and epistemology, Mao carries forward the traditional attitude which sees a unity in particular things and which sees knowledge as inseparable from practice. Consequently, his philosophy also places the traditional emphasis on the unification of humanity through improved practical living."

In China, therefore, the new anthropology seems to be a synthesis of anthropological fieldwork, Marxism and traditional Chinese philosophies.
Exhibiting a variation on the general patterning of the Asianization of anthropology is the Japanese experience. While the social sciences entered Japan from the West as early as the Meiji period (1868-1912) (UNESCO:1977) and while the Japanese Society of Ethnology was established in 1934 (Nakane 1974:57), it was not after World War II that social and cultural anthropology gained recognition as an independent discipline (Nakane 1974:57). Still, compared with the other social sciences, anthropology has not benefited from the post-WWII reforms. As of 1974, cultural anthropology was taught at the graduate level in only three universities (Nakane 1974:57). In the Social Science Council of Japan, which advises the Prime Minister, members come from the natural sciences and social sciences but excluding the new-comers such as cultural anthropology, international relations and area studies (UNESCO 1977:44).

According to Nakane (1976), anthropological studies by Japanese first came under the influence of British anthropology with its emphasis on kinship. Studies on Japanese kinship had a parochial focus until studies were made outside Japan after the war. These studies have helped make possible the shift to comparative studies and the critical application of Anglo-American models.

Initially, cultural anthropology in Japan started as a study of Japanese society and culture by Japanese scholars trained in other disciplines who did work that were anthropological. These were done in isolation from the international community which was aided, in part, by publishing results in the Japanese language. In the 1950's with the growing affluence of Japan, research in the other countries, (e.g., India) by Japanese started. Since then, Japanese anthropologists have worked in other neighboring Asian countries and in the Pacific in the areas of social organization, folk beliefs and rituals. In Japan, studies have been confined to Japanese speaking areas of rural Japan and the Okinawa Islands.

There has also been a serious attempt to look at Japan from the outside (Nakane 1974:62). As a reaction to the previous period of isolation from the international intellectual community, efforts are also being exerted to integrate Japan into the mainstream of world anthropology. Methodologically, this is being done through cross-cultural comparisons particularly the efforts at linking Japanese data with those from the other countries of the Malay-Polynesian world. Moreover,
she (1974:71) argues for the view which regards Western works as "common property" and that "[t]he future contributions of Asian anthropologists can only be made on such a richly accumulated scientific ground, not out of a narrow provincial mind." It might be pointed out at this point that Japanese anthropology seems pre-occupied with purely academic concerns. Nakane's (1976) brief historical account of cultural anthropology in Japan does not mention any conscious use of anthropology in solving Japanese social problems.  

Conclusion

Clearly, the available data show that anthropology in Asia is undergoing some profound changes. Reflecting the various levels of social development of the various Asian countries, the different periods of the introduction of anthropology, and the type of interaction each country has with other countries, the Asianization of anthropology, however, is not homogenous. It is also taking place at different rates.

Still and all, it may be said that as these countries continue to grapple with their politico-economic problems towards national self-determination in an interdependent world, equity and social justice, so, too, will anthropologists and other social scientists grapple with their theories, methods and practice.

In any case, there are indications that an Asianized anthropology will emerge from the creative tension between efforts at their transformation.

Towards this end, an insight from an Asianized historical analysis is relevant:

"Sa kabuuan, kalaliman at kahabaan ng kasaysayan ng Asya, tila pinakaimportante ay ang kasalukuyan, ang panahon ng paglaya at ng pagtatag ng kinabukasan."

(Salazar et al., 1981:n.p.)

7 This seems a bit odd considering the history of anthropology as a discipline at once utilitarian and intellectual with the former after preceding the other. It is clear from the report however, that anthropological studies have been made by Japanese anthropologists on areas once occupied by Imperial Japan. Moreover, in recent years, with Japanese rise to one of the industrial powers of the world, Japanese anthropologists have increasingly made their presence in other Asian countries particularly Southeast Asia (Tugby, 1968). Without meaning to be alarmist, yet aware of the probable abuse of anthropology in the perpetuation of relations of inequality and domination and bearing in mind the social responsibility of social scientists to their objects of study as well as to mankind in general, it is strongly suggested here that preventing the re-emergence of anthropology as a handmaiden of domination should be an item on the agenda of Asian anthropological communal praxis.
Going back to anthropology and its organizing principle of holism, an Asianized anthropology would be one which in its analytic confrontation with particular cases of man, society and culture would aid in transforming them as wholes. This unified and unifying holistic tradition — at once rejecting the fragmentation of life as total experience and the separation of knowing from acting — is an Asian tradition, which though submerged by the dominance of the West, is now being reconstituted in the new anthropology to help Asia's resurgence as a Great Tradition.

It should be stressed, however, that the Asianization of anthropology is but a part of the Asianization of social knowledge, which, in turn and ultimately, is only a part of an encompassing Asianization of Asia itself.

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FAITH HEALING IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE*

ZEUS A. SALAZAR

It has been my pet hypothesis that “faith healing” is probably just one of the forms in which our prehispanic medico-religious system of beliefs and practices continues to survive. A study of faith healing would, therefore, throw light on one aspect of the history of Philippine psychology. In my view, research into the history of Philippine psychology cannot but delve into at least four lines of filiation, and “faith healing” (particularly in its so-called “psychic surgery” aspect) is but the culminating point or an adaptive survival of one of these four areas of development—i.e., precisely that of the psychomedical system (and world view or pananaw) of our prehispanic ancestors.

FOUR LINES OF FILIATION

At least four separate areas of investigation appear to be available to the historian of psychology in the Philippines. These are: 1) Academic-scientific psychology, which entered the Philippines ca. 1920 mainly through the University of the Philippines and in the form of the American pragmatist-behaviorist school, although a direct filiation from Wundt has been claimed for the teaching of at least one professor at the University of San Carlos; 2) Academic-philosophical psychology, which we might presume to have started in our land with the establishment of a system of higher education around the University of Santo Tomas in Spanish times (actually toward the middle of the 17th century); 3) observation of ethnic personality as part of general social psychology (mainly indigenous) which started with the coming into contact between Filipinos and foreigners, mainly Spaniards (later simply all sorts of Westerners, including Americans) after 1521; and finally, 4) indigenous medico-religious practice and theory. Graphically, one can show the temporal interrelationships of these lines of filiation in the attached diagram.

* Introductory paper to the Seminar on Faith Healing in the Philippines sponsored by the U.P. Psychology 206 students on October 1, 1979, DSS Conference Room, Faculty Center, Diliman.
The most easily identifiable one, the academic-scientific psychology, began to establish itself towards the end of the second decade of this country with the establishment of America and its educational system in our country. Formally, one can probably date the Filipino phase of this event with the return in 1925 of Dr. Agustin S. Alonzo to the Philippines to teach at the College of Education of the University of the Philippines. Dr. Alonzo and the other Filipino pioneers in Western psychology all belonged to the pragmatist-behaviorist school which had just then begun to distinguish itself from its European origins—i.e., mainly the German, English, and French traditions. Although the University of the Philippines appears to have been the prime point of entry of this type of Western psychology, other higher schools of learning were likewise involved, such as the University of Santo Tomas and the University of San Carlos, with the latter probably pioneering in the introduction of the specifically European psychology by a product of the German educational system. In any case, Western psychology has been up till only recently synonymous in academic circles to psychology as such. As a matter of fact, however, its entry into Filipino consciousness and preoccupation was a clear case of technology transfer *cum* foreign ideology and world view. Its integration as component element into a broader Philippine psychology would, in perspective, become a grave problem of orientation and relevance to more socially conscious contemporary Filipino intellectuals (Enriquez, 1976; Salazar, 1976).

The academic-philosophical line is older than the preceding one in the history of psychology in the Philippines. We might suppose that it started with the advent of higher education in our land—i.e., with the establishment of the University of Santo Tomas and other Spanish institutions of higher learning like the Jesuit-managed San Ignacio and San Jose (Marcos, 1976: 171-172; Pe, 1973: 3-12). It is from their courses in philosophy and medicine that psychological materials can be sought and brought out. Another area of research would be the individual writings of the preachers and monks, including those of the Jesuits. Some of these writings are linguistic and could therefore be sources for the determination of early ideas concerning the psychology of language. In any case, all these ideas based on philosophical and "pre-scientific" considerations were the domain of the Spanish (later, also the adjunct native but Spanish-speaking) elites. Early in the twentieth century, this academic-philosophical line would rejoin the new American-oriented scientific psychology, even as the Spanish-speaking elites
converted themselves into avid supporters of the new colonial dispensation.

The third and more popular line, which carries all the threads of what I have called "ethnic psychology", is not only much older but considerably more complex than the previous two. One of these threads can be called *katutubong sikolohiya* or "indigenous psychology" in the sense of "common or innate to the Filipino" and "worked out by Filipinos from indigenous and foreign elements individually or in response to their common national and cultural experience". The framework of psychological reasoning and understanding innate to the Filipino can be culled from his language, art, literature, and even religious ideas. This includes not merely his world view or *pananaw* as a people but rather his set of integrated psychological principles with *and through* which, subconsciously, he explains (and thus places in a meaningful context) man and reality. An attempt to elicit some elements of this *katutubong sikolohiya* from language was recently made in the realm of consciousness (*kamalayan*) through semantic analysis of the indigenous idea of the soul (*kaluluwa*) and other concepts related to it (Enriquez, 1979; Salazar, 1977; Salazar and Alfonso, 1977).

There are enough examples of psychological thought expressed by individual Filipinos in terms of native and foreign elements. More or less systematic in character, these have been worked out by Filipinos in response to individual or collective experiences. Among them, one can cite the *Lagda*, a manual for the education of the half-acculturated Visayan elite published by a native cleric in 1734 and reissued throughout the 18th century; the psychological insights of Hermano Pule, Jose Rizal, Isabela de los Reyes, and the *Kartilya* of the Kapisanan; and, more recently, the more organized works of Kalaw and Mercado. It is probably to this native psychological thought that the designation of "*katutubong sikolohiya*" (psychology worked out by Filipinos or from native sources) should properly apply; whereas "*kinagsinang sikolohiya*" (psychology one has born into) should refer to the subconscious psychology imbedded in the native language, art, music, culture, and religion. Both types constitute, of course, a general *katutubong sikolohiya*.

Aside from *katutubong sikolohiya*, ethnic psychology includes the study of Filipino psychology in the sense of the Filipino people's perceived ethnic traits—"*ang sikolohiya ng mga Pilipino*" in the formulation of Enriquez (1976). Such
perceptions could be foreign (since 1521 mainly Spanish and then from 1898, American) or native. The latter came to be expressed in writing mainly as a reaction against the Spanish viewpoint, which became less and less positive as the Filipinos acquired and expressed more self-assurance vis-á-vis their colonizer. The early foreign views about Filipinos (such as those of Chao-Ju-Kua and other Chinese chroniclers) did not affect our ancestors, if only because they were not quite aware of them. Furthermore, there was no national psyche as yet that could be hurt by the adverse opinions of foreigners. Pigafetta was quite objective about the Filipinos in the Visayas and the coastal areas of Mindanao and Palawan; on the whole, he was in fact impressed by them. The same attitude pervades the works of Morga, Colin and the early missionaries. Negative judgments became frequent, however, as the seventeenth century wore on; but it was not until Gaspar de San Agustin (1720) that they really got crystallized into a psychological thesis on Indio character. Although Juan Delgado refuted most of San Agustin’s opinions in the 1750’s, these became nonetheless gospel truths about the Indio in the nineteenth century as Spaniards and other Europeans expanded on them. In fact, as late as the turn of the century, the Agustinian Eladio Zamora could still discourse, in his Las Corporachiones religiosas en Filipinas (Valladolid, 1901), on the innate incapacity of the pure Indio for intellectual achievement. At that time, the socio-anthropological school was constituted around the works of Worcester (later, likewise those of Beyer and Barton). The people belonging to the school tended to view the Filipinos as distinct ethnic groups different from one another, the main division being that which they perceived (and conveniently perpetuated) between “Christian” and “non-Christian,” with the latter subdivided into “Pagans” and “Moros”. This categorization continued up to quite recently, when the “values” of hiya, utang-na-loob, etc. were considered by the Post-World War II socio-anthropologists in Ateneo as “lowland Christian”. It was however simply an attempt to give Filipino names to foreign or even universal concepts (Enrique, 1976) or rather, to discover these concepts or “values” in the Philippine setting (Salazar, 1972 a and b). Be that as it may, the hiya school appeared to be the latest avatar of the foreign or external view of the psychology of Filipinos.

Under the circumstances, the internal view went unrecorded, although elements of this were evident even then from stray comments by rebels about their motivations as well as
from analyses of rebellions by the friar chroniclers. Thus, the Filipino viewpoint about his own being can only be discerned through the critical evaluation of a mass of naturally biased and dispersed data. In this sense, Hermano Pule (ca. 1840) was probably the first to leave to posterity some personal documents on his psycho-religious views, principally a dalit (hymn) and several letters to the faithful. The documentation should of course allow the researcher to distinguish between Pule's personal psychological frame of reference (katutubong sikolohiya) and his view of the Filipino in psycho-social terms (sikolohiyang Pilipino), particularly in so far as this ran counter to the common Spanish view of the Filipinos. If the sympathetic vein is the sole consideration, then, perhaps Father Delgado's refutation of San Agustin should be reviewed as the first published expression of the Filipino (or, at least, pro-Filipino) insight into the Indio's psychology within the colonial frame of socio-economic relations. Between Delgado and Hermano Pule, we can then go into the subjacent psychological ideas of, among others, the Dagohoy and the Basi revolts. But the really direct expression of the Filipino viewpoint about himself we shall find in Burgos, Rizal, and the whole generation of Filipinos active in the Propaganda and the Revolution as well as the various "messianic" movements then and earlier. The entire complex of ideas then bruited about in affirmation of the Filipino personality became common national property, sometimes expressed with a tinge of gnawing insecurity, particularly with the growing American colonial presence in the islands. Since this affirmation, however insecure, constituted not only a common good but likewise the emotional well-springs of nationhood, it was necessary to subject its real cultural bases to scientific study. That task was left to the new socio-anthropological school starting with Worcester and then Beyer and Barton but really based on the late nineteenth-century European scientists like Jagor, Montano, Marche, Meyer and others. In the end, this line would lead to studies on Filipino ethnic character, particularly those which sought to identify the so-called "Christian lowland values". And it was partly in reaction to this hiya-bahala-na syndrome of the Lynch-Bulatao school in the social sciences that the movement to discover the true "Sikolohiyang Pilipino" through the study of psychology in the Philippine context and with a Filipino orientation was constituted sometime around the year 1970. It is in fact from that time that one could date the beginnings of the study of the various lines of psychological thought in the Philippines.
It is thus probably upon the touchstone of Filipino personality (pagkataong Pilipino)* that Philippine psychology will find some degree of integration in the years to come. But, beyond this "psychology of Filipinos", the study of ethnic psychology includes the practice of psychology by Filipinos from the very beginning up to our own times. Such a study is concerned with both the normal techniques of enculturation or socialization and the proto-clinical approaches to problems, tensions, and conflicts. Enculturation and social control necessitate techniques which range from child rearing practices to the use of oral literature, beliefs, myths, legends, etc. through the inculcation of norms by means of religion, ethnic law and even tribal warfare. Three stages of development seem to present themselves in this sphere—i.e., indigenous; modified indigenous around a clerical core (whether Islamic or Christian); and modern-indigenous, with massive importation of American norms for the elite. The modified indigenous stage would include ideas in educational psychology in the Lagda to the extent that they reflect those of the Filipino elite of the eighteenth century, as well as those which we find in Urbana at Felisa and other ilustrado pieces in the nineteenth century. As for the proto-clinical techniques, one could investigate, for instance, the tension-dissipating function of the alternating chants during wakes and other occasions. Alcina already saw this among the seventeenth century Visayans who could criticize one another during feasts through the bical, "a chanted verse through which two persons, usually of the same sex, exposed alternately the physical and moral defects of the other, to the general enjoyment of the audience," it being understood that what was then said would be forgotten, "although not disregarded after the merriment" (Marcos, 1976: 73). This is not too far removed from certain American techniques of group therapy. The functions of intermediaries, professional peace makers (in Ifugao society), soothsayers (manghuhula), and the like can also be regarded as pro-clinical.

Closely related to ethnic psychology but nonetheless constituting a whole complex by itself is the psycho-medical system of our ancestors which had religion as its basis and explanation. The line of filiation which starts from this ancient Filipino system of religious-medical beliefs has already been looked into. From the religious-therapeutic ideas of the babaylan-katalonan to the faith healing arts of the present, one can

* Personally, I would prefer the term "katauhan" to translate the western concept of "personality," reserving "pagkatao" for "being in its various philosophical meanings.
perceive an historical connection through the messianic movements and the condemned or tolerated medico-religious practices during the Spanish period as well as through the culminating and highly acculturated *spiritista* movement at the turn of the twentieth century. In other words, this line of filiation would start from the medico-religious practices of *babaylan-katalonan* in which the diagnosis and treatment of diseases is based on the idea of two souls. During the Spanish period, these practices survived among the rural folk, even as they were condemned by the friars, who were sometimes forced to tolerate them. But it was within the messianic movements that the ancient medico-religious beliefs and skills have been preserved with the most fervor. Then, during the Revolutionary Period, we see the birth of the *spiritista* movement, itself a complex phenomenon that includes, beyond the political ends of emancipation, the socio-cultural and emotional needs to which the messianic movements have responded. Faith healing as we know it today appears to derive at once from the survival of the millenarian spirit amongst the urban poor and the peasantry and from the more specifically *spiritista* strain.

The connection between the *spiritista* movement and faith healing is quite clear. Most faith healers—in any case, those whom we have studied up to now—confess to some spiritista past, if they are not in fact still spiritista. The relationship between the spiritista movement and millenarian strains in the Revolution and beyond has not yet been elucidated by research. But strong messianic impulses are only too evident among various faith healer groups, some of which can in fact be considered as incipient churches with a zeal for proselytism.

About the filiation of the babaylan-katalonan complex to the messianic movements, there seems to be little room for doubt, although the messianic movements are a much broader phenomena, since they have generally pursued cultural as well as political ends. They were in fact at once early expressions as well as sources of later Filipino nationalism. It can be remarked, however, that the katalonans or babaylans were, aside from the datus, the leaders of early revivalist revolts against Spanish colonialism. In fact, Hermano Pule can be considered, save for his sex, a nineteenth century descendant of the katalonans. Indeed, some "nationalistic" thread seems to run from the early katalonian revolts through the messianic uprisings to the Revolution and beyond. In fact, the spiritista movement was an aspect of the more nativist Filipino nationalism at the turn of the century. The movement was actually a part of the
great revolutionary movement around the 1890's up to the 1920's, and a great number of spiritistas have been nationalists.

At the turn of the century, the religious aspects were being shed by the Revolution as a result of its secularization in pursuit of political authority. Some part of this great movement would thus detach themselves from its general thrust and continue as messianic movements. The most highly acculturated among the religiously oriented would coagulate into the so-called spiritista movement. Thus, one can say that the messianic movements carried the ancient medico-religious complex just as the mature and secular nationalism of the Revolution carried with it the spiritista movement. Just as an acculturative process occurred through the messianic movement to the present form of our nationalism, the ancient medico-religious complex likewise traversed an acculturative process through the spiritista phase to our present faith-healing stage. But this of course is just an hypothesis. It was through the present research effort that I had hoped to at least partly clarify this.

_Faith Healing Then and Now_

Of the four lines of filiation in the history of Philippine psychological thought, the fourth one is thus the most directly relevant to faith healing. The study of faith healing can in fact shed light on the survival of our ancient medico-religious system through all the vicissitudes of our history. The fourth line of filiation can in fact be clarified by comparing the ancient psycho-religious therapy to the present one of our faith healers. For this I thought we should distinguish between the process of healing itself and the ideology or explicative complex behind it. So the comparison will be on the actual techniques and the explanation for disease and the healing process. My belief is that no real healing could really take place if there were no common ideology or frame of reference—a language, in fact, a metalanguage—understood and accepted by both healer and patient. It is this as well as the techniques of healing themselves that we have thus tried to compare.

I tried to work out a comparison, and this is what has come out of it. In the first place, in our ancestral art of healing, one distinguishes between what can be healed by the available medical lore and what belongs to the realm of the spirits. What a _babaylan_ or _katalonan_ could (and in fact did always attempt to) heal had something to do with the relations between man and the spirit world, about which the priestess was the expert in the ancient community. There were of course the
more usual diseases, which could be cured with herbs and other tested medical preparations. The katalonan-babaylan could naturally cure these ailments, too; but they were generally left to other specialists. In our days, we call these native medical practitioners herbolarios, the name given them by the Spaniards who certainly availed of their service and appreciated herbs, albeit probably grudgingly.

This ancient distinction between spiritual and non-spiritual diseases seems to have survived up to our times. The faith healer would tell you that there are diseases that can be healed (and should in fact be healed) by the medical doctor or by a good herbolario. But those diseases which doctors cannot heal, the faith healer can heal. He does not therefore stand in the way of medical practice but rather complements it. The only difference between the pre-hispanic and the present situation is the fact that the modern-day katalonan, aside from the apparent change of sex (now mainly male, although there are still quite a number of women in the “profession”), is prepared to stay in the shadow of the doctor. In fact, today’s katalonan initiates the doctor in many ways, particularly with regards to the “clinical” surroundings. In the older days, she was the center and pivot of the religious and the medical profession.

Another area where some comparison can be made is the healing procedure itself. The techniques of the katalonan were varied enough. Of these, at least two stand out in the literature (both in the Philippines and in comparison with other areas in the Malayo-Polynesian world). These are apparently related to the common Austronesian (or Malayo-Polynesian) idea of the double soul. Briefly, this means that each individual possesses two spiritual parts. One is the soul (in Tagalog, kaluluwa; in Bikol, Bisaya, etc., kalag) which is that part of man which in life is the essence of his intellectual and moral powers and, at death, becomes an anito or spirit. The other is the human being’s life force which, as I have argued elsewhere (Salazar, 1976), was most probably known among most Filipino groups as “ginhawa”. If the kaluluwa or kalag is generally situated in the head, the ginhawa has its seat somewhere in the intestinal region, often in the liver or atay. In Encarnacion’s Visayan dictionary (1851), in any case, the term “ginhawa” means: “stomach, and the pit of the same stomach; to live, to breathe, respiration, vital spirit; metaphorically, is taken upon eating for being that which, with nutrients, give life to all living things; ... sometimes and with relative frequency, the term ginhawa is understood to mean character, dis-
position, condition, for the good or the bad; ... Dihá diámay anac ang vaca sa súlud sa iang guinhaoa.—The cow has a foetus, a child, in its stomach. Ayao pa itubong cay may guinhaoa pa.—Do not bury yet, for there is life still. Guinaculbaan ug maayo guining acong guinhaoa.—My spirit was greatly startled." Much earlier, in 1637, Mentrida gave practically the same meaning to "ginhaua", including that of "taste" or "appetite" (Dili iyón ining canun sa ginhaua co. This food does not go well with my ginhawa). There was equally ginhauaan which appeared to Mentrida as "the source of respiration or the vital spirits, as in Naigoan siya sa ginhauaan, busa namatai (He was hit on the principal part of the vital spirits, like the heart, so that he died).

How then was this concept of the double soul related to sickness and its cure? For one thing, the kaluluwa or kalag could get out of the body (willingly or through some mischief of some aswang or spirits) and cause, through its long absence, various diseases. Unless the kaluluwa is reintegrated into his body, a man would die. The katalonan must, therefore, reintegrate the soul in the man's body that it might again be whole. The Bikols called ailments of this type sakon, and the Balian has to rub the body with banay leaves to force the soul to return (Castaño, 1895). In the Calamianes, San Nicolas (1664: 228) noted that the priestess "placed a leaf of a certain kind of palm upon the head of the sick man and prayed that it (i.e., the soul) would come to sit there, and grant him health."

There is another set of diseases which are caused by some object entering, or being projected into, the body, generally the abdominal region. This area, which was the seat of the ginhawa and thus probably called among the ancient Visayans ginhawaan, was in fact the special preference of the aswang. Among the Bikols, it was customary at the death of a datu to kill a slave precisely in order to offer the latter's entrails to the aswang, "so that, diverted by them, he should leave those of the datu." (Castaño, 1895), Among the Bisayans, according to Blumentritt, the boyayao was "an internal ailment which comes from the demons." At the turn of the century, the Tagalogs believed that mangkukulam or witches caused "pains in the stomach, swellings in any part of the body" and "boils or internal tumors" (Nuñez, 1905). Among the Tongas in Polynesia, utua meant "a sickness sent by god, pain of the entrails, inflammation" and utua pu referred to a "demon, bad spirit" (Dumont d'Urville, 1834:114). In the Marquesas, this sickness or mate note atua was the result of a "vengeance of the en-
trails” which was cured only when the shaman or tawa looked for the malevolent deity in order “to softly calm him with the palm of his hand” (Vincendon-Dumoulin and Desgraz, 1843: 228). In the Philippines, the method was simply to extract the object causing the disease or the aswang himself who entered the body of the sick person. In case it was an aswang which was inside the body, the Bikols performed either the hidhid, by which the badián put an emplaster of buyo leaves on the head of the patient and danced, or the haplos, which was a ritual message, preceded by the invocation of Bathala and the execration of the aswang (Castaño, 1895).

How do all these ancient techniques compare with those used by our modern faith healers? Concerning the reintegration of the soul, it would appear that what is put back into the body of the patient is “energy” through “magnetic adjustment”. In the olden days, the reintegration of the soul into the body was presented by making some kind of insect caught by the kata­lonan disappear somewhere on the head of the patient. Or the insect could be blown into the head through the puyo or cow­lick. Today, what actually is “charged” into the body through “magnetic adjustment” is not shown. It is something that we just have to believe, a “magnetic fluid” or “bioplasm” which somehow comes out of the healing hand of the medium and penetrates the body of the patient like some mystical electric current. In some sects, such as the In Hoc Signe Vince Church, one could get, aside from psychic energy through massage, spiritual injection and blood transfusion. It would seem that in this form the ancient kaluluwa or kalag, has acquired philosophical and scientific—even biological and medical—consistency. The kaluluwa has, therefore, remained a motor principle of the human being, the most important motive force in the body’s inner functioning.

The old art of extracting by massage the object thrown into the ginhawaan by the aswang still persists together with the much rarer method of exorcising the aswang himself. This is still practised by the lesser groups of healers who, like the experts Núñez wrote about at the turn of the century, could still tie the toes and fingers of the patient “in anona bark” or even beat him till the mangkukulam leaves the body. But then these healers operate in the fringes of the profession. The center belongs to those who have modernized the extraction technique through the kneading of the affected parts. Their most spectacular achievement seems to be that they have come to be identified with surgery, as demonstrated by their capa-
city to exhibit extracted tissues and clots of blood. In the ancient technique, to my knowledge, there was no blood involved in the operation. Blood appeared only in the sacrifice of animals (chickens, pigs, or carabaos), and used to anoint the patient and often also the assisting relatives, as in some Northern Luzon groups. Aside from this, I do not believe blood was involved in the extraction operation. Our ancestors believed too much in their own medico-religious world view to need such proof of actual operation. Besides, surgical operations were not known then. The need for blood could only come with modern times. Our faith healers apparently want to prove that they are in the same class as the surgeons. They had therefore to invent the process by which they could appear to extract materials from the bodies of their patients, thereby showing that the operation actually proceeded in terms of the modern surgical ideology. The patients might be involved here, too, for it is for them, after all, that the psychic surgeons perform. The patients expect the healers to be local and less expensive versions of those unattainable operation monsters in white. With the modernization of their techniques through blood-letting, our native healers can finally offer to suffering Philippine humanity a semblance of the highest form of modern medicine.

And what about the medico-religious ideology which both patient and healer shared in our ancient society? Obviously, the anitos have lost ground as prime movers in bringing about and curing illness, although I was told by one of the assistants of Placido in Baguio that he was a friend of the anitos and got his power from them. If they survived at all among us, it is mainly because they still help explain medico-religious phenomena to “less sophisticated” Filipinos in the rural areas and in the transitional or squatter communities in the urban environment. We have been able to interview only very few native patients, and most of these have been urban dwellers. Our data are therefore biased in favor of modern explanatory viewpoints, and even these are really quite meager. As for the faith healers themselves, they appear to have a split medico-religious ideology, with a bias toward mystical and pseudoscientific concepts like astral bodies, “bioplasm,” psychic energy, etc. We have not investigated this fully, but I suspect that the psychic healer’s ideology can adapt easily to changing circumstances. However, as we have suggested earlier, even the new ideas like “psychic energy” seem only to translate into the modern viewpoint the earlier qualities of kaluluwa, which is in reality some kind of
“battery” too which needs to be recharged when its power has been spent.

The new ideas from American occult literature (and from Asian philosophies culled from American books) nonetheless appear to be quite recent arrivals. It is the Christian framework which serves as an integrating ideology, with the Bible as an important “dictionary” for the metalanguage used to explain disease causation and therapy. We must study this further. Particularly, we must compare the Catholic and Protestant sources of the religious rituals and ceremonies surrounding the healing sessions. For the psychic healers are also religious leaders who are in the process of building up churches which they have founded. In this sense, they do not indeed differ from the katalonans of old, for healing in their view can only take place in the context of one’s religious belief system and is in fact simply an aspect of religious experience. Finally, like the katalonans, our modern healers are mediums with specific contacts in the spiritual realm. The katalonans had tutelary anitos who entered or “rode” them in their trances, whereas our faith healers have as beneficent sponsors the various saints in the Christian pantheon, the Holy Spirit not excluded. More detailed research into this, I suspect, will reveal further correspondences and continuities.

CONCLUSION

If we compare our present faith healers with their ancient counterparts, the katalonans or babaylans, faith healing can thus be viewed as just the latest avatar of the ancient Filipinos’ medico-religious system of beliefs and practices. This continuity can be traced historically along an apparently continuous line of filiation, either through survivals among our ethnic minorities or through preservation in the lowland areas as a result of the inability of the friars to suppress native beliefs or the intensity with which these were lived and revitalized in the succession of rebellious and messianic movements before and after the Revolution. This medico-religious line, however, constitutes just one of the sources and resources of Philippine psychology. We have therefore placed it in perspective with three others, one native and two foreign. The line of ethnic psychology is probably the richest of all, the poorest being that of academic-philosophical psychology. Both are however still virgin fields of historical as well substantive research. The Western tradition of academic-scientific psychology is probably the most well-known, and, until recently, it was considered as the only valid
form of psychology worthy of the scientist's attention. However, the integration of all the Philippine forms of psychology into a Sikolohiyang Filipino with a Filipino orientation may be viewed as the task of the present generation of Filipino psychologists.

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When Martial Law was proclaimed on September 21, 1972 and a "New Society" brought officially to life, new social forces were set into motion and old social forces distilled into new forms.

As some of the old forces died out, others merely split and still others consolidated or merged with entirely new ones. New contradictions became evident. The problem of constructing adequate analytical differentiations has quickly emerged. Central to this problem is the correct formulation in political economy of the specific and definite social mode of which underdevelopment and dictatorship in the Philippines may be both scientifically understood and competently exposed and opposed.

It is correct that the whole social condition is determined in the last instance by the concrete logic of real processes understandable only through the methodological and analytical structures of historical materialism expressed in political economy. It would be wrong, however, to see the problem of ideological formation as entirely peripheral, for to do so would mean to deny subjective disposition as an eventually objective force in the internal logic of a given line of historical development.

The martial law regime in the Philippines—the most consistent and outstanding feature of Philippine politics over the last years—is both common and distinct. It is common in the sense that it partakes of a general political tendency sweeping numerous Third World societies, especially those most closely linked with centers of monopoly capital through tight webs of dependency and underdevelopment. This general political tendency is characterized by the emergence of strong, centrally organized authoritarian states working through expanded military organizations and powerful technocracies operating beyond the old "law and order" line of self-justification and forming a more sophisticated line of ideological argument that vests the

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state with the role of leading instrument for "national development" as a response to the intensifying crises of underdevelopment. While the emergence of authoritarian structures in periphery societies may be explained in terms of the crisis of overaccumulation of capital in the capitalist metropolis, it does not diminish the fact that authoritarianism is also an ideological problem.

The "national development" regimes have so far been unified by their fundamental opposition to the national liberation movements as best expressed by the militarized character of what has already been referred to as the "neo-fascist" dimension of Third World authoritarianism. "Neo-fascism," however, refers not only to the militarism of these regimes but also to their general reliance on powerful technocratic control that, on a fundamental ideological basis, sees the problem of underdevelopment merely as problems of "efficiency" and "manageability." These powerful technocratic systems of domination and control are characteristically not opposed to imperialism, as they perceive Third World societies as "developing" rather than "underdeveloping"; and that "backwardness" may be resolved not by a revolutionary anti-imperialist break but by adequate "planning" and a strong political ability for the "implementation" of these plans. Thus, an attitude holding the primacy of the state in the historical transformation of societies: the familiar "statism" characteristic of the American school of political science.

In seeing the crisis of underdevelopment as simply a problem between "order" and "anarchy," technocrats develop strong sympathies with the military and serve both as allies and as justifications of military rule. The military-technocratic character, then, of the emergent Third World dictatorship develops both out of the real crisis of underdevelopment and constitutes a form of ideological understanding of the nature of the crisis. For close to a generation now, capitalist political scientists have been explaining away the structural crisis of underdevelopment as merely transitory conditions of political instability due either to the political "immaturity" of the post-colonial societies or to the unsettled legitimacy of the of the new independent states. This is disciplinist distortion, and it has led to the consequent ignorance among social scientists of the fundamental crisis of underdevelopment. The emergent "neo-fascist" understanding of the crisis of backwardness constitutes the logical conclusion of bourgeois-liberal understanding of social processes.

Martial law in the Philippines is a curious case of a regime that alternately insists it is tentative and transitory at one in-
stance and that it is the embodiment of a "new society" at other instances. On the one hand, its language of self-description argues for a "national security" state organized to meet specific and immediate "threats" to the Republic. On the other hand, it sees itself as the embodiment of the future, the principal initiator and guarantor of "national development." This ideological frame we shall refer to in this paper as "developmentalism." These two tendencies of rationalization are summed up in the initial proclamation that inaugurated the regime in the phrase: "to save the Republic and to form a new society."

The martial law regime is a comprehensive political phenomenon, while it has managed to constitute itself into a clear "break" with the government and politics of the Republic, the political coup that set its processes in motion does not represent an unbridgeable chasm in Philippine history. On the contrary, the paper sees it as the ineluctible conclusion of processes already in motion in Philippine history. This includes the objective processes of political economy, the distinct features of the class struggle as it manifests itself in the specific characteristics of neocolonialism and underdevelopment in the Philippines, and the subjective processes of ideological synthesis and political culture as it is determined in the last instance — and preeminently in the last instance — by the neocolonial mode.

Ideological formations must not be taken as if they occurred in a historical vacuum, as if they were self-determining — and much less, as if they were determinant in the last instance. To investigate these ideological formations in this way, while it has become characteristic of a large number of social scientists, is to investigate from the standpoint of idealism because such accords the realm of culture a separate and objective existence. A more perverted variation of this line of understanding is to see a whole complex of historical phenomena tumble out of the ideas of one man.

Another, not entirely separate line of understanding that has increasingly revealed itself inadequate is that which considers the ideological formations characteristic of the "New Society" period as being born entirely out of the political demands confronting the regime on a day-to-day basis. The ideological self-justification of the martial law regime is then seen as being premised largely on political opportunism — a conscious effort to deceive without being deceived. Thus, it is perceived, narrowly, as a wholly objectively determined conceptual system reflecting on a one to one basis the objective position, interests and direction of the ruling circle; or as thus.
forming nothing more than a series of consciously formulated deceptions to conceal the antagonistic political motions of the ruling circle perpetrated on the people and yet obfuscating the people's concrete understanding of the ruling circle's machinations.

This line of understanding oversimplifies the "mediative" operation of ideological systems by situating the ideological mediation between the ruling class and the dominated classes thus implying the absence of "mediative" intervention between the ruling circle and their objective class interests. This line of understanding ideological systems derives from a vulgar materialist understanding of the character and role of the state in class-divided societies. To expose therefore this more insidious line of understanding (more insidious because it infects the Left as much as the Right—or, more precisely, because it constitutes a bourgeoisified "Left" understanding that otherwise reconciles heretofore "Left" understanding with the right and subverts genuine revolutionary understanding) emerges as the more urgent task and a task that at the same time requires a more adequate theoretical grasp because it seeks to some to grips with qualitatively unique historical circumstances.

The outcome of the abovementioned line of ideological understanding in terms of scholarly output has been an extremely narrow assessment of the specific phenomenon of the "New Society" whose predominant line of analysis tends more to the consequently vain attempt to show the inconsistency of the regime's "claims" from the "reality" it conceals. This attempt to show the "insincerity" of the regime, while not being entirely wrong, is geared ultimately, whether the commentators are conscious of it or not, to a criticism of the regime and at the same time a validation of its "claims" since it is not the objective character of the "claims" that are subject to radical investigation but the "effectiveness" by which the "claims" are being transformed into actuality. This leaves the basic and objective ideological "moment" unexamined and eventually—and often unwittingly—reconciles the "critics" of the regime with the regime's own basic assumptions and subjectivities, with its "mission" of national emancipation. The outcome, therefore, consists not of "objective" assessments but ultimately of subjective concurrence with the essential presumptions of the dominant self-justification of the ruling classes and therefore of the myopic assessment of the historical processes it sets into motion and a non-recognition of its objective historical "moment."
In the last analysis, these types of assessments of a concrete phenomenon in history is treated in a manner that differs very little from the positivist, technocratic self-justifications and reproductions of the dominant consciousness that have already been discredited with finality and transcended by the most advanced modes of social understanding generated by the "critical" social sciences.

"Clearly, the main theoretical problems emerging in the course of constructing an objective assessment of the ideological characteristics of a concrete "moment" in history boils down to the need for an adequate clarification of the nature of the state in relation to the objectively formed and scientifically investigable characteristics of the social mode and the subjectively developing and objectively determined ideological formation as it develops and clusters around a definite social mode. The laws of history (historical materialism) explain the development of a social mode and situate it in the larger context whereby the historical essence of a social "block" may be understood. It does not, however, provide a consistent "guide" to the subjective formations accompanying the emergence in history of social modes. It does not explain from an external logical the subjective determinations that at certain historical "moments" seemingly play the determinant role in the turn of historical circumstances.

The state under any condition should not be understood as a totally mindless, reflex expression of production relations especially in the warped class circumstances of underdeveloping societies. It is not literally and simplistically the "executive committee" of the ruling class which otherwise connotes the absolute self-consciousness of the ruling class, and thus also of the underclasses', requiring the outrightly violent imposition of class rule without the consoling and mollifying mediations and fetters of a "civil" culture. The state rather than being directly an expression of production relations is an expressions of the specific social mode and therefore the specific nature of the class struggle in a society at a given instance with all the dimensions of determinations and contradictions contained herein.

It is important to situate the investigation of ideological formations within a general understanding of the state in underdeveloped societies. Otherwise the attempt to reflect on the ideological traditions shall sum up into mere summarizations of policy statements rather than a comprehensive understanding of the functions of ideological formation in the specific context of an underdeveloped society.
An ideological mould forms in the context of concrete political circumstances and cannot be fully grasped apart from an understanding of the structural conditions determining these circumstances. While it is beyond the scope of this study to determine the exact function of the "New Society" regime in the context of underdevelopment, it must by necessity operate on a definite and conscious set of propositions concerning the "periphery" character of the martial law regime. The state must be seen in terms of the role imputed to it by conditions of underdevelopment—not in terms of political scientism that is capable of seeing only functions in themselves without the dimension of epochal essence, and thus in a consequently affirmative way that has in fact rationalized authoritarianism.

More definitely, however, the study must treat as its object the ideological view of the state as the material embodiment of such abstracts as "nation," "sovereignty" and "national destiny" which are precisely, as taken in this paper, the very subjective dispositions of the self-justification, the specific ideological formation it investigates. On this basis, it shall attempt to trace the development of the bourgeois-liberal theory of the polity up to its maturation in the self-justification of authoritarianism in its basic military-technocratic forms and its developmentalist rationalization. It must then consider the political pressures that determined the transformation of the "referee" conception of the state with its pluralist implications to the "interventionist" conception of the state and its authoritarian political practice. Therefore, the theoretical view that the bourgeois "interventionist" state is not ideologically inconsistent with the bourgeois-liberal view. It is, in fact, its ideological conclusion. This essential transformation in the ideological mold of bourgeois statism as it occurs within the dominant political circle in the Philippines shall be the main task of this description.

This Nation Shall Be Great Again

The distillation of bourgeois-liberal understanding of politics and government from the nebulous pluralist theory to the more cogent statism of authoritarian self-justification did not simply occur in the Philippine context when Presidential Proclamation 1081 was declared. The process of distillation in the political consciousness of the ruling circle—conditioned both by the necessities of crisis and the legitimation of specific political responses to necessity—has been in motion perhaps as early as President Quirino's suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus at the height of radicalized peasant resistance to landlord rule during the early part of the fifties.

The process is more evident, however, in the gradual reconstitution of political rule characterizing the Marcos presidency from 1965 to 1972 and culminating in the Marcos regime of martial law. The distillation of the political consciousness of the ruling circle is best expressed in the ideas of the central figure, and perhaps the personification, of this process whereby Philippine society entered into a definite line of development where the state apparatus overdeveloped as the social mode undrdeveloped to contain both fundamental resistance to the condition of underdevelopment and to promote an ideological notion of "development" without an anti-imperialist revolutionary break.

Even before the Marcos years, "enlightened" economists and businessmen were beginning to clamor against the "high cost of politics" while at the same time demanded a "stable" political order that would provide a "healthy climate" for capital. Liberalism as social theory sets the premises for the theory of a "popular" revolution emanating from "above" in the institutions of state authority. This ideological theme rests almost in its entirety on the assumption of the non-ideologicality of the state. The state is "popular" because it is the embodiment of the "general interest"—specially the general interest "in the last analysis," meaning the fundamental basis of a society that may not, in the Rousseauan sense, be perceptible by all, or, in the Hobbesian sense, a common interest made evident by necessity. In this sense, the Aristotelian notion of "constitutionalism," the underlying "mean" unaffected by the whole range of "passions" which is merely presumed in liberalism, becomes the expressed and cogent logic of self-justification in authoritarianism. The logic as well as the rhetoric of liberalism plays a crucial role in authoritarian self-justification.

Utilization of the social contract framework for rationalizing the authoritarian state is explicit rather than merely implicit in the discourses of the President. The state is then to be understood as a natural mechanism for social regulation and, therefore, an inherent component of society. While this myth of the social contract has been debunked as anthropologically baseless, the ideological attitude deriving from this naturalist theory of the state continue to be pervasive specially as it is preserved in bourgeois legalism.

The basic liberal-technocratic premises thus developed from the essential world-view of bourgeois political theory finds its
logical conclusions in the authoritarianism of the state—authoritarianism built on the autocracy of one person being merely a variant. Without the framework of social class analysis, liberalism eventually distills into a "classless" view of the state and politics. The state then exists for the "authoritative allocation" of values and is, therefore, standing "above politics" or must ideally do so. Along with the rhetoric on the "end of ideology", a pure reason of science is held aloft not for scrutiny on a critical basis that assumes ideological relativity but for uncritical reverence. A political authority acting in the name of this scientific reason cannot, therefore, be questioned—and fundamentally it is unopposable. Superimposed on the social contract framework, this scientistic delusion reduces the problem of political oppositions into a problem merely of opposition to the state. Since the state is held to be the objectification of the 'general will' then opposition to the state is historically, rationally and politically invalid. Thus, the "anti-politics" attitude of technocrats is subsumed into the ideological fibre of authoritarianism—and their uncritical submission assured since it is beyond the technocratic wit to think beyond the logic of the present. Constrained as they are by the logic of positivism, they are merely concerned with trying to make given circumstances "workable".

On this ideological theme, the ruling circle perceives the crisis confronting Philippine society to be nothing more than a crisis of the political order rather than a crisis of underdevelopment, which would thus require an essentially "political" solution: although exclusively a political solution by the already existing institutional political authority. None of the competing groups represent the "national" solution to the crisis—they are all "particular wills." Only the "duly established" political authority can provide this kind of political solution. This is the essential character of the claim to "democratic revolution" or the "revolution from the center."

Even if the competing groups were admitted to be "an accumulation of responses to the ills of society, which were rooted in social and economic imbalances and inequities", they were categorized primarily as anti-governmental and thus were posed as being all in the same category—as "problems" rather than as alternative solutions: the martial law regime being conversely not an "alternative" solution but the solution in objective form. The regime represents the necessary political precondition for society to realize itself; in Rousseau's terms, it is the transitory condition marked by the systematic eradica-
tion of all particular wills which is at once the process of self-
realization.

The basic line of confrontation is therefore understood as
that which divides government and all opposed to it. There is
therefore no cognition of "progressive" and "regressive" forces
identifiable through some theory of qualitative historical motion
because such does not exist in bourgeois consciousness, the basis
of the criticism of its "myopic" character. The essence of the
"democratic revolution," the declared objective of the martial
law regime, is merely to make government work.

Consistent with the liberal understanding of the state, gov-
ernment is taken as an abstract objective hovering over and
above the real forces at work in society and not partisan to any
of the opposing forces. Government is the neutral arbiter of
conflicting forces and social forces in opposition are necessarily
considered "abberations and mere disturbances." Social conflict
must be eradicated rather than resolved and a state without
"politics" is thus required. The martial law state specifically
presents itself as the embodiment of some interest-of-the-whole
whose realization of retarded by "partisan" contests. With the
mandate of Reason, it does not need the majority.

The Democratic Revolution

The regime in general and Marcos in particular has been
consistently trying to appropriate the characteristic "revolu-
tionary" for itself. Presenting itself as the solution to a social
crisis which everyone had decided required a revolutionary
response, the regime had to take on a "revolutionary" constitu-
tionality required to sustain its legitimacy specially in the eyes
of the old forces on which it relies on much of its immediate
support. The combination of both "constitutionality" and a revo-
lutionary claim is essential because it must appeal to the
broadest sections of a decidedly polarized society. Since the
regime has not been equipped by a historical; long-range pro-
gram of revolutionary social overhaul, it must rest, on the
one hand, on its revolutionary claims. Since it must substan-
tially restructure the mechanisms of law and governmental
process to eliminate opposition, centralize power and assure its
own political survival as well as convince sections of the oppo-
sition that it is intent on resolving the political immobilisme
which had developed in the years preceding the declaration of
martial law, it must use, on the other hand, the rhetorics of
revolution. The reconciliation of these two aspects still finds
hospitable ground in bourgeois-liberal political theory and hos-
piteable quarters in the bourgeois legalism of the old Republic. This ideological synthesis the regime refers to as the "Democratic Revolution" the central argument of which is not the establishment of a revolutionary regime that overthrows in the process the old state but rather a revolution coursed through (it is tempting to say "sublimated") the existing institutional processes.

The theory of the "democratic revolution" intends to draw revolutionary legitimacy from those who could compete politically with the regime of denying the validity of revolutionary movements outside the state apparatus. In order to invalidate revolutionary movements, specially those of an anti-imperialist nature, the regime must appropriate revolutionary legitimacy for itself. This requires extending state monopoly to cover revolutionary transformation and deny the revolutionary validity of those opposed to the state. Since the state is "value-free", in the last analysis, according to the ideological premises of liberalism, only the revolution launched by the state can possibly represent the general welfare. It is also the most convenient since it is presented as the alternative to a "bloody upheaval," a prospect quite distasteful for the middle-class constituency, that would eventually lead to the disintegration of the nation. The "democratic revolution" also represents the most rational undertaking by men in an age of reason and science, as made to contrast with the typified revolutionary war whose violence is to be understood as expressive only of a barbaric past. For the regime to claim a monopoly as the radicalizing force, it combines the "national security" function with that of "national development.

To better secure this monopoly, it is necessary to invalidate both the autonomous "radicalizing" capability of the masses and their inability or incompetence to formulate or even understand a comprehensive line of development beneficial to them in the last instance. This leads logically not only to an elitist attitude which is important to mandate the technocracy but also to a subtly cultivated contempt for mass initiative important for validating the repressive role played by the military.

Bourgeois social science has consistently maintained that sporadic revolution is "disruptive" and patently "dysfunctional". Only when revolution is redefined as a conscious, planned and institutional process which does not result in breaks and discontinuities but occurs within the realm of expectancy and continuity of control it is acceptable: thus within the framework of state persistence and initiative. This redefi-
tion thus castrates revolution of the content of spontaniety and popular initiative.

Contempt for the historical creativity of the masses—the notion that they do not make as well as compose the revolutionary phenomenon—leads to the rationalization of processes of domination and control exercised over the masses by a technocratic establishment that "leads" them down the road of history. This contemptuous view of the masses is the raison d'etre for a technocratic establishment planning for the masses rather than with them. It is central for the consistency of argument for the "developmentalist" role of the state—where "public welfare" rather than explicit consent becomes the basis of "mandate."

Isang Bansa, Isang Diwa

The core of the martial law regime's effort at political integration and ideological incorporation is a sustained appeal to nationalism—specifically a definition of nationalism that follows a line of least resistance; more precisely, a nationalism that draws from the old bourgeois-democratic revolution close to a century ago an artificially revived attraction. The crude comprador nationalism of the old bourgeois-democratic revolution has, however, been distilled into a glorification of the nation-state, the imagination of some national essence, a Weltanschauung of sorts, and a consequent classless view of politics that provides the ideological precondition for a corporatist political order.

Nationalism is here understood as a conservative, preservative emotive force, one that "builds" rather than "destroys" and its main expression is the "democratic revolution" that is pursued to hold the nation together. Nationalism means recognizing the "general will" that is rendered in evident by the short-sightedness of political competition. The martial law regime presents itself as the main instrument for nationalism and the source of its moral compulsion to sustain "assimilation into political authority." Political integration on the basis of the nation, nationalism in rhetoric and corporation in substance, is not unique to the ideological distillation of the "New Society" alone: it is the logical conclusion of bourgeois-liberal premises.

By misconceiving nation as fact rather than as concept, it is inevitable that it be reduced both in theory and in political practice to assume an abstract corporeality, an ideological imagination that is at the same time the reason of being for an actual authoritarianism. The imputation of a national essence
on the individual binds him on a fundamental basis to his "nationality" and therefore to the national state which is the objective embodiment not only of a national spirit but also of the national destiny. The state thus presents itself, from this ideological standpoint, as the clear view into the future from a vantage point not available to the individual. It denies the "individual" a separate view comparable in significance to the state which is not only benefitted with the historical accumulation of the whole society, its "heritage", but also a profound grasp of the collective historical effort of the society.

*The Ethics of Corporatism*

The crucial cornerstone of the social ethics of authoritarianism is an absolutist view of man. The one-dimensionality of "reason" in Lockeian and the constancy of "human nature" in the Hobbesian sense form the essential premises of technocratic consciousness and the authoritarian preference for social control and "social engineering."

The unidimensional concept of change is understood as occurring in the framework of "reason" that is in no way historically relative and therefore absolute and non-partisan. The process of change, then, is understood as a completely conscious process, one that technocrats may plan for. Individual men must therefore submit themselves to this singular "reason", and consequently to the "plans" detailed from above to achieve "development" that is known to the reason of the state but not autonomously available to individual consciousness. From the standpoint of this singular reason, men must conform eventually not through coercion but by "free" option on the basis of "rationality." This is the theoretical essence of the call for "discipline."

The reason of science is not merely technocratic rhetoric. It is the very fibre of a new Right ideology that brushes aside all social issues and fundamental ideological differentiations on their resolution by posing the false promise of technology and technological reason as the resolution of the leading problems of human existence. It also posits the infallibility of a political apparatus laying claim to scientific reason. By posing "technology" as the liberating element, technocratic reason invalidates the question of social relations as the focus of any effort at social change; the social structure is therefore not a matter of historically tentative relations transformed by human will on the basis of historically limited consciousness but a phenomenon determined wholly by available technology and changed
by technological alteration. The total and totalizing "reason of science" subsumes even the understanding of "humanism" by denying any form of relativity beyond the transplanted techniques of the natural sciences imposed on the understanding of human society. The simplistic reductionism of technocratic consciousness of every social problem to a problem of "management" puts the primacy of control, operating on the one-dimensional logic of costs and benefits, over independent initiative: the technologized consciousness.

Authoritarianism and "Take-off"

The promise of "national development" is at once the familiar export-led, foreign-investments-fueled dependent industrialization mapped out by the planning institutions of the centers of capital and enforced through the dictatorships in the neocolonies, as well as the raison d'etre of the developmentalist authoritarian states. Since the line of "development" articulated by, among others, the IMF-World Bank that emphasizes integration into the world imperialist system rather than self-propelled, self-sufficient development by emphasizing interdependence" rather than independence is more or less standard and not substantially depreciated in its specific enforcement on the Filipino people, more attention must now be paid to its significance as ideology over its significance as policy (an aspect extensively discussed in other studies).

Backwardness, according to the reactionary social science exported from the capitalist centers to the Third World, is merely a transitory condition caused by a rapid infusion of Western social influences and the "lag" emerging from the slow "adaptability" of the non-western societies. The solution, then, is the establishment of "strong" political orders that would "stabilize" these societies and allow for rapid adaptability and transition from the "backward" cultural systems that served to "bottleneck" development. The martial law regime sees itself as the "initiator" of development. It sets the political basis for transcending the condition of "backwardness" by establishing the new political structures necessary for it. The regime sees itself often as "development" in its political form, and that "development" is inconceivable outside the framework of the martial law establishment.

By situating the focus of backwardness on the political "paralysis" of society and its "disorientation" rather than on the periphery character of the economy and thus to its neocolonial linkages, no inconsistency is seen between the "New
Society" and its nationalist guises on one hand and continued foreign intrusion on the other.

Unable to distinguish the industrial functions of an economic system from its nature and qualitative character as well as its long-term qualitative outcomes, the technocracy, ridden by short-sighted liberal economism, operates on a crisis to crisis basis, and in so doing merely reproduces the general crisis of underdevelopment in ever newer mutations. It would be wrong to try to see the regime as subservient to imperialism on a point by point basis. The regime conforms rather to the overall requirements of the world imperialist system in terms of the overall outcome of its projected “New Society.” It may, from time to time, give out semblances of relative national autonomy and independence as well as relative autonomy from the traditional and developing ruling classes. But its long-term direction is definitely the reconstitution of the ruling classes internally on the basis of a neo-colonial society transforming on the qualitatively new premises of monopoly capital at its most advanced, world integrative stage. The antagonism of the regime towards persisting “inefficient” feudal social forms is not from the standpoint of an autonomously developing national capitalism but rather from the standpoint of a dependent capitalist social formation that the regime does not “reflect” on a unilateral basis. Moreover, the regime also creates as a response to increasing neocolonial pressures that, given its ideological debility, perceived merely as “anarchic” forces that will be laid to rest with the imposition of overwhelming “political will” through dictatorship.

**Liberalism and Authoritarianism**

Third World authoritarianism, in its Philippine expression in particular, is not to be understood merely as a right-wing backlash to the growing tide of national liberation movements. Neither is it a mechanical response of the local, existing ruling classes nor is it wholly a self-conscious imperialist plot carried out against the masses through fully aware mercenaries and puppets. It is not even the classic fascist outcome growing out of general distress. It is beyond all of these and at the same time is all of these. But only in the last analysis.

To try to explain the martial law regime in terms of the given stereotypes mentioned above would result not in a full scientific understanding but in a caricature of it. The controversial implication, therefore, is that both the straight-forward “dependista” analysis that looks at the “concrete” structural
sources of dictatorship in a merely economistic way unenlightened by the advantage of dialectical investigation, and the political scientistic "decision-making" analysis that looks for the "objective" influences determining the formulation of policy—and in its oppositionist application, that looks for "actual" imperialist policy "pressure" and decision-making linkages—would prove futile in the task of placing the phenomenon of "nationalist" and "revolutionary" dictatorships in the context of deepening underdevelopment and in terms of a long-term understanding.

The martial law regime, along with the ideological rhetoric it exhales, is, rather, a subjective consensus from a single, distilled ideological standpoint on how to respond to the crisis of underdevelopment not understood as such. It is a backlash, partly, but not from the "right" if this connotes the whole spectrum of the already existing ruling classes, but from those who, feeling threatened by the "disorder" of rising oppositions, want a way out of a social condition that absorbs and transforms, rather than liquidates, old forms of domination. It is also partly a "coup" against the pluralist political expressions of undistilled liberalism, but one that transforms and "reforms" the old process by which privilege is distributed without changing the fundamental source of privilege, in a structural sense, not because it does not will it but because it does not "see" it. It is not classic reactionism in the sense that it does not restore and preserve the social process that feeds the centers of domination by preserving the persons in the process, but a seemingly "progressive" reactionism because it preserves the old process of domination by qualitatively elevating it to a new stage. It is a new fascism peculiar to the underdeveloped societies because it does not merely glorify and render the state metaphysical, it specifically vests on the state the all-mandating distinction of being the instrument of the whole society that would finally resolve the crisis of backwardness and "emancipate" the whole people.

The martial law regime and its "New Society" are not solely by-products excreted by the objective production forces locked in the crisis of underdevelopment. They are, rather, also the products of an ideologically defined way out of the morass of backwardness. They are the sublimated resolutions of the problem of underdevelopment because they represent an incomplete understanding of the nature of underdevelopment.

The dominance of a technocracy working on the premises of the "social science" of distilled liberalism and reliant on the
back-bone of military command structures, the problem of the "relative autonomy" of the state, the possibility of "normalization" after the internalization of technocratic logic on a mass scale, the "splits" in the ruling class, and other such questions are not resolved without first taking into consideration the over-developing state mechanisms and the conscious logic of its development from which both its objective circumstances and its subjective understanding of its circumstances should be investigated. Karl Marx warned us earlier against the dangers of analytical simplification and "non-ideological" pitfalls when doing the type of investigation in which we are involved here:

Victor Hugo confines himself to bitter and witty invective against the man who was responsible for the coup d'état. The event itself appears in his work like a bolt from the blue. He sees in it only the violent act of a single individual. He does not notice that he makes this individual great instead of little by ascribing to him a personal power of initiative, which would be unparalleled in world history. Proudhon, for his part, seeks to represent the coup d'état as the result of the preceding historical development. Unnoticeably, however, his historical construction of the coup d'état becomes a historical apologia for its hero. Thus he falls into the error of our so-called objective historians. I, on the contrary, demonstrate how the class struggle in France created circumstances and relationships that made it possible for a grotesque and mediocre personality to play a hero's part. (Preface to the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte).

On the question of the "New Society" regime in particular, the preponderant tendency for authoritarianism and the justification for it falls consistent with the definition of the crisis of backwardness and its proposed resolution put forward by a well-developed technocratic bureaucracy composed of imperialist-trained "developmentalists", "nationalist" and "progressive" nurtured in the liberal social sciences and seriously engaged in the requisite "social engineering" for development.

The social questions confronted by the regime as well as those new social issues emerging as a consequence of the regime's very existence cannot anymore be resolved by the distilled liberalism of conventional social science. It has already become dictatorship's own justification.
IN THE MOUNTAIN'S WOMB

MICHAEL MANUEL GONZALEZ

The study of the kolorum,¹ the Tagalog term for those 'revitalist' (Wallace: 1956), 'nativist' (Linton: 1943), 'messianic' (Lanternani: 1974) and 'millenarian' phenomena (Burridge: 1969), requires not only an explanatory paradigm for "kolorum" activity, but also a theoretical stance in the handling of "subjective" data which these activities invariably generate. Failure to come to terms with the symbolic milieu of these activities often betrays the observer's bias and reveals ambiguities at description:

Secret societies seem to achieve the most dramatic results in changing the pattern of living among members but on the whole, they only retard the process of socio-economic development . . . (Cullen: 1973)

While Cullen concedes the presence of dynamic social relations within these societies, he inevitably assigns to them an image of stasis and fatalism. He does not explain how he has arrived at such a conclusion. We can only guess on the basis of similar experiences with these so-called secret societies that confusion arises from the 'subjective' statements that members of these societies are prone to make. When asked, for instance, to link their founder with other historical personalities, one of my informants responded: "They are all one." A decade and a half ago, in a different place, a similar query by an earlier researcher elicited a similar response: "It's all the same banana."² (Sturtevant: 1976) In transcending both time and matter, the utterances lead the casual observer to mistake this sense of timelessness for a lack of "change".

Other writers have been less kind and less balanced in describing kolorum groups. Academics doing research on the sub-

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¹ The term kolorum is derived from the phrase *per omnia secula seculum* and often used to imply 'illegitimate' activities with jorative undertones. The term as used here implies a historical type characterized by a patriotic and anti-friar (Roman Catholic) stance. A more recent insight on the term is suggested by Patricia Araneta Gonzales's "Banahaw: Per Omnia Secula Seculorum", in *Diliman Review*, 28 (3) 1980: 52-54.

² See "Appendix B" p. 276, Interview with Pedro Calosa (kolorum leader in the 1930's).

My informant Mr. Amador Suarez is the *tagapayo* (adviser) of the Suprema dela Iglesia del Ciudad Mistica de Dios, Inc. located on the slopes of Mt. Banahaw, Dolores, Quezon Province.
ject are themselves often regarded as oddities, and were they to maintain an even sympathetic stance towards the kolorum, “guilt-by-association” is meted to them in haste. It appears that the problem arises not only in attempting to forward an explanation that is defensible, but also in reconsidering the very problem of “objectivity” as practised over several hundred years of western science and philosophy (Mushakoji: 1970). The latter, however, is beyond the scope of this paper, but its inclusion identifies the problematique confronted by non-western social scientists in general and questioned periodically by western scholars especially when this data cannot be entirely “objectified” (Turner: 1977). The problem becomes more complex for Philippine scholars since they have yet to establish a common ground for research. This indicates that so much shift has occurred in scholarly preferences even as the bibliography grows in length since Sturtevant’s pioneering study of “popular uprisings”. Equally diverse assumptions are suggested, as in the formers’ stress/strain theory (1976); Jocano’s (1973) adaptive reaction to the breakdown of modernization; Foronda’s ephemeral cults (1961) and Covar’s taxonomy of cultural traditions (1975). A more recent contribution to this growing bibliography is Ileto’s persuasive study on the pasyon (the Philippine version of Christ’s Passion) as the locus of peasant perceptions of change (1979). Unfortunately, however, this variety of approaches unearthed merely an edifice of data which taken together defies cohesiveness. The question remains: How do we bring an explanation to bear on such an “inchoate”, subjective and even “odd” subject such as the “kolorum”?

While doing research on “folk religious sects” in the summer of 1976 (despite the protests of our research director), we trekkled with our pastor (guides) to the summit of symbolic Mount Banahaw (2,177 m.) In the context of the religious communities on Banahaw, the act of climbing the mountain is an act of sacrifice, an act that is reenacted during the Lenten season by thousands of devotees. The pasyon-like ritual involves the visitation in rosary-like fashion of puestos (shrine stations) starting from the foothills to the mountain summit. The pilgrims’ motives centered on the panata (vows). By comparison our motive appeared banal to witness the pilgrims’ ordeal

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3 Reviewing the literature available so far, Sylvia Thrupp (1962) laments the lack of any basis for comparative studies.
4 The research was conducted by the now defunct Philippine Center for Advanced Studies in 1975-76 under Dr. P. Covar. The latter felt the mountain was beyond our jurisdiction, we argued otherwise, pointing out that this was the apex of the pilgrims’ ritual. For three days of heat, fog and cold drizzle we negotiated the peak, then its crater and back.
although intuitively, we felt that climbing the mountain would lead us to a better perspective on ritual behavior. But for a while the metaphor of the mountain was lost when physical survival became our major concern. The fact was, we were, as non-believers, not even expected to manage the half-way mark to the peak. Our climb and our return unscathed added a new dimension to our relationship with the sect members. It was a shock of recognition to them as it was for us.\(^5\) Having bared our loob (inner self), so to speak, we found that they were now more willing to bare theirs. The revelation is better expressed by an earlier pilgrim who wrote (Aranas: 1927):

\[
\text{Ang nasa loob ko’y itong kahirapan} \\
\text{ay ang hahalili itong katuwaan,} \\
\text{kaya ko sinapit ang ganitong bagay} \\
\text{nang makilala ko ang kaliwanagan.}
\]

This suffering within will be replaced by this joy why I came unto this lot is for me to recognize the light.\(^6\)

Literally, the term makilala means to recognize but in the nuance of Tagalog it can refer to a deeper and more face-to-face relationship with the object of knowing. In terms of our metaphor of sacrifice, the mountain climb, we had moved closer to the “light” or kaliwanagan. Being a magbubundok—one who has climbed the mountain—bestows a certain status so that curious lowlanders seeking a similar experience have sometimes been referred to us, “Ayan, itanong mo sa kanila.” (There, ask them.) With this came the tacit acknowledgement of our “memberships” the symbolic community. This leads us to an essential feature of the study of the kolorum and similar activities: to see the light requires sacrifice, for sacrifice is in fact the key concept of every ritual endeavor. In more secular terms, the light is that “intuitive grasp” arrived at by prolonged exposure to the milieu being investigated.\(^7\)

The metaphor of sacrifice is well enshrined in folk literary tradition. Heroic self-sacrifice for the good of the parent or the kingdom is an oft repeated theme. In the narrative poem Ibang Adarna, the hero prince commits self-laceration—squeez-
ing a lemon into a self-inflicted wound—in order to remain conscious and thus avoid the bird’s mesmerizing song. By staying awake, the prince can dodge the bird’s potent droppings that could turn him into stone. One can derive a variety of symbols from such a vivid combination of sacral and banal imagery. That the folk symbolists (raconteurs and writers) have raided the awit and corrido and other similar genres is evident in vernacular bibliography. This providence unfortunately is seldom mined, except by folklorists and students of comparative literature.

Tagalog literature is noted for its characteristic angst which has been present even during its proto-Christian stage (Medina: 1976).

And the quality of emotion that dominated folklore—poetry and prose, and then the derivative ritualistic theatre—defined the primary virtue: an agency that is a celebration of the Tagalog predilection for suffering.

This notion of struggle does not escape even from what should otherwise be innocuous oyayi or lullaby (Medina: 1976):

Matulog ka na bunso
ang ina mo ay malayo
at hindi ka masundo
Daa’y may putik at balaho

Sleep now, child sleep
your mother is far away
there is mud and puddle on the road.

Filipino folklorists agree that folklore takes on a rather “serious view of life” characterized by a general feeling of “sorrow” (Eugenio: 1976) which upon the consolidation with the Christian tradition developed into “epic” proportions. Until the 19th century, Spanish colonization engendered the acculturation of Biblical and medieval European myths through the folk theatre—the moro-moro (Christian vs Moor play) and senakulo (Passion play) (Tiongson: 1975). An acculturated Christ emerged and took on the feature of a Filipino culture hero. We take clues from the biography of Jesus as interpreted by the writers of the pasyon: Gaspar Aquino de Belen, Aniceto de la Merced, and Mariano Pilapil (Lumbera: 1968). In his analysis of the pasyon, Father Francisco, S.J., found four images of Christ represented in these versions. One image is that of Christ as a model for man; second, that of Christ as

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8 Marcelo P. Garcia, ed. (1957). *Awit* (chants) and *corridos* (narratives) were popular literary fare during the Spanish period. They are distinguished by metre, but their thematic content is similar.

The Adarna bird was a popular symbol of Hispanic origin. (Romualdez: 1938 as cited by E. San Juan: 1971) A cult that calls its foundress *Inang Adarna*, may be found in Bongabong, Nueva Ecija.
God yet humble and obedient to his parents and the church; third, that of Christ as a model of suffering and calm; and lastly, that of the unity of Christ in man (Francisco, 1977:190-197). Historically, the colonial regime found appropriate use for the first three images. Ultimately, what caught the imagination of the population was the possibility of social protest using the image of Christ as "the exemplary insurgent." A detailed investigation of the pasyon will also reveal sociological data that hewed closely to what we have come to know as the "traditional culture"—the family ethos, the value of motherhood, the strength of friendship; and, to contextualize the spatial setting of the pasyon, a tropical, albeit symbolic mirror-image of Jerusalem is created. This process Ileto calls "recasting". I would prefer to place this process within the context of acculturation to encompass a wider sociological area (La Barre: 1971:20-22). In either case, the folk character of the pasyon, the presence of "doctrinal mistakes" which agitated the friar-clergy no end, brings it closer to reality and, therefore, better mirrors the folk consciousness of its audience.

In his analysis of peasant and religious leadership behavior between 1840-1910, Ileto provides evidence that the peasants perceived reality in terms of the pasyon or that the leaders were able to communicate through the facility of the pasyon symbols like pagtitis (forbearance), loob (inner self), liwanag (light) and katubusan (redemption) among others. So embedded were these symbols that time and again even in modern times the radical worker or peasant writers need only resurrect these images for relevant political action (Kerkvliet: 1977; Reyes: 1978). Only in this diachronic sequence can we appreciate Ileto's historical observation (1979: 19):

During the Spanish and American colonial era, these images nurtured an undercurrent of millineal beliefs which, in times of economic and political crisis, enabled the peasantry to take action under the leadership of individuals or groups promising deliverance from oppression.

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9 The term, a very apt one, was coined by E. San Juan Jr. (1971:32).
10 For example, to concretize this reality, Mount Banahaw, to its devotees, is pasyon-land with its River of Jordan, Gethsemane, and Calvary. The area is popularly called Banal na Lugar (Holy Land) and Bagong Herusalem (New Jerusalem).
11 To La Barre: Acculturation is not the cause of crisis cults; it is only one very common area for human ambivalence about culture...and for cultural "identity crisis—but always of individuals and groups of individuals." p. 20.
12 Direct appropriation of these images may be seen in Aurelio Tolentinos' play Bagong Cristo (New Christ) 1907, depicting the conflict between labor and capital. See Delfin Tolentino (1976:6-8). Contemporary activists have likewise found the utility of "recasting" Marx in Biblical terms when working in more "traditional" communities.
IN THE MOUNTAIN’S WOMB

This “undercurrent of millinealism” continues to this day despite the competing forms of potentially symbolic media, such as cinema and television. Beyond the prophetic statement of Keesing that the Philippines is “messianic potential”¹³ there remains the problem of seeking out these continuities. Turner (1977) believes that socio-cultural systems orient themselves to “root paradigms”. He defines this (in terms strikingly similar to Ileto’s excerpt above) as representing (1977: 74):

conciously recognized (though only on occasions of raised consciousness) cultural models of an allusive, metaphorical kind, cognitively delimited, emotionally loaded, and ethically impelled, so as to give form to social action in publicly critical circumstances.

Narratives of exemplary religious and political personalities which climax in actions of self-sacrifice for social goals become the basis for such “root paradigm”. A “genealogy of folk heroes” and mythic characters from Christ, Hari sa Bukid, Bernardo Carpio, Leon Kilat to Rizal may very well fit the narrative.¹⁴ No wonder, as casual observers would put it, that Filipinos have a soft spot for the underdog and the martyr.

The pasyon as a cultural model represents explicit social action raised to the level of sacrifice, redemption and resurrection: Jesus is separated from his parents and his apostles, arrested, pilloried and convicted by the higher priests, crucified then entombed only to disappear three days later, and finally resurrected to redeem all mankind. Philippine folklore is replete with examples of this process. In the sleeping hero myth (Mojares: 1974), the hero withdraws from the kingdom; he is imprisoned or killed by his enemies; but he does not die or is not really “dead”; he is instead prophesied to return and redeem his people. Each time a hero’s death captures the symbolic imagination, the myth of the eternal return is invariably invoked. In this milieu the heroes of Ileto’s study did not “die”. It is noteworthy that in some Rizalista cults, the founder’s death or a revered person’s demise is not termed namatay (has died) but is instead referred to as “umalis” (has left). In the same manner, Jose Rizal did not “die”.

Unlike Christ, the exegesis of Rizal can stand on real historical grounds, a fact that even makes the study of Rizalista cults more perplexing.¹⁵ Not only was the man a prolific writer who made known his sentiments, he is also the un-ending source

¹³ The term comes from Felix Keesing as cited by Sturtevant (1976: 260).
¹⁴ Adapted from a lecture of Ileto with a similar title delivered at the Ateneo University, 1977.
of journalistic attention. Yet Rizal when placed among his peers was no different from the others in that they all sought intellectual and cultural liberation from a repressive Spanish colonial regime. In fact, his exemplary life was accented by the “dramatic publicity” of his death. Rizal’s execution in the hands of the oppressive regime, given the assumption that the pasyon and similar genre established the perception of real historical events among the people, could not but evoke an expression similar to the Christian metaphor.

That Rizal himself cultivated this metaphor of sacrifice is beyond mere speculation. Although others will contest this as sheer coincidence, we need only review the manner of his incarceration and execution to show the contrary. A Rizal biographer describes this aptly (Coates: 1968:293):

...never for an instance was there the slightest failing of his supreme composure. And with it, then and until the end, went a quiet strain of humour. Shortly after his return [when they arrested him enroute to Cuba] he designed and sent to the family a little sketch of the Agony in the Garden beneath which he wrote the words, “This is but the First Station.”

The inner calm of Rizal as he was led to his Golgotha on December 30, astounded the attending military doctors. As the soldiers raised their rifles, Rizal declared: “Consummatum est.” When he fell he made an effort to hit the ground with his face towards the sky and thus dignify his death. Within the norms of the pasyon, the steadfastness of Rizal in the face of death projected a steadfast loob. Organizing a motific index of the myths which have grown around the hero illustrates this correlation with the life of Christ:16

15 Jose Protacio Rizal was born on June 19, 1861 to Francisco Mercado and Teodora Alonso, in Calamba, Laguna. Rizal (from ricial, green of renewal) was assumed as a secondary surname to Mercado (market-place) and has remained such due to Jose’s popularity. A genius nurtured by self-discipline, Rizal earned degrees in Medicine and Philosophy (1885), wrote two novels Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo. His writings and political leadership led the Spaniards to brand him as dangerous to the regime. He was arrested, exiled (1892-96) and later executed on December 30, 1896 after a mock trial. He left behind voluminous tracts on politics, culture and literature. Successive regimes, American, Japanese and various others served up Rizal as a model. No plaza is without his statue, and students are required by law to study his life and works.

16 These themes are culled from Alfonso Santos’s collection of Rizal tales (1973-1974). Other themes are derived from folklore gathered in the field. This schema, however, is preliminary. A more systematic and extensive collection of Rizal myths must be conducted.
1. Rizal's mysterious death
   i. born on a mysterious night in the presence of a lady in white
   ii. baby is found by the door swaddled in clothes marked JOVE REX AL
   iii. Rizal is a curious name

2. Rizal's travels abroad
   i. separation from loved ones and family
   ii. known to be polyglot and learned
   iii. studies medicine and becomes a famous healer

3. Rizal hounded by his enemies
   i. returns to the Philippines despite dangers
   ii. has powers to avert harm that may come to him

4. Rizal does not die at Luneta
   i. Spaniards shoot a look-alike
   ii. Rizal is having tea in another part of town
   iii. Spaniards bury a banana trunk

5. Rizal is alive and will redeem the Filipinos
   i. in various human manifestations, e.g., Tatang de los Santos
   ii. waiting and manufacturing products in the bowls of Mt. Makiling, Laguna
   iii. will return and lead the army of God

The mythification of Rizal probably began even before his execution. Since he lived a life calculated to perfection with such a characteristic semblance to the pasyon Christ—the "exemplary insurgent"—Rizal knew this image would outlive his mortal death and guarantee his "resurrection" (Coates: 1968, 309).

One could very well interpret the existence of Rizalista cults as the cognitive proof of Rizal's "resurrection". At the level of Rizalista ritual, this reality is permeated with the hero's symbols: the two novels, Noli and Fili, as the biblical fount; ritual mass performed by priestesses incorporate the "Last Farewell" poem; and spirit-mediums trance about as Rizal, spouting authority and advice. The ritual variations bring on an indeterminate "shock of recognition" that attest to the creativity of the "Rizalist mind":

17Valentin de los Santos, leader of the Lapiang Malaya (Freedom Party) who figured in a tragic "uprising" in the summer of 1967 in urban Manila.

18Ritual is meant here as those activities which translates a belief system into observable terms.
...Ang Kristo ng Katagalugan ay si Dr. Jose Rizal. Ang Panginoon ng lahat dito sa Sanglibutan. Hari ng mga Hari, Panginoon ng mga Panginoon. Sapagka't siya ang pinagkalooban ng banal na Tipan ng Espiritu Santong Bathalang Maykapangyarihan. Sapagka't siya ay inilagak lamang sa mag-asawang Teodora Alonso at siya rin ang Espiritu ng Panginoon kung kaya' gayon na lamang ang Pagibig sa mga anak ng Bayan. Kaya't si ikapitong buhay ay hindi na mamamatay at itinitindig ang kanyang kapangyarihan at maniningil sa mga sukaean na hindi lumongon sa lupang tinubuan at iyan din ang Inang pinanggalingan ng gatas na malapot na ikinabuhay.

Rizal is the Christ of the Tagalog region. The Lord of the whole universe. King of Kings, Lord of Lords. Because the Almighty Bathala gave unto him the Holy Writ of the Holy Spirit. Because of his love for children of the country, the Holy Spirit decreed that Teodora Alonso should conceive him. Thus in the seventh life he will no longer die and he shall bring about his power and shall exact the payment for the greed of those who ignore the motherland who is also the mother from whom comes our very life.

The formalism can be deceptive yet a quick reference to the Apostle's Creed will show the careful deletion of the last few lines to avoid a conflict of ideas. In this prayer of the Inang Makiwaga cult, the audible image is remarkably similar to the Creed when recited in a mumbling, prayerful manner. Examples of these abound in Rizalist literature.19

But Rizalism is not all ritual. It is a way of knowing, of perceiving reality (the historical and the common sense) in categories determined by the cultural model offered in the pasyon. In one interview, an informant advised me: “Don't you know... that to know Rizal you should know Christ first? Hindi mo ba alam—kilalanin mo muna ang pagkatao ni Kristo, bago mo makikilala ang pagkatao ni Rizal?”20 Knowing can also come literally, by way of revelation.21

We listened intently, eyes glued to the drawings of a mysterious woman described in Apocalypse 12-14. He flips his drawing and proceeds to explain: the woman gives birth to a boy who is Rizal, but the dragon which is no other than Spain, kills the boy. But God redeems him and the dragon is killed by St. Michael in the person of Andres Bonifacio....

19 Foronda (1961) was able to collect valuable documents, which are sprinkled with these “gems” of creativity. A psychoanalysis of this material should reveal very novel insights.

20 Interview with Mrs. Zenaida Martinez, ‘nanay’ (mother) to a group called Sagrada Familia in Tanay, Rizal.

21 Paliwanag (giving light) by Mr. Eustaquio Niofe during a ganap (religious event) at Ronggot, Calamba, Laguna.
Now, the speaker asks: Has Rizal “returned”? Not yet, I said. He asks his companion who nods affirmatively. Observe, he says, the one-peso coin where our hero is facing left. But look at the two-peso bill. We now have two faces, one facing left the other facing right. Now in this new coin [New Society issue] has not Rizal revealed his face in full, bounded by a hexagon crowned by stars?

This process of thinking and knowing seems typical and a continuous interpolation of the symbolic, from the “material” and the “spiritual”. Folk wisdom is also used to drive home the banal (sacred):22

A Rizalista of possibly middle age, was explaining his concept of geography to a curious crowd gathered at the Luneta in the aftermath of the Rizal Day celebrations. Shifting from the descriptive to the rhetorical, he queried his audience: “Why is Rizal’s face in the one-peso coin facing left?” The audience, taken a back giggled uneasily. Sensing he has caught the crowd’s attention, he blurted out the explanation (palawanag) which to me, given the context of the situation (a patriotic day of celebration) sounded profound: “Because...Rizal’s countrymen were lefthanded.” (Literally, kaliwete. But in Tagalog metaphor it can mean unfaithfulness and treachery...)

Taken out of its milieu, these examples cannot be explained adequately. Tracing the continuities of metaphor, inchoate and ambiguous descriptions gain an understanding and become meaningful. By seeking out a “root paradigm” (the pasyon in this case) a better grasp of the subject is possible, giving coherence to data that otherwise would appear nonsensical and subjective. Instead, ambiguities are reduced and other variables explained in the light of other theories. Hence we can see that folk religious cults have a dynamic logic of their own. Following our own prescription, we have to seek elsewhere for an explanation of Cullen’s conclusion that secret societies retard socio-economic development. To put it in another way, is the belief system of the “secret societies” the culprit or is it something else?

To change social relations requires a great deal of personal and social sacrifice which invariably has its effects on economic production. My own experience with these groups indicates that land ownership (some are technically squatters) and market forces (which exploit their cheap labor), rather than the belief system of the cults are more likely to retard socio-economic development. The gospel value of “poverty” lies more in

22 Or the political, if you prefer. Profundity is marked by a deep repertoire of metaphors like: “How many mothers does a person have?” Inang-suso (biological mother), inang-bayan (motherland) and inang-wika (mother tongue).
a given economic reality than in a symbolic one. On the other hand, material improvement is not prescribed either so long as it is pursued without greed. Folk religions of this nature do idealize economic life, but to claim that it rationalizes such behavior might be too hasty a conclusion. We can invoke a statement of a Rizalista who was questioned about his owning a sari-sari store: "Pakitang tao lamang iyan. (That's merely for show.)"

We will always encounter a process of indeterminate interpretation with this subject. But we can, through metaphor, have an expanded yet coherent milieu, a kind of symbolic world within the mountain's womb. This demands a new method of comprehending the familiar in ways understandable to us and to our anthropological community. We enter the mountain's womb that our inner selves (loob) may match, as we emerge, those whom we seek to understand.

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POTENSIYA, BISA, AT ANTING-ANTING
(Decoding Belief System Encoded in Folklore)

PROSPERO R. COVAR

Upang lalong maliwanagan ang ating paksa, isinaayos ko ang pira-pirasong halaw sa iba't ibang aklat na tinipon ni Melencio T. Sabino at ipinalimbag noong 1955 na isang librong may pamagat na Karunungan ng Dios. Ang libro ay naglalaman ng sari-saring paniniwala, mga oraciones sa iba't ibang kaukulan, at mga kuwento hango sa Biblia o Banal na Kasulatan. Ang isang kuwento na ipinalalagay na apokripsal ng mga Kristiano ay tungkol sa paglalang at paglikha.

Bisa ng Salita


Sa aking palagay, ito ang pinagbabasihan ng paniniwala tungkol sa bisa ng salita, palabra, o oracion. Ang oracion ay may potensiya na baguhin ang mga bagay na nangyayari at mangyayari.

Ang Pangalan ng Dios

Ang pangalan ng Dios ay salita. May pangalan hayag at lihim ang Dios. May isang bagong pangalan at may isang pangalan walang hanggan na hindi mapaparam. May pangalan ang Dios na lumikha ng langit at lupa; may pangalan ang Dios na makapangyarian sa lahat; may pangalan ang Dios na kataas-taasan, at may pangalan ang Dios ng mga hukbo. May pangalan nakasulat sa noo ng dakilang Dios, may pangalan nakasulat sa kanyang mga mata, may pangalan nakasulat sa kanyang hita, at may pangalan nakasulat sa kanyang damit. Maraming pangalan ang Dios ayon sa kanyang mga ginawa.

Paglalang at Paglikha

Noong una ay walang makikitang anuman kundi pulos na liwanag. Ang liwanag ang tanging sumasaklaw at nakababalot sa lahat ng dako. Ang liwanag ang matatawag na Dios sapagka’t walang Dios na matatawag maliban sa liwanag.

Inisip ng Dios na lalangin ang mundo. Pina-urong niya ang liwanag sa buong kapaligiran upang magkaroon ng lugar na paglalagyan ng kanyang mga lilikhain. Ang liwanag ay tumahan na kaitaasan na walang katapusan at walang hanggan.

Ang Dios na walang hanggan ay nakilala na Infinito Dios. Sa alapaap siya napapaligid-ligid. Paiba-iba ang kanyang ayos subali’t ang tunay niyang anyo ay isang matang may pakpak na nakabalabal. Sa balabal ng dakilang Dios ay nakasulat ang kanyang kabanal-banalang pangalan. Ang sinomang maka-alam at makasambit nito ay hindi dadanas ng anomang hirap sa kabilang buhay.

Gumamela Celis

Inisip ng Dios na bago siya magsimula sa paglikha ng anomang bagay ay magkaroon siya ng isang kasangguni na makakatulong. Sa kanyang pag-iisip ay sumipot sa kanyang ulo ang limang titik na may sinag at nagniningning na anyo ng limang talulot. Ito'y naging isang mayuming bulaklak. Ang bulaklak na ito ang tinatawag na gumamela celis na ang ibig sabihin ay bulaklak ng langit at mundo. Ang limang titik na nabanggit ay dili iba't ang matamis na pangalan M-A-R-I-A na ang kahulugan ay kataastaasan.


Nang masabi ng Dios ang gayon ay nanao ng siya sa kailaliman upang ihanda ang isang malungkot na tahanan ng kanyang mga piling arkanghel na likhain.

Nang makaalis na ang Dios ay binuksan ni Bulaklak ang nasabing kaban ng tipan sa hangad na makilala ang katotohanan. Nang mabuksan ang kaban ay biglang lumabas ang tatlong letrang “B” na may mga pakpak at nagsilipad. Ang tatlong titik na nabanggit ay ang Tres Virtudes na lubhang mahimala at makababalaghin. Biglang isinara ni Bulaklak ang kaban,
POTENSIYA, BISA, AT ANTING-ANTI NG

subali’t ang tatlong “B” ay nakalabas na at hindi na niya nakita.

Nang dumating ang Dios buhat sa kailaliman ang sabi kay Bulaklak ay ganito, “Ngayon ay matutupad sa iyo ang aking sinabi na mananaog ka sa lupa at magpapakasakit.”

**Plano ng Paglalang**

Sinimulan ng Dios ang plano ng kanyang mga lilikhain: tubig, apoy, hangin, lupa, langit, mgakahoy at halaman, mga tao at mga hayop, araw, buwan at bituin, nguni’t ang higit sa lahat ay ang mga banal na espíritu na kakatulungan niya sa paglikha at paggawa.

Ipinakita ng Dios kay Bulaklak ang nasabing plano. Sinabi ni Bulaklak na tumpak at mabuti kung espíritual nguni’t ka­langang baguhin ang iba kung gagawing materyal.

Ayon sa plano ng Dios ang malalaking kahoy at matataas ay malalaki rin ang bunga. Ang maliliit at mabababa ay maliliit ang bunga. Sinabi ni Bulaklak na kung ang mga kahoy na yaon ay ilalagay sa lupa, kailangang paggawa na halaman sa lupa ay siyang dapat bigyan ng malalaki at ang maliliit, mabababa, at gumagapang na halaman sa lupa ay siyang dapat bigyan ng malalaking bunga, sapagka’t ang matahayog at malakap dahil ang espíritu ay sisilungan ng mga tao at hayop kung nadadarang sa init ng araw. Kung ang malalaking bunga ng kahoy ay mahinog at hindi makaya ng tangkay at malaglag sa taong nakasilong, maaaring mamatay o mapinsala ang tao.

At binago nga ng Dios ang kanyang ginawa. Ang malalaki at matahayog na kahoy ay siyang pinapagbunga ng malalaki at ang mga maliliit at halaman ay siyang pinapagbunga ng malalaki, ayon sa payo ni Bulaklak. Nang nakahanda na ang lahat ay inisip ng Dios na lihain na ang kanyang kakatulungan.

**Ang Doce Pares**

Sa kanyang pag-iisip ay bigla siyang pinawisan sa kanang tapis. Sa paghaplos ng kanyang kanang pakpak ang mga butil ng pawis ay tumalsik. Ito’y naging labing-anim na espíritu. Binigyan niya siya ng kanilang tungkulin at kalagayan.

Ang unang dalawa ay ang dalawang matanda na tumatahan sa litid ng lupa sa magkabilang panig sa labas ng mundo. Sila ang nagahahawak sa araw at buwan. Nasa kanilang kapang­yarahan ang pagbibigay ng liwanag sa sangsinukob.

Ang sumusunod na anim ay ayaw tumanggap ng anomang kaloo ng dakilang Dios. Nagpagala-gala na lamang sila sa
labas ng mundo. Ang kanilang mga pangalan ay sina Elim, Borim, Morim, Bicairim, Persalutim, at Mitim.


Inisip ng Dios na muling lumalang ng iba pang kakatulungan. Nang siya'y nag-iisip ay muli siyang pinawisan. Sa paghaplos ng kanyang kaliwang pakpak sa mga butil ng pawis, ito ay tumalsik at naging espíritu. Ang lima sa walo ay siyang lumapit at bumati kay Kristo noong siya'y naka-bayubay sa Krus ng ika-tatlong hapon ng araw ng Viernes Santo. Hiniling ng lima na sila'y binyagan ni Kristo nguni't hindi nangyari ang kanilang kahilingan. Sa oras na ay biglang pinanawang hininga ang dakilang Mananakop at Tagapagligtas kung kaya't hindi sila nabinyagan. Tinaglay din nila ang kanilang dating pangalan na Istac, Inatac, Isnatac, Taratara, at Sarapao.

Ang huling tatlong espíritu ay siyang naging Tatlong Persona. Sila ang binigyan ng Infinito Dios ng buong kapangyarihan sa paglikha at paggawa ng lahat ng bagay. Sa mata ng bawa't isa ay nakasulat ang isang titik na "M".

Sa kabuuan ang mga espíritong nilalang ng Infinito Dios ay tinaguriang Doce Pares.

Kapangyarihan ng Tatlong Persona

Bago pasimulan ang paglalang, ang Tatlong Persona ay naupo sa tatlong magkakatungkong bato na kung tawagin ay Piedra Mental, Piedra Crisol, at Piedra Amor na kung liliwanagin ay bait, ala-ala, at loob. Sa ibabaw ng bawa't bato ay may tig-iisang saliting nakasulat na Ardam, Aradam, at Adram. Ang tatlong saliting ito ay siyang tunay na pangalan ng Tatlong Persona. Ang mga pangalan ito ay dapat na ilihim at hindi dapat banggitin kung hindi karapatan dapat.

Sa kanilang pag-kakaupo ay nakatanaw sila ng tatlong liwanag na tumataas na nagbubuhat sa kailaliman. Nagtaka ang tatlo sa hiwagang nakita. Sa bawa't isa sa kanila ay may
tigatlong salitang tumapat: Seliam Talugom Magugam, Sumitam Tucsam Meeliam, at Salitam Temitam Macam.

Sa ganitong pangyayari ay nagpatuloy sa pag-uusap ang tatlo. Pinagkaisahan nila na palitawin ang lupa, subali’t ng limitawan ang lupa ay gayon na lamang ang kanilang pagtataka at panggigilalas sa kanilang nakita. Ito’y may pitong bakas na hindi nila maubos malirip kung bakit nagkaroon ng gayon ay hindi pa sila lumilikha ng tao. Inisip nila na hanapin upang makilala kung sino-sino ang mga may bakas niyaon. Sa kanilang paglalakad ay natagpuan nila ang nasabing pito, subali’t ng tanungin nila upang makilala ay ayaw magsabi ng kanilang pangalan. Ang sagot pa sa tatlo ay wala silang pakiramdam sa kanila sapagka’t sila’y hindi nila nasasakupan. Idinugtong pa na noong hindi pa yari ang santinakpan ay gumawa na sila ng sariling tahanan, sa litid ng mundo sila tumatahan. Sa sagot na ito’y iniwan ng tatlo ang pito upang magpatuloy sa kanilang paglikha at paggawa.

**Pagbibigay ng Sinag sa Araw**


Trinidad Virgen Muy Poderoso Sumitan Rey de los Reyes Tartat, atbp.


Susi ng Pinto

Nasa ganitong kalagayan ang Tatlong Persona ng sila’y makarinig ng isang tinig na hindi nila mapagsiya. Ulilang liwanag ang kanilang nakita. Tinanong nila kung sino siya at ang sagot sa kanila’y siya’y isang mata at biglang lumagpak sa kanilang harapan ang isang matang may pakpak at kanilang hinabol hanggang sa gitna ng dagat. Ang matang tumalsik ay biglang nabasag at naging tatlong piraso na naging tatlong isda at sa katawan ng bawa’t isa ay nakasulat ang salita na Aram, Acdam, Acsadam. Nang sundan ng Tatlong Persona ang tatlong isda ay biglang lumubog at nawala sa pusod ng karagi­tan. Hindi hinivalayan ng Tatlong Persona ang tatlong isda hanggang sila’y sumapit sa kaibuturan ng isang malaking bato na may pangalang Ara at sa libis ng nasabing bato ay may isang matandang naglalakad.


**Tradisyong Pangrelihiyon**

Ang paglalang at paglikha na ating natunghayan ay hinabi mula sa tatlong tradisyong pangrelihiyon sa Pilipinas: (1) ang tradisyong anitismo, (2) ang tradisyong Katoliko Romano, at (3) Protestantismong Americano.

Ang tradisyong anitismo ay batay sa paniniwala na ang mundo ay punong-puno ng mga espiritu. Ang mga espiritung ito ay may taglay na galing, alam, o anting-anting ukol sa iba't ibang bagay. Ito ay ipinagkakaloob sa mga napipiling tao. Ang mga bundok, kueba, sapa, ilog, talon, halaman, hayop, pati na ang tao ay may kani-kanyang potensiya. Ang potensiya ay makakamit sa pagkakaroon ng ritwal gaya halimbawa ng taikim na pagdadasal.

Ang tradisyong Katoliko Romano ay nananampalataya sa kahiwagaan ng Misa. Ang Misa ay isang pagpapahayag ng mga sacrificial ni Jesus Kristo. Ang mga santo at santa ay mga taong matiyagang tumupad sa kalooban ng Dios kaya sila ay karapat-dapat na sambahin.

Ang tradisyong Protestantismong Americano ay nananalig sa Biblia na tanging batayan ng kanilang pananampalataya. Ang kaligtasan ay nakamtan na sa pamamagitan ni Jesus na nabayubay sa Krus dahil na kasalanan ng mga tao. Ang paggawa ng mabuti ay bilang ganti at pagtanao ng utang na loob.

Ang relihiyon ng mga Filipino ay nanggaling sa iba't ibang tradisyon. Gayon din naman ang potensiya, bisa, at anting-anting ay nagiging makabuluhan ayon sa pangrelihiyong pananaw ng mga Filipino. Sa pananaw ng Kristiano (Katoliko o Protestante) ang potensiya, bisa, at anting-anting ay itinuturing na maling paniniwala o superstisyon.

**Pag-aalaga ng Anting-Anting**

Mayroon nang paniniwala sa anting-anting bago pa dumating ang mga Kastila sa Pilipinas. Ang paniniwala ay pinag-yaman lamang ng pananampalataya sa Infinito Dios, mga santo at santa at iba't ibang uri ng espiritu. Ang mga mirakulo na isinagawa ni Jesus sa pamamagitan ng salita tulad ng pagbangon ng patay, paglakad sa tubig, pagpaparami ng tinapay at isda pati na alak, pagpapagaling at marami pang iba ay

Ang anting-anting ay pinakakain ng dasal. Hindi ito kung kani-kanino ipinagkakaloob. Ang nagkahawak ng anting-anting ay sumumpa na hindi niya ito gagamitin sa masamang paraan. Oras na gamitin ito sa masamang paraan ay naglalaho na parang bula o lumilipad tulad ng tatlong Virtudes na pinakawalan ni Bulaklak mula sa kaban ng tipan ng Infinito Dios.


ANG PANANAW SA BUHAY AT WELTANSCHAUUNG NA MAHIHIWATIGAN SA SIKOLOHIYA NG WIKANG TAGALOG

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Layunin ng sikolohiya at ng agham panlipunan ang mawawaan hindi lamang ang tao sa kanyang pagkilos sa lipunan, kundi pati na rin ang kanyang kaisipan, damdamin at kamalayan, na siya mismong mga saligang bumubuo sa kanyang pagkatao. Sa isang pakahulugan sa sikolohiya batay sa pagsusuri sa wika at kultura, ay sinabi ngang “ang sikolohiya ay tungkol sa kamalayan na tumutukoy sa damadamin at kaalamang naranasan; sa ulirat na tumutukoy sa pakiramdam sa paligid; sa isip na tumutukoy sa kaalamang at pagkaunawa; sa diwa na tumutukoy sa ugali, kilos o asal; sa kalooban na tumutukoy din sa damadamin; at sa kaluluwa na siyang daan upang mapag-aralan din ang tungkol sa budhi ng tao” (Enriquez, 1975).


Ang Weltanschauung sa mga Pagsusuring Sikolohikal. Halimbawa ng paggamit ng metodong eksperimental sa sikolohiya tungo sa pag-unawa ng “Weltanschauung” ng Pilipino ang pag-aaral ni Tangco (1977) sa isang partikular na konsepto na tinatawag na “locus of control.” Sinuri niya ang eksternal na “locus of control” na kung saan ay pinaghambang niya ang kanyang mga kalahok na Pilipino sa batayan ng kanilang pagkontrola sa buhay o sa pagkilos bilang paghahanda at pagtanaw sa hinaharap. Ang pagkilos ba ng Pilipino ay dulo't ng mga tao sa kanyang paligid? Dulot ba ito ng mga puwersang labas sa kanya o ito ba ay bunga ng kanyang sariling pagsusumikap? Sa lalo't madaling sabi ng “locus of control” ba ay eksternal o internal?

Kapansin-pansin ang palagay ng ilang sikolohistang kanluranin na ang mga taong galing sa Ikatlong Daigdig ay mayroong eksternal sa halip na internal na “locus of control”. Gayundin, sinasabi ang kababaihan ay mayroong eksternal sa halip na internal na “locus of control”. Mababasa sa mga paghahambugan na ito na tila mas mabuti ang internal kaysa eksternal na “locus of control.” Mas mabuting maniwala na ang kinabukasan ay nasa iyong kamay sa halip na ipalagay na ito’y dahil mayroon kang kumpareng malakas sa gobyerno, o dahil ang ama ay may mabuting posisyon sa komunidad, o dahil marami kang kaibigan na maaaring makatulong sa iyong pagunlad.


Ang “Weltanschauung” sa Sikolohiyang Pilipino. Ang layuning maipakita ang panghalahatang ideya ng mga Pilipino hinggil sa pananaw sa buhay ay maaaring isalalay sa pagsusuri sa wika bilang salamin ng sikolohiyang Pilipino. Ang pagsuri at paggamit sa katutubong wika ay pundamental sapagka't ang wika ay hindi lamang nakaugat sa kultura bilang prisma sa pagpapakahulugan ng tao sa realidad kundi, bukod sa rito,
ang wika ay isa sa mga pleksible at produktibong kagamitang pang-komunikasyon na tiyak na makakatason ng mahalagang aspektong pag-iisip ng tao hinggil sa kanyang relasyon sa realidad.


Ang Pagtuklas sa “Weltanschauung” ng Pilipino. Ang kasalukuyang papel ay nakatuon sa wikang Tagalog tungo sa
pagtuklas ng “Weltanschauung” ng Pilipino batay sa pagsusuri ng iba’t-ibang wika sa Pilipinas*. Ipinalalagay sa kasalukuyang papel na lahat ng ideya ay karaniwang maipahayag sa isang partikular na wika kaysa sa ibang partikular na wika. At marahil, mayroong mga ideya na totooong mahirap ipahayag sa isang partikular na wika. Nangangailangan ng mahabang pagpapaliwanag lalo’t higit kung ang ideyang ito ay hindi nauugnay sa kanilang kultura at sa kanilang pananaw sa buhay. Kung gayon, layunin ng papel na ito na alamin kung anu-anong ideya at konsepto ang madali at mahirap ipaliwanag sa wikang tagalog. Ito’y isang panimulang pagsusuri lamang kaya makatitiyak na maraming hindi napansin dito.


Hindi lamang ang yamang bokabulario ang makapagpapahiwatig sa pananaw sa mundo, maaaring kasalatan ng bokabulario ay mayroon ding ganitong implikasyon. Mapapansin sa pagsusuri sa pagkataong Pilipino na ang mga salitang kaugnay ng layunin ay tila hindi kasing yaman ng leksikon o bokabulario kaugnay ng pagpapahayag ng damdamin. Gayunpaman, may mga konsepto dito na mainam suriin sapagka’t magbibigay sa atin ng mga panimulang ideya kung gaano


Isa pang kapansinpansin ang tungkol sa kasarian. Sa papel ni Rita Estrada (1976), sinabi niya na “Tagalog is a non-sexist language”. Halimbawa, nagbibigay siya ng napakahabang kuwento tungkol sa kanyang pamangkin na ibinili siya
ng damit o sa kanyang magulang at kung anu-ano pa. At sa hinaba-haba ng kanyang kuwento ay hindi mo malaman kung ang pamangkin ay pamangking babae o pamangking lalaki at kung ang kanyang binanggit na magulang ay ang ina o ang ama. Sa lalu’t madaling sabi, ang Tagalog na ginamit niya ay hindi nagbigay-daan tungo sa pagbibigay-pansin sa kasarian. Isang bagay na marahil ay hindi mahalaga kung tutuusin, subali’t totoo hindi dapat isawalambahala kung salagatain ang pagtatalo ngayon tungkol sa sexism sa wikang Ingles. Hindi nakakatuwang pag-awayang bakit daw “history” at hindi “herstory.” Ang bagay na ito ay hindi maliliit na bagay para sa mga tao kung may kaugnayan sa mababang pagpapahalaga sa isang kasarian.


Isa pa rin ang distinksiyon ng “um” at “mag”. Ipinaliwanag ng mga linggwista kung ano ang pagkakaiba sa gamit ng “um” at “mag”. Kung minsan ay pinagpapalit-palit na ang gamit katulad ng “lumakad” at “maglakad”, parehong lakad iyon. Pero kung titignan ang ibang mga anyong analohikal, makikitna na ang “pagwalis” ay iba sa “wumalis.” Sa “pagwalis” ay gumamit ka ng eksternal na bagay para ito ay maka-paglinis, samantalang hindi naman tama na sabihin mong ikaw ay wumalis puwera na lang kung ikaw ang ginamit na pangwalis.

Karagdagang punto na nabigyang-pansin ay ang punto ng intensiyonalidad. Bagama’t hindi itinakda ng wikang Ta-
galog na sabihin mo ang iyong intensyon, meron kang laya na kung saan puwedeng sabihin mo kung sinasadya mo o hindi ang isang bagay na iyong ginawa. Kaya't kung "Nahulog ang bata," malamang na ito ay isang aksidente, pero kung "hinulog" ay merong intensyon na siya ay ihulog.


_Mga Haka Tungkol sa Weltanschauung ng Tagalog_

ng isang pananagutan na dapat sana ay pananagutan ng iba. Ito ay sa gamit naman ng apiksasyon.

Ikalawa ay maaaring hakain na mahalaga ang damdamin at kapakanan ng iba. Ito ay batay sa yaman ng bokabularyo kaugnay ng damdamin. Sa Ingles ay meron silang “all-embracing term” na “aggression”. Ito naman ay maaaring hiramin at nagagamit ang salitang “agresyon.” Ngunit ang Pilipino ay hindi nagagalit lamang. Hindi siya nakikipagaway lamang. Maaaring nagagalit, maaaring nagtatampo, maaaring hindi totoong galit kundi nagtatampo lamang o naglalambing o maaari rin namang hinanakit nga.


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THE WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION IN KAMPUCHEA, 1954-1970

M. RAGOS-ESPINAS

I. Background

On March 23, 1970, Prince Sihanouk in Peking formally called upon Cambodians to wage a war of national liberation against the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak regime. He was merely legitimating a movement which had rocked Cambodian politics since the dismantling of French colonialism in 1953, transforming the various movements in Cambodia—from xenophobic nationalism to anti-French rule—into a single, all encompassing revolutionary struggle with an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal orientation. Hence, the March 23 general call to armed struggle was the culmination of the long history of protracted struggle waged by the Khmer Vietminhs against the Japanese occupation forces in World War II, which, in the words of V. M. Deddi, provided a “fillip to Cambodian nationalism.”

When Japan occupied the southern parts of Indochina in 1941, anti-western sentiment was generated by the frenzied propagation of such slogans as “Asia for Asians” and “the emancipation of the People of Greater East Asia.” Japanese pro-Asian propaganda reached its peak in the face massive Allied retaliation. Japan was forced to modify its master plan for the control of Cambodia, and it become its overriding concern to win over the Cambodian nationalists before the return of the Allies. Under Japanese pressure, King Norodom Sihanouk proclaimed on March 13, 1945 the independence of Cambodia and abrogated the Protectorate treaties of 1863 and 1884. Then the Japanese transferred the departments of Cambodian civil administration, except finance and budget, into Cambodian hands, created a Cambodian Cabinet on March 18, released political prisoners who had been incarcerated by the French colonial administration during the 1942 demonstration, and allowed the revival of the Nagaravatta newspaper.

Although the transfer of power was nominal by the end of July, 1945, the Cambodians took control of the civil administration. The Cambodian intellectuals, particularly, relished the first fruits of self-government. Ironically enough, it was during

2 Ibid., p. 88.
this last phase of the Japanese occupation that the Cambodians were impelled into nationalism but they would not be nationalistic enough to undermine French colonial interests in Cambodia.

When the French reoccupied Cambodia, however, the political climate had definitely changed. Popular sentiment strongly favored French recognition of Cambodia independence, a concession the French was hardly in a position to grant. World War II left France in the throes of economic bankruptcy, and French colonial domination of the Indochinese peninsula was an exigency to be met at all cost.

Cambodian nationalism which had received such a powerful impetus from the Japanese proved too formidable an obstacle for the restoration of the French pre-war position in Cambodia. The rank and file of the Cambodian nationalists wanted to preserve their "newly enjoyed" independence. This was particularly true of the radical nationalists, the Khmer Viet-minh. Largely inspired by Marxist ideology, they were vehemently opposed to the return of French colonialism. Even the more moderate among the younger nationalists as well as the Cambodian intellectuals, private and public employees shared the anti-French look, a sentiment inspired by such nationalists as Son Ngoc Thanh, Pach Chhoeun, Huy Kanthol, and others.\(^3\)

The moderates were strongly nationalistic, though they were not Marxists. Although not \textit{ipso facto} anti-monarchical, they were extremely critical of the king's apparent alignment with the French. For instance, the more militant moderates, the Khmer Issarak, accused the Monarch of being too subservient to the French. Since the moderates also wanted to regain Cambodian independence, they went so far as to join hands with the Vietminhs, siding with the supporters of King Sihanouk only when the Vietminhs tried to dominate the independence movement. In the meantime, the supporters of King Sihanouk had succeeded in gaining a large measure of political autonomy for the country.

King Sihanouk and the members of the royal family favored the conservative nationalists. In general, they identified patriotism with their particular interests. For their own self-preservation, that is, to protect themselves from internal dissension as well as from foreign engulfment, especially by its predatory neighbors, Thailand and Annam — they would therefore allow the French to return.

\(^3\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 104.
However, the conservative cause was eclipsed by the unrelenting attitude against French colonialism expressed by Son Ngoc Thanh, the undisputed leader of the moderates who was both Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs of the Japanese sponsored Cambodian Cabinet. Upon the withdrawal of the Japanese from Indochinese territory, he declared that his government was determined to resist the re-imposition of French colonialism in Cambodia. On September 6, 1945, he issued a proclamation to the effect that beyond normal courtesies to the French on an individual-to-individual basis "there does not exist any political relation between France and Cambodia." He organized a plebiscite on September 12, which registered a "unanimous vote" for the country's immediate independence. Supported by the Cambodian people's mandate, Son Ngoc Thanh and his associates in the Cabinet swore to undertake sacrifices, including laying down their lives, in defense of the Monarchy and in the name of independence.

Son Ngoc Thanh went so far as to encourage fraternal relations between the Vietminhs and Cambodians, two traditionally hostile peoples, to enlist support for the Cambodian position before the French returned. The elites, however, were not convinced about the desirability of Son Ngoc Thanh's proposed alliance with the Vietminhs in support of Cambodia's struggle to retain its independence. Even his colleagues in the Cabinet (e.g., Kniek Tioulong, Minister for Interior) were hesitant in this regard. Moreover, the conservatives and the moderates feared that the growing personal influence of Son Ngoc Thanh might upset their position in the country's power structure.

On October 10, 1945, the French, British and the Indian troops entered Phnom Pehn. Five days later, General Leclerc, the Commander of the French Forces in the Far East, arrested Son Ngoc Thanh and finally deported him to Saigon as a prisoner on the ground that his interests were inimical to the security of the Allied troops and the interests of Cambodia. Deprived of Thanh's leadership and lacking adequate material resources, the moderates could not muster an effective popular

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4 Ibid., p. 100.  
5 Ibid., p. 106.  
6 Cambodge (Phnom Penh), September 7, 1945.  
8 Cambodge, September 13, 1945.  
9 Ibid.
front against the French. Many fled to Thailand and others joined the Vietminhs in Vietnam.

The conservatives were now free to plot the future of post-war Cambodia without opposition. The succeeding Cabinet, now led by Prince Sisowath Monireth, uncle of King Sihanouk, was ready to negotiate with the French. France was equally eager to do likewise for various reasons. First of all, the French image among the Indo-Chinese peoples had been adversely marred by its war record before the Japanese. Second, the Vietminhs north of the parallel were waging a relentless liberation struggle which was fast depleting French resources. Finally, as stated earlier, France needed Cambodia to rehabilitate its war-damaged economy.

The Royal Government was eager to end the hostilities between the French forces and the Cambodian. This attitude of accommodation on the part of King Sihanouk was a complete reversal of his previous position on the question of retaining Cambodian independence. Hence, he and his followers contended that certain "practical reasons" forced them to reaffirm their loyalty to France. First, the independence granted by the Japanese suffered greatly from a basic legal weakness, namely, the Cambodian sovereignty had not been formally recognized by the Tokyo Government. Second, despite the long years of French hegemony in the country, Cambodia still lacked the necessary trained personnel to run an independent government. If the French were to withdraw suddenly, Cambodian administration would be paralyzed. Third, the conservatives also felt that they could not recover the Western provinces of Cambodia namely, Battambang, Sisophon and part of Siem reap which had been annexed by Thailand in 1941 with French aid. Fourth, Cambodia did not have the wherewithal to fight the French.

Perhaps, the most significant justification for the rapprochement with France was the fear of the resurgent Vietnamese seeking hegemony over Vietnam. This was not an unfounded rationalization in the light of Cambodia's historic feud with Vietnam, and Thailand. This fear was further exacerbated by the radical ideas emanating from Vietnam, ideas considered to be inimical to the interests of the monarchy. King Sihanouk viewed these developments with alarm especially because critical denunciations had already been heaped upon him by Thanh's

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radical followers, who regarded him as “pro-French and a traitor to the nation.”

In these circumstances, Sihanouk was left with two possible courses of action: he could openly declare his hostility against the French and join the ranks of the nationalists or align himself with French colonialism. Either way his power and position would be clearly jeopardized. If he completely sided with the nationalists’ cause on the one hand, he would certainly be unseated in the process by the people. Moreover, the French as kingmakers were powerful enough to effect his abdication in an attempt to perpetuate their control over Cambodia. On the one hand, if he opted for alignment with the French, he would surely be branded a “traitor”, an epithet which he abhorred.

It was clear that Sihanouk desired neither course. Inevitably, therefore, he had to follow a “middle-of-the-road” policy which would enable him to rally the country’s nationalist forces on his side without losing the protective umbrella of France.

On January 7, 1946, the Modus Vivendi was signed between Cambodia and France, an act which re-established French power in Cambodia. Although Sihanouk assured his subjects that France would be sympathetic to the nationalist aspirations of the Cambodians;11 the moderates nevertheless remained unconvinced. From this reaction issued two divergent movements: one adopted the constitutional method to regain independence, and the other joined the Khmer Issarak in the latter’s armed struggle for liberation.

Commenting on the Modus Vivendi, E. J. Hammer wrote: “Despite a somewhat wider participation in the administration of the country after 1945, the situation in Cambodia remained much the same as before the war.”12 The Modus Vivendi was supposed to have conceded a certain degree of autonomy to the Cambodian government. Cambodian autonomy, however existed only in principle. In practice the French officials enjoyed very extensive powers, which embraced practically almost every sphere of Cambodian national life. They regulated public order and maintained an armed forces. On the whole, they also dominated the political and economic spheres in the country. To make matters worse, none of these French officials were answerable to the Cambodian government. This state of affairs occasioned enough bitterness on the part of the Cambodian people, as to desire the restoration of whatever had been gained towards

11 Cambodge, October 23, 1945.
the attainment of independence during the Japanese interregnum.

Three major political forces began to emerge towards 1945, as a reaction to the French reimposition of the status \textit{ante bellum} in Cambodia. The most notable of these was the \textit{Khmer Issaraks}, an organization founded in Bangkok by a retired Cambodian official, Pock Khun, early in 1945, for the purpose of regaining Cambodian independence.\textsuperscript{13} His areas of recruitment were Battambang, the Siem reap, and Kraland. A number of those recruited were followers of Son Ngoc Thanh who, upon Thanh’s arrest, joined the Khmer Issaraks. The signing of the \textit{Modus Vivendi}, which definitely re-established French power in Cambodia, drove more Cambodians to join the organization.

The Issarak movement gained the support of Thailand since the Thais wished to re-acquire Angkor (in the Siem reap province). Hence, during Pridi Panomyong’s reign in 1944, Thailand gave a quasi-official recognition of the movement. The Issarak leaders enjoyed freedom of movement in southern Thailand, especially in their propaganda campaign against the French in Cambodia.\textsuperscript{14}

Towards 1946 the Issaraks were already launching sporadic attacks on the border of Cambodia which the French effectively quelled. However, Issarak incursions in the countrysides disrupted the normal agricultural activities of the peasants, a development which precipitated their exodus from the rural areas. Consequently, agricultural production declined and plunged to near famine. The Issarak movement, however, posed no military threat to French authority in Cambodia.

In the meantime, the constitutionalist section of the moderate nationalists had been employing non-violent constitutional methods to gain Cambodian independence from the French. This group had consistently adopted a cautious policy toward French colonialism while extending continuous support of the monarchy. The most prominent among this group, the Democratic Party, was formed by Prince Youthevong, a member of the royal family who had socialist leanings. It was this party which dominated the political arena after the proclamation of the Electoral Law in 1946.

The Democratic Party expressed “loyalty to the monarch, and advocated a constitutional monarchical system of government with a popularly elected assembly having legislative and deliberative powers. It also stood for the principle of govern-


\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
ment by majority; and the economic, intellectual and moral amelioration of Cambodian people. The party rejected linking Cambodia to the Indochinese Federation but advocated instead its joining the French Union based on the principles of equality and liberty. It proposed to achieve independence from the French through constitutional means but continued to maintain its basically anti-French orientation.

When the Democratic Party came to power on September 1, 1946 as a result of a sweeping victory during the elections of the year, it proceeded to draft a liberal constitution with adequate provisions for civil liberties, political rights, a bicameral legislature, and the succession to the monarchy in the event of the death or abdication of the reigning monarch. King Sihanouk was forced to proclaim the liberal constitution, because of his fast waning popularity among the Cambodian intellectuals, civil servants, and students who reacted negatively to the sudden reversal of the monarchical policy toward the French. In his desire to rally this section of the nationalists as a counterpoise to the Issarak movement, Sihanouk supported Yodthevong Cabinet.

On the other hand, the French authorities in Cambodia viewed the liberal tendencies of the Democratic Party with hostility. French opposition to the Party came to a head during the “Black Star” incident in February 1947. The French utilized the incident to arrest prominent leaders of the Party, claiming that about fifteen of its members were in conspiracy with the Issarak rebel movement. The arrested Cambodians were then deported to Saigon after having been detained for some months.

Understandably the Democratic Party, despite its well-organized political infrastructure, was hamstrung by the actual occupation of Cambodia by the French, a condition which denied the basic political rights inherent in an independent government. For instance, it could neither organize its own armed forces nor contract treaties in the light of its national interests.

To aggravate the already restrictive conditions in Cambodian politics, the Democratic Party activities were further hampered by the economic dislocation and political chaos of the period. In order to minimize the problems confronting the Kingdom, the Youthevong Cabinet appealed to the patriotic sentiments of the Issarakks and urged them to return to the

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16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., p. 132-133.
18 Ibid.
The Issaraks, on the other hand, responded to the Royal Government’s offer of amnesty. Towards the end of 1947, the Issaraks were surrendering to the Royal Government with increasing regularity. The mass surrender of the Issaraks was indicative of an over-all malaise that plagued the effective conduct of their anti-French propaganda. In the first place, the Issaraks relied too much on Thailand for support. When Thailand finally stopped giving aid and support to them in southern Thailand the movement had to abandon its base there. Secondly, the movement was splintered into various factions, a condition which adversely affected the coordinated execution of the group’s policies, tactics, strategies. Finally, certain Issarak factions which had resorted to banditry alienated many Cambodians in the provinces. The rest were too disillusioned as to re-align their loyalty to the Royal Government. Thus, the Youthevong Cabinet was credited for the break-up of the Issarak movement and for enlisting its membership in support for the constitutional struggle against the French with the tacit approval of the King.

Meanwhile, a sizable section of the Issaraks began to seek Vietminh assistance in their fight against French rule. These Issaraks had no illusions about the motives of French colonialism in Cambodia. As earlier mentioned, after the arrest of Son Ngoc Thanh (October, 1945) some of his followers joined the Khmer Issarak in Thailand and later on operated in Battambang and the Siem reap region. Others fled to Cochin-china (now southern Vietnam) to organize a resistance movement with the help of the Vietminhs. The determining factor here was not really their belief in Marxian ideology, but the patriotic desire to dismantle French colonialism in Cambodia completely. Prominent among them was Pach Chhoeun, who resigned from the Cabinet the day after Prime Minister Son Ngoc Thanh’s arrest and withdrew to Cochin-china. He united all the anti-French elements, and with the assistance of the Vietmins he organized a resistance movement.

Pach Chhoeun organized a Committee of Independent Cambodia in Soctrong (in Cochin-china) which aimed, among others, to draw the attention of the world to the Cambodian independence movement. However, after a few months Pach Chhoeun surrendered to the French authorities and was later on banished to France to join Son Ngoc Thanh. After this the activities of

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19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. 186.
21 Ibid., p. 150.
22 Thompson and Adloff, Minority Problems, p. 175.
the resistance organization until the surrender of the Issaraks from Bangkok sometime in 1947 are not clearly known (this was attested to by V. M. Reddi). It can be presumed that the resistance fizzled out with the surrender and deportation of Pach Chhoeun.

In the meantime the Vietminh had re-organized the remaining Issarak elements and tried to link the Issarak movement with that of the Vietminhs in Vietnam. A Committee for Khmer Liberation was formed with Dap Chhoeun of Siem reap as president. The task of the committee was to coordinate Issarak operations with that of the Vietminh’s resistance to the French. Towards the end of 1948, almost the whole of Cambodia became the arena of Vietminh-Khmer Issarak activities. The collaboration of the Khmer Issaraks with the Vietminhs so alarmed the Royal Government that the latter even solicited French support against the imminent threat posed by the Khmer Issaraks and the Vietminhs. Because the French promise of support did not come the Royal Government appealed again to the patriotic sentiments of the Khmer Issaraks (now associated with the Vietminhs) to lay down their arms. In a series of amnesty proclamation in May, 1948, the Royal Government, now headed by Penn Nouth, proclaimed that independence was the prime concern of the government, but armed rebellion was not only unnecessary but was also harmful to the government’s negotiations with France for Cambodian independence.

By the latter part of 1948, French Vietminh relations had deteriorated. This had actually started sometime in 1946 when France had shown reluctance in implementing the March 1946 agreement it signed with Ho Chi Minh recognizing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam “as a free state with its own government, parliament, army, and finances, forming part of the Indochinese Federation and the French Union.” Furthermore, France refused to hold a referendum on the matter of uniting Tongking, Annam, and Conchin-china to form a united Vietnam. Instead, in the Ha Long Bay Agreement, France brought back Bao Dai to Vietnam as a counterpoise to the growing popularity of Ho Chi Minh. In this agreement, the French incorporated the word “independence,” without intending to give real meaning and substance to it. This subterfuge on the part of the French eventually became widely known in Indochina and resulted in the improved propaganda position of the Vietminhs.

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23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Reddi, Cambodian Independence, p. 156.
26 Ibid., p. 157. 7
Using these developments in Vietnam to bolster their stand, the Khmer Issaraks now associated with the Vietminhs undermine the fundamental argument of the Cambodian Royal Government. Eventually they proved that there could be no real independence within the framework of a French Union.

On November 9, 1948, King Sihanouk was compelled to appeal to the French to give substance to its promise of independence. He pointed out that if France failed to grant Cambodia its independence, the monarchy and the welfare of the people would be endangered in the face of mounting Issarak opposition. The King also stressed that the granting of the independence did not constitute a break with France.

On the contrary, he declared, he could not “conceive of Cambodian independence without France and the French Union.” In response to Sihanouk’s appeal, the French President V. Auriol recognized the independence of Cambodia within the framework of the French Union on November 28, 1948. A month after, the independence of Cambodia within the framework of the French Union was proclaimed in Phnom Penh. Once again King Sihanouk enjoined the Cambodian people, especially the Khmer Issaraks, to return to the national fold and to put an end to insecurity in the country.

The post-1949 was the most critical in Cambodia’s struggle for freedom. The Franco-Cambodian treaty of 1949 and the Conventions signed in 1950 actually conceded limited freedom to Cambodia. In the end these agreements did not work out satisfactorily for the Cambodian nationalists, including the King. As a result, after 1949 certain important alignments in the nationalist ranks were forged which greatly influenced the eventual course of the movement.

The first was the emergence of Marxist-oriented Issarak radicalism which threatened the very foundations of Cambodian life and institutions, as well as that of the monarch. Secondly, the return of Son Ngoc Thanh to Phnom Penh (1951) upon the King’s representation with the French, rallied nationalists behind him who were even more popular than the King. The third was the chronic political instability of the government because of the existing multiplicity of parties and groups. For instance, the powerful Democratic Party split into mutually-warring groups. One faction supported the King while the

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29 *Cambodge*, December 22, 1948.
30 *Cambodge*, December 22, 1948.
others maintained that he should not stand in the way of the Parliament. In response to this splintering of the Democratic Party, the King dissolved Parliament on June 15, 1952. Sihanouk then assumed personal rule of the Kingdom and the leadership of the independence struggle.

The upsurge of nationalism among the Cambodian people after 1959 became more pronounced. The Vietminh-inspired Khmer Vietminhs denounced the Franco-Cambodian treaty of November 1949 as an imperialist design to keep Cambodia a colony.\(^{31}\) They urged the Cambodians to resist and launch an armed struggle against the French. This exhortation did not fall on deaf ears. A fresh outbreak of acts of terrorism as well as a wave of anti-French and anti-Government propaganda swept the kingdom. Then Son Ngoc Thanh returned from exile, to an enthusiastic welcome. Now Sihanouk faced a formidable challenge to his leadership.

Up to this time he had been acting as a sort of a buffer between the two contending political forces: the militant nationalism of the Khmer Vietminhs and Son Ngoc Thanh on the one hand and the dogged determination of the French to retain Cambodia as a colony. Accused of subservience to the French, he not only lost the support of the politicians, students, civil servants and Buddhist monks among his constituents but he also alienated the Khmer Vietminhs from the throne, forcing them to drift further toward Marxism.

Alarmed, Sihanouk went to work openly for his country's freedom to retrieve both his throne and his waning popularity. Thus, compelled by national as well as personal interests, the King set out on a crusade fashioned after his people's sentiments, "if possible without losing the friendship of France, but if necessary even losing it.\(^{32}\) On March 1953 he launched the movement now popularly known as the "Croisade royale pour l'indépendance."

The King went to the French Riviera where he plotted the course of action toward the pursuit of Cambodian independence. On March 5, 1953, he wrote French President V. Auriol in which he justified the immediate grant of Cambodian independence. He stressed the fact that the present French policy ran the risk of totally losing Cambodia to the communist Vietminhs.\(^{33}\) The French government, however, did not give his letter much import. The French President even encouraged the

\(^{32}\) Reddi, Cambodian Independence, p. 199.
\(^{33}\) Ibid.
King to return home. Disappointed, he proceeded to the United States hoping to influence world opinion on Cambodian independence.\textsuperscript{34} King Sihanouk also hoped to pressure the French Government to change its attitude toward the Cambodian appeal for the immediate grant of independence.

In the United States, King Sihanouk criticized the stubborn French policy vis-a-vis Cambodian sovereignty claiming that the continuation of French rule in Cambodia had encouraged rather than abated communist infiltration in the country. He further stated that there was a growing conviction among the Cambodian people that only the Communist-inspired Khmer Vietminhs were fighting for independence. He also added that even with the grant of independence Cambodia would still join France in fighting Communism.\textsuperscript{35} In answer to his appeal for support, Secretary of State Dulles made Sihanouk understand that while the U.S. was sympathetic to Cambodia nationalist aspirations, it did not believe that the time was right for independence in view of the Communist threat.\textsuperscript{36}

He returned frustrated to Phnom Penh, but left again after two months for Bangkok on June 13, 1953 on a self-imposed exile “to alert world opinion.” This time, he expressed himself with some force and even warned the French that if they continued to ignore the Cambodian struggle for independence, there would be a general uprising in which all Cambodians would be likely to participate. Declaring an uncompromising stand on the issue, Sihanouk publicly stated:

“At this decisive turning-point in our national history and in relations with France, I have to choose between France and my people. I have obviously chosen my people.”\textsuperscript{37}

On June 16, 1953, King Sihanouk moved his battle to the Battambang-Siem reap region where he was joined by many of his constituents in his renewed struggle for independence. Issarak elements surrendered to the Royal Government and vowed to work with the King until independence was regained. The French responded by bringing in foreign troops from Vietnam, Algeria, Morocco, and other areas, cordonning Phnom Penh and installing cannons around the city.\textsuperscript{38} The Royal Gov-

\textsuperscript{34} Cambodge, April 8-9, 1953.
\textsuperscript{35} Le Monde, April 23, 1953.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
ernment retaliated by deploying its own troops "at all points occupied by the French troops." This debacle in the French-Cambodian relations augered well for the spread of the Vietminh struggle for liberation in Cambodia.

Confronted with the stepped-up activities of the Khmer Vietminhs, and still suffering from the havoc which resistance to the Vietminh liberation struggle wrought on its economy and manpower, France finally capitulated. French popular feeling was for stopping the war in French Indochina and Britain as well as the United States were reluctant to intervene directly pushed the French to grant independence to Cambodia on November 9, 1953. The King returned to Phnom Penh, acclaimed by the people as a national hero. He urged his people to unite for national reconstruction.

One very significant development after the grant of independence was the Cambodian switch from a commitment to fight communism to a neutralist foreign policy. Cambodia committed itself to a policy of non-intervention as long as the Vietminh did not interfere in Cambodian affairs. This reversal of Cambodian commitment caught the "free world" by surprise even if it was obvious that this shift could not just have been born from a desire to retaliate against the Great Powers. The changed geopolitical realities dictated a neutral policy in order to preserve Cambodian territorial integrity and independence which were the primary goals of Cambodian nationalism.

During the 1960's the West became increasingly convinced that Cambodia's foreign policy was unpredictable and often contradictory. The main brunt of the criticism was directed against the main architect of Cambodia's neutral policy, King Sihanouk, who was reproached for his "ficklemindedness" and "tightrope diplomacy." These allegations were based on his seemingly vacillating attitudes toward the contending world powers as well as toward other political issues. One day he would attack the United States for the "strings attached" to its "aid" and the next day criticize the Soviet Union for its indecisiveness in helping the developing nations. In the same fashion he would complain bitterly of North Vietnam's expansionism, while at the same time strongly opposing the various anti-communist regimes that were successively established in South Vietnam. Similarly, Sihanouk observed with apprehension Chinese intentions in Southeast Asia.

It was indeed difficult to place Prince Sihanouk (after his abdication on March 2, 1955, his title was changed from King

40 Refer to page 45 of this paper.
to Prince) in the political spectrum. His diplomatic maneuvers ranged from "courtship" of the United States and France to gain economic and military assistance to "flirtation" with the People's Republic of China to gain technical aid. In terms of the "cold-war" politics initiated and propagated by the West, Sihanouk did not follow a consistent foreign policy. On the other hand, when viewed from the perspective of the central issues in Cambodia at the time, Prince Sihanouk's actions were not only consistent but well conceived. Sihanouk perceived the core of the issues for what it was—"the preservation of the integrity and independence of the Cambodian nation in the face of its much larger neighbors and the world powers who see Southeast Asia as one of the battlefields for their own confrontation."  

Cambodia's foreign policy was guided by four major considerations:

1. "to avert a confrontation between the cold-war powers on her soil";
2. "to avoid any relationship with a stronger power which may compromise her independence";
3. "to preserve the sanctity of her borders and the security of her people against ... the imperialistic ambitions of her traditional antagonists—Thailand and Vietnam"; and
4. to be able "to exert some influence upon international events."  

After the Geneva Conference in 1954, the evolution of a neutral policy as conceived by Cambodia was inevitable in the light of the Great Power competition in Southeast Asia, particularly in Indochina. During the conference the interplay of world power politics in Indochina was irrefutably substantiated. For instance, the extent of the influence of the Peoples' Republic of China's on the Vietminhs became apparent when Chou En-lai, the head of the Chinese delegation, effectively persuaded the Vietminhs to drop their proposal to have a Cambodian communist representative recognized in the conference. Seeing this and other influence as an integral aspect of the political reality in Indochina, Sihanouk took extra care

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in avoiding the overtures of any of the world powers. For instance, to avoid compromising his country's independence and to avoid Cambodian entanglement in the rivalry between the PRC-USSR and the United States and its allies, Sihanouk foiled the United States plan to have Cambodia join the SEATO as a counterpoise to the growing influence of the PRC in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{44}

Another major factor which necessitated a neutral foreign policy for Cambodia was the fear of being once again overrun by the irredentism of Thailand and the expansionism of Vietnam. This fear was not without basis. Historically, the armies of Thailand (Siam) and Vietnam (Annam) had fought on Cambodian territory; each had imposed its suzerainty over Cambodia at various times and both had occupied large tracts of Cambodian territory either temporarily or permanently.\textsuperscript{45}

Prior to the French rule, both Siam and Annam had spawned intrigues in the Khmer court as they furthered their interests in the kingdom. Thai irredentism was manifested more recently during the Japanese occupation when it seized the ancient Khmer temple of Preah Vihear which was located on a rocky promontory in the Dangrek mountains of Cambodia bordering the southern flank of Thailand.\textsuperscript{46} Thailand, however, was to return this temple in 1946 as a result of the Treaty of Washington.\textsuperscript{47}

In 1953, upon the withdrawal of the French from Cambodia, Thai irredentism sprung anew when Thai police forces occupied the Preah Vihear temple. The exchange of press and radio attacks which followed this incident further heightened the tension between the two governments. Eventually, in 1959, Cambodia suggested to Thailand two possible solutions to the Preah Vihear problem: the joint administration of the temple by the two countries or the submission of the case to the International Court of Justice at the Hague.\textsuperscript{46} Thailand's refusal to come to an agreement prompted Cambodia to submit the matter to the International Court of Justice. On July 15, 1962, the Court ruled that the temple of Preah Vihear was "situated in the territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia."\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} Manomohan Ghosh \textit{A History of Cambodia} (Saigon: G. K. Gupta, 1960), pp. 227-263.
\textsuperscript{46} Smith, \textit{Cambodia's Foreign Policy}, p. 141.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p. 149.
Despite Thailand's obvious resentment over the Court's decision, it had no choice but to abide by its ruling although not without protest. This resentment became manifest with the erection of barbed wires around the temple on January 4, 1963, while Cambodian forces were occupying it. For Cambodia the act indicated Thailand's deep-seated annexationist interest toward the Kingdom. Cambodian apprehension over Thailand's irredentism did not take long to be confirmed. On April 1970, a month after the coup d'etat of the Sihanouk government by General Lon Nol, Thailand re-occupied the Preah Vihear temple without a word of protest from the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak regime. The silence of the regime regarding the Thai reoccupation of Preah Vihear temple was condemned by the Khmer Rouge as proof of the treachery of the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak regime.

On the other hand, Cambodia's relation with South and North Vietnams during the post-independence period go back to Cambodia's historically-rooted suspicion of Vietnamese expansionism. At the height of Annamese expansion, the western provinces of Cambodia — Bienhoa, Giadinh, and Mytho — were annexed to Annam territory. Later the whole of the Cochinchina region was likewise engulfed. So aggressive was Annam's designs on South Cambodia (then referred to as Kampuchea Krom and now as southern Vietnam) that a Cambodian King (Ang Duong) was moved to seek French assistance in 1854 to prevent Annam from nibbling away his kingdom. However, even with French help Cambodia never recovered Kampuchea Krom. In 1948, Sihanouk wanted the return of South Cambodia, but in the Ha Long Bay Agreement of 1949 between Bao Dai and the French, three more Cambodian provinces — Rachgia, Soctrong, and Travinh — were given to Bao Dai as a reward for his cooperation. During the Geneva Conference of 1954, the Royal Government of Cambodia again reiterated its historical rights to the Cambodian territories misappropriated by Annam and France. These territories were eventually incorporated in South Vietnam and later absorbed by the Soc. Rep. of Vietnam.

The withdrawal of the French from Vietnam in 1954 reawakened among some Cambodian leaders fears of Vietnamese expansionism. From the Cambodians' point of view, a united Vietnam would be in a stronger position to embark

50 Caldwell and Tan, Cambodia, p. 331.
51 Smith, Cambodia's Foreign Policy, p. 153.
52 Ghosh, Cambodia, pp. 260-261.
on a new phase of expansionism. At this point, the Cambodians were particularly apprehensive of the Vietnamese design to appropriate the rich plains of the Mekong-Tonle Sap-Bassac basin. Because of this, the Cambodian subjected the Vietnamese minorities, the largest minority group in Cambodia, to a tight surveillance and in the early years of the 1960's deported Vietnamese nationals in spite of strong protests from South Vietnam.

In another effort to check Vietnamese expansionism, Cambodia constructed the port of Sihanoukville in the early 1960's to end Cambodian dependence on the port of Saigon. However, during the construction of Sihanoukville (1965) South Vietnam, in retaliation, claimed a group of islands south of Cambodia, South Vietnam had also inherited from the French, the Koh Tral (Phu Quoc), a group of islands situated on the Cambodian maritime waters. Consequently, it was easy for it to initiate Cambodian fishermen in the area. These South Vietnamese maneuvers were enough to confirm Cambodian fears that the Vietnamese were still intent on keeping Cambodia in a subordinate position.

The 1960's further witnessed the heightening of tension between Cambodia and South Vietnam as border violations were often committed by the South Vietnamese in the process of "hot pursuit" of the Vietminhs. This additional irritant finally resulted in the rupture of political relations between the two countries in August 1963.54

On the other hand, the Cambodians were worried about the North Vietnamese not so much for their ideology as for the fact that they were Vietnamese. They were aware that during the Geneva Conference (1954), Pham Van Dong proposed that a communist delegation from Cambodia be represented. Moreover, the Vietminhs had always been sympathetic to the Khmer Vietminhs in their fight against the French and Sihanouk's French predilection.

Hence, in the 1960's, the traditional fear of becoming the battleground between two states with historically-rooted irredentism toward portions of Cambodia territory re-emerged with full vigor and complications and affected all domestic and foreign policies of Cambodia.

It was this sense of insecurity vis-a-vis Thai, South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese irredentism which convinced Prince Sihanouk to work for diplomatic neutrality after Cambodia regained its independence. He departed from the tradi-

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54 Smith, Cambodian Foreign Policy, p. 162.
tional policy of allignment with a big Power most probably as a reaction to the case of his great-great-grandfather, King Ang Doung, who had sought French protection and ended a victim of French century imperial ambitions in Indochina. Learning from the Cambodian experience under the French protectorate, the Prince was thus guided not only by the need for succor but also by the need to survive without compromising his country's independence.

Yet, ironically, Cambodia condemned the very polarization of power which made it possible for Cambodia to preserve her independence. Since both camps sought to influence the unaligned nations, Sihanouk played one bloc against the other in order to pressure the big powers to restrain their Southeast Asian allies in their designs against Cambodia. For instance, in the early 1960's, when Thailand and South Vietnam escalated their violation of Cambodian territorial integrity, Prince Sihanouk threatened to seek Chinese assistance unless the United States stopped the black propaganda being directed by Thailand and South Vietnam against his country. Similarly, it was apparently the fear that Cambodia might forsake its neutral policy, and join the SEATO that prompted China in 1963 to restrain North Vietnam from actively supporting the Khmer Vietminhs.

In anticipation of the time when his neighbors would nevertheless undertake further 'amputations' of his territory, Prince Sihanouk proceeded to seek international recognition of Cambodia's neutral position. In 1962 he appealed to the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union to convene a Geneva-type conference to discuss the neutrality of Cambodia. The Prince appealed to President Kennedy to exert influence among the Big Powers to convene such a conference. However, the American President side-stepped the main problem cited by the Prince's letter since his acquiescence to Cambodia's request or any help extended by the U.S. to guarantee further Cambodia's neutrality would be tantamount to an admission of its allies', Thailand's and South Vietnam's aggressive designs on Cambodian territory. The United States President was left no choice except to encourage the three states to settle their border disputes among themselves. Cambodia, however, knew that any border settlements arrived at with its neighbors would not be binding unless enforced by the Big Powers.

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55 Ibid., p. 190-191.
56 Portions of these letters were cited in Simth, Cambodia's Foreign Policy, pp. 190-191.
The Communist bloc on the other hand, particularly China and North Vietnam, favored the holding of such a conference and signified to Cambodia their willingness to recognize the latter's frontiers and neutrality (1962).\textsuperscript{57} Falling to secure American commitment to call that conference, Cambodia had to consider a new approach to ensure its territorial integrity. At the beginning of 1963, Cambodia began to receive assurances from the People's Republic of China and North Vietnam of their support of Cambodian neutrality.

Meanwhile, relations between Cambodia and the United States worsened in the middle of 1963 as anti-Sihanouk radio broadcasts emanating from the Khmer Serei propaganda based in Thailand and South Vietnam increased in virulence. Moreover, the repeated incursions by the South Vietnamese forces on Cambodian territory had prejudiced the rapprochement between the United States and its allies and Cambodia. As the Vietnam war turned in favor of the Vietminhs, Cambodia was gradually drawn into the war as the United States became more and more deeply involved in Thai and South Vietnamese expansionism. Consequently, Cambodia accepted Chinese economic aid as well as North Vietnamese support for its neutrality. Although Prince Sihanouk was not yet prepared at this stage to join the communist camp against the United States, the decision had to be made in response to the need to protect Cambodia's national security. When the United States refused to protect Cambodia on the issue of neutrality, it was only logical for Sihanouk to accept PRC's and North Vietnam's offer of support. Thus, with the final diplomatic rupture with the United States, the increased cooperation between Cambodia and PRC and the progressive determination of Cambodian relations with Thailand and South Vietnam in 1965, and the collapse of an otherwise ingenious diplomatic policy had become inevitable.

In the study of Cambodia's final collapse in 1970, it is essential to elucidate the factors which eventually revealed the futility of Cambodian neutrality and the inevitability of the declaration of a war for national liberation against, in Prince Sihanouk's words, "US imperialism and its lackeys" in Cambodia.

The September 1966 elections clearly indicated the polarization of the political forces in Cambodia. On one side were the reactionaries who disagreed with Prince Sihanouk's neutral policy in favor of rapprochement with the United States and

\textsuperscript{57} Caldwell & Tan, \textit{Cambodia}, p. 169.
its allies, and on the other were the progressives who continued to gain popularity as notable figures in the Royal Government were hounded by the reactionaries into defecting to the guerrilla zones. With the departure of the notable progressives in the Royal Government, right-wing membership in the National Assembly multiplied. Immediately after the election with General Lon Nol as Prime Minister, a right-wing Cabinet was formed. The New Prime Minister was the embodiment of the aspirations of the businessmen, landlords, and their political allies who wanted to resume the vitality of Cambodian trade and commerce. General Lon Nol and his supporters were averse to the Prince's neutralist policy as it obstructed the flow of dollars to Cambodia and hampered business operations. Hence, this group longed for the return of American aid and business to Cambodia.

Once installed as Prime Minister, General Lon Nol launched a campaign against Cambodians identified with the left. In the Battambang revolt of 1966, peasants who were dispossessed of their lands demonstrated against the Lon Nol regime. The Prime Minister retaliated with a brutal campaign of repression against the protesters, and peasant leader who continue to oppose the regime were "liquidated."66 Lon Nol was greatly alarmed by the unrelenting resistance of the peasants and by the massive support they received from peasants of the neighboring provinces. He branded the rebellion a communist plot to sow dissension in that part of Cambodia.69

Meantime, progressive elements in the National Assembly, like Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon, and Hu Nim, who came to the defense of the peasants, were immediately branded as "foreign agents" by the Lon Nol regime. Many other sympathetic government figures like former Minister Chau Seng and So Nem, who supported the progressives' stand, were also attacked by the right for their leftist leanings. In a general assault on the progressives, many school teachers, academicians, and others who were critical of the Lon Nol government or who were known for their progressive views were arrested and executed. By April 1967 most of the notable progressives in government like Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon, and Hu Nim had already disappeared from the Cambodian political scene and several hundred intellectuals had suffered the same fate. However, it was only by the middle of 1969 that the Phnom

69 Ibid.
Penh official press admitted a number of well-known radicals had disappeared only to reappear among the maquish.60

With the elimination of the progressive elements from the government, the Lon Nol Regime started preparing the ground for the final seizure of political power. The problem of eliminating Sihanouk was their only obstacle. However, the popularity of Sihanouk made this obstacle more formidable than that presented by the progressive elements.

Despite his popularity, Sihanouk began to lose his grip on the political situation in the years 1966 and 1967. During the Battambang crisis of 1966, he was able to defuse the critical situation through such palliative measures as the institution of infrastructure projects, construction of destroyed houses and increased medical aid to affected areas. However, he failed to reverse the process which had led to the progressive deterioration of the political and economic situation in Battambang. Besides, Sihanouk never knew what the real conditions were since the Lon Nol government kept critical information from him. Hence, Sihanouk was unduly optimistic about the responsiveness of the masses to his political maneuvers. Insulated within the cordon sanitaire built by the Lon Nol regime around him, Sihanouk begun to lose track of the real import of Cambodian events.

September 1967 was the critical month which saw the build-up of events in the Cambodian political scene which culminated in the coup of March 18, 1970. Unwittingly, Prince Sihanouk made two major moves which actually helped the plans of the Lon Nol cabinet to bring Cambodia into the Western camp. He began by closing down the friendship associations and student unions, especially the Amitie Khmero-Chinoise (AAKC) and the Association Generale des Etudiants Khmers (AGEK). Next, he muzzled the press, the La Nouvelle Depeche du Cambodge in particular. Sihanouk construed or was led to construe that the AAKC had gone beyond their purpose of cultural, artistic, and economic exchanges and contacts by spreading subversive foreign ideologies and anti-national propaganda61 and that the AGEK was responsible for the violent anti-government demonstrations staged by the radicals in Phnom Penh in 1966 and 1967.

These moves eventually led to the repression of the Cambodian press which, Sihanouk alleged, had become a mere propaganda outlet for either the “free world” or the communist

60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., p. 165.
camp. *La Nouvelle Depeche* was silenced and with it, the last venue for airing criticisms against the government. Moreover, all foreign newspapers were banned from Cambodia.

These developments worked in favor of the Lon Nol regime's plan to wean Sihanouk from the socialist bloc and eventually to draw him closer to the Western bloc, to the United States in particular. However, contrary to Lon Nol's expectations, the intended change in Cambodian foreign policy did not materialize with the escalation of the U.S.-South Vietnam border violations in the middle of 1967. On May 19, Prince Sihanouk called upon the world to reiterate his fifteen-year campaign for international recognition of Cambodia's neutrality and territorial integrity within its existing frontiers. DRV and NLF immediately responded in favor of Sihanouk's appeal. The NLF recognized Cambodia's neutrality. In the same communication, the NLF condemned acts of aggression against Cambodia by the United States and its South Vietnamese and Thai allies, and opposed any change in the existing Cambodian frontiers. The DRV also concurred with the NLF's declaration. By the end of the year twenty-three other countries had responded to Sihanouk's call. These included France, Singapore, East Germany, USSR, PRC, North Korea, Cuba, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Poland, and the Republic of the Philippines among others.

That the United States and its allies, South Vietnam and Thailand remained silent might easily be explained. Firstly, the United States and its allies could not accept the conditions imposed by Sihanouk since to recognize the existing frontiers of Cambodia would be tantamount to giving up the Cambodian territories from which American forces have been strafing Vietminh "sanctuaries." Secondly, it was in the middle of 1967 that the greatest number of aggressions had been perpetrated on Cambodian territories and people by the forces of U.S.-South Vietnam-Thailand alliance. Now to accept Sihanouk's conditions would mean the de-escalation of a war they had every intention of escalating. Hence, the only strategy left to the United States, South Vietnam, and Thailand was to widen the Vietnam war so as to include Cambodia.

The year 1967 proved to be the watershed of Cambodian politics. That year, Prince Sihanouk, as a result of the worsening situation along Cambodia's borders, was being strongly drawn into the socialist camp, where he could always find

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strong support in his battle for the preservation of his country's strict neutrality and non-alignment. It was also the year Prime Minister Lon Nol, finally succeeded in filling his Cabinet and the National Assembly with his supporters and in eliminating leftist opposition in Phnom Penh.

Having forced the Cambodian left out of legitimate politics, Lon Nol and his supporters now began easing out the Sihanoukists, the loyal supporters of the Prince. As their most notable achievement of this campaign, they forced the resignation of Sonn San, one of Prince Sihanouk's principal advisers. They progressively isolated Sonn San from government circles and made his position intolerable. Even in the armed forces, they moved against known Sihanoukists who were dismissed and replaced by Lon Nol's nominees. Civilian governors in the provinces were replaced by military officers loyal to Lon Nol ostensibly because of the widespread disorder spawned by the Khmer Rouge. Department chiefs in various ministries known to be loyal to the Prince were also removed. The "creeping coup" was substantially completed by 1969. All that was need now was to set up the palace coup that would unseat the Prince himself.

From 1968 to 1969 it was clear that Prince Sihanouk had become increasingly cut off from reality. Surrounded by Lon Nol's supporters, he was no longer being informed of the government's activities. As a matter of fact, he never knew that he was reigning without ruling and that this lack of awareness was abetted by his constant confrontation with the complex interaction of various social forces at work in Cambodia, i.e., the hatching maquis, the American-South Vietnamese-Thai aggressions, the American plot with the Lon Nol group, and the fast deteriorating Cambodian economy.

Preparations for the forthcoming coup had more or less been completed by the end of 1969 and it was then just a matter of waiting for the right moment. When Prince Sihanouk left for Grasse (January 1970), a summer resort in the French Riviera, Lon Nol and his men had considerable elbow room to set the spark that would ignite the coup. During his absence, the Lon Nol group revived the issue of anti-Vietnamese feelings among Cambodians by accusing the North Vietnamese of designs to annex portions of Cambodian territory. Since the Cambodians had a long history of fighting against the Vietnamese, it did not take long for the Cambodians to stage demonstrations in front of the DRV embassy in Phnom Penh, protesting the pre-
sense of Vietminhs along the borders of Cambodia. The series of demonstrations in February 1970 had been described as “well-organized” and “stage-managed.” This upheaval in Phnom Penh gave the plotters the excuse to intimidate Sihanouk (who was still in France) into reversing his policies toward the DRV. On March 12, 1970 the Cabinet cabled Sihanouk for such a change in policy. At the same time, Lon Nol demanded that the North Vietnamese and NLF troops leave Cambodian soil within seventy-two hours. The removal of Prince Sihanouk as Head of State was only a breath away.

On March 18, 1970 at 1:00 p.m. the National Assembly voted that the Prince be temporarily replaced by Cheng Heng, one of the major plotters. The decision was broadcast shortly afterwards. Significantly, there was no spontaneous manifestation of popular approval in Phnom Penh or in the provinces.

The Prince heard the news in Moscow as he was boarding the plane for Peking. He left Moscow for Peking upon failure to receive an assurance of support from the Russians. He was now going to Peking to enlist the support of the Chinese. Contrary to his expectations, the Chinese received him as the Head of State of Cambodia. With Chinese support, the Prince now prepared for a protracted struggle.

II. THE FORMATION OF THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT OF KAMPUCHEA (NUFK)

Prince Sihanouk told Chou En-lai that he would fight the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique, and he was assured of the “total and unshakable support of the Chinese people.” Hence, on March 23, 1970, the Prince announced the formation of the National United Front of Kampuchea (NUFK), a broad alliance of all progressive social forces of Cambodia for the struggle against United States imperialism and the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak government. He also announced the formation of a National Liberation Army and exhorted patriotic Cambodians to enlist in its ranks. Significantly, he also announced

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66 The discussion hereon will be confined mainly to the formation of the National United Front of Kampuchea (NUFK) as the broad alliance of progressive forces in Cambodia for a war of liberation, against the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique.
67 Caldwell and Tan, Cambodia, p. 266.
68 Le Monde, April 7, 1970. From the text of “Message and Solemn Declaration by Samdech Norodom Sihanok, Cambodian Head of State, March 23, 1970.”
the establishment of a New National Union Government (GRUNK) whose members would come from all circles of the Khmer society—monks, peasants, workers, merchants, army-men, youth, intellectuals, women, etc. (The GRUNK became the important legal body that would plan and direct the overall war of national liberation.)

The whole tone of the Prince's March 23 message did not fail to strike responsive chords among the people, and not even the restrictions of the Phnom Penh ruling clique could censor the news from filtering into Cambodia. On March 25, 26, and 27 pro-Sihanouk riots broke out in several provincial towns. At the same time Khmer Rouge leaders and former deputies in the erstwhile Sihanouk government who had fled to the maquis in 1967, pledged to support Sihanouk's proclamation of March 23. In a message addressed to the people of Cambodia Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon, and Hu Nim exhorted all progressive forces in Cambodia "to march forward under the banner of the NUFK to defeat U.S. imperialists and the traitors, Lon Nol and Sirik Matak."70

The immediate response of the Khmer Rouge now linked the armed struggle in the countrysides to the struggle of the masses of oppressed workers, professionals and youths in the cities. This enabled the revolutionary guerrillas to acquire legal backing together with an organized political infrastructure in the maquis as well as in the cities.

Having enlisted Sihanouk on their side, the Khmer Rouge guerrillas gave the movement new impetus uncommon to similar revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia. Aptly, the Khmer Rouge made Sihanouk the rallying symbol particularly in the villages where the deposed Head of State was immensely popular. Upon entering a village, Cambodian cadres distributed Sihanouk portraits explaining to the villagers why the Prince could not return and conveying to them his March 23 proclamation. Since the Prince was genuinely revered by the countryfolk, converting them did not prove to be a difficult task. By May-June 1970, the guerrillas had clearly gained impetus as more and more of the peasantry, moved by their desire for survival, their social grievances, and their reverence for the Prince, opted to support the movement.

On May 5 Prince Sihanouk, as chairman of the NUFK, released the Political Programme of the NUFK, which defined

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70 Ibid.
the political, social, and economic goals of the war of national liberation. Its primarily political aim reads as follows:

"... to realize the broadest national union for fighting against all the maneuvers and aggression of the American imperialists, overthrowing the dictatorship of their flunkeys headed by the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak and for defending the national independence, peace, neutrality, and sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country within her present frontiers and for building a free and democratic regime of the people progressing towards the construction of a prosperous Cambodia conforming to the profound aspirations of our people." 71

This political goal was envisioned in the light of the determination to build-up and develop an independent national economy by relying principally on the resources and productive forces of Cambodia. 72 It proposed an economic policy designed to free the national economy from the excesses of private capital, guaranteeing at the same time a gradual phasing out of private ownership of the forces of production. It also guaranteed to the peasants the right to the land they tilled and to assistance in increasing land and labour productivity. It also proposed to carry out the industrialization of the country and to formulate a rational industrial policy so that production would meet the principal needs of the people to the maximum. Moreover, it proposed a policy of nationalization of the banks and foreign trade. In short, the economic policy envisioned was to lay down the base for the real democratization of Cambodian society.

Alongside these economic goals, the social goals of the NUFK ensured and supported extensive political, civic, and cultural education among the people and the youth.

The political programme of the NUFK was generally a definition of strategy and tactics in the liberation struggle against U.S. imperialism and its "flunkeys." In particular, the NUFK stressed the all-important idea of armed struggle in the dismantling of US imperialism before a viable economic emancipation could be undertaken.

At this point, perhaps, a look at the role of Sihanouk in this liberation struggle would enable us to appreciate the unique forging of a united front of progressive elements with a monarch as the rallying symbol of national liberation. Prince Sihanouk's alliance with the Cambodian masses was really the climax of his own political development, from the time he was...

72 Ibid., p. 9.
placed on the throne by the French as a safe successor to the
time he was finally deposed by the Lon Nol clique.

During his entire reign, Sihanouk had always defended his
country's neutrality and territorial integrity through means that
often disconcerted the West. In the words of Han Suyin, Sihanouk "is a rare man born of royal blood and endowed
with a French education who should have transcended the
barriers of his own kingly, feudal upbringing and his acquired 'western orientation,' and achieved such insight into the forces
that transform emergent nations."\(^7^3\)

In the past, he was often chided for having "flirted with
the Reds" but a deeper look at Cambodian history would reveal
that Sihanouk was acutely aware of the precarious position of
his little kingdom vis-a-vis the changed political conditions in
post-war Indochina. Moreover, he was cognizant of the fact
that the United States would rather support its allies who were
bent on dismembering Cambodian territory than accord Cam­
bodia an international guarantee for its neutrality. Thus, he
correctly perceived the PRC could be a counterpoise to Amer­
ican design in Indochina. The 1960's saw PRC's and PRC's
and North Vietnam's respect for Cambodian neutrality as
indicated by their ready response to Sihanouk's demand for
recognition of neutrality and respect for territorial integrity.
Perhaps it was this genuine respect for Cambodian neutrality
which convinced Sihanouk to align himself finally with the
communist camp in 1970.

This crucial decision to move toward the communist
camp, therefore, should not be viewed as the conversion of
the Prince to the communist ideology, but rather as a result
of his over-riding concern over the preservation of the ter­
ritorial integrity of the Khmer nation. Since it was only
PRC which had consistently respected Cambodian integrity,
Sihanouk chose China as its protector. The following excerpts
reflect Sihanouk's thinking at the time:

1. January 1963: "In order to avoid [-subjugation by Thailand
and Vietnam-] the Khmers are ready to ally themselves with
anyone. Only the socialist camp seems disposed to protect us
from dismemberment. Only it has proposed to help us and says
it is ready to offer us guarantees. If our national existence is
at stake, how can we neglect this sheet anchor?"\(^7^4\)

2. In a speech in February 1964, Sihanouk pointed out that: "We
do not want to become Red. But some day we will have to ac­

\(^7^3\) Han Suyin and Robert Shaplen, "Portraits of the Prince," in 
Jonathan S. Grant, et al. (eds.), Cambodia the Widening War in Indo­
\(^7^4\) Realites Cambodgiennes, January 18, 1963.
cept it because we will be unable to avoid it, that is, provide we are able to safeguard our territorial integrity... We only want to maintain forever the Khmer nation and the Khmer flag. Most of the countries which have become Red have maintained their national flag and their names are mentioned with great honor in the list of U.N. members.”  

Sihanouk had always feared the division of his country by Thailand and Vietnam, and this had driven him to seek communist assistance to help him preserve Cambodia. Until he could gain the support of China, Sihanouk did not know that he would be asking the Chinese to assist him in his war for national liberation.

Being a Khmer monarch, Sihanouk ruler in the great tradition of the Khmer monarchy where rulers were expected to care for their people by building roads, rest houses, hospitals, granaries, etc. During his brief reign as a monarch and as Head of the State, he espoused a kind of populism bordering on paternalism. On the other hand, he genuinely distrusted the elites and never viewed them as part of the “people”. To him, they had separate class interests which made them potentially dangerous to social harmony. When this elite embraced an anti-national, capitalistic, and anti-people program, Prince Sihanouk chose to be on the side of the greater masses of the Cambodian people. When he finally chose to fight with his people, he lent his prestige to the Cambodian revolution and pushed the war of national liberation to a speedy conclusion.

In his famous declaration of March 23, he said: “I should resign the function as Head of State after our people’s certain victory over their enemies and reactionary oppression and their masters—U.S. imperialists. On that very occasion, I will give our progressive youth and working people the possibility of fully assuming the responsibility of national construction and defense with the cooperation of the entire nation...”  

Perhaps the left should be given credit for carefully nurturing better relations with the Prince. In the entire career of the known leftists who served under the Royal Government, they supported the Prince’s battle for the recognition of Cambodian neutrality. Chau Seng, for instance, who enjoyed the confidence of the Prince, served him until he was forced to flee Phnom Penh to escape the dragnet of Lon Nol in 1967. Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon, and HuNim served in the Cambodian Ministries and before their disappearance warned the

76 Le Monde, April 7, 1970. Cited in page 38.
Prince of a "creeping coup" being hatched by the Right. These were but a few of the many leftists who were prominent in the Royal Government who had to flee Phnom Penh toward the close of the 1960's as Lon Nol tightened his grip on the political machinery.

During the Battambang crisis of 1967, the guerrillas distinguished the Prince from the outright reactionaries in the Royal Government. The Prince was never mentioned in their leaflets that circulated in the rebel-infested area of the Battambang-Siem reap region.

When Sihanouk formed the NUFK and called upon the Cambodian people to take up armed struggle against the U.S. imperialism and the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak regime, the former officials of the Royal Government, Khieu Samphan, Huo Yuon, and Hu Nim, to name a few, immediately responded to his call. Cambodian ambassadors accredited abroad and students from all over the world joined the NUFK either in Peking or in the countrysides of Cambodia. To date there is no finer instance of revolutionary solidarity than that shown by the unmistakably popular base of the forces of social revolution in Cambodia. Confronted with this revolutionary phenomenon, the United States had no choice but to intervene massively (April 30, 1970), only to find out for itself that the gains of its twenty-year counter-revolution in mainland Southeast Asia had eroded overnight.

The NUFK was a powerful magnet that draw progressive forces to its side in the battle for the national liberation of Cambodia. It was able to demonstrate its solidarity in purpose and practice, as well as in program. In conducting the war, the NUFK implemented extensive reforms in the liberated zones — agrarian reforms, political education, extension of medical care and proved its ability to protect the life and property of the population. The liberation forces were so tightly coordinated that in the summer of 1970 the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak regime had to request for U.S. assistance; hence, the American invasion of April 30, 1970. However, by that time the liberation forces had already over-run the countrysides and it was only a matter of months before the final drive to Phnom Penh.

By April 17, 1975 exactly five years after the coup d'état, the liberation forces reoccupied Phnom Penh, an event which signalled the victory of the NUFK over the U.S. imperialism and its "flunkeys", Lon Nol-Sirik Matak. The swiftness of the Cambodian revolution is a historic record set by the Cam-
bodian revolutionaries considering the long drawn-out national struggles that characterized many other battles in the Third World against U.S. imperialism.

Perhaps, at this point, a question needs to be asked: Where did the NUFK draw its strength? As Yudh-Mitt and other political analysts put it, the answer lies in the NUFK:

"...its correct political line and its correct stand on the problem of unity. It is a broad national democratic movement that rallies around itself all social strata of the Khmer people (workers, peasants, petty-bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie, monks, patriotic members of royal family, national minorities, intellectuals and all patriotic personages), based on an indistructible worker—peasant alliance which compromise over 90% of the population."

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A SPANIARD'S DIARY OF MANGALORE, 1776-1777

SALVADOR P. ESCOTO

A rare phenomenon in the history of colonial India\(^1\) took place in 1776: a Spanish frigate docked at the harbor of Mangalore on April 7 and departed on March 25, 1777. This occurrence would have remained unknown\(^2\) but for documents discovered in two Spanish archives, which disclose detailed information about the mysterious visit. An archive in Madrid has most of the material on the background, purpose and result of the expedition.\(^3\) On the other hand, the one in Seville contains the narrative of the voyage itself, which is summarized in this article.

The narrative written in the form of a diary consists of 138 folios and is embellished with four sketches and a map of Mangalore. The author was Miguel Antonio Gomez, who by virtue of his office—second in command and eventually the captain of the ship—was probably the most qualified to write about the voyage. Unlike many narratives which read like

\(^1\) As Holden Furber commented: “Among all the foreign flags displayed by ships loading cargoes in British (India) harbors after 1783, the banner of one great European power (Spain) was never to be seen.” See John Company at Work (Cambridge: Harvard, 1951) p. 145.

\(^2\) Furber could have added: nor was one seen before 1783 with the exception of the year 1776. Although intermittent clandestine trade had long been carried on in Manila by the British, employing ships flying Asian or Portuguese banners, no ship displaying the Spanish flag is known to have gone to British India. For works concerning this topic, see Serafin Quiason, English “Country Trade” with the Philippines, 1644-1765. Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1966; and W.E. Cheong, “An Anglo-Spanish-Portugese Clandestine Trade between the Ports of British India and Manila, 1785-1790,” Philippine Historical Review, I (1965) 80-94.

\(^3\) To the best of my knowledge, there is only one work which mentions this incident but due to lack of information dismisses it in one sentence. See T.W. Venn, Mangalore (Mysore: Wesley Press, 1945), p. 57.

According to these sources Haidar Ali, the ruler of Mysore (1761-1782), sent a Jewish merchant on a diplomatic mission to seek an alliance with Prussia, a country whose military system Haidar greatly admired. Failing in his attempt, the envoy went to Madrid where the negotiation devolved to the level of a commercial transaction. The Jew was eventually told to confer with the Spanish governor-general of the Philippines. The appearance, therefore, of a Spanish ship in Indian waters was the outcome of a tentative trade agreement between Spain and Mysore.

The historical setting of this bizarre episode occurred between the First and Second British-Mysore Wars (1767-1769 and 1780-1782). Haidar Ali’s double objective was to prevent the coalition of the British, the Marathas and the Nizam of Hyderabad, and to seek military alliance with other European countries. If he failed in the latter objective, he hoped at least to establish commercial treaties with them, offering trade privileges in exchange for war material and services of military advisers and skilled shipwrights. While much has been written on Haidar Ali’s efforts to win European allies, particularly France, nothing is known about his overture to Spain.
travelogues, Gomez’s work is quite unique and valuable in several respects. For one thing, of the ten or so accounts of Mangalore written by travelers from Ibn Batuta in 1324 to an anonymous writer in the 1920’s, the Spanish diary is the longest and the most informative. While others wrote briefly of Mangalore as one of the numerous places they had visited, Gomez practically devoted his entire work to the town. Due to his diligence, he touches on diverse topics, sometimes giving fresh information on such neglected areas of studies, as the rebuilt navy of Haidar Ali, the Nawab of Mysore 1761-1782, after the First British-Mysore War in 1767-1769, or his trade with Muscat in the Persian Gulf. For instance, he mentioned such little known bits of information as Haidar’s naval chiefs in the mid-1770’s, his “Jewish concubines” and the Persian mercenaries in his army, who on one occasion clashed with the Muscat sailors in armed combat to the consternation of the populace. Most important of all, the Spanish diary is a valuable contribution to Indian local history. There is a scarcity of material on the history of Mangalore, especially the period before the British occupation. Gomez’s observation of the town’s commerce, religious festivals, social classes and government officials will certainly delight document-starved researchers. It is pleasantly readable, and probably the only Spanish first-hand narrative on colonial India. The summary of Gomez’s work follows:

Relation of the Voyage to Mangalore

The Spanish frigate departed from the Philippines 25 January 1776, and reached the strait of Malacca February 8. Along the way, the Spaniards were asked twice by the British—first, past Mahim and then, just before entering Mangalore—where they had come from and where they were going. They replied: “From Manila to Goa and Surat,” and—on the second occasion—“to get water supply and to ballast the ship.” On April 7, they arrived in Mangalore, where the author expressed shock at the uncouth manners and greed of the stevedores that


5 The actual title of this document is “Relacion del Viaje hecho del Orden de Su Majestad por la Fragata N.S. del Carmen alias La Deseada escrita por Don Miguel Antonio Gomez al Puerto de Mangalore para Fines del Real Servicio, año 1777,” Archivo General de Indias (Sevilla), Sección del Estado, legajo 45.

Unless otherwise indicated, hereinaforward all parts of this article are drawn from this narrative.
unloaded the cargo from April 9 through 14. "They swarmed all over the ship and tried to get everything they could lay hands on, including cannons on deck." When the lightened vessel was about to enter the inner harbor, a squadron of British ships intercepted it. Informed by the English factor, "Stuart" 6, that the Spaniards unloaded war material, the squadron commander named "Mor" 7, tried to confront them with the evidence. In the presence of the Moslem governor of Mangalore, the admiral and other town officials, he yelled angrily at them: "'I will do with the Spanish frigate what I will do with this hat.' At these words, he grabbed it off his head, hurled it to the ground and stamped on it furiously with his foot until it was torn to pieces."

During the months of May and June, several diary pages of Gomez described in detail the destruction caused by the Indian monsoon which buffeted the town night and day with "continuous torrential rain and howling wind [that] uprooted trees." Several big ships, native as well as European, were wrecked with heavy loss of human life. Although the Spanish frigate was not seriously damaged, the sick crew had to be moved three times because the roofs of the first two houses which had served as infirmaries were blown off by the wind.

On May 8, Ramon Yssasi, the ship captain, departed for "Patan" [Seringapatam] in the company of Haidar's envoy. Cheg Ali, the Moplah governor, left shortly afterward for the same destination but died in "Turcur Umali" [Karkal-Udipi?] on his return trip. He was succeeded by his brother, Pocre Balaal. Gomez, who was in command of the Spaniards left behind in Managalore, tried to win his good-will through gifts, favors and social amenities. Despite his efforts, he had only unpleasant memories of the new governor. The killedar, Yacabai Khan, was different. Initially cold to the Spaniards, he gradually changed his attitude and became quite friendly. Another interesting official was the "admiral" of Haidar Ali's navy, whom the author called "Angri" after his ancestral state Angria. 8 His father was the famous Maratha pirate who terrorized the coast of Malabar with his mighty fleet based in

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6 Actually, his name was Charles Stewart, assistant to the senior factor of Hanower in 1769 within the jurisdiction of the Bombay Presidency. He later became a senior merchant and was elected eventually to the vacancy on the Board of Trade in Bengal in 1788. See Indian Register, 1768-1786, vol. 1776-1778, pp. 48.66.

7 This writer was unable to identify this British naval officer.

8 According to Gomez, Stewart spent most of his time in Tellicherry because the local authorities severely restricted his commercial activities in Mangalore.
“Guirien” [Gheria]. After his father’s capture by the British, he was appointed admiral by the Nawab. Gomez described in detail the reception accorded the Spanish officials at the admiral’s residence (see Fig. 1). On November 27, however, Angri was taken prisoner. According to the killedar’s explanation, his father was restored by the British to his state and Haidar had doubts about the admiral’s loyalty. He was succeeded in his post by a Hindu whom Gomez called “Baburao,” a generic name given to a Brahman in the service of the Nawab. Of him, the author wrote: “Unlike others, he is very good and generous to us...without any deceit or intent to exploit us.”

Gomez did not write directly about Haidar’s navy as he seemed primarily interested in recording all ships that called at the port. Implied, however, in his writing is that rarely if ever were all the Nawab’s ships assembled in one place, some of which were in fact seldom seen. Among those frequently mentioned as entering the channel was a flotilla of three packets and five gallivats plying between Mahim and Mangalore, bringing arms and ammunition to the latter port. Its commander was Hebrain Bap Donga, who went to Calicut on 9 March 1777 to conduct to Mangalore an English ship bought by the Nawab for 160,000 rupees. Another frequent caller was a ship of Ali Rajah of Cannanore, an ally of Haidar. It regularly carried rice to Bombay and brought back riggings for Haidar’s fleet. Two bombaras and a grab reportedly from Bombay were sometimes seen unloading cordage and lumber for ship construction. Three and sometimes four frigates of the Nawab sailed regularly to Muscat with cargoes of rice and returned laden with horses, camels, dried fish, salt, sulphur, coffee, nuts, almonds, raisin, dates and drugs. A flotilla of eleven gallivats and two grabs were recorded 21 December 1776 as having sailed for Coondapoor in order to convoy to Mangalore “ships recently constructed” there. The biggest assemblage of Haidar’s navy was sighted 27 January 1777 and estimated by Gomez at about forty ships. But he had nothing good to say

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8 His full name was Raghunath Angria. In his work, The Military System of the Marathas (Bombay: Oriental Longmans, 1958, p. 206.), Surendra Nath Sen mentioned him casually in one short sentence as “the captain of Haidar’s navy”. In view of Sen’s remark, Raghunath Angria’s title of “admiral” has to be ascertained.

9 His father’s name was Tulaji Angria. See B.K. Apte, A History of the Maratha Navy and Merchantship (Bombay: Government Press, 1973), pp. 82-83.
about the seamanship and valor of the crew, once criticizing them severely for not having "the courage to pursue four or five gallivats [which] robbed two merchant ships from Masulipatam — within sight of the Nawab's fleet." The Maratha pirate who perpetrated the daring robbery was called "Raspu".

The author had much to say about the town's commerce. Rice was the major export. Certain merchandise like pepper, areca, cardamon, etc., were under government monopoly. They were grown elsewhere and transported to Mangalore or Condapoor where they were traded for guns, saltpetre and European hardware. Some products were for local consumption like the cotton textile woven in Chandrapatent and Bagalur and kitchen utensils manufactured in "Nagar" (Bednur?).

The most conspicuous mercantile ships were from Muscat. Six, seven and eight bombaras arrived in October, November and December 1776 respectively. The busiest month was January 1777 during which Gomez counted sixteen bombaras, excluding a huge frigate of the Imam himself. Besides their cargoes of dates, lemons, garlic, shark fins, sulphur, dried fish, camels and more than one hundred horses, they carried aboard three "Jewish women" for Haidar's harem and 300 Persian recruits for his army. When they departed, each ship was loaded with about 3,000 cavans of rice, some areca nuts, sandalwood, sugar and pepper. One day, a fight broke out in the market place and developed into a two-hour melee between 300 Persian mercenaries and an equal number of people from Muscat. The following day, hundreds of uninvolved Muscat sailors landed in order to participate in the fray, but they were pacified by the governor and the killedar who forbade the Persians from leaving their quarters.

Of the European ships that called at Mangalore, the British were predominant. Occasionally, big warships came from Europe loaded with "fresh European troops." Most of the time, however, shipping consisted of small merchant vessels flying the "British flag" and sailing alone or in groups of as many as thirty. Mr. Stewart, the English factor, seldom stayed in town. In fact, he was afterwards prohibited to trade there. Gomez did not mention any resident French factor and recorded only ten French ships during a period of almost one year. One day in October, a frigate arrived allegedly sent by Governor Picot of Mahim with a secret message about an English plot to seize the Spanish ship. Although Gomez offered no explanation, he noted that while Dutch and Portuguese ships passed

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10 A cavan is a Philippine unit of measure equivalent to 2.13 bushels.
by in the open sea, none of them entered the harbor of Mangalore.¹¹

The port town of Mangalore, according to the author, is situated at the confluence of Mangalore and Kodial rivers (actually called Natravati and Gurpur rivers) which originated from the Ghats. In the first mentioned river, smaller vessels can sail about six leagues inland as far as the town of Bentual; the second river is navigable as far as the town of Gurpur about three leagues away. Besides the downtown coastal area called "Codeal" [Kodial], there were many outlying residential districts located on hilly terrain and separated from one another by vast ricefields (see Fig. 2). At the outskirts of the town was a gunpowder factory, where Gomez saw rows of about 160 women alternately pounding the ingredients with such impressive timing that the numerous falling pestles produced only one sound. The powder, however, was of poor quality. The mill left by the British in 1768 was still in good condition but it had lain idle, because the natives did not know how to operate it.

The author divided the inhabitants into four categories: 1) The Moplahs, about 15,000 in number, who lived in the Kodial and monopolized the town's trade and bureaucracy. Recognizable by their skullcaps which looked like the cheese of Flanders, they were deceitful and notorious for bilking people, especially strangers. 2) Gentiles, consisting of several classes: a) Brahmin or nobles; b) Persis—dedicated to military careers and the "liberal arts"; c) "Bania" [Baniyas?] — the common people who worked as laborers, peddlers, boatmen, etc., d) Sudras — about 20,000 in number, who performed the most menial jobs. Gomez considered them as very good people; 3) about 4,000 Catholics — "Portuguese, other Europeans, creoles, mestizos, Canarians, old Christians and converts" — concentrated in the parishes of Nuestra Señora del Rosario and Nuestra Señora del Milagro. They worked mostly in the service trades, such as tailoring, shoemaking, etc., while many mestizos served as soldiers garrisoned in town; 4) other nationalities — Europeans, Turks, Persians, Arabs and Mongols — the number of which was difficult to estimate.

¹¹ Maybe, Gomez had little knowledge of the strained relations between Haidar Ali and the Dutch. However, he knew why Portuguese ships were not welcome in Mangalore. Angry over the Portuguese collaboration with the invading British who captured Mangalore in 1768, Haidar abrogated their rights and privileges, dismantled their forts and imprisoned the factor and his family. Gomez heard the news in Mahim on 3 April 1776 while on his way to Mangalore. He must have a good reason for keeping quiet on this sensitive Portuguese issue.
What fascinated though oftentimes dismayed the Spaniards were the many exotic religious celebrations in Mangalore. Gomez gave a lengthy description of the festivals of the elephantine god Ganoso" [Ganesha] 16-18 August 1776 (see Fig. 3), the goddess “Govari” [Gauri] August 27-28 (see Fig. 4), and the “Sheep” January 2, 1777. During the festival of the “Sheep,” the governor’s dependents and Moslem children flocked to the Spaniard’s rented house “like a swarm of bees heading toward the beehive,” asking for gifts. Then, there was another Moslem holy day on March 5, during which chained prisoners daubed from head to foot with chalk powder limped along the streets crying plaintively in order to move the people to pity, and thus give alms. Troops of pilferers disguised as fakirs roamed the streets. “It was necessary to close the house all the time,” complained the author, “[because] if I were seen and did not give, they would shout all kinds of execrations to me and to all those in the house.”

Besides these religious holy days, there were also civic parades and festivities to celebrate the arrival of the new governor on 12 August 1776, and the victory celebration of the Nawab’s army over the Marathas near Bankapur January 17-18, 1777. On the first occasion, Gomez gave a sumptuous party (see Fig. 5) to honor the governor. When it was over, six pagodas were given to each band of dancers and each guest was given three pagodas and a wax candle to illumine his way home. During the victory celebration, it was announced that the enemy suffered heavy losses. There was a colorful parade during which the military received the ovation of the people.

Despite this kaleidoscope of distractions, the sojourn of the Spaniards in Mangalore can hardly be described as pleasant. It was essentially a wretched, if not a frightening experience. What they thought would only be a visit of a few months dragged on for almost a year. For those who remained in Mangalore, it was boredom, culture shock, sickness for many, and for a time acute destitution for all. Those who went to Seringapatam had so traumatic an experience that it led to the premature death of Commander Yssasi. The exhausting trek

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12 It was reported that about “15,000 horsemen were taken prisoner and an equal number died in battle; 12,000 infantrymen were captured and 3,000 killed; more than 50 elephants, 30 palanquins, almost all the baggage, artillery pieces and the military cashbox of the enemy were taken.”

The accuracy of these figures has to be ascertained. While it is true that Haidar’s army was encamped at Bankapur — Gomez’s narrative mentioned this a few times — the actual battle was said to have taken place near Saunsi. See Narendra Khrisma, Sinha, *Haidar Ali* (Calcutta: Mukherjee, 1949), p. 126.
covering hundreds of miles over harsh terrain and the gradual realization upon their arrival at Haidar's court that they were literally trapped in the most expensive accommodations they had ever known must have been a nightmare to the Spaniards, who had no inkling of what could befall them. "To be able to talk to the Prince," a liaison officer wrote to Gomez on 20 September 1776, "it is necessary to bring a gift to him and to all the people surrounding him. Even all the silvers of Potosí will appear little to him, and the [visitors] stay would thus be unnecessarily prolonged as was in our case." After spending a great deal of money, the Spanish delegation was finally received by the Nawab. However, permission to leave was granted after several weeks of delay. They finally arrived in Mangalore on November 10 to the relief of the starving Spaniards who had long awaited their return. With the proceeds from the sale of the ship's cargo, Gomez—now the highest ranking Spanish official—could once more afford to provide regular meals to the crew, and to resume his rather expensive manner of befriending local officials and other Europeans.

At Haidar Ali's order, "Rajah Ran, the governor-general of "Vidonor" (Bednur), sent an elephant as a present to the Spanish governor-general in Manila. Then, one of the twelve secretaries that comprised Haidar's cabinet arrived to discuss various unfinished matters with Gomez. The local authorities gave a three-day banquet in his honor. So did Gomez, who further gave him lavish gifts upon his departure on December 15.

While the Spaniards were preparing for their return trip to the Philippines, two French officers arrived and confided to the author that a combined British-Dutch-Portuguese fleet was being assembled to seize the Spanish frigate as soon as it came out of the harbor. They offered two or more warships to convoy it to Manila. For unexplained reasons, Gomez rejected the offer. As the day of departure approached, Gomez bade goodbye to the authorities. He could not see the Governor, since he was busy entertaining a guest, the son of the Imam of Muscat.

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13 To have an idea of the hardship involved in traveling to Seringapatam, the expenses incurred in having an audience with Haidar Ali or his son, and the difficulty of obtaining permission to leave, see J. Van Lohuizen, The Dutch East India and Mysore (Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1961), pp. 42, 82, 83-90, 123, 138-140.

14 The richest mine in Spanish America located in what is now Bolivia and is said to have produced 800,000,000 pesos' worth of silver during the Spanish colonial period. See John Edwin Fagg, Latin America (12 ed: London: MacMillan, 1969), pp. 195-197.

15 Maybe, because it implied big protection fee and/or a concession to trade in Manila, which was forbidden by the king.
The killedar, however, was available. "I know for sure that the British will get you," he told Gomez. "If they bring you to Bombay or to other areas, write me and I will notify the Nawab...." To which the author replied: "The Spaniards have also hands and feet like the Englishmen. In terms of strength, I do not know how much to answer you." The Baburao in turn told Gomez, that it was Haidar's wish that "they come back with a huge amount of weapons, especially cannons, and accompanied with skilled shipwrights."

On 25 March 1777, the Spanish frigate departed and had an uneventful voyage to the Philippines. Thus ends the narrative.

Conclusion

If judged by present-day standards of scholarship, Gomez's narrative obviously leaves much to be desired. His ignorance of Indian history and of local dialects, such as Tuly or Kannada, impaired the quality of his work. This led him to commit many errors. Whenever he ventured to render a brief historical background of local dynasties—obtained no doubt through hearsay. The result was a mixture of fact and fiction. His chronology was atrocious. Because of his upbringing and lack of appreciation of Indian culture, racial and religious prejudices surface now and then in his writing. At times he was silent or very brief on matters of great importance and quite verbose on things of little significance.

Viewed, however, from the standpoint of his personal limitations and the circumstances of his time, the author's shortcomings are understandable. First of all, he was not a chronicler by profession, much less a historian. When he devoted 15 pages of his diary to the fauna and flora of Mangalore, which would seem irrelevant to many modern readers, he was merely following the literary style of his time. Although biased, he was typical of Europeans of the 18th century and, in fact, his prejudice was mild compared to that of other contemporary writers. His silence on some important matters (the Portuguese condition in Mangalore, for instance) was probably due to the fact that, being a tactful person, Gomez did not want to offend Haider Ali and his local officials or because he considered some matters too sensitive (the commercial treaty negotiation, for example) to be included in his narrative. To emphasize this point, the author probably in his desire to eliminate the danger of his work falling into the wrong hands, described Mangalore and wrote other important papers and drew the map aboard.
the ship during its return voyage to the Philippines. In recapitulation, many of Gomez's errors and superfluities are understandable, and while his local histories are to be disregarded, his first-hand observation are valuable.

As mentioned earlier, Gomez's work is accompanied by four sketches and a map of Mangalore. Experts in Indian art may want to appraise his drawings for whatever they are worth. The map on the other hand seems to have considerable historical value. According to Venn, "neither the archives of Bombay nor of Madras have preserved anything of pictorial interest [of Mangalore]." To his knowledge, there are only two good sketches of Mangalore: one made by a Dutch engineer in 1670, which he considered the best and selected it as the frontispiece of his book; and the other by a Portuguese pilot in the early 17th century (no date) which is found in Faria y Souza's Works. Venn was of course unaware of the Spanish version, which is definitely superior. Unlike the other two which merely delineated the harbor of Mangalore, Gomez's work was not only a detailed mariner's guide to the seaport, but it is also a map of the town and its outlying areas. According to Gomez, "It was a very difficult task to accomplish," not only because of the town's "extensive irregular terrain and sinuous streets," but also because of the "suspicion he aroused" by roaming the streets with measuring equipment. It was only through sheer ingenuity that he was able to finish the survey. The map's value is further enhanced by the fact that Mangalore was then the bustling seaport and the naval station of Haidar Ali. Due to the shallowing of the channel at the close of the 18th century, Mangalore lost its commercial and strategic importance. It would not be surprising if Gomez's map is the only work of its kinds in the history of Mangalore from ancient times to the end of the 19th century.

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16 Venn, pp. 3-4.
17 Ibid., pp. 4, 7.
PLATE I. Reception accorded the Spanish officials at the residence of the Admiral of Haidzr Ali's navy.
PLATE II. Map of Mangalore made by Miguel Antonio Gomez.
PLATE III. Ganezo.
PLATE IV. Govari.
PLATE V. At the party given by Gomez on 12 August 1776.
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