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SOME PATTERNS OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ASEAN

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Introduction: An Overview

The condition of the ASEAN countries[1] exemplifies the general features and trends of politico-economic developments in the Third World, reflecting at the same time the position of the developing countries in the present stage of world capitalism. Overall, amidst the crisis of the global economy, the Third World is experiencing a rapid pace of differentiation, resulting from the efforts of the developing countries to find a viable direction in their economic and social development as old and emergent contradictions are aggravated. In certain cases, the movement for independent development has veered towards non-capitalist or socialist orientation as in Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Mozambique. Side by side with this trend, nascent capitalist development in many developing countries has accelerated, characterized by the dismantling of feudal or other precapitalist structures which obstruct their industrial integration to the Western economy and Japan.

On the whole, the ASEAN countries are objectively united by their past as defined by colonial relationships, four of them having been the object of direct colonial rule. They find common cause in overcoming their dependence on an essentially monocultural economy, dominated by a few primary export commodities, which formed part of the colonial international division of labor. In this colonial specialization, they share common roots of underdevelopment with the rest of the Third World, implanted by the international movement of capital during that period. Even after political independence, the economic development of the ASEAN countries had been distorted by the colonial division of labor, which, in view of falling export prices and export proceeds, had distorted their patterns of investment and consumption and jeopardized the wherewithal of capital formation.

[1] Established on August 8, 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is composed of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. It covers a land area of about 3,050,000 sq. kms, more than two-thirds of the land area of Southeast Asia. Three-fourths of the Southeast Asian population are in the ASEAN countries.

The acceleration of capitalist development in the ASEAN region assumed more rapid pace in the late sixties. This coincided with the significant changes in the policies of the ASEAN countries on the entry of private foreign investments, accompanied generally by the advent of militarized political structures which have provided the basis of political stability for foreign monopoly capital. By the first half of the seventies, the ASEAN economies had achieved considerable re-structuring from singular dependence on export of primary products to the expansion of their facilities for export of labour-intensive manufactures and semi-manufactures.[2] The character of this export industrialization, determined now by the demands of an emergent new international division of labor, is profoundly transforming the form and level of dependence of the ASEAN countries to the industrial systems of the United States, Western Europe and Japan.

The ASEAN countries are now in the throes of transition from the colonial division of labor based on raw materials-finished products exchange, to a neo-colonial division of labor which is transforming them into industrial appendages of transnational corporations based in the leading capitalist countries, for the manufacture of labour-intensive products, parts and components and for resource-intensive processing. Their economic growth still weighed down by dependence on primary export commodities, from which they are emerging, the ASEAN economies are entering a new stage in which they forge their technological links of integration to the internationalized assembly-line manufacturing of transnational corporations. This new level of economic integration is forming a new international division of labor in which the ASEAN countries assume a specialized role in the production cycle of transnational corporations through a fuller exploitation of their cheap labor power in labour-intensive industrialization and in the processing of their own raw materials for worldwide-based production facilities of transnational corporations.

This condition of the ASEAN economies does not arise from temporary adjustments nor is it the result of pragmatic policies in meeting concrete economic problems. Rather, it is a new feature of the internationalization of productive processes under the control

[2] This changing situation may be summarized thus:

Merchandise Trade
(%)

	Primary Commodities		*Manufactures*	
	1960	*1975*	*1960*	*1975*
Indonesia	100	99	0	1
Thailand	98	77	2	23
Philippines	93	83	7	17
Malaysia	94	82	6	18
Singapore	74	54	26	43

Source: World Bank, *World Development Report*, 1978.

of transnational corporations as a medium of capitalist appropriation. This situation expresses the concrete forms of capitalist development which organically link the ASEAN economies to the demands of transnational corporations. In this respect, the problems of the ASEAN countries are integral to the present stage of the world capitalist economy. The crisis of the ASEAN economies in this sense becomes a component of the general crisis of world capitalism. It is not a situation from which they can escape by some convenient policy manuever. The direction of change lies in structural transformation, in which the inter-relationship of the external and internal factors can be seen in proper light: the ASEAN countries can only succeed in de-linking themselves from the oppressive patterns of international economic relations if necessary structural changes in their internal economy can be significantly achieved. More perceptively now, the crisis of the ASEAN countries increasingly relates itself into the basic question as to whether they would continue to pursue capitalist development under powerful external pressure, or, on the basis of popular forces, muster sufficient political will towards independent development that may broaden into non-capitalist or socialist orientation.

Moribund for about a decade after its formation in 1967, the ASEAN underwent a virtual revival in the wake of the American debacle in Vietnam. The quickened pace of ASEAN developments after 1975 was propelled by strong politico-ideological considerations on the part of the United States which regards the ASEAN as a regional buffer against a socialist Indochina and as a major base of its forward defense perimeter. The victory of the Vietnamese liberation forces in 1975 provided the decisive impetus for the United States to build up an anti-communist regional base to restore the balance of power to its favor in Southeast Asia. Seen in this light, it is important for the United States to prevent the consolidation of political power in Kampuchea in the present Heng Samrin government and to direct the ASEAN countries, in collaboration with China, to the necessity of effecting at best a pro-West Kampuchea or at the least a neutral government in that country.[3]

The object of U.S. apprehension in Southeast Asia has recently come to light: the last congress of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea announced an Indochinese Federation of which Kampuchea forms part together with Laos and Vietnam.[4] The irreversibility of political developments in Kampuchea—which the United States, the ASEAN countries and China are attempting to reverse—points to

[3] How the United States destroyed the neutrality of Cambodia under Norodom Sihanouk and turned it into a puppet state is detailed in W. Shawcross, *Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia* (1980).

[4] *Bulletin Today* (Manila), 31 May 1981, p. 3.

the consolidation of socialism in Southeast Asia, and the prospect of strengthening the forces of liberation from neo-colonial domination in the region. The recent policy pronouncement of U.S. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig that the United States would give "top priority" to ASEAN and the assurance of U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for Security James Buckley to significantly increase U.S. military assistance to the ASEAN countries,[5] indicate clearly the role of the ASEAN in relation to the political trends in Indochina. The dialectics of struggle and cooperation between Indochina and the ASEAN will continue to be one of the focal points of Southeast Asian developments.

ASEAN's political orientation within the U.S. policy framework also assumes importance side by side with the operations of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Asian Development Bank in deliberately structuring the ASEAN economies along capitalist development. The basic assumption of the aid program of these international financial institutions is that the recipient countries maintain an economy open to private foreign investments, which in contemporary terms mean the transnational corporations. The general purpose of the World Bank "to promote private foreign investments"[6] operates as a high-powered instrument to reinforce capitalist structures in the ASEAN. Its decisive role is to spearhead the "modernization" of ASEAN economies, which would be realized in their transformation into thorough-going capitalist economies. In reality, this is actualized by the efforts of the World Bank and the IMF in dismantling political and economic obstacles in the ASEAN countries for the new international division of labor of the transnational corporations. Complementary to this political function of the World Bank and the IMF is the principal foreign-policy objective of the United States to spread the "free-enterprise system" and to "export that philosophy to other nations."

Thus, profoundly underlying the economic and political developments in the ASEAN is the antagonism between the two world systems of capitalism and socialism. As a result of revolutionary changes in the last twenty years, the broadening of non-capitalist or socialist-oriented development in the Third World marks a new stage in the transition of the world from capitalism to socialism. Emerging as one of the last frontiers of foreign monopoly capital, the ASEAN countries are under tremendous pressure from external sources to speed up their capitalist development and to secure themselves against

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[5] *Times Journal* (Manila), 18 June 1981, p. 1; *Times Journal,* 21 Aug. 1981, p. 2.

[6] Articles of Agreement of the World Bank, Art. 1(i) and (ii).

the erosion of socialist influences. These inter-related politico-economic considerations are served by the militarized political structures of the ASEAN countries, in line with the McNamara principle that "security is development."[7] They are speeding up their capitalist development at the time of general decline of world capitalism and at a particular stage of capitalist development when its structures are proving to be fetters to the social progress ushered in by the scientific and technological revolution of the last three decades.

Pattern of Japanese Neocolonialism

Pressured by rising labor costs, labor shortage and lack of industrial sites, Japan's crisis was aggravated by the demand of U.S. foreign monopoly capital to gain entry into Japan. The increasing flow of foreign capital has set off a thrust for a more rapid internationalization of Japanese capital, as a means of coping with competition from non-Japanese transnational corporations. Thus, the internationalization of the productive processes (which means a broader inflow of transnationals' capital into Japan) has intensified inter-capitalist contradiction, compelling Japan to accelerate capital export as a measure to cut down production cost in order to remain competitive. One such measure is to segment the production cycle and relocate the facilities for the labor-intensive phases to low-wage areas, such as the ASEAN countries. Accordingly, the ASEAN economies are in the process of being organized around the Japanese problem.

Japan is now undergoing industrial reorganization, which involves a gradual phasing out of labor-intensive industries and their relocation to cheap-labor countries, such as the ASEAN countries, which can then be developed to set up such industries with the assistance of Japanese capital. Logically, such industries as relocated in the ASEAN countries have to be export-oriented since their whole rationale is to produce for the Japanese market or for the world market of Japanese transnational corporations. As Japan promotes the specialization of the ASEAN economies in the low-technology, labor-intensive production, it also increasingly concentrates in high-technology or science-intensive industries.

In a survey conducted in 1970 by the Export-Import Bank of Japan, covering 234 Japanese manufacturing enterprises, it is shown that about 31 per cent moved their investments abroad to develop export-oriented industries in the host countries as a source of manufactures or semi-manufactures for Japan or for their market in other

[7] R. McNamara, *The Essence of Security* (1968), p. 149.

countries.[8] Taking place in the Philippines is the relocation of Japanese small- and medium-scale industries to manufacture textile, garments, chemicals and plastic products, machinery parts, motor vehicle components, electronic and electric equipment.[9] This neo-colonial industrialization integrates the ASEAN economies to Japan's economy and its labor-intensive requirements, with the result that the mobilization of natural, manpower, and financial resources in the ASEAN is geared to the profit demand of Japanese big business, not to the basic needs of the ASEAN peoples. The proliferation of Japanese dominated joint-ventures in the manufacturing sector of the ASEAN countries manifests the development of labor-intensive industries in this region as part of Japan's industrial system. *Such industries in fact form an extension of the Japanese economy; they constitute the labor-intensive sector of Japan's industrial system, geographically located in the ASEAN countries.* In this light, Japan's development aid to the ASEAN countries appears as the financing of its own industrial relocation.

The relocation of Japanese labor-intensive industries to the ASEAN countries is now a matter of official policy. During the ASEAN summit meeting at Kuala Lumpur in 1977, Japan and the ASEAN countries reached a "political understanding" on this question. In June this year, during the ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting, the ASEAN countries renewed their interest in this policy, with a reminder to Japan of the political understanding reached in 1977.[10] Japan's interest now includes the relocation of its energy-intensive industries, for which Prime Minister Suzuki has offered the ASEAN countries energy development assistance.[11]

The far-reaching significance of Japan's industrial-relocation policy is that it is emerging as a main thrust in the development strategy of the World Bank. In its *World Development Report* for 1978, the World Bank approvingly viewed the relationship of some developing countries with Japan:

> Some developing countries are following in Japan's path, expanding exports of labour-intensive manufactures as Japan moves out of them because of rising labour cost. Their opportunities for expanding exports will depend on further shifts by Japan into exports of more sophisticated products and on the extent to which protectionist measures will be moderated by a more liberal import policy in Japan.[12]

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[8] See G. Adam, "Multinational Corporations and Worldwide Sourcing", in Radice (ed.), *International Firms and Modern Imperialism*, p. 98 (1975).

[9] See *Business Day*, 31 May 1978, "Special Report: The Sogo-Shosa", pp. 10-21.

[10] *Times Journal*, 12 Aug. 1981, p. 11. See also "Japan shifts industries to ASEAN", *Times Journal*, 9 Jan. 1981, p. 1.

[12] *Op. cit.*, p. 18.

In his address at the 1979 UNCTAD Session in Manila, Robert McNamara, as president of the World Bank, singled out Japan as an appropriate example of a developed country which "has been particularly successful in making adjustments well ahead of time and thereby securing its overall momentum of trade and economic activity, rather than delaying and relying on protection to save industries that have already become troubled and inefficient".

The special features of Japan's economic relations with the ASEAN, as surveyed above, expand its sphere of national interest and bring within its own concept of "self-defense" the security of this larger area. Self-defense is assuming an offensive thrust, extending its reach to Southeast Asia, towards the Indian Ocean and Japan's definition of the "Pacific Community". Ominous are the military-strategic implications of the policy pronouncement of Foreign Minister Sunai Sonoda in late 1980, *viz.* that the security and protection of Japan were impossible without the security and stability of the ASEAN countries, which are now the organic base of its labor-intensive sector. Shaping up as a security component of the Japanese-initiated "Pacific Community" is an anticipated Japanese participation in the military alliance of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS). On the occasion of Foreign Minister Okita's visit to Australia early last year, the study committee on Japanese-Australian relations, headed by Okita himself, issued its report which openly advocated that the security of the Asian-Pacific region should be based on the US-Japanese Security Treaty and the ANZUS military alliance.[13]

In 1978, Japan's Self-Defense Forces Navy extended its patrol area to as far as Guam and Taiwan to protect sea communications. In November of that year the US-Japanese Consultative Committee on Security adopted guidelines for closer US-Japanese military cooperation, particularly with respect to joint military operations. The new feature of this alliance is Japan's acceptance of the responsibility to deal with emergency situations in the Far East, confirming Japan's new role as the gendarme of the region,[14] in keeping with its neocolonial industrial expansionism.

Changing Strategy of Foreign Monopoly Capital

The rise of revolutionary democratic regimes in the Third World carries with it a wave of nationalization as a means for the recovery

[13] *Asahi Evening News,* 14 Jan. 1980.

[14] See R. Constantino, *Second Invasion: Japan in the Philippines,* citing Y. Akio, "Japan's Shift to the Right Gathers Momentum", *Japan-Asian Quarterly Review,* No. 3, 1978, p. 3.

of national wealth from the plunder of foreign monopoly capital. The expansion of socialist influence and the accelerated pace of national liberation in that part of the world have significantly increased the political risks of private foreign investments. In the period 1960-76, 1,369 cases of nationalization or takeover of foreign enterprises were registered in 71 developing countries.[15] The rate of nationalization in the first four years of the seventies doubled that of the sixties.[16] The annual average of the number of nationalization cases increased from 47 in the sixties to 140 in the seventies.[17] As in the case of the oil-producing countries in the developing world, nationalization has proved to be a step toward economic independence. It has also become a major point of confrontation with the forces of foreign monopoly capital. Already, the three centers of world capitalism — the United States, Western Europe and Japan — have established a higher level of consultation and coordination in the Trilateral Commission, which is now exploring ways of countering the nationalization trend in the Third World.[18]

Revolutionary transformations in the developing world have so disrupted the traditional conditions for private foreign investments that political stability of the host country now has become the central concern of transnational corporations in investment decision-making. In response, international monopoly capital has mobilized a broad range of approaches in dealing with the problem of political risks to foreign investments in the Third World. Reversal of political developments has taken the form of destabilization leading to the destruction of a duly instituted government and the re-establishment of an "open economy" through a dictatorial regime, as in Chile and Indonesia. Destabilization may create conditions for political and economic changes necessary in shifting a developing economy from its colonial fulcrum to its new base in the neo-colonial division of labor, as the declaration of martial law in the Philippines illustrates. The transformative process of national liberation was characterized by former US Secretary of State Robert McNamara as "incidents of violence" for which as president of the World Bank he later devised a development strategy aimed at reinforcing the political stability of countries where transnational corporations are heavy investors. Un-

[15] UN Commission on Transnational Corporations, *Transnational Corporations in World Development: A Re-examination* (E/C. 10/38, 20 March 1978, pp. 64-65, Tables III-28 and III-29.

[16] UN General Assembly, *Permanent Sovereignty over Natural* (A/9716, 20 Sept. 1974, Annex 10.

[17] *Supra,* note 15.

[18] See Karganov, *The Trilateral Coordination Centre for Imperialist Policy,* 1978 International Affairs, No. 10, pp. 106, 108-109 (Moscow), citing reports of the Trilateral Commission: "The Reform of International Institutions", Triangle Papers, No. 11 (1976) and "Seeking New Accommodation on World Commodity Markets", Triangle Papers, No. 10 (1976).

der the Reagan administration, it has become "international terrorism" to be countered by outright military containment.

In the last decade, transnational corporations have taken advantage of technological and institutional devices calculated to minimize financial or economic losses in case of adverse political changes in the host countries. Among those are industrial complementation, establishment of export free trade zones, and international subcontracting.

A. *Industrial complementation.* The internationalization of production taking place within the framework of transnational corporations has assumed a particular character, resulting from the refinement of technology in the segmentation of the production cycle. They have utilized the strategy of industrial complementation by which developing economies are tailored to specialize in the production of specific parts or components, intermediate products or in a particular stage of production. This is exemplified in the Ford plan for an "Asian regional car", by which

> . . . . A stamping or car-body plant will be set up here [in the Philippines] to complement the axle and transmission plant to be set up in Indonesia, the engine-block plant to be set up in Thailand, and the electrical-parts plant to be set up in Malaysia, and other parts and accessories plant to be set up in Singapore.[19]

Thus, in the making of one whole major product line, such as motor vehicles, electronic products or data processing equipment, the ASEAN countries would be integrated into the assembly line of one transnational corporation, each specializing on one component or intermediate product. Aside from the cost-cutting benefits resulting from subcontracting of labor-intensive processes and the non-disclosure of the complete patent-protected technological package, industrial complementation, as Meier has noted, "reduce[s] the risk of investing in any one developing country".[20]

The development of the electronic industry in the ASEAN typifies the pattern of industrialization in which the member countries would become merely the geographical site of "offshore" operations of transnational corporations. The industry consists of "expatriate" plants, located in the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia, which are integral to the manufacturing facilities of these corporations located in the United States, Japan, and West Germany. The segments of the whole technological process which are labor-intensive are operated by the "feeder plants" in the Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia.

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[19] Editorial, *Financial Journal* (Manila), 26 July 1971.

[20] See G. Meier, *New Possibilities for Foreign Enterprises,* Modern Gov't., p. 32 (June-July 1971).

Intermediate components and devices are "exported" by the global corporations of the United States, Japan or West Germany to their "feeder plants" in the ASEAN countries, and are "imported" back by the same corporations after the labor-intensive assembly-testing operations. In this context, the "electronic industry" located in the ASEAN consists merely of certain segments of the whole production cycle.

As in the case of the electronic industry, the car manufacturing complementation has developed in the ASEAN countries on the initiative of the transnational corporations. Ford, General Motors, Mitsubishi, Toyota and other transnationals which now manufacture car parts or components in the ASEAN countries are the first beneficiaries of the ASEAN industrial complementation program. Their products are included in the "product coverage of the first package of existing AIC products", as approved by the 11th meeting of the ASEAN Economic Ministers in May 1981.[21]

Under the Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Complementation,[22] an industrial product manufactured or to be manufactured in an ASEAN country may be allocated to that country as its participation in the ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC) package. Normally, such product may be identified for inclusion in the AIC package by the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry — which emphasizes the private-enterprise character of the ASEAN economies. A product thus included shall enjoy trade preferences in the other ASEAN countries and generally "such countries cannot set up new production facilities or expand existing ones to make the same product as that country for which such product was allocated unless 75% of its production is for export outside of the ASEAN region".[23]

It is anticipated that the AIC will consist of major product lines of the transnationals, the parts or components of which would be identified for inclusion in the AIC package. The result is the industrial or technological integration of the ASEAN economies on the basis of the assembly-line manufacturing of the transnationals. The terms of the Basic Agreement on AIC are so broad as to cover every conceivable industrial product, and accordingly such integration will have an expanding base in the industrial requirements of the transnationals. Each relevant industrial sector of every ASEAN economy holds the prospect of being converted into a product division of the manufacturing complex of a transnational.

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21 ASEAN Standing Committee, Annual Report, 1980-81, pp. 24-25.

22 Approved and Initialed by the 11th meeting of the ASEAN economic Ministers on 30 May 1981.

23 Article IV, paras. 4 and 5, Basic Agreement on AIC.

Hence, the problem of political stability ceases to be an independent matter on the part of an ASEAN country. It would become in fact a collective concern. Each ASEAN country assumes real interest in the political conditions obtaining in the others. A collective security arrangement becomes an organic necessity. The collective nature of their security becomes the basis of political stability for the ASEAN as the regional industrial base of the transnationals.

B. *Export free-trade zones.* The development thrust of the ASEAN countries has a feature they share in common: they maintain free-trade zones for the exploitation of cheap labor for the export interests of foreign monopoly capital.[24] Oppressive conditions of works at exploitative wages inhere in the nature of free-trade zones. Since manufacturing is geared to export, the rationale of productive activity in these zones is not defined by the basic needs of the people, but by the demand of profitability for foreign monopoly capital in the export market.

What needs to be emphasized here is that free-trade zones are designed for manufacturing by foreign capital at the lowest cost possible with the least possible political risks. In addition to cheap labor and a package of investment incentives, the host government provides a complete physical plant, together with power and communication installations and other accessories, to achieve a minimum financial or capital exposure on the part of the investors. Whatever light machinery or equipment that may be brought in by the foreign investor enjoys accelerated depreciation. Hence, any adverse political change or upheaval in the host country would entail, if at all, a negligible loss on the part of the foreign investor.

C. *International Subcontracting.* The ASEAN economies are on the way to being developed as suppliers and subcontractors of transnational corporations. This trend is exemplified in the effort of the World Bank in re-organizing the Philippine economy along the strategy of foreign sourcing on the part of the transnationals.

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[24] *Free trade zones in Thailand:* Zones 1—Chiang-mai, Lampuhn, Lampang; Zones 2—Phitsanoluk, Sukhotai; Zonge 3—Udon Thani, Khon Kaen; Zone 4—Ubon Ratchathani; Zone 5—Nakhon Ratchasima; Zone 6—Saraburi; Zones 7—Nakhon Pathom, Samut Songkram, Ratchaburi, Kanchanaburi; Zones 8—Chaochangsao, Chon Buri, Rayon; Zones 9—Phukat, Phangnga, Krabi; and Zones 10—Songkhla. *Free trade zones in Malaysia:* Prai, Bayan Lepas, Sungai Way, Ulu Klang, Telok Panglima, Datu Berandam,Tanjong Kling, Pasir Gudang, and Senai. *Free trade zones in Singapore:* Bukit Timah, Jurong, St. Michaels, Tiong Bahru, Red Hill, Ayer Rajah, Tanglin Halt, Kallang Basin, Tao Payoh, Ang Mio Kio, Chai Chee, Bedok, Indus Roard, and Woodlands. *Free trade zones in Indonesia:* Batam Island, Pulau Gadung, and Surabaya. *Free trade zones in the Philippines:* Mariveles in Bataan Province, Baguio City, Mactan Island in Cebu Province, Cavite, and Phividec. See *Business Review* (Bangkok), April 1978, pp. 196-98; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 18, 1979, p. 77. Twelve other free trade zones are being planned in the Philippines.

The World Bank is promoting the development of small-and medium-scale enterprises which can manufacture parts, components and sub-assemblies to be incorporated into the products of a contracting international company. The survey mission of the Bank which visited the Philippines last year saw the bright prospect of international subcontracting for Philippine enterprises.[25] As in other parts of the ASEAN, various sectors of foreign monopoly capital are moving into the Philippines in search of Filipino manufacturers for the production of parts and components. General Electric has offered about 1,000 parts and sub-assemblies of home appliances, electronics and other electrical products to Filipino manufacturers under long-term subcontracting arrangements. Siemens of West Germany has also confirmed its plans to have subcontracting projects in the Philippines. The United Kingdom Trade Agency is in search of Filipino manufacturers for the production of camera, television, electronic and electrical components and parts.[26] Already the manufacture of Ford's Fiera vehicle alone has given rise to about 33 Filipino supplier enterprises which subsist on Ford procurement. General Motors has announced the expansion of manufacture of components and parts for its diesel engine manufacturing program in the Philippines.[27]

It should be stressed that as a result of the reorganization of its whole financial sector on recommendation of the World Bank, tremendous capital resources in the Philippines are now being mobilized for the establishment of small-and medium-scale industries to meet the "supplier and subcontracting" demand of international companies. These industries are wholly owned and operated by the "natives" themselves.

This industrialization pattern signifies a departure from the traditional movement of capital in terms of direct equity investments by foreign capital. It thus marks a shift from equity control to market and technological control on the part of foreign monopoly capital. Obviously, international subcontracting, which may minimize the dominance of equity investment in the ASEAN countries, avoids effectively the problem of nationalization. But it assumes as well an effective domination of the politico-economic processes of a given developing country by foreign monopoly capital.

The overall result of these readjustments on the part of foreign monopoly capital is reflected in the World Bank's *World Development Report* for 1979 thus:

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25 "Subcontracting jobs advised for small firms", *Phil. Daily Express* (Manila), 6 Oct. 1979, p. 9.

26 *Times Journal*, 4 Nov. 1980, p. 10; *Times Journal*, 18 Nov. 1980, p. 10; *Phi. Daily Express*, 14 Jan. 1979, p. 14.

27 *Phil. Daily Express*, 16 Oct. 1979, p. 16; *Phil. Daily Express*, 8 Dec. 1978, p. 10; *Phil. Daily Express*, 9 Aug. 1979, p. 10.

> The character of links between private transnational firms and developing countries has been changing in recent years. First, equity participation is being gradually replaced by the use of loans and suppliers' credits. Second, direct managerial control by the parent company is being superseded by management participation, technical assistance agreements, production sharing and supply contracts. These changes have resulted partly as a response of multinational corporations to host country controls on foreign investment, and partly from the growth of competition from new suppliers, who are increasingly willing to design arrangements to suit host country requirements. The term "private direct investment" as it is currently understood — equity participation by a foreign firm with an effective voice in the management of the enterprise — does not encompass these shifts. Consequently, the information based on traditional definitions of equity participation tends to underestimate the role of transnational firms in capital flows to developing nations in recent years. More important, policies based on the traditional concepts would not address the new economic realities.[28]

Over the past two decades, there have been changing forms of control by the transnationals over export of primary commodities, with the emergence of joint ventures, licensing agreements, and management contracts. This has been interpreted as a decline of that control.[29] The nationals of host developing countries have gained increasing equity participation in resource-based projects.[30] Governments in the ASEAN countries are attempting to increase the degree of local participation in the processing of raw materials or primary commodities, as indicated by the proposed copper smelting project in the Philippines, the timber contracts in Indonesia, and the processing of tobacco and pineapple in Thailand.[31] However, increased local participation in the processing of raw materials is also precipitated by the desire of developed countries, such as Japan, to avoid the adverse environmental consequences of basic processing or to relocate their energy-intensive industries to the developing countries. At any rate, as noted in one study, "the mere fact that TNCs [transnationals] are not involved in the ownership of the production phase does not, by itself, ensure either a lessening of ultimate TNC control or better distribution of gains".[32] As shown above, TNC control or appropriation of economic surplus does not necessarily depend on ownership of the productive facilities.

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[28] At p. 34.

[29] Joint CTC/ESCAP Unit on TNCs, *Transnational Corporations in Export Oriental Primary Commodities: A General Conceptual Framework for Case Studies,* Working Paper No. 1 (Bangkok, 1978), pp. 5-6.

[30] *Id.*, p. 3.

[31] See Joint CTC/ESCAP Unit on TNCs, *An Overview of Case Studies on Transnational Corporations in Primary Commodities in the ESCAP Region* (Bangkok, Oct. 1979), p. 4.

[32] *Id.*, p. 7.

While on the whole the stock of foreign investments in the extractive industry and primary commodity sector has declined, there has been a marked increase of foreign capital in the manufacturing sector. In Malaysia, the "Malaysianization" trend in rubber production operations is paralleled by the rapid movement of transnationals' companies into the rubber goods manufacturing industries.[33] The decline of foreign capital in the extractive and plantation sectors is clear; on the other hand, foreign investments in manufacturing had increased from 60% of the total investments in this sector in 1960 to 72% in 1979.[34] As a general trend in the rubber industry in Asia, it may be said that the transnationals have been playing "an ever-diminishing role in the actual cultivation of natural rubber", with considerable reduction of foreign landholdings; however, TNC activities have increased in domestic rubber goods manufacturing.[35] Significant in this respect is the recent integration of the Philippine coconut industry in the hands of a high-placed local financial group, resulting in the phasing out of the transnationals' control over processing and export of this commodity.

By Way of a Conclusion

The Annual Report of the ASEAN Standing Committee for 1980-81 puts forward an impressive role for the Association: "ASEAN constitutes the cohesive center, the stable core which is helping to hold Southeast Asia together. It is emerging as one of the potential cornerstones of the proposed New International Economic Order." The patterns of development surveyed above hardly supports this aspiration. In fact, the main trends in the ASEAN, propelled by foreign monopoly capital, appear to be a reversal of the directions drawn by the United Nations' *Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order*.[36] This historic document expresses the collective consciousness of the developing countries that "the remaining vestiges of alien and colonial domination, foreign occupation, racial discrimination, *apartheid* and neo-colonialism in all its forms continue to be the greatest obstacles to the full emancipation and progress of the developing countries and all peoples

[33] Joint CTC/ESCAP Unit on TNCs, *Transnational Corporation and the Rubber Industry of Malaysia: Patterns of Control and the Distribution of Net Benefits,* Working Paper No. 6 (Bangkok, Oct. 1979), p. 6-7, 53.

[34] Lim Mah-Hui, *Capitalism and Industrialization in Malaysia* (mimeo), p. 17. Paper presented at the International Conference on Alternative Development Strategies and the Future of Asia, New Delhi, March 11-17, 1980, sponsored by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research.

[35] Joint CTC/ESCAP Unit on TNCs, *The Rubber Industry in Asia: Transnational Corporations and the Distribution of Gains,* Working Paper No. 4 (Bangkok, June 1979), pp. 66-67.

[36] UN General Assembly resolution 3201 (S-VI), adopted on May 1, 1974.

involved."[37] The essence of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) lies in the structural transition of the developing countries to economic self-determination and liberation. It transcends a "new order" which merely provides for the transition of the classical methods of colonial exploitation to a neo-colonial international division of labor that now entraps the ASEAN countries. NIEO is a program of action for a new alternative in (1) centralizing the integration of the national economy on the basic needs and social progress of the people themselves, (2) strengthening the permanent sovereignty over natural resources, (3) phasing out the TNC domination over the national economy, and (4) reinforcing the State sector as the main basis of the economy.

In the developments reviewed above, the impact of industrial complementation, free-trade zones industrial allocation, and international subcontracting would inevitably result in the disintegration of the national economies in the ASEAN; each sector or industry in an ASEAN national economy, directly involved in the neo-colonial division of labor, becomes integral to the assembly-line manufacturing of the TNCs. The economy ceases to be national; it is transformed into an internationalized segment of the TNCs' production cycle. Thereby, the main motive force of the economy will not be the inner mechanism of the people's decision-making, but the financial and economic imperatives of international monopoly capital. On the basic level of decision-making, the World Bank and the IMF, in behalf of international monopoly capital, have taken charge of the main directions of the ASEAN economies, derogating the ASEAN governments to the role of mere implementing agencies of their "recommendations".

A close study of ASEAN trends will disclose a general pattern of development designed by international monopoly capital, as a response to the demand of the developing countries for the NIEO. It is in this light that the new international division of labor appears as a NIEO version of the transnational corporations—a New Imperialist Economic Order.

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[37] *Ibid.*

BOLSHEVISM IN THE COLONIES INDOCHINA AND THE "PHILIPPINE EXAMPLE"

A. S. MALAY

Tolerated in the capitalist countries of the West, communism was regarded by the colonial authorities as a dangerous doctrine in their under-developed, agrarian-based colonies. It did not take long for communist parties in Indochina and the Philippines, both formally founded within months of each other in 1930, to be subjected to repression and/or declared illegal. Subsequent periods of relative benignity on the part of the French and the American colonial authorities, notably during the anti-fascist Popular Front and later during World War II, never meant the definite elimination of the threat which the new ideology represented for the ruling classes of the "mother countries" and their local counterparts in Southeast Asia.

This threat was magnified by a certain perception of communism as an international conspiracy of likeminded revolutionary parties obeying the directives of the Komintern. Capitalism's weakest links being then found in the colonies, the growing popularity of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice there did not fail to arouse the wariness of the colonialists. Gen. Charles Mangin, a veteran of the African campaigns, gave an early reading of the danger for the West: the "yellow" and "black" perils, he claimed, were negligible in comparison to the "red" Russian menace.[1] If France represented, for ex-Indochinese Governor-General Albert Sarraut, "the moral force most capable of resisting triumphantly the universal enterprise of national and social disintegration whence the leaders of Muscovite communism hope to launch their new imperialism,"[2] her colonial empire was being put to the test by internal and external stresses for which mere moral force provided an inadequate response. Indochina—"the most important, the most developed and the most prosperous of our colonies," in Sarraut's enthusiastic words[3]—began showing unmistakable symptoms of the Bolshevik virus in the 1920s. So did the nearby American island colony, the Philippines. French authorities concluded, quite rightly, that this simultaneous manifestation of similar symp-

1 *New York Times,* 23 October 1921, in Thomas Ennis, *French Policy and Developments in Indochina* (Chicago, 1936), p. 177n.

2 Speech at Constantine, 23 April 1927, quoted in Raoul Girardet, *L'idée coloniale en France de 1871 à 1962* (Paris, 1972), p. 223.

3 Albert Sarraut, *La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Francaises* (Paris, 1923), p. 463.

toms was no simple coincidence; but as this study will show, they grossly over-estimated the supposed "Philippine example" in the "contamination" of Indochina. That this exaggerated view eventually paved the way for the French authorities' mishandling of its Indochinese problem is not a farfetched conclusion.

This study of French bureaucrats' fascination with the Philippine case and the "contamination" theory during the colonial era is based mainly on declassified consular and intelligence reports on file at the overseas section of the National Archives in Paris.[4] Needless to say, there are limits to these reports' accuracy. Their veracity, however, is beside the point. The value of these documents lies in their insight into the colonial order's visceral hostility to Bolshevism and all other ideas, including bourgeois nationalism, susceptible of weakening the French position in Indochina. Given this extreme rigidity, it is not surprising to find that the French were prone to alternately magnify the Bolshevik menace (for purposes of "exposing" its multiform activities), or belittle its influence (for purposes of reassuring Paris when it was too late to deny its tenacious existence). In any event, the bureaucratic limitations inherent in the job of reporting on the "enemy" are made explicit in a dispatch, circa 1931, sent by the acting consul in Manila to the Indochina Governor General. In the course of a detailed analysis of the PKP's activities, Consul Peyronnet (1) complained of the consulate's lack of a translator for the Spanish and especially the Tagalog press, which had better coverage of the provinces; (2) criticized the "more or less fallacious" reports emanating from the Constabulary, which was "eager to boost its image"—therefore "it is difficult to know the truth"; and (3) revealed that he had procured information, and was hoping for more, from the U.S. Army intelligence service.[5] Now, the other reports consulted in this study show that Peyronnet was not alone among his French colleagues in obtaining basic data from the local English-language press (e.g., the *Manila Times,* the *Philippines Herald* and the *Philippine Free Press*), or in relying on American informants for more "specialized" information.

This is not to say that official or semi-official reporting on the new American colony consistently lacked an independent analysis of

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[4] Located at 27 rue Oudinot, Paris 75007. Dossiers about Philippine revolutionary movements may be found under the following headings: Indochine Nouveau Fonds 110, 118, 188, 561, 1041; Asie Orientale 32, 46; Affaires Politiques 82, 110, 365, 366, 367, 2109, 2415, 2416; and SLOTFOM Series VIII. For brevity's sake, these headings are omitted in the subsequent footnotes.

[5] Peyronnet, gérant of the French Consulate in Manila, to the Indochinese Governor-General, confidential. There is no date, but from the context it appears to have been written in early 1931. Peyronnet occupied his post for less than a year, after Antoine Valentini (Jan. 1921-April 1930) and before Gaston Willoquet (Feb. 1931-Jan. 1941).

contemporary developments. Quite the contrary: notably where the American presence in the Philippines was concerned, the French manifested a highly critical, not to say supercilious, attitude which led them, for example, to lump Spanish obscurantism and American aggressiveness in the same conqueror's camp.[6] But French disapproval of U.S. policy in the Philippines, and the contradictions stemming from American's post-World War I encroachment on the French colonial preserve of Indochina, gave way to the objective convergence of Franco-American strategic interests in Southeast Asia. In due time, this convergence of interests led to a grudging admission on the part of French officials that the international anti-communist alliance necessitated American hegemony in Southeast Asia—were it at the price of French withdrawal from Indochina.

Repercussions of the separatist movement on Indochina.—At least two decades before the propagation of communist ideas in the Southeast Asian countries, French authorities were already attuned to the inter-regional repercussions of national independence movements. Anti-Spanish agitation in the Philippines in the late 19th century evoked apprehension among the French, jealous of their control over the newly-acquired Indochinese territories of Tonkin, Annam, Cochinchina, Laos, and Cambodia. In 1896 the French ambassador thus called the attention of his ministry to the contagion that would probably spread to Indochina from the "separatist" movement he perceived to be gaining ground in the Spanish colony. The dispatch concluded with a warning:

> It seems to me that henceforth there are reasons to closely watch the state of mind in Luzon, for our situation in the Far East and the proximity of the Philippines with our Indochinese empire do not allow us to remain indifferent.[7]

The analogy of the two neighboring colonies' past, present and future evolution made the Philippines an extremely interesting country for the French to observe.[8] The ambassador to the U.S. was thus requested by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to report on the "backlash" of Philippine independence on Annam.[9] Ratification of the Jones Bill in 1916, which would grant eventual autonomy to the archipelago,

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[6] Charles Garnier, "Les Américans aux Philippines". *Bulletin de la Société Normande de Géographie* (Jan.-March 1902), p. 94. Garnier, an *agrégé* and professor, spent a month in Manila in the summer of 1900.

[7] Marquis de Reverseaux, French Ambassador, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (henceforth abbreviated as MAE), Madrid, 25 April 1896.

[8] Consul-General of France to MAE, New York, 25 September 1921. Earlier, the deputy for Cochinchina Ernest Outrey had visited Manila in 1917 to look into the repercussions of the American experiment in the Philippines; Outrey complained, however, that all foreign powers, except France, were represented by officers above vice-consul level. "Notes sur les Philippines", 25-page typewritten report to the President of the Commission for External and Colonial Affairs (15 February 1918), p. 19.

[9] French Ambassador to the U.S. to MAE, Wash., D.C., 25 June 1921.

spurred Vice Consul Maurice Paillard in Manila to wonder: would the U.S. government be setting a precedent in arousing "separatist or emancipatory ideas" among "neighboring Asian peoples under Western domination"? Paillard answered his own question in the negative, for "the traditionalism of our Indochinese protégés makes them very different from the Filipinos." However, he added, the Philippine example could still be exploited by Annamite agitators or even by "certain aliens" living in Indochina.[10] As subsequent reports were to show, the allusion was to the overseas Chinese.

There is a pronounced alarmist tone in Paillard's earlier report denouncing the founding of the Sociedad Oriental in Manila in May 1915. One of the Sociedad's aims was "mutual understanding among Far Eastern countries," the latter defined in its statutes as consisting of China, Japan, Indochina, Siam, Java, Sumatra, the Straits Settlements, the Confederated Malay States, Borneo, Celebes and the Philippines. The Sociedad's implicit long-term objective of an "Asia for the Asians" prompted the vice-consul to comment that

> Our Annamite subjects and protégés have appeared, these past few years, to lend a rather attentive ear to noises from the outside, and if the Sociedad Oriental's propaganda reaches them, it is perhaps to be feared that they will attribute to it an importance and a significance which can only lead to error.[11]

As Paillard was well aware, Japan was the moving spirit of the new organization.[12] Fears of Japanese expansionism exacerbated French jealousy for its colonies, and those of other Western countries, in Southeast Asia. Japan's malevolent intentions, in fact, were invoked as a pretext to retain the levers of French colonial empire.

> An independent Philippines would mean, in the short run, a complete anarchy apt to lead to a more or less prolonged Japanese intervention followed by a Japanese occupation; the threat for Indochina would thus become very close.[13]

Harrison's provocation.—Especially when they came from the Americans, manifestations of sentiments favorable to Philippine independence took on the character of a provocation for the French. Governor-General F. B. Harrison precisely touched on a sensitive spot in the French ego when he reminded his audience in a farewell speech that

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[10] Vice-Consul Paillard to MAE, Manila, 6 Sept. 1916.
[11] Paillard to MAE, Manila, 14 May 1915.
[12] The SO-Japanese connection is evoked by Grant K. Goodman, "The Problem of Philippine Independence and Japan; The First Three Decades of American Colonial Rule," *Southeast Asia* (Southern Illinois University), Summer 1971, p. 175.
[13] Consul-General of France in New York to MAE, 25 Sept. 1921.

> The question of Philippine independence is much wider than the bounds of these islands. It reaches out to half of the human race. Do not forget that your successes here are watched by *millions of men, your neighbors,* for whom these successes and your ideal are equally their own.[14]

Consul Antoine Valentini's commentary on Harrison's inflammatory remarks is worth quoting at length, for the insight it provides into the wishful thinking and above all the anxiety that would continue to haunt French colonials until the final disintegration of their Indochinese empire:

> ...there is no mistaking the repercussion and the inevitable consequences which the granting of independence to the Philippines would have in Asia. All minds which are in the least enlightened are aware of this... [The Americans and other foreigners present] showed the greatest coldness and remained silent on this occasion. In [their] opinion, Mr. Harrison's policy has been rather pernicious, if not from the domestic point of view, at the very least insofar as the unfortunate example given to the outside world is concerned.[15]

On the other hand, prominent Filipinos' second thoughts about independence were approvingly cited for Paris' consideration. One such personality was Trinidad Pardo de Tavera, described as pro-French in his sympathies, "a man of common sense, well-informed, judging the situation with impartiality," who expressed to Valentini his fear that in the present circumstances "the Philippines, left to herself, would become another Mexico."[16]

Nationalism and its anti-communist potential.—If separatism was anathema to the French "Philippine watchers," nationalism was no less an object of apprehension. Especially when the Bolshevik message was beginning to find favorable responses in the colonies, the imperialist reflexes of the French authorities led them to suspect nationalism as a simple disguise for the greater enemy: communism. A report from the Indochinese government-general took note in 1928 of the common aspirations binding the Filipino and Chinese peoples to each other and termed this development "understandable," but added that

> it is unfortunately to be feared that the phase of nationalist action in the archipelago as in China be preceded, accompanied or followed by communist agitation, much more dangerous.

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[14] Emphasis supplied; retranslated from the French. This underlined passage was written in capital letters in the report of Consul Antoine Valentini to MAE, Manila, 7 March 1921.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] Valentini to MAE, Manila, 31 Jan. 1921. Pardo de Tavera's allusion was to the major upheaval that occurred in the ex-Spanish colony starting 1910.

This warning was reinforced by the observation that "limited to national demands alone, agitation in the Philippines would not offer a great danger".[17] The report identified the "first symptoms" of this phenomenon, similar to others previously observed in Canton, Shanghai and Hankow: Soviet intervention through international workers' congresses; the use of trade unions, and the attempt to "conjugate nationalism with communism, with the thirst for independence necessitating the acceptance of funds and directives from Moscow."[18]

The following year, a split perceived within the Congreso Obrero inspired the foreign affairs section of the Indochinese government-general to urge:

> One must surely begin to take advantage of the current disagreement by definitively isolating the extremist agitators from the elements which have remained relatively healthy in that they seek a *national* solution to a properly *national* problem.[19]

This recognition of the anti-communist potential of bourgeois nationalism is an isolated case in the documents under study. Moreover, the possibility of harnessing indigenous politicians' aspirations to offer an alternative to more radical elements was denied by contemporary French policy in Indochina. French intransigence in the direct colony of Cochinchina thwarted the elitist Constitutionalist Party's objective of coopting communist demands for freedom. For all their good intentions, the constitutionalists' clamor for a share of political power did not sit well with the French authorities, whose unshakable conviction in the efficacity of direct rule plus military strength eventually played into the hands of the Vietnamese communists.[20]

The Chinese in Southeast Asia.—As we have seen, the French assumed that the Chinese revolution would also affect political events in both the Philippines and Indochina. As early as 1898, French authorities were already anticipating potential Chinese subversion in the Far East. That year, the opening of a Chinese consulate in Manila was reported as a matter of routine by the local French consul, but with the warning that the Chinese might try to set up similar posts

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17 *Note sur l'action des colonies chinoises aux Iles philippines,* pub. by the Government-General of Indochina, Foreign Affairs Service (Hanoi, 31 July 1928, pp. 6-7).

18 *Ibid.*

19 Emphasis supplied. *Note sur la situation politique aux Iles philippines (Année 1929)*, pub. by the Governor-General of Indochina (Hanoi, 14 Dec. 1929), p. 15. The split originated from the alleged demand of Domingo Ponce, one of the Congreso's leaders, that the CO break away from the Shanghai-based Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat on the grounds that "Filipino workers must first resolve the national problems concerning them before helping foreign workers' organizations in their demands."

20 A detailed study of the Constitutionalists' dilemma is the monograph of Megan Cook, *The Constitutionalist Party in Cochinchina: The Years of Decline, 1930-1942,* Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, No. 6 (1977).

in Saigon, Hanoi and Haiphong, thus paving the way for future subversion.[21]

Bolshevism was adding greater urgency to the "Chinese peril". In 1928, the Indochinese government-general admitted that Chinese immigrants in the Philippines posed no security problems, but stated that it would be in the Filipinos' interest not to grant "too great facilities" to these aliens, for economic and poliical reasons.[22] Numerous clandestine arrivals of Chinese nationals allegedly facilitated the entry of "radical emissaries" from Canton and "other centers of disorder" in southern China.[23] The visit to Manila of the Indochinese governor-general gave him the opportunity to report that Philippine officials distrusted these immigrants for a variety of reasons, but above all for the "communist agitation" being allegedly carried out by numerous Chinese residents.[24]

Sinophobia intensified in 1928 with the founding of the Singapore-based Nan Yang communist party and the imminent organization of a Philippine one. Speculation about possible Chinese involvement in the party being formed in the American colony was shared by French intelligence agents, alerted to Chinese communists' activities everywhere.

An intelligence dispatch sought to prove that Lenin, no less, intended to use the Chinese workers in France for the propagation of Bolshevism.[25] Chinese workers in the Paris region were closely watched, their meetings infiltrated and mail intercepted.[26] In the French lease territory of Kwang Chow-wan (Kwangtung province), tight security measures were enforced on the entry or stay of "aliens" from Indochina, and on their exercise of certain strategic trades or occupations (e.g., painters; customs, intelligence, immigration and emigration agents; weapons or ammunitions dealers; makers and dealers of private radio sets or their spare parts).[27] Many Chinese nationals were

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21 Consul G. Bérard to MAE, Manila, 23 Sept. 1898.

22 *Note sur la situation politique* (1928), op. cit., pp. 27-28.

23 Ministre de Martel to MAE, Peking, 31 December 1927.

24 Report of Pasquier to the Minister of Colonies, Hanoi, 11 Feb. 1932, pp. 11-12.

25 "De l'utilisation des Chinois en France pour la propagande bolchévique", in *Bulletin mensuel* No. 4 (1 July 1922), p. 12. This monthly bulletin, with irregular dating after the first few issues, was published by the Ministry of Colonies, Political Affairs Direction, First Bureau.

26 Records of police surveillance and expulsion of suspects may be found in the "dossiers chinois" of the main National Archives (44 rue des Francs Bourgeois, Paris 75004), viz. boxes F7 12900 and 12901.

27 "Décret reglémentant les conditions d'admission des Francais et étrangers en Indochine", dated 31 August 1933, in *Bulletin Officiel des Colonies,* 1933, pp. 1217-1230.

in fact expelled from the territory in the latter half of the 1930s, presumably for security reasons.[28]

More than 400 Chinese nationals suspected of having links with the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) were expelled to Hongkong in April 1931; the French consul expressed the hope that these "undesirables" be denied subsequent entry to Indochina.[29] Governor-General Pierre Pasquier assured the Ministry of Colonies that "useful dispositions" had indeed been taken in this regard. Intercolonial cooperation against Bolshevism was well on its way to becoming a reality.

Bolshevism as an international menace for France.—The first official document that explicitly identifies communism as an international menace for France, and calling for coordinated political-military action against it, is a "Note on Bolshevism in the Far East" written by the military attaché in Peking and dated 15 December 1920.[30] This secret document claimed that the Soviet Union's main objective in Asia was Japan, followed by the French and the British colonies. These colonies, it was alleged, would fall to the USSR through southern China's "political cooperation" and through "social propaganda" among the intelligentsia of Southeast Asia. The region was singled out by the attaché as being particularly favorable for Bolshevik propaganda because it had already been exposed for the past 20 years to "advanced ideas". These, however, were "most often misunderstood, maladapted to the Asians' needs."[31]

Southeast Asia in particular as a Soviet target is the object of another secret document, a bulletin published by the Ministry of Colonies' political affairs section.[32] Not without some pride, the author traced the ideas of the Bolsheviks to those of the French Revolution:

> It does not extend its hand to the proletarian classes alone, but also claims to liberate the oppressed, the disinherited... and not [just] individuals belonging to a determined social class.[33]

Through manipulation of these libertarian concepts, the bulletin continued, Bolshevism could pursue the double objective of weakening its enemies and spreading its international influence through

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[28] The names of Chinese (as well as Indochinese) nationals expelled from Kwang Chow-wan during this period are found in several issues of the *Journal Officiel de l'Indochine Francaise.*

[29] Consul Gaston Willoquet to MAE, 2 May 1931.

[30] *Note sur le Bolchévisme en Extreme-Orient,* by Chef de Bataillon Tambrun, military attaché of the French Legation (Peking, 15 December 1920).

[31] *Ibid.,* p. 16.

[32] "Note sur la propagande bolchévique aux colonies" in *Bulletin mensuel* No. 1 (19 April 1922).

[33] *Ibid.,* p. 4.

"ethnic groups won over to its principles".[34] A strong belief in the superiority of French civilization, however, assuaged French anxieties over the looming Bolshevik challenge. "French individualism, refined by 20 centuries of spiritualism, is the living antithesis" of the Soviet regime, as the consul in Manila pointed out.[35]

French view of the PKP's development. — Two months after it identified Southeast Asia as a target for Soviet designs, the *Bulletin mensuel* carried the first mention of the Philippines. The French communist party newspaper *L'Humanité* was quoted as having claimed that revolutionary propaganda was making headway in Indochina, and recommending that isolated elements group together and link up with workers' movements in neighboring countries, notably in Singapore, Hongkong and Manila.[36]

There follows a six-year gap in the documents' narrative of the progress of Philippine communism. The apparent reason is that the French diplomats or agents in Manila, Hanoi, Washington or elsewhere saw nothing significant to report during those relatively peaceful years before the PKP's founding. The same may be said of American officials in Manila: according to an American scholar-specialist on Asian communism, until 1930 the annual reports of the U.S. governor-general showed little concern with a communist problem in the islands.[37] But from 1928 on, the French reports increase in quantity, if not in quality. Representative excerpts from these documents are revealing both for the "information" they convey and for the insecurity that consistently underlies even the sarcastic or patronizing tone that occasionally emerges.

In March 1928, French agents noted the presence of a Filipino identified as Dantes at the international trade union congress held in Moscow that month. Together with a black American delegate named Ford, Dantes spoke on working conditions "under the yoke of the American boss". These two delegates' presence in the Soviet capital drew the following comment:

> The participation of colonials and semi-colonials in the conference is, after all, without importance: in Moscow they like to trot

[34] *Ibid.*

[35] Willoquet to MAE, 1 July 1932.

[36] "Note sur la propagande révolutionnaire intéressant les pays d'outre-mer" in *Bulletin mensuel* No. 3 (June 1922), p. 16. I have not been able to check either the veracity or the date of the *Humanité* report. Note that the French intelligence bulletin's mention of the Philippines comes a full year before that of a Profintern "Resolution on Work in the Far and Near East", which recognized the archipelago as "an important strategic point in the Pacific Ocean": *Inprecor,* 6 October 1923, in Charles McLane, *Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: An Exploration of Eastern Policy Under Lenin and Stalin* (Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 113.

[37] McLane, *ibid.*, p. 114.

> out... exotic "extras", with the role of convincing the Russian proletariat of the international influence of Bolshevism.[38]

The following year, a review of political activities in the U.S. colony reaffirmed the red peril. The Indochinese government-general observed, in the Philippines, "the growth of a workers' movement which is taking on considerable importance, and whose undoubted communist links render it particularly dangerous for the prosperity and even the security of the archipelago". This movement, the author claimed, was born out of workers' anxiety over the mechanization of most local handicraft (i.e., non-mechanized) industries. As proof of its communist tendencies, Point 7 of the Congreso Obrero's programme was cited: "Support for the Chinese worker-peasant evolution and defense of the USSR".[39]

The thirties ushered in a wave of social unrest in the Southeast Asian colonies, and with it a wealth of material to bring to the attention of Paris. A strike at the Philippine Sheet Metal Company in March sounded the alarm for the decade to come:

> The workers of this enterprise were hitherto satisfied with their lot and it is only during the past few months that their attitude has been transformed, this change having taken place as soon as communist propaganda infiltrated their ranks.[40]

"Communist manipulators" were held responsible for a high school students' boycott in protest against anti-Filipino remarks uttered by an American teacher.[41] The monthly bulletin devoted to "Bolshevik propaganda in the colonies" identified two other organizations as Communist: the Congreso Proletario de Filipinas (made up of ex-Congreso Obrero militants) and the Philippine-Chinese Labor General Association. Leaders of these two organizations, the bulletin averred, had made trips to Shanghai, Vladivostok, France and Germany to link up with the communist parties of those countries.[42]

A report dated 17 November 1930 is of particular interest because of two items: firstly, local press accounts were cited which imputed Bolshevik ideas to student unrest in Laguna province; secondly, a meeting held by "a local socialist organization" on 8 Nov-

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[38] "L'action du secrétariat pan-pacifique des trade unions" in *Bulletin mensuel* (31 Oct. 1928), pp. 23-24.

[39] *Note sur la situation politique* (1929), *op. cit.*, p. 12.

[40] Consul A. Valentini to MAE, Manila, 26 March 1930.

[41] "Les organisations communistes aux Philippines" in *Bulletin mensuel* (31 October 1930), p. 22.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 21. The same information is conveyed by Consul Valentini to the Governor-General of Indochina (10 February 1930), in response to the latter's confidential request for a briefing on Philippine political movements. However, no evidence is presented in either document to establish Philippine linkages with the French or German parties.

ember 1930 (and not 7 November, as the consul erroneously stated), was the occasion for "speeches marked by the purest Bolshevism".

> It is difficult to know what occasion is marked by this meeting; it is thought (to be) in commemoration of an important event in Soviet Russia, either the death or the birth of Lenin, or the founding of the Soviet Republic dating 13 November 1918.[43]

The event, of course, was the founding of the PKP, which had already been anticipated by the French in Indochina in 1929.[44]

The Tayug rebellion in January 1931 struck the new consul, Gaston Willoquet, as having "a great analogy" with the Yen Bay uprising of February 1930 in Tonkin.[45] In his report about the Tayug incident to the Minister of Colonies, Indochinese Governor-General René Robin did not fail to mention Moscow's alleged role as instigator.[46]

In 1931, the PKP was outlawed after a violent demonstration in Manila. In spite of his prediction that the new hard-line policy of the U.S. colonial regime would lead to the party's decline, Willoquet was forced to admit, three months later, that communism was still on the rise — but that it was not going to bring about significant changes "in this country where only cockfights succeed in exciting passions. Communism itself, as it descends towards the equator, no longer has the same face."[47]

French disapproval of U.S. "leniency". — Whereas in the early 1920s French criticism of U.S. policy in the Philippines focused on American officials' rash promises of independence, reports to Paris in the following decade harped on what was perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be signs of American leniency towards the PKP. Thus Willoquet approved of the PKP's proscription, which marked "a complete turnabout in the policy . . . characterized by an exaggerated respect for constitutional principles".[48] The outlawed party held its congress on 27-30 June 1932; that it took place at all, and that the congress delegates were not molested by the police as they visited government offices where they delivered "subversive speeches" before the personnel constituted proof, where Willoquet was concerned, of laxity on the part of the Americans, unable or unwilling to "take energetic measures that may extirpate the evil at its root".[49]

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43 Peyronnet to MAE, Manila, 17 November 1930.
44 *Note sur l'action des colonies chinoises,* op. cit., p. 8.
45 Willoquet to MAE, Manila, 5 May 1931.
46 Robin to the Minister of Colonies, Hanoi, 28 May 1931.
47 Willoquet to MAE, Manila, 15 June 1931.
48 Willoquet to MAE, Manila, 14 March 1931.
49 Willoquet to MAE, Manila, 5 October 1932.

Analyzing the American regime's apparent tolerance towards the PKP, Willoquet could only conclude that an agreement had been reached between Moscow and Washington.[50] The consul offered four reasons in support of his theory:

> 1) affinities between the Russian and American peoples, and strong sympathy after Alaska was ceded to the U.S.;
> 2) reinforcement of this sympathy by certain Slavic traits which, in turn, were abetted by the advent of communism: "the same taste for the grandiose and the standard (sic), the same spirit of brutal will power, the same thirst for material pleasures, the same worship of the machine, and finally, "this promiscuity of bodies and souls characteristic of the Soviet regime" which, being equally the basis of U.S. society, predisposed Americans to indulgent understanding towards the USSR;
> 3) existence of a common enemy (apparently referring to Japan);
> 4) American capitalists' plan for a "new economic world" in the Pacific which would encompass the Soviet Union and "bolshevized China", with the U.S. as leaders and promoters.[51]

Willoquet further reported that among the American community in Manila he often heard expressed the opinion that well-intentioned cooperation was still the best way of "embourgeoisizing the Soviets".[52] In view of the alleged U.S.-Soviet collusion, the consul felt duty-bound to register his doubts about the Americans' "spirit of solidarity" and darkly alluded to the threat which their leniency posed to "the community of interests of the white race in the Pacific".[53] The new situation in the Philippines, Willoquet predicted, would provide an opportunity for Indochinese, Javanese and Chinese agitators to launch their reprehensible activities.[54]

Explanations for communist popularity. — After its banning in 1931, the PKP not only continued to mobilize the worker and peasant masses, but even gained more ground throughout Luzon and the Visayas, particularly in the countrysides. The French were not hard put to find reasons for this phenomenal upsurge. American tolerance, as we have seen, was for the French an important factor. "Peasant gullibility", as in Indochina, was advanced as another reason.[55] Other official French analyses, which apparently derived in part from U.S. military intelligence reports, identified four others:

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[50] Willoquet to MAE, Manila, 1 July 1932. However, the consul added that "this is only an impression without a precise basis; the surveys I have undertaken on the subject in official circles and on the communist side have not yet yielded any result."

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 7 and 9.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[55] Governor-General of Indochina to the Minister of Colonies, Hanoi, 1 April 1931.

> the *kasama* system: "the main communist idea being the equal redistribution of land among all men, all these workers are ready, therefore, to rally to Moscow's ideas";
> *distance from Manila:* "In provinces far from the central government like Cebu and Iloilo, all communist or revolutionary influence may more readily find partisans;"
> *Filipinos' corruptibility:* "One must not forget that after a long Spanish occupation, all Filipinos, whoever they may be, can be bought, and the present American government knows it very well";
> *secret societies:* "these... appeal to ignorant people and nationalist sentiment may easily change to revolutionary sentiment".[56]

Filipino intellectuals also came in for their share of the blame, in the French view.

> We are not here in a country sufficiently developed socially and morally—supposing that it is intellectually so—to expose it with impunity to the corrosion of communist theories. The middle class —main factor of the stability of States—is practically inexistent in the Philippines and the agrarian problem is posed here in all its acuteness. The congenital apathy of the Malay, his spirit of kinship, may *à la rigueur* be invoked as factors contrary to communism but they do not counterbalance, far from it, the danger which is represented by the rising tide of the intellectual proletariat thrown every year upon the pavement of Manila by the American universities.[57]

French desire to commit the U.S. — Towards their American counterparts, French bureaucrats were eager to give assurances of their country's cooperation in matters affecting their supposed mutual interests as colonial powers in Southeast Asia. For example, Consul Valentini reassured Governor-General Leonard Wood that Paris maintained "the greatest reservation" about Philippine independence, and that French support would not be extended to the campaign for greater freedom from the U.S. Valentini belied the rumor, circulating in Manila, to the effect that the Parti Radical and certain government officials in Paris had encouraged Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmeña during their visit to France in September 1924. The consul was pleased to report to his ministry that Wood believed his explanation, and that the latter reminded him of the "dangerous repercussion in your rich and prosperous Indochinese colony" which eventual independence for the Philippines would set off.[58]

Where the possibility of engaging the U.S. in a Southeast Asian colonial alliance against communism was concerned, the French were

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[56] Peyronnet to the Governor-General of Indochina, n.d. (see fn. 5). The French obsession with secret societies was nothing novel: in a 1928 report, these were indicated as possible conduits for communist ideas which the masses had not previously received with favor. *Note sur la situation politique* (1928), *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[57] Willoquet to MAE, 1 July 1932, p. 8.

[58] Valentini to MAE, 15, December 1924.

even more unequivocal. Governor-General Pierre Pasquier thus signalled French intentions to the Philippines' governor-general, during the latter's visit to Indo-china, in terms of shared responsibility.

> Destiny has led us, in this part of the Far East, to assume responsibilities of the same nature towards the peoples whom we have the noble design of gradually drawing to ourselves. You will always find us disposed to harmonize our acts with yours, when it will come to fighting whosoever, from the exterior, will attempt to corrupt souls and trouble minds.[59]

Governor-General Dwight Davis was apparently just as well-disposed to reciprocate Pasquier's offer; in the latter's account, Davis

> spontaneously offered to send me, through our consul in Manila, documents about the communist agitation in the Philippines. I myself informed him very exactly about the activities of the Third International in Indochina and the energetic measures which we adopted to neutralize them.[60]

Elsewhere, "close contact" between French and U.S. colonial intelligence services was confirmed by Consul Willoquet in a communication to his ministry.[61]

In the course of a talk in 1932 with Sir William Peel, governor-general of Hongkong, Pasquier learned that the British government had recently instructed Peel to cooperate with the Straits Settlements and Indochinese regimes in fighting communist propaganda and infiltration. (At this time, Nguyen Ai Quoc — later to be known as Ho Chi Minh — had just been expelled from Hongkong, but for some mysterious reason was not turned over to the French Sureté.)[62] This British initiative may have inspired Pasquier to suggest a "discreet" conference, to be held in either Saigon or Hanoi, of police police forces from Indochina, the Philippines, Siam, the Dutch East Indies, the Straits Settlements and Hongkong. But British reluctance prevented it from taking place.[63]

Inter-imperialist contradictions. — The record of Franco-American relations in Southeast Asia during the colonial period does not warrant the conclusion that the French necessarily derived a sense of security from greater U.S. involvement in their strategic interests. The objective dynamics of American monopoly capitalism's drive to capture more markets on a global scale followed a logic of its own, which often ignored the wishful thinking of French officials. After

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59 Banquet speech by Pasquier, cited in Pasquier's report to the Minister of Colonies (Hanoi, 1 April 1931), No. 1008.

60 *Ibid.*

61 Willoquet to MAE, Manila, 2 May 1931.

62 Jean Lacouture, *Ho Chi Minh* (Pelican Books ed., 1969), pp. 59-60.

63 *La Dépeche d'Indochine,* 5 November 1934, in Daniel Hémery, *Révolutionnaires Vietnamiens et Pouvoir Colonial en Indochine* (Paris, 1975), p. 160.

World War I, American traders and investors began to challenge French "rights" over Indochina, and French capitalists in that colony found it hard to resist American encroachment. Cochinchina senator Ernest Outrey made no secret of his wish to see American investment in the French colony, "which offers much more interesting economic possibilities than those presented by the Philippines".[64] For his part, Consul Maurice Paillard reported from Manila that during their visits to the Philippines, French businessmen from Indochina had developed an inordinate liking for American consumer goods, which were in fact already replacing French merchandise in Indochinese shops. Concerned with the psychological impact which this American invasion would have on the Indochinese, Paillard saw fit to remind Paris that "in the Asiatic regions, the moral influence of a nation is in a measure correlative with its economic situation in the country".[65]

On the other hand, French capitalists in Indochina had no significant share in the Philippine market. Tonkinese coal, it was argued, should find an important outlet in the Philippines, the more so as Indochina was nearer the archipelago than the latter's two main suppliers: Japan and Australia.[66] The French commercial attaché for Indochina in the U.S. thus urged a reversal of the trend:

> And why should we not also make Indochina a distribution center of French products for the whole Far East, just as our magnificent Along (sic) Bay coal deposits and our minerals of Tonkin should be the supply center of all the surrounding countries?[67]

But American economic power retained its strong appeal in Indochina through the colonial period. In 1943, French businessmen in Hanoi confided to a visiting American officer that harsh restrictions against U.S. goods entering the colony were bad for the Indochinese economy.[68] According to still another American source, Ho Chi Minh himself said that while he was willing to give priority to French advisers, concessions and purchases of machinery and equipment for the postwar reconstruction his socialist republic, he felt that Indochina would be a "fertile field" for American capital and enterprise.[69] French intelligence reports after the war referred to American desires for a more liberal French policy with regard to the

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64 "Notes sur les Philippines", *op. cit.*, p. 14.

65 Paillard to MAE, Manila, 6 April 1918.

66 G. Giraud, "Le Régime Actuel aux Philippines: Les Ensiegnements à en Tirer", *La Dépêche Coloniale*, 29 January 1927.

67 Robert Reyrieu, "Les Philippines", *La Dépêche Coloniale*, 1 June 1923.

68 "Report of Arthur Hale of the USIS Based on a 13-Day Stay in Hanoi, October 1945", in Appendix I of *The U.S. and Vietnam*, 1944-1947, *A Staff Study Based on the Pentagon Papers* (Wash., D C., 1972), p. 35.

69 Memorandum from George Abbott, First Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Paris, to Ambassador Caffery, 12 September 1946, quoted in Robert Blum, "Ho Chi Minh and the U.S.", *ibid.*, p. 13. Ho and Abbott were both in Paris at the time, negotiating with the French on separate matters.

entry of U.S. capital in Indonchina, specially for cotton and coal. The corresponding dangers that these American incursions would entail, intelligence analysts pointed out, were U.S. control over the economy on the one hand, and possible U.S. support for anti-French elements in Indochina on the other.[70]

Ho takes advantage of U.S.-French contradictions. — French mistrust of American motives had heightened in the war years with Franklin D. Roosevelt's celebrated plan to place Indochina under United Nations trusteeship. This project, which would have preempted the postwar French government's claim to regain Indochina as its sole master, sprang from a cherished American belief that the "prestigious" policy of the U.S. vis-à-vis its Filipino wards could successfully be replicated by other colonial powers.[71] In fact, Roosevelt would have liked a Filipino representative appointed to the proposed trusteeship council, and even offered Filipino experts and advisers to Charles de Gaulle to help France establish a "more progressive policy" in Indochina.[72]

Taking up the Americans on their word, Ho Chi Minh appealed on several occasions to the U.S. government from autumn 1945 to February 1946 for recognition of the infant Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or trusteeship under the U.N., or simple support at the U.N. for Vietnamese independence "Philippine style".[73] Ho told an agent of the Office of Strategic Services (forerunner of the CIA) that "I have always been impressed with your country's treatment of the Philippines. You kicked the Spanish out and let the Filipinos develop their own country."[74] American operatives in Hanoi in October 1945 had the pleasant surprise to note, "down to the smallest village", awareness of U.S. policy in the Philippines.[75]

Ironically for the French, the pernicious "Philippine example" was bearing fruit in Vietnam, but in an unforeseen manner: instead of the communist virus, it was the American promise of decolonization that had caught. Ho Chi Minh probably never expected the U.S. to abide by its promise, and as a good Marxist-Leninist he had only seized on the tactical advantage offered by the Roosevelt plan in order to exert pressure on the French. But these speculations are

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70 Report of the Direction Générale des Etudes et Recherches, "Ingérences économiques américaines en Indochine au cours du deuxieme semestre 1946", in *Notice Technique de l'Ingérence Economique* (9 January 1947), pp. 3, 17.

71 See Linda C. Robins, "Whatever Happened to the U.N. Trusteeship of Indochina?" *France-Asie,* No. 198, 3rd quarter 1969; also Bernard Fall, *The Two Vietnams* (New York, 1967), pp. 50-53.

72 Fall, *op. cit.,* pp. 52-53.

73 *Pentagon Papers* (Gravel edition), Vol. I (Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 17-20.

74 René Defourneaux as told to James Flowers, "A Secret Encounter With Ho Chi Minh", *Look,* 9 August 1966, p. 33.

75 Hale, *op. cit.,* p. 30.

ultimately academic. After Roosevelt's death in April 1945 the trusteeship project was shelved (indeed, Roosevelt himself had began to doubt its desirability); and U.S. policymakers came around to vindicating the French viewpoint: the good will of the Paris regime, held to be vital in American post-war policy vis-à-vis the USSR and Germany, was not to be jeopardized by inciting the Vietnamese to rebel against the French.[76]

Meantime, the French foreign ministry in a review of U.S. policy in the Philippines until the outbreak of the war claimed to discern American tendencies to vacillate on the question of postwar independence. These alleged vacillations were cited to justify Paris' refusal to withdraw from Indochina:

> What conclusions may aptly be drawn from these doubts, these hesitations, these gropings, these contradictions of the policy of a great country, usually sure of itself and of its destiny? It is that a colonial enterprise, even recent, is not liquidated, even if one wished, in a few years. Time is needed to educate a population ill prepared for independence. Even an economic association, though it be not older than a quarter of a century, cannot be broken impromptu, unless it be to expose to a catastrophe the country which one has placed under one's tutelage and which one has the mission of guiding towards autonomy. The history of the American administration in the Philippines both confirms and illustrates this rule of general application.[77]

Postwar: French acceptance of U.S. hegemony. — After the war, the U.S. pulled down its flag from Philippine soil — "to unanimous regret", according to Willoquet's *Histoire des Philippines*[78] — yet did not lift a finger to prevent the French from reclaiming Indochina. But both Western countries still faced the postwar challenge of the communist movement, which in both Vietnam and the Philippines had survived the Japanese occupation. In fact, the DRV, the first socialist state in Southeast Asia, was proclaimed in September 1945 in the momentous conjuncture of Japanese surrender, Emperor Bao Dai's abdication, the effective absence of the French, and unchallenged superiority of the Viet Minh forces in the North. Conditions were not as favorable for the PKP and the Hukbalahap: the brutal repression unleashed by the U.S.-Roxas regime forced them to a continuous defensive, and factional differences — some dating from before the war — blunted whatever policy the PKP leadership had elaborated for the postwar era.

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[76] David Halberstam, *The Making of a Quagmire* (NewYork, 1965), pp. 81-83.

[77] *Les Etats-Unis et les Philippines de* 1898 à 1941, MAE, Asia-Oceania Section, to the Minister of Colonies, 25 Jan. 1944, pp. 38-39.

[78] Gaston Willoquet, *Histoire des Philippines* (coll. Que Sais-Je?) (Paris, 1961), p. 75.

Needless to say, the new situation in both the Philippines and Indochina no longer warranted references to the contagion theory, if indeed it were justified at all. The French minister in Manila began to realize the weakness of the PKP, and to accept the *fait accompli* of 4 July 1946. Willoquet, reappointed to his post after the war, reacted positively to "majority politburo" leader Jorge Frianeza's assurances that the PKP — or at least his faction of the party's leadership, a difference which Willoquet apparently was not aware of — was not planning a violent revolution that would result in a socialist regime, and that the party was in fact in favor of wider development of capitalism in the Philippines.[79]

> The moderation (of Frianeza) is not surprising: it corresponds to a general slogan whose manifestations have been noted in many countries. In the Philippines the maneuver appears to be very clever...While it does not constitute a disavowal of the Huk uprising, it clearly indicates the inauguration of a new policy.[80]

However, Willoquet opined that with popular support for the U.S.-Roxas reconstruction and industrialization program, PKP propaganda was "falling into a void".[81]

Tighter American control over the ex-colony, according to Willoquet, could only encourage Philippine development.[82] U.S. bases in the archipelago were perceived as useful and indeed necessary attributes of American international hegemony, in a secret study made by the defense staff of the Gaullist regime. Communism once again provided the pretext for this military presence, with a crucial difference: the French military, at least, now conceded the primary role of U.S. power in containing communism in Asia.

> Recent developments in international politics, very particularly the progress of communism and of pan-Islamism, prove overabundantly that if America wishes to play the role assigned to her in the plan of peaceful organization of the world, she must in all necessity have military, economic, political and even ideological bases on the entire surface of the globe.[83]

The Philippine archipelago was described as a "choice position" for American military bases, for it lay within aircraft's reach of that part of Asia "most subject to fermentations of all sorts", i.e. East

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79 Willoquet to MAE, Manila, 15 Feb. 1947. See also Frianeza's "In Defense of the Communists", *Philippines Free Press,* 16 Aug. 1947, for more details on his faction's postwar policy.

80 Willoquet, *ibid.*

81 *Ibid.*

82 Willoquet to MAE, Manila, 16 May 1947.

83 Emphasis in text; "La situation des Américains dans la république indépendante des Philippines", *Bulletin d'Etudes* No. 43. Published by the Présidence du Gouvernment Provisoire de la République Francaise, Etat Major de la Défense Nationale, 2nd section (Paris, 23 Oct. 1946), p. 2.

Asia and Indochina.[84] The report concluded that "the U.S. knows how to unite a liberal policy with a strong guarantee of its military interests", and that the Philippines could be held up as an example to "the most intransigent nationalists of our overseas territories".[85]

As this last passage shows, the French phobia for nationalism died hard. It led Willoquet, for instance, to indulge in the luxury of counselling his "old friend", the diplomat-general Carlos P. Romulo, to guard against

> any rash enthusiasm in the role he has arrogated for himself, [that of] spokesman of the self-styled oppressed peoples. Before reaching the degree of advancement of the Filipinos, most Asian peoples still have a long evolution to undergo and it would not be doing them a favor to launch them in the great adventure and to precipitately grant them an independence which would rapidly be translated...into anarchy and misery.[86]

Conclusion. — It remains to be definitively proven whether these consular and intelligence analyses, commentaries and progress reports on the Philippine communist movement influenced French policy for Indochina in any way. But it may be posited that the myopia of the "Philippine watchers", who were only too willing to exaggerate the proto-communist and communist "example" in the archipelago, was matched by the failure of their compatriots in charge of Vietnamese policy to adequately gauge the ideological, political and military strength of the Vietnamese communists. In their preoccupation with the proximity of and the apparent analogy between the Philippines and Vietnam, the French officials were seduced into regarding revolution as an exportable commodity; and worse, that the revolution would spread from the American colony to the French one. This facile conceptualization did not take into account certain barriers between the two colonized peoples.

A more judicious estimate of the Philippine communists' potential for inter-colonial contamination is afforded by data, testimonies of circumstantial evidence that have since then become available. Direct or indirect links between Indochinese and Philippine communists were inexistent: information about the activities of the various Comintern agents for Southeast Asia, viz. Ho Chi Minh, Tan Malaka and Hendrik Sneevliet, does not suggest the least coordination of

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[84] *Ibid.*

[85] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[86] Willoquet to MAE, Manila, 26 Feb. 1947. Needless to say, Willoquet's words of advice were given to Romulo when the Philippine republic was already formally independent and sovereign. However, Willoquet still believed as late as 1961 that the Philippines had no foreign policy of its own: "America has continued to govern the Philippines and to direct its foreign policy as if it were a protectorate." *Histoire, op. cit.*, p. 114.

revolutionary movements between the two colonies.[87] While Ho Chi Minh had some rudimentary notions about the Philippines under U.S. rule, he himself never visited the country.

No contacts between ICP and PKP leaders or cadres seem to have taken place during this period, either bilaterally or in the course of the various congresses attended by Asian revolutionaries.[88] Vietnamese militants were not informed about developments taking place in the Philippines[89]: a content analysis of *La Lutte,* the revolutionary newspaper published by a local alliance of Third and Fourth Internationales in Saigon between 1933 and 1937, shows that news from abroad concentrated on events in France, Spain, the Soviet Union, Ethiopia and China, in that order, but none on Southeast Asia and much less the Philippines.[90] This mutual ignorance is confirmed indirectly by PKP leader Jose Lava writing about the party's 30th anniversary. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, according to Lava, the major influences on the Philippine anti-imperialist movement were the Chinese and Indonesian struggles, as well as the October Revolution, of course. But the Indochinese revolution is not mentioned.[91] In fact, one of the reasons advanced by the PKP for the failure of

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[87] See V. Thompson and J. Adloff, *The Left Wing in Southeast Asia* (New York, 1950), pp. 24, 212. 270, 284; Michael Williams, "Sneevliet and the Birth of Asian Communism," *New Left Review* (Sept.-Oct. 1980), pp. 83-86; and Charles McLane, *Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: An Exploration of Eastern Policies Under Lenin and Stalin* (Princeton University, 1966), p. 82n, which disputes Sneevliet's link with the Philippines.

[88] E. H. Carr, *Socialism In One Country,* 1924-1926, vol. 3, part II of *A History of Soviet Russia* (London, 1964), pp. 621-623; McLane, *op. cit.,* p. 70; Gregorio Santayana (Jose Lava), *Milestones of the History of the Philippine Communist Party* (circa Sept. 1950), pp. 6, 8.

[89] This is not to suggest utter ignorance, on the part of Indochinese revolutionaries *of the pre-communist era,* of their Filipino contemporaries. The Dong Kinh group, for instance, was aware of Emilio Aguinaldo's role in the Philippine revolution (apparently through the book of Henri Turot, *Aguinaldo et les Philippins,* published in Paris by Stock in 1900.) See, in this regard, the following studies in Walter Vella (ed.), *Aspects of Vietnamese History* (University of Hawaii, 1973): Vu Duc Bang, "The Dong Kinh Free School Movement, 1907-1908", p. 55, and Hoang Ngoc Thanh, "Quoc Ngu and the Development of Modern Vietnamese Literature", p. 199, Also, the Toa Domeikai group which Phan Boi Chau helped establish in Japan included Filipino members. David Marr, *Vietnamese Anticolonialism* 1885-1925 (University of California, 1971), p. 148.

[90] Hémery, *op. cit.,* p. 127.

[91] Jose Lava, "Clandestine Struggles, Arrests, Battles", *World Marxist Review,* Dec. 1980, p. 124. See also Santayana, *op. cit.,* p. 54, for his references to "advanced revolutionary situations" in the early 1950s, which include the Korean War but not the Indochinese struggle. Elsewhere, Huk leader Silvestre Liwanag in an interview compared the Philippine situation in the early 1950s to that of Indochina: "We needed a peace to retreat and to recuperate, but we did not have one, unlike the guerillas in China and Indochina." In Benedict Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion* (Philippine ed., 1979), p. 236. This recollection, made in 1970, does not necessarily mean that the Huks knew about the Indochinese situation after the war.

the Philippine revolution was its physical isolation from international allies, with virtually no support from abroad.[92]

These considerations were quite obviously lost on the French agents, operating as they did from a necessarily limited perspective and above all on the assumption that communism was a contagious malady. The contagion could be limited, if not altogether eliminated, through a concerted multinational — i.e. intercolonial — effort. This strategy curiously prefigures that of the American camp during the Cold War and its local byproduct in Asia, the "domino theory". As the Americans' failure in Indochina shows, the French were not alone in constructing—and falling into—the same conceptual trap.

92 Jorge Maravilla's critique of the PKP's failure appeared in *World Marxist Review*, November 1965, and is quoted by William Pomeroy, *Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism* (New York, 1968), p. 178.

THE EUROCENTRIC WORLDVIEW: MISUNDERSTANDING EAST ASIA

LARRY FIELDS

The United States, especially since 1941, has exercised enormous power throughout the world. East Asia, one region meriting America's heightened attention, spans a significant part of Eurasia, from the Japanese island chain to the Ili region in Central Asia. Peoples there number more than one billion, natural resources abound, while states like China and Japan wield considerable influence. Unfortunately much misunderstanding concerning East Asia permeated, and still permeates, American education and scholarship.[1] Therefore this essay will explore and analyze this problem by focusing on China.

After a brief historical introduction showing how the Europeans have viewed China since the seventeenth century, the focus will shift to evaluate how East Asia is treated in education (vocabulary, concepts, source materials) through teaching. Then, research will occupy the center stage, with special reference to the social sciences. Of course, teaching and research overlap, but here they are separated for analytical purposes. It must be noted that unlike Edward Said's *Orientalism,* which limits its scope to Islamic studies, this essay examines not merely Sinology or even East Asian scholarship, but rather the larger academic treatment of world history. Textbooks purporting to survey objectively world civilizations actually promote Eurocentric bases throughout their pages. Terms like modern, modernization, or revolution are likewise steeped with Eurocentrism.[2] Furthermore, as this essay makes no claim to be comprehensive—Said reports that between 1800 and 1950 alone about 60,000 works were written about the Orient[3]—only a few representative works will be explored.

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1 S. S. Eisenstadt, "Sociological Theory and an Analysis of the Dynamism of Civilization and of Revolution," *Daedalus,* CVI (Fall 1977), pp. 59-65, 74-75.

2 Perez Zagorin, "Prolegomena to the Comparative History of Revolution in Early Modern Europe," *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* XVIII (April 1976), pp. 156-157, 172-174. It is interesting to observe that Zagorin who specializes in pre-1789 European history rails against colleagues who judge sixteenth and seventeenth century political movements as backward simply because they did not espouse the progress concept. Therefore Eurocentrism also has its internal divisions.

3 Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York, 1978), p. 204.

Some Historical Perspectives

Europeans interacted with East Asians in large numbers beginning about 1600. Although missionaries and merchants had traveled to and lived in East Asia since the 1540s, Matteo Ricci was able to reside in Peking, capital of the Chinese Empire, only after 1600. About that time, the English East India Company and the Dutch East India Company were founded. From these varied religious and commercial contacts many European images of East Asia emerged. One striking view of China emanated largely from the Jesuits. Beginning with Ricci who mastered both spoken and written Chinese, the Jesuits managed to win concessions that permitted them not only to take up residence in the capital but gradually to ingratiate themselves to the imperial court. Thus even though they witnessed the tumult accompanying the Ming Dynasty's (1368-1644) fall and the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1912) rise, the Jesuits associated themselves with China's most sophisticated cultural and political elites. Moreover, Ricci's Chinese dress reflected a keen cosmopolitan spirit and cultural receptivity. This positive regard for China later surfaced in the writings of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz, who urged Europeans to learn from the Chinese, especially about ethical and political matters.[4] Leibnitz spoke at length about Chinese philosophy in a work, *Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese,* where he eloquently argued for understanding, exchange, and interaction between the Chinese and the Europeans.[5]

This favorable perspective continued to the Enlightenment and may be seen in the writings of the *philosophes* and the *physiocrates.* Representing the growing secularization of European thought, Voltaire and others admired the Chinese not merely for their political and ethical accomplishments, but also because they fashioned their systems without a Christian basis. Even in the artistic realm, a craze for collecting Chinese artifacts (*chinoiserie*) developed.[6] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, however, saw the Chinese quite differently. Here, as elsewhere, he may be viewed as a maverick Enlightenment figure because in his essay "Has the Restoration of the Arts and Sciences Been Conducive to the Purification of Morals?", Rousseau used China as an example to illustrate his negative conclusion:

> There is in Asia an immense country where learning is so honored that it takes men to the highest positions in the state. If the sci-

[4] Donald Lach, trans., *The Preface to Leibnitz' Novissima Sinica* (Honolulu, 1957), p. 69.

[5] Gottfried W. Leibnitz, *Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese,* trans. by Henry Rosemont Jr. and Daniel J. Cook (Honolulu, 1977), p. 7.

[6] Michael Sullivan, "The Heritage of Chinese Art," in Raymond Dawson, ed., *The Legacy of China* (Oxford, 1964), pp. 167-168. Raymond Dawson, "Western Conceptions of Chinese Civilization," in Dawson, ed., *The Legacy,* p. 12. E. A. Kracke, Jr., "The Chinese and the Art of Government," in Dawson, ed., *The Legacy,* p. 335.

> ences purified morals, taught men to shed their blood for their country, and animated their courage, then the peoples of China ought to be virtuous, free, and invincible. But there is no vice that is not common among them. If that vast empire could not be saved from the yoke of the crude and ignorant Tartars by the sagacity of its ministers, the supposed wisdom of its laws, and the great number of its inhabitants, of what use to it were all its scholars? What has it gained from all the honors heaped upon them, other than the distinction of being peopled by slaves and scoundrels?[7]

The decades around 1800 witnessed a shift in Europe's attitudes about East Asia generally, and China more specifically, being closely tied with the twin transformations: the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. Broadly speaking, the political upheavals in France brought, among other things, a highly centralized, unified bureaucratic state which could effectively mobilize that nation's energies for vital tasks like war. A coherent and elaborate ideological system revolving about liberty, equality, and fraternity became a means to measure and judge other societies. At the same time, French nationalism developed, and soon sparked national awareness within the European community, an awareness which tended negatively to view foreigners as different and therefore inferior. The Industrial Revolution transformed the United Kingdom, propelling the British bourgeoisie dynamically across the globe in its search for markets and raw materials. Now, as war materials as well as textiles could be mass produced, British strength seemed invincible. Europeans reckoned a country's worth in terms of its warships, cannon, and colonies more than ever before.

In China the British settled on much different terms than their Jesuit predecessors. Britain's merchant class, a social group traditionally despised by Chinese elites, lived outside Canton, itself distant from Peking. As social and cultural outsiders, the British observed a declining China weakened after nearly two centuries of Manchu rule, population explosion, and widespread corruption. Unlike the Jesuit "cosmopolitan internationalists," the British presented a narrow nationalism and "Western modernism" which tended to scorn the Chinese. Protestant missionaries contributed to the dehumanizing process by considering the Chinese as heathens and therefore inferior. European power, influence, and contempt for colored people reached an apogee in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The essential attitudes that the West dominated a stagnantly passive Asia, that the Western road to industrialization or "modernity" was the only one to follow, and that the Western model was therefore the one

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[7] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Essential Rousseau,* trans. by Lowell Bair (New York, 1974), p. 211.

by which nations would be judged, have continued until today despite certain changes in the degree or sophistication of scholarly treatment.

Eurocentrism in Education

Education, in this essay, will be defined rather broadly to include both kinds of formal schooling, public and private, as well as the electronic and printed media. All these educational forms powerfully convey information including perceptions to the public. One striking example of Eurocentric bias vis-a-vis East Asia is the continued use of *Far East,* which means far from Europe—in the Eastern direction, of course. Far East refers somewhat vaguely to China, Japan, Korea, and possibly Vietnam. To designate collectively these nations as the Far East implies that Europe is the world's wealth, power, and cultural center. One very elementary, common-sense objection to that view is that the globe cannot possibly have a center on its surface but only at its core. When Americans employ Far East in their speech or writing, they show unthinking mindlessness. China, Japan, and Korea really lie to America's West, being the "Near West" from Hawaii and the "Far West" from Washington, D.C. Certainly, American usage of Far or Near West would be equally biased. The point is that a more accurate and less biased terminology must be employed in education. "East Asia," for example, usually refers to Eastern Eurasia with or without Vietnam's inclusion. Similar appropriate designations would be "Southwest Asia," "South Asia," "Southeast Asia" and "Central Asia." Southwest Asia is a seldom-used name for a region that scholars and news-people call the Near East or the Middle East. Yet *Near East* is as Eurocentric as *Far East* but it is much more widely used in all educational aspects. *East Asia* and *Southwest Asia* should be employed because they are more accurate and less biased.

This discussion may seem rather old-fashioned or out-of-date. At the most, professors might use "Far East" pedagogically to heighten students' sensitivities about images used to characterize East Asia. Unfortunately, however, "Far East's" usage did not die out in the 1950s, 1960s, or the 1970s; rather it is still "alive and well" in the 1980s. Late in 1979, for example, Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for Asian Affairs, used "Far East".[8] Such lapses by high ranking policy making American officials are disconcerting and inexcusable. Franz Schurmann, a noted American sinologist and author of numerous articles and books on China, recently wrote an article about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan using

[8] *The Far Eastern Economic Review,* (November 16, 1979), p. 16. This periodical's title, of course, reflects Eurocentrism.

"Far East".[9] Moreover, in recent years several articles written by French and Russian scholars refer to the "Far East".[10] American textbooks still widely employ the term in their titles or in their contents. Therefore future generations of scholars, teachers, and citizens will read these texts which are steeped with Eurocentric bias.[11] Closely related to this usage is the tendency to treat Europe as the only "true" civilization in the world; the underlying assumption is that "civilization" began in Greece and Rome, underwent a revival in the Renaissance, and has flourished ever since in Europe and the United States. Asian or other civilizations receive scant or condescending attention. These attitudes dominate nearly every textbook concerning world history.[12] Elbaki Hermassi summarized this kind of attitude most succinctly:

> But in a complex and multi-centered world, it will take a good deal of ethnocentrism ... to believe that political and innovation can take place only in certain historical and geographical areas.[13]

This most serious issue must be confronted immediately and with wide-ranging discussion.

East Asians used the term "Far East" too. In the Republic of Korea, for example, Yonsei University ran a Far Eastern Studies Institute which published a periodical, *The Journal of Far Eastern Studies*.[14] A Korean business establishment was known as the Far

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[9] H. Franz Schurmann, "Geopolitics Behind the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan," *Hawaii Tribune Herald,* January 25, 1980, p. 4.

[10] See for example A. Mikhailov, "Victory in the Far East and the Destinies of the Chinese Revolution," *International Affairs,* IX (1975), pp. 39-47. "Revolution Culturelle Chinoise et Politique Américaine en Extrême-Orient," *Revue de Défense Nationale,* XXIII (1967), pp. 507-516.

[11] Joseph Strayer, Hans W. Gatzke, *et al., The Mainstream of Civilization,* 3rd edition (New York, 1979), II, *vide supra,* 683-688, 777-778, 785, 787. E. M. Burns and P. L. Ralph, *World Civilizations,* 5th edition (New York. 1974), 143, 147, 154, 279, 289, 307, 314, 578, 688, 693, 917, 948 ff, 1171, 1211, 1220. L. S. Stavrianos, *The World Since 1500,* 3rd edition, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1975), 203, 276-277, 492-496. W. H. McNeill, *A World History,* 3rd edition (New York, 1979), 44, 104, 117, 221-222, 230, 238, 260, 289, 298, 316, 337, 347, Chapter 22, 399-400, 458, 516, 546. This is a representative, not an exhaustive sampling. McNeill used Middle East in his work (not reflected in this citation). He also employed Western Asia, Far West, European Far West, and Far East. His terminology although somewhat inconsistent does seem to point out that he used the Eurasian land mass as a reference point. Far West would presumably be Europe, European Far West would be Western Europe, Middle East would be near the center of Eurasia, and the Far East would be the Eastern part of Eurasia. This is still somewhat vague but perhaps slightly less Eurocentric.

[12] Strayer, Gatzke, *et al., The Mainstream,* Part I, for example, has but two chapters (44pp.) on India, China, and Japan whereas most of the remaining nineteen chapters (450pp.) concern the European culture area. The other texts cited above have similar distributions except for McNeill whose coverage is most even pagewise but nevertheless Eurocentric.

[13] Elbaki, Hermassi, "Toward a Comparative Study of Revolutions," *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* XVIII (April 1976), 234.

[14] Hapdong News Agency, *Korea Annual, 1972* (Seoul, 1972), 446. Hapdong News Agency, *Korea Annual, 1975* (Seoul, 1975), 372-373.

Eastern Transport Company.[15] The *Japan Times,* an English-language newspaper in circulation since the nineteenth century, employed "Far East" on numerous occasions in early 1980, especially when quoting from Japanese language newspapers.[16] The interesting thing is that the Japanese characters (*kanji*) used to translated "Far East" literally mean East Asia.[17] A particularly confusing example in the *Japan Times* appeared in reference to a trip by a former government official who was scheduled to travel in the "Middle East." Not only was it mindless to use "Middle East" from a Japanese perspective, but "Middle East" was employed in the same sentence with Southeast Asia, and in a mutually exclusive context:

> Former Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda is going to visit countries in Southwest Asia and the Middle East...[18]

Such examples illustrate the wide-ranging influence that Eurocentrism wields throughout the world.

That the term Far East can create problems in the international arena is seen in an early 1980 article' "How Wide is Far East?" by Kiyoaki Murata. Therein the author noted that much Japanese governmental concern with Far East stemmed from the September 8, 1951 Japan-United States Security Treaty. Article I of that document gave the Americans:

> ... the right ... to dispose United States land, air, and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without...[19]

Thus by this treaty the Japanese government permitted the Japan-based American forces to strike at parts of the "Far East" when conditions warranted. The Far East's vaguely defined nature emerged when the Security Treaty's revision became a major political issue in 1960. During some extremely sharp exchanges with opposition Diet members, government officials stated that "Far East" was an area, not defined with geographical precision, located within the "Far Eastern" region. Muddled rhetoric aside, the imprecision became necessary when other Asian countries became the recipients of American interest and involvement. In the mid-1960s, for example, the Americans added Vietnam as a fringe area so as to justify Okinawa-based flying missions over that war-torn land. About the same time,

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15 Hapdong News Agency, *Korea Annual, 1978* (Seoul, 1978), 434.

16 *The Japan Times,* (Hereafter JT)), 2/1/1980, p. 16; 2/3/1980, p. 38; 2/7/1980, p. 12; 2/16/1980, p. 192.

17 P. H. Clyde and B. F. Beers, *The Far East* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1975), *vide supra.* The text's cover is especially interesting because it reproduces the *kanji* meaning East Asia which it translates Far East.

18 *JT,* 2/19/1980, p. 228.

19 *JT,* 2/8/1980, p. 16.

the Japanese government did define "Far East" to include Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Matsu, Quemoy, and Japan's northern territories as defense areas. Such specific connotations, however necessary they might be for diplomatic or security purposes, excluded the People's Republic of China and North Korea, thus making "Far East" even more imprecise and problematic. With the rise of the Iranian and Afghanistan "hot spots" in 1979-1980, the possibility that American forces stationed in Japan might be used there, and thus involve Japan in a wider conflict, clearly worried many Japanese, who asked whether

> ... the Persian Gulf which is in the Middle East be considered a 'fringe area' of the Far East.[20]

A Japanese Foreign Ministry official stated that:

> The Persian Gulf is not within the scope of the Far East. But the transfer of the U.S. forces to that region from Japan would pose no problem. It would not be an infringement of the Security Treaty if it is only a transfer.[21]

The security issue, although quite important and critical, lies outside this essay's scope. Nevertheless it is most interesting that the Japanese, who in effect had the term "Far East" thrust upon them via the Security Treaty language nearly thirty years ago, have felt compelled to continue that usage into the 1980s. They do this so as to remain loyal allies. The American government, on the other hand, save for some inexcusable lapses like that of Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke, generally dropped "Far East" from its vocabulary. Thus we are presented with the spectacle of non-Europeans employing "Far East" terminology without seriously questioning its bias.

Uncritical word usage by authors, revealing the Eurocentric worldview's continuing influence, must now be examined. Pyongchoon Hahm, in an otherwise brilliant article attacking Eurocentrism in relation to Korean history, employed the words "lacked" or "failed":

> For example, no one can deny that Korea lacked manorial feudalism and had a highly centralized government; it was militarily weak; it failed to enjoy a high level of civilization...[22]

This passage clearly shows that although Hahm, who thoroughly criticized biased Eurocentric interpretations of Korean history, he still unconsciously felt that Korea somehow did not measure up to

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[20] *Ibid.*

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] P. C. Hahm, "Toward a New Theory of Korean Politics: A Re-examination of Traditional Factors," in E. R. Wright, ed., *Korean Politics in Transition* (Seattle, 1975), 329, 337. Thomas Metzger, *Escape From Predicament* (New York, 1977), p. 32.

European standards. Therefore, since Korea did not have European institutions or living patterns, it "lacked" something or "failed" some test.

Other authors' Eurocentric views surfaced when they noted that Asian history "lurks", that the Chinese "evade" the mind-body dichotomy basic to Western philosophy since Descartes, and that there is a "peculiar" logic of Confucian ethics.[23] One particular passage forcefully conveys this view:

> Self-assertion therefore, was intertwined with interdependence. It is in this context too that we can understand that tendency toward indirect, Machiavellian, and devious strategies of behavior which political scientists are increasingly regarding as a major aspect of China's inherited political culture.[24]

In condemning both traditional and current Chinese political behavior, the author presumably believed that European or American political activities are direct, non-Machiavellian, and non-devious.

Uncritical word usage also hampers our understanding of China in other ways. Granted that most works exhibiting Eurocentrism are written by Westerners for Westerners; however, widespread utilization of Western adjectival forms like *Machiavellian, Appolonian, Dionysian, Sisyphean, Eriksonian, Weberian, Panglossian, Promethean, Faustian,* and *Spenglerian* to characterize traits, be they Chinese or some other, may seriously impair our understanding.[25] In the first place, summarizing a person's work or major ideas by a single word or name, can be grossly misleading. Chinese traits thus described may not accurately equate with Weberian or Eriksonian traits, whatever these may be. At best, these words approximate Chinese things; at worst, they represent that tendency "if one is off by the slightest fraction to begin with, one ends up nowhere near the target."[26]

Eurocentrism also surfaces when scholars evaluate events then rank them. When reviewing the so-called decisive battles in history, for example, one usually finds Blenheim or Agincourt, but seldom if ever, the Talas River Battle. In the latter, Islamic forces in Central Asia met and badly mauled the Chinese forces in 751. This defeat not only weakened the T'ang Dynasty (618-907), it reversed a centuries-long Chinese expansion into Central Asia. Furthermore, forces from China did not permanently re-enter Central Asia until the mid-1750s. Nothing could be more "decisive" than that one

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[23] Leon Stover, *The Cultural Ecology of Chinese Civilization* (New York, 1974), p. 151. Metzger, *Escape,* pp. 85, 209.

[24] *Ibid.,* p. 44.

[25] *Ibid.,* pp. 3, 14, 18, 29, 32-34, 36-38, 44, 46, 56-57, 64, 168, 198, 200, 207-209, 211, 215, 220-221, 226.

[26] *Ibid.,* p. 4.

thousand year reversal. Again, consider some key human inventions or discoveries like gunpowder, the compass, paper, movable-type printing, and pottery making. East Asians developed each, in most cases long before their non-East Asian conterparts.[27] Yet, a contemporary scholar could not apparently conceive of Chinese having abilities to invent such things as chariots or a system of writing. Therefore he created a myth:

> West Asian warfare, bronze armor, horse and chariot, compound bow, and square walled encampments ... (were) new techniques probably brought by chariot driving warriors originating in the Iranian plateau who after oasis-hopping across Chinese Turkestan for generations, marrying locally and sending their sons ever eastward, finally arrived in the densely settled area of North China and there conquered the Lungshan people...[28]

This may make "interesting fiction" but rather sloppy history or anthropology. Unfortunately the eminent historian William McNeil also subscribed to a similar hypothesis despite admitting that there was no evidence to support it.[29] Stover also derived his negative view of traditional China by relying heavily on critical accounts written by hostile Westerners, radical Chinese writers, and Marxists who visited or lived in China during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. China, in that period, was in serious decline. Therefore this jaundiced picture was projected back into the Chinese history.[30] Stover stated, for example, that Chinese office-holding merely added "dignity to a style of profiteering" and that the examination system meant cribbing and cheating.[31] Some officials probably did profiteer from their positions, but Chinese rule was neither better nor worse than elsewhere in the world. No mention was made that the Chinese created and staffed a government using a civil service examination system which the British copied in the nineteenth century, or that the Chinese state merit-rated its officials two thousand years before the British. This political system held China together during the long centuries when Europe was still divided into many quarreling particularistic entities.[32] Similarly scholars have viewed Confucianism as backward-looking and therefore unchanging or stagnant.[33] Yet

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[27] Ho Ping-ti, *The Cradle of the East* (Hong Kong, 1975), pp. 122-123. Joseph Needham, "Science and China's Influence on the World," in Dawson, ed., *The Legacy*, 242, 299. Ho's book abounds in Far East and Near East usages, something unfortunate for a great Sinologist who described the Western intellectual chauvinism which long dominated him. The book itself clearly shows that China developed independently from other world cultures.

[28] Stover, *The Cultural Ecology*, pp. 43-44.

[29] McNeill, *A World History*, pp. 51, 104.

[30] Stover's sources included May Fourth Movement figures like Lu Hsun and unsympathetic Westerners like J. J. M. de Groot.

[31] Stover, *The Cultural Ecology*, pp. 205, 220.

[32] H. G. Creel, *Shen Pu-hai* (Chicago, 1974), pp. 47, 52-63, 75-76, 130.

[33] Stover, *The Cultural Ecology*, pp. 4, 57. Max Hamburger, "Aristotle and Confucius: A Comparison," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XX (April 1959), pp. 243, 247, 249.

Confucianism survived more than two-and-one-half millenia by being a dynamic, vibrant way of life and thought. Confucianism could and did change; indeed, there is a Chou Confucianism, a Han Confucianism, and a Sung Confucianism. A recent book, Thomas Metzger's *Escape From Predicament,* also demonstrates that previous Western accounts of Confucianism's twentieth century demise are premature to say the least. It flourishes today in Hong Kong and Taiwan.[34]

Eurocentrism in Research

In this section attention will center on research, especially as related to the social sciences, and how they have influenced our understanding of East Asia. A major premise is that because the social sciences originated in Europe or America, they project Eurocentric values, something which sharply undermines their claims to being objective.

Many, if not all, social sciences evolved in the nineteenth century, that epoch of the glorification of science. Scholars organized disciplines, conducted research, and exchanged information. Although a key aspect of scientific undertakings should be an objective approach to the subject matter, when considering human beings especially those outside Europe, the resulting scientism was anything but scientific.[35] Darwinism, for example, was perverted through its application to *homo sapiens* as Social Darwinism to support racist ideas.[36] One example of this scientism is found in the term "Mongolism." When a nineteenth century physician, J. L. H. Down, described characteristics common to a group of children and adults judged to be mentally retarded, he emphasized the folded skin around the eyes which he associated with a primary feature of the Asians. Since Down considered Asians, especially the Mongol or Mongoloid group, to be racially inferior, he called the retarded group "Mongoloid." Despite the fact that there is no scientific basis for Down's racist views, "Mongolism" or "Mongoloid" have been used until comparatively recent times. Today the disorder is also known as Down's syndrome, supposedly a more "neutral" designation, but one still honoring a racist.[37]

Psychology, begun by Sigmund Freud and others in the late nineteenth century, has developed a wealth of insights about European cultures. Yet this branch of the social sciences must be cautiously applied to non-European cultures, because of the European values

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[34] Metzger, *Escape,* pp. 7-8.

[35] Daniel Kwok, *Scientism in Chinese Thought, 1900-1950* (New Haven, 1965), p. 3.

[36] *Ibid.,* pp. 24-26 ,34, 81, 87, 92.

[37] *Webster's New World Dictionary,* 2nd College edition (Cleveland, 1976), p. 919.

it contains. For example, filial piety, a vital concept and practice central to Confucianism not only in China but in Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, embodied deep-felt love by children for their parents, as well as invoked similar responses by parents for their offspring. Such warm, expressed love, interpreted as neurotic or abnormal by Western psychologists, seems perfectly natural to East Asians.[38] Hahm presented a detailed view of Korean familial relationships, which countered Western Freudian psychological interpretations.[39] This contradiction suggests that Freudian assumptions be sharply modified before they are used to interpret Korean (or East Asian) society or history. Of course, while Freudians occupy but one part of Western psychology, Eurocentrism has permeated all psychological schools. Chinese psychologists have been reported as having problems treating their patients with behavioral norms developed by American psychologists. Such norms that grow out of a particular Western cultural environment regard many traditional and current Chinese traits as pathological or undesirable. Some scholars have called for theories of personality devoid of the cultural bias favoring individualism found in Western psychology.[40] Psychological theories relating to East Asia must be rooted in East Asian practices to be at all valid.

Thomas Metzger's *Escape From Predicament* noted many shortcomings common to Western psychology yet employed troubling psychological techniques.[41] Although Metzger somewhat cautiously interpreted Chinese familism from a Chinese perspective, he then projected this view backward to eleventh century China. Such a practice seems misleading because even if it can be demonstrated that twentieth centry Chinese exhibited a certain set of behavioral traits derived from Western experience (something quite debatable), to assert that eleventh century Chinese also manifested these traits is most incautious.[42]

Anthropology is another Eurocentric social science discipline whose perspectives inhibit objective interpretation. Leon Stover, for example, wrote about China on several occasions from an anthropological viewpoint. One such work, *The Cultural Ecology of Chinese Civilization: Peasants and Elites in the Last of the Agrarian States,* should be carefully considered. Stover used "Far East" or "Far Eastern" on occasion, and talked about the necessity of observing non-Europeans in a "pristine condition"; presumably this meant as

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[38] Stover, *The Cultural Ecology,* p. 206. Hahm, "Toward a New Theory," p. 339.

[39] *Ibid.,* pp. 338-344.

[40] Metzger, *Escape,* pp. 6-7, 45.

[41] H. D. Harootunian, "Metzger's Predicament," *Journal of Asian Studies* XXXIX (February 1980), p. 247.

[42] *Ibid.,* p. 251.

in a scientific laboratory or perhaps a zoo. Stover's Eurocentric viewpoint surfaced on the first page where he classified China as an agrarian state, "one which grows out of its prehistoric roots." Although unclear about how this occurred, or even what it means, Stover stated that the agrarian state is the "most archaic form of civilization known to archaeology" because such a state evolved out of its own "primitive" beginnings. Thus the book's whole tone and China image is forcefully established: that of a primitive, archaic China incapable of positive, meaningful change. Thus, unlike the future-oriented Western elites of Europe and the United States, the backward-looking Chinese elites kept their government and society unchanging and stagnant because they seldom, if ever, gave serious concern to problems of change and development. Never mind that this claim is simply untrue. Chinese elites did consider all kinds of problems including change, government and society to change radically on occasion, and Chinese culture is different from but not inferior to Western culture.[43] But, never mind, even Chinese eating habits revealed their "primitive" nature because chopsticks developed in Neolithic times.[44] Elsewhere Stover noted that the Chinese agrarian system, highly specialized in one way only, was another characteristic of the static "primitive condition of archaic civilizations."[45] Again the Chinese pattern is judged inferior. These views raise a host of interpretative questions, not the least of which is historical accuracy. During the tenth and thirteenth centuries, the Chinese created a highly diversified, agrarian system with cash crops distributed through the local, national, and international markets.[46] Also by the eleventh century, China's rather enormous industrial capacity could produce more than fifty thousand tons of pig iron per year.[47] These two examples constitute but a small part of the amazing economic diversity in Chinese history. Indeed some scholars, impressed by China's accomplishments, have labeled the Sung Dynasty (960-1279) as "modern" or "pre-modern."[48]

Sociology also embodied deeply held Eurocentric perspectives. Macro-sociological analysis coupled with the comparative study of societies was an early focus of sociology in nineteenth century Europe. The first important sociological thinkers were Karl Marx, Herbert Spencer, and Auguste Comte. They viewed modern (European) society as progressing through stages by means of technology, social

[43] Raymond Van Over, ed., *I Ching* (New York, 1971), pp. 249-252. This classical work is just one example of Chinese scholars' interest in change.
[44] Stover, *The Cultural Ecology,* pp. 1-2.
[45] *Ibid.,* p. 67.
[46] Mark Elvin, *The Pattern of the Chinese Past* (Stanford, 1973), Chapter 9. Peter Golas, "Rural China in the Song," *Journal of Asian Studies,* XXXIX (February 1980), pp. 296-299.
[47] Elvin, *The Pattern,* pp. 84-85.
[48] Golas, "Rural China," p. 291.

development, the extension of liberty, and the use of rationality. All other societies were judged backward. In the early twentieth century, Max Weber projected a Eurocentric bias when he tried to show how non-European countries "failed" to develop capitalism, of which more will be said later.

Then in the post-World War II era America inherited the Eurocentric worldview. Modernization studies, which will be analyzed below, dominated the American intelligentsia's interests until at least the 1970s although by the late 1960s a powerful critique within sociology began to appear. The revisionist scholars faulted modernization studies for a historical methodologies, simplistic traditional-modern dichotomies, as well as Eurocentric biases. Although a variety of new models relating to economic growth and social development have since appeared, Eurocentric views still seem to be evident.[49] S. N. Eisenstadt's most recent analyses relating to revolutions and civilizations seem less culture-bound and more objective but still use the European experience as a positive model against which other countries are measured.[50]

Eurocentrism in modernization and comparative studies

To borrow from Crane Brinton in his famous *Anatomy of Revolution, modern* "is one of the loose words."[51] *Modern, modernity, modernizing,* and *modernization* have been employed by historians, political scientists, and other social scientists with inconsistency and non-clarity. Scholars commonly speak of modern Western politics, a modern political perspective, modern ramifications, a modern industrialized Occident, a modern vocabulary of history, society, and culture, as well as late imperial and modern times in Chinese history.[52] These examples manifest a strong Eurocentric orientation. Indeed, when speaking about Europe, "modern" has rather specific connotations. Yet, when used in relation to China, the meaning is not so clear.[53] Calling the Sung period "modern" means that it possessed traits usually associated with European institutional history since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, such as a rationally established, staffed, and evaluated bureaucracy. The "mo-

[49] Eisenstadt, "Sociological Theory," pp. 59-65.
[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 59-75.
[51] Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York, 1965), p. 3.
[52] Metzger, *Escape,* pp. 9, 11, 16, 91. Kwok, *Scientism,* pp. 3-4, 9, 12, 17, 20. Said, *Orientalism,* pp. 43, 88, 104, 122, 132, 156, 232-233, 237, 260. Hamburger, "Aristotle and Confucius," p. 236. G. S. Alitto, "Introduction," *Journal of Asian Studies,* XXXIX (February 1980), pp. 238-239, 241. Metzger does differentiate between modern and Western in his text but does not clearly say why he separates the two.
[53] Golas, "Rural China," p. 251. David Kopf, "Hermeneutics Versus History," *Journal of Asian Studies,* XXXIX (May 1980), p. 501.

dern" characterization, accurate or not, has generated much discussion within the Sung studies field.[54] In a related example, many nineteen century Chinese scholars, impressed by the similarities between "modern" Western thought and that of China more than two thousand years earlier, urged that the two be fused into a unified doctrine.[55] Just when should China be characterized as "modern": in the fourth century B.C., in the twelfth century A.D., the 1890s, the 1920s, the 1950s, or the 1980s?[56] Scholars attach the *modern* label without really analyzing just what the word meant or means. (Indeed, one scholar added more confusion by referring to the "electronic, post-modern world.[57])

Modernization is a process involving change and power. Process means sustained activity over a time period, measured in years, if not decades. *Change* involves not only the transformation of institutions but also of perceptions, and in this case from a "traditional" to a scientific, future-oriented, industrialized, secularized, literate, mobile, democratic, individualistic, or modern society.[58] This change may occur gradually in a relatively peaceful manner, or it may be violent, structural, and irreversible. The latter kind of change is usually associated with revolution, a topic briefly considered later. The People's Republic of China until recently viewed itself as a modernizing, revolutionary society. Since Mao Tse-tung's death, however, more stress has been placed on modernization. *Power* refers to the fact that change or the impetus for change often occurred from country to country to country through the medium known as colonialism or imperialism. British imperialists initially spoke of an Anglicized India or the French of a Gallicized Indochina. A broader European imperialist program incluling other countries brought the term "Europeanization" to the world, then when America was added, "Westernization" seemed a more appropriate designation. Finally some argued that after Japan and Soviet Russia became dominant powers, "Westernization" was no longer accurate, hence "modernization" must be used.[59] Presumably this also meant that a society might be modernized without becoming Westernized.

Although modernization theory developed in Europe, its most complete elaboration came under the "tender care" of American

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[54] Golas, "Rural China," p. 251.
[55] Alitto, "Introduction," p. 241.
[56] The B.C.-A.D. dating system also reflects Eurocentric tendencies. One argument in their favor, of course, is uniformity in dating world events. Why not a less biased dating system?
[57] Said, *Orientalism*, p. 26. J. A. Goldstone, "Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation," *World Politics*, XXXII (April 1980), p. 451. This latter author employed the term *late modern*.
[58] *International Encyclopedia*, X, p. 387.
[59] *International Encyclopedia*, X, pp. 386-387.

social scientists during the 1950s.[60] Supposedly the "scientific nature" of modernization should mean a value-free, non-judgmental approach to research but once again Eurocentrism permeated the various studies. Americans first labelled non-modernized societies "underdeveloped," then, when that term became controversial, "developing" was substituted. Whatever name appeared, those states with a different approach to solving the twentieth century's problems were judged backward and inferior. The American radical movement of the late 1960s added new insights about the modernization theorists. In the radicals' view modernization theory masked U.S. imperialism. Conflicts between America and China or between Britain and China, which the modernizers saw as results of China's failure to modernize, brought a different interpretation from the radicals. They argued that by shifting attention to the so-called responding (challenge and response theory) nation, the destructive policies imposed by the imperialists were de-emphasized. In addition, the modernizers desperately constructed their theory to counter the growing acceptance of the Marxist worldview.[61] Samuel Huntington, a key modernization theorist of the 1960s, applied his views to Vietnam:

> In an absent-minded way the United States in Vietnam may well have stumbled upon the answer to 'wars of national liberation.' The effective response lies neither in the quest for conventional military victory nor in the doctrines and gimmicks of counter-insurgency warfare. It is instead forced-draft urbanization and modernization which rapidly brings the country out of the phase in which a rural revolutionary movement can hope to generate sufficient strength to come to power.[62]

One may well ask just how this forced-draft "urbanization and modernization" would be accomplished. Huntington did not shrink from facing the issue:

> For if the 'direct application of mechanical and conventional power' takes place on such a massive scale as to produce a massive migration from countryside to city, the basic assumptions underlying the Maoist doctrine of revolutionary warfare no longer operate. The Maoist-inspired rural revolution is undercut by the American-sponsored urban revolution.[63]

Not merely content to place this "solution" (one is sadly tempted to say "final solution") in the "modernization" mode, Huntington added:

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[60] Alitto, "Introduction," p. 237.
[61] James Peck, "The Roots of Rhetoric," in Friedman and Selden, eds., *America's Asia,* pp. 41-52.
[62] Samuel Huntington, "The Bases of Accommodation," *Foreign Affairs,* XLVI (July 1968), p. 652.
[63] *Ibid.,* p. 650.

> In this sense history—dramatically and brutally speeded up by the American impact—may pass the Viet Cong by.[64]

A sober counterpoint to Huntington's analysis comes from Harry Eckstein:

> Rebels who can count on popular support can lose themselves in the population..., count on the population for secrecy..., and reconstitute their forces by easy recruitment; if they can do all of these things, they can be practically certain of victory, short of a resort to *genocide* by the incumbents.[65]

This refugee-generation strategy was a key policy of the American government until 1975. Here modernization theory reached its logical conclusion in a most blatant form, proving the radicals correct in their argument.

Thomas Metzger's *Escape from Predicament* also analyzed Chinese history from a modernization perspective. Therein the author refined Max Weber's perspectives as they related to China. Weber had argued that China "failed" to develop capitalism and therefore modernized because of weaknesses in Confucianism. Metzger saw much more dynamism within Confucianism than did Weber and stressed continuity between twelfth century and twentieth century Confucians. Nevertheless, Metzger also concluded that the Chinese failed.[66] Furthermore, although employing a much more impressively sophisticated and sensitive analytical method than most other Sinologists, by arguing within a modernization framework, Metzger unnecessarily clouded his work with Eurocentrism. He arbitrarily imposed questions regarding modernization on twelfth century texts which had nothing to do with the interested or categories of Western origin. Metzger's desire to show continuity between Sung thinkers and those of the late Ch'ing caused him to overstress their similarities, while minimizing their differences.[67] The resulting history is artificial, and does little to clarify Western-Chinese interactions of the last century.

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[64] *Ibid.*, p. 652.

[65] H. Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal Wars," in B. Mazlish, A. O. Kaledin, D. B. Ralston, eds., *Revolution: A Reader* (New York, 1971), pp. 39-40.

[66] Metzger, *Escape*, pp. 234-235. Here is the critical passage:

> We are thus brought back to the importance of Max Weber's analysis of the Confucian ethos. His perspective was partly different from ours. He was asking why in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the indigenous development of the West led to capitalism and China's indigenous development did not. He concluded that China's failure was largely due to the effects of the Confucian ethos, and his conclusion still carries weight today, even though his early analysis was erroneous.

[67] Harootunian, "Metzger's Predicament," pp. 249-253.

The study of revolutions is similarly interconnected with Eurocentrism. An important reason for this stems from the fact that many revolutions originated in Europe, beginning in the seventeenth century with the English Revolution of 1640-1688. Therefore, not only did the interest in revolution as a political phenomenon commence then, but additionally, the very definition of revolution related to the English, or even more important, to the French Revolutions of 1789-1814 and to the Russian Revolution of 1917-1921. Thus the key revolutional models and paradigms related to Europe. They included focusing on pervasive ideologies, particular vanguard groups, and polarized societies.[68] In addition, social scientists' theories built on political protest and change models derived from liberal democratic or capitalist societies.[69] One common scholarly view of revolution defines it as something total, grand, and monumental which excludes many types such as the American Revolution.[70] One problem is to define revolution, then develop a meaningful typology of revolutions devoid of Eurocentrism. Elbaki Hermassi seems to have stated the issue quite clearly:

> The re6cognition of a world-historical culture to which all societies at different times and in various ways ... contribute and from which they borrow, should free social science from its parochial limitations and open it up to the multiplicity of historical facts and the manifold ways in which values come to be realized. The study of revolution which requires the patient collaboration of historians and a wide range of social scientists can achieve much...[71]

Another dimension manifesting Eurocentrism in the social sciences is comparative studies. When value-free and devoid of judgmental assessments, comparative studies can be extremely useful. They point out special institutional and societal features by indicating differences as well as similarities. Some studies also develop, test and refine causal, explanatory hypotheses about social structures.[72] If properly developed and refined, classification can lead to sympathetic thinking and understanding. Often, however, in comparative works there is an underlying premise, a kind of perceived law of development patterned after European experiences. This "law" is often metaphorically expressed by a line or road.[73] The development road has a beginning, end, and is universal to the extent that comparativists imposed it on all states. Through analysis each country is placed at a particular spot on the road according to the scholar's

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[68] Hermassi, "Toward a Comparative Study," p. 211.
[69] Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge, 1979), p. 2.
[70] Zagorin, "Prolegomena," p. 156.
[71] Hermassi, "Toward a Comparative Study," pp. 234-235.
[72] Skocpol, *States*, p. 36.
[73] Harootunian, "Metzger's Predicament," p. 247, and Hahm, "Toward a New Theory," pp. 330-332.

classification. A state like Korea in the 1960s might find itself labeled "underdeveloped" or "developing", especially when compared with the Eurocentric norm. Beyond this is the judgmental aspect whereby a wealthy and powerful country is good while a declining state or one with different values is bad or seriously defective.[74] Therefore wealth and power are critical determinants measuring all countries.

Korea has been considered backward and underdeveloped because Japan ruled her as a colony from 1910-1945. To explain these "deficiencies," Japanese and Western scholars studied Korean history. Their universally negative conclusions focused on the many Korean "inadequacies" like the "lack" of a feudal period and a non-aggressive foreign policy. This supposed failure to develop a militaristic tradition weighed heavily against Korea.

P. C. Hahm exposed the assumptions underlying these comparative studies. He demonstrated convincingly that wealth and power, critical values in Eurocentrism, were but two among many for the Koreans. As serious students of Chinese history, the Koreans equated an excessive wealth and power drive with tyrannical rule and inhumanity, such as occurred during China's short-lived Ch'in Dynasty (221-207 B.C.). Although Ch'in conquered and united China in a strong centralized manner not previously attained, it collapsed after a mere fourteen years. The Korean scholars believed that Ch'in fell because it relied heavily on wealth and power and ignored the human concerns of its subjects. Furthermore, in observing human nature, the Koreans saw that those people obsessed by wealth and power usually treated their family members inhumanely. Therefore, as wealth and power easily corrupted, they should be gathered in moderation.[75] In addition, Korea's decision to maintain an army only large enough to quell internal disorders reflected values different from Eurocentrism.[76]

This discussion thus highlights another issue—judging cultures by wealth and power norms. Often rich and strong countries which dominate others so as to force them to adopt "modern" cultural aspects merit the designation "advanced." Views which equate progress with numerous guns, tanks, fighter airplanes, missiles, or neutron bombs, are seriously biased against humanity. Why consider nations backward simply because they refuse to find more efficient ways to kill people? Progress should never be equated with murder. Growth and rapid change should not be the only positive societal measures. Confucianism offered many stabilizing elements which gave generations of relative peace and prosperity in China and Japan. European

[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 331-334.
[75] *Ibid.*, pp. 346-348.
[76] *Ibid.*, p. 345.

competition and warfare after the fifteenth century may have been interrelated with growth and development;[77] but to label non-European societies as stagnant simply because they valued different thnigs is to misunderstand them.[78] China, for example, has different rather than inferior patterns in her history and should be respected for uniqueness as well as for similarity. One scholar has stated the problem facing comparative studies with the utmost clarity:

> Perhaps the most important task of all would be to undertake studies in contemporary alternatives to Orientalism, to ask how one can study other cultures from a liberation or a non-repressive and non-manipulative, perspective. But then one would have to rethink the whole complex problem of knowledge and power.[79]

Scholars should immediately begin this task, devoid of Eurocentrism, Sinocentrism, or ethnocentrism; with a strong commitment to scientific objectivity as a guide.

Conclusion

Social scientists must continually remember that their disciplines emerged from the European and American culture areas and that they still manifest Eurocentric biases. Thomas Metzger's work, *Escape From Predicament,* for example, while provocative and challenging, needlessly suffers from an attachment to modernization theory. Metzger judged China for failing to develop capitalism rather than noting and then analyzing the different road which China travelled. P. C. Hahm, Elbaki Hermassi, and Edward Said have all pointed out significant flaws in Western political theorizing, yet each scholar unconsciously manifested Eurocentric traits.

Scholars would do well to approach the study of people from a humanist perspective. By humanist is meant developing, maintaining, and manifesting an interest in, appreciation for, as well as a commitment to not only the similarities, but also the differences, found among people across the globe. Self-examination and constant criticism of one's methodology and practice have to be continuously and rigorously implemented. This process hopefully should weed out Eurocentric, Sinocentric, or other biases.

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[77] Max Weber, *The Religion of China,* trans., H. H. Gerth (Glencoe, Illinois, 1951), p. 103.

[78] Hahm, "Toward a New Theory," pp. 322-323, 330.

[79] Said, *Orientalism,* p. 24.

THE INDIAN COMMUNITY IN THE PHILIPPINES: A PROFILE

AJIT SINGH RYE

The Indian community in the Philippines is rather small—only about five thousand—in comparison to the "Overseas" Indians in other Southeast Asian countries. Unlike the sepoys who came from Madras in 1762-1764, the later waves of migrants originated from Sindh and Punjab. The British annexation of Sindh (1843) and Punjab (1849) brought the lure of overseas adventure to the northwestern part of India. Unlike the landlocked Punjabis, the Sindhis had been traders and had developed a long tradition of looking outward beyond the seas. However, it is the adventures of farm hands from the districts of Jullundur, Ludhiana and Ferozpur in eastern Punjab, their accidental coming to the Philippines and settling here as traders, that make a fascinating tale.

The study of the Indian migration to the Philippines becomes more meaningful if it is set in the context of Philippine-Indian cultural contacts prior to the coming of Islam and Western colonialism. A brief reference to the British venture into Manila also serves as a contextual link to the Filipino perception of the Indian people and their migration to the Philippines.

Early Indic Influence in the Philippines

Philippine-Indian cultural links developed, over a long period of time, prior to the spread of Islam in Southeast Asia. Brahmanical and Buddhist influence spread through the intervening culture areas to the islands of Borneo, as well as Mindanao and the Visayas in the Philippines. It gradually penetrated even the northernmost island of Luzon. There are remarkable traces of Indic influence in languages, literature as well as social customs in the Philippines. Some of the pre-Islamic influences are more pronounced in the cultures of the Tausugs, the Maguindanaos and the Maranaos.

Islam and Isolation

In 1521, Ferdinand Magellan claimed for Spain the islands which were later to be named in honor of the Infant King Philip. Spanish control of the islands expanded with each succeeding expedition and the archipelago was gradually cut off from the Asian mainstream. Portuguese naval power, growing in the Indian Ocean and

the South China Sea, ruthlessly smashed the existing trade pattern in the area. Thus the island world of Southeast Asia was cut off from the South Asian mainland. The Spanish authorities in Manila were always apprehensive of Portuguese designs in East Asia. To keep both Portuguese and Chinese away, the Spaniards decided to close the islands to any unrestricted foreign trade and commerce.

The conquistadores and the clergy found the presence of Islam in the islands a serious threat to their long-range interest. They had been mandated, by the Pope no less, to annihilate Islam and subdue its adherents wherever they resisted. To subdue native Muslim sultans and datus, the Spaniards, persistently but often unsuccessfully, attempted to isolate the country from the rest of the Muslims in Borneo and other parts of the Indonesian archipelago.

The Spanish policy of isolating the Philippines, born of their imaginary fear of Portuguese and Chinese aggressive designs, failed in its objective. Firstly, the Muslims in the South successfully maintained trade and cultural relations with their Southern neighbors. Second, the British occupation of Manila in 1762 exposed the vulnerability of Spanish rule. The first serious challenge to Spanish poyer in the Philippines ironically came, not from the feared Portuguese or Chinese, but from the British.

The Seven Years War and Philippine-India Contract

The spilling over into the East of the Seven Years War brought the Philippines and India into direct contact with each other for the first time. Although it was only a brief and rather unhappy encounter, it left a durable mark on the history of the Philippines.

The British expedition against Spanish forces in the Philippines was mounted from Fort St. George in Madras, sailing under the command of General Draper. Manila was occupied in 1762 with little effort or bloodshed. The expeditionary force included a contingent of over 600 Indian sepoys and nearly 1400 laborers. They were mostly recruited from among the subjects of the Nawab of Arcot. Thus, all in all, the "Madras" contingent constituted nearly half the total expeditionary force. (This contingent became the forerunner of the famous Madras Regiment in the Indian Army.)

The "Madrasis" who sailed with the British fleet to capture Manila were a curious mixture of "mercenaries" and "indentured" labor. The sepoys were called the "Nawab's irregulars" but in fact they were treated as menial workers by their British superiors. Both the sepoys and the laborers were recruited or "hired" from the Nawab of Arcot. Nawab Mohammad Ali, an incorrigibly corrupt and inept ruler, was deeply indebted to the East India Company

and many of its officials at Madras, and was thus inclined to oblige the East India Company with a part of his own irregular forces to fight for the British flag. These people were ill-paid, ill-clad and ill-treated. Many of them were paid less than five pagodas (a coin current in Southern India corresponding at the normal rate of exchange to three and a half rupees). Payment they received in Madras was left with their families and while in Manila they were often reduced to living on the charity of their British superiors.

The Seven Years War came to an end with the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763. However, it was not until June 1764 that the British occupation of Manila was lifted and the British Fleet sailed back for India.

Considerable number of sepoys and laborers did not return when the British pulled out of Manila. Those who "chose" to stay behind were either prisoners of war in the hands of Don Simon de Anda's men or those who had drifted into the bush to escape miserable living conditions at the garrison camp. Later, they settled down in different parts of Luzon. A large group converged in the small town of Cainta, a large part of whose population are the descendants of the Madrasi sepoys. Their Dravidian physical features and dark complexion have earned them the nickname of "Bombays," but they retain no memory of their Indian past.

The Second Coming

There is no record of any significant migration from India to the Philippines for over a century after the British withdrawal in 1764. But in the wake of the British occupation of Sindh and Punjab, a fresh wave of immigrants began to trickle into the Philippines. These immigrants were mostly people from the newly annexed territories in India looking for opportunity for work overseas. Finding the people in the islands hospitable, kind and friendly, they decided to stay.

The Sindhis

The first to come to the Philippine shores in the closing years of the nineteenth century were traders from Sindh, who pioneered in the establishment of business houses in various British colonies. For instance, by the turn of the century a firm by the name of Pohumals had put up a chain of retail stores in the Philippines, Hongkong and elsewhere. These establishments recruited, from among their close kin and caste groups, promising young men to work as their salesmen and managers in Manila. Thus the pattern of growth and expansion of the Indian community in the Philippines has been like

an extended family. An intricate pattern of kinship and family ties exists among most of the ifmigrants.

The Punjabis

The first Punjabi appeared in Manila rather accidentally sometime in 1902. On reaching Hongkong he learnt that the Philippines had been acquired by America as a colony and that there were job opportunities there. Belonging to the Ghummar caste (of brick layers or potters), he hailed from Sangatpur, a small village in Jullundur district in Eastern Punjab. Ever since his arrival, people from Jullundur, Ferozpur and Ludhiana districts of Punjab have maintained a slow but steady stream of migration into the Philippines.

The Punjabis, with their rural background, still distinguish themselves by their village, district or caste origin. For instance, those from Ferozpur and Ludhiana, manly Jats, are called the "Malvais"; the people from Jullundur and Hoshiarpur, mainly Sainis and Ghummars, are called the "Duabias". Interestingly, despite long years of stay in the Philippines—mainly in and around Metropolitan Manila—the Punjabis have managed to retain the peculiarly rural traits which characterize their communal and social life in the Philippines. They are generally conservative, cautious and hardworking.

Settlement Pattern

Except for a few wealthy Sindhis, most of the Indian immigrants are of middle and lower middle class origin. The Punjabis, for instance, mostly come from the landed families in rural areas while many Sindhis are of urban origin. However, most of those who immigrated before World War II started from humble beginnings, working at secure jobs such as watchmen at American and Spanish establishments, and gradually shifting to retail trading, often moving from one market to the other in different localities.

Manila being the primate city and business center of the country, nearly 85% of the Indians live in the Metropolitan area and the surrounding towns and cities. Unlike the Manila Chinese, they do not tend to crowd into exclusive ghettos. However, there are localities, such as Paco district, where some of the Indian families have traditionally been living close to each other.

Most of the Punjabis and the Sindhis employed in Indian business firms usually live in middle and lower middle class neighborhoods; and generally closer to the areas where they do their business. The economically better-off Sindhis generally live in upper and upper-middle class subdivisions and exclusive villages in Makati.

Business and Livelihood Pattern

The Indians, unlike the economically well established Chinese, constitute a marginal community, because of their small number and the marginal nature of their economic activities. However, as an alien community they enjoy a reputation far out of proportion to their number and economic strength.

The Punjabis specialize in retail trade of dry goods, textiles, garments, household appliances, and jewelry. In recent years some of them have also branched out into money-lending. A Punjabi businessman is an individualist in his enterprise. Hard work and thrift (rather than a complex business organization) are his guiding mottos. Typically, he forms a husband and wife team with the children pitching in. He thrives on small-scale operations which he can personally manage and control. His educational and cultural background has a lot to do with his individualistic self-reliance in business ventures.

The Sindhis, slightly larger in number than the Punjabis, are much more advanced in business. Most of the Sindhis also started with small stores and as individual retailers in Sunday markets. But, unlike the Punjabis, they persistently expanded their business operations and followed steadfastly where the opportunity and profit led them.

The Sindhi businessman, always forward-looking, is pragmatic in his business ventures. He is moved by opportunity and is never slow to grab it. Manila Sindhis have demonstrated a remarkable capacity to adjust to changing conditions and respond dynamically to new circumstances and situations in the business world. For instance, when the Philippine retail trade was nationalized in the mid-fifties, the Sindhi businessmen gradually phased out their stores and shifted to wholesale business, manufacturing and imports. Lately, seeing more challenge and sensing better returns, many of them have entered the export trade. Some of them have entered into joint ventures with Indian industrial houses to set up industrial plants in the country.

Religious and Cultural Organizations

By the mid-twenties many immigrants had brought their families to Manila. The Punjabis, particularly the Sikhs, felt the need to set up a gurdwara (Sikh temple) where the entire community could gather together for religious and social purposes. Thus the *Khalsa Diwan* (the Sikh association) was organized and a gurdwara was built in 1924, under the name of "Indian Sikh Temple", in the Paco district of Manila. It became a community center for religious services and social functions for the entire community, including the Sindhis

and Punjabis. In addition to religious and social activities, the *Khalsa Diwan* gradually assumed the role of mediator in the settling of disputes and differences among the Indians. The gurdwara also became a focal point of community "politics" which has often been characterized by caste and regionalism. For the Punjabis, be they Sikhs or Hindus, despite petty disputes and differences, the gurdwara has a central place in their social, cultural and religious lives. Marriages, betrothals, baptismals and Akhand Paths (readings of the Holy Book of the Sikh), all take place in the gurdwara. Sikh religious festivals, such as the birthdays and martyrdoms of the gurus (Sikh teachers) are all celebrated with enthusiasm. For such annual gatherings, Indians living outside of Manila converge at the temple to join the congregational prayers and partake of the Langar (communal kitchen or eating together). A permanent feature of the Gurdwara, this is served every week after the Sunday services.

The gurdwara in Paco is managed by a board of trustees, elected by the members of the *Khalsa Diwan.* Religious services are conducted by a garanthis (the priest who recites the Garanthi—the holy book of the Sikh faith—and leads the congregational prayers and singing in the Temple) usually brought in from India under contract.

Two in one—the Hindu Temple plus the Gurdwara

The Sindhis and the Punjabis used to be a united congregation and religious services were held only in the gurdwara. But a difference over the performance of Arati (Vedic prayer for the Gods) during a Sunday service led to a split in the mid-fifties. The Sindhi community decided to set up a separate Hindu temple-cum-gurdwara under one roof.

The decision to set up a mixed, non-denominational place of worship, combining under one roof Gurugranth Sahib (Holy Book of the Sikh) and the statues of Hindu gods, typifies Sindhi eclecticism on the one hand, on the other a difference in lifestyle and the belief patterns of the two major linguistic groups. To an orthodox Sikh or a Hindu, the Hindu temple in Manila may seem an archaic mixing up of the irreconcilable elements of the two faiths. The Sikh faith is nonatheistic and worship of idols is prohibited. The Sikhs place no idols of their gurus in the gurdwara. But the Sinhi community feels that it has found a happy solution to their spiritual and social needs. In the Mandir (Temple) the *Gurugranth Sahib* is placed in the middle and it is flanked on the side by the statues of Lord Krishna, Radha, Vishnu and his consort and on the other side by the statues of Lord Shiva, his bull, the Lingam and the statue of "Jhulelai" — a legendary Awatara (incarnation) that according to popular Sindhi

belief rose from the sea. It is a popular object of workship among Sindhis every where.

Like the Khalsa Kiwan, the Hindu temple also serves as a center of social activities and a forum for communal programs. Early in 1980, the temple was transferred to a newly constructed edifice situated on a spacious site in Paco district of Manila.

In the Hindu Temple, the regular services on Sundays are mixed. The Kirtan of Gurubani (recitations from the Sikh holy scriptures) is followed by the recitation of Vedic hymns and the offerings of Aratis. The tolling of temple bells is followed by the recitation of Vedic hymns and the offerings of Aratis. The tolling of temple bells is followed by the cry of Wah Guruji Ka Khalsa Wah Guruji ki Fateh (a common Sikh chant: The Sikh belong to the God, God be great). The chief priest of the Hindu Temple is a Sikh Garanthi. The establishment of such an ecumenical set up, temple-cum-gurdwara, reflects the spirit of accommodation and tolerance withibn the local Sindhi community. It is an attempt to accommodate and provide for the satisfaction of diverse religious feelings and sentiments for Hindu faith within the Sindhi fold, and at the same time retain the strong attachment that most Sindhis feel for the teachings of the Sikh Gurus. This is reflected in placing the Garanth Sahib in the middle of the status of Gods.

The Ladies Clubs

Sindhi women, especially those who graw up in the Philippines, are active in social and cultural affairs of the Indian community. They also take part in the affairs of the larger Filipino national community. The elder ladies have organized themselves into the Indian Ladies Club with an active membership of nearly 200. Interestingly enough, its incumbent president is a Filipina lady married to a Sindhi businessman. She is remarkably integrated culturally into the Sindhi fold, and speaks fluent and flawless Sindhi.

The Indian Ladies Club's activities are supplemented by those of the Merry Maidens Club, composed mostly of a younger age group.

Business Organizations

The business association to be established first was the Bombay Merchants Association. Its membership was confined largely to Sindhi business establishments. The Association established the Indian Club for social and cultural activities. The Bombay Merchants Association was later followed by a broad-based organization of the business sector and was named the Indian Chamber of Commerce. The Cham-

ber included in its membership both Sindhi and Punjabi business establishments. Since a number of its members have taken up Philippine citizenship, the Chamber has been renamed as the Filipino-Indian Chamber of Commerce to accommodate the naturalized members.

Over two hundred Indian nationals have so far applied for naturalization. Nearly 150 have already granted citizenship, a majority of them Sindhi businessmen. The applications of the rest are still being processed.

The Non-immigrants

The image of the Indian community went through a transformation for the better, with the entry of significant number of transient-non-immigrant Indians into its ranks. The establishment of the Asian Development Bank in Manila brought to the Philippines a number of Indian civil servants, economists and specialists in banking. There are about forty Indian families of the officials of the Bank, with an estimated population of nearly 200 (including wives, mothers and children). This small group has added variety to the societal dimensions and to the regional composition of the local community. Added to the traditional composition of the community are now a sprinkling of Bengalis, Beharis, Madrasis, Rajathanis and of course more Sindhis and Punjabis. In addition to the ADB staff and their families, there are a few more families of Indian scientists and specialists working with various regional offices of the UN specialized agencies — WHO, ILO, UNESCO, etc., the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), and Indian businessmen working with joint industrial ventures in the country.

The Indios and the Bombays

The Indians in the Philippines are popularly know as *Bombays* meaning the people from Bombay, even though none of the early arrivals were from Bombay. A majority of them, in fact, sailed out of Calcutta. With the opening of Manila to foreign trade in the later half of the 19th century, European ships sailing through Bombay began to frequent Manila on their way to China. The Indian sailors on these ships were probably the first to be called the Bombays. Even though sailing from Calcutta, the immigrants too, perhaps, found it convenient to identify themselves as people coming from the city of Bombay. Thus the nickname "Bombays" resolved the problem of identity for the people coming from India. It was a bit better than to be called British subjects.

The Filipino National Community and the Indians

The Indians in the Philippines have been well regarded by the Filipinos and the cultural and business relations between the two communities have so far been agreeable. Government officials feel that the Indians in general have been law-abiding residents. One reason for such agreeable relations is that, because of their small number and moderate economic position in the national economy, the Indians do not seem to pose any serious threat to Filipino business interests. Further, although the Indians have managed to maintain, so far, a distinct cultural identity, they have learned to adjust and interact meaningfully with the Filipino community. For instance, the Sindhi businessmen are active members of many middle-class organizations such as the Lions, Rotary and Kiwanis Clubs. The community as a whole has always actively supported social, cultural and relief projects where their participation has been called for.

THE GENESIS OF THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN CEYLON (SRI LANKA): A HISTORICAL SUMMARY

AMEER ALI

Research on the historical origins of the Ceylon Muslim community is yet an unchartered field in the overall history of the island. Ramanathan's "The Ethnology of the Moors of Ceylon,"[1] I. L. M. Abdul Azeez's criticism on Ramanathan's thesis,[2] Siddi Lebbe's writings on the subject in his *Muslim Necan*[3] and Cassim's *Ilankaic Conakar Carittiram,*[4] based almost entirely on Siddi Lebbe's works, are all, considering the context and spirit in which they were written (as shown below), open to the charge of historical bias and partisanship. Van Sanden's *Sonahar*[5] is a comprehensive but an uncritical presentation of all hearsay evidence and is overtly apologetic of the British colonial rule over the Muslims. Goonewardena's "Some Notes On The History of the Muslims In Ceylon Before the British Occupation"[6] and de Silva's "Portuguese Policy Towards Muslims"[7] are the only scholarly works available on the period before 1800, but they too have their shortcomings. The former, as the title itself suggests, is only a peripheral treatment limited by the author's inaccessibility to Arabic, Portuguese and Tamil sources; while the latter, constrained by the scope of the article, does not throw any light on the origins of the community. Besides these, several articles have appeared from time to time authored by a variety of writers ranging from Muslim activists to University lecturers. The only common feature in all these articles is that they try to trace the historical origins of the Ceylon Muslims as far back as possible and thereby they forget to

[1] P. Ramanathan, "The Ethnology of the Moors of Ceylon", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Ceylon Branch),* vol. 10, no. 36, 1888. The name Ceylon was changed to Sri Lanka in 1972.

[2] I.L.M. Abdul Azeez, *A Criticism of Mr. Ramanathan's Ethnology of the Moors of Ceylon,* Colombo, 1957 (reprint).

[3] The *Muslim Necan* was a Tamil journal edited by Siddi Lebbe. His writings on the history of the Ceylon Muslims were serialised in this journal between 1883 and 1885.

[4] B.D.M. Cassim, *Ilankaic Conakar Carittiram,* (in Tamil), Colombo, 1948.

[5] Van Sanden, *Sonahar, A Brief History of the Moors of Ceylon,* Colombo, 1926, 2nd edition.

[6] K.W. Goonewardena, "Some Notes on the History of the Muslims in Ceylon Before the British Occupation", University Majlis, vol. IX, 1950-1960.

[7] C.R. de Silva, "Portuguese Policy Towards Muslims", *The Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies,* vol. IX, no. 2, Jul-Dec. 1966.

highlight some of the changes that took place in the later periods. This article, while trying to trace the origins of the Ceylon Muslim community, approaches the existing knowledge on the subject with a critical mind, and accounts for the changes that had taken place in later periods on the basis of available data.

The Ethnological Aspects

Ethnologically the Muslim community of Ceylon is a complex of two major and several minor elements. Among the major are the Moors and the Malays while the Arabs, Persians and Afghans; the Sinhalese, Tamil and Burgher[8] converts to Islam; and the Muslims of other nationalities constitute the minor elements. This article is not interested in the latter group and even in the former, its main concern is about the Moors.

To start with, the name Moor itself requires explanation. It is, first of all, one among several names by which a majority of the local Muslims in Ceylon are called. Among the others the Tamil name *Conahar* and the Sinhalese name *Marakkalaminusu* have wider currency. Epithets such as *Tambi*,[9] *Nanamar*[10] and *Kakka*[11] are sometimes used by the Sinhalese and Tamils when referring to the Muslims. These epithets are however not generally liked by the Muslims because they believe that those epithets carry with them a sense of derogation. There are also two other names, *Hambankaraya* in Sinhalese and *Cammankarar* in Tamil by which a certain section of the Moor community is referred to. The meanings of these two names will be considered later in this section.

The etymological origin of the name Moor is universally known. It comes from the Latin root *mauri* which originally referred to the inhabitants of the Roman province of Mauretania which included

8 The Burgher are the descendants of the Portuguese and Dutch who are are also called Eurasians.

9 *Tambi* is a Tamil word for younger brother. But the Europeans in Ceylon, particularly the British, used it confusingly to refer to any itinerant merchant. According to them there were "Sinhalese Tambeys", "Moorman Tambeys", "Bombay Tambeys", "Brahmin Tambeys" and "Madras Tambeys". See "Tambeys of Ceylon" in *The Chambers Journal of Popular Literature, Science and Art,* no. 781, 14 Dec. 1878. Today the epithet *Tambi* simply represents a Ceylon Muslim.

10 This is a colloquial Tamil word of obscure origin mainly spoken by the Muslims living in the Sinhalese Districts of Ceylon to address their elders. These districts are those outside the Northern and Eastern provinces. By the end of the 19th century Ceylon had nine provinces and within them twenty-one administrative districts. Except for the two provinces mentioned above, which had five districts between them and which were predominantly Tamil populated, the rest were known as Sinhalese Provinces and Sinhalese Districts.

11 *Kakka* is also a Tamil word for crow but the Muslims of the Tamil Districts it means an elder brother.

present day Western Algeria and North-East Morocco.[12] After the seventh century A.D. the Latin *mauri* through its Spanish counterpart *moro* was employed to denote the followers of Islam who after the death of the Prophet Muhammad overran Spain and Morocco.[13] The Portuguese were said to have "borrowed" this epithet and "bestowed" it indiscriminately upon the Arabs and their descendants, whom, in the sixteenth century, they found established as traders in every port on the Asian and African coast.[14] According to the Portuguese historian Fernao De Queyroz the Muslims of Ceylon were called *Mouros* by his people because "they . . . were from Muritania".[15] Thus, the Spanish *moro*[16] in turn became *mouro* in Portuguese and finally took its anglicised form Moor.

Although this sixteenth century apellation, "previously unknown among the Muslims themselves,"[17] was current within the political circles of colonial times, it did not receive its ethnic sanction from the Muslim community until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, as a result of a speech made in 1885 at the Ceylon Legislative Council by the Tamil member P. Ramanathan. While addressing the council on the "Mohammadan Marriage Registration Ordinance" of that year he stressed a point that the Moors of Ceylon were of Tamil origin.[18] He elaborated his theory further in a paper which he read before the Ceylon Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, three years later.[19] To the articulate Muslims of that time Ramanathan's theory, despite some elements of truth,[20] threatened to undermine the community's chances of gaining a Muslim representative at the Legislative Council.[21] His contention

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12 The *Encyclopaedia Britanica,* 1971 edition, vol. 15, p. 819.

13 E. Levi-Provencal, "Moors" in The *Encyclopaedia of Islam,* Leiden, 1936, vol. III, p. 560. He even traces the origin of the name Moor to ancient Phoenicia.

14 Sir James Emerson Tennent, *Ceylon, An Account of the Island: Physical, Historical and Topographical With Notices Of Its Natural History, Antiquities and Productions,* London, 1860, vol. I, p. 630.

15 Father Fernao De Queyroz, *The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon,* translated by S.G. Perera, New York, 1975, AMS edition, Vol. I, p. 21.

16 In fact, for e.g., it was the Spanish who called the Muslims of Philippines *Moros* by which name those Muslims are known even today. See, Cesar Adib Majul, *Theories On The Introduction And Expansion Of Islam In Malaysia,* International Association of the Historians of Asia, Biennial Conference, Proceedings, Taiwan, 1962.

17 A.M.A. Azeez, "Caylon", *The Encyclopaedia of Islam,* 1980 edition, vol. II, p. 27

18 *Ceylon Legislative Council Debates,* 1886.

19 P. Ramanathan, *op. cit.*

20 Ramanathans point that many of the social customs and manners of the Moors were similar to those of the Tamils and were possibly borrowed by the former the latter was never denied by his Muslim critics. See, I.L.M. Abdul Azeez, *op. cit.*

21 The government of Ceylon at this time operated on the basis of the Colebrook Constitution of 1833 according to which the Legislative Council was to consist of 10 official members and 6 un-official members, all of the latter nominated by the Governor to represent the Sinhalese, Tamil, Burgher,

that all the Moors in Ceylon were Tamil speaking and of Tamil origin made a separate Muslim member superfluous. Hence it became incumbent on the part of the leading Muslim personalities such as M. C. Siddi Lebbe (1838-1898), a pioneer Muslim journalist and reformist in Ceylon, and I. L. M. Abdul Azeez (1867-1915), also a journalist and intellectual, to prove that the Moors were an entirely different race of Arab origin. Siddi Lebbe's *Muslim Necan* spearheaded the attack against Ramanathan's malicious campaign. The battle was however won when Arthur Gordon, the then Governor of Ceylon, nominated M. C. Abdul Rahiman as the first Muslim member to the Legislative Council.[22] But the most significant outcome of this episode from the present point of view is not that the Muslims won a seat in the Legislature but the tenaciousness with which they clung to the name Moor which later made even Ramanathan plead in the Legislative Council "not [to] deprive them of the pleasure and honour of that name."[23] It finally found its place in the Ceylon law books with the passing of the Ceylon Citizenship Act in 1949.

The name most familiar to the bulk of the Ceylon Muslims is *Conakar*. There are at least three interpretations of the meaning and derivation of this name. The least accepted is that it is a Tamil derivation from the Arabic word *Sunni* denoting one of the two principal sects in Islam. This opinion which was advanced by Brito[24] has to be rejected for two reasons, one factual and the other logical. Factually the Tamil-speaking Muslims of both Ceylon as well as India call themselves *Cunnattu Jama' attar* to indicate their belonging to the *Sunni* sect and not *Conakar*. And logically it is unacceptable because the Muslims of southern India are not known as *Conakar* even though they speak Tamil and belong to the *Sunni* sect. The second interpretation is that of Rev. Fr. Beschi, an eighteenth century Catholic priest according to whom the name *Conakar* is a Tamil corruption meaning *Cola-nakara* people or the people of the *Cola*

General European planting and mercantile communities. In the seventies and eighties of the century there was increasing agitation from the Ceylonese for an unofficial majority in the legislature. Some were claiming for a councillor to represent Buddhist interests and some others for even the *karava* (fisher) caste. It however looked legitimate that the Muslims of Ceylon who had been denied so far of a place in the legislature should get one representation. Hence Ramanathan's attempt to identify the Muslims with the Tamils was a planned sabotage. On the Legislative Council and its development, see, K.M. de Silva, "The Legislative Council in the Nineteenth Century", in *University of Ceylon History of Ceylon,* vol. III, pp. 226-248.

[22] It is significant that the Donoughmore Commission Report mentions this Muslim representation as one for the Moormen of "Arab descendants", *Ceylon Report of the Special Commission on the Constitution,* London, 1928, London, 1928, p. 12.

[23] *Ceylon Legislative Council Debates,* 1924.

[24] C. Brito, *The Yalpana Vaipava Malai or The History of The Kingdom of Jaffna,* translated from Tamil, Colombo, 1879, Appendix, p. 82.

country.[25] The real name according to him is *Coliyar* and *Conakar* is its corrupted version. This interpretation was rejected in the nineteenth century by the Muslim critics on very sound evidence. It was shown by them that the ancient Hindu geographers had mentioned in their works the names of fifty-six different countries, two of which were *Colam* and *Conakam.*[26] In addition, those geographers had also mentioned the names of eighteen different languages among which one was *Conakam.*[27] Hence, it is clear that the name *Conakar* must refer either to the people of *Conakam* or to those who speak *Conakam.* Since *Colam* is different from *Conakam, Conakar* cannot be the people of *Cola-nakaram* as Beschi claims. The solution to the problem appears to lie in a third interpretation which is popularly accepted and has more historical authenticity. According to this, *Conakar* is the Tamil derivation of the Sanskrit *Yavana* which was originally applied both in India and Ceylon to designate the Ionian Greeks but later extended to include "all the foreigners who came from the west, and also the Arabs."[28] Thus *Conakar* means not *Sunni* or *Coliyar* but those from Greece or Arabia and their descendants. Like the name Moor in English *Conakar* in Tamil also has gained currency to denote a particular ethnic group in Ceylon whose members are largely Muslims.

The name *Marakkalaminusu,* though popularly used by the Sinhalese to address the Muslims in general, is partly Sinhalese and partly Tamil in its composition and does not literally carry with it any ethnic connotation. The first half *marakkala* is the combination of two Tamil words *maram* + *kalam* meaning wooden vessel and the second half is the plural form of the Sinhalese *miniya* meaning a person. Hence, in combination they mean the persons who either came by boats or owned boats. The Sinhalese *marakkala* and Tamil *marakkalam* also bear similarities in meaning and sound with the Arabic *markab* from which the Maraikkayar Muslims of South-India trace their origin.[29] Nevertheless, whether the name *marakkalaminusu* refers to Mauritanians, Graeco-Romans, Arabs, Indians or even Malays who all indeed came by boat to Ceylon is not clear from its literal meaning. But in practice, it has come to mean in Sinhalese the same group of people referred to by the Tamil *Conakar* and the English

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[25] J.C. Beschi, *Vulgaris Tamulicate Linguae Dictionarium Tamulico-Latinum,* South India Time Press, Madras, 1882.

[26] B.D.M. Cassim, *op. cit.,* pp. 32-33.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] Wilhelm Geiger, *Culture of Ceylon in Mediaeval Times,* edited by Heinz Rechart, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1960, p. 110. There is a difference of opinion however with regard to the directoin from which the foreigners came. According to some the name *Yavana* was applied to those who came from a northerly direction. See, Van Sanden, *op. cit.,* p. 123; P. Arunachalam, *Ceylon Census Report,* 1901, Vol. I, p. 117. This difference does not matter because after all Greece, Rome and Arabia all lie to the north-west of Ceylon.

[29] Edgar Thurstan, *Castes and Tribes of Southern India,* Madras, 1909, Vol. I, pp. 1-2.

word Moor. Considering the historical link between the Arabs and navigation it may well be more appropriate to connect the Sinhalese *marakkala* to the Arabic *markab* than to the Tamil *marakkalam.*

Within this group of Moors or *Conakar* or *Marakkalaminusu* is a sub-group called coast-Moors or Indian Moors which is regarded as different from the Ceylon Moors. They are also known as *Hambankaraya* or *Hambaya* in Sinhalese and *Cammankarar* in Tamil. The meaning of the English expression is direct and clear but the Sinhalese and Tamil equivalents raise some confusion. In this case the words *hamban* in Sinhalese and *campan* in Tamil are said to be the derivations from the Malay word *sampan* which also means a small boat. [30] Therefore linguistically speaking *hambankaraya* and *cammankarar* must refer to the same people as *marakkalaminusu.* But whereas the last is used to denote all the Moors in general the first two are employed to refer only to those "Mohammedan immigrants from the east coast of India . . . not permanently settled in Ceylon . . . (who) do not as a rule bring their wives and families to the island . . . [but] sojourning in it for a year or two at a time for purposes of trade . . . return periodically with their savings to South India."[31] Confusion increases when one studies the names and inhabitants of two towns in Ceylon, Sammanturai on the east coast and Hambantota in the south. The former is a thickly populated Muslim town almost totally occupied by the Ceylon Moors while in the latter there is a significant Malay colony established during the time of the first British Governor Lord Frederick North in the early nineteenth century.[32] It is said that the names of these two villages take their origins from Malay. But neither of these inhabitants are addressed as *Hambankaraya* or *Cammankarar.* If so, how and why the Indian Moors acquired a name of Malay origin is a historical mystery. Ramanathan's interpretation that *Cammankarar* comes from *camankarar*[33] meaning dealers in wares seems reasonable but it does not explain its Sinhalese equivalents. Clearly, more information than that provided by etymology alone is required for a satisfactory explanation of the ethnology of Ceylon Muslims.

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30 P. Ramanathan, *op. cit.*

31 P. Ramanathan, *Riots and Martial Law in Ceylon,* 1915, London, 1916, pp. 1-2.

32 C.N.A., 5/2, North to Hobart, 24 Nov. 1802. By the end of the 19th century the town of Hambantota had a total of 767 Malays, second only to Colombo which had over 5,000 of them. *Census of Ceylon, 1946,* Vol. I, part II.

33 P. Ramanathan, "The Ethnology of The Moors of Ceylon", *JRASCB,* 10 (36), 1888.

Origins of the Muslims of Ceylon

(a) *The Moors and the Arab Theory*

Ethnologically, as mentioned at the beginning, the Muslims of Ceylon fall into two major groups, i.e., Moors and Malays and within the former is a sub-group called the Indian Moors. Of the Ceylon Moors it has been said that they still continue to be "among the few ethnological conundrums . . . (yet) to be unravelled."[34] Nevertheless, there are two theories of which one, generally asserted by the local Muslim leaders[35] and accepted even by Ceylon educationists[36] traces the origin of the Ceylon Moors to Arabia, while the other traces it to India. The core of the first theory is a set of traditions that was current among the Ceylon Moors and which received the attention of scholars quite early in the nineteenth century. Although these traditions are generally "vague, distorted and unsatisfactory", they serve as useful pointers towards further inquiries. The least known of those traditions is that the Ceylon Moors are the progeny of "that tribe of Arabs of the posterity of Hashim, who were expelled from Arabia, by their Prophet Mahomet as a punishment for their pusillanimous conduct"[37] in the battle of 'Uhad in 625 A.D. These expatriates were said to have founded a colony at Káyalpatnam in the east coast of South-India and from there were said to have moved in successive waves to Ceylon.[38] This tradition which is quoted even in the official documents of recent times[39] can be rejected on two grounds. Firstly, after the battle of 'Uhad the Prophet was not yet in full control over the whole of Arabia and so not powerful enough to expel anybody from the peninsula. The available literature on the Prophet's biography does not make any reference to the expulsion of any member of the Hashim tribe during his life time. All that he did was to expel the Jews from Medina and it is known that they settled at Khyber which was well within Arabia.[40] Secondly, that

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[34] Harry William, *Ceylon Pearl of The East,* London, 1951, reprint, p. 81.

[35] Razik Farred, "The Executive Committee for Education from Inside" in *Education in Ceylon (From the Sixth Century B.C. to The Present Day),* Colombo, 1969, Part II, p. 599. M.C.A. Hassan, *Sir Razik Fareed,* Colombo, 1968, pp. 167-171; I.L.M. Abdul Azeez, *op. cit.;* B.D.M. Cassim, *op. cit.*

[36] J.E. Jayasuriya, *Educational Policies and Progress During British Rule in Ceylon, 1796-1948,* Colombo, not dated, p. 2.

[37] C. Pridham, *Ceylon and Her Dependencies,* London, 1849, Vol. I, p. 470.

[38] *Ibid.;* also see, John Ferguson, *Mohammedanism in Ceylon,* Colombo, 1897, pp. 304.

[39] See for example, *The Ceylon Census Report,* 1946, Vol. I, part I, pp. 8-9.

[40] Mohamed Ibn Ishak, *The Life of Muhammad,* translated by A. Guillaume, Oxford University Press, 1967, reprint, pp. 437-445; W. Montgomery Watt, *Muhammad Prophet and Statesman,* Oxford University Press, 1961, pp. 148-153; Maulana Muhammad Ali, *Muhammad The Prophet,* Lahore, 1933, 2nd ed. pp. 157-166.

part of the tradition relating to the settlement at Kayalpatnam conflicts with a tradition current in India according to which the first Muslim settlement at Kayalpatnam seems to have been of Iraqi refugees who escaped from the persecution of Hajjaj Ibn Yusuf who was then Governor of Iraq under the Caliphate of Malik Ibn Marwan.[41] This must have been either in the late seventh or early eighth century A.D. According to one Ceylonese historian the Kayalpatnam settlement was of an even later date and was established in the middle of the ninth century.[42]

This Indian tradition which came to be reiterated with much tenacity by prominent Ceylon Moors[43] was first recorded by Sir Alexander Johnston, the Chief Justice of Ceylon in the early nineteenth century.[44] According to Johnston's version a portion of those Hashimite Arabs driven from Arabia by the tyrannous Caliph, "made settlements in Concan, in the southern parts of the peninsula of India, on the island of Ceylon and at Malacca."[45] This tradition receives some historicity in the light of an event recorded by an Arab historian, Ahmad Ibn Yahya Ibn Ja'bir Al-Biladuri in his *Futuhul Buldan* written in the ninth century. He records that the king of the Isle of Rubies (Ceylon) sent as a present to Hajjaj Ibn Yusuf the bereaved widows and daughters of certain Muslim merchants who had died in his country.[46] He seems to have done this as a measure to ingratiate himself with Hajjaj.[47] This event has not been disputed even by Sinhalese historians.[48] Besides, the discovery in Ceylon of a dinar coin belonging to the time of the Umayyah Caliph Walid Bin Malik, A.H. 86-96 (A.D. 705-711) also suggests that the Arabs may have been in contact with Ceylon during this period.[49] However, to trace the

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41 *Madras Census Report,* 1891, Vol. XIII, p. 275.

42 H.W. Codrington, *Ceylon Coins and Currency,* Colombo, 1924, p. 157.

43 See for e.g. I.L.M. Abdul Azeez, *op. cit.;* A.M.A. Azeez, "Ceylon", *The Encyclopaedia of Islam,* 1960 edition; M.C.A. Hassan, *op. cit.,* p. 167.

44 Sir Alexander Johnston, "A Letter to the Secretary Relating to the Preceding Inscription", *Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland,* Vol. I, 1827, p. 538.

45 Sir Alexander Johnston, *op. cit.*

46 H.M. Elliot and J. Dawson, (ed.) *History of India as Told by Its Own Historians,* London, 1867, Vol. I, p. 118; Suleyman Nadvi, "Muslim Colonies in India Before Muslim Conquest", *Islamic Culture,* Vol. VIII, 1934, pp. 478-480.

47 H.M. Elliot and J. Dawson, *op. cit.* This event is said to have been the immediate cause for the Arab invasion of India in 712 A.D., I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent,* The Hague, 1962, 1962, p. 35.

48 C.W. Nicholas and S. Paranavitana, *A Concise History of Ceylon,* Ceylon University Press, Colombo, 1961, p. 164; S. Paranavitana, "Civilisation of the Period: Economic, Political and Social Conditions" in *University of Ceylon History of Ceylon,* Colombo, 1959, Vol. I, part I, p. 362.

49 H.W. Codrington, *op. cit.,* p. 158. Although Codrington lists this coin amongst the collections discovered at Muturajawela he fails to make any comment on it. The reason may be his confusion over the name and dynasty of the Caliph which he calls Al-Wahid I and Awami respectively. There was no such Caliph and such a dynasty in Muslim history.

origins of the Ceylon Moors to the Umayyah period is to conclude that they arrived in Ceylon only after the death of the Prophet in 632 A.D. and that they originally came as Muslims. The statement of Nafis Ahmad that " one of the earliest scenes of Muslim settlements was Ceylon towards the end of the first century A.H.,"[50] and the conclusion of Neelakanta Sastri, a historian of great repute in India, that "before the end of the 7th century, a colony of Muslim merchants had established themselves in Ceylon,"[51] also express the same sentiment.

But the Arab connections with Ceylon reach far back into pre-Islamic times. "Long before anybody else—Persians, Indians, Chinese, Egyptians, Greeks or Romans—became navigators in Southern Seas", says Ahmad, "the Arabs were the only nation which furnished mariners, carriers and merchants in the Indian Ocean."[52] Joseph Desomogyi traces the Arab connection in the Indian Ocean to "the days of the Phoenicians."[53] From a study on Java, Imam claims that the Arabs traded between Madagascar and Sumatra via Ceylon as early as 310 B.C.[54] And according to Tennent, one of the most brilliant Civil Servants and historians of British Ceylon in the nineteenth century, "the Arabs, who had been familiar with India before it was known to the Greeks, and who had probably availed themselves of the monsoons long before Hippalus ventured to trust to them, began in the fourth and fifth centuries to establish themselves as merchants at Cambay and Surat, at Mangalore, Calicut, Coulam and other Malabar ports, whence they migrated to Ceylon, the government of which was remarkable for its toleration of all religious sects, and its hospitable reception of fugitives."[55] But the most significant of all the references is that which Geiger quotes from the ancient Pali chronicle Mahavamsa; according to which in the fourth century B.C. Anuradhapura, the Sinhalese capital had near its western gate a "ground set apart for the Yonas"[56] who "were the Arabian traders who visited the island perhaps even before the Aryan immigration."[57]

Among those Arabs must have been a group of Sabaean traders who were also inhabitants of South Arabia and are mentioned by name

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50 Nafis Ahmad, "The Arab's knowledge of Ceylon", *Islamic Culture,* Vol. IX, 1945.

51 K.A. Neelakanta Sastri, *Foreign Notices of South India,* Madras, 1939, p. 20.

52 Nafis Ahmad, *op. cit.*

53 Joseph Desmogyi, *A Short History of Oriental Trade,* Hildersheim, 1968, p. 54.

54 S.A. Imam, "Ceylon-Arab Relations", *The First Twenty Years,* A Moors Islamic Cultural Home Publication, Colombo, 1965.

55 J.E. Tennent, *op. cit.,* Vol. I, pp. 579-580.

56 Wilhelm Geiger, *ip. cit.,* p. 59.

57 *Ibid.*

in the Qur'an.[58] Religiously they are said to be a Judaeo-Christian sect,[59] and racially they were "Arabs from the Hadramaut and Oman coasts."[60] The narratives in the Periplus of the Erithrean Sea show that already in the first century A.D. the Sabaeans had monopolised the maritime commerce of India and had acted as intermediaries between the Indian merchants and those of Egypt.[61] And they were also in frequent contact with the Malayan Archipelago ever since the days of Babylon.[62] Therefore, it is probable that the Sabaeans must have also been in contact with Ceylon. The fact that the Chinese traveller Fa-Hien had seen them in Ceylon in the fifth century A.D.[63] supports our conclusion.

Besides the Arabs, traders from Persia also had contacts with Ceylon before the birth of Islam. Cosmas Indicopleustes mentions a Greek and Persian trader disputing before the King of Ceylon in the sixth century A.D., as to which of their kings was superior.[64] All this shows that long before the arrival of the Muslim expatriates during the time of Hajjaj there were Arabs, Persians, Greeks and Romans[65] frequenting the shores of Ceylon. On the eve of the birth of Islam, however, it was the Persians who dominated the Indo-Arabian trade and had become the "intermediaries for the silk trade between China and the West";[66] and Ceylon being the entrepot for sea trade between China and the Near East became a frequent port of call to the Persian merchants.[67]

Since sea travel in those days was dependent upon the winds and since loading and unloading of vessels took a much longer time than at present, merchants and sailors who set foot on the shores of the island had to wait for considerable periods of time until their ships were reloaded with goods and the winds became favourable. During that period "there would always be a few women at the ports

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58 *Al-Qur'an,* 2:62, 5:69; 22:17.

59 Maulana Abdul Majid Daryabadi, *The Holy Qur'an,* The Taj Co. Ltd., Karachi, 1971, Vol. I, p. 13A, 276n.

60 Chau Ju-Kua, *Chu-Fan-Chi,* translated by F. Hirth and W.W. Rockhill, St. Petersburg, 1911, introduction, p. 3. This book deals with the Chinese-Arab trade in the 12th and 13th centuries.

61 Captain R.L. Playfair, *A History of Arabia Felix or Yemen from the Commencement of the Christian Era to the Present Time,* Bombay, 1859, p. 15.

62 Roland Braddell, "Notes on Ancient Times in Malaya", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Malayan Branch,* vol. 20, part II, 1947; H.G. Quaritch Wales, "The Sabaeans and Possible Egyptian Influences in Indonesia", *JRAS (MB),* Vol. 23, no. 3, 1950.

63 G.F. Hourani, *Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times,* New Jersey, 1951, p. 38.

64 Cosmas Indicopleustes, *The Christian Topography,* translated from Greek and edited by J.W. McCrindle, New York, not dated, pp. 367-370.

65 On the Roman Ceylon contcats see, C.W. Nicholas, "The Geographical Background", *University of Ceylon History of Ceylon,* Vol. I, part I, pp. 16-18; J.E. Tennent, *op. cit.,* Vol. I, pp. 549-570.

66 G.F. Hourani, *op. cit.,* pp. 40-41.

67 *Ibid.,* also pp. 43-44.

of this island (as at other ports of the world under such circumstances) to provide some consolation to the lonely sailor or trader."[68] It is therefore quite probable that out of these circumstances there emerged a nucleus of an Arab and Persian community in Ceylon during the fourth, fifth and sixth centuries. Of this the Persian element must have been quantitatively important since the Persian government staged an expedition against Ceylon in the sixth century "to redress the wrongs done to some of their fellow countrymen who had settled there for purposes of trade."[69] Many of these Persians appear to have been of the Nestorian sect of Christianity and even had a presbyter appointed from Persia.[70] The most vital clue to the origins of the Ceylon Moors lies in the fate of this Persian community after the sixth century. Hourani finds in the Arabic records of sea trade with the Far East less mention of Persians and more of Muslims and Arabs after the ninth century.[71] In fact the Far-Eastern trade after that time became an Arab monopoly which was never challenged until the coming of the Portuguese towards the end of the fifteenth century.[72] Mendis is certain that the "Persian trade with Ceylon ceased in the seventh century,"[73] but as to what happened to the Persian community in Ceylon there is no information. Among the local records there is no further mention of the Persians until the arrival of Ibn Batuta, the Arab traveller from Tangiers in 1344 A.D.[74] During his travels in Ceylon Batuta met a Persian Muslim[75] in Mannar who accompanied him to Adam's Peak; cited a shrine built to venerate a Persian Muslim saint Shaikh Othman of Shiraz; and visited the King Aryachakkaravarthy who he found "understands the Persian tongue."[76] All this suggest that the king must have had intimate and lasting contacts with the Persians before he met Batuta. The question therefore arises whether the Persians with whom Aryachakkaravarthy was familiar were an entirely new wave from Islamic Persia or the progeny of those who settled in Ceylon before Islam was born and became Muslims later in keeping with changes in their mother country, or a mixture of both. There is little evidence on the question as a whole, but some references indicate that the answer probably lies in the second possibility.

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68 K.W. Goonewardena, *op. cit.*
69 J.E. Tennent, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 579.
70 Cosmas Indicopleustes, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-119.
71 G.F. Hourani, *op. cit.*, p. 65.
72 Cesar Adid Majul, *op. cit.*, p. 342.
73 G.C. Mendis, *The Early History of Ceylon or The Indian Period of Ceylon History*, Calcutta, 1940, fourth edition, p. 70.
74 "Ibn Batuta in the Maldives and Ceylon, translated from the French of M.M. Defremery and Sanguinetti", *JRASCB*, 1882.
75 This Muslim was a khorossanian, a province in Persia.
76 Ibn Batuta, *op. cit.*

Geiger calls the early Persians the "pre-runners of the Moormen."[77] Another author of recent times is certain the Ceylon Moors are of Persian origin, even though he fails to support his case with evidence.[78] Tennent, while analyzing the causes for the disappearance of Nestorian Christianity from Ceylon came to the conclusion that "the more immediate cause . . . was in all probability the rising influence of Mahometanism [sic] and the arrival of its followers from Persia and Arabia whose descendants are known by the popular designation of 'Moors'."[79] He goes on to say later that the Moors are "of Persian rather than Arabic origin."[80] Even the discourses in the mosques, according to Tennent, seem to have been delivered in Persian in the nineteenth century.[81] There is however one difficulty in accepting this conclusion, and that is the difference between Persian Islam and the Ceylon variety. While the former has been predominantly *shi'a* after the sixteenth century[82] the latter is predominantly *sunni*. Tennent was obviously exaggerating the identity of the Muslims of Ceylon as belonging to the "sect of shahis" as opposed to "Sonees",[83] even though there is reference to the "followers of Ali" amongst the Muslims in nineteenth century Ceylon.[84] It is also highly improbable for Persian to have been the language of discourse in the mosques because there is evidence to show that until very recently the *'ulema* in Ceylon were refusing to deliver their sermons in any language other than Arabic. What is more plausible is that the Persian community that was domiciled in Ceylon on the eve of the birth of Islam was converted to that religion either by the Muslim traders who came later or by the *sufis*[85] and *faquirs*[86] who arrived from the Malabar coast in the ninth century.[87] This is only speculation, but until further evidence is discovered the theory that the Moors are of Arab origin has to remain subject to doubt. To say that the term Arab is employed to designate the "conglomeration of the Persians, Arabs and Abyssinians"[88] from which the Muslims of Ceylon originated is a convenient way of dodging the issue.

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77 Wilhelm Geiger, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

78 F. Houtart, *Religion and Ideology in Sri Lanka*, Hansa Publishers, Colombo, 1974, p. 75.

79 J.E. Tennent, *Christianity in Ceylon*, London, 1850, p. 7.

80 *Op. cit.*, p. 35.

81 *Op. cit.*, p. 36.

82 *Shi'ism* was imposed on Persia by the Safavid King Ismail Safavi (1502-1524). Before that Persia was *sunni* Islam by religion.

83 *Op. cit.*, p. 35.

84 J.W. Bennett, *Ceylon and Its Capabilities*, London, 1843, p. 62.

85 The *sufis* are Muslim mystics.

86 The *faqirs* are also a group of mystics living in voluntary poverty to reach self-realisation or any form of spiritual fulfilment. See, M.M.M. Mahroof, "The Faqirs of Ceylon", *Islamic Culture*, vol. 41, 1967.

87 S.M. Yusuf, "Ceylon and the Arab Trade", *University of Ceylon History of Ceylon*, vol. I, part II, p. 705, 10n.

88 *Op. cit.*, p. 704.

The Moors and the Indian Theory

The second theory that the "Moors are (by race) pure Tamils of South India who had been converted to Islamism",[89] originates from the idea that the early Arabs did not come direct to Ceylon. Since they could obtain the produce of this island from the "great emporia of the Malabar coast", [90] the Arabs, according to Arasaratnam "did not come to Ceylon . . . for a long time";[91] and in his opinion the earliest Arab colonies in Ceylon were of the tenth century, established "by agents of the principal traders of the South Indian ports to supply them with the goods of Ceylon."[92] The date tenth century is presumably based on the cufic inscription discovered in Ceylon by Alexander Johnston in the early nineteenth century, which refers to the death of one Khalid Ibn Bakaya and which bears the date 337 A.H. (959 A.D.[93]) It is difficult to accept Arasaratnam's view especially in the light of what was discussed in the preceding section. There were Arabs who came to Ceylon before Islam and there were Arabs who came after Islam. Even in the case of the latter, researches show an earlier date than the tenth century.[94] According to one researcher the Muslim Arab-Ceylon connection goes back to the days of the *Rashidun* (rightly guided) Caliphs of the seventh century.[95]

Yet, the Indian theory is not altogether valueless. It shows that the Ceylon Moors originated from more than one source. The Arab settlements along the Malabar coast in India are as old as those in Ceylon.[96] "The similarity in the peculiar nature of the social organization in pre-Islamic Arabia and on the western coast of Southern India, especially in Malabar facilitated the free mingling of the Arabs with the women of South-West India."[97] According to Panikkar, "it is reasonable to suppose that . . . at least after the time of Caliph Omar the trade with Malabar was exclusively in the hands of the Moors."[98] Thus after the seventh century the Arab traders came in large numbers, married Indian women and settled as permanent communities.[99] The Mapilla (Moplahs) Muslims of Kerala and the Lebbes and Maraikkayars of the Coromandel coast are the descendants of these settlements.[100] In Ceylon, the fact that many of

89 C. Brito, *op. cit.*, appendix, p. 82.
90 S. Arasaratnam, *Ceylon,* New Jersey, 1964, p. 117.
91 *Ibid.*
92 *Op. cit.*, p. 118.
93 I.L.M. Abdul Azeez, *op. cit.*, appendix A.
94 A. Cherian, "The Genesis of Islam in Malabar", *Indica,* vol. 6, no. 1, 1969.
95 *Ibid.*
96 Nafis Ahmad, *op. cit.*
97 A. Cherian, "The Impact of Islam on South India: Synopsis of Thesis submitted for Ph.D. at the University of Bombay, 1971", *Indica,* Vol. 1, 1964.
98 K.M. Panikkar, *Malabar and The Portuguese,* Bombay, 1929, p. 23.
99 A Cherian, *op. cit.*
100 E. Thurstan, *Caste and Tribes of Southern India,* Vol. IV, pp. 198-205

the Moors in the nineteenth century carried the name Lebbe or Maraikkar or both as part or parts of their full names (such as for example, Segu Lebbe Maraikkar Muhammad Ali Maraikkar and Ahamathu Lebbe Meera Lebbe), spoke the Tamil language and even physically resembled the South Indian Muslims, induced the British to identify them with the Lebbes of South India.[101] The Lebbes and Maraikkayars as seen above were people of "mixed Hindu and Musalman origins,"[102] and they were said to be Hanafiites and Shafiites respectively.[103] But in Ceylon amongst the Ceylon Moors the majority were of the latter sect though with a sprinkling of Hanafiites.[104] This suggests that a majority of these nineteenth century Moors must have been the descendants of the Maraikkayars of the Coromandel Coast and particularly of Porto Novo, Nagore, Muttuppettai and Kayalpatnam.[105]

The earliest of Arabs and Persians who came directly to Ceylon could not have been large in number although the latter was numerically and in terms of influence sufficient to cause an expedition against Ceylon. Gunawardena estimates their number in "terms of dozens rather than in hundreds and thousands."[106] As a racial entity in Ceylon they could not therefore have been a significant factor in an estimated population of about seven million.[107]

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the Muslims in Ceylon were said to have "attained the highest degree of their commercial prosperity and political influence"[108] in the island. This was also the period when the Muslims on the opposite coast had a similar success in the economic and political spheres. The rise of the Zamorin of Calicut as "the leading ruler"[109] on the West Coast of India in the thirteenth century was possible, according to Panikkar, partly because of "the support of the Moorish settlers who contributed so

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and Vol. V, pp. 1-5; S.S. Nadvi, "The Muslim Colonies of India before the Muslim Conquests", *Islamic Culture,* Vol. VIII, 1934; Roland E. Miller, *Mappila Muslims of Kerala: A Study in Islamic Trends,* Orient Longmans Ltd., 1976, pp. 41 & 51; K.A. Neelakantasastri, *A History of South* India, Madras, 1976, fourth ed., p. 439.

101 C.N.A. 5/1, North to the Court of Directors of the English East India Company, 26 Feb. 1799; James Cordiner, *A Description of Ceylon,* London, 1807, Vol. I, p. 139.

102 *Madras Census Report, 1901.*

103 *Ibid.,* W. Preston Warren, "Islam in South India", *The Muslim World,* Vol. 21, 1931.

104 A.M.A. Azeez, "Ceylon", *The Encyclopaedia of Islam,* 1960 edition, p. 28.

105 H. Bperrum, "The Tamil Muslims of South India", *Musiim World,* Vol. X, 1920.

106 K.W. Goonawardena, *op. cit.*

107 N.K. Sarkar, *The Demography of Ceylon,* Ceylon Govt. Press, Colombo, 1957, p. 18.

108 Alexander Johnston, *op. cit.*

109 K.M. Panikkar, *op. cit.,* p. 11.

largely to the prosperity and power of his kingdom."[110] The Zamorin's naval forces were under their command and it was with the help of the Muslims that he was able to defeat his enemies.[111] In addition, the Muslims under the Zamorin had a monopoly of seaborne trade and "their commercial relations extended as far west as Tripoli and Morocco."[112] In short it is said that in political power and influence the Muslims in Malabar were next only to the Nairs,[113] a class of militia-men.[114] An important development of this honeymoon period between the Zamorin and the Muslims was that even the Indo-Ceylon trade gradually passed from the hands of the Hindu traders to those of the Muslims.[115]

It is against this background of commercial prosperity and political influence of the South Indian Muslims that one should view their arrival in Ceylon, and their addition to the already existing Arab, Persian and perhaps even Abyssinian[116] Muslim complex. The rate of this influx is not known. Writing in the late seventeenth century Queyroz observed that the Moors came to Ceylon at the rate of "500 to 600 each year."[117] That he is referring to the period prior to the arrival of the Portuguese in Ceylon in 1505 is apparent because after that time the anti-Muslim policy of the Portuguese, based on economic and religious rivalry, would not have encouraged Muslims to come to Ceylon in such large numbers. It is also significant that a tradition relating to the Muslim village of Beruwela on the west coast of Ceylon speaks of a colony of Muslims from Kayalpatnam settling there towards the middle of the fourteenth century.[118] Hence it is not unreasonable to conclude that Muslims from

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110 *Op. cit.*, p. 17.

111 *Op. cit.*, p. 23.

112 *Ibid.*

113 *Ibid.*

114 For a detailed description of the Nairs, see E. Thurstan, *op. cit.*, Vol. V.

115 K. Indrapala, "South Indian Mercantile Communities in Ceylon, Circa 950-150", *The Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Stubdies,* (new series),

116 Ibn Batuta speaks of Colombo being under the control of a sea captain named Jalasti who had under his command 500 Abyssinians. Ibn Batuta *op. cit.*

117 Fernao De Queyros, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 742.

118 K.W. Goonawardena, *op. cit.* But this cannot be the first settlement at Beruwela as Goonawardena thinks. His argument that Ibn Batuta did not mention Beruwela in his travels is not sound because no one knows the routes which he followed within the island. How could he have mentioned a place if he had not gone there? Moreover, a year or two and not "five or six" after Ibn Batuta left Ceylon, John de Marignolli, otherwise called John of Florence, a Papal Legate, was driven ashore by gale and he landed at Pervilis which later identified as Beruwela. "Here" he says, "a certain tyrant by name Coya Jaan, a eunuch, had the mastery in opposition to the lawful king. He was an accursed Saracen, who by means of his great treasures had gained possession of the greater part of the kingdom." Sir Henry Yule, (translator & editor), *Cathay and the Way Thither,* vol. 3, Taipei, 1966, p. 231. This Coya Jaan is said to be the title Khwaja Jahan given to the vazirs by the Sultan of Maabar and it is agreed that this particular vazir is the

South India must have traded with and sometimes settled peacefully in the coastal districts of Ceylon between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. As a result of this influx of the Indian element the strain of Persian and Arab blood in the community must have been gradually weakened as it happened in South India itself.[119] Thus when the Portuguese arrived in Ceylon at the beginning of the sixteenth centry the port of Colombo had developed into a "colony of Moors of Indian origin."[120] From the sixteenth to the nineteenth century until the British arrived the Indian influx was largely curtailed if not totally prohibited. On the one hand the lack of Portuguese power in the east coast of Ceylon enabled the Muslim traders to trade with the independent Kandyan kingdom in the central hills of the island, through its eastern ports of Trincomalee, Kottiyar and Batticaloa.[121] On the other, the relative freedom which the eastern coasts of South India also enjoyed from Portuguese harassment[122] meant that intercourse was possible between the Indian Muslims and their counterparts in Ceylon. This connection continued even after the Portuguese were ousted by the Dutch in 1656. According to a Tamil source,[123] a colony of *Conakar* from Kayalpatnam settled at south Mirusuvil in the north of Ceylon during the Dutch rule.[124] However the anti-Muslim attitude of both the Portuguese and the Dutch did not allow that freedom of movement which the Indian Muslims enjoyed prior to the arrival of the colonialists. Nevertheless, it is evident that the majority of the Moors who lived in Ceylon at the beginning of the nineteenth century were the descendants of those Indian Muslims who came centuries earlier and who were themselves of mixed origin, while a minority was of either Arab or Persian descent amongst whom some had come long before Islam was born and some thereafter. In Hambantota for example, Denham reported in his census of 1911 that a colony of Muslims traced their origins to a *Maulana* or religious dignitary who had come from Baghdad only one hundred and fifty

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"vazir and admiral Jalasti" whom Ibn Batuta met in Colombo. *Op. cit.;* Van Sanden, *op. cit.,* p. 41. This shows that Jalasti's power and command had extended up to Beruwela where there must have been a Muslim settlement. This is proved by the copper grant dated 7 May 1018 which speaks of the privileges granted by the Sinhalese king to Mudali Maraikkar, a Muslim merchant of Beruwela, and his descendants for bringing seven weavers from the opposite coast. (For a translation of this grant in Tamil, see B.D.M. Cassim, *op. cit.,* pp. 55-56. Sir Alexander Johnston also refers to it.) Therefore Beruwela must have been settled with Muslims long before the 1340s.

119 Kenneth McPherson, The Political Development of the Urud- and Tamil-speaking Muslims of the Madras Presidency 1901-1937, an unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Western Australia, 1968, p. 7.

120 P.E. Pieris, *Ceylon and the Portuguese 1505-1658,* Tellipalai, Ceylon, 1920, p. 24.

121 C.R. de Silva, *The Portuguese in Ceylon,* Colombo, 1972, p. 10.

122 T.V. Mahalingam, *Economic Life in the Vijayanager Empire,* University of Madras, 1951, p. 119.

123 *Yalpana Vaipava Malai* or The History of the Kingdom of Jaffna, (translated by C. Brito), Colombo, 1879.

124 *Op. cit.,* p. 54. The exact date of the settlement is not known.

years earlier.[125] And even in the nineteenth century the Arabs continued to frequent Ceylon especially to take part in the pearl fisheries.[126] The Qur'an's encouragement to "go about in the spacious sides" of the earth and to "eat of this sustenance"[127] probably gave an added incentive to the wandering instincts of these desert dwellers. Despite the discriminatory policies of the Portuguese and Dutch it would appear that the (new) Muslim communities were not treated with hostility by the indigenous people. Davy, a British Major, remarked in the early nineteenth century that all these groups, though looked upon by the Colonialists as "foreigners" were in actual fact "naturalized" Ceylonese.[128]

The Malays

The Malays are another element in the Ceylon Muslim racial complex. Although their origins are definitely known, they are not detailed here since the main focus of this article is on the Moors. Nevertheless, a summary is provided below for the sake of a comprenhensive picture of the Muslim community.

Ceylon had contacts with the Malay peninsula from very early times and the country was known to the Malays as *swarnabhumi* (land of gold).[129] Twice in the thirteenth century the island was invaded by Chandrabhanu of Tambralinga, a Javaka prince from the Malay peninsula.[130] The *Yalpana Vaipava Malai* mentions that there was during the reign of Vijayabahu "a numerous army of *yavakar*[131] in the king's pay."[132] And toponyms such as Sammanturai in the east and Hambantota in the south, and Cavakacceri and Cavankadu in the north of Ceylon also indicate that there must have been some Malay connection with these places during the medieval era.[133] In these latter areas there seems to have been a small Malay colony whose "numbers underwent constant diminution by deadly feuds

125 E.B. Denham, *Ceylon at the Census of 1911*, Colombo, 1912, p. 238.
126 *C.S.P.* 37 of 1890, W.C. Twynam's Report on the 1890 Pearl Fishery; Ma.Ka.Mu. Katar Mukaiyateen Maraikkayar, *Alim Pulavar Anra Olukkam*, (A Biography of S.M. Sayyid Muhammad Alim Pulavar), Madura, (India), 1960, p. 14.
127 *Al-Qu'an*, 67:15.
128 J. Davy, *An Account of the Interior of Ceylon*, London 1821, p. 108.
129 Senarat Paranavitana, *Ceylon and Malaysia*, Lake House Publishers, Colombo, 1966, pp. 1-5.
130 *Op. cit.*, p. 76; W.M. Sirisena, *Sir Lanka and South-East Asia*, Leiden, 1978, pp. 36-57.
131 In Tamil alphabet there is no equivalent to the sound 'Ja'. It is either written as *'ca'* or *'ya'*. Thus Java can be written as *Cava* or *Yava* and *Javakar*, the people of Java as *Cavakar* or *Yavakar*. In the old days the Tamils called Java *Cavakam*. V. Kankasabhai, *The Tamils Eighteen Hundred Years Ago*, Madras, 1966, reprint, p. 11.
132 *Yalpana Vaipava Malai*, p. 33.
133 W.M. Sirisena, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-48.

among themselves and by the oppression of kings."[134] During the Portuguese period also one hears of Malay soldiers serving in the army of Rajasingha,[135] the King of Kandy. The Dutch council minutes of 8 September 1660 cited by Tambimuttu refers to a land grant of twenty-eight acres at Wolvendhal in Colombo to a group of Malays who had become Christians.[136] Finally, Goonewardena observes that some of the Sinhalese who bear names like Malalage, Malalasekera and Malalgoda "have remarkably Malayan features."[137] From these references it is possible to conclude that whatever was left of the old Malay community must have lost most of its Malay identity both by changing religion and by inter-marriage with the Sinhalese.

But the Malays who lived in nineteenth century Ceylon were Muslims and the descendants of a new wave whose arrival dates back to the eighteenth century. It had been customary for the Dutch to take the Malays to various settlements in Asia and Africa "for the purpose of carrying on various branches of trade and manufactures and also to employ them as soldiers and servants."[138] They formed the artisan community in Cape Colony,[139] while in Ceylon they served mainly as soldiers. The first arrival of this later infusion of Malays was in 1709 when the Dutch in Java banished Susuna Mangkurat Mas, a Javanese ex-prince together with his followers and their families to Ceylon.[140] He was followed in 1723 by another forty or so Javanese princes and chiefs who surrendered to the Dutch at the Battle of Batavia.[141] These families formed the nucleus from which the Malay community later grew.

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134 *Yalpana Vaipava Malai,* p. 34.

135 Fernao De Queyroz, *op. cit.,* Vol. II, p. 442.

136 Paulinus Tambimuttu, "Malays were in Ceylon Before Recorded History", culled from an article in *Ceylon Daily News,* 13 Nov. 1965 and reprinted in *Glimpse from the Past of the Moors of Sri Lanka,* (ed.) A.I.L. Marikar, A.L.M. Lafir and A.H. Macan Markar, Colombo (not dated).

137 K.W. Goonewardena, "Comments on Ceylon and Malaysia in Medieval Times", *JRAS(CB)* new series, vol. 7, no. 2, 1962.

138 Robert Percival, *An Account of the Island of Ceylon,* London, 1803, p. 168.

139 Freda Troup, *South Africa An Historical Introduction,* London, 1972, pp. 58-61.

140 Thomas Stamford Raffles, *The History of Java,* London 1817, vol. II, pp. 195-197; Gallicus, "Javanese Exiles to Ceylon in the 18th Century", *Tropical Agriculturist (Literary Register Supplement)* no. 18, 1888-1889.

141 H.C. Sirr, *Ceylon and the Cingalese,* London, 1850, pp. 260-261. According to some the number was forty-four. See Paulinus Tambimuttu, *op. cit.*

A FRAMEWORK FOR PHILIPPINE FOREIGN POLICY: SOME SUGGESTIONS*

ELPIDIO R. STA. ROMANA

The study of international relations and foreign policy is fundamentally an American-evolved branch of the social science and for this reason the theories and paradigms of the discipline were strongly influenced by the national and strategic interest of the United States during the Cold War and the era of multi-polarism.[1] It is not hard to understand then why Third World political and economic relations have seldom been the sympathetic concern of the discipline.

This inevitably makes the usefulness of the prevailing paradigms doubtful in satisfactorily explaining Third World external relations. The prevailing paradigms or approaches (namely, the realist paradigm, systems theory and the decision-making approach) have not really given Third World international relations the importance and understanding that it deserves for the sake of balance and fairness in the discipline. If this is true of international relations as a whole it is equally true of the study of foreign policy.

Further, the artificial division of disciplines in the social sciences is inevitably reflected in international relations. Political relations are treated separately from economic relations both in the domestic and international level. This probably makes the present discipline of international relations more distant to the interpretation of Third World relations and the approaches to the sudy of foreign policy brought even farther away from reality, not to speak of the needs, of Third World nations.

In this context, this essay will attempt to sketch a more relevant framework of Third World foreign policy as it relates to the domestic needs of a developing country. The framework will be based on Bahgat Korany's situation-role model[2] and Franklin Weinstein's model

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1 Stanley Hoffman, "An American Social Science: International Relations", *Daedalus*, I, Summer 1977.

2 Bahgat Korany, *Social Change, Charisma and International Behaviour: Toward a Theory of Foreign Policy-making in the Third World.* (Genève: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, 1976).

of foreign policy.[3] Foreign policy is *not* a separate part of the total politico-economic scene of underdevelopment, in spite of what some people may want us to believe. Therefore, such relevant model must be related to the problem of political stability and consequently to the problem of development to show that foreign policy is in fact a useful instrument in the preservation of a regime and/or state which is ultimately the bearer of the burden of development (regardless of whether the regime and/or state is revolutionary or not).§

Space limitation only allows a critical appraisal of the foreign policy decision-making approach. After this, an alternative framework will be presented through a critical synthesis of Korany's and Weinstein's models. Then, two events in Philippine diplomatic history will be presented to see how the model could possibly be useful. At the end, a number of suggestions will be made on how foreign policy relates to the problem of political stability and development.

Critique of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process Approach

The foreign policy decision-making approach attempted to correct the basic shortcomings of the realist paradigm and the systems theory which both neglected the vital internal processes of actors in the international system. The latter suffered from the additional defect of ahistorism in the form of "systems tyranny" and isomorphism trap. The decision-making approach proposes that the internal processes of nations be classified for study under the broad categories (or "clusters of variables") of: 1) "Internal Setting of Decision-Making with three *main* variables; 2) "Social Structure and Behavior" with six *main* variables; 3) "External Setting of Decision-Making with four *main* variables; 4) "Decision-Making" and finally, 5) "Decision-Makers". In other words, there are five clusters of variables with about 15 variables all in all. The main objection to this ap-

[3] Franklin Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno to Soeharto.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979). See also his "The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries", *World Politics,* XXIV:3, April 1972 and *Indonesia Abandons Confrontation: An Inquiry into the Functions of Indonesia Foreign Policy,* monographs, (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1969).

§ At this point, some definitions are in order. The term "development" here is taken to mean transformation of status in the capitalist world economy of a nation from peripheral status to that of a semi-periphery and the attempt of a periphery to achieve core status, all *regardless* of whether that nation is socialist or not. This definition is based on Immanuel Wallerstein and the political economy of the world system approach. It avoids a number of Aesopian and ideological myths woven around the concept of "development".

Also, the term "Third World" is used only for convenience. Increasing heterogeneity and differentiation among nations of the Third World in the past decade makes the term both theoretically and empirically questionable.

proach lies here: the large number of variables is simply discouraging if not impossible to study. No amount of industry can solve this problem. Even if it were possible to study all the variables satisfactorily there is still no indication in the approach of the order of significance of the variables (assuming that order of variables is indeed indicative of their significance, a doubtful proposition according to some). Further, the approach was also intended to deal with a once-and-for-all decision which is seldom faced by any nation. Also, contrary to what the approach implies, issues are seldom faced in a clearcut fashion.

These weaknesses of the approach apply to both developed and developing countries. For developing countries, however, these weaknesses are even compounded because the approach assumes the existence of complex organizations and communication channels engaged in decision-making. Korany calls this the "interchangeability of eggs in the same basket" error, meaning that nations as diverse as the United States, the Philippines, France, Togo or Somalia could be studied using exactly the same approach. This taxes the imagination. It should be added too that the assumption of complex organizations implies a certain symmetry of nations in the international system, which we know does not exist. This makes the approach's relevance doubly doubtful since it will inevitably ignore the problems of inequality and underdevelopment.[4]

The flaw of unresearchability (i.e., the excessive number of variables) is rendered beyond salvage by the fact that there are limitations on the freedom of information in "closed" developing societies. There is also the difficulty of getting an insider's view of the process that led to a decision. This is worsened by time and failure of memory. An insider's account, if available and still fresh, will inevitably be biased and be the opinion of one man; it cannot be the "whole truth". Scantiness of documents and disorganized archival materials are also major obstacles. Consequently, if the decision-making approach is ever used in a developing country it will require data that are simply not available or non-existent. Decision-making processes in such countries are less structured and communication channels obscure. Furthermore, as Weinstein has observed, the decision-making approach leads away from more fundamental questions of interaction between politics, external pressure and "idiosyncracies".[5] This is true not only of the decision-making approach but also of other approaches to the study of foreign policy of developing countries. Foreign policy in these countries is often presented as something irrelevant to the domestic needs or as a game played by an "adven-

[4] Korany, p. 65.
[5] Weinstein, 1972, p. 360.

turous", "mercurial", "irrational", "erratic" or "unpredictable" leader or elite. The same adjectives are used to describe the resulting policies. Such policies have also been called "nuisance strategy".[6] (The colorfulness of the adjectives even seems to be a function of how discordant such policies are with overall U.S. global strategy.) "Idiosyncracy" is almost seen as a disease of Third World leaders but not of the leaders of the major actors. Weinstein states:

> Foreign policy in less developed countries takes on an appearance of pathology—an effort to explain why leaders act in such apparently irrational ways.[7]

Korany's Situation-Role Model and Weinstein's Model

Considering the criticisms formulated above, it is natural that those aspects unsatisfactorily treated by the prevailing paradigms should be the starting point of a more relevant framework in the study of foreign policy of developing countries. These aspects are:

1. The existence of specific ends of foreign policy orientation *and* behavior of developing nations.

2. The existence of internal determinants of these foreign policy orientation and behavior. These determinants must be more simple and with a *focus,* i.e., the handling of these determinants will benefit a group and class of people in the domestic society.

3. The existence of asymmetry in the international system.

4. Specification of the exact role of "idiosyncracy" or the personality.

These neglected aspects find its way into the assumptions of Korany's situation-role model to which, in this essay, Weinstein's model is critically integrated. These assumptions are:

1. The asymmetry in the international system: this asymmetry is reflected in positions of "weakness" and this position is correlated with perceptions of the international system and ultimately, foreign policy orientation and behavior. Weinstein defines weakness as the extremely limited capacity to deal with overwhelming national problems.[8] In this essay "weakness" will be equated with peripheral (or semi-peripheral) status as defined by the dependencistas and Wallerstein. This assumption indicates the main concerns of policy-makers and they are how to make "weakness" more palatable and simul-

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[6] See for example Robert Rothstein, *The Weak in the World of the Strong,* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

[7] Weinstein, 1979, p. 24.

[8] *Ibid.,* 1972, p. 364.

taneously solve its political and economic causes. Here, Nos. 1, 2 and 3 above are subsumed.

2. The model must show the psycho-societal variables which constitute the subjective essence of underdevelopment (No. 2 above). These variables are the presence of disintegrative forces in domestic society caused by the clash of "modernity" and "tradition" which can lead to a weakening, instability and lower legitimacy of the state. The objective aspect of this subjective phenomenon is that it undermines the ability of the state to deal with "overwhelming national problems", i.e., the peripheral or semi-peripheral status. This assumption also implies that the model is not ahistorical since a peripheral status is historically rooted. Moreover, the resulting and evolving structure of dependency must constantly be kept in mind since it interacts with the psycho-societal variables. Space limitation here does not allow treatment of historical causes and evolving structures.

3. A less obvious assumption is *the complementarity of levels of analysis*. Korany correctly rejects the distinction between levels of analysis in international relations, i.e., there is no need to choose inflexibly between subjective and objective levels (the two levels of analysis in social science) and the national and international level dichotomy (as the supposed controversy is manifested in international relations) but "one can *emphasize* one component rather than the other depending on (a) *what issues* in (b) *which situation* we are *investigating*."[9] Here, at the subjective level, the role of personality is subsumed.

The first two of these assumptions are shared by Korany and Weinstein while the former contributes the third. In simplest terms, Korany's situation-role model can be stated as follows: behavior is a function of the interaction between actor and his environment.[10] The actor and environment are two sets of variables with each set composed of interdependent factors.[11] It shows the objective external events and the equally important meaning (i.e., psychological factors) which actors attach to them. All these comprise the *situation*. Korany's contribution lies in his bringing to the forefront the phenomenon of the colonial experience as it relates to the *definition of the situation*, or as an "input" in foreign policy. The model presents a different empirical referrent and a different situation of nations with different stakes and ends in the international system.

The definition of the situation

The definition of the situation, i.e., the factors in the environment and the meaning attached to them, has two main components: the

9 Korany, p. 70. Emphasis in the original.
10 *Ibid.*, p. 22.
11 *Ibid.*

international system or the *systemic component* and the *national component.*

Foreign policy orientation is a function of perceptions of positions in and of the structure of the international system. Developing countries perceive major structural characteristics of the international system in varying ways and adopt strategies and policy orientations to fit and/or as a reaction to this systemic structure. It is the parameter in the choice of foreign policy and it has a subjective and objective aspect. The orientation of the developing countries towards the international system is their perception of how its characteristics affect their situation of underdevelopment and global inequality. In spite of similar orientation towards the systemic component, there are differences in foreign policy behavior and this is determined by the *national component* and/or the personality in the definition of the situation. Behavior, as distinguished from orientation, is largely internally determined.

The national components are the universal elements of geographical location and topography, capability, organizational values, national historical experience, domestic public opinion and personality. The developing countries have as their national historical experience the modern colonial experience in or integration into the capitalist world economy, an experience which differentiates them from the major actors. Weinstein calls long-term internal givens a similar aggrupation of elements. Korany collapses the national component into a summary variable which he called the "prismatic political system" and singles out personality which accounts for behavioral specificities inspite of common policy orientation.

The prismatic political system is simultaneously the result and process of social change triggered by the colonial experience. It is social "disorganization" caused by the implantation of foreign economic and political institutions, attitudes and ideas (or structural distortions as a result of integration of "pre-capitalist societies" into the capitalist world economy) and a general lack of group cohesion. This is concretely manifested in an "identity crisis" on the individual level. In the societal level it is manifested through any combination of geographically, class, ethnically, religiously and linguistically-based disintegrative forces. Integration into the capitalist world economy ("modernization") and transformation of social relations tends to intensify these disintegrative forces in a nation. From here it can be deduced that the political problem of development is how to deal with such disintegrative forces which can result in systems-threatening demands such as the overthrow of the state (regardless of whether the state is revolutionary or not) or ethnic autonomy and how to consolidate a coherent society out of a fragmented one. In the case

of revolutionary regimes, such distintegrative forces may be ethnic or "counter-revolutionary elements", "agents of imperialism" or even "capitalist roaders".

Disintegrative forces are usually dealt with by a combination of legitimacy, consensus and coercion. But the problem with the developing countries is precisely that legitimizing symbols and institutions are underdeveloped or absent. Charismatic personalities are only effective in the short-run. In this kind of social context foreign policy orientation and behavior helps fulfill a legitimizing function for the state, i.e., it contributes to sysetms maintenance through the manipulation of symbols related to the national historical experience or myth.[12]

The systemic component and the prismatic political system element of the national component set the general direction of foreign policy. To this, the variable of personality (Korany) or elite perception (Weinstein) react. The elite's view of the world account for behavioral specifiicities in that it creates impulses for the uses of foreign policy. Once this is set, "idiosyncracy", or better still, *style* comes in and through a feedback process "the country's real capabilities, reflecting actual domestic and international conditions rather than elite perception of them are brought to bear on policy-makers..."[13]

The importance of personality, according to Korany, is also manifested in the following way: the personality and his conception of his national role links the international system to the national system. This formulation was based on the reification of the state into its representatives. This essay departs from Korany and proposes a distinction between personality and his regime and the state. The reification of the state into its representatives is useful in the analysis of actors at the international level. At the national level, however, it tends to ignore the long-run structural changes brought about by the leader and his regime not only on the state apparatus but also in the citizens' perception of the central authority and the very structure of society. (Internally, it also gives rise to the danger of reducing political issues to personalities.) The leader and his regime shall pass away ("in the long run we are all dead") but the state apparatus will remain with all the structural changes the leader brought about. The leader will account for the manner or style by which the changes were brought about in the international system. But after that, what? The leader is dead or changed and the structural changes in the state and society remains to be handled by the next leader and regime. For this reason, the state which is more

12 *Ibid.*
13 Weinstein, 1979, p. 375.

lasting, should be the focus of analysis at the national level. The state is the only entity that remains in the long run.

The matrix of the situation-role model can now be presented. Korany originally made the matrix to represent the situation of the members of the non-aligned movement.[14] It has been modified here to show the contemporary situation of Southeast Asian nations:

	External Situation (Systemic Component)	*Internal Situation (National Component)*
General	1. Multi-polarization 2. Détente (US, China, USSR)	1. Former Colonies 2. Economically Developing 3. Politically Prismatic 4. Geo-political Asian
Particular	1. Contiguity to China, Indochina, & Japan 2. US Policies in the Region	1. Leadership National Role 2. Intra- and/or Inter Elite Conflict & Regime Stability

The external/internal and general/particular dimensions can give rise to the following combinations of determinants or variables: 1) general/external; 2) general/internal; 3) particular/external and 4) particular/internal. The advantage of this scheme is that it incorporates and classifies in a manageable form the varieties of foreign policy determinants of developing countries, as well gives insights into the dilemmas and contradictions of these policies. It helps prevent the error of interpreting the behavior of developing nations as mere reflections of western paradigms. Depending on which of the combinations of squares is emphasized, results of studies will differ. The model also shows that interchangeability of internal determinants is dysfunctional beyond a certain point. The question of which variable is primary is also rendered irrelevant since results of studies depend on which square is emphasized.

Integrating Weinstein's model with Korany's matrix, the functions of foreign policy in the particular situation of developing countries can be deduced together with the position that the state occupies in the framework.

From the fundamental situation of weakness (economically developing, politically prismatic or peripheral status) and in the context of the contemporary systemic component foreign policy has three main uses which illuminate the relations of the variables or squares. According to Weinstein, these are: 1) the defense of the nation's independence against perceived threats; 2) mobilization (or cutting off) of external resources for internal development; and 3) achievement of a variety of purposes related to domestic political

[14] Korany, pp. 93-95.

competition. Foreign policy in developing countries then is an interplay, complementation and contradictions of independence, development and political competition.

The uses of foreign policy for political competition apart from the issues of independence and development is not peculiar to developing nations but it does take on a specific form in such nations. The colonial experience and foreign penetration give relationship with the great powers a more significant bearing on internal affairs than it might otherwise have.[15]

Weinstein points out the uses of foreign policy for political competition and the *inverse relations* between independence and development, i.e., emphasis on independence by the elite decreases as emphasis on development increases and vice-versa (e.g., the transformation of Sukarno's independent foreign policy into Suharto's emphasis on dependent development). This formulation on the uses of foreign policy can be modified in two ways.

First, Weinstein's function of foreign policy for political competition seems to consider a short-run function of foreign policy like the lifetime of a party or faction as was the case with Korany's emphasis on the charismatic personality. What of the long-run? In the long-run one must see a continuity from one leader, regime or "period" to another in terms of the structural changes in society, the manner of integration of the nation into the capitalist world economy and the state apparatus. Legitimacy fluctuates but while a state still enjoys legitimacy with the aid of foreign policy, the very nature of the state and society is changed. If legitimacy disappears, new state controllers will take over the very same state and society, build up a new legitimacy and the state and society continue to change. Hence, there is no such thing as a "break" in history; there are only continuities. Change of policy, party or leader is not a break since the state and structure of society continue to change. Whether such changes are regressive or progressive depends on one's ideological stance.

Secondly, in the long run it is the state, which is never neutral, that will always preside over changes and continuity in society. Therefore, the handling of the situation must never be seen as an endless interaction of environment and actor but in relation to a continuing social transformations in the state which presides over the society and situation.

Here, it becomes obvious that foreign policy is not separate from the total situation of underdevelopment. Foreign policy may

[15] Weinstein, 1972, p. 366.

fulfill a legitimizing function in the long run but so do other economic policies designed to solve underdevelopment, or to be more accurate, start a transformation from a peripheral to a semi-peripheral status. Obviously, foreign policy alone can never legitimize a state but the national symbols that it can manipulate has a wide psychological impact considering the socio-psychological variables of the situation.

The psychological impact of foreign policy (e.g., as a symbol of independence) also has a structural effect similar to the effect of an economic policy designed to pursue development through a massive redistribution of surplus against a policy encouraging a concentration of surplus. Foreign policy symbols appeal to the middle class, specifically the attentive public among them. Their "attentiveness" is a function of their social position.[16] The structural significance of this fact is that it is this sector which *fulfills a stabilizing function in any society in the sense that its ambiguity towards radical redistribution of surplus or even interest in the state prevents the rapid polarization of society.* In some societies this "attentive public" could be the large number of cadres of the central authority.

Two Cases in Philippine Foreign Policy

Two cases in Philippine foreign policy will be presented to see how the framework above can be useful in gaining insight. These two cases are the normalization of ties with China on June 1975 and the ratification of the Philippine-Japan Treaty of Amity,Commerce and Navigation, the old one in 1973 and the new one in 1979.

Normalization of Ties With China

It seems that the internal situation of the Philippines, specifically the prismatic political system, geo-political Asian, national role and regime stability elements were the primary considerations for normalizing ties with China. This is to say that foreign policy served the purpose of demonstrating independence and as a tool of political competition. The external situation played a secondary role *at the moment* of normalization.

The establishment of diplomatic ties with China took place in the era of détente, multi-polarization, the "North-South confrontation" and the Arab oil strategy (general/external). Contiguity to China was of course a permanent given but the reunification of Vietnam and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from mainland Asia were probably contributing factors in the final push for normalization (particularly/

[16] See Johan Galtung, "Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position", James Rosenau, *International Politics and Foreign Policy: a Reader in Research and Theory,* (New York: The Free Press, 1969).

external). China as a source of oil and consumer goods as well as market for Philippine products were motivated by the economically developing element of the situation although this did not seem to be the main function of foreign policy towards China. The geo-political Asian element of general/internal situation took the form of a continuation of the Asian foreign policy of the Philippines. In the past, this Asian foreign policy, i.e., the advocacy of closer ties with free Asia for the purpose of asserting an Asian identity of a former U.S. colony in the iron grip of excessive American "cultural" influence probably served as the independence function of Philippine foreign policy. This Asian foreign policy was pursued within the clear framework of the security alliance with the U.S. and the doctrine of containment with a non-aligned stance being out of the question. This changed by the mid-1970s and while U.S. security arrangements remained, containment was transformed into the doctrine of balance of power in the region. The Asian foreign policy continued to perform an independence function but with the normalization of ties with China, this policy took on a broader function in demonstrating independence. Establishment of ties with China, while demonstrating independence and "Asianness", also served to deflate criticisms of nationalists and oppositionists of the martial law regime for the continuation of its excessive identification with the Western alliance system. Regime support and stability was probably enhanced not only with this demonstration of independence but by the pledge of non-interference by China in its relations with the underground Communist Party of the Philippines' program of armed revolution.

The Philippines was the 101st country to establish diplomatic relations with China and the second ASEAN member to do so (after Malaysia, which normalized ties in May 1974). As early as 1964 former ambassador to the United Nations Salvador P. Lopez was already advocating the establishment of diplomatic relations with China. In early 1969 the Department of Foreign Affairs indicated that it was studying the possibility.

In May 1972 President Marcos signed Executive Order No. 248 regulating trade with the eastern bloc. In later 1972 a Philippine table tennis team participated in a tournament in China and was received by Madame Mao. In March 1973 a group of Chinese doctors and officials of the Chinese Health Ministry visited the Philippines; the visit was returned by a mission of the Department of Trade. The most important event was the state visit of Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos to China on September 1974. She met with Premier Zhou En Lai in his hospital bed as well as with Chairman Mao. With this, normalization was only a question of time.[17] A trade agreement was

[17] *Bulletin Today*, June 3, 1975.

signed during the state visit providing for 750,000 tons of crude oil a year for the Philippines in exchange for coconut oil, sugar, lumber and copper.

After the visit, Mrs. Marcos attended a joint meeting of the Foreign Policy Council and the National Security Council. It seems that the formal decision to normalize ties with China was made during this time. By April 1975 trade with China was $47.3M, making it the No. 16 trading partner of the Philippines but still the most important socialist trading partner.

In early 1975 Marcos announced that he would make a state visit to China to normalize relations. The date of the state visit was set from June 7 to 11. Diplomatic ties with Taiwan would be cut although a commercial office would be retained in Taipeh. Department of Foreign Affairs officials called the normalization as the "incontrovertible signs of our arrival", obviously referring to the new independent posture of Philippine foreign policy. In the same breath however, the same officials added that ties with China would have no effect on security relations with the U.S., particularly with the U.S. bases in the Philippines. Marcos also announced that diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union would immediately follow. (It did not actually materialize until June 1976.)

The projection of an independent posture was obviously a major consideration in the normalization. Such a posture was defined as "befriending all nations in order to expand economic and political options of the nation."[18] The cutting off of ties with Taiwan differentiated Philippine policy towards China with that of the U.S. which at that time was largely undecided about Taiwan. In this point the Philippines truly had an independent posture.

However, one point must be made about normalization of ties with China. While normalization was undeniably an innovation in Philippine foreign policy that demonstrated its new measure of independence it must be kept in mind that the idea of independence among Third World nations by the mid-1970s was still largely measured in terms of the ideological backlash of the non-aligned movement and the Cold War, i.e., independence was having a different policy from U.S. policy both for objective economic and political reasons as well as subjective symbolic reasons. This created an ideological demand on the Philippine national polity. The Phillippine official stand in the mid-1970s was a sort of "redefinition" of independence as befriending all nations, an unassailable stand. Even if the Philippines had a different stand with the U.S. vis-a-vis Taiwan (a minor difference since the Philippines did not have security ties

[18] *Ibid.*

with Taiwan) and that the Philippines was five years ahead of the U.S. in recognizing China, the overall Philippine stand did not differ from that of the U.S. stand in the Pacific region as manifested in the continued presence of the bases.

The bases are a potent symbol of dependency and its abolition, the symbol of independence. But by the mid-1970s while the potency of the symbol remained the systemic component of the situation had already changed and the U.S. presence in the Pacific region took on a different dimension with the emergence of a new balance of power in the region. Vietnam has been reunited and the doctrine of containment transformed into the balance of power. The security consideration of the Philippine elite inherent in this doctrine gained a measure of justification in the late 1970s with the Cambodia-Vietnam and Vietnam-China wars as well as Soviet penetration of the region and the Indian Ocean. These were the perceived systemic components of the Philippine situation by the mid-1970s. This perceived systemic component and the U.S. bases as its concrete manifestation was diametrically opposed to the ideological demands of a non-aligned movement and Cold War-based definition of independence. While befriending all nations is a sound orientation in a multipolar world, the U.S. bases and the ideological demands of the non-aligned movement and Cold War-based concept of such independence militated against the full use of the possible independence function of foreign policy. This of course assumes the acceptance of that particular concept of independence. But Philippine officials themselves have at certain times indicated that the Philippines is tending towards a non-aligned policy associated with Cold War politics. They were aiming for that kind of independence and the presence of U.S. bases, dictated by perceptions of the new systemic component, conflicted with it. This was a dilemma of dependency in a multipolar international system or systemic component.

Further, multi-polarism in Asia was inaugurated by China-U.S. détente. After détente, normalization of ties with China was a foregone conclusion for most of free Asia. It is doubtful that the Philippines took the cue from the U.S., as it were, but the changed systemic component brought about by the détente made it *appear* that the Philippines' independent China policy was intended to fit U.S. strategy in Asia. This only made the Philippines more "unable" to meet the ideological demand of the non-aligned movement and Cold War-based definition of independence. Hence, from the point of view of the external situation there was a strong ideological demand for a

[19] Leon Ma. Guerrero, *Prisoners of History* (New Delhi, 1972 quoted in Man Mohini Kaul, *The Philippines and Southeast Asia,* (New Delhi: Radiant Press, 1978).

certain kind of independence, the reality of multi-polarism and the balance of power in the region were all in conflict with each other as the Philippines tried to use foreign policy to demonstrate its independence.

It is useless to argue that the Philippines should have recognized China when an ideological and policy difference with the U.S. still spelled independence as it did during the Cold War. The very national situation of the Philippines did not allow this: the prismatic political system to which independence was to be demonstrated was wracked by communist insurgency which always made China suspect of internal subversion (hence opposition of diplomatic ties by the military), rabid anti-communism as a result of the U.S. colonial experience and ideological influence as manifested in a "hysterically pro-American" public.[19] Considering the post-war national and systemic component of the Philippines it can be surmised that the country "missed" as it were a certain historical and ideological conjuncture in the international system which could have allowed the full use of the independence function of foreign policy to counter a regressive psycho-societal variable in the form of pro-Americanism.

Who is responsible for this "missing" of the conjuncture? To hazard an answer: the elite. To explain further: the source of legitimacy of the Philippine state, according to Remigio Agpalo,[20] was the continuity of the prewar U.S.-trained elite who were carriers of the American liberal democratic ideology. Their "counterpart" was a pro-American and anti-communist middle class and public. The memory of an independence movement or national revolution has been obliterated by an American educational system. (The reaction of the elite to this kind of situation was to exploit this source of legitimacy for political competition. In foreign policy, this found expression in "special relations" with the U.S. Thus, at a time when independence and its full use as a foreign policy orientation was the preoccupation of the former colonies of the Third World, the Philippines has this myth of special relations with the U.S. No Philippine president departed from this position by force of circumstance, considerations of political career or ideological affinity. Marcos, at times, was able to question the myth and by the mid-1970s the strong state structure allowed him to do so in a better way than his predecessors. But by this time the systemic component was such that the full use of the independence function of foreign policy was already muted.

Still, the regime was undeterred in projecting this innovation in foreign policy as an "independent posture" in June 1975. This could

[20] Remigio E. Agpalo, "Legitimacy and the Political Elite in the Philippines", *Philippine Political Science Journal,* No. 2, December 1975.

be gleaned partly from the timing of the normalization. It can safely be said that the timing was deliberate: the president was to return from China on the eve of Independence Day (June 12). The symbolism and impact of the timing was not lost to the leadership and the attentive public. This analysis is consistent with the style of Marcos—a penchant for the dramatic as manifested, for example, in his state visit for the U.S. in 1966 as well as other occasions. Not surprisingly, the whole independence day speech of Marcos was devoted to normalization with the Peoples Republic of China.

On June 4, with what clearly was the economic development variable in the situation, leading Filipino bankers, businessmen and industrialists arrived n Peking to discuss a trade agreement. By 1975, three years into the authoritarian regime, most of these men were already associated with the state controllers. On June 6 Marcos signed Presidential Decree No. 730 giving permanent status to the 1,785 overstaying Chinese in the Philippines for the purpose of integrating them into the national community. From the perspective of removing an irritant between the Filipino and Chinese community, this was undeniably a positive step. (The overstaying Chinese have always been exploited by corrupt judges and immigration officials.)

With a clear eye on the tremendous prestige and independent credentials of the "New Society", Marcos left for China amidst newspaper announcements that a "rousing welcome, expected to exceed those extended to previous chiefs of state" was to greet him.[21] On June 8 the First Couple "unexpectedly" met with the late Chairman Mao.

Philippine perceptions of the systemic and national component were reflected in the speeches which Marcos delivered in China. Philippine interest in the post-Vietnam era was regional stability and security, which Marcos referred to as the obverse side of the coin of development. In such a stable region, areas of cooperation between communists and non-communists could be expanded and "small nations of the area can develop."[22] Marcos attributed instability in the region to power politics and added that the Philippines "realize the futility of seeking absolute security but we do understand also that we require a measure of it."[23] The root of security and independence was identical as the "creation of the institutions of solidarity" and the caution "not to become proxies for thre power competitors."[24] Reflecting Philippine concern with the balance of power in Asia, Marcos also

21 *Bulletin Today*, June 6, 1975. Hereinafter referred to as *BT*.
22 *BT*, June 8, 1975.
23 *BT*, June 9, 1975.
24 *BT*, June 11, 1975.

said that China's national interest would be "a force of stability and peace in the region."[25]

The act of normalizing ties with China was an independent posture in itself. This posture was further emphasized during the visit through 1) the assertion of the Philippines' Asian and Third World identity; 2) indirect criticisms of the U.S.; and 3) criticism of foreign intervention and domination. In a speech at the Great Hall of the People, Marcos said that this is the "age where the most subtle forms of foreign domination or intervention must disappear".[26] ASEAN members, including the Philippines, have become "truly and genuinely independent, capable of being friendly with all nations."[27] China, he added, is the "natural leader of the Third World."[28] Criticizing the U.S. in the same speech Marcos also said, in obvious reference to special relations with the U.S., that the Philippines is a reliable ally and friend but there were times that its friendship as such was "repeatedly depreciated or taken for granted that we make an effort to do what is distasteful to us, to act as if selfishly, with a singular devotion to our strict national interest."[29] This was followed through with a call for Filipinos "to be more objective and less emotional".[30] If ever Filipinos must be emotional, Marcos said, it should be based on an Asian identity which should be the basis of remodeling Filipino thoughts and policies.[31] Marcos best summarized contemporary Philippine foreign policy as being "apprehensive of Japan, frightened of China, watchful of Indonesia, aggravated by India".[32] In another speech later in the visit of Marcos also commented that the dangers in the world "derive from the destructiveness of Western civilization and the arms race among the predatory powers; second, the terrible wars have not been brought about by the poor people but by the rich countries."[33] In another speech in Shanghai Marcos again asserted Asian identity as a form of independence by saying that "China's challenge is to be true to ourselves—to build our new societies not on alien forms indiscriminately borrowed, but on our own unique historical experiences and cultural identities."[34]

First Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping's response was naturally collaborative with the perceptions of the Philippine president. He referred to the "unyielding and heroic struggle against imperialism"

25 *Ibid.*
26 *BT*, June 8, 1975.
27 *Ibid.*
28 *Ibid.*
29 *Ibid.*
30 *Ibid.*
31 *Ibid.*
32 *BT*, June 9, 1975.
33 *BT*, June 10, 1975.
34 *BT*, June 22, 1975.

of the Filipino people and the Philippines' development of "relations with Third World people, support for their economic rights and [opposition] to hegemonism and power politics".[35]

One of the most important and concrete results of normalization for the Marcos regime were the separate statements by Zhou and Mao disclaiming support for the Communist Party of the Philippines and assurances that China was not seeking to overthrow or exploit the Philippine government. This assurance of non-intervention was incorporated in the communiqué, the contents of which were only announced after the return of Marcos to Manila "to coincide with the June 12 national celebration in the Philippines."[36] The communiqué contained provisions for the establishment of diplomatic ties, principle of peaceful coexistence, peaceful settlement of disputes, opposition to hegemonism, subversion and interference, a one-China policy, single citizenship for overseas Chinese, trade and cultural exchange and exchange of ambassadors.

Upon arrival in Manila on June 11 Marcos immediately assured old allies that "this new friendship" would not affect existing alliances with the U.S. The national and systemic component that were probably responsible for this kind of stance has already been discussed. If the Independence Day speech of Marcos was a gauge of the significance the regime attached to normalization, then ties with China were indeed one of the most important evens of Philippine diplomatic history—the whole June 12 speech was devoted to it. Marcos considered normalization as the most important event that reflected the "changed character of our nation" because it "liquidated a political past."[37] This was a clear reference to the independent posture of the country. More concretely, the gains for the regime's stability were pointed out in the form of the non-intervention clause of the communiqué, and verbal assurances from Zhou and Mao that the Philippines "would be free to deal with any insurgency, subversion or rebellion..."[38]

Then came what some may consider the most astonishing part of the speech. Marcos gave assurances that diplomatic ties with Peking did not mean that the Philippines would "become communist" or change its social system, and that the system of free enterprise would remain.

Marcos then proceeded to say that there would be no uncritical awe or naiveté towards China and that the Philippines did not enter the relations on China's terms. Relations with the U.S. remains

[35] *BT*, June 9, 1975.
[36] *Ibid.*
[37] *BT*, June 13, 1975.
[38] *Ibid.*

undiminished and controlled "entirely by its own set of circumstances."[39] The U.S. would remain a "good friend and firm ally"; nothing should be "construed as an effort to diminish our historical relationship" with the U.S.[40] (The *Bulletin Today* editorialized on June 12 that "Filipinos just do not turn their back on old friends after years of kinship."[41]) Finally, Marcos said that normalization demonstrated that the Philippines had the boldness of (imagination) and intellect in exploiting areas of positive cooperation "to enhance not only its national security but also its integrity and self-respect."[42]

Lastly, normalization of ties with China was a boost to the integration of the Chinese community into the Philippine national polity, a positive contribution by any count. On June 19, 1975 Marcos announced that Chinese in the Philippines must either become Filipino or Chinese citizens, thus concluding the dilemma of dual citizenship. Those who failed to choose a citizenship would become stateless persons. Members of the Chinese community were encouraged to become Filipino citizens. At the same time, the foreign office ordered a ban on the continued operation of Chinese schools that had not yet Filipinized their curricula or registered as Philippine corporations. Some 60% of the 131 Chinese schools had become Philippine corporations, i.e., 60% Filipino-owned. These schools had a total of 50,000 students and 3,093 teachers, 60% of whom were Chinese. Legally, according to the foreign office, these schools should have been closed down with the establishment of ties with China. A fully Filipinized curricula became a requirement, while Chinese language and art became optional subjects.

As a fitting end to that hectic June of 1975, the Philippine embassy pulled out of Taiwan on June 21.

Philippine-Japan Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation: 1973 and 1979

There were two Philippine-Japan Treaties of Amity, Commerce and Navigation: the first was signed on December 9, 1960, immediately ratified by Japan but ratified by the Philippines only in December 1973, more than one year after martial law was declared. This treaty expired on January 1977, was renegotiated, ratified in May 10, 1979 and took effect on June 1980. As Dr. Josefa M. Saniel described the 1973 agreement: "No diplomatic document of

39 *Ibid.*
40 *Ibid.*
41 *BT*, June 12, 1975.
42 *BT*, June 13, 1975.

the Philippines has perhaps undergone closer scrutiny and discussion for an extended period of time than this treaty."[43]

There were clearly two functions of foreign policy in this case: independence defined as defense against economic threats, and development as defined earlier in this essay, both having a clear inverse relations with each other. Political competition seems to have played a minor role. (There was a case of opposition to the treaty that seemingly arose out of nationalist consideration. Congressman R. D. Antonio vehemently opposed the treaty in his speeches at the House, invoking Japanese economic invasion. After a while he stopped attacking the treaty, disappeared from the scene for a few months and then reappeared in the newspapers as the exclusive distributor of Suzuki motorcycles in the Philippines!)

The independence use of foreign policy was most prominent from 1960 to 1972, after which the development use of foreign policy completely overshadowed the former. The imposition of martial law precluded any use of the treaty for political competition after 1972. The reorientation of the Philippine economy to an export-oriented industrialization policy and the open-door policy for foreign investments put the accent on developmental considerations as the basis of the treaty and relations with Japan. There is little political symbolism that could be used in relation to Japan except for some remnants of anti-Japanese sentiments that could always be exploited.

The 1973 Treaty

The first draft of the treaty was submitted in July 1959 to Pres. Carlos P. Garcia, whose reaction was "cautious".[44] At that time the Philippines was nearing the limits of its import substitution policy (internal/particular) and the Japanese prime minister Nobusuke had announced an Asian Economic Development Plan (general/particular, i.e., Japan as economic power in Asia) which encouraged greater economic cooperation with the Philippines after conclusion of the treaty. Negotiations started on February 1960; the treaty was signed in Tokyo on December 9, 1960. One member of the Philippine delegation, Lorenzo Sumulong, refused to sign the treaty because of some unequal provisions. The treaty, having been concluded before an unportentous presidential election year, was placed in "deep freeze".[45] This prevented the use of the treaty for political competition. Garcia lost the election and it was Diosdado Macapagal, his successor, who took the first step in considering the treaty.

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[43] Josefa M. Saniel, *The Philippines-Japan Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation: An Overview,* monograph (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1972).

[44] *Ibid.,* p. 32.

[45] *Ibid.,* p. 35.

In the 13 years that followed, the objections to the treaty fell along two main lines: 1) fear of Japanese economic invasion and 2) the issue of territorial waters with Japan subscribing to the 3-mile principle while the Philippines held on to the archipelagic doctrine.[46] The treaty was the first international agreement of the Philippines with a most-favored nation (MFN) clause. Three committees were formed to study the treaty as Macapagal launched his Five-Year Socio-Economic Development Program on January 1962 calling for economic growth with the help of foreign investors in exploiting natural resources with due "regard to public interest".[47]

On the basis of the document itself, the fear of economic invasion arose out of the extension granting of the MFN clause in all provisions concerning trade and investments. The MFN clause has a dual characteristic: while it prevents discrimination of a national product it also exposes the home market and industry to external competition.[48] Given the peripheral status of the Philippines and the core status of Japan, it could only lead to a loss of autonomy and independence on the part of the peripheral economy; it is a concession to international interest.[49] Because of this contradiction the MFN clause can be severely restricted, subjected to strict reciprocity and renounced in a few days' notice. (In the 1930s the practice of granting MFN treatment was practically abandoned.[50]) A possible response to loss of autonomy is the abandonment of positions as component parts of the unified world market[51] (or semi-mercantilist withdrawal from the capitalist world economy in the words of Wallerstein.) The Philippine-Japan treaty provides for no such restriction on any grounds; it has no list of products to be excepted, no instant renunciation clause and no escape clause. Instead, it has a consultation clause. This clause provides that the initiative of remedying injuries to the national economy *belongs to the exporter of manufactured products* (clearly, Japan) after the aggrieved party has presented reasonable evidence.[52] If this consultation fails, the matter could be brought to the International Court of Justice, a time-consuming process. Clearly, there were perceived and real threats to independence in the form of an economic invasion.

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[46] *Ibid.*

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

[48] Elpidio R. Sta. Romana, *Dependency and the Philippine-Japan Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation: Focus on Trade and Investments,* unpublished MA thesis, (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1976), Chapter 1.

[49] *Ibid.* See also Richard Carlton Snyder, *The Most-Favored Nation Clause: An Analysis with Particular Reference To Recent Treaty Practice,* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1948).

[50] Snyder, p. 246.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 245.

[52] Sta. Romana, p. 37.

As for territorial waters, there were fears that Japanese fishing vessels would enter the Philippine inland sea. The treaty, as former ambassador Juan Arreglado said, was simply a set of rules that did not envisage any concrete benefit for both parties, nor did it have any loan component.[53]

The three committees that were formed by Macapagal were: 1) the Inter-Agency Technical Committee on Economics; 2) the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Economic Policy and 3) a committee headed by former ambassador Juan M. Arreglado who later became a rabid oppositionist of the treaty. All the committees submitted recommendations suggesting strong caution in view of the perceived threats of Japanese economic invasion.

A combined report of the Inter-Agency Technical Committee and the Cabinet Committee of January 1963 recommended that Macapagal maintain the *status quo* while working out a *modus vivendi* with the Japanese on specific agreements concerning technical assistance, taxation, shipping and other aspects of commercial relations. (At that time trade with Japan was growing, and Japanese technical assistance and economic activities in the form of liaison offices in Manila were increasing.) The two committees also suggested that before ratification, laws to serve as safeguards covering immigration, business operation of aliens and dumping should be passed by Congress. The report also suggested that the Philippines use its position on civil and air transport as leverage for a liberation of the interest rate of the Reparations Agreement's loan component. Finally, if the treaty was to be ratified, the Senate should provide certain reservations.

The Inter-Agency Committee also pointed out that the treaty does not exempt any future regional groupings that the Philippines may join and that the treaty had no escape clause or any provision against dumping and other malpractices, or any agreement on loans. The Committee also believed that national treatment of Japanese vessels could be prejudicial to the Philippines.

The Arreglado Committee recommended that the Securities and Exchange Commission continue its vigilance in licensing Japanese corporations. Japanese investments should be restricted to the exploitation of natural resources and operations of public utilities. It It also recommended that after the tenth year if reparations (1966) the Philippines should work out an arrangement for shortening the payment period of the loan component as well as liberalization of its interest rate. It was also suggested that the treaty be used as a leverage to attain the above recommendations and a bilateral airlines agreement with fifth freedom rights for both countries beyond Tokyo

[53] Saniel, pp. 34-35.

and Manila. In the opinion of the Committee, Japan should lift its ban on the importation of Philippine banana and frozen shrimps.

The three committees recommended two courses of action: submit the treaty to the Senate for ratification, subject to any reservation that the Senate may impose; or delay its submission but provide measure as safeguards against any ill-effects of the treaty. Macapagal chose the latter course of action. Apparently, Macapagal too was concerned with the threat that Japan posed to the Philippine economy. However, the hypothesis cannot be precluded that the remnants of anti-Japanese sentiments in the public which the oppositionists could exploit (together with real fears of economic invasion) played a role Macapagal's decision. Had he submitted the treaty to the Senate, opposition would be instantaneous (as was the case when Marcos submitted the treaty). He would be giving his political enemies ammunition which could be combined with a measure of anti-Japanese sentiments among the public. But in the main, caution was due mainly to the desire to protect economic independence.

Marcos certified the Treaty to the Senate for ratification on March 17, 1970, four years after assuming the presidency and a few months after his unprecedented reelection. (As early as September 1966 Marcos had given the Japanese assurances on a quick ratification of the treaty.) From 1967 to 1970 Congress passed laws which it considered as safeguards as well as stimulants to the economy. These laws covered entry of foreign traders, residence of professionals, amendments in the tariff code, the Foreign Business Law which aimed at regulating foreign investments, a law regulating awards of government contracts, the Investments Incentives Act of 1968 and the Export Incentives Act of 1970. These laws, specially the last two, were not, however, particularly aimed at the Japanese but were already part of the gradual transformation of Philippine economic policy from that of import substitution into export-oriented industrialization.

The Senate failed to act on the treaty until early 1972. On January 13 of that year Senate President Jose Roy, who was also Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, announced that as long as he was committee chairman the treaty would never be reported out. There was no indication at that time that he would be replaced. Opposition in the House and Senate was instantaneous, persistent and bi-partisan from the time the treaty was submitted. In February the Foreign Affairs Committee decided to report out the treaty in spite of the negative consensus by the members of the Committee, aparently out of fear of economic invasion. Marcos

said that the flaws of the treaty could be the subject of future negotiations. This was not reassuring to the Senate.[54]

Finally, on March 1, without actually reporting the treaty out as decided earlier, the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs rejected it through a unanimous vote and opened the door for a new pact.[55] Japanese representatives calmly claimed that trade would increase but investments might become sluggish.

Fears of economic invasion, intrusion into Philippine territorial waters, alleged malpractices of Japanese liaison offices and dummies, dumping and smuggling of Japanese products and the excessive concentration of Japanese capital in the extractive industries were the underlying reasons for the rejection of the treaty.[56] At the time the treaty was rejected, a hearing was actually underway on the activities of Japanese liaison offices by the House Committee on Commerce and Industry upon the complaint of the Philippine Chamber of Industries and the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines. Two weeks after the rejection, the Committee decided to prosecute 47 Japanese firms for conducting illegal business in the country.[57] Independence was then the primary consideration in the opposition of the treaty while the government was constantly pushing for the development angle.*

Not much was heard of the treaty since its rejection. With the imposition of martial law in September 1972, the Senate was disbanded and the mass media supervised. Suddenly, on December 26, 1973 the newspaper announced the forthcoming ratification of the treaty. The next day the instruments of ratification were exchanged in Manila, together with an exchange of notes concerning a $17M loan.

The independence use of foreign policy in terms of protecting the country against perceived threats was clearly predominant in the case of the 1973 Philippine-Japan treaty from the period 1961 to 1972. The development use of foreign policy became predominant after the imposition of martial law, with independence being reduced to a minimum. Japan, in 1973, was the No. 2 trading partner of the Philippines (30% of total foreign trade) as well as a source of foreign investment. That independence was clearly sacrificed for the

* It would be interesting to compare the fate of the Philippine-Japan and the Laurel-Langley Agreement (1955) and see how anti-Japanese sentiments were manifested in the former and pro-Americanism in the latter, if these factors were at all crucial. This point, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.

54 Sta. Romana, p. 10.

55 *Ibid.*, p. 11.

56 Saniel, pp. 64-77.

57 *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.

sake of dependent development becomes clear if we look at the process by which the 1973 treaty was renegotiated, signed and ratified in 1979.

The 1979 Treaty

On July 11, 1976 Japan and the Philippines agreed to renegotiate the treaty not only because it was expiring in January 1977 but also, according to Philippine officials, because of the Philippines' new ideological stance of identifying with the Third World and its desire to develop a customs union in ASEAN. It was even claimed by officials that the Philippines actually suspended the treaty in early 1976.

That independence was clearly sacrificed for dependent development now appears as an official admission on the part of the Philippines. Foreign Ministry of officials stated that the treaty "has worked against the interest of the Philippines" and that the new treaty is expected to do "away with certain provisions which the President himself considers lopsided and in favor of Japan."[58] Finance Minister Cesar Virata also made the astonishing statement that "the Philippines signed the old treaty just the same, hoping that Japan would not take advantage of the lopsided provisions." Equally dumbfounding was the reason he gave; according to him the Philippines signed the treaty since Japan "had a strong bargaining strength at that time (1973) as a world economic superpower and one of the country's main trading partners."[59] Some of the fears expressed over the old treaty materialized. The recession of 1974 and 1975 resulted in a rash of complaints by Filipino businessmen of Japanese business malpractices such as requiring Philippine banana exporters to use only Japanese-made cartons (a persistent complaint even before the 1973 treaty), breach of contract regarding copper concentrations, and dumping. Foreign Minister Carlos Romulo also admitted that national treatment of Japanese shipping in the old treaty was onerous.[60]

The first negotiation session took place on March 22, 1977. There was a plan to finish the first draft by the time of the state visit of President and Mrs. Marcos to Japan on April 25 to 28, 1977. This deadline was not met and five negotiation sessions were conducted from June 1977 to July 1978. On April 19, 1979 Romulo went to Tokyo on an official visit and initialed the new treaty the following day. The actual signing took place in Manila in May 1979 with the state visit of Prime Minister Masahiro Ohira. Details of the treaty were kept undisclosed until the visit of Ohira.

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58 *BT*, March 23, 1977.
59 *Ibid.*
60 *BT*, May 11, 1979.

Foreign Ministry officials claimed that in the new treaty Japan agreed to abolish national treatment of Japanese business and changed it into an MFN treatment. Thus, MFN treatment became more extensive. The consultation clause was also abolished; instead, a prior system of notification was set in case either party decides to impose restriction on certain products. There are also restrictions to prevent deceptive practices as well as practices that encourage monopoly. Romulo claimed that the new treaty provided for equitable sharing of cargoes in shipping as well as provisions for amending the treaty while in force. There was also an exchange of notes concerning a $166M credit at the time of ratification. A tax treaty was signed during ratification providing for criteria of taxable income in the two countries. Incentives (lower taxes on dividends, interest and royalties) were also given to Japanese capital to enter Philippine pioneer areas. Taxes for shipping and aircraft for the two countries were also reduced.

It is hard to find where all these supposed new provisions are in the treaty. An examination of the treaty will reveal a virtual verbatim reproduction of the old treaty. Ex-Speaker of the House Jose B. Laurel has charged that all the claimed changes were minimal and were done only for the sake of style with no effect on the essence.[62]

In contrast to the 1973 treaty the new treaty was negotiated, signed and ratified with virually no opposition on the basis of any threat to economic independence. This was possible because of a strong state apparatus and the silencing of the critics of the martial law regime. It certainly precluded the use of the treaty for political purposes but it also removed the consideration of independence.

It was said earlier that the independence, development and political competition uses of foreign policy are most effectively used among the middle sector of society. In the case of normalization with China the impact was basically *psychological;* its structural impact could probably be found in the promise of non-intervention by China, thus giving the Philippines greater freedom in dealing with insurgency. In the case of the two treaties with Japan and closer economic ties with Japan, the impact was mainly *structural*—these ties with Japan benefited the upper and middle sector of the society as they pursued a path of dependent development.

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[61] *BT,* April 22, 1979.

[62] *Business Day, Special Report on RP-Japan Relations,* XIV: 106, July 24, 1980.

Conclusion

We saw that normalization of ties with China by the Philippines served a double purpose: to demonstrate a measure of independence of the regime and to enhance its stability by pre-empting external support of subversion. The independence function of foreign policy was however muted because of the changed systemic component in the case of the Philippines. This however did not prevent a "celebration" of the new independent posture of the regime in a typically dramatic style. Ideally, it would take a survey to measure the exact psychological impact of the normalization of ties with China. While this is beyond the scope of this essay, it could be hazarded that such impact was confined to the Philippines' middle sector, a sector which in any society fulfills a stabilizing function.

In the case of the two treaties with Japan, foreign policy was used to protect national independence from external economic threats. The independence function of foreign policy (as well as its uses for political competition) was overshadowed with the coming of martial law, and foreign policy towards Japan fulfilled mainly a development function (and a dependent development at that). If the benefit of ties with China was basically psychological and politically symbolic among the middle sector of society, the benefit of closer ties with Japan was material among the same middle class.

At a higher level of abstraction it can also be hazarded that the ultimate beneficiary of foreign policy in a developing country is the state through its psychological and material manipulations that allows the middle sector of society to gain. *Internally,* foreign policy is meant by the state for that sector. The state and the middle sector overlap but the state has greater political power since it is more organized with its own cadres and instruments of coercion. *Externally,* the measure of regional security that foreign policy can bring will only allow a nation to pursue development which in many instances reconcentrates surplus in the same middle sector. In both instances the state is preserved.

THE PERCEPTION OF NEOCOLONIAL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES: NATIONALISM IN FILIPINO LITERATURE SINCE THE 1960s*

EDGAR B. MARANAN

> The United States, after all, has been the single most influential foreign power in the Philippines and its political, military, economic and cultural interests have shaped, far more than any other external factor, the social environment in which Filipino writers have to function as human beings and as practitioners of their craft.
>
> S.P. Lopez, *The Writer in a Society in Crisis*

> The existence of the Filipino people, of which the writer is a part, is primarily defined by the neocolonial relations dominant in our society.
>
> Luis V. Teodoro, Jr., *Literature and Social Reality*

The Persistence of Protest

The years following the declaration of martial law in the Philippines in 1972 which aimed, among other things, at clamping down on radical dissent, have witnessed the undiminished influence of the radical perspective in Filipino nationalist literature, as may be gleaned from the works of the present crop of poets and fictionists.

By radical perspective, we have in mind the primacy of social content projected by creative writers who were either activists or active sympathizers of the nationalist movement, the mass-audience orientation which emphasized clarity of presentation and clear-cut partisanship, and a literary symbology which dwelt on the basic issues confronting Filipino society, identified as *imperialism, bureaucrat-capitalism,* and *fascism* or *state violence.* It was, above all, the perception of an ideological imperative for this kind of literature to be developed and upheld as a criticism of social conditions and a call to action, if not to arms.

The call was for writers to write effectively and well, to write about and for the Filipino masses and, as much as possible, to go out among them in order to learn about their experiences, in the process not only gathering materials for their works but also transforming their generally petit-bourgeois class outlook. It was deemed

* Condensed version of a paper submitted to the 2nd International Philippine Studies Conference, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 27-30 June 1981.

the only way by which a writer who subscribed to the aims of the "national democratic movement" could honestly acquire a *proletarian* standpoint.

Political writers, historians and critics, echoing Claro M. Recto who is reported to have been the first to use the phrase, have referred to that period as a Second Propaganda Movement qualitatively different from the First Propaganda Movement, the campaign for colonial reforms waged by Filipino middle-class *ilustrados* self-exiled in *Madre España* in the 19th century, presumably because the contemporary writers engaged themselves politically as cultural activists in the revolutionary (not merely reformist) protest movement, demanding genuine post-colonial independence and social justice for their country which they held to be a neocolony.

This commitment they pursued by means of writing poems, stories, plays, and articles which dealt with the historical problems and present-day experiences of the majority of the Filipino people, that is to say, the peasants, workers, fishermen, urban poor, lumpen, and the middle-class; participating in mass actions, strikes and pickets; and conducting literature workshops and seminars for people with a bent for socially-conscious creative writing.

The radical perspective in the new literature required a reorientation in content and style. Content had everything to do with issues energizing the protest movement. Style (form and technique) followed content. The literary revolution within the social revolution itself became another issue. What was the function of literature? For whom did one write? Why write at all? In upholding the radical aesthetics of committed literature, the writers had to contend wih the criticism of literary traditionalists and formalists who saw in committed literature nothing more than didactic moralizing or demagoguery (depending on the degree of derision) and was therefore impure art. In a word: ephemera, propaganda. Philosophical and literary discussions on the nature of art and literarature during that period probed into the country's Western cultural legacy, and the (bourgeois) construal of art and literature "uncontaminated" by politics and ideology was taken to task by the Movement's writers as yet another proof of the colonial influence of culture on Filipino intellectuals and writers.

The nationalist literature spurred on by conditions in the early sixties and sustained by the fervor of the early seventies took many names: "committed", "protest", "progressive", "radical", revolutionary", activist", "proletarian". Some of these terms, including "nationalist", are not perfectly synonymous. In fact, the term "nationalism" had to be qualified early on. The old-style nationalism understood in terms of political separatism (or anti-colonialism) had been ren-

dered obsolete by the fact of formal decolonization (a colonial power divesting itself of exterritorial possessions) and in its stead had reared postwar nationalism whose chief advocate in the Philippines had been the celebrated "voice in the wilderness," Senator Claro M. Recto. His nationalism struck at the roots of RP-US "special relations," and championed a genuine sovereignty for the Philippines, an independent foreign policy, and end to economic mendicancy, and laid down solid arguments against parity rights, American control of the country's politics and economy, (or, which is the same thing, Philippine subservience to America's interests), and the presence of military bases in the country which not only served as a built-in "magnet" for nuclear attack but were already spawning social problems for the Filipino communities around the bases.

The terms "committed" and "protest" are problematic. In many a literary workshop, a writer or critic of the universalist (i.e., belletrist) persuasion, would assail the appropriation of "commitment" by Movement writers, arguing that in the first place, the quintessential duty of the writer is to write well, and in the second place, commitment can take many forms: one is committed to writing well, committed to writing about "the highest humanist values," committed to writing about the True, the Good and the Beautiful, and about the Ugly, for that matter; in other words, committed to his Art.

"Protest", on the other hand, may conveniently serve as a generic term for all writing which raises any social, economic or political issue, but it is precisely this blanket anti-Establishment connotation that renders it inadequate to singularly describe the literature of the past two decades. Besides, it evokes too closely the counter-culture and counter-consciousness movements in the United States aninated by different impulses, laying siege on different targets. Protest at Woodstock was qualitatively and contextually different from protest at Plaza Miranda. It may be pointed out that in some cases, during the early sixties, the effects of the Western cultural seepage into Filipino sensibilities produced a predilection for pacifism and anti-war angst, expressed in the singing of American protest folksongs, the reading of "existentialist" poetry by candlelight, all indicating a certain state of Revulsion against the order of things. Outside the classrooms and the bohemian cafés, the Revolution was beginning to shape up. A number of writers were to be drawn into it.

The Neocolonial Nexus

British author Felix Greene, whose writings and films about Vietnam and China in the process of national liberation and socialist construction, respectively, had helped influence the internationalist fervor of Filipino activists, came out in 1970 with a book that

took its place alongside the revolutionary classics popular among students during the period, which included the works of Karl Marx, Lenin, Mao Ze Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap (*People's Army, People's War*), Franz Fanon (*The Wretched of the Earth*), Ernesto 'Che' Guevara (*Reminiscences of the Guerilla War*), Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy (*Monopoly Capital*), Christopher Caudwell (*Studies in a Dying Culture*), Jose Ma. Sison (*Struggle for National Democracy*), and Amado Guerrero (*Philippine Society and Revolution*).

Greene's book was *The Enemy: Notes on Imperialism and Revolution.* In it he lays down a simple explanation of Neocolonialism:

> The continued control of a former colony through economic and other means is the essence of neocolonialism.[1]

This is of course followed up by a more involved discussion. Greene cannot be more succinct in his formulation than in the following:

> The new state, though nominally 'independent', finds itself shackled by debt. It must continue to use its precious foreign exchange to pay interest and profit to foreign investors. The glorious future does not arrive, for political 'independence' has left the former colony in no better position to retain its surplus, to build up capital or to break down the feudal structure of its society. And the mass of the people are left with their age-old poverty.[2]

It is in this context that the nationalist writers of the period have understood the workings of Filipino society. Greene, of course, was just one of the many authorities, and merely one of the most recent. The nationalist writers, especially the most politically advanced and who had had more exposure to the Movement, were familiar with most of the authors mentioned above. In their poems, stories and plays, a basic recognition of the gravity of "special relations," or neocolonialism, was evident.

Political economy has seldom been the primary concern nor the province of the Filipino creative writer, but this may not be the case with many of the politicized or radicalized poets and fictionists who addressed themselves to the basic issues. Writers as well as critics who were part of the national democratic movement had to arm themselves with at least an appreciation of political economy and history if they were to comment correctly and incisively on Philippine society. A writer/critic like Dr. Lucille Hosillos would in recent years be addressing herself to the question of the economic and cultural decolonization, not only of the Filipinos but of the whole region,

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[1] Felix Greene, *The Enemy: Notes on Imperialism and Revolution,* (Quezon City: Malaya Books, Inc.), p. 163.
[2] p. 164.

in fact. She looks at Southeast Asia as a region that has yet to attain the full measure of economic independence and human dignity.

> In such a neocolonial milieu perpetuated by imperialist domination, Southeast Asia has become an agricultural region with a feudal economy with predominantly peasant communities. Its semi-industrialized cities are veritable slums overpopulated with the unemployed or low-salaried workers and its luxurious housing enclaves are inhabited by the political economic and social elite who control of life of its people through bureaucracies that function for their interest and those of their foreign partners.[3]

This is quoted here to underscore the fact that Filipino writers from the sixties onwards have long since gone beyond the bounds of Filipinist nationalism, but have found common cause with Afro-Asian and Latin American writers in an implicit universal denunciation of Western neocolonialist policies. One may refer to this as the Third World Consciousness in literature. Some contemporary Filipino poets are familiar with the works of Pablo Neruda, Jose Marti, Chairil Anwar, Dennis Brutus, W. S. Rendra, Kim Chi Ha, Nicolas Guillen and others.

Roots of the Nationalist Consciousness

What in general were the elements in that total milieu that catalyzed the new nationalist consciousness of the writers?

1. *The national situation.* Diosdado Macapagal came to power in 1961, his administration highlighted by the decision to lift the import controls instituted during the previous term of the "Filipino First" president, Carlos P. Garcia. Under the latter, the official national slogan was economic nationalism, although no amount of patriotic posturing could conceal the debilitating graft and corruption that contributed to the downfall of Garcia's Nacionalista administration in 1961. Grand economic plans of attaining the industrial take-off were in the air. But the Unfinished Revolution (the first in a series of official "revolutionary" pronunciamentos punctuating Philippine political culture during these past twenty years) was compromised right away and rendered infirm by the new president's imposition of full and immediate decontrol in 1962. Looking back on that presidential fiat, one of the first radical poets in the late fifties and early sixties who eventually turned polemicist and organizer pondered its general implications for the country:

> This single presidential act has reinforced the supremacy of US imperialism, raw-material exporters and all the comprador capi-

[3] Lucila Hosillos, "Nationalism and Southeast Asian Literature", *The Philippines in the Third World Papers,* Third World Studies Program Series, UP, 1977, p. 4.

> talists within the country. While US business firms can remit their superprofits with impunity, those who export sugar, copra, hemp and other raw materials keep their dollar earnings without any consideration for the urgent need of developing industries to provide the increasing number of unemployed with jobs. These Filipino agents of US imperialism live in luxury while they fail to give a decent wage to their farm workers, sacadas and tenants. While there is a construction boom and luxury spending among the compradors, our masses live in dingy hovels, afflicted with poverty, bad health and illiteracy.[4]

The indictment which Sison levelled against the System, specifically the neocolonial nexus that explains the incredible linkages between Wall Street and Tondo or Negros, was echoed in the polemical and literary output of his contemporaries and those who were to follow in their footsteps.

2. *The international situation.* Wars of national liberation were the most significant political phenomena worldwide. These had actually been going on as a process of decolonization after World War II, and only caught fire in the popular imagination at least of Filipinos, after the victory of the Cuban revolution in 1959, but especially during the Second Indochina War in the 1960s. The anti-war protest movement in the United States, precipitated by American intervention in the Vietnam war, had its counterpart in the Philippines. But here it was not so much anti-war as anti-imperialist and pro-Vietnam. It was launched not merely to demand the withdrawal of American troops but also to signify solidarity with the nationalist protracted guerrilla war waged by the National Liberation Front. And it was a denunciation of U.S. imperialism not only in Vietnam but in the entire Third World, including the Philippines. Among Filipino writers, the poets particularly, the unfolding Vietnamese saga was a lode of revolutionary inspiration and imagery for their own country's continuing nationalist struggle. The "first Vietnam"—the Philippines in the 1900s—was called to mind, and the war in Indochina was viewed as a logical development of America's colonial and neocolonial interests in the whole of Southeast Asia.

3. *The intellectual and cultural ferment.* To uphold revolutionary literature entailed not only a criticism of social conditions but also a revolt against the romantic and escapist tradition, the bourgeois and feudal sentimentalism, in Philippine literature. The new orientation, the new audience, demanded a new content and style: a new aesthetics.

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[4] Jose Ma. Sison, "The Economic Emancipation Movement Against US Imperialism," in *Struggle for National Democracy*, (Manila: Amado V. Hernandez Memorial Foundation, 1972), p. 137.

Meanwhile, historians were taking a hard second look at both Philippine history and conventional historiography. Renato Constantino had fired the initial salvos with his *Origins of a Myth* and other thought-provoking essays. The nationalist literature of the 1900s (the period of the seditious or revolutionary drama), the socialist writings during the Commonwealth and post-liberation period were rediscovered and pointed out as evidence of the unbroken tradition of anti-colonial resistance in Philippine letters.

Either as poem or fiction, or drama for that matter, the literary work infused with the new nationalist consciousness can be appreciated for having taken on the most fundamental reality in our national existence: neocolonialism, the evils attending it, such as the bleeding of a nation's resources, emasculation of the political will and of sovereignty, general underdevelopment, as well as the perverse multiplier effect of underdevelopment on society—the intensification of poverty among the lower classes and the increased affluence, political privilege and power of those who profit most from the neocolonial system.

1. *Poetry: The Metaphors of Resistance*

In 1961, a slim volume of poetry in English appeared with the title, *Brothers and Other Poems.* Its author was Jose Ma. Sison, then a young campus writer and instructor at the University of the Philippines. The first poem in the anthology, "Hawk of Gold", minces no metaphor, so to speak, in its symbolization of imperialism. The imagery, in fact, is rather conventional, a variation on a classic theme: the colonizer as a *bird of prey.*

> Imperious hawk of burnished gold,
> How sharp and sure you calculate
> As you ripple the firmament with
> your wings [5]

begins the poem. The picture of the swooping creature's unmitigated violence and the unequal contest between hunter and victim is maintained until the last lines.

> Claim your chick, imperial aerialists, and
> Race to a feasting crag as you raise phlegm
> In your rough throat, O hawk of gold.
> Burnish your plume and beak with helpless
> blood.[6]

Seventeen years later, the poet finds himself inside a maximum security isolation cell, deprived initially of pen and paper. He com-

[5] Jose Ma. Sison, *Brothers and other Poems* (Manila: Filipino Signatures, 1961), p. 1.
[6] *Ibid.*

poses lines, even whole poems, in his mind, and reconstructs them later. In one of these poems, "The Woman and the Strange Eagle," he takes up the old metaphor and builds familiar images around it. Instead of the imperious hawk, it is now the fiercer eagle. He talks about a woman (Filipino society) sailing a boat (the revolution) on a rough ocean (history). He depicts a hardy battle against the elements. The first part is a statement of what the voyage originally started out to be: a voyage to a perceived destiny, much like the fervid dream of ancient boatmen. Then the dream, at some point in time, turns into a nightmarish terror.

> Yet a strange eagle shuts out the sun.
> Its talons of steel drip with blood,
> Its wings stir the wind and darken
> the skies,
> It has diamantine devouring eyes,
> Shreds of flesh are in its razor bite.[7]

The strange eagle is no stranger at all. Reckoned as a historical metaphor, the eagle may represent the alien conqueror in the person of Admiral Dewey and the American expeditionary forces in the 1900s. But it may also be considered in a contemporary sense, and as a precautionary symbol. *Talons of steel,* wings which *darken the skies,* and *razor bite* are strongly evocative of the awesome war machine with which the war in Vietnam was waged.

If the eagle is the most appropriate metaphor in the bird-of-prey characterization of imperialism, why the occasional allusion among some poets to the hawk, a lesser bird? This is perhaps explained by the folklore—of which writers are surely aware—regarding the penchant of the native hawk for swooping down on hapless chicks for its meal. The hawk then becomes another embodiment of a strong, ruthless presence. There have been numerous poems written carrying the hawk imagery. Among the contemporary ones is a poem written by Lamberto Antonio, "Luzviminda: 1966 AD," which is typical of this poet's ability to fuse lyricism with historical insight. *Luzviminda* is a woman's name one may come across only in the Philippines, since it is a contraction of the country's three main regions (Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao). This is virtually a technically perfect symbolism: the country as an imperilled woman.

> you shall behold
> Reflected on the bloody cloud
> The facelessness
> of the hawk who waves his standards...
> his talons clutching a strip of flag

[7] In *Pintig sa Malamig na Bakal (Lifepulse in Cold Steel): Poems and Letters from Philippine Prisons,* Hongkong, 1972, p. 32.

bespeaking a drought
to come upon yet another Tomorrow![8]

The word of warning seems to be inchoate still, even ambiguous, but any doubt is removed with a reference to "yet another Tomorrow." The poet warns against the repetition of the Philippines' unfulfillment. She had been thwarted in 1899, she continues to be thwarted still.

Federico Licsi Espino, Jr.'s poem in English, "Under The Eagle's Shadow," written in 1971, is more explicit. The poem is characteristic of Licsi Espino's style: clustering of metaphors, conjuring historical scenes, mythological allusions. The first part of this poem, *The Profile of the Beak,* narrates the onset of the Philippine war of independence against the United States.

The rice-bird bleeds; a contest, lopsided,
begins —
The talons of February amend Jefferson,
reveal the Eagle,
The juvenal plumage, the profile of the
beak, the pinions
Limned by Audubon...
The other rice-birds wheel; evening
Turns them into hawks, a clash of claws
ensuing.
Ares on Clio grinds — above the winding
river, the star—
Spangled night modulates into morning.
The battle Escalates: by the dawn's early
light, rifles crow —
Springfields and Krags of Minute Men with
profiles
Aquiline against the Mausers and Murates
of snub-nosed
Young men dying.

The negation of America's own revolutionary and democratic tradition is summed up in Licsi Espino's phrase *the talons of February amend Jefferson.* Equally pointed is the parallel phrase occurring a few lines further: *Nebraska amends Philadelphia.* Philadelphia evokes not only the revolution of 1776, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution (by extension, also the Declaration of the Rights of Man), the Liberty Bell, but also its own connotation, that of being a "city of brotherly love." That Nebraska should symbolize American foreign policy at the turn of the century serves to illustrate the fact that America's "humanist tradition" had become a perverse,

[8] In *Manlilikha (Mga Piling Tula, 1961-1967,* edited by Rogelio Mangahas (Manila: Pioneer Printing Press, 1967), p. 33.
I have taken the liberty of translating into English the Pilipino poems and stories (or passages therefrom) used in this study.

because false, missionary zeal. Nebraska was of course among the states which sent "volunteers" in the brutal, genocidal pacification campaign in the Philippines. *Minute Men* thus becomes sarcasm, the poet's way of pointing out America's travesty of its own professed democratic ideals.

Valerio Nofuente in his "Awit Sa Agila" (To the Eagle), also ascribes to the eagle the qualities of ruthlessness and overweaning ambition. But as the resolution of the Vietnam war shows, the Almighty Eagle's wings can get badly clipped. The Third World voice of intransigence and defiance rings clear.

> Wherever your dire talons alight
> Bellies are emptied and mouths are sealed.
> We protest, and will not be crushed
> Ours is the voice of a world unyielding.
> Ever alone, and enfeebled each time,
> You shall be prey to us, and then fall.
> Cruel as the dreams you dream in flight
> Shall be your plummeting ashen death.[9]

The parallelism between the Philippines and Vietnam in terms of national experience vis-a-vis the United States is given another dimension by poet Edgar de la Cruz in a poetic tryptich entitled "Ilang Tagpi sa Gula-gulanit Nilang Kasaysayan" (Patches of Their Tattered History). The poet uses for an epigraph a *Newsweek* article about two Vietnamese orphans named Phuong and Sa who are whisked away to the USA in the controversial "Operation Babylift". Phuong and Sa are christened Christian and Adam by their foster parents. De la Cruz' poetic imagination leaps, and he discerns a comparison between the orphanization of Vietnamese children and that of Filipino children in the 1900s. However, he goes back much further in history and comes up with the symbolic figure of Rizal's tormented Sisa in *Noli Me Tangere,* looking for her two missing sons, Basilio and Crispin. The search extends to our own time. Basilio and Crispin are made to represent Filipino revolutionaries past and present. The third poem *Tanghaliang-tapat Sa Isang Tag-araw* (High Noon in a Season of Heat) proceeds to encapsulate Philippine history:

> Hapless children! The crash of the Krag.
> On your skulls still resounds in the ring
> Of thirty silver pieces eagle-emblazoned,
> Resounds in the wail of the sleepless child.
> Phuong, Sa, be rid of Christian and Adam!
> Basilio, Crispin, be rid of Clark and Subic!
> Do you not hear the droning of eagles?[10]

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[9] *Diliman Review* (Literary Issue), (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1979), p. 15.

[10] Philippine Collegian, June 30, 1975, p. 5.

The single biggest tissue or "irritant" in RP-US relations concerns the continued presence of American Military bases in the country. Base killings, such as the infamous "wild pig" incident, over which the host country still had to contest legal jurisdiction, touched off public outrage and demonstrations against the bases. The exclusiveness and the 'state-within-a-state' status enjoyed by the bases have driven poets like Rio Alma to write poems like "K-9, O Ang Sugat ni Ruben T. Valeinte" (K-9, Or, Ruben T. Valeinte's Wound). For an epigraph, Alma reproduces a front page item in one of the dailies of December 18, 1974, which reported that a *pan de sal* vendor from Mabalacat, Pampanga, had sustained eight wounds from bites on his arms, back and buttocks, inflicted by a guard dog turned loose on him by American military police in Clark Air Force Base.

When the white gods came
Blue-eyed and hairy-armed,
Their straining ward
Baring ivory knives in the mouth,
You were pounced upon
Like a chick by an eagle
Then whisked to their miniature
Olympus ringed with steel.
Is it not an honor for a wretch
Like you to get in as a guest
To that elite country of the elite
Sentineled by a monstrous dog? [11]

In the poem "Mga Kanyon" (The Cannons), Mike Bigornia muses on that symbol of Philippine-American partnership revered by the veterans of the Pacific War: the island of Corregidor, famous for its battery of now-rusting cannons. Military historians have invariably waxed lyrical and sentimental about the USAFFE's holding action on the island. Bigornia, in mock nostalgia, lyricizes too on the interaction between American and Filipino defenders. He succeeds in uncommemorating it, by posing the historical irony: the Filipinos were fighting a war not of their own making, together with the armed forces of a government that had controlled their country and would continue to control it after and beyond the war.

Noble is the heart that resists
the caprices of any aggressor.
Yet, is he not a better enemy
who is visible to the eye
than this friend who may be secret foe?
Let us ponder it:
helping hands and loving smiles
are weapons too of vile ambition.[12]

[11] Virgilio Almario (Rio Alma), *Doktrinang Anakpawis,* (Manila: Aklat Peskador, 1979), p. 17.

[12] In *Galian 2* (Quezon City: Galian sa Arte at tula, 1976), p. 12.

It certainly is not the poet's intention to ascribe hypocrisy at the level of personal relationship. Rather, his point is the need to reassess ties and recognize myths so that we are forewarned about the subtle danger lurking behind the improbable 'friendship' between two unequal countries.

A poem by Epifanio San Juan Jr., would be a marked contrast to Bigornia's "Ang Paghihimagsik Ng Mga Anakpawis Laban Sa ESSO, Mobil Oil, Goodyear, Firestone, Bank of America At Iba Pang Kasangkapan ng Imperyalismong US" (The Revolt of the Workign Class Against ESSO, Mobil Oil, Goodyear, Firestone, Bank of America and Other Instruments of US Imperialism) bristles with militance, even anger:

> From a gun's barrel, Esperanza,
> My love shall blossom forth.
> Dolefil pineapples, sugar, copra,
> hemp, minerals
> Hear the thunder of peasant and
> worker armies
> History breaks out into the warcloud
> of our time.[13]

A most articulate and artistic, at the same time politically powerful indictment of neocolonialism is a poem written by Rogelio Mangahas with the innocuous-sounding title, "Bahay-bahayan" (Playhouse). Unlike some of the period poems which reeked of cordite and thundered with the staccato of AK-47s and armalites, "Bahay-bahayan" takes the point of view of the colonizer, and we see how he—in Mangahas' interpretation—looks at his subjects, at his victims. The imperialist as the *persona* in a poem was very rarely attempted, and Mangahas' imperialist unfolds the oppressor's attitude and philosophy in a manner possibly more morbid than if the victim had done the narration. The poem appears in a four-poem anthology entitled "Duguang Plakard at Iba Pang Tula" (Bloodied Placards and Other Poems). Managhas, one of the best poets of his generation and a stalwart of the old PAKSA, advises the reader to "observe the process of (the poet's) metamorphosis, from the rhetorical question of an indecisive petty-bourgeois in the first poem towards a radical, dialectical standpoint of a proletarian realist in the last poem."

The fourth poem is "Bahay-bahayan." The imperialist or colonizer as the *persona* casts himself in the role of a visitor enjoying all the benefits of "traditional Filipino hospitality." In fact he is more than an honored visitor. He proceeds to claim the choice spots, the best amenities in the house, the products grown around the house,

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13 *Philippine Collegian Folio* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1971), p. 60.

and also the host's wife and daughter. He has ceased to be a transient. He has come to stay. The host has really nothing to lose, the imperialist says. He gets good advice, though not necessarily a helping hand with hard work around the place, he honors himself by sharing his bounty and everything dearest to him, and he is ennobled before the world.

The poem attempts to be a metaphor of underdevelopment. Recto, many years ago, had decried the fate of the Filipinos who had become mere "hewers of wood and drawers of water" for the neocolonial master. Mangahas deepens the sense of outrage, and magnifies the patent absurdity of the relationship, for a more telling impact on one's consciousness.

> ...and now that our little hut
> is done
> built from twigs and rotting wood
> leaves of banana, acacia and *madrecacao*
> harken now to my decree
> I of the fair nose and skin.
> ...I shall descend
> and in the guava tree, be guava-bird
> and guava-worm.
> All for your sake, friend Juan,
> I'll peck and sip and mop up
> as I crawl. Now when it falls,
> if it should fall at all, the guava bit
> will also be food for your belly.
> I shall climb up to take my rest
> and claim the sala or the room
> that's meant for me.
>
> Be honored that I shall bed
> your wife, or anyone of your
> darling daughters,
> while your eyes are closed
> as you snore on so reposed.
> In the space of an hour, work the yard,
> raise and reap and mill and cook.
> Be honored, yes, be honored truly
> by serving this visiting bed-partner.
> How blessed is the thought that you
> and only you can claim
> the cuds, by-products, husk, fishbone, crumbs:
> all yours, rejoice! [14]

As if this flagellation were not enough, the visitor makes another observation on how he expects the host to internalize and fully accept his presence. The line is formulated simply, but few other lines in Pilipino literature can achieve as much force in only a few words,

[14] Rogelio Mangahas, *Duguang Plakard at Iba Pang Tula* (Quezon City: Manlapaz Publishing Co., 1971), pp. 51-52.

in commenting about the colonial acculturation (or the cultivation of a Stateside mentality) among Filipinos.

> Bawat bagay na may halimuyak ng aking
> utot ay kanilang nanaisin.
> (Each object that reeks of my farting
> shall be the joy of their desiring.)[15]

Ten years have passed since *Duguang Plakard* came out. There is no end in sight for the writing of poems that aim to reveal the colonial umbilicals with which Philippine society and culture are still tethered to the Stepmother Country.

2. *Fiction: Documenting the Counter-Consciousness*

In the history of Philippine fiction in Pilipino, the anthology known as *Mga Agos Sa Disyerto* (Streams In The Desert) which appeared in 1964 and reissued in 1974 is said to have represented a major breakthrough in Philippine literature. The stories contained in the anthology were described as a watershed, collectively, of excellent writing skill and social relevance in literature. The writers who comprised the *Agos* group declared then, in their introduction, that there were some quarters who believed that literature in Pilipino up to that time, was "a sprawling desert, where one may only see dried skulls, rotting driftwood, sere grass ringing an already parched oasis." They refused, they said, to accept the "desert condition" of Philippine literature, and so they were offering their works as proof of the fresh trickles, streams rather, of a newer and more vigorous current of writing. In a way, they were correct. Their short stories did represent a radical parting of ways with the escapist, sentimental, phantasmagoric and even medieval themes materializing, out of nowhere, in Pilipino literature.

The decade from 1964 to 1974 witnessed the earlier streams of realist literature swell into a veritable flood-tide of revolutionary poetry, fiction and drama. The literary desert was no more. Many of the short story writers, like the poets, were drawn into the protest movement in the sixties. The early stories of these writers would already indicate the literary direction they were headed for. Their characters would usually be workers, share tenants, social outcasts, and others. Even before the fullblown literary revolution that accompanied the protest movement, these writers (including some in the *Agos* group) would not only turn their backs on conservatism and romanticism, would not only engage in social realism, but experiment as well with revolutionary realism, that is to say, introduce ideological content and even offering a revolutionary resolution of the conflict

[15] p. 52.

developed in their stories. Their material was no long merely city slum and rural shack, no longer merely the despair of a jobless city bum or the sheer misery of a *kasama* or sharecropper; their material would now include workers' strikes, peasants' revolts, scenarios of a violent revolution.

Fiction writing during the past two decades has contributed somewhat in shaping the radical counter-consciousness in the movement. The greatest impact produced by the fictionists was not actually upon the mass audience but their fellow writers. Fiction writing, even as it bolstered the new nationalist approach and substance in literature, constituted a revolt against literary traditions and canons. Experimentations abounded, and some fictionists would not at all shirk from producing a work that actually run counter to the cherished ideal: readability for the sake of theoretical millions of the mass readership. Their works were technically intricate and sometimes affected a contrived stream-of-consciousness.

The most important reature in the new nationalist fiction, nonetheless, was the fact that it was either about any of the "Three Basic Issues in Philippine Society," or else it was about the period's historical protagonists acting on and reacting to those "Basic Issues."

One of the more frequently cited works in the genre is Domingo Landicho's *Elias at Salome,* a love story set during the period of activism. It is not a love story in the conventional sense, because what the writer consciously wants to play up is the process of consciousness-development in the characters. The writer attempts to cast love in a revolutionary mold: one does not exist for the other, one exists for the rest, or for the whole. The imperialist control of Philippine society, the cancer eating up that society, the hopelessness of peaceful reforms, the reasons behind the student protest movement, are not dramatized or fleshed out through the action of the characters, but are rather didactically presented in the dialogue between Elias' father and mother. He is an enlightened intellectual who understands, or thinks he understands, the revolutionary phenomenon. She is benighted, and sees only chaos and destruction all around and a hopeless love affair between her son and his activist girlfriend. It is in another of his stories where Landicho manages to create a scenario, a fictive docudrama in which the reader becomes privy to a hypothetical negotiation between a Philippine president and the American president. The story, "Golgota," appears to be half-allegory, half-burlesque in certain scenes. There is an air of authenticity in the dialogue where the unequal heads of state exchange pleasantries first and then go into the serious business of "national desiderata." Somehow, one feels that Landicho aims to chastice Filipino puppetry by

recreating his version of what goes on in state-to- (puppet) state negotiations. In mid-story, President Geronimo Lazaro (whom Landicho has interestingly invested with a self-wondering, sometimes anguished disposition about his country's condition) is in the United States on a state visit.

The following exchange has a morbid touch to it, and the allusion to constitutional tinkering for immoral political ends prefigures events beyond the time in which *Golgota* was written. The power play implicit in the following passage becomes an undisguised indictment of the United States' bullying tactics in dealing with client states.

> "You are our hope in the East, Geronimo."
> "I am confused."
> "Well, use your power to revise the
> Constitution. Provide the people some
> entertainment."
> "Make them hope only to end up frustrated?"
> "That is within your power. And we're
> foursquare behind you."
> "Suppose I'm not able to do it?"
> "History teaches us that thrones
> fall easily!" [16]

Expository dialogue, on the other hand, is a rarity in a highly introspective work of fiction like *Elias at Salome.* What the fictionist has sustained is the contradiction which Elias is trying to resolve in himself: should he join the march of protesters or not? From where he is, he can see the multitude marching, waving placards and streamers, shouting anti-establishment slogans. He knows that Salome is among them. He finally breaks out of their house and pursues the Revolution that has gone on ahead without him. The final scene shows Elias getting doused by the gasoline that he spills as he stumbles. Fired up by the revolutionary ideals he has shared with Salome, fired up by the frenzy of the demonstrating crowd chanting cries of protest, and proclaiming to the world what he now deems to be the highest kind of love possible, Elias uses his lighter to turn himself into a human torch as the riot police close in. His final act is unpremeditated, making Elias a quasi-martyr.

The story "Ang Kamatayan Ni Tiyo Samuel" (Uncle Samuel's Death) by Efren Abueg is even more abstract and symbolistic than Landicho's story, but here the allegory of Tiyo Samuel is pursued by the author as a tableau of historical characters. The main characters are also the main symbols: Felipe is the country, Ligaya, his woman, is freedom, and Tiyo Samuel is the enemy of both. The

[16] Domingo Landicho, *Himagsik: An Anthology of Prize-winning Stories* (Manila: R.P. Garcia Publishing House, 1972), p. 75.

allegorical device is strongly reminiscent of the technique in the seditious drama of the 1900s. Tiyo Samuel is Felipe's uncle, who acts as the guardian of the wealth that his (Felipe's) father has left behind. Tiyo Samuel goes to all lengths alienating Ligaya from Felipe's affection, arguing that he deserved a better fate than getting involved with Ligaya. He shows off to him the wealth that would be his someday, provided he cooperate, provided that he help his uncle in financing business ventures that would realize greater riches for both of them.

Felipe recalls the time he was much younger and Tiyo Samuel was showing him the extent of his possessions. (The author pays strict attention to significant small details about the uncle's physical appearance.)

> His Tiyo Samuel wore boots, a sevastopol hat, and with his cane pointed out to him the vast tract owned by his father.
>
> "From here to there...all yours!"
>
> "When you reach the age of 22, that will be yours and you ought to prepare yourself. So I want you to take up agriculture, since your father has all this land."[17]

The succeeding events in the life of Felipe rush headlong to a violent ending: he is influenced by newfound heretical (i.e., progressive) ideas that open his mind to possibilities other than living off the wealth he has inherited (and which his Tiyo Samuel is manipulating for personal interest), he meets Ligaya, a woman from the unprivileged ranks of the people, and he feels a different kind of love being kindled in himself, an attachment to those who have nothing in life, and for whom he entertains, one day, visions of a different social order—Socialism—until finally, he is drawn into the great tide of protest sweeping the land, aimed at the powerful friends of his Tiyo Samuel, aimed at the evil force represented by his Tiyo Samuel, and he joins the chorus of voices as the Movement gathers momentum:

Down with the imperialists!

but Tiyo Samuel drags him from the streets and brings him to where Ligaya is waiting: she is pregnant, but his uncle categorically forbids him from marrying the woman, insisting that they live worlds apart and thus can never be one. Felipe summons all his strength and resolve, whips out the *balisong* knife he carries with him and stabs Tiyo Samuel dead. The repression is over. A new history dawns for Felipe and Ligaya.

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[17] In Sigwa: *Antolohiya ng Maiikling Kuwento* (University of the Philippines, 1972), p. 23.

Efren Abueg's and Domingo Landicho's stories were among the last of their kind appearing at the period of the First Quarter Storm. During the martial law years, the subject of imperialism would be dealt with in a more subdued manner, relying on the device of irony to bring home the message of irreconcilability between the interests of a world superpower and an underdeveloped society. This is brought across in a story written by Virgilio Crisostomo, "Hindi Malayo Ang Biyetnam" (Vietnam Is Not Far Off) which touches on two related themes: the support wittingly or unwittingly given by Filipinos to the war effort in Vietnam, and the opposition to that war effort by the radicalized youth in Filipino society. In the story, the link between the two themes is the character Danny Crisol. He is a university scholar who gets involved in the students' anti-imperialist movement. His father, however, is a construction man who has applied for and found a job with an American communication engineering battalion in Saigon, Vietnam, helping put up camps, radio signal towers, communication centers, settlements for war victims. In a confrontation with his mother, the following exchange occurs (as overheard by the narrator, Danny's younger brother):

> "There you go again. Is it a good thing, wanting to drive out the Americans from the Philippines? Oh, but you should have seen what the Americans did for us during the war!"
>
> "That's what the old folks always say... the American sacrifices during the war. But that war was a war of ... (and *Kuya* would suddenly hesitate, not sure whether he ought to go on with what he wanted to say)... of the imperialists." [18]

A more indirect technique of presenting the problem is offered by fictionist Fanny A. Garcia in her story "Pina, Pina, Saan Ka Pupunta?" (Pina, Pina, Where Do You Go From Here?) The setting is the present. The very informal style of the straight narrative and idiomatic dialogue almost succeeds in projecting the story as purely naturalistic, but the allegorical intent of the author is brought out by the names the author gives to the heroine—Pina, a contraction for Filipinas—and to the anti-hero (in the sense of *contravida*) Sammy.

Pina is a woman from the slums who dreams of being liberated from the drudgery of poverty. She has visions of someday finding herself, like a famous Filipino movie actress who rose from 'rags to riches', another "slum Cinderella." She sends her name to an international pen-pal club and after screening the many letters she gets, decides on Sammy, an American businessman who comes to the Philippines to marry Pina, and who strikes the impressionable poor people of the *looban* (slum interior) as "lordlike of manner, tall and

[18] In *Daluyan* (Special Issue, Literary Apprentice), UP Writers Club, 1978, p. 28.

straight as a pole, very fair of skin." He easily wins their affection. Pina and Sammy go out on several dates, and one day end up in a hotel room where Sammy initiates Pina into the ways of love (and sex). Sammy goes back to the States ostensibly for business matters. Pina gets pregnant but Sammy does not come back. She learns to her sorrow that he is a married man, that he is actually married to another Filipina, and that he has pulled the job on other Filipinas. Sammy is, in short, an exploiter. Pina suffers a miscarriage while taking a bath, and she feels a kind of liberation: from shame, from her nightmare, and from the dread of bringing into the world a modern-day GI baby.

No novel in Pilipino has been published yet that deals with the protest movement of the past two decades, especially about the critical period of the First Quarter Storm. Ceres Alabado wrote a novel in English in 1971, *I See Red In A Circle.* Having been written at that particular time of the "troubles," and containing as it does actual names of people involved and the places where the action happened, it has the ring of immediacy, authenticity, except that this is not pure novel but perhaps a *docunovel.* It is conceivable that Alabado may have reproduced here actual discussions, teach-ins, exchanges, and the only genuinely fictionalized part may be the *persona* narrating the events and talking to the other characters. The narrator is Maria or Mars, and the person playing Maria's mother is, quite obviously, Alabado herself.

It is through Mars that Alabado presents her own perception of what the history of Philippine-American relations has been all about. In Chapter 13, Mars is engaged in one of her many mental ruminations, pondering the myths and realities in Philippine history, digging out insights from books as well as from her own nascent poltical consciousness shaped by discussion and participation in mass actions. Thus:

> America had been our Mother America. America had given us roads and bridges and schools, the English language and literature, toilets, Coca-Cola, and rock 'n' roll. Civilization, in other words. Weren't we grateful for all this?
>
> I thought of the books which I had read in high school, and now in college, but outside, not in class. First, there was *Little Brown Brother* by Leon Wolff and *The American Occupation of the Philippines* by James Blount. You can imagine my shock at the discovery of a lot of things about America's conquest of our country, things which I had not known before, because all of our classroom books said America had saved us from Spain, and later from Japan...[19]

[19] Ceres Alabado, *I See Red In a Circle,* Manila, 1972, p. 205.

A few months ago this year, a mimeographed, masking-taped and cardboard-bound, cheap-looking first edition of the novel "Hulagpos" came out. "Hulagpos" means *Breaking Free.* It was written by Mano de Verdades Posadas (Hand of Fettered Truths), obviously a pseudonym. It is not available in bookstores, but a handful of copies have managed, barely managed to pass from hand to hand and some copies have found their way to other countries where there are Filipino communities. It is said to be the first underground novel to have come out during the period of martial law. It is not a novel the way we construe a novel conventionally to be. It is not even a docunovel in the sense that Alabado's novel is. Rather, it is a fusion of fiction, field reports, journalistic features, and documentation of recent events in Philippine society. The novel traces the process of Tommy Guevara's enlightenment, and eventual participation in the Philippine resistance movement. Tommy is a balikbayan who is initially impressed by the achievements of the new dispensation. Then he learns his journalist father has been politically harassed and threatened and is confined in a hospital. He is mistakenly arrested, brought to a safehouse and tortured. He is transferred to a detention center where he finds time to reflect on his life, his family's fortunes, his friends' decision to commit themselves to the struggle, and he meets other detainees with whom he has interesting discussions. Tommy escapes after some time in prison, and goes to the countryside to join the forces of the revolution.

In a discussion between Cynthia, Tommy's activist girlfriend, and her unpoliticized brother Fred, the problem of U.S. imperialism is taken up. She clarifies one important point: the movement is not and never has been against the American people (a point patiently argued by Danny Crisol to his mother in "Hindi Malayo Ang Biyetnam") but rather against the state apparatus of imperialism in the world center of monopoly capital.

"Hulagpos," as a literary piece, leaves much to be desired. It is nevertheless an important documentation of the nationalist aspirations that have been and continue to be the motive force of progressive literature in the present stage of Philippine history.

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