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THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN CHINA: YESTERDAY AND TODAY

SOON MAN RHIM

This paper traces the evolution of the social changes in the status of women from traditional Chinese society to contemporary life under the Communist regime.

Although radical changes have been made in the status of women under the Communist regime, the effort to improve that status was well under way prior to the rise of Communist power. These changes have accelerated since 1949 when the Communist regime took national power. While the history of the Chinese women's struggle for their rights dates back to the 2nd century A.D., the most eruptive development began to blossom about the 19th century.

Any serious assessment of the progress of women's emancipation under the Communist rule must begin with the conditions women faced in pre-revolutionary China.

Women's Position in the Old Society

It has been said that Confucius (551-479 B.C.), whose philosophical system dominated Chinese culture for nearly twenty-five centuries, had not one favorable word for women. In this connection, David and Vera Mace noted:

> Confucius had little enough to say about women. But what he did say was decisive and far-reaching in its effects. He based his whole teaching about human society upon the patriarchal family, ancestor worship, and the duty of filial piety. The function of the woman within this system was simple and clear. It could be summed up in one four-letter word—'obey.' Woman is a creature born to obedience. Throughout her life her duty is to follow three simple rules. In childhood and early youth she obeys her father; when she is married she obeys husband; in widowhood she obeys her son. The quality of her obedience is to be unquestioning and absolute.[1]

The traditional Chinese cosmology propounded the world as being composed of two complementary elements: yang, the male principle, and yin, the female. The male elements representing the positive and superior forces, stood for heaven, sun, height, strength and action;

[1] David and Vera Mace, *Marriage: East and West,* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1960), p. 67.

and the female elements, representing the negative and inferior counterparts of the male, signified earth, moon, depth, darkness, weakness and passivity. It can easily be seen that Confucian teachings about the status of women were powerfully reinforced by these ideas.[2]

The birth of a female child always caused some degree of dismay to a family in China. In a poor family or in one with no sons, it was a tragedy. By the time the child was old enough to be of even minimal labor value to her parents, she would have to be sent off to another family as a bride, and her most productive years were devoted to the service not of her own family, but of her husband's. Although at marriage a girl's parents were usually given a cash payment as a "bride price" by the family of her fiance, for a peasant family much of that money was usually returned to the groom's family in the form of a trousseau. Consequently, daughters were considered an economic burden because they would not become a financial support to the family.

In normal times, a girl-child would be treated with affectionate attention, which Chinese typically lavish upon small children. Nevertheless, in times when there was a narrow margin between survival and starvation within which many Chinese peasants existed, the high rate of female infanticide in traditional China is not surprising. For example, as Elisabeth Croll observed:

> In a nineteenth-century survey conducted in several different provincial villages, the 160 women over fifty years of age who were interviewed, and who between them had borne a total of 631 sons and 538 daughters, admitted to destroying 158 of their daughters; none had destroyed a boy. As only four of the women had reared more than three girls, the field workers felt that the number of infanticides confessed to was considerably below the truth. The greatest number of infanticides owned to by any one woman was eleven. Sixty per cent of their sons had lived for more than ten years as opposed to 38 per cent of their daughters.[3]

A heartrending story of female infanticide is cited in Han Suyin's book, *Birdless Summer*. She writes of an incident that occurred as late as 1938-1942, of a woman who, in the hope of giving birth to a male child, went to the same midwifery hospital as her neighbor whose son had been born there. The fate of the woman's nine births of daughters is recounted:

> The first was alive, and also the third; but the second had been strangled at birth by the husband and so had the fifth and the sixth; the seventh had been born in a bad year, a year of famine when

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2 *Ibid.*

3 Elisabeth Croll, *Feminism and Socialism in China,* (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 24.

> her belly skin struck to her spine, and the husband had smashed her skull in with his axe; at the eight female child the husband had been so angry that he had hurled it against a wall; the ninth was a year old and had been given away to a neighbour...[4]

What happened to the fourth birth? — the woman had omitted telling out of all the other numbered infanticides. Then, sobbing, she related: "She had been so frightened when it was born and it was a girl, that she herself had pushed it into the big toilet jar, and there it had suffocated."[5] Her tenth child was also a girl. Without any emotion she accepted her fate, and took the child to her own parents' home where the newborn's future fate would still be in question.

Apart from infanticide, it was also common that in order to free themselves of the expense of rearing a daughter, the poorer peasants and townspeople sold their daughters into domestic service or prostitution. It is obvious that the neglect and maltreatment of female children were tied to the oppressive feudal economic system. William Hinton, in his analysis of rural village life, presents the following case study on the integral relationship of child neglect and economic conditions:

> In Chingtsun one old woman said, 'I sold four daughters because I had to pay back a landlord debt. I wept the whole night, and the tears burned my eyes. Now I am blind. Poverty forced me to sell my own daughters. Every mother loves her child." Others said, 'In the society no one loved a daughter because you brought them up and they left the house.' Many parents drowned their little daughters...[6]

In traditional China, women were generally denied the benefits of formal education. They were discouraged from developing any inherent ability or talent useful for a career outside the home. Only the privileged daughters of the scholar-gentry class[7] sometimes shared their brothers' tutor and enjoyed an opportunity to develop their minds and cultivate their talents.

Generally, it was widely believed that knowledge was a bad investment for a girl who would soon be leaving home. It was considered unnecessary or even harmful, as expressed by the following frequently used proverbs: "A woman's lack of talent is in itself a virtue," or "A woman too well educated is apt to create trouble." As a consequence, there was a general lack of professional skills among women and a tremendously higher percentage of illiteracy

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[4] Han Suyin, *Birdless Summer,* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1968), pp. 163-164.

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 164.

[6] William Hinton, *Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village,* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966), p. 397.

among women than among men. For example, in a study of 16,786 individual farms in 168 localities, and 38,256 farm families in twenty-two provinces in China, 1929-1933, by John Lossing Buck, "only 30 per cent of the males, and one per cent of the females, had attended school long enough to learn to read a common letter."[8]

It is apparent that the aim of education for females in traditional China was to develop perfect submission and compliance rather than to cultivate the mind. Among the books of instruction for girls were the "Nu Jie" or "Precepts for Women" and the "Nu er Jing" or the "Classic for Girls." In the "Nu Jie," women were instructed to "be obedient, unassuming, yielding, timid, respectful, reticent and unselfish in character."[9]

According to this book:

> A woman should endure reproach, treasure reproof and revere her husband for 'A husband, he is Heaven' and 'Heaven is unalterable, it cannot be set aside.' 'If the wife does not serve her husband, the rule of propriety will be destroyed.'[10]

The "Nu er Jing" similarly catalogued the ideal qualities of women, outlining in more detail what were known as the "three obediences" and the "four virtues." Throughout her life cycle a woman was expected to obey absolutely her father before marriage, her husband after marriage, and her son if she became a widow. The four virtues were:

> First, a 'general virtue' meaning that a woman should know her place in the universe and behave in every way in compliance with the time-honoured ethical codes; second, she should be reticent in in words taking care not to chatter too much and bore others; third, she must be clean of person and habits and adorn herself with a view to pleasing the opposite sex; and fourth, she should not shirk her household duties.[11]

The chief aim of a girl's education was the inculcation of ancient stereotypes of female conduct. And girls were almost exclusively trained for their duties in the domestic sphere. As a result, few wives

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[7] Normally traditional Chinese society was divided into four social classes —those of the scholar-gentry, the peasants, artisans and merchants. Outside this classification are those without a recognized place in Chinese society—the "mean' people or the boat people, actors, storytellers, prostitutes and other like social categories.

[8] John L. Buck, *Land Utilization in China*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1937), p. 373.

[9] Croll, *op. cit.*, p. 1e.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] *Ibid.*

received formal education. Proverbial wisdom summed it up: "Educating a daughter is like weeding someone else's field."

In regard to marriages, they were arranged between families of different surnames and usually of similar social standing. Negotiations about the choice of the marriage partner, the bride-price and dowry were conducted by a go-between or a matchmaker. As noted previously, the groom's family presented a bride-price to the bride's family, and in many cases the bride's family invested in a substantial dowry which the bride brought with her upon marriage.

Romantic courtship played no part. The young people, therefore, were strangers to one another. Often the couple had never laid eyes on each other before the wedding day. This was the so-called "blind-marriage."[12]

Traditionally, a family too destitute to bring up a daughter might, rather than sell her into slavery or prostitution, offer her to a boy's family and hand her over to his parents to be brought up as his future wife. She was known as a "child bride." Explaining about this practice of taking a child bride, Dr. C. K. Yang described:

> A very young girl, sometimes even an infant, was purchased by a poor family which would raise her along with the young son. When they both reached marriageable age, they were married with a simple ceremony. While the ritualistic function was not outstanding in such a situation, the economic bondage of the couple to the parents was stong, for the parents had not merely raised the son but also the girl.[13]

He went on to say:

> The subordination of the child bride was even greater than that of brides normally married into the family, for she owed directly to the parents-in-law the efforts and expense of bringing her up. Consequently, the parents-in-law's treatment of a child bride was frequently more tyrannical than normally.[14]

This custom of child brides was more prevalent among the rural poor than among richer classes, and it was extremely difficult for girls who were thus separated from their families at such an early age.

The primary functions of marriage in old China was the production of male offsprings to ensure the continuance of the family line, the acquiring of a daughter-in-law for the service and comfort of the

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[12] William L. Parish and Martin K. Whyte, *Village and Family in Contemporary China*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 156.

[13] C. K. Yang, *Chinese Communist Society: The Family and the Village*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1959), p. 26.

[14] *Ibid.*

parents, and the begetting of sons for the security of the parents' old age.[15] The wife, therefore, was not her husband's friend, confidante, or lover. Her role in life aws to bear male children to perpetuate the family name and to fulfill her obligations toward her husband's parents.

As a result, failure to produce a son was the greatest disaster that could overtake any married couple. According to Mencius, Chinese philosopher and teacher of Confucianism (372-289? B.C.), to have no posterity was the greatest of all filial sins. This is the supreme act of ingratitude to a man's parents. So everyone used to approve if a man with a barren wife took a concubine or a secondary wife, and often his first wife would be the one to suggest it. A childless woman could be cast out of her husband's home, disgraced, and socially ostracized. It was only in her function as a breeder that she attained status in society.

The new bride, entering her husband's household as a stranger, had to assume the most important role as daughter-in-law. Her first duties are to her husband's parents; only secondarily is she responsible for her husband. According to *The Classic for Girls,* which established the young wife's priorities:

> As a wife to husband's parents,
> You should filial be and good,
> nor should suffer imperfection in their clothing
> or their food,
> Be submissive to their orders, all their wants
> anticipate,
> That, because his wife is idle, they your
> husband may not hate.
>
> Be submissive to your husband,
> Nor his wishes e'er neglect
> First of all in this submission is his parents
> to respect.[16]

The husband-wife relationship was not stressed, and even the slightest public demonstration of affection was taboo. Thus, there was to be no noticeable expression of amorous life between any couple. In fact, newlyweds were supposed to sleep in the same bed for only seven days. After that, they occupied different beds but in the same room. In public they were to appear indifferent toward each other.[17] In his study of "West Town," the community deep in the mountains of remote southwestern China, in 1941-43, Dr. Francis L. K. Hsu described this traditional attitude:

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[15] *Ibid.,* p. 25.
[16] Quoted in Croll, *op. cit.* ,p. 27.

> A local boy returned to West Town after a period of schooling in Hong Kong and one day walked hand-in-hand with his newlywed bride on the street. Some local man threw a bucketful of human manure over their heads from behind. They had no redress, since they had violated the local taboo against intimacy between the sexes in public, and had to leave town.[18]

In public, therefore, and even in front of other family members within the household, a couple was expected to refrain from any display of affection.

Another important obligation of the bride with her new family was to willingly perform householdchores under the direction of her mother-in-law, who was both her forewoman and workmate. "It was said that when a mother-in-law wanted to find fault with her daughter-in-law, she was as thorough as a donkey going round and round the rolling millstone: she did not miss a step."[19] In cases of conflict, the husband was expected to side with his parents rather than his wife and to defend her submission to familial authority, if necessary, even by the use of physical force. It was, therefore, commonplace for a man or his mother to beat his young wife as a means of discipline, and this practice sometimes degenerated into a mere outlet for their frustrations.

Burgess and Locke, in their work, *The Family: From Institution to Companionship* provide us with a document secured in 1932 from a Chinese student. It records an interview with an aged woman in Chicago's Chinatown. Burgess and Locke point out that this document describes the traditional concept of the roles of mother-in-law and daughter-in-law in the context of the changing conceptualization of these roles. This is revealed by the younger woman's inner rebellion against the traditional power and authority of the older woman. For the subject matter under discussion, it may be of particular interest to quote the young woman:

> Mother-in-law was deeply religious, a faithful follower of Buddhism. My husband and I were Christians. Before I was married, friends frankly warned me that it is impossible for a Christian to marry into a pagan family without domestic troubles. Some told me that mother-in-law was cruel. Accordingly, the double image of the tender Buddha and devilish mother-in-law constantly appeared in my mind. But I had to sacrifice my own happiness for the sake of my beloved husband.

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[17] Francis L. K. Hsu, *Under Ancestors' Shadow,* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1971), p. 57.

[18] *Ibid.,* p. vii.

[19] Croll, *op. cit.,* p. 27.

A part of the marriage ceremony involves the giving of presents between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law. Mother-in-law gave me a gold bracelet and I gave her the customary present of a skirt made by my mother. This signified the resignation of family duties by the mother-in-law. According to the old idea, a full-dress was inconvenient for work; and hence the removal of a skirt signified taking on the duties of work. I thought this signified that the wife was to be the successor of the mother-in-law in carrying on family duties. My mother-in-law, however, interpreted it in a very restricted sense. Family duties to her were but the hard labor and the rest of the duties she kept for herself. Family policies were devised and executed by her, as a queen sitting on the throne of her kingdom.

Every morning, while the sun was still lying behind the morning dews, I went quickly to the kitchen to prepare morning tea for mother-in-law. Afterward I came back to my room to comb my hair, and then, I put on my formal dress. The skirt was indispensable for a full dress.

Going to her bedroom, I found that she was still sleeping. I stood beside her bed for an hour waiting to attend her. At last she awoke. I bowed to her humbly; then I gave her my arm in support until she reached her armchair. I went to the kitchen and took a basin of hot water to her bedroom and helped her wash her face. Then I presented her a cup of hot and fragrant tea with all the eastern virtue and politeness I could command.

It was nine now; I had to prepare a breakfast. We had servants, but did they help me do anything at all? No. My own status was lower than any of them. I had no experience in cooking. The criticisms of my cooking were hardly bearable. Such criticisms as 'It is too salty,' 'It is tasteless,' etc., prevented me from being calm; my tears flowed like an inexhaustible fountain. I came back to my private room, crying and crying.

At night I had to take care of her bed. I had to hang down her mosquito net in order to keep mosquitoes out. Besides, I had to say good night while leaving.

I disliked two things particularly. The prohibition against having a private talk with my husband destroyed the best part of my marriage life. Occasionally we talked in our private room. As soon as she discovered it she would call me out with a scornful voice. In her own philosophy private talks were undesirable at home since everything in the home was open to every individual. There was no privacy at all.

Second, I was not permitted to visit my mother's home often. I was permitted to go to her home once a year, though she was living near by. Once when I went to my mother's home for five days, I suddenly found out that a carriage was waiting outside for

> my return. Mother-in-law tried to cut me off from both my husband and my mother.[20]

As for property, Chinese women had practically no rights. When a family estate was divided, all property was distributed among the males. Explaining the total absence of property rights which is almost without example, Olga Lang said:

> The property-less woman of China was herself the property of man. Young girls were sold by their fathers and became slaves, concubines, or prostitutes. Husbands sold their concubines, pawned or sold their wives for temporary or permanent marriages to other men. Such transactions were forbidden by law but took place not withstanding. A woman sold as a concubine was enslaved for her whole life.[21]

For the Chinese, marriage was not sacred. Thus, there was no difficulty in accepting the principle of divorce. The term for divorce, which literally meant "oust wife," closely reflected the unilateral nature of divorce. The legal codes of the Chinese Empire followed the Confucian classics in recognizing seven grounds on which a husband might divorce his wife:

1. She is rebellious toward her parents-in-law.
2. She has failed to produce a son.
3. She has been unfaithful to her husband.
4. She has shown jealousy toward her husband's other women.
5. She has a repulsive and incurable disease.
6. She is given to hurtful talk and tale bearing.
7. She is a thief.[22]

Nevertheless, there were three circumstances in which, even though grounds existed, the wife could not be put away:

1. She has mourned three years for her husband's parents.
2. She has no family to which to return.
3. She married her husband when he was poor, and now he is rich.[23]

A woman had no reciprocal rights. Divorce, therefore, was entirely a man's privilege.

Although in theory, reasons for divorce were enumerated and discussed at length in description of the Chinese marriage system, in practice, divorce was rare in traditional China. A wife who returned to her parents had little or no chance to remarry, and her future

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[20] Ernest W. Burgess and Harvey J. Locke, *The Family: From Institution to Companionship,* (New York: American Book Co., 1945), pp. 46-47.

[21] Olga Lang, *Chinese Family and Society,* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), p. 45.

[22] Mace, *op. cit.,* p. 246.

prospects otherwise were bleak. Her children belonged to her husband's family. She had no property of her own.

The Chinese held that a woman had to be the wife of one man only, and expressed this attitude by setting up memorials to widows who remained faithful. One could see many a monumental arch which lined the Chinese roads to honour the virtues of the faithful and lifelong widow. "There is a long tradition of Chinese wives who committed suicide when the husband died, as a demonstration of perfect loyalty and the conviction that it was better for a wife to go to heaven with her husband than to go living alone on earth."[24] To prove devotion to a dead husband, some widows had the idea of cutting off an ear and throwing it into the coffin—a pledge not to marry again. At least this was preferable to joining a husband on a funeral pyre as was the case in traditional India.

Surprisingly, even unmarried virgins were encouraged to die or to refuse to marry in memory of their deceased betrothed.[25] Or, more surprisingly, in some localities a girl would still be required to marry her dead fiance. In such a case, she was brought home carrying a cock as a symbol, and then had to sleep in the marital bed with the memorial tablet of her dead "husband" for three days, after which she was considered to be a married woman. From then on, she would spend the rest of her life as a widow![26]

In case a woman chose to remarry against the objection of the family, she had to risk her life. The whole clan had the right to interfere, even the right to kill her. The following incident, as late as 1949 in Honan Province, is testimony to the above fact:

> A woman whose family name was Ch'en was married to a man name Hsu. The husband died eight years after the marriage, and both the woman's and the husband's families did not permit her to remarry. In 1949, the widow took the matter into her own hands and married the head of a neighboring village. Two months after this, the woman's uncle, a local bully, and her own brother, ordered her to hang herself. She begged for mercy....Both turned a deaf ear to her pleas. She then requested to see her children and to put on her good clothes before dying, but this was also denied. She adamantly refused to hang herself; so her own brother strangled her to death, then hung her body up below the roof.[27]

Ideally, a chaste widow should not remarry in traditional Chinese society. However, this was commonly practiced only among the gentry

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[23] *Ibid.*

[24] C. K. Yang, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

[25] Hu Shih, *The Chinese Renaissance*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 104.

[26] Yang Yi, "The Past and Present of the Women of Hui'an County," *Women of China*, December 1980, p. 10.

[27] Quoted in C. K. Yang, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

who followed seriously the Confucian ethic that the remarriage of widows was abhorrent. Among peasants and the urban poor, widows did remarry on account of economic pressure. In these classes, the husband's family usually arranged remarriage for their widowed daughter-in-law in exchange for a good price. In such a case, the woman was permitted to take neither her children nor her first husband's property, because these belonged not to her but to her first husband's family. Widowers and divorced men, in contrast, were encouraged to remarry, and they did not forfeit any rights to property or children in doing so.

Although custom and law allowed only one principal wife, husbands could take secondary wives or concubines, at least among those who could afford to do so. Traditional China, therefore, "could be said to combine the profession of monogamy with the practice of polygyny."[28]

A man could take a concubine if the first wife did not bear children, and in practice this was done for many other reasons.[29] A concubine, being an informal wife taken into the house with no formal wedding ceremony, had no ritualistic recognition or institutional guarantee for her security nor permanency of her position in the family. She might be thrown away at will. Divorce was not necessary. Consequently, she had to keep her wits about her in order to retain her precarious position. "The two best ways to do so were to make herself sexually attractive to the husband, and to bear him sons."[30]

The status of the concubine, who often had previously been an attractive slave girl or courtesan,[31] was lower than that of the wife. In the household, the wife had dominion over all concubines. Usually the concubine and her children had their own private apartments in the household. But she did not enjoy any recognized share of the family income as did the wife and, therefore, she was completely dependent on her male sponsor. The concubine's children, including sons, did not have any ceremonial status and family opportunities

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[28] Lucy Mair, *Marriage,* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 157.

[29] In connection with this, Dr. Hsu, for example, noted: "Concubines are taken by wealthy persons, generally ostensibly to acquire sons....Yet a review of the eleven cases of concubinage I have collected will show that more than half of them have nothing to do with the popularly professed reason. In six out of eleven cases the concubines were taken because the wives were barren." Hsu, *op. cit.,* p. 105.

[30] Mac, *op. cit.,* pp. 206-207.

[31] As for courtesans, they "were often skilled in music, dancing, conversation and poetry composition, and merchants and scholar-gentry frequented the houses of courtesans for such feminine companionship. They often supplied the need for courtship and romance which many men had missed in their youth, and many later became concubines. Some wives cooperated with their husbands in such ventures." Croll, *op. cit.* p. 30.

equal to those of sons born to the wife. The concubine's sons were unable to claim an equal share of inheritance with the wife's sons. They could do so only when the wife had no sons. If the concubine remained in favour until the death of the wife, however, she might find herself promoted to succeed her as mistress of the household. For a concubine, this was considered the classic success story.[32] Then her sons and daughters enjoyed the same right as those of the first wife.

Concubinage as a means of continuing the family line seems to have been merely a rationalization. It was often associated with the expression of prestige, or with polyerotic tendencies of the male.[33] An example of this may be cited from Han Suyin's *Birdless Summer*. A concubine, Spring Wave, was a member of the Liu household harem. Liu was a powerful warlord. Since Spring Wave was about to give birth, possibly a son, she was his favorite at the time and was given very special treatment. When she was about to give birth, the warlord Liu brought home a new concubine.

> How and why this sudden change? Perhaps the disfigurement of Spring Wave's body, in the last weeks of pregnancy, had displeased him? From the room where she was giving birth, Spring Wave could hear, in the adjoining bedroom, separated only by a screen, the giggles and the little screams of her rival, in bed with the warlord; and when her child was born it was a girl....And then there was the case of the warlord, who only two hours after his concubine had given birth insisted on intercourse with her...We were called in haste, but she died bleeding to death.[34]

Thus, the richest of the local lords often had numerous concubines from whom they benefitted for their sexual pleasure. The polygamous household became the rich man's privilege. Certainly it was sometimes the symbol of his prestige. Under the circumstances, Chinese wives, trained to submission, were usually unable to complain about it. They could not be jealous of their rivals, because jealousy was a recognized ground for divorce.

Traditionally in China women were generally secluded. Especially in the upper classes women lived in virtual purdah:

> They had little association with unrelated women (other than servants), limited contact with even the male members of their family, and very little information about events outside their living quarters, including the income-producing activities on which they were dependent.[35]

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[32] Mace, *op. cit.*, p. 207.
[33] Hsu, *op. cit.*, p. 106.
[34] Han Suyin, *op. cit.*, p. 159.
[35] Margery Wolf, "Chinese Women: Old Skills in a New Context," in *Woman, Culture, and Society*, ed. by Michelle Z. Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1974), p. 161.

Perhaps the most striking feature of social life in traditional China was the segregation of the sexes. The Confucianists considered it most desirable that men should have no public social relations with women. Thus, this forestalled romantic love as a basis for marriage. Also, they deemed it desirable that even within the home, boys and girls seven years or older were not supposed to sit or eat together. The complete separation of the sexes was carried through "even to the extent that the husband and wife were not supposed to hang their garments in the same closet."[36]

Where men were entertained at home, rather than at the customary teahouse, women were seldom seen and noticed. At such times women were not allowed to even peep outside the doors of their apartments. Thus advice to a husband was:

> So misfortune and intrigue will pass you by.[37]
> Let not your guests behold your wife,
> and secretly lock the postern gate.
> Resrict her to courtyard and garden,
> So misfortune and intrigue will pass you by.[37]

The ideal woman in traditional Chinese society was one who concentrated all her efforts on her household tasks. From earliest times all women were taught that they should not concern themselves with outside affairs, especially public matters. Participation in these matters "was abhorred as the root of all evil and the cause of the downfall of the great dynasties."[38] Thus, women were cut off from opportunities for independence in political, economic and social activities.

Oddly enough, concerning the practice of secluding women and the division of labor, in reality it was the prerogative of the richer classes to live up to those standards. Peasant families could not afford the luxury of secluding their women. The peasants lived in small separate houses, or sometimes several families shared one of the old gentry houses. Their living quarters afforded them much less seclusion than the rambling courtyards characteristic of gentry dwellings. The light inside their houses was poor, so peasant women frequently sat and worked on their doorsteps. As Elisabeth Croll describes peasant women in the village, they:

> sometimes gathered water from the well, did their washing at the river, and had no servants to shop and market for them. They had more contact with local shopkeepers and pedlars and in some areas of China, such as the southern provinces, women traditionaly

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[36] Vern L. Bullough, *The Subordinate Sex: A History of Attitudes toward Women,* (New York: Penguin Books, 1974, p. 249.

[37] Croll, *op. cit.,* p. 17.

[38] Bullough, *loc. cit.*

> worked in the fields alongside their menfolk during the busy seasons.[39]

She goes on to say:

> Women of the non-Han ethnic minorities, boat-women, water-carriers, servants, fuel gathers and scavengers tended to come and go freely.[40]

In this way, women in the lower classes customarily had more freedom of movement.

It should be noted, therefore, that besides class differences in the status of women, there were also regional differences in traditional China. A Canadian femininist, Katie Curtin said of this fact:

> The conditions of women in North China, the old heartland of the dynastic imperial system, were more oppressive than in the South. There were deep prejudices in the North against women working in the fields, while it was acceptable practice in the South.[41]

It is significant that from time immemorial women in the provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Fukien of South China worked in the fields and also as coolies, boatmen, and in other manual tasks.[42]

Another feature of the inferior status of Chinese women is entirely unique, that is, the custom of footbinding, a practice which made it almost impossible for women to move about without great effort.

The origin of the footbinding custom is obscure. It is thought to have begun about the tenth century A.D. It was first practiced by the women of the upper classes but later became general. So in spite of class or relative wealth or poverty, all women bound their feet. The only exceptions were nuns, Manchu women, and maids, even though maids who bound their feet were regarded as much more valuable.[43] In addition to these specific groups, were the Hakka women,[44] the so-called "hill tribes" of China and the boat population of Canton who also kept their feet unbound.

Bound feet in traditional times came to be such a supreme mark of quality in a woman that it was more important even than being

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[39] Croll, *loc. cit.*

[40] *Ibid.*

[41] Katie Curtin, *Women in China,* (New York and Toronto: Pathfinder Press, 1975), p. 13

[42] Olga Lang, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

[43] Howard S. Levy, *Chinese Footbinding: The History of a Curious Erotic Custom,* (Tokyo: John Weatherhill, Inc., 1966), p. 272.

[44] They "had a reputation for hard work and for being exploited by lazy husbands—women are reported to do as much private-plot work as men or even more." Parish and Whyte, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

clever or beautiful. It was, therefore, difficult to marry off a daughter with big (natural) feet. A girl whose feet were not bound would not even be desired as a concubine or prostitute. Only paupers who were obliged to preserve their daughters' ability to work would thus deprive them of having bound feet.[45] This class of females was contemptibly called "chopping blocks" or "the bigfooted."[46]

Nevertheless, the binding process, which had to be begun in early childhood, was excruciatingly painful and ended in permanent crippling. A woman recalled the indescribable pain she endured:

> I was inflicted with the pain of footbinding when I was seven years old. I was an active child who liked to jump about, but from then on my free and optimistic nature vanished...Binding started in the second lunar month; mother consulted references in order to select an auspicious day for it. I wept and hid in a neighbor's home, but mother found me, scolded me, and dragged me home. She shut the bedroom, boiled water, and from a box withdrew binding shoes, knife, needle, and thread. I begged for a one-day postponement, but mother refused: 'Today is a lucky day,' she said. 'If bound today, your feet will never hurt; if bound tomorrow, they will.' She washed and placed alum on my feet and cut the toenails. She then bent my toes toward the plantar with a binding cloth ten feet long and two inches wide, doing the right foot first and then the left. She finished binding and ordered me to walk, but when I did, the pain proved unbearable...My feet felt on fire and I couldn't sleep; mother struck me for crying...I tried to hide but was forced to walk on my feet...Though I wanted to sit passively by the k'ang, Mother forced me to move around.[47]

This excessive pain and suffering were summarized in an old saying: "For every pair of bound feet, a bucket full of tears."

As for the deformity that footbinding produced, the foot looked like a hoof. The bound foot with this hoof-like shape, however, was given the romantic name of "golden lily" or "golden lotus." The ideal size of bound foot had to be only three inches in length from heel to toe.[48] Thus, adult women in traditional China walked on three-inch stumps.

This barbarous custom, however, was romanticized and eulogized. For example, during his stay in China (about 1895), a French doctor, named Matignon, questioned Chinese gentlemen about the bound feet and found that they were unanimous in their praise: "Oh! The small foot! You Europeans can't understand how exquisite, agreeable, and

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[45] Olga Lang, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
[46] Charles Humana and Wang Wu, *The Ying Yang: The Chinese Way of Love*, (New York: Avon Books, 1972), p. 91.
[47] Levy, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
[48] Humana and Wu, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

exciting it is!"[49] In connection with the aesthetic value of footbinding, Olga Lang said: "Several peasants and coolies interviewed...in 1936, asserted that bound feet, though impractical, are nevertheless much more beautiful than natural feet."[50] Even Lin Yutang, a modern westernized author, describing the beauty of one of his heroines, says:

> She had very small feet, neatly bound, but she stood quite erect... Beneath the trousers showed a pair of red bow shoes, three and a half inches long, beautifully embroided and topped by ankle bands of white cloth. A well-bound, well shaped pair of dainty feet was a delight because most bound feet were not well bound with regard to proportion and angle. The principal thing, apart from perfect harmony of life, was 'uprightness' so that the feet formed a perfect base for the woman's body. This young woman's feet were almost ideal, being small, unright and neat, round and soft and tapering to the point gradually, and not flattened as many common feet were.....A pair of big unbound feet would have completely ruined this harmony of line.[51]

Footbinding was also considered having sexual appeal. A German scholar wrote in 1928 that "the fundamental meaning of this injurious practice was the arousing of male lust."[52]

The essential function of footbinding, however, is clearly not to make the women beautiful and sexually attractive, but to make them immobile. Bound feet restricted the physical mobility of women, thus preventing them from moving about freely and unchaperoned. In the famous "Classic for Girls" we read:

> Have you ever learned the reason
> For the binding of your feet?
> 'Tis from fear that' twill be easy to go out
> upon the street.
> It is not that they are handsome when thus like
> a crooked bow,
> That ten thousand wraps and bindings are en-
> swathed around them so.[53]

According to a rhyme from a presumably Yuan dynasty source, we can see a similar attitude:

> Why must the foot be bound?
> To prevent barbarous running around! [54]

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[49] Levy, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-131.
[50] Olga Lang, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
[51] Lin Yutang, *Moment in Peking: A Novel of Contemporary Chinese Life*, (New York: The John Day Co., 1939), pp. 45-46.
[52] Levy, *op. cit.*, p. 130.
[53] Quoted in Croll, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
[54] Levy, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

So it came to be regarded as a means of teaching chastity and preventing women from becoming lewd. The Chinese believed that if young girls went out of doors, they would be sure to get into mischief. A virtuous woman was discouraged even to look out of the door of her house. Footbinding not only restricted women's freedom, but also considerably injured their health. This practice of footbinding, which was introduced into China in the 10th century, continued well into the 1940s, although it was officially banned in 1911.

Another traditional limitation which applied to the status of women in Chinese society was loss of her name. After marriage, the wife's given name was discarded and she was known to the community only by her surname prefixed with the surname of her husband's family. "In the home she was addressed by a kinship term denoting her position in the family organization which omitted both her surname and given name."[55] Thus, her individual existence in society was virtually completely effaced.

Thus far, many factors in the traditional oppression of women have been discussed. Yet, it should be noted that some writers have claimed that Chinese women have not always been cruelly subjected to men. Rather than being chattel, Chinese women were believed to have really held the power. For example, Dr. Hu Shih, one of the prominent scholars of contemporary China, had the following to say:

> At the outset, it is necessary to point out that the position of women in the old family was never so low as many superficial observers have led us or believe. On the contrary, woman has always been the despot of the family. The authority of the mother and the mother-in-law is very well known. Even the wife is always the terror of the husband; no other country in the world can compete with China for the distinction of being the nation of hen-peck husbands. Certainly, no other country has produced so many stories of hen-pecked husbands. The wife built up her strong position sometimes upon love, sometimes upon beauty of personality, but in most cases upon the fact that she could not be dislodged from her position: she could not be divorced! [56]

There may be considerable truth in what Dr. Hu Shih said. It is true that Chinese women in their capacity as mothers and mothers-in-law did hold some power. This was, however, only over the women of the family. And all the women still remained subordinate to the men. It is also true that the status of women in the family was comparatively high in those areas where they took a greater part in productive labour. But even in such areas, girls were less valued than boys, and they could not inherit property and, therefore, did not

[55] C. K. Yang, *op. cit.*, p. 111.
[56] Hu Shih, *op. cit.* pp. 104-105.

become owners of the land. An occasional case occurred where a very strong woman would somehow gain considerable control in her family, including over the male members. The real levers of power, however, were held by the men, in the patriarchal male clan institutions of the village, and in the government bureaucracy. In view of these facts, the position of women relative to men in traditional Chinese society was, without doubt, an inferior one.

Attempts to Improve Women's Position

Thus far, we have discussed the condition of Chinese women which was one of subjection and suffering, frustrated dreams and unrealized potential. Nevertheless, this does not mean that their subordinate position passed unnoticed or unchallenged.

Bemoaning the sad fate of women in contrast to men, a poet Fu Hsuan, as far back as the third century B.C., exclaimed:

> How sad it is to be a woman!
> Nothing on earth is held so cheap.
> Boys stand leaning at the door
> Like Gods fallen out of heaven.
> Their hearts brave the Four Oceans,
> The wind and dust of a thousand miles.
> No one is glad when a girl is born;
> By her the family sets no store.[57]

In the twelfth century A.D., Yuan Cai grieved for women's inequality and their enforced dependence on husbands and sons. In the sixteenth century, the injustice of the traditional divorce procedures was deplored by one scholar. And another, Yuan Mei, in the eighteenth century, appealed for a system of education for women and mutual sexual license in his anarchist revolt against the entire Confucian system. In his four essays on chastity, Yu Zhangxian, in the eighteenth century, condemned the double standard of morality and rebuked the custom of footbinding.[58]

Perhaps the most satirical criticism of the inequality of women can be found in one nineteenth-century novel, *Flowers in the Mirror*, by Li Ruzhen. In it the author reversed the roles of men and women. In the "Women's Kingdom," women ruled and men attempted to gain their favour. In this land of fantasy, men were dressed in voluminous petticoats and subjected to the tortures of footbinding. With the exclusive advantage of education, women entered the state-examination system to take up positions in the government bureaucracy. Moreover, old men painted their beards black in order to preserve their youthful attractiveness. In short, as Elisabeth Croll points out:

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[57] Quoted in Curtin, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
[58] Croll, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

> Li Ruzhen used the novel to question the inequality of women in society and the double standard of morality. He emphasized the injustice done to women, and later in the twentieth century his novel was heralded as the first 'Chinese Declaration of the Rights of Women.' [59]

Popular rejection of the subjugation of women is often to be found in the ideas and practice of peasant revolts in Chinese history. For example, the Yellow Turban rebellion, one of the two great Taoist uprisings, which broke out in the second century A.D., manifested "a certain assertion of women's rights."[60] This Taoist movement was seemingly aimed at creating a society in which men and women would be on a more or less equal footing. According to Dr. Denise Carmody, the Taoists' understanding of nature's way was in many respects feminist."[61] And, she believes that "Taoists achieved one notable practical victory when they brought about the outlawing of female infanticide."[62]

The best known example of a revolution in the position of women is that of the extensive and widespread Taiping ("great peace") peasant rebellion of the mid-nineteenth century. In this Taiping Rebellion of 1850-1864, women were accorded equality:

> Women had a right to an equal allocation of land under the Taiping land system, and girls could attend school, take examinations, and become officials. The sale of brides, footbinding, prostitution, and polygamy were forbidden. Widows were permitted to remarry. Women could join women's armies which sometimes engaged in battle although they were more often used in non-combat roles.[63]

In 1853 the Taipings captured Nanking and made it their capital. By this time there numbered forty women's armies, each with 2,500 soldiers. The early women followers were mainly from the minority nationalities of the southern provinces, but later they were joined by numerous village women from the other provinces. Occasionally, whole families joined the Taiping forces.[64] For instance, in the case of Marshall Liang Litai's family, it is recorded that

> only his two younger brothers remained at home. His mother, wife, sister, son and daughter all joined the Taipings. His elder brother was killed in action. At the age of 34, Liang Litai commanded a men's detachment of 13,000 troops, and his mother, Hu Damei, was in command of 2,500 women soldiers.[65]

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[59] *Ibid.*
[60] *Ibid.*
[61] Denise L. Carmody, *Women and World Religions,* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1979), p. 70.
[62] *Ibid.,* p. 71
[63] Deila Davin, *Woman-Work: Women and the Party in Revolutionary China,* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p. 7.
[64] Croll, *op. cit.,* p. 40.
[65] Tian Xiang, "Stories of the Taiping Women Army," *Women of China,* No. 2 (April, 1979), p. 33.

Among the Taiping women marshalls, Hong Xuanjiao and Su Sanniang were exceptionally fearless, mighty warriors. Consequently, their names became legendary.[66]

In the first years of their rule, the Taipings enacted some reforms for women. Later, through the degeneration of the movement, however, polygyny and concubinage became prevalent among the leaders. Women were given as rewards to successful generals. The possession of women even became a badge of rank: the more senior the officer or official, the larger the number of wives were permitted to him. For instance, "the highest ranking men in the armies received more than ten women and the number decreased as the rank lowered."[67]

The leaders, the Kings of the Taiping, built up enormous harems in the decadent years of the rebellion and had unlimited license. The Taiping leader Hong Xiuquan wrote about the role of women clearly:

> Women in the rear palaces should not try to leave;
> if they should try to leave, it would be like hens
> trying to crow.
> The duty of the palace women is to attend to the
> needs of their husbands;
> And it is arranged by Heaven that they are not to
> learn of the affairs outside.[68]

It is obvious that the old Confucian ideology persisted.

Eventually, overcome by superior military power borrowed from the West, the Taipings were suppressed, but at the height of their success they held most of Central China, and their armies fought in 16 of the 18 provinces south of the Great Wall. The Taipings were fighting to overthrow not only the Ch'ing dynasty, but also the whole traditional social system. Their doctrine was a sort of primitive communism obtained partially from Chinese tradition and partially from a false or spurious Christianity.[69]

As discussed above, the Taiping attitudes toward women displayed the contradictions and inconsistencies in practice, but their utopian ideals and to a lesser extent, their practice remain valuable evidence of a tradition of dissent. Undoubtedly, the seeds of general revolution among the peasantry had been sown.

In the early and middle nineteenth century the Christian missionaries also challenged existing social norms and attempted to improve the position of women. So many wives of missionaries and

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66 *Ibid.*
67 Croll, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-41.
68 Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 41.
69 Davin, *loc. cit.*

single women missionaries opened small schools for girls. But only a very small number of pupils attended the schools. As a matter of fact, many of the pupils were slave-girls, foundlings and beggar-girls picked up off the streets. Then, in 1877, the Chinese government officially condemned the activities of women missionaries so as to stop their work among women.[70]

From the early 1800s to the late 1930s, and organized movement against the traditional marriage also developed among women in the Shun-te district of Kwangtung of south China. It was mainly the workers in the silk industry who refused to marry, remained virgins, and went to live in "Girls' Homes." There they stayed with others who shared their views.[71] According to Denise L. Carmody, those women

> often took vows of celibacy and formed sisterhoods, frequently in the name of Kuan-yin, whom they believed to have been a princess turned nun, against her parents' objections. This was a powerful model; Kuan-yin had no husband to claim her, no mother-in-law to control her, no children to impede her.[72]

Despite the fact that this movement was not widespread, it raised furious opposition because it cut to the marrow of the Confucian expectation that women would be obedient wives and good mothers.

In the late 1800s the idea of female equality was championed by prominent liberal reformers like K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. In the so-called abortive 100-day Reform of 1898, they advocated modern education for women and the unbinding of their feet.[73]

Shortly after this, the first women revolutionaries appeared on the scene. They were from the privileged classes, graduates of new educational institutions for women in China and abroad, particularly in Japan. They gave most of their time and effort to working as equals with men in the revolutionary movement led by Sun Yat-sen which aimed at the overthrow of the reigning Ch'ing dynasty and the establishment of a modern nation state governed by parliamentary means. One of the best known of these women was Ch'iu Chin, who published the first "Women's Journal," and who was executed in 1907 for leading an uprising against the Ch'ing dynasty. Women's divisions fought in the Republican revolution of 1911, "a revolution which promoted women's rights to education, 'to make friends,' to marry by free choice of partners, and to participate in government."[74] And with the establishment of a Republic in 1912, a group of women's

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[70] Croll, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43.
[71] Curtin, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
[72] Carmody, *op. cit.*, p. 75.
[73] C. K. Yang, *op. cit.*, p. 117.
[74] *Ibid.*

organizations made a petition to the Provisional Parliament in Peking demanding that the new constitution grant equal rights to women. When it was denied to them, they physically stormed the Parliament, smashing its windows and injuring guards.[75]

By 1913, the Republican revolution had fallen under the dictatorship of Yuan Shih-K'ai. Revolutionaries were being killed and driven underground again. In the course of this development, China broke up into a number of warlord states, and the women's movement was crushed. But still, intellectually, if not politically, China was awash with new ideas. In 1916, the newly established Chinese Renaissance Movement levelled powerful ideological attacks on traditional institutions and family-oriented values. Advocating a new family system, therefore, its leaders demanded that women be free to choose their own mates, remarry if they wished, and be economically independent. They even went so far as to "demand full emancipation of women from household drudgery, proposing that the care of children, preparation of food, laundry, and home cleaning be put on a collective basis."[76]

In 1919, a profound political upsurge shook China with a series of student demonstrations and merchant boycotts in major cities, against the selling out of Chinese sovereignty by the Western powers to Japan in the Treaty of Versailles ending World War I. This movement, called the May 4th Movement, injected renewed social and political consciousness into the women's movement. The traditional family system was a major target of attack. Women campaigned for reforms in the laws of property and inheritance. They demanded the right to be educated, to work, to vote, to hold office, and to choose their own husbands. Ibsen's plays, especially "The Doll's House," were being translated and performed.[77]

Reform movements, such as those associated with the Chinese Renaissance Movement and the May 4th Movement (1916-1919), attempted to change laws and institutions concerning women. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that most of rural China continued to imbibe the proverbial wisdom that "noodles are not rice and women are not human beings."

By the 1920s, politics, influenced by the May 4th Movement, took a more progressive and nationalistic direction. In 1923-24, Sun Yat-sen reorganized his followers into the Koumintang or Nationalist Party along Soviet Bolshevik lines. He also formed an alliance with

[75] Curtin, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.
[76] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[77] Davin, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

the then tiny Chinese Communist Party[78] established in 1921. So, one could see the successful northern expedition from 1925 to 1927 of combined Nationalist and Communist forces against the warlords of southern and central China.

But then, after the crush of the Shanghai workers' uprising in April 1927 at the hands of the rising bourgeois party of Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang (KMT), the country was unified under the KMT. In the 1927 massacre of the Shanghai workers, Chiang ordered, without warning, all Communists rounded up and executed. Thousands were killed, including women activists. Another uprising in Canton in December 1927 was suppressed by the KMT. In the course of this crackdown, "some two or three hundred women were executed. . . for simply being caught with short haircuts, a symbol of emancipation."[79] During this bloody year of 1927 it was reported that more than 1,000 women leaders were killed. Chiang Kai-shek was especially vindictive against women activists and eradicated most of the women's associations.[80] In this year the split between the Kuomintang Party and the Chinese Communist Party took place.

It is noteworthy, however, that in 1931, the Kuomintang government promulgated the Civil Code, which upheld many of the objectives of the women's rights movement:

> Woman were granted equality in civil, political, and property rights. The prohibition against footbinding was repeated. Freedom of choice and equality in marriage were upheld. Divorce by mutual consent was permited, but here a concession was made to custom: the father normally took custody of the children.[81]

Many of these legal changes, however, remained solely on paper. There is no evidence that this code was ever seriously enforced by the Kuomintang government. In general, the effects of the new laws were largely limited to the educated urban middle and upper classes. The vast majority of peasant women would never even have been informed of this legislation.[82]

As for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), following its defeat by Chiang Kai-shek in 1927, it retreated to the countryside, establishing a peasant army and "red bases" in Hunan and Kiangsi. In

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78 The Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921 by Ch'en Tuhsiu and a handful of intellectuals who had participated in the May 4th Movement of 1919.

79 Curtin, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

80 *Ibid.*

81 Davin, *op. cit.*, p. 15. cf. Hu Shih, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

82 Despite the 1931 Code which aimed at liberation of the woman from her ancient servitude, "it was reported in 1937, after it had been in operation for six years, that there were still two million girl slaves in China." Mace, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

Kiangsi, Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh built a powerful Soviet (1928-34). In these rural base areas, the status of women changed dramatically under the impact of mass mobilization. As Katie Curtin put it:

> They were granted inheritance and property rights as well as freedom of marriage and divorce. Ten thousand women in the Kiangsi base area participated in local unions. Women were also organized into brigades to make clothing and shoes for the Red Army. They were mobilized to work in the fields while the men fought at the front, and in many villages women were organized into guerrilla groups to defend the area when the men were absent.[83]

In *Portraits of Chinese Women in Revolution,* Agnes Smedley gives a clear illustration of the change that took place in the lives of peasant women of the Ningkang area when it was under Communist control. She wrote:

> In this Ningkang district were thousands of women agricultural laborers with unbound feet. For their labor the landlords had paid them rice and four or five silver dollars a year. But some were slaves, bought for work on the land or in the rich homes. When the Agricultural Laborers' Union was formed, these women agricultural laborers entered, dominating it, and when the Red Guards were organized, some of these women stepped forward, saying: 'Our feet are big—look! They have never been bound! We can walk and work like men! We are strong as the men! Give us guns!' So the Red Guards of Ningkang became a mixed body of armed men and women with red bands on their sleeves.[84]

Thus, large numbers of peasant women began to stand up, take charge of their lives and fight with their men against Chiang's forces.

The rural base areas in Kiangsi in southern China were destroyed, however, by Chiang Kai-shek. On October 18, 1934, therefore, the Chinese Red Army began the famous "Long March" of 1934-35, and Yenan in northern Shensi province became the new communist capital.

The Communists and Chiang's Kuomintang (KMT) then, as a united front in a general struggle for national liberation, fought against Japanese imperialists from 1937 to 1945. During this period of war with Japan, as its part of the bargain with the KMT, the CCP dropped its program for land reform and played down the activities of the women's organizations. It emphasized that "the vital task for the women's movement was to involve women in productive labour."[85] Changing its position toward marriage, the CCP no longer referred to the abolition of the "feudal" family which oppressed women. It

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[83] Curtin, *op. cit.,* p. 29.

[84] Agnes Smedley, *Portraits of Chinese Women in Revolution,* (New York: The Feminist Press, 1976), p. 115.

[85] Davin, *op. cit.,* p. 38.

also "backtracked on the principle of freedom of divorce, which it had advocated during the Kiangsi period, introducing a series of restrictions on this right."[86]

At the end of the anti-Japanese War, the CCP opened negotiations with Chiang for its admission into the KMT government as a minority party. But it did not come to realization because of Chiang's rejection. Consequently, another Chinese civil war was to occur from 1945 to 1949.

During this civil war, the change in policy on women was not so drastic. The CCP seems to have felt that too sudden and strong a campaign for women's rights might alienate many peasants, including even many of the women themselves.

Very significant changes, however, took place in the course of land reform as acknowledged in the resolution of the Central Committee of the CCP on woman-work, issued in 1948:[87]

> Women have become much more aware and enthusiastic, and consequently there has been a fundamental change in their political and economic status, and in their position in the family and in society.[88]

Under land reform not only did men and women get equal rights to the land, but separate land deeds were sometimes issued. In the words of the above-mentioned resolution of the Central Committee:

> When a family is taken as the unit for issuing land deeds, a note must be made upon them to the effect that men and women have equal rights to the land. Every member of the family has democratic rights in the disposal of the property. When necessary, land deeds for women can be issued separately.[89]

In this period of civil war, women had to be mobilized for unaccustomed roles in agriculture, handicrafts, and war support work. Such a mobilization as well as the land reform raised the morale and the consciousness of women.

Women could be found in the army as doctors and nurses, and even more important, in the political and propaganda departments. They worked in government administration, land reform, and cadre training programmes. Here one can see that traditional attitudes to women were crumbling. Thus, women increasingly came to reject their old subordinate role in the "feudal" family and in society.

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[86] Curtin, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
[87] For the 1948 Central Committee resolutions, see Appendix 2 in Davin, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-209.
[88] *Ibid.*, p. 201.
[89] *Ibid.*, p. 204.

As we see from the history of any social change, while a new policy may be implemented, the actual practice is hampered by the ages old traditional ways. Therefore, one should not make the hasty conclusion that women's liberation in the communist-controlled areas during the civil war was completely successful. Great numbers of people did still cling to the old ideas of women's subservience and dependence. Thus, in 1948 the CCP was urged to "correct the feudal ideology which values men and despises women"[90] that still survived both inside and outside the Party. But it is obvious that women had started on the road to full emancipation.

The Position of Women after Liberation in 1949

The Chinese civil war ended with the CCP victory over Chiang's Kuomintang, and on the first day of October 1949 the People's Republic of China was proclaimed in Peking (Beijing). The leader of the new government, MaoTse-tung (Mao Zedong), demanded to put an end to the subjugation of women, regarding subjugation as an intimate part of the evils of Confucian family relations. Thus, he held that Chinese women, who "hold up half of heaven," have to be accorded equality with men. As Parish and Whyte put it:

> In fact Mao showed more concern for improving the role of women than he did for the general reform of family relations. This emphasis was incorporated into a number of policies and programs, from the 1950 Marriage Law to a more recent stress on equal pay for equal work and on promoting women into leadership positions.[91]

Consequently, the new government was explicitly committed to redefining and improving the position of women in society.

In September 1949, on the eve of the birth of the new China, the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference declared:

> The People's Republic of China shall abolish the feudal system that holds women in bondage. Women shall enjoy equal rights with men in political, economic, cultural, educational and social life. Freedom of marriage for men and women shall be put into effect.[92]

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[90] *Ibid.*

[91] Parish and Whyte, *op. cit.*, p. 236. Mao was betrothed by his family to a girl he hardly knew. He later repudiated the marriage. "Mao is said to have resented it as much for the girl as for himself, just as he resented his mother's traditionally subservient role to his father. He was once deeply shocked by a local girl's suicide on her way to be married to an unknown man twice her age." Maria Roper, "How Do the Chinese People Live?," in *China Profile: A Symposium, ed. by Ross Terrill* (New York: Friendship Press, 1969), pp. 129-

[92] "China's Marriage Law: Past and Present," *Women of China,* May 1980, p. 12.

On May 1, 1950, the Central People's Government made public "The Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China" which, in its principles, stipulates:

> The feudal marriage system based on arbitrary and compulsory arrangements and the supremacy of man over woman, and in disregard of the interests of the children, is abolished. The New Democratic marriage system, which is based on the free choice of partners, on monogamy, on equal rights for both sexes, and on the protection of the lawful interests of women and children, is put into effect.[93]

This law, setting itself up in oppostion to the evil customs and practices connected with the feudal marriage system in old China, prohibited bigamy, concubinage, child betrothal, interference with the remarriage of widows, and the exaction of money or gifts in connection with marriage. It set the minimum age for marriage at twenty for men and eighteen for women.

The equality of husband and wife was asserted in a declaration of their freedom to choose their own occupations and social activities, their equal status in the home and their joint duty of striving for the welfare of the family and the construction of the new society. Women were allowed to retain their own surnames. Women were declared to have equal rights in the ownership and management of family property and its inheritance. The responsibility for rearing and educating children lay with the parents. Children out of wedlock were given the same rights as other children.

The Articles dealing with divorce established a system wherein divorce was a simple matter of registration of the proper papers when both parties agreed to divorce, and in cases where either the husband or the wife alone sought divorce, it could be granted only when mediation by the district's people's government and the judicial organ had failed to bring about a reconciliation. The revised law, however, stated that "in case of complete alienation of mutual affection, and when mediation failed, a divorce should be granted."[94]

Prompt response to the 1950 Marriage Law was clearly evident. Women especially took advantage of the divorce provisions. For instance, in Shanghai, almost 91 percent of the divorce cases in 1950 were initiated by women.[95] The strong campaign to encourage divorce

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[93] A translation of the marriage law appears in Paul Chao, *Women Under Communism: Family in Russia and China,* (New York: General Hall, Inc., 1977), Appendix II.

[94] "Report on the Work of N.P.C. Standing Committee," *Beijing Review,* No. 37 (September 15, 1980), p. 4. The Third Session of China's Fifth National People's Congress, convened in September 1980, had adopted the revised "Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China" which came into force on January 1, 1981.

[95] Curtin, *op. cit.,* p. 36.

of discontented women brought about "a total of 409,000 divorces in 1951—a rate almost one-third as high as that in the United States."[96] Nevertheless, it should be noted that old customs died slowly. According to Teng Ying-Shao, vice president of the All-China Democratic Women's Federation, it was observed:

> In some rural areas, resistance to the new concepts of women's equality in marriage was so strong that 'there are still found many cases of women being killed, or committing suicide as a result of the absence of the freedom of divorce'.[97]

In 1951, ten thousand women were murdered or committed suicide in Central and South China alone after family disputes about questions of marriage and divorce, and in 1955, it was estimated that between seventy and eighty thousand women were dying every year on the grounds of such disputes.[98]

In 1951 and 1952, the propaganda campaign for marriage and family reform was at its heights. But having seen violent reactions, as cited above, the CCP gradually realized that marriage reform would be a long-term task. The new marriage laws were often opposed or subverted by backward husbands, including party cadres. According to an official report published in the *People's Daily* in November 1953, the Vice-Chairman for the Regulation of the Marriage Law Movement acknowledged that "15 percent of the population accepted marriage and family reform, 60 percent were reluctant, and 20 percent had not been touched at all by the propaganda campaigns."[98] (The remaining 5 percent were not accounted for.)

But changes in the traditional customs came more rapidly in the cities, where those new ideas had already filtered through for a longer time. According to a survey of eleven large and medium cities, for example, it was shown that "close to 97.6 percent of the marriages in the first part of 1954 were based on free choice."[100] During the same period, however, the selling of women was still going on under various guises, and cash transactions were made secretly in rural areas where old traditions clung tenaciously.[101]

All in all, however, it is obvious that through the introduction and enforcement of the Marriage Law, promulgated on May 1, 1950, women's new status is being extended to an ever-increasing number

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[96] Edgar Snow, *Red China Today*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), p. 293.
[97] Curtin, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
[98] Davin, *op. cit.*, p. 87.
[99] Wolf, *op. cit.*, p. 171.
[100] Curtin, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
[101] *Ibid.*

of women in both urban and rural communities in all sections of the country.

The position of women was also improved by land reform. According to the Agrarian Reform Law of 1952, land in rural areas was to be equally distributed to the peasants irrespective of sex. Each woman had in her own name a certificate of land ownership. Consequently, women were given an unprecedented sense of their importance and, potentially, they were able to appropriate and take their share of land out of the family in the event of divorce, widowhood, or remarriage. This was revolutionary indeed in China where, as a rule, women did not own land.

But peasants were not destined to retain their newly acquired land for long since, in 1953, the government began immediately to prepare the way for the collectivization of agriculture. "By the end of 1956, then, the vast majority of China's 100 million farm families had been organized into collective farms."[102]

The period of the Great Leap Forward which followed from 1958 to 1960 is perhaps best known for the formation of the new forms of rural social organization, the people's communes.

The communes brought about a massive introduction of women into the labor force. In 1959, 90 percent of the total female labor force worked in the rural communes. To get women into the labor force, important efforts were made to free them from household duties.As part of this program, the rural communes set up communal dining halls, collective kitchens, and child-care centers. In order to reduce further the need for individual woman's work within the family, there were developed additional services, such as: laundries, weaving and sewing cooperatives, barber shops, and shoemaking and repair shops.[103]

Concerning the effects that land reform and collectivization had on women's economic position, however, women seem still to be a long way from economic equality with men in the countryside. It is true that wages in industry, which affects only a small majority of the Chinese women, are relatively equal between the sexes. But in the rural communes, women receive fewer work-points per day than men because they are judged to be weaker and still have to do housework, which is unpaid. This lowers both women's morale and their paychecks. In 1979, for example, Fu Xiuzhen, a woman member of Donggaocun Commune, Pinggu County, in suburban Beijing, explained the reason for women's poor attitude toward work:

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[102] Parish and Whyte, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

[103] Mark Hutter, *The Changing Family: Comparative Perspectives*, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1981), pp. 502-503.

> They were unhappy about the pay scale. For a man could get as many as 10 work-points a day while a woman wouldn't get any more than eight, even though many women worked just as much and just as well as the men.[104]

The Constitution states that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work. This is able to be guaranteed in the cities through a unified government wage system. To carry out the system in the rural areas was not so easy with conservative ideas from the old society about women.

But there is no doubt that a fundamental change is taking place in that women earn and receive money as individuals and can, in the last resort, support themselves in order to preserve their independence.

According to Engels, the introduction of women into social production was a precondition of their liberation. He stated that

> ...to emancipate woman and make her the equal of the man is and remains an impossibility so long as the woman is shut out from social productive labor and restricted to private domestic labor.[105]

He continued to say:

> The emancipation of women will only be possible when women can take part in production on a large, social scale, and domestic work no longer claims anything but an insignificant amount of their time.[106]

Women in Chinese rural areas play almost as important a role as men in agricultural labor outside the home. Thus, in terms of Engels argument, it is quite natural that one should expect the most important obstacle to sexual equality to have been removed.

In this sense, as Edgar Snow observed, the collective farming "deprived the male of opportunities to use ownership as a means of oppression or exploitation."[107]

In China, the broad masses of working women are not only becoming economically independent but also politically emancipated. They take direct part in managing state affairs. Communist Party and revolutionary committees at all levels, from the peoples commune to the provincial and national bodies, all have women members. Women

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[104] "Chinese Women Discuss Life and Work," *Beijing Review*, No. 10 (March 9, 1979), p. 21.

[105] Frederick Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 148.

[106] *Ibid.*

[107] Snow, *loc. cit.*

are elected to the National People's Congress and to membership in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

For example, when the Ninth Party Congress of the CCP was held in April 1969, 13 out of 170 Central Committee members were women, meaning that women comprised 7.6 percent of that body's membership. In the Tenth Party Congress, which met in Beijing in August 1973, 20 out of 195 Central Committee members were females, meaning an increase to 10.3% of the membership.[108] These figures still show the insufficient representation of women in political and leadership positions in China. Yet, compared with the percentage of women members in the United States Congress, they are much ahead. In the 93rd Congress (January 1973), for instance, there was not one woman in the United States Senate of 100 members. In the House, there were 16 women among its 435 members, meaning that women were only 3.7 percent of the total membership.[109]

Women are also making noticeable gains in other national leadership bodies in China. When the Fourth National People's Congress (the highest organ of state power) convened in Beijing in January 1975, more than 600 women attended. This meant that women comprised 22 percent of the total deputies. Over 27 percent of the Standing Committee of the Congress were women. Furthermore, three female members were elected as Vice-Chairmen: Soong Ching-ling (Madam Sun Yat-sen), Tsai Chang (Madam Li Fu-ch'un), and Li Su-wen.[110]

Between 1966 and 1973, the CCP admitted six million new members, of whom 27 percent were women. Women constituted an average of 40 to 45 percent of the delegates at the provincial congresses of the newly reconstituted Young Communist League in 1973.[111]

Today, one can see more women assuming rural leadership position in China. Reporting on the women of Nui'an County in the coastal province of Fujian, a reporter for *Women of China* stated, in December 1980:

> Gradually, women gained equal status to men politically. Today, there are 3,421 farm production teams all over the county, with 1,543 women team leaders and 2,795 deputy team leaders, and 9,802 women working as accountants, cashiers or in other public posts. Quite a few hold leading positions at the production brigade and the commune levels. There are women who are doing an excellent job in the fields of industry, education, health and scientific experimentation, and within the militia.[112]

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108 Mary Sheridan, "Young Women Leaders in China," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, vol. 2, no. 1 (Autum 1976), p. 62.
109 *Ibid.*
110 *Ibid.*, p. 63.
111 Croll, *op. cit.*, p. 327.
112 Yang Yi, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

One can hardly assume that these figures reflect the general trend of the women's political role in today's rural China. As a matter of fact, it is still true that Chinese women do not have a formal political voice that corresponds to their increased economic role. Nevertheless, as C. K. Yang put it:

> That women such as common laborers and peasants now hold responsible positions as a regular part of the political system is striking evidence of the new situation brought about by the changed social status of women under Communist rule.[113]

It is amazing that those who were rarely allowed to "slip out of doors," now pay close attention to current affairs and participate in various social and political activities. More continued improvement of the political status of Chinese women, however, requires an indefatigable struggle against the remnants of the age-old feudal viewpoint of "looking down" on women.

Women's equality in the right to education further established their independence. The Chinese Communist Party was confronted with a massive problem of illiteracy, particularly among women. Before the revolution, no systematic census was ever taken in China. And there was no available accurate data on illiteracy. Official estimates varied from eighty-five percent to ninety-five percent. Never theless, it seemed probable that well over ninety percent of the rural population was illiterate, whereas in a few cities the figure was possibly seventy percent. Anyhow, in 1949 it was viewed that "not one in ten adults could read and write."[114]

After 1949, therefore, mass literacy campaigns were launched to combat this problem. With reference to literacy classes, Elisabeth Croll observes:

> A great handicap to women's entrance into social production was their illiteracy and lack of technical skills. Literacy classes were very often the first step into public life and women were encouraged to take the opportunities presented by the evening, winter, and spare-time classes. According to figures published in 1951, of the 56 million peasants of both sexes attending winter and spare-time schools, about half were women.[115]

As time passed, China showed very impressive results of literacy even in the rural areas. For example, in 1970, literacy among rural adults in Kwangtung reached 72 percent. Of this figure, 83 percent of men and 61 percent of women were shown to be literate. It is

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[113] C. K. Yang, *op. cit.*, p. 130.
[114] Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 228.
[115] Croll, *op. cit.*, p. 249.
[116] Parish and Whyte, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

believed that this gap of 22 percentage points between male and female literacy is among the smaller gaps for developing societies.[116]

As for the proportion of women in schools, it increased from 25 percent in 1949 to 30 percent in 1958 at the primary level, from 20 to 31 percent at the technical middle-school level, and from 18 percent to 23 percent in the institutions of higher learning.[117] These figures show no drastic increases, but there are some increases of female students in schools at the end of the first decade of the People's Republic.

Schooling as a whole, particularly college level, was drastically curtailed during the Cultural Revolution (1966-69), which put a temporary end to organized education. With reference to the educational climate during the Cultural Revolution, Edgar Snow states:

> All universities and secondary schools were closed, to release on the countryside millions of teenagers (initially under the leadership of newly created Red Guards) and other rebels against 'those within the Party who are in authority and taking the capitalist road'. A major propaganda theme of the G.P.C.R. (Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution) was educational reform. 'Old things, old thoughts, old culture, old ideas', and all vestigial bourgeois influences were to be replaced by teaching of pure proletarian content, methods and ideals. That meant reorganizing the primary and secondary schools in ways which placed teaching and administrative responsibility directly in the hands of committees of soldiers, peasants workers. Schooling was divided between practical shop and/or farm work and classroom work. Political reliability received priority recognition above demonstrated scholastic ability, in selecting worker-peasant students to receive higher education. In 1970 this new Maoist educational pattern was still in an experimental stage—with the professional teachers working under 'revolutionary committee' directives.[118]

The universities which had become the first targets for reform when the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, were the last segment of the educational system to resume operations. Not until 1970 did institutions of higher education begin gradually to resume instruction. The results, while not aimed at women especially, were to greatly reduce educational opportunities for all Chinese youth.

It is very difficult for us to find general figures on the percentage of women students among the reduced student bodies of the institutions of higher education after the Cultural Revolution. The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars visited China in 1971 and was told that women constituted 30 percent of the student body at Beijing

117 Curtin, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
118 Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

(Peking) University.[119] Even today, however, the percentage of women students in some of the major universities does not seem to match the above figure. For instance, in 1980 at Nanjing (Nanking) University, women comprised about a quarter of the student body of 5,800, and of the 150 students in the junior classes of the physics department, 25 were women.[120] Out of seven million Chinese who leave high school each spring, fewer than 300,000, or 4 percent, will go on to college.[121] In terms of this situation, it must be especially lucky for a girl to study in college.

Today, these women university students are from all backgrounds—worker, peasant, cadre and other families. Before 1949, certainly a poor peasant woman in college was almost unheard of. College was mainly for the upper class. Describing Lu Xuanming studying acoustics at Nanjing University, a writer of *Women of China,* says:

> Lu Xuanming's parents are both workers. Before liberation, it would have been inconceivable for the children of workers, let alone girls, to go to university. At that time, only the children of the rich could afford to study at university. Now, however, the three children in Lu Xuanming's family entered university in the same year. She is the eldest daughter. All three benefit from the grants-in-aid sytem arranged by the state.[122]

In addition to the basic kind of formal education, it should be mentioned, China has also many other interesting programs for training village veterinarians, paramedics—known as barefoot doctors, midwives, tractor drivers, agricultural demonstration representatives, and the like, that are frequently missing in other countries. This kind of strategy for spreading rural education is very impressive.

In view of these facts, any western visitor may be impressed by the growth of educational institutions and literacy achieved in China since 1949. After visiting many higher, middle and primary schools, Edgar Snow, one of America's finest reporters, concluded:

> China had made greater progress in liberating masses of people from illiteracy and bringing millions some knowledge of scientific and industrial technique than any nation had ever done in so short a time. The emphasis had been quantitative rather than qualitative, but standards comparable to those in Russia and the West were now imposed in all fields of advanced study.[123]

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119 Curtin *loc. cit.*

120 Liu Fen, "Women Students at Nanjing University," *Women of China,* July 1980, p. 1.

121 *The New York Times Magazine,* December 28, 1980, p. 32. General information on China's higher education today may be found in Chen Su, "Higher Education Today," *China Reconstructs,* Vol. XXIX (August, 1980), pp. 5-7.

122 *Ibid.*

123 Snow, *op. cit.,* p. 228.

It would, of course, be completely wrong to expect that Chinese women would suffer no discrimination in education introduced since 1949. Today, proportionately more boys than girls attend school. But it is certainly true that, as compared with the pre-1949 revolution, Chinese women today are provided with many more opportunities to receive education, which is a very important prerequisite for their advancement in the social, political and economic life of the country. Indeed, inadequate education had disadvantaged women in China. Now the status of women in China, therefore, greatly depends upon how seriously the present communist regime carries out measures that advance female education as an important vehicle for the elimination of oppression. Since they have been allowed to study again after the Cultural Revolution, today Chinese youths have packed universities and technical schools, as well as night schools, spare-time classes and correspondence course. For their emancipation, Chinese women surely have to make the best use of these opportunities to receive education.

Family planning is another great help to the emancipation of Chinese women. Referring to family planning, *Newsweek* magazine reported in early 1979:

> Article 53 of the Chinese Constitution 'advocates and encourages family planning.' In a country of one billion people, birth control is rigorously enforced. Couples are 'advised' to have two children. Those marrying in January, for example, were handed a card that gave them their 'birth quota': one child in 1981 and a second in 1985. If these 'recommendations' are not followed, citizens may suffer. Besides chastising overproductive parents publicly, their 'unit' — the place of work or the street committee that oversees their lives — can cut their rice ration, deny them pay increases and deprive them of their 'forward status' as citizens of 'good proletarian class origin.'[124]

The Chinese have strongly emphasized family planning and birth control since the middle of the 1950s, with a short hiatus in 1959-61 and some disruption during the early part of the Cultural Revolution. Birth control devices are readily available and are distributed without cost in China. Sterilization operations for both men and women are encouraged. Abortions are free and given on request of the woman alone. Of course, there is no social pressure against women who want to have an abortion.

Another form of population control is late marriage, ideally not before 28 for men and 25 for women. Legally, Chinese men may marry at age 22 and girls at 20. This modifies the Marriage Law of 1950 which stipulated that a marriage can be contracted only after the man has reached 20 years of age and the woman 18 years

[124] *Newsweek*, February 5, 1979, p. 53.

of age.[125] The practice of delaying marriage helps women to achieve an identity as workers and participants in building the society as a whole, rather than limiting their role to that of housewife and mother.

The family planning campaign in China, however, is more effective in cities than it is in the countryside, where 85 percent of the population lives and old attitudes are more deeply entrenched. On farms, a large family was traditionally seen as insurance against parents' starvation in old age. Despite the fact that the countryside lags behind the cities in lowering the birth rate, it cannot be questioned that the government birth control campaign has made a significant impact. Visitors to the Province's country side often see two charts on the walls of the commune's office: one showing agricultural production targets, and the other targets for family planning.[126]

Having visited China recently, A. M. Rosenthal, the executive editor of *The New York Times,* described China's population problem more vividly:

> In China, you can only think about population figures in exclamation points. One out of every four human beings is Chinese! .....If it were not for birth control, people would be fighting for a place to stand in China. Then you comprehend that free contraception and the availability of free abortion are not matters of ideology here but of keeping China a place where a person can breathe and walk.[127]

He went on to say:

> It is official policy to give a bonus to couples pledging to have only one child; the bonus must be returned if they have more. And there are other penalties for having more: Rations and housing are provided on the basis of a two-child family. That means that if a third child comes along, everybody in the family has to get along with less of whatever foods or goods are being rationed.[128]

So, the 38 million Communist Party members have been ordered to have only one child per family. And they, together with the 50 million members of the Communist Youth League, have been urged to set an example for the masses.[129]

But the adaptability of the Chinese approach to family planning in different situations is illustrated by the policy in the national minority areas. China has 55 minority nationalities, which constitute

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[125] "Report on the Work of N.P.C. Standing Committee," *Beijing Review,* No. 37 (September 15, 1980), p. 4.

[126] Ouyang Huiyun, "Marked Results in China's Most Populous Province," *Beijing Review,* No. 46 (November 16, 1979), p. 23.

[127] A. M. Rosenthal, "Memoirs of a New China Hand," *The New York Times Magazine,* July 19, 1981, p. 16.

[128] *Ibid.*

[129] *The New York Times,* September 27, 1980, p. 2.

only 56 million of China's population of 970,920,000, or 6 percent of the total.[130] These minority people live in an area covering over half of China's territory, and some of them in remote rural areas had almost completely died out because of the harsh conditions before 1949. In some cases, an entire minority was reduced to a thousand people. The Chinese government, as part of a vigorous campaign to preserve the national minorities, has not included them in the birth-control drive. In fact, members of ethnic minorities have been encouraged to take measures to increase their populations.[131] Today, this means that "the minority people will not be subjected to the new program to limit families to one or two children."[132]

If women are to become liberated, they need to be freed from child-care chores so that they can spend more time working. In this respect, the Chinese system of nurseries and kindergartens has become a help to working mothers. First of all, women workers in China are given sick leave of up to three days per month for menstrual difficulties. They get 56 days of maternity leave, and 70 days leave after the birth of twins or a difficult delivery.[133] Those having a miscarriage get 30 days paid leave.[134] When the women return to work, they bring their babies with them. The infants are looked after in nurseries at the places where they work, and the mothers are allowed time off to nurse them. There are doctors on the premises, and isolation wards for sick children, so the mother need not stay home if the baby is not well.

Today, nurseries and kindergartens are to be seen almost everywhere in China. They are run by government organizations, factories and neighborhood committees in the city. Busy-season and regular nurseries and kindergartens also appear in the countryside. For example, according to Huangxian County, located on the southern tip of Bohai Gulf, Shandong Province:

> Since 1977, the 598 brigades in the county have set up 590 kindergartens, accommodating 97 percent of the county's pre-schoolers, 328 day-nurseries, which look after 85 percent of the infant population.[135]

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130 For a more detailed discussion of China's minority people, see *China Pictorial,* January 1981, pp. 1-13.

131 *The New York Times,* September 8, 1975, p. 8.

132 *The New York Times,* March 4, 1980, p. A10.

133 Fredric M. Kaplan, Julian M. Sobin and Stephen Andors, *Encyclopedia of China Today,* (updated ed.; Fair Lawn, New Jersey: Eurasia Press, 1980), p. 241. In passing, it should be mentioned that "unlike their urban counterparts, commune women do not receive any pay when on maternity leaves." Curtin, *op. cit.,* p. 66.

134 Davin, *op. cit.,* p. 177.

135 Guan Xia, "The Kindergartens and Nurseries of Huangxian County," *Women of China,* April 1980, p. 11.

In the past, children's nurseries and kindergartens were open only in the daytime. This was very inconvenient for parents who worked on night shifts. There are now industries and factories on 24-hour schedules. And to accommodate all these workers, their nurseries and kindergartens now provide round-the-clock service, and parents can go there whenever they wish. Some families, however, choose to leave the infants with grandparents, a task which the older people welcome. Commune tots especially, are often cared for by grandparents. Furthermore, according to *The New York Times*: "About one-third of the children are boarders, sleeping over at their schools from Monday morning until Saturday afternoon."[136]

China underwent its share of revolutions in modern times—the Kuomintang Revolution, then the Communist Revolution and, most recently, the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s. But one revolution that was shaking much of the rest of the world—the sexual revolution—was passing China by completely. During Mao's rule which ended with his death in 1976, an extreme puritanism characterized the official party line on sexuality. Premarital sex, courtship and even dating were a no-no for the youth of Communist China. Any public demonstration of affection between young men and women, was frowned on. So, the Chinese never embraced in public. One hardly ever saw a man and a woman walking arm in arm, or even holding hands. In his discussion of sexual behavior in Communist China, Peter Stafford observed:

> Life had to become Puritanic, asexual, almost inhuman. No Chinese play or film ever presented a proper love scene, allowed men and women to kiss. Even though Soviet Russian films have always been excessively prim and proper, the Chinese censor made heavy cuts whenever there was a couple kissing. Because of a few chaste caresses, many films from the Communist satellite states were also banned.[137]

Chinese women had no lipstick, cosmetics, jewelry or hair styling. As Rosenthal pointed out:

> Cosmetics or a touch of color here and there were discouraged severely during Mao's rule. Mao, who had four wives himself, did his best to eliminate outward differences between men and women, to make the country almost asexual in appearance and in conduct.[138]

Armed with the ideology of Engels and Lenin, the Chinese Communists believed that law is not a personal but a social affair, and

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136 *The New York Times*, January 5, 1981, p. B10.

137 Peter Stafford, *Sexual Behavior in the Communist World*, (New York: The Julian Press, Inc., 1967), p. 40.

138 Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

hence, cannot be separated from politics. In fact, a Chinese girl's ideal husband-to-be had to display the following qualifications: He should have boundless love for Chairman Mao and the Communist Party and a willingness to serve the people wholeheartedly. For Chinese youth, love for Mao, loyalty to Mao's thought, was more important than any other, even the natural affection for husband, wife, or family. Romantic love would be dismissed as a petty bourgeois sentiment.

There was, therefore, practically no premarital sex, no prostitution, and no sex education in the schools. Shirley MacLaine, who had made a trip to China in April, 1973, spoke of ignorance about sex in China:

> A man and a woman were expected to meet as virgins on their wedding night — with relatively little knowledge of what was expected of them — and work it out naturally. Queen Victoria would have loved modern China.[139]

And, she continued to say that "I could see for myself that in China you were able to forget about sex."[140]

Consequently, the joy of love, the ordinary pleasure of sex, human affections—were all repressed and denied in Mao's China.

In post-Mao China, however, changes in their attitudes toward love and sex appear to be taking place. In this respect, Fox Butterfield, *The New York Times*' Beijing bureau chief, wrote in January 1980: "The wall of puritanism the Communists built around China's sexual mores shows signs of crumbling, but a traditional Chinese reticence still remains."[141]

Under headlines with such titles as "Love Blooms Again,"[142] "Paris Fashions Go to Peking: With Cardin's Couture, a Great Leap Sexward,"[143] "China Discovers the Sweet Smell of Money in the Perfume Trade,"[144] and "An East-West Romance Unites a Chinese Knot: Marriage to a Foreigner,"[145] these news stories report a loosening up of the strict moral codes covering relationships between men and women.

Now girls may curl their hair if they wish. They wear other colors than blue, green or grey if they can be found. The heels on

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139 Shirley MacLaine, *You Can Get There From Here*, (New York: Bantam Books, 1975), p. 150.
140 *Ibid.*
141 Fox Butterfield, "Love and Sex in China," *The New York Times Magazine*, January 13, 1980, p. 15.
142 *Newsweek*, February 5, 1979, pp. 51, 53.
143 *Time*, February 12, 1979, p. 70.
144 *The New York Times*, August 12, 1979, p. 12.
145 *The New York Times*, May 9, 1980, p. A28.

women's shoes are getting higher. Even girls' knees begin to appear. According to the most recent report from Beijing:

> The metamorphosis of Chinese women this summer, from being wrapped in cocoons of baggy trousers and formless shirts to wearing colorful and relatively revealing dresses and skirts, even miniskirts, has transformed China into a land not only of beauty but also of beauties.[146]

As for Chinese men, of course, they also have knees, and

> They have been seeking comfort in shorts and undershirts instead of the pants and long-sleeved shirts that a few years ago demonstrated their 'resoluteness' in adhering to the party's notion that comfort and Communism do not mix.[147]

Noticeable increases in the number of young men sporting mustaches and longer hair are also being seen in the cities. These changes indicate that there is less pressure for social conformity.

Finally, romance itself is making a comeback, or at least a Western version of romance. Western observers report that there are now young persons holding hands or sitting on public benches and gazing into each other's eyes. For example, James Sterba, the Beijing correspondent of *The New York Times,* said:

> Daytime kissing in the parks has increased this summer... Kissing used to be exclusively a nighttime activity, but there is now a day-shift as well.[148]

According to another report:

> Occasionally, open affection breaks through and you feel like cheering. Shanghai is for lovers, because boys and girls actually walk hand in hand in public. I once saw a boy with his arm around a girl's waist in Shanghai.[149]

In the recent past, one was able to see the publication of a number of literary works with love as the theme. For instance, in the short story "A Place For Love" which appeared in *Women of China,* the author Liu Xinwu wrote that:

> while the gang of four lived in debauchery and luxury, literature on how to deal with love and marriage was banned. Just to talk about it publicly meant a criticism. Love had no place in our lives whatsoever. But now that I've fallen in love with Yuchuen — In my deepest emotions, I believe our love is such a wonderful thing that I want to defy the ignorance and obscurantism caused by the

146 *The New York Times,* July 29, 1981, p. A2.
147 *Ibid.*
149 Rosenthal, *op. cit.,* p. 51.
150 Liu Xinwu, "A Place for Love," *Women of China,* No. 2 (February 1979), p. 44. cf. Yu Yu-wei, "Reevaluating Attitudes on Love," *China Reconstructs,* Vol. XXVIII (January, 1979), pp. 8-10, and Chang Li-han, "A Chinese Love Story," in *ibid.,* pp. 10-12.

> gang of four. Love based on common revolutionary ideals and shared interests will certainly blossom and send forth sweet fragrance far and wide.[150]

In this work, the author praised the revolutionary concept of love between men and women. Thus, one can perceive that in post-Mao period romance is no longer vulgar. Love is rather an important part of the life of proletarian revolutionaries.

At least in the cities, many Chinese youths began to turn away from politics and toward modernization and their own individual fulfillment. At the same time, personal relations began to be officially reappraised as a legitimate focus of life.

Many of the post-Mao China's new attitudes are on display in *"Watch Out for the Foreign Guests!": China Encounters the West,* by Orville Schell. For example, a young Beijing girl tells of her desire to be a fashion designer.[151] Another most shocking observation the author made was the Peace Cafe, a scruffy Beijing hangout for pimps, whores and drunks.[152]

In the early 1950s, when the Communists were at the height of their revolutionary zeal and powers, they claimed to have eradicated prostitution, along with opium addiction and venereal disease. So, *Beijing Review* reported:

> One of the first items on the agenda of the People's Government was the banning of prostitution. In November 1949, a decision was made to immediately close down the brothels. On the night of November 21, the police in Beijing carried out this decision and rounded up the prostitutes and brothel owners, dividing them into separate groups. A production and training class was started for those newly freed women; their venereal diseases were treated and they were given some proper education.[153]

In Beijing alone, in fact, there were over 1,300 prostitutes and 224 brothels licensed by the Kuomintang government.[154]

Prostitution, considered all but eradicated, reappeared in China. This was quite shocking news in terms of the Communists' puritanical moral code. As a matter of fact, in late December 1979, the Beijing police arrested a gang of 16 prostitutes and pimps doing business at the Peace Cafe, charging them with detracting from the fame of their country.[155] The authorities closed the Peace Cafe shortly after this.

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151 Orville Schell, *"Watch Out for the Foreign Guests!": China Encounters the West,* (New York: Pantheon, 1980), p. 111.

152 For detail on the Peace Cafe, see *ibid.*, pp. 33-55.

153 Zhou Jinghua, "Beijing for Three Decades," *Beijing Review,* No. 32 (August 10, 1979), p. 18.

154 *Ibid.*

155 *The New York Times,* December 28, 1979, p. A8.

Of course, it would be wrong to exaggerate the number of people who came to the Peace Cafe. They must have been a tiny minority. But they appeared to be part of the overall decline in authority brought on by Mao's last great utopian experiment, the Cultural Revolution.

But we should be wary of misreading these events discussed thus far as evidence that the rigid facade of official puritanism in China has disappeared. That is far from the case, especially in the light of female sexuality. For instance, traveling to China last May, Mr. Rosenthal had an opportunity to visit a reformatory for teenagers known as a "work and study" school. Those youngsters had been accused of "light crimes"—stealing, chronic misbehavior, or "sexual offenses." It was in an outlying district of Shanghai: 200 boys in one school, 50 girls in another a mile away. In the girls' school, Mr. Rosenthal turned to one of the girls and asked her why she was there. Then,

> she stood up immediately, looked straight at me with pain and said loudly and firmly. 'My name is Ma Xiulan. I am 18 years old. I am here because I had affairs with boys.'[156]

Another girl responded to the same question in a similar way:

> She stood up, looked at me, and said, 'My name is Li Shanxing. I am 19 years old. I am here because I had an affair with a boy.'[157]

Later, this visitor was informed that " 'most' of the girls were there for having 'affairs' with boys—not prostitution, but the crime of sex without sanction."[158]

This appears to reflect the fact that in China there is still an air of desexualization and the advances in other fields that Chinese women made are not accompanied by a liberation of female sexuality.

Conclusion

Women were more oppressed than men in old China. In addition to the three forms of oppression weighing upon men, women also had to cope with male domination. In his essay on the "Autumn Harvest Uprising" in Hunan, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) wrote that:

> A man in China is usually subjected to the domination of three systems of authority (political authority, clan authority, and religious authority).... As for women, in addition to being dominated by men (the authority of the husband).[159]

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156 Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
157 *Ibid.*, p. 50.
158 *Ibid.*
159 Quoted in Croll, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-189.

Mao considered these four oppressions—political, clan, religious, and masculine—to be the four ropes of China's old feudal- patriarchal society shackling the Chinese women, especially those of peasant origins.

In little over three decades since China was put under the Communist regime, the social status of women has been fundamentally altered. Such phenomena as child brides and baby girls being drowned, are now non-existent. Equality between men and women is guaranteed by law. Women are playing a larger role in politics, industrial and agricultural production, culture and education, and have a bigger say in family affairs. For women of an older age who have lived in the old and the new societies, the changes experienced in their own lives are little short of miraculous.

Yet, in present-day China it is also recognized that women have not yet reached their full potential. Chinese women are still confronted with such real problems as: the problem of equal pay for women in rural areas, the insufficient representation of women in political and leadership positions, the persistence of traditional customs in courtship and marriage, and the division of labour within the household.

Today, one can notice that despite far-reaching changes in the status of women, many traditional attitudes still persist, especially in rural China. For example, one of the young female informants in the Parish and Whyte study gave the following picture of the division of labor in 1974 in the rural areas:

> Women did all the housework such as cooking, washing, tending the children. In the morning before work, at noon, and in the evening from nine to eleven or twelve, the men would be gathered about in groups of three to five just chatting away. The women, meanwhile, were home working.... No, no one talked about men doing the work in the home. It was just about doing the heavy work in the fields that the women complained. We sent-down women pointed out that in Canton husbands helped with dishwashing and even cleaning up the diapers of the children. The village men just laughed and said they wouldn't be men any more if they did that. The village women couldn't even think of such a change, so they didn't express any opinion.[160]

That Chinese customs die slowly may also be illustrated by another case of frank conversation held between a female Chinese university student and an American woman on her visit last summer to China. The girl said:

> I do not want to be married ever....Here in China, men and women are equal for work. But certainly men are considered best.

[160] Quoted in Parish and Whyte, *op. cit.*, pp. 204-205.

> Mothers still prefer sons to be born. Boys are thought smarter, they have more value than girls. Even I, too, cannot stop myself to think boys are smarter. Then I say, 'How can this be? In their brains, girls and boys are the same.' To be married only makes life more hard for a woman. She must not only work at her job to serve our country, but she must shop, cook, clean, help the child with his lessons. The husband helps, too, but only by choice.[161]

> She went on to say: "My mother is of the old fashion. She feels when I am finished with my studies it is right for me to marry..... It may be that I shall go to war with my mother. Certainly it can only be a small war."[162]

According to a study on the position of women and marriage in China prepared by a government women's organization in the summer of 1980, it was found that many traditional peasants' customs banned by the Communists in 1950 were continuing. The *New York Times* reported about these classified materials:

> In a commune in Shanxi Province, the study said, 43 percent of the children under 5 years of age and 80 percent of the children under 10 had already been betrothed by their parents. As a result of these early engagements, the selling of young women as brides and the insistence of many families on arranging the marriage of their children, a county in Fujian Province had four suicides in the first half of 1980, four people with mental breakdowns, and two attempted murders.[163]

Although these phenomena may not be prevalent in today's rural China, it is still occasionally a shocking news item.

These several illustrations suffice to indicate how China must continue to fight the traditional versus the innovative type of battles, especially for half—the female half—of the total population of one billion people.

There is no hiding the fact that there are women and men who still resist equality, either from traditional habit or from a continuing self-centeredness. The moving component in resolving these inequalities is to recognize that the liberation of women is a part of the continuing revolution in China.

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161 Quoted in Muriel Spanier, "Wei Wei, and Kwang," in *The New York Times,* June 6, 1981, p. 23.

162 *Ibid.*

163 *The New York Times,* December 31, 1980, p. A3.

THE CHINESE NATURAL RELIGION: CONFUCIANISM AND TAOISM

PAUL CHAO

This paper investigates those Chinese ideas which were strikingly conveyed by Confucianism and Taoism in the early Han dynasty and Neo-Confucianism in the Sui (A.D. 581-619), T'ang (A.D. 618-907) and Sung (A.D. 960-1778) dynasties. It is evident that a number of the elements of Confucianism were viewed as an elaboration of the ancient Chinese tradition and owned their authority to the exemplary character of the sage kings Yao and Shun. Confucius himself showed due respect to the Duke Chou, son of King Wen, as his inspiration. The Duke Chou was also considered by the Chinese to be the founder of Confucianism, which developed in Wu Ching (five Classics). The theory 'never too much' in *I Ching* (Book of Changes) furnished the principal argument for the Doctrine of the Golden Mean which was cherished by Confucians and Taoists. On the other hand, Confucius drew his moral value from the *Shih Ching* (Book of Poetry or Odes), which, he said, contains three hundred poems, the essence of which can be summed up succinctly in one senence: 'have no depraved thoughts'. The Ch'un Ch'iu (Spring and Autumn Annals) was a year by year record of events in the State of Lu. Confucius took a leaf out of the *Li Chi* (Book of Rites) in that harmony or moral order is the universal law of the world. As for *Shu Ching* (Book of History), one of the inserted chapters of the *Shu Ching* says: '....And goodness itself has no constant resting place, but accords with perfect sincerity'. This notion is similar to what Confucius treated at length on the concept of Jen (sincerity or love) in *Lun Yü* (the Analects of Confucius).

Taoism existed at the beginning of the fifth century B.C.; but it was not espoused until the first centry B.C. Among Taoists, Lieh Tzu laid an emphasis on pessimism, fatalism and self-interest, whereas Yang Chu (c. 440-366 B.C.) held that Taoist spirit was simplicity and harmony. We can readily point out in *Lü Shih Ch'un Ch'iu* (A Compendium of various Schools of Philosophy written by Lu Pu-wei in the third century B.C.) the root and source of the two main trends of Chinese thought, Taoism and Confucianism. Both in the realm of nature (Taoism) and in that of man (Confucianism), when anything moved to its extreme, a reversal to the other extreme inevitably came about.

In speaking of Neo-Confucianism, there are three lines of thought in its main sources. The first is Confucianism; the second is Taoism along with Buddhism through the medium of Ch'anism; the third is the Taoist religion, of which the cosmological views of Yin and Yang school are of paramount significance and interest.

To understand the Chinese natural religion, there should be a study of what the Chinese consider to be 'Nature' and man's relationship with it. The word 'Nature' can hardly be understood unless we probe most especially Confucianism, Taoism and Neo-Confucianism. I, for one, am quite aware that the Chinese philosophy of life and Western philosophy are poles apart. It is certain that the former is unlike the Christian religion to say the least. To bring this into better relief, it is necessary to expound the concept of 'Nature' in the context of the Chinese philosophy.

Indian thought is characterized by profound metaphysical speculation and asceticism; Hebrew-Christian thought by a theocentric approach; early Greek thought by semi-materialistic speculation in regard to the essence and origin of the universe. Chinese thought is described by an ethical realism that conveys deep-rooted beliefs: (1) both the universe and man's life are real, and running through the universe and life is a pervading ethical principle, i.e., man's duty is to follow the natural order of the universe; (2) the world must be transformed into an ideal pattern and axiomatic unity of supreme perfection, which consists of developing one's nature and in the end culminating in a well-ordered state; (3) the human propensities, such as selfishness, attachment and worldliness are out of accord with the perfect philosophy of life; (4) the universe is a macro-micro cosmos while man a micro-macro—a world in miniature, so that 'Sheng-Jen' (the sage or living saint) who is of help in transforming and nourishing the power of heaven and earth forms with them a triad; (5) in Taoism all forms of change arise from the interaction of two opposite forces—Yin and Yang. The vicissitudes of Yin and Yang account for the regular succession of day and night and the alternate waxing and waning of the four seasons, so that man has his days and nights, and the prime of life and its decline.

Confucian Monism and Human or Social Harmony

The metaphysical aspect of Confucianism and its ethical implication can be thought of as monism. To Confucians, a thing's activity is to be guided by its essential nature, and its activity as a whole lies in the form of a harmonious relationship. "All things live together without injuring one another," says *Chung Yung* (the Doctrine of the Mean), 'and all courses are passed without collision with one another." A natural order or social order are two faces of a single

order: well-being for the individual and for society at large depends on the continuance of this harmonious order. The theologians who have treated religious concept often refer to what cannot be experienced by the senses. This is inadmissible in Chinese religious thought and practices which are a projecton of their social life.

The perfect state of life in Confucianism is understood in terms of universal principle, namely, natural relationship between man and cosmos, not a supernatural being of any kind. As the Confucians do not believe in God, immortality conceived in the Confucian tradition and the eternal life Christianity has preached are two separate things. Most Chinese people crave for something, which is immortality in this natural world, but not beyond this present life, for in no Chinese philosophy, be it Confucianism, Taoism or Neo-Confucianism, is there the Western conception of personal immortality. True, there is the realm of immortals in the Taoist cult, but this belief which I suppose we should call 'secular' or 'mundane' is a conception of man's place in the universe, that is, salvation or long life and lasting vision in this world. Likewise, in the Confucian doctrine, the sage or saint and the moral order which are bound up with the cosmic order do not transcend this world. Lao Tzu, the founder of Taoism was one of the prophets of life according to nature. He sought to bring the human Tao into harmony with the Tao of the cosmos.

Taoism on Universe and Harmony

The universe of Yü Chou (the world) is conceived of as embracing within itself a physical world as well as a spiritual one. The physical world stands for matter, while the spiritual world for *Tao* or Reason. The universe is also conceived of as a comprehensive realm wherein matter and spirit have become entirely unified so as to form a coalescence of life, which continues with creation unlimited by space and time. The word 'Yü' is a constellation of a three dimensional series of changes in succession: the past continuing itself into the present into the future. The universe is a spiritual whole in which there is only one world—the objective, or actual world that we ourselves actually experience.

Romantic Taoism conceives the universe as a harmonious whole. There exists a harmonious relation between the universe and man, an identity of attributes under the form of reciprocity, and the principle of creativity, that is, the universe and man are equipotent in creation.[1] Man and universe stand in a relation of harmony, though they are not identical.

[1] Tung-mei Fang, *The Chinese Way of Life,* (Hongkong: The Union Press, 1957), p. 135.

This theory of harmony between man and the universe can be better understood if we compare it further with Western thought. The ancient Greeks also established a theory of harmony: man formed an insignificant part of the universe which was bifurcated into ideal and actual realm, the latter being weighed down by the evil effects of matter. Men living in the actual universe can barely overcome natural forces and social allurements so as to ward off evil. Thus when the Greeks contemplated supreme good they had to disentangle themselves from the shackles of the material world.

Here again, modern Europeans have set man against the universe and have done their level best to gain ascendancy over nature, and, in subduing nature, to harness all natural forces to human purpose and needs. Such a state of hostility between man and nature looms large quite clearly in the whole of modern European thought. As a result, many moral ideas have caused torment and war; good Europeans have often seemed to mistake assertiveness for justice and the exercise of power for beneficence.[2] This point of view is at best arbitrary, and at worst fallacious and self-defeating.

To understand better the above ideas we can compare Western philosophy,[3] Confucianism and Taoism as follows:



Now, what is this kind of morality? Nietzche gave a clear answer:

> "The condition of existence of the good is falsehood; morality is the idiosyncracy of decadents, motivated by a desire to avenge themselves successfully upon life. Morality is just immoral... morality is in itself a form of immorality."[4]

Chinese philosophers by contrast have conceived the universe as a plane of the confluence of universal life, in conjunction with

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[2] R. Tagore, *Creative Unity*, (New York: W. E. Norton and Co., 1928), p. 96; B. Russell, *Sceptical Essays*, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1956), p. 105.

[3] Man's knowledge of nature and power over it — see I. A. Richards, (ed. & trans.), *Plato's Republic* (U.S.A.: Cambridge University Press, 1964), Book II, pp. 51-57. Man, relinquishing the kingdom of Heaven, established a kingdom of man on earth. — see F. Bacon, *The Advancement of Learning and New Atlantis*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 271-72.

[4] F. W. Nietzche, "Der Wille sur Macht," *Werke* (Munchen: C. Hauser, 1966), p. 215, 308.

heaven, make up the cosmos within which all men come to be in harmony with heaven and earth, in sympathic unity with one another and in perfect equilibrium with all things. In the Han dynasty (221 B.C.-206 A.D.), it was the people's belief that there was a unity between heaven and earth and man. Disturbances in the heavens or earth were inseparable from human actions and acted as a warning of impending catastrophes. The 'hui-hsing' or comet which was seen for 70 days from the second month of 5 B.C. was linked, perhaps retrospectively, with an important and potentially treasonable suggestion put forward in the sixth month.[5] The Chinese people ascribed the disturbances of the natural order to the social disarray. Hence, to make every form of life congruent with the comprehensive harmony is the prospect of the universe. The Chinese, by following 'nature' strive to the best of their ability for the attainment of the supreme good in imitation of cosmic order, radiance and splendour. All that need be said here is that they, while being men, have their philosophy to abide by the fundamental principle *Tao,* to identify themselves with the sentiments of compassion, righteousness, benevolence and love, and to eradicate what is regarded as ignominy in selfishness, prejudice and violence. The sages are respected as ideal personalities with attributes from heaven and earth, leading to the eminence of universal love.

Taoism and Monism

Chinese monism corresponds to, and supplements that of the West. Monism in Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy brings out the same points: the rejection of the view that attaches ultimate value to the individual, and the introduction of a higher principle. *Tao,* the only reality, is one and it produces many, although they are but appearances. In the view of Plato, the "many" which are only appearances gain what is called reality by virtue of their participation in the "one".

The subject of the "one" and "many" was broached in a Buddhist essay *The Golden Lion* by Fa Tsung (A.D. 643-712). In the *Golden Lion,* the gold and lion are of one substance, the lion being in-laid with gold; every part of the lion penetrates the gold and vice versa. Since *Tao* is the moral law and the principle of life, it is the universal principle of all things. This is similar to Plato's idea of God that the world would be most real if all things conformed to the idea of God.

A question arises whether promoting longevity is contrary to nature. The answer is negative in that nature's time-scales are variable. As the slow growth of minerals could be achieved by the alchemists,

[5] Han Shu, *History of the Former Han Dynasty, 205 B.C.* Chapter IV, p. 144.

so man's short life could be slowed down and often be unending. A man might defer death without going outside nature if only he could find out certain natural processes.[6] We cannot control nature but must obey her. Hence, *Tao* abhors competition or any effort to expand oneself beyond the natural bounds of one's nature. To the Western thinkers, naturalism implies competition and control, but the Taoist mode of thought views nature as a harmony.

The *Tao* or law corresponds to ethical perfection and is termed by Chu Tzu "good" in heaven and earth, man and all things. There is only one *Tao* which is received by every individual in its entirety, like the moon shining in the heavens. When it is reflected on rivers and lakes, and is thus visible everywhere, we would not say that it is divided.[7] Here the *Tao* bears resemblance to what Plato called the idea of "good" or what Aristotle called "God". Chan dealt on the comparison between Chu Hsi and Aristotle. "While Chu Hsi", Chan, said, "is an Aristotelian in the field of nature, he is a Platonist in the field of moral values, recognizing that there exists an eternal unchanging truth."[8]

Two Modes: Yin and Yang and Moral Order

The principles Yin and Yang coexist and function together. When activity Yang reaches its limit, it becomes tranquil, producing the passive principle Yin. The two principles Yin and Yang are in fact two aspects of the one reality. As a result, the "Many" is ultimately "One", and "One" is differentiated in the "Many". The principle of the "One" and of the "Many" is akin to what Hua Yen said that the ocean consists of many waves, and the many waves are from the ocean, each involving the other. This metaphysical principle may be illustrated in the ancestral individual-group rites in which all male descendants (the "many") of an ancestor took part, each having the proper position in accordance with seniority and performing the rites under the direction of the head of the family (the "one"). In ancestral cults where there is a lineage system, the cult group consists of lineal descendants from the same ancestor. The clan acted as unity and each member collectively; the male had his unique place and function, and his sentiment and sincerity towards his ancestor were personal and direct.

Furthermore, the Neo-Confucian philosophy of One-in-All and All-in-One was based on *Li* (reason or law). Reason, as Swift put

[6] Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China,* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 82.

[7] Yu Lei, Chu Tzu. *Classified Conversation of Master of Chu Hsi, Sung C.* A.D. 1270, Chapter I, 106.

[8] Wing-tsit, Chan, "Neo-Confucianism and Chinese Scientific Thought," *Philosophy East and West,* ed. by C. A. Moore (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 255-56.

it, enables men to see truth impartially, unclouded by passion; only through his own reason man grasped what he needed to know. Like the ancient Stoics, deists found Man's reason confirmed and supported by the rational structure of the universe.[9] Reason cannot operate without the substantiating principle *Ch'i* (vital force), which works in the form of Yin and Yang principles. It is due to the coordinating function of reason and the vital force that the universe is made a cosmos. Much the same could be said of the universe which in all its manifestations is a harmonious system. The order of the universe is central, and harmony is its immutable law, and so reason stands for cosmos, a moral order.

The Change in the Universe and the Self-transformation in Human Life

The philosophy of change in the universe lays the foundation of Neo-Confucianism. In terms of change in the universe, Buddhists compare the universe with a sea wave, and made considerable efforts to cross the sea of waves to arrive at the other shore where the perpetual becoming will cease.[10] Taoists who compared the universe with a galloping horse consider this drama with detachment. Confucians think of the universe as a great current which plays a leading role in the drama with pleasure. One of Confucius' disciples, Tseng Hsi, enjoyed going swimming, adult and children together enjoying the breezes and returning home singing. Confucius delighted and said: "You are one after my heart."[11]

Needham holds that Neo-Confucians arrive at essentially an organic view of the universe which, though neither created nor governed by any personal deity, was completely real.[12] He saw a striking similarity between Chinese organism and that of Whitehead. Nevertheless, there is an absence of Whitehead's God in Neo-Confucianism. As for the change in the universe, Taoists maintain that time travels in a circle, and since a thing comes from non-being, it will return to non-being. Ancestors exist in the changeless dream time of the past, and wherever our ancestors are now, it is there that we are going, too. The eternal changeless past and future time tend to coalesce.[13]

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[9] J. Swift, *Gulliver's Travels.* The World's Classics. (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), XI.

[10] C. Chang, *The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought,* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1967), p. 135.

[11] Lun Yu, *The Analects of Confucius,* Chai (Lu) c. 465-450 B.C. compiled by disciples of Confucius, in *Ssu pu pei yao* edition.

[12] Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China,* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1956), p. 412.

[13] E. Leach, "Time Concept of Primitive People," a Lecture delivered at the University of Cambridge, 1964.

In the process of production and reproduction, Confucians contend that time never comes to an end or repeat itself. Yet Neo-Confucians relish a metaphysical flavour and undoubtedly agree that the universe is good because it involves the greater acts of love. The universe embraces all things, and what moral act can be better than identification with everything? In the Doctrine of the Mean the principle *Ch'eng* (sincerity) means the beginning and the end of things, leading to activity, change and transformation.[14] Lao Tzu spoke of *Ti* (Lord), yet, if the idea of God is insinuated in Taoism, it is overshadowed by the cardinal doctrine of self-transformation. In Confucianism, heaven is of anthropomorphic character and is identified with Shang-Ti, who, not being the personal God as held by Christians, implies the greatest mystery in the process of production and reproduction. Christians preach that all beings but God are imperfect, whereas Taoists say that men can become perfect through self-transformation.

Hence man can strive to be perfect whether he is called "sage" or a perfect man. It means that perfection is accessible to man without being what is thought to be transcendental or other worldly. Here we speak of the pragmatism of self-cultivation or edification which is in an anthropomorphic way, a substitute for the worship of, and dependence upon God. Humanism, in the sense of attaching importance to human interests and affairs and classical scholarship, is founded upon the dignity of the individual. It is compatible with, and a partner of Christianity, but Chrstianity is not a philosophy or metaphysical system. In Confucianism, man depends upon other men for self-cultivation and perfection; the relation of fatherhood is not external to the son, but enters into his very self and becomes part of his very nature.

The Mind and Jen (Love) of the Universe

The character *Jen* (亻二) consists of two parts, of which one (亻) refers to men, and the other (二) means two; two persons can establish human relationship. *Jen* (love) or moral perfection, as Ch'eng Tzu puts it, as the principle of affection and the virtue of the mind. *Jen* is also the vital impulse which is translated *Shing-Yi*. The two words *shing* (life) and *yi* (purpose) combined together convey the principle of life, such as exists in the grain of wheat, in peach and apricot kernels, although they seem to be dead.[15] For to live without *Jen*, man is dead. We can in no way move or melt the hard-hearted man, just as we can neither sow seed in a block of stone or reap fruit from it. The vital

[14] Chung Yung, *The Doctrine of the Mean*, Chou, 4th Century B.C. Traditionally attributed to K'ung Chi (K'ung Tzu-ssu), XXII, 17a.

[15] Chuan shu Chu Tzu, *Collected Works of Master Chu Hsi*, Sung dynasty (ed. Ming), edition princeps. A.D. 1713 by Chu Hsi, p. 47, 3a.

impulse carries more weight than the principle of life as it is latent in the seed or kernel which will under favourable conditions burst full-blown.

This is certainly the case we see in the budding life of spring when all nature is shooting. In the four seasons, spring is the birth of the vital impulse, summer is its development, autumn is consummation, and winter is the storing-up of the vital impluse. This impulse, whether in man or in the universe, is *Jen,* which imports the delight of creator in creating things. It is to the same *Jen* that whatever is in the world owns its origin. The *Jen* is the gentle mind which loves mankind and other creatures alike. It also extends human feeling and experience to animals because when a man hears the cry of an animal that is to be slaughtered, he cannot help having instinctive compassion. Chu Tzu was even reluctant to allow anyone to cut the grass in front of his window.[16] These feelings and experience bespeak the innateness of the heavenly nature within man.

On universal love, both Spinoza and Wang Yang-ming are, I suppose, of the same opinion. Wang approved what was preached by Mo Tzu about universal love. The love between father and son is the starting point of the love spirit; hence it extends to love people and all things. Spinoza spoke of universal love as the intellectual love of God: this love is eternal. He said: "He who lives under the guidance of reason makes every possible effort to render back love or kindness for another's hatred, anger and contempt towards him."[17] When man sees his parents, he naturally knows what filial piety is and acts upon it. If man is remiss in filial piety, it is due to his selfish motives which besmirch the original nature of the mind and put him outside the pole of society. In short, to be a true man is to love all men and to possess the attributes: "propriety", "modesty", and "honesty". Propriety is the basis of man's conduct; modesty, his starting point, and honesty, his goal.[18]

Now we ask what becomes of existence beyond this world or what would be the future of man after death? It is clear that Western idea of personal immortality hereafter does not exist in Confucianism, Taoism and Neo-Confucianism. None of them has anything to say on this matter. It was only Mo Tzu who believed in spiritual beings and founded a religion in ancient China.[19] In the belief of Chinese philosophers, at death man's soul returns to the heavenly paradise from which it comes, and his spirit returns to the earthly or passive

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16 Ibid., p. 48, 8b.

17 B. Spinoza, "Definition," *Ethics,* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1910), p. 168.

18 Lun Yu, *The Analects. . . . ,* VIII, 15, "Wei Ling-Kung," 14a.

19 Shih Hu, *The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China,* (Shanghai: Shanghai Oriental Book, Co., 1928), p. 57.

universal principle from which it takes birth. Man's soul and spirit dwell apart. It is taken for granted that people have some sort of existence after death—social immortality—though the Chinese do not pretend to know where and what kind of life it is that they have.

Now what is social immortality? Influenced by Buddhism in a land which promised eternal life in paradise, the Chinese masses had no doubt that the individual continues to live after death. Yet the Chinese intellectuals speak, as I understand it, of their belief in a personality that survives after death, namely, social immortality or immorality of inspiration. Both Lao and Confucius have been thought to live on still not so much as physical persons but as spiritual beings, because at death certain attributes continue, such as influence, work, doctrine and example. The idea of life among the Chinese is not just restricted to one's body—we live not simply as ourselves alone, but we depend on those of the past and have the duties to those living in the present and to those of the future who will depend on us. In other words, our blood will persist in our children. Dubs does not believe in earthly immortals as put forward by Lao Tzu, but he insists that Lao Tzu understood the word "immortality" to mean an "immortality of influence."[20]

The continuation of a life for individual families and for the society at large depends on a male heir. A male heirdom has symbolic meaning and is a ceaseless family link; it is projection of oneself, the self being identified with the large self. Although Chinese people are devoid of a formal religion, they do entertain the idea of religion in a rather anthropomorphic way. Their ancestors are spoken of as spirits and stand for the collective strength to which the person belongs. The ancestral rites are performed unbroken in Chinese society because they are part of the mechanisms by which an orderly and harmonious society is sustained, serving as they do to produce certain fundamental social values. To render service to the living is embellishing their beginning, to send off the dead is beautifying their end. When the beginning and the end meet, the service of the dutiful son is well recompensed and the way of the Sage is achieved.

Confucius, however, neither denied the existence of spiritual beings nor ignored ancestors. He urged his pupils to serve parents, when alive, according to propriety; bury them, when dead, according to propriety; and sacrifice to them after death, according to propriety.[21] As a result of Confucius' emphasis on rules of propriety, spiritual beings had been relegated to obscurity. Hence, to all intents and

[20] H. H. Dubs, "Ssu erh Pu wan," *Asia Minor*, 1954, pp. 149-161.
[21] Lun Yu, *The Analects. . . . .*," no. 2, "Wei Cheng," 8a.

purposes, Confucius apparently weakened, if he did not destroy, the belief in personal and spiritual survival after death.

One may raise another question: if human nature is good as both Confucius and Mencius insisted upon, whence comes the evil in the world? Taoism imputed the appearance of evil to man's ignorance which engenders inevitably false knowledge and pernicious desires. Confucianism and Monism as well account for evil in terms of selfishness, delusion and deviation from the Golden Mean. No one would dispute, I think, that when men are liable to be tossed hither and thither by pursuit of selfish and sordid interests, evil will certainly ensue. Chinese philosophers have on the whole agreed that since evil is produced by man, it is within his power to eliminate it. This being so, it may be clearly seen that the idea of original sin and its atonement is out of place in Chinese philosophy. Man perpetuates wicked actions which entail his own downfall but he can also ascend to perfection in life.

Conclusion

The Confucian concept of *Jen* (humanity or love) has been central in Chinese philosophy. The man of *Jen* is the perfect man, a man of the golden rule, for, wishing to mould his own character, he also fashions the character of others, and wishing to be eminent himself, he also helps others to excel. The harmony of self and society in *Jen* is expressed by *Chung* (conscientiousness) and *Shu* (altruism), which is essentially the Golden Mean or the Golden Rule. The extended idea of *Jen* inspired the Neo-Confucian doctrine of man forming one body with Heaven, the universe or the unity of man and nature. This idea entails balance and tranquility of mind. The Chinese have held that the world embodied in ultimate goal of the present life should be transformed into an ideal pattern pranked with the axiomatic unity of supreme perfection. They have aspired to the transfigured world of edifying morality and of contemplative truth—any other world will be a sphere of anxiety and dismal disquietude for us.

On this basis, the Confucians have aspired to the continually creative power of the heavenly *Tao*—the way of reality on a par with Plato's idea of God—to mould the whole cosmic order. This, however, can by no means be achieved unless man lives in accord with the general pattern of the universe and fosters moral life, namely, benevolence, righteousness, wisdom and propriety. Obviously these four virtues are the manifestation and moral fulfillment of the ideology of human life. This is simply what Mencius said: "To dwell in the

spacious habitation of the universe (to practice benevolence), to stand in the right place of the universe (conform to propriety or moral rules of correct conduct), and to walk on the grand path of the universe (to observe righteousness), these are the marks of a great or perfect man!"[22]

[22] Meng Tzu, *The Book of Mencius,* Chou C. 290 B. C. by Meng Ko. 4' Li Lon," Pt. i, 7a-7b.

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THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT: POST-MAO PERIOD, 1976-1979

R. C. LADRIDO

For more than twenty years now, Peking and Moscow have been exchanging charges and counter-charges against each other. According to a Chinese account, the Sino-Soviet dispute has a recent origin: "The truth is that the whole series of differences began more than seven years ago."[1] Thus, Peking traces the beginnings of the dispute to the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956.

Khrushchev's statements on Soviet policy provided the immediate grounds on which Sino-Soviet differences have been made public by both sides. Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing Stalin and his pronouncements on peaceful coexistence and the peaceful transition to socialism were the initial source of the immediate public exchange of polemics between Peking and Moscow.[2] On the ideological plane, Peking's publication of an essay entitled "Long Live Leninism," in reply to Moscow's position, marked the open break between the two countries.[3]

Sino-Soviet differences have deeper historical roots. It can be traced back in the remote past, especially in the development of Soviet policies in China. For instance, the current territorial dispute and boundary questions date back to tsarist Russia's days when vast areas traditionally under Chinese rule were acquired by the Soviet Union in the treaties of Aigun (1858), Peking (1860), and Ili (1881)—treaties which have become the basis of Peking's accusation of "unequal treaties" by 1963.[4]

Since 1956, a number of issues had exacerbated Sino-Soviet relations which included the following: the question posed by the

[1] See Editorial Departments of the *People's Daily* and *Red Flag*, "The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CP SU and Ourselves — Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU," *People's Daily*, 6 September 1963, pp. 6-23. For a complete text, see William E. Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1964), pp. 338-420.

[2] See David Floyd, *Mao Against Khrushchev: A Short History of the Sino-Soviet Conflict*, Praeger University Series, no. 142 (New York: Frederick A Praeger Publishers, 1963), pp. 33-34.

[3] See complete text in G.F. Hudson te al, *The Sino-Soviet Dispute*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Inc., 1961), pp. 82-112.

[4] See "A Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of the USA," *People's Daily* Editorial, 8 March 1963.

CCP regarding the nature of relations between the CPSU and the rest of the communist parties in the socialist camp as an offshoot of Soviet intervention in Poland and Hungary; Peking's disappointments over Moscow's lukewarm support for its stand on Taiwan and the border war with India in 1962; the Soviet refusal to support China's nuclear weapons development programs, and aggravated by the deployment of Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet frontiers and the attendant threat of a Soviet invasion against China. Domestic developments in China were also related to Sino-Soviet differences, especially in China's campaign against "modern revisionism" which is a veiled criticism aganst Soviet practice. Chinese Communist leaders initiated a number of mass campaigns to underscore their own road to socialism such as the "Great Leap Forward," the "Cultural Revolution," and the struggle against the Gang of Four. The Chinese linked these tumultuous domestic campaigns with their struggle against "capitalist restoration" and "modern revisionism." Such actions constituted China's rejection and criticism of the Soviet Union and seriously undermined Sino-Soviet relations.

Post-Mao Sino-Soviet Relations

The status of Sino-Soviet relations has remained largely unchanged, even with the death of Mao Zedong who ruled China for more than three decades. Anti-Sovietism has remained the main driving force behind Peking's foreign policy.

For one, Soviet leaders had viewed leadership changes in China as a key factor in improving Sino-Soviet relations. A Pravda article on January 16, 1976 signed by "I. Alexandrov" (a pseudonym for articles approved by the highest leadership) noted that Mao and his group were governing the Chinese people by "dictatorial and bureaucratic methods," and leading them astray to realize the "great Chinese nationalist aims." It added that the achievements of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries filled Mao and his colleagues with terror because "they still have not managed and never will manage to destroy genuine patriots" who were striving to return China "to a realistic policy on to the rails of scientific socialism, on to the path of friendship and brotherhood with the peoples of the socialist system."[5]

Mikhail S. Kapitsa, the head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Far East Department, told the Rome L'Espresso, "We are counting on the new leaders who will emerge after Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. With them, we will be able to negotiate."[6] In the wake of the American defeat in Indochina and the acceleration of the Soviet-

[5] Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation (QCD), *The China Quarterly* (April-June 1976): 445.
[6] Ibid., p. 445.

initiated detente in Europe, Peking intensified its anti-Soviet campaigns in 1975 and 1976. Soviet spokesmen in the mid-1970s noted that Moscow had to wait for a basic change in the composition of the Chinese leadership. Likewise, Moscow predicted that "healthy forces" would emerge in China after Mao's demise.[7] On the other hand, a CPSU Central Committee letter warned that it should not be expected that the departure of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai would lead to changes in China's policy towards the Soviet Union, rather, that the Maoist-type "nationalist" and "chauvinist" regime in China would be of long duration.[8]

During the 25th CPSU Congress in February 1976, Soviet and foreign delegates attacked China's domestic and foreign policies but failed to agree on a common international position on the issue. Setting the general tone, L. Breshnev asserted that "Maoism" would continue to be opposed and that the Soviet Union was willing to improve relations with China on the basis of peaceful coexistence. Brezhnev repudiated the Chinese notion of the "so-called Soviet threat...either on the West or the East." Instead, he identified "Maoism" as the source of war and claimed that China's policy was aimed openly against other socialist countries. Brezhnev also noted that should China revert to a policy which is "genuinely based on Marxism-Leninism, there will be an appropriate response from our side." In his words, "the ball is on the Chinese side."[9]

Mao Zedong's death on September 9, 1976 presented Moscow with a new opportunity for improving relations with Peking. Having consistently regarded Mao Zedong as the main instigator of Peking's anti-Soviet line, Moscow initiated a series of public gestures apparently designed to show China's post-Mao leaders that the Soviet Union was willing to seek an accommodation with China.

Meanwhile, Peking continued its scathing commentaries against Soviet "social imperialism" at home and abroad. In a message issued by the Central Committee, the CCP pledged to continue Mao Zedong's policies, especially in foreign affairs.[10] The Chinese outrightly rejected condolence messages for the late Chairman Mao from the Soviet and other East European parties (except Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Albania) on the grounds that there are no interparty relations between

[7] Robert G. Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Policy After the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1967*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1978), p. 92.

[8] Wolfgang Berner, ed., *The Soviet Union 1975-1976: Domestic Policy, Economics, Foreign Policy*, (London: C. Hurst & Company), p. 216.

[9] QCD, *CQ 66, p. 45; Harold C. Hinton, The Sino-Soviet Confrontation: Implications for the Future*, (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1976), p. 38.

[10] "Message to the Whole Party, the Whole Army and the People of All Nationalities Throughout the Country," *Peking Review*, 13 September 1976, p. 11. See also QCD, *CQ* 69 (March 1977): 204-205.

them and China.[11] At the same time, they responded politely and correctly to the friendly gestures the Soviets made on the purely governmental level.

Brezhnev sent an official message of condolence on Mao's death—the first CPSU message to be sent to China in a decade. He also congratulated Hua Guofeng on his appointment as the new Chinese Communist Party chairman in October.[12]

On the occasion of China's National Day on October 1, 1976, the Soviet Government sent a message to Peking which called for the normalization of relations based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. A Pravda commentary on the same day noted that "there are no problems that cannot be solved" between the two countries. A Pravda article by "I. Alexandrov" surveyed Sino-Soviet relations in a non-polemical tone. It expressed the standard Soviet view on Soviet-Chinese relations, particularly on the first ten years of the People's Republic and claimed that the deterioration of mutual relations was through no fault of the Soviet side.[13]

Likewise, on the occasion of the Soviet Union's 59th anniversary on November 7, Peking sent greetings that included one fairly warm sentence—"The Chinese people have always cherished their revolutionary friendship with the Soviet people."[14] Amidst the mutual exchange of accusations, the two countries have continued the practice of sending messages during their national days and other special occasions.

The removal of the four leftist Chinese Politburo members which included Mao's widow, Qiang Jing, in October 1976, did not affect China's stance towards the Soviet Union. The Chinese news agency, NCNA, continued publishing criticisms on Soviet "social imperialism" since the fall of the Gang of Four. Immediately after the Gang's arrest, Chinese authorities reiterated their anti-Soviet position. In a speech welcoming the premier of Papua New Guinea, Vice Premier Li Xiannian singled out the Soviet Union, the superpower that daily clamours about "detente and disarmament", as the main source of war. He accused the Soviet union of flaunting the banner of socialsm and extending its arms for expansion in all parts of the world.[15]

Peking's first official response to Soviet gestures of reconciliation came in a November 15, 1976 speech by Li Xiannian at a banquet for an African president. Li accused Moscow of creating "false impres-

11 *Far Eastern Economic Review,* 24 September 1976, p. 5.
12 Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Policy,* p. 92.
13 QCD, *CQ* 69 (March 1977): 209.
14 Ibid., p. 20.
15 Ibid., p. 209.

sions" of relaxation in Sino-Soviet relations in order to confuse world opinion. He stated that Moscow was engaging in "wishful thinking and daydreaming" about a Sino-Soviet reconciliation.[16] Subsequently, the Chinese stepped up their attacks on a broad range of Soviet policies.

In May 1977, Moscow resumed its attack on China and for the first time explicitly criticized Chairman Hua Guofeng, Mao's successor. A Tass commentary of May 30 noted that the "methods of the new Peking leadership have dashed hopes that the death of Mao Zedong would bring positive changes" in China. Soviet press articles claimed that China was militaristic and sought a new war. Brezhnev, on June 6, blamed the new Chinese leadership for the failure to improve relations at the state level. In a rally commemorating Lenin's death anniversary, Zinyatin, the secretary of the Soviet Central Committee, criticized China's policies as running counter to the "vital interests of all people." It marked the first public attack against China by a prominent Soviet leader since the death of Mao Zedong.[17]

Brezhnev also accused the Chinese leadership of following a policy which is "openly directed against the interests of the majority of the socialist states." He declared that the Soviet leadership would continue "to wage a principled and relentless struggle against Maoism."[18]

The Soviet Union delivered a formal note of protest to the Chinese Embassy in Moscow on May 19. Li Xiannian responded by accusing the Russians of extending differences on matters of principle to state relations. He warned that the Chinese people would not be taken in by Soviet "soft and hard methods," the former referred to overtures after the death of Mao.[19]

Meanwhile, border talks were resumed on November 29, 1976. Leonid Ilyichev, the head of the Soviet delegation, arrived in Peking a day before and was met by Yu Chan, his Chinese counterpart. When he left Peking eight months ago, Ilyichev commented that he would return to China only if there was a good chance of substantial progress in the border talks. But the border talks remained deadlocked.[20] Peking noted that the talks remained deadlocked because

[16] Passages like these in Li Xiannian's subsequent speeches on 15 November (Peking Review 47, November 9), 8 December (PR 51, December 17), and 21 December (PR 52, December 24) led to walk-outs by the envoys of the Soviet-bloc countries headed by Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov. Ibid., p. 210.
[17] QCD, *CQ* 71 (July-September 1977): 664.
[18] Berner, *Soviet Union*, p. 189.
[19] QCD, *CQ* 71, pp. 664-665.
[20] QCD, *CQ* 69, p. 211.

Moscow refused to withdraw its troops from the disputed border regions.[21]

The Soviets expected the Chinese leadership to change its views towards Moscow following the death of Chairman Mao just as the Chinese had expected a new direction from the Soviet leadership after the fall of Khrushchev in 1964. If so, they were disappointed. Despite Soviet overtures following Mao's death, there was no significant improvement in Sino-Soviet relations.

On Peking's side, reasons for criticizing the Soviet Union are legion. In Hua Guofeng's words, "The Soviet leading clique has betrayed Marxism-Leninism. Restoring capitalism and enforcing fascist dictatorship at home while pushing hegemonism, perpetrating aggression and expansion abroad, it has brought about the degeneration of the Soviet Union which has become a social-imperialist country."[22]

Hua Guofeng and the Sino-Soviet Conflict

The new Chinese Communist leadership under Hua Guofeng declared that in foreign affairs, it would follow Chairman Mao's "revolutionary line." At the eleventh CCP Congress in August 1977, this stance became official. In his political report, Chairman Hua restated and defended the theory of the three worlds and provided the framework with which China's relations were to be conducted.[23]

Hua Guofeng restated China's position regarding the Sino-Soviet conflict:

> The Soviet leading clique has betrayed Marxism-Leninism. Restoring capitalism and enforcing fascist dictatorship at home and pushing hegemonism and perpetrating aggression and expansion abroad, it has brought about the degeneration of the Soviet Union, which has become a social-imperialist country. Our debates with the clique on matters of principle will go on for a long time. We will, of course, continue to wage a tit for tat struggle against hegemonism. At the same time, we have always held that China and the Soviet Union should maintain normal state relations on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The Soviet leading clique has not shown one iota of good faith about improving state relations between the two countries. Not only has this clique made it impossible to achieve anything in the negotiations on the Sino-Soviet boundary question which have been dragging for eight years now, it has also whipped up one anti-China wave after another to extricate itself from its dilemmas at home and abroad and divert attention by making a feint to the east in order to attack in the West. It has been trying by hook or by crook to force us to change the Marxist-Leninist line laid by chairman Mao. This is pure daydream-

21 Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Policy*, p. 94.
22 See Hua Guofeng, "Political Report," pp. 23-57.
23 Ibid.

> ing. It is the Soviet leading clique and nobody else that has led Sino-Soviet relations "up in a blind alley." If it really has any desire to improve the state relations between the two countries, this clique should prove it by concrete deeds.[24]

Hua also reminded everyone on the possibility of a Soviet invasion. Over the past years, Chinese leaders had played up the possibility of a Soviet attack. Thus, the Chinese people have been asked to "heighten their vigilance," "strengthen education for defense against nuclear attack," and "to mobilize the masses to dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere and make adequate preparations against such an attack."[25] Moreover, Vice Premier Li Xiannian noted that while Russia was mainly interested in the West, it was essential for China to maintain vigilance and be ready to fight any time. He commented that the Chinese people did not intend to start any war but it could not be caught with its guard down.[26]

Four Modernizations

At the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975, Zhou Enlai called for the comprehensive modernization of China's industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense. Zhou Enlai noted that before the end of this century, China is "to accomplish the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology so that our national economy will be advancing in the front ranks of the world."[27] In striving to make China "a great and powerful socialist country," the Four Modernizations thrust is invariably related to the Chinese perception of the Soviet Union as the principal enemy of the moment.

The Fifth National People's Congress held in February 1978 confirmed the goal of modernization that the Chinese leadership has set to achieve: to make China a major economic power by the year 2000. Hua Guofeng, in his speech to the fifth NPC, specifically related the modernization drive to the threat posed by the Soviet Union:

> Internationally, since the two hegemonist powers, the Soviet Union and the United States are locked in a fierce struggle for world domination, war is bound to break out sooner or later. The Soviet revisionists are bent on subjugating our country. We must race against time to strengthen ourselves economically and heighten our defense capabilities at top speed, for this is the only way to

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24 Ibid., pp. 42-43.
25 Ibid., pp. 42-43.
26 QCD, *CQ* 70 (April-June 1977): 460.
27 Zhou Enlai, "Report on the Work of the Government" (Delivered on January 13, 1975, at the First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China), in *Documents of the Fourth National People's Congress*, pp. 47-65.

> cope effectively with possible social-imperialist and imperialist aggression against us. Domestically, speeding up socialist modernization in the above four fields is likewise highly important.[28]

On February 24, 1978, (two days before the opening of China's fifth NPC), Moscow privately suggested that the two countries issue a joint statement to the effect that their mutual relations would be based on peaceful coexistence. On March 9, China rejected the Soviet proposal.[29] Tass complained of China's "negative stand" and noted that China had "repeated the unacceptable preliminary conditions it had advanced before." Hua Guofeng mentioned these conditions in his report to the NPC on February 26, which included the demand that Moscow honor the agreement for a mutual troop withdrawal from the disputed areas as agreed between Premiers Zhou Enlai and Kosygin in September 1969. Hua added that the Soviet forces in the Mongolian People's Republic should be withdrawn and that the situation regarding the Sino-Soviet borders should "revert to what it was in the early 1960s." Hua Guofeng held to the established line by saying that, if Moscow desired improved relations, it should prove its sincerity by deeds."[30] Hua further noted that "how Sino-Soviet relations will develop is entirely up to the Soviet side."[31]

The Chinese note of March 9 was a reply to the suggestion of the Soviet side that the two countries issue "a joint statement on the principles of mutual relations" and that "a meeting of the representatives of both sides" be held for this purpose. The Chinese letter stated that "responsibility for the deterioration of relations between our two countries to what they are today does not lie with the Chinese side; China is the victim." It also restated Peking's stand that "the differences of principle should not impede the maintenance of normal state relations between the two countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. And to this end it has made unremitting efforts."[32]

The exchange of Sino-Soviet polemics continued unabated. On March 9, 1978, Pravda remarked that Peking's anti-Soviet propaganda was increasing "to help solve extremely complex internal problems" facing the post-Mao leadership. Pravda counted more than 100 articles which had "crudely distorted" Soviet domestic and foreign policy

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[28] Hua Guofeng, "Unite and Strive," *Peking Review*, 10 March 1978, p. 14.
[29] See "Chinese Foreign Ministry's Note to the Soviet Embassy in China," *Peking Review*, 31 March 1978, pp. 17-18.
[30] Hua Guofeng, "Unite and Strive," p. 39. For the Soviet letter of February 24, 1978, see *Peking Review*, 31 March 1978, p. 18.
[31] Hua Guofeng, "Unite and Strive," p. 39.
[32] "Chinese Foreign Ministry's Note to the Soviet Embassy in China," *Peking Review*, 31 March 1978, pp. 17-18.

which had appeared in a Chinese newspaper in the first two months of 1978.[33]

Moscow rejected all of the Chinese preconditions in a Pravda editorial of March 21. The editorial announced also Peking's rejection of the Soviet proposal of February 24; the demands were described an "unacceptable preliminary conditions" which the Chinese had presented earlier. On April 1, a Pravda editorial explicitly and vehemently denied the existence of any agreement between Zhou Enlai and Kosygin. It strongly criticized Peking's proposal for a mutual withdrawal of armed forces from the disputed areas. Furthermore, it accused the Chinese leaders of "deliberately whipping up" the border question for their "anti-Soviet chauvinistic aims."[34]

The Pravda editorial in effect rejected the Chinese version as to what had been agreed between Zhou Enlai and Kosygin in 1969. It took particular exception to two of China's "preliminary conditions" for negotiating a settlement: "recognition of the existence of so-called 'disputed areas' on Soviet territory adjacent to the border," and "the withdrawal of armed forces from these areas." The editorial argued that these disputed areas had no legal foundation. And if Chinese demands were acceded to, the editorial said, the borders would be open along "a front stretching for thousands of kilometers; as a result of which the Soviet population would be left without any protection and defense, while Chinese forces would remain in the old frontiers and the Chinese authorities would be given the opportunity to 'develop' these areas."[35] With regard to Peking's demand for a Soviet military withdrawal from Mongolia, the leadership of the People's Republic of Mongolia informed Peking on April 12 that Soviet troops were stationed in the area by their own invitation and would stay as long as the "Chinese threat" continued.[36]

For more than twenty years now, China has continued its criticisms against the Soviet Union. Under Hua Guofeng, Mao Zedong's short-lived successor, Soviet "social imperialism" has remained a principal theme in China's confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The Principal Enemy: Soviet "Hegemonism"

China's perception of the Soviet Union has changed radically, in the course of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Peking's earlier accusation of the rise of "modern revisionism" in the Soviet Union has been upgraded to the existence of Soviet "social imperialism" in the 1970s. The shift became clear in 1972 when China openly identified the

[33] QCD, *CQ* 74 (April-June 1978): 477.
[34] QCD, *CQ* 75 (July-September 1978): 714.
[35] Ibid., pp. 714-715.
[36] Ibid., p. 715.

Soviet Union as its most dangerous and principal enemy and initiated a rapprochement with the United States as a major step towards the formation of an anti-Soviet alliance on the international level. Subsequently, Peking has concentrated in exposing what it terms the "hegemonic designs" of the Soviet Union.

Moreover, the concept of the Soviet Union as the most dangerous enemy enables China to justify a broad range of domestic and foreign policies. China has considered the Soviet Union as its most dangerous enemy for a number of reasons. First, the Soviet Union has surpassed the United States in military power, the latter having suffered badly in Vietnam. Second, the Soviet Union has adopted an offensive strategy while the United States has shifted to strategic defense. Lastly, the Soviet Union uses deceptive words to portray itself as the champion of socialism and national liberation, especially to third world countries.

From Peking's perspective, if the Soviet Union is indeed the most dangerous enemy and its military superiority is its main source of strength, then modernization in agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology remains a primary task for China today. Chinese Communist objectives, in its most succinct form, is epitomized by the late Premier Zhou Enlai's statement to the National People's Congress in January 1975 that China wants to build a powerful and modern socialist country by the end of this century. Notably, the Four Modernizations is based on the proposition that the development of the productive forces is the principal task in socialist construction. Moreover, Chinese leaders have openly acknowledged the need for a prolonged period of peace in order to build up their economy, technology, and armed forces—essential prerequisites in the pursuit of a prosperous and powerful China.

China's anti-Soviet thesis also argues for the development of closer relations with the United States, Japan, and Western Europe, as well as with third world countries. Thus, party-to-party relations have been subordinated to state-to-state ties with any government willing to agree with Peking on the overriding priority of opposing Soviet "hegemonism". On issues concerning relations among the major powers, security, or political development affecting the global configuration of military power, China's policies appear to be shaped above all by realpolitik considerations and based on a strategy designed to strengthen worldwide oppostion to its major enemy, the Soviet Union. Thus, China's current insistence that Soviet "hegemonism" is the principal threat not only for China but also for the rest of the world. In the post-Mao era, the whole course of Sino-Soviet relations rests on such a perception.

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE INDO-US RELATIONS: NEW DIRECTIONS AND OPTIONS

B. M. JAIN

The dialectics of relationship between India and the U.S. are rooted in the nature and character of social structure and self-images of key political leaders and policy makers of both the countries. Due to differentiation in historical and cultural experiences and styles of national life of the two countries, their perceptions and attitudes towards the global as well as regional diplomacy are bound to diverge in certain respects. Perhaps, little attempt has been made to understand Indo-U.S. relations within the paradigm of national images and the power status of each country in the international system. It is also necessary to understand underlying fundamental conditions and factors that have contributed to oscillating relations between the two countries.

Needless to say, the post-war U.S. foreign policy towards India is the outgrowth of its global strategy of containing the rise of independent centers of power. India's ambition and assertion to be an independent factor in world politics was a source of irritation and annoyance to the U.S. Americans felt that though India lacked necessary components of a major power in military, industrial and technological terms, she was trying to build and exert its influence in the system of global politics through political machination—using non-aligned ideology as a political weapon. The U.S. being a global power tried to contract India's role in global as well as regional affairs and refused to treat her from equi-distance. This policy continued for a long time and still continues but in a different diplomatic style and approach.

However, the outcome of the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 that resulted in the rise of Bangladesh as an independent nation, altered the strategic structure and security scenario of South Asia. India emerged as a predominant power in the subcontinent. It was for the first time that the American Administration recognized India as a "pre-eminent power" of the region and also accepted her non-aligned policy.[1]It is true that India's relations with the U.S. were at the lowest ebb due to the Kissingerian heavy tilt in favour of Pakistan. But the

[1] See Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's address as US Secretary of State that he delivered at the Indian Council of World Affairs on 28 October, 1974, New Delhi, Official Text, USIS, New Delhi, pp. 3-5.

changed geopolitical setting of the region obligated the U.S. policy elites to review and reorient their policy behaviour towards India. When the Democratic Party came to occupy the White House under the leadership of President Carter, tone, style and form of the U.S. foreign policy towards India appeared to be more accommodative and was also suggestive of a balanced approach towards India and Pakistan. Unfortunately, symptoms of deteriorating trends in the bilateral relations of India and the U.S. soon became evident when the Carter Administration took a momentous decision of providing U.S. military aid and equipment to Pakistan in the wake of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

It is in this background that we would attempt to understand and examine Indo-U.S. relations during the Reagan Administration. Before we proceed, we should bear in mind that the containment of India and the balance of power considerations that form an integral component of the U.S. policy postures towards the subcontinent are not the creation of the Reagan Administration. They are the legacies of the past.

New Phase

India and the U.S. have entered a new phase of relationship with the coming of the Republican Party to power under the leadership of Ronald Reagan. Eyebrows were raised in India that relations between the two countries might suffer a serious set back due to change in the U.S. Administration that was being identified and interpreted as "reactionary", "rightist", "centrist". Such an image leads India to perceive that "the Reagan Administration is particularly hostile to India. As seen from New Delhi, the Reagan Administration views the world in East-West terms with India being in the Soviet Camp. To be seen in this way is something the Indians find deeply offensive."[2] These perceptions and presumptions were based on anti-India biases of the past Republican Administrations and in the present context, were attributed to the divergent belief systems and policy styles of President Reagan and Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi.[3] In India's case it should be mentioned that as a political leader, Mrs. Gandhi enjoys a virtual command over the party. Unlike her father, she is doggedly a pragmatist and within the government "Mrs. Gandhi's authority is virtually unchallenged, and much of the conduct of foreign affairs reflects her personal style and prejudices."[4]

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2 A Report to The Committee On Foreign Relations United States Senate, March 1982 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1982) p. 5.

3 For the study of anti-India biases of the Republican Administrations refer to Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power,* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968); John W. Mellor (ed.), *India: A Rising Middle Power,* (US: Westernview Press, 1979).

4 A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations....., p. 3.

We may also point out here that Mrs. Gandhi's dramatic return to power in early 1980 caused a strong suspicion among liberal American intellectuals and the right-wing Republican leaders that her strong pro-Soviet tilt, except during a brief spell of the Janata regime, might deepen differences between the two countries. Portentuously enough, such misgivings and conjectures were set at naught by the governments of India and the U.S. Official pronouncements at both the levels sought to clarify that the pattern of friendly ties that evolved during the Carter Administration would not be reversed merely on account of the change of leadership in Washington and New Delhi. Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi in her message to newly elected President Reagan stated:

> Our countries share common traditions of struggle for independence, dedication to democratic ideals and spirit of tolerance and understanding.
> We sincerely hope that our bilateral relations will continue to deepen and diversify for the mutual benefit of our two peoples and objectives of peace and security for the world.[5]

In a similar tone, U.S. spokesman, Robert F. Goheen, the then U.S. Ambassador to India, declared that:

> With Mr. Reagan's election I see no change in the desire of the United States to continue a policy of friendly cooperation based on mutual respect.[6]

Though it is a well known fact that due to compulsions of U.S. regional interests, President Reagan cannot afford to ignore India, rhetorics of "peace", "security" and "friendly relations" in the interest of world order do not by themselves, in practical terms, contribute to cultivating positive images by each one of them towards each other. They are relevant so long as global and regional interests of both the countries do not clash with each other. But things are not so simple as they appear to be. For instance, the Reagan Administration by virtue of U.S. policy needs and priorities, is committed to extend military and economic succour to its allies and is simultaneously keen on diminishing the influence of its adversaries through the application of global strategies. This is evident from Reagan's inaugural address that reflected his "support" and "firm commitment" to allies who remained faithful to the U.S. "We will match loyalty with loyalty, he said, and "strive for mutually beneficial relations."[7]

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[5] The *Times of India* (New Delhi) November 6, 1980.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Official Text issued by the United States International Communication Agency, New Delhi, January 21, p. 1.

One might easily infer from his inaugural remarks that the matrix of "loyalty" has been adopted in dealing with "unequal" powers. In this context, where does India stand? Can she declare herself to be loyal to the U.S. in order to win its friendship? A pertinent question arises as to "loyalty" for what and for whom? Loyalty here implies an acquiescence in the satellite status of somebody in exchange for some gains which it is incapable of achieving by itself. At least on this count India would not compromise her independent course of the foreign policy nor barter away with her political autonomy.

Sources of Tension

Let us examine main sources of irritants that have been rocking the bilateral relations of India and the U.S. in the present policy scenario. We maintain that basically these sources are the function of (i) divergent national interests, priority and preferences of both the countries and (ii) the personalities of political actors who dominate the national scene of their respective countries. For example, the personality of India's Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, is "charismatic" and tough. She is described as an "iron lady". This has been evidenced by a great realist of this century, Dr. Kissinger in his recently published memoirs.[8] What we intend to stress is that when America deals with India on bilateral and multilateral issues, it is in fact dealing with the personality of Mrs. Gandhi who is out and out a cold-blooded practitioner of power politics. Now we come to discuss in brief those areas and issues that remain to be main sources of tensions between the two countries.

U.S. Arms to Pakistan

Pakistan has been a key factor in Indo-U.S. relations ever since the manifestation of the compatibility of geostrategic and political interests of the U.S. and Pakistan. Right from the presidency of Truman, Pakistan has occupied a central position in the U.S. thinking in its policies towards the subcontinent. The Reagan Administration's recent decision, to supply sophisticated arms and military hardware to Pakistan on massive scale, has created an impasse not only in the bilateral relations of India and the U.S. but also between India and Pakistan. It has adversely affected the process of normalization of relations between India and Pakistan—two major countries of the subcontinent. India's External Affairs Minister, P. V. Narsimha Rao, told the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Indian Parliament) that the U.S. supply of armaments to Pakistan would disturb the strategic harmony and security environment of the subcontinent. Rao added

[8] Refer to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, *The While House Years,* (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1979).

that expectation of a "change" in the U.S. determination "to arm Pakistan to the teeth" would be "hope against hope."[9]

K. R. Narayan, Indian Ambassador to the U.S., explained to press correspondents in Washington that:

> Our stand is that the kind of weapons that Pakistan is acquiring can only be used against India. Security of Pakistan is an asset to India. We have always stood for a stable, but not a Pakistan which is militarized in an unbalanced way. The magnitude of U.S. military balance in the region has to be considered. We do not believe that the type of weapons proposed to be given to Pakistan would enhance Pakistan's security.[10] Ambassador Narayan scoffed at the U.S. attempts to establish any parallelism between India and Pakistan in view of India's size, population, military and industrial capability and her nuclear status. He further stressed that "it was wrong to compare the defense requirements of India with those of Pakistan in the same way as it would be wrong to compare the defense needs of the U.S. with those of Cuba."[11]

U.S. Explanation and Interpretation

The Reagan Administration explained to India that induction of American arms into Pakistan in the context of military presence of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and consequent upon its menace to the security of the entire Gulf region, is no longer intended to weaken or alienate India. A U.S. State Department official said:

> We explained to the Indians that whatever we may do for Pakistan is not directed against India or India's legitimate interest. We do not approach our relations with India and Pakistan as a zero—sum game. We want good relationship with both and we think that it is possible.[12]

The U.S. officials tried to convince India's External Affairs Secretary, Eric Gonslaves and the Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission, Homi Sethana, that America was fully aware of India's sensitivity and her grave concern over the American arms to Pakistan. But they maintained that military aid to Pakistan was sequel to the Soviet threat.

Another State Department official spelt out:

> A weak Pakistan serves the interests only of the Soviet Union. A strengthened Pakistan in closer relationship with the U.S. poses no threat to India and indeed shoud contribute to the overall security of the Subcontinent. Our assistance to Pakistan should not be a cause for heightened tension in the region. We have consistently supported improved Indo-Pakistan relations and will continue to do so. We certainly would not wish to see an arms race in the Subcontinent.[13]

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9 Quoted in *The Times of India* (New Delhi), April 2, 1981.
10 The *Times of India* (New Delhi), May 20, 1981.
11 Ibid.
12 *The Indian Express* (New Delhi), April 19, 1981.
13 *Ibid.*

India was not convinced by the U.S. logic. To most of the Indians, the U.S. arms deal (especially F-16 aircraft) to Pakistan "is straight and simple case of the United States seeking to undermine Indian hegemony in the Subcontinent."[14]

Even the Western strategists have questioned the rationale behind the channelling of the U.S. sophisticated weapons into Pakistan under the veil of security threats from the USSR. Selig S. Harrison, a senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has argued that the U.S. F-16 and 155 mm. howitzers are not suitable for the Afghan frontier. He stressed that if it is really serious about Pakistan's defense vis-a-vis the USSR, it should give her F-5 Gs which are effective interceptors in the given geographical conditions of Afghanistan. Moreover, F-16s are irrelevant in controlling and combating "domestic insurgency." Harrison further warned that the U.S. arms policy would not only disturb the strategic autonomy of India but would also result in further deterioration of bilateral relations of India and the U.S. However, the fact is that the U.S. in its quest for acquiring bases for its Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in the ports and air fields of Pakistan, is keen on building up the security of the latter. *The New York Times* commented that the U.S. should not be too much optimistic to take it for granted that Pakistani bases would be available to it since the Zia regime is "unstable" and "unpopular."[15]

During the recent visit of Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi to the U.S. in July-August 1982, President Reagan gave her an assurance that arms supplied to Pakistan would not be used against India. It was too simplistic a remark to be taken seriously. Mrs. Gandhi retorted that Pakistani rulers were acquiring weapons with the sole purpose of directing them against India as it did in the past. Mrs. Gandhi reiterated that India was not against the legitimate security build-up of Pakistan but disfavoured the induction of massive arms into it for that would, in her opinion, bolster up war psychosis of its military ruling elites. One might recall here that President Reagan's recent invitation to President Zia is sequel to Mrs. Gandhi's visit and is also indicative of America's serious concern about Pakistan's security affairs. Reagan's assurance of additional supply of military weapons to Pakistan is being interpreted in New Delhi as a calculated move to counter India's defenses and security preparedness.

Atomic Fuel for the Tarapur Plant

Indo-U.S. relations seemed to have turned sour ever since the controversy generated over the issue of the U.S. obligation to supply

[14] A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations....p. 4.
[15] *The New York Times,* July 16, 1981

enriched uranium for India's Tarapur Atomic Plant at Trombay in Bombay. The story goes as far back as August 1963, when the U.S. had agreed to supply nuclear fuel for the plant for a period of thirty years ending in 1993. But the U.S. application of fresh safeguards and inspection requirements for India's nuclear reactors under its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, 1978, provoked the ire, indignation and anxiety of the Indian government and its people. India's top officials who held discussions with their counterparts in Washington in April 1981, argued that the U.S. domestic legislation on nuclear non-proliferation was both legally undefendable and morally untenable. The retroactive application of the legislation, India's External Affairs Minister P. V. Narsimha Rao reiterated, would not be acceptable to India. Nor would, the Minister said, India abandon her "right" over the nuclear spent fuel.

The Indian government thinks that the long term objective of the U.S. to pressure it into accepting the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act. 1978, is to prevent India from emerging as an autonomous nuclear power. Without pretense, opposition members like Samar Mukherjee (CPM), Mr. Parulekar (Janata) dubbed the U.S. tactics as a "black-mail". What has really distressed the Indian government is the manifest discrimination of the Reagan Administration against India. Its efforts to "lift Symington Amendment restrictions on aid to Pakistan evoked some comment in New Delhi about a U.S. double standard."[16] The New Delhi leadership argues that if the Reagan enthusiasts are prepared to do a special favour to Pakistan by bringing in such amendment, they can do the similar thing in India's case by modifying the NNPA, 1978. Such a policy behaviour reflects that the U.S. is mainly guided by political and extraneous considerations rather than by dictates of legal and moral obligations.

It is significant to observe here that the General Accounting Office (GAO), known as the watchdog of the U.S. Congress, is critical of the U.S. nuclear policy vis-a-vis India. It commented: "India's national pride has become heavily involved in the issue of discrimination with respect to international nuclear non-proliferation."[17] In spite of becoming critical of the U.S. nuclear policy, the GAO has justified the "export criteria" applied to the shipment of nuclear fuel to India. It has also supported Pakistan's nuclear programmes which will, in its opinion, "enhance its security position with India and improve the stablility of South Asia."[18] Reacting to such a "prejudiced report", U.S. policy analysts are of the view that it would supplement to boosting the morale of Pakistani rulers in the direction of "war preparedness."

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16 A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations...p. 7.
17 Quoted by *The Times of India* (New Delhi), May 23, 1981.

One of the important dimensions of the controversy over the nuclear issue that has recently caught attention is the question of the reprocessing of nuclear spent fuel. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Malone rejected outright India's claim over the "reuse" of the fuel. He persisted in his argument that it was obligatory on India's part to allow safeguards on Tarapur even if the U.S. stopped the shipment of nuclear fuel to India.[19] He described India's adherence to the policy of recycling the spent fuel to extract uranium, as contravention of diplomatic norms. Dr. Homi Sethana described the U.S. thinking as "fanciful." The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) in its annual report (1980-81) declared that it "would reprocess the spent fuel from its power reactors to recover plutonium."[20] It also contends that two trials have already been completed at the reprocessing plant at Tarapur. It also agrees that though the production capacity of the Tarapur Plant has considerably fallen due to the sudden U.S. announcement of the postponement of the nuclear shipment, it has managed to generate 1646 million units of power.

The position has slightly improved when Mrs. Gandhi recently undertook an official visit to the U.S. The Reagan Administration has discovered an alternative to rearrange the supply of enriched uranium to India in collaboration with the French government. Under the tripartite agreement among India, U.S. and France, the latter has agreed to supply nuclear fuel for the Tarapur Plant. Unfortunately, air has not been fully cleared. Controversy still exists on the question of safeguards and India's right to reprocess the spent fuel. Mrs. Gandhi made it clear before Americans that India was not opposed to the safeguards evolved by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) but she asserted having accepted them once, India has "the right to reprocess."[21] Mrs. Gandhi further explained that "once IAEA safeguards were met there was no need for India to take concurrence of any country for reprocessing."[22]

The U.S. government, however, is not in agreement with Indian point of view. It is worth mentioning here that due to an articulate and strong lobby at the Capitol Hill, the Reagan Administration will not give India a free hand in the reprocessing of the spent fuel. And, moreover, India does not enjoy a strong leverage like Japan and Germany with the U.S. to get conditions waived off on the reprocessing issue. Under these circumstances, options before India are: (i) seeking uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel from France; (ii) reprocessing

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18 Ibid.

19 See also The Annual Report 1981-82, Ministry of External Affairs, Gov't. of India, New Delhi, 1982.

20 Quoted in *The Indian Express* (New Delhi), April 19, 1982.

21 The *Times of India* (New Delhi), August 1, 1982.

22 Ibid.

the nuclear spent fuel without taking U.S. objections into consideration; (iii) deployment of indigenous sources to achieve self-reliance. India may also use MOX fuel as an alternative to enriched uranium; (iv) searching for new markets.

If we make an impartial and objective assessment of nuclear fuel as a determinant in the bilateral relations of India and the U.S., we find that it has left a bad taste. It would perhaps be a fatuous estimate if the U.S. makes tall claims to have succeeded in breaking deadlock over this controversial issue. It has, of course, succeeded in shifting its majority responsibility to France. The succees of U.S. diplomacy is suggestive of the lack of diplomatic finesse on India's part. India has not only lost the diplomatic battle with the U.S. but also seems to have lost with France. The French insistence on the "perpetuity clause" on safeguards has made India's task still more difficult. The Indian government is trying to persuade the French government to dissuade itself from the "perpetuity clause" and make her available enriched uranium without a further loss of time. How the French government will look upon India's persuasion, is a matter of speculation. It, however, seems apparent that the tripartite agreement has given rise to complexities between India and France and heightened the degree of misunderstanding and bitterness between India and the U.S.

U.S. Presence in the Indian Ocean

One of the indirect sources of tension between India and the U.S. is the latter's growing military build-up in the Indian Ocean. This, in India's perception, constitutes a threat to her security and that of the littoral states. Contrary to India's perceptions, however, the U.S. looks upon its naval-cum-air presence in the Indian Ocean as an integral component of its global diplomacy to checkmate the Soviet Union's expansion and influence. India's consistent stand has been that the Indian Ocean should be declared a permanent zone of peace. During Mrs. Gandhi's recent official visit to Mauritius in August 1982, she strongly supported her right over Diego Garcia. The U.S. has taken a serious view of India's stand on Diego Garcia. The crystallization of U.S. interests would make it almost impossible for it to withdraw from the Indian Ocean. The U.S. has already intensified its naval presence and improved its strategic position vis-a-vis the USSR. Any Indian strategy of diminishing its influence or driving it out would not only be interpreted by the U.S. as an act of open hostility but would be met with stiff opposition through its military, economic and diplomatic instruments. The recent Indian advocacy of handing over Diego Garcia back to Mauritius is likely to create a negative image of India and might give a further set back to the

bilateral relations of the U.S. and India. Recent trends also indicate that except denunciation of the U.S., India is not in a position to exert a positive influence on the U.S. to retreat from the Indian Ocean. It appears a far distant dream that the U.S. would withdraw under moral pressures.

Economic Field

On economic issues, India is fully aware of the U.S. policy of free enterprise and neo-protectionism that is contrary to India's mixed economy with a heavy tilt toward socialist planning. The divergent perceptions between the two countries on global economic diplomacy became manifest when Mrs. Indira Gandhi held discussions with President Reagan at the Cancun conference. The developed, rich, industrialized countries are not prepared to give substantial concessions on trade and aid to the less developed countries. The transfer of wealth by rich countries seems absolutely a chimera. They are not in a mood to transfer even their technology to less technically advanced countries of the Third World. Aid through multilateral agencies generated a lot of controversy. In the U.S. view, this would lessen the dependence of developing countries on its unilateral aid which could be used as an instrument to promote U.S. national interests.

So far as bilateral economic relations are concerned, the Reagan Administration does not seem to look upon India's economic problems with sympathy. Instead, it vetoed "low-interest" energy loans to India to be provided by the World Bank for her oil industries. More than that, India's adversary—Pakistan—was rewarded when the U.S. doubled its economic and military aid from the previous year to humiliate India. It has further committed to more than half a billion dollars for the forthcoming financial year. To India's dismay, she had to content herself with a meagre $210 million aid for her various developmental programmes. Still, India and the U.S. have much scope to cooperate with each other in trade and technical fields. Perhaps for the first time, balance of trade was in India's favour during a brief tenure of the Janata Party regime. She can be hopeful of increasing her trade with the U.S. and boosting her export. The American Business Council has evinced much interest in its investment in India for a variety of items. In her recent visit to the U.S., Mrs. Gandhi emphasized the need for mutual cooperation in "improvement of food production research, reduce energy consumption, biomedical research and biomass production."[23]

In the fields of science and technology also, India and the U.S., said Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi, "can build true links of understand-

[23] Ibid.

ing."[24] America has expressed its willingness that the U.S. scientists are prepared to cooperate with India in "biomedical research to control leprosy, tuberculosis and waterborne diseases, and for fertility control through immunology."[25] Mrs. Gandhi emphasized that the U.S. and India could collaborate with each other in the reduction of energy consumption that would benefit not only India and the U.S. but other nations, too. To encourage creative skills, leaders of both countries agreed to mutual scientific and technological collaboration. Mrs. Gandhi, however, "regreted that in spite of all the exertions of developing countries and projects of multilateral and bilateral cooperation, 95 percent of the world's research and development was still confined to the industrialized nations."[26] She, therefore, appealed to the U.S. for giving active reconsideration to the question of the transfer of technology to the Third World that was struggling very hard to make itself self-reliant and self-sufficient.

New Directions

New directions, trends and patterns in Indo-U.S. relations can be better understood and appreciated in the context of the recent visit of Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi to the U.S. in July-August 1982. During her nine days stay in the United States, Mrs. Gandhi sought an opportunity to have had wide ranging discussions with prominent American leaders, top officials and intellectuals. If viewed within the totalistic perspective, the aim of Mrs. Gandhi's visit was to search areas of mutual cooperation and interests rather than confrontation. Mrs. Gandhi spelt out:

> "Our hand of friendship is stretched out to all. One friendship does not come in the way of another.....No two countries can have the same angle of vision, but each can try to appreciate the points of view of the other. Our effort should be to find a common area however small, on which to build and to enhance cooperation.....[27]

She especially emphasized India's serious concern with the "people-to-people relationship." But simultaneously she did not give the impression that India might deflect from her basic postulates of the foreign policy. She spoke with a sense of poise and confidence and expressed her frank views on global and regional issues. Of course, the Reagan team was trying that India reappraise and revise her rigid policy postures on the issues of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Israel, West Asia, etc.

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[24] Quoted, Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Quoted in *Span* (New Delhi), September 1982.

Mrs. Gandhi's firmness to criticize U.S. role of global "policemanship" constituted a mild rebuff to the U.S. She told the National Press Club that India's "stability" would be a major factor in the stability of the entire region. She, of course, expressed her serious concern over the presence of Soviet troops lying on the gateway to the Subcontinent. Mrs. Gandhi clearly pointed to this fact that unless both the super powers adopted in practice the policy of "non-interference" in the domestic affairs of the country, the possibility of troop withdrawal by the Soviet Union does not seem possible. Mrs. Gandhi further explained: "I don't think the Soviets will tolerate any regime which is anti-Soviet", she added, "but they would accept a non-aligned regime in Kabul."[28] Mrs. Gandhi, however, conceded that there was still scope for general withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan provided both the super powers concede to bartering away something with one another.

But she was more obsessed by China and Pakistan than the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister said: "I think we stand upright. One does not spend one's life fighting for independence just to be able to give it away."[29] On international issues, both the governments reaffirmed their faith in "equitable peace" in conflict ridden areas of the world. Reagan and Mrs. Gandhi felt that peace and stability of the region depended on constructive approach of the two countries. Besides political issues, both the countries expressed a sense of optimism on economic issues. Mrs. Gandhi pointed out "liberalized conditions" existed in India that would encourage U.S. foreign businesses. During her talks with A. W. Clausen, President of the World Bank, Donald Reagan, U.S. Treasury Secretary and the Commerce Secretary Malcolm Balridge, she emphasized the need of international economic cooperation in the economic development of India and the Third World nations.

Her visit as an "adventure" in search of 'understanding' and friendship was literally speaking, more adventurous and less reassuring to India's national interests. For instance, on the question of U.S. aid and transfer of technology and capital, the outcome of her efforts to seek more aid, according to an Indian critic Namboodiri Pad, "to rescue the crisis-ridden Indian economy and industry" have been "utterly disappointing."[30] It is true that India is seeking massive economic aid from multilateral institutions like World Bank, IMF. But it was to her great dismay when the Reagan Administration refused to oblige India by giving aid on concessional terms. Her case was rejected on the ground that India could not be treated on par with less developing countries (LDCs) in terms of her per capita income.

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[28] Quoted in *The Times of India* (New Delhi), August 21, 1982.
[29] *Span* (New Delhi), September 1982, p. 3.
[30] The *Times of India* (New Delhi), August 10, 1982.

On the question of supplying F-16s, the U.S. government assured India that it would sympathetically consider her case if she asked for these aircrafts. India refused to seek aid and aircrafts from the U.S. by making a direct request. Mrs. Gandhi in her sarcastic tone said: "We are not seeking military aid from any country. Whatever we sought, we have bought."[31] Question, however, arises as to what was the intention behind the U.S. move to throw hints to considering India's case for acquiring F-16s. Did it like to mollify her? Or did it want to create a positive image for itself in the Indian eyes? A plausible explanation being offered is that U.S. believed that it would be far less vulnerable to India's condemnation of the American policy of rearmament to Pakistan.

Without surprise, President Reagan did not commit anything to the Indian Prime Minister in terms of reduction in arms supplies to Pakistan in the overall interests of strategic harmony in the Subcontinent. India's fears have been reinforced by the U.S. latest plan to offer new credits to Pakistan for her purchase of arms in 1983. It has been decided to "expand its military aid and arms sale through 1984 and beyond it in an effort to gain political influence and access to foreign bases."[32] As evident from the report of the General Accounting Office, the Reagan Administration has pointed to "the $6.0 billion for this year and $8.7 billion requested for 1983."[33] Thus, expansion of the U.S. military programmers for Pakistan would be disquieting and less assuring to India in the context of fast deteriorating security scenario of the region. If the U.S. perceives every Indian move—diplomatic, military or otherwise—on the issue of the Indian Ocean as hostile, disturbing, India too, perceives U.S. effort to prop up war psychosis of Pakistan by way of committing more arms to Pakistan, as an act of inciting hostility against her.

It is appropriate here to point out that Indo-U.S. relations should be assessed in the context of the current scenario of new realignments and readjustments that are taking place between some of the powers. For instance, U.S.-Pakistan relations are likely to be adversely affected in view of China's positive assurance of providing nuclear assistance to Pakistan. Americans believe that China is assisting Pakistan in acquiring the capability of manufacturing nuclear weapons by way of developing her facility to enrich uranium. The fact is that Pakistan is an ally of the U.S. and only a friend of China but America would not encourage a weak ally—Pakistan—to acquire nuclear capability. History bears the testimony. The U.S. did not disclose its nuclear secrets even to Britain—a one-time close ally—

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31 *Span* (New Delhi), September 1982, p. 3.
32 The *Times of India* (New Delhi), August 9, 1982.
33 Ibid.

when it was reduced to the status of a secondary power at the end of World War II. Obviously, it would not serve U.S. interests if Pakistan emerged as an autonomous nuclear state with the Chinese assistance by the calculus of a simple logic that nuclear Pakistan would not subserve to the U.S. designs in South West Asia. A non-nuclear Pakistan would be more subservient to the U.S. strategic and military interests in the region. At this juncture, India has a diplomatic opportunity of intensifying U.S. displeasure with Pakistan. But to conceive of a total reversal of U.S. policy towards Pakistan, would be a mis-calculation.

Another significant development is the suspension of the U.S. government's nuclear cooperation with China. Though both the governments have succeeded in a great measure to resolve their outstanding differences over the question of American assistance to Taiwan, the Reagan Administration has realized that China's clandestine diplomatic moves to assist Pakistan in her nuclear programmes are intended to diminish the U.S. influence on Pakistan. America seems to have realized that in the context of the ripening of dialogue between the Soviet Union and China, the latter's anti-Soviet stance is also becoming less prominent and hostile. It, therefore, thinks that the objective of the Sino-American axis to defeat its common adversary would fail.

One might take up cues from these developments that both the U.S. and India have a bigger scope for drawing close to each other. It is essential to qualify this assessment because the nature and quality of relationship between India and the U.S. largely depends upon the nature of relationship between India and China. The U.S. would not like to take any political risk that might maximize growing cooperation between India and China. On the other hand, it would like to take such measures that might stabilize and enhance its strategic interests in the region without completely cooling off its relations with China. Similarly, India too, would not like to cultivate close relations with the U.S. at the cost of straining her relations with China. Still, both the countries can broaden areas of mutual cooperation in mutual interests without tilting in favour of a third country.

In brief, both India and the U.S. need to appreciate each other's view point, perceptions and approaches to bilateral as well as global issues in a correct perspective. Instead of cultivating each other's negative images, they should explore those areas of mutual interests where confrontation is minimal. In this context, the U.S. should realize that it would not be a fruitful exercise to dilute India's special strategic relationship with the USSR. It would also be a self-deluding assess-

ment that U.S. would be successful in weaning New Delhi away from Moscow as that India would be successful in driving U.S. out of the Subcontinent. What both need are the management of crises and problems and removal of irritants in their bilateral relations not only through negotiations and appreciation of each other's problems and compulsions but also with a sense of granting some concessions to each other in the mutuality of their interests.

PHILIPPINE INVOLVEMENT IN THE KOREAN WAR: A FOOTNOTE TO R.P.-U.S. RELATIONS

LILY ANN POLO

The fledging Republic of the Philippines (R.P.) was one of the sixteen United Nations-member countries that fought on the side of the U.S.-backed South Korean government in the Korean Civil War of 1950-53. Broadly, Philippine participation in the war efforts in Korea may be viewed as a decisive turning point in evolving its foreign policy during the emerging Cold War in the Fifties. Specifically, active Philippine military involvement in the Korean War reflected to a large extent, its decidedly pro-U.S. and anti-communist orientation in an international political climate that was heavily influenced by the post-World War II ideological rivalry between the so-called democratic and communist forces led by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., respectively.

Prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, the Philippine government under President Elpidio Quirino came close to formulating a neutralist stand in the Cold War. In 1949, for instance, when the idea of a Pacific Pact was proposed by Quirino, the Philippine government bowed to the warning of such neutralist countries as India and Indonesia, to exclude Taiwan and South Korea in the proposed Asian Conference. Hence, despite Quirino's initial plan of inviting the rigidly anti-communist governments of Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee to the conference, these two countries were dropped from the final list of participating nations.[1] In fact, barely four months before the Korean War erupted on June 25, 1950, Quirino expressed his neutralist attitude when he declared to the press:

> Let China go communist. Let Japan go communist. We don't care. We will respect whatever forms of government any of our Far Eastern neighbors choose to have.[2]

The ensuing Korean War however, saw the decided hardening of the Philippine stand against communism at home and abroad.

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[1] Milton Meyer, *The Diplomatic History of the Philippines,* (U.S.A.: University of Hawaii Press, 1965), pp. 145-152.
See also "Quirino Memoirs," *The Sunday Times Magazine,* Vol. XII, No. 31 (March 17, 1957).

[2] "Quirino Will Deliver Talk at Airport," *Manila Chronicle,* February 11, 1950, p. 1.

Philippine Decision to Fight in Korea

Initially, the Quirino administration did not perceive the Korean War as an immediate threat to Philippine external security. Quirino declared that he was more concerned with the country's internal security—that is, the Huk[3] raids, as well as the weak economy—than with the threats posed by the Korean War.[4]

On June 29, 1950, when the U.N. Secretary General transmitted the U.S.-drafted and Philippine-supported Council Resolution 27[5] to all U.N. member states, Quirino and his cabinet voted to confine Philippine contribution to the sending of commodities and medicines.[6] Quirino also confirmed the General Military Council of his country's decision not to use Filipino troops in military operations outside the country. He claimed that sending troops to a foreign land would constitute an act of war. Later, Quirino elucidated that he would not engage the Philippines in a war against communism outside the country's territory since this would be an act of intervention in the internal affairs of another country. He further explained that although the Philippines was committed to democracy, it would not attempt to intervene in the event that other countries "of their own free will choose to turn communists."[7]

Quirino's initial declarations and actions tended to show that he was against the commitment of the Philippines to an active participation in a foreign war which could provoke the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China. Quirino also cited inadequacy of funds to support his stand. However, despite these initial official reactions, it is noteworthy that forty-five days after the outbreak of the war, the first of several Filipino battalion combat teams sailed for Korea to fight on the side of the South Korean government against the communist North.

The Sending of Troops to Korea

At least three related factors had greatly influenced official Philippine decision to send combat troops to Korea: (1) the Philip-

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[3] The Philippine acronym for Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon, the anti-Japanese guerilla force during the Japanese occupation. Later renamed Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan, the military arm of the Soviet-influenced Philippine Communist Party.

[4] "Declaration of Taruc Stirs Hornets' Nest," *Manila Times,* July 6, 1950, p. 1.

[5] The Resolution recommended that the U.N. members furnish such assistance to South Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack from the North and to restore international peace and security in the area.

[6] "Cabinet Votes to Send Food, Medicine, Goods," *Manila Times,* July 8, 1950, p 1; also refer to U.N. Document 1584.

[7] "EQ Will Not Embark PI on War Against Red Outside Country," *Manila Times,* July 18, 1950, p. 1.

pines' alliance with the United States; (2) Romulo's presidency in the United Nation's General Assembly; (3) the war scare and public pressure.

The American Factor

In view of the dominant role of the U.S. in the Korean conflict, the attitudes and reactions of other countries vis-a-vis the Korean War reflected their policy toward Washington, D.C. At the same time, it is also safe to assume that the extent of these countries' reaction to and involvement in the Korean conflict, reflected the degree of the U.S. government's influence on them. Obviously, the greatest contributory factor which influenced active Philippine military involvement in the Korean War, was the Philippines' alliance with the U.S.

As previously cited, the Quirino administration was initially against the sending of troops to Korea. As a member of the U.N. however, the Philippines actively supported all the important U.S.-drafted resolutions of the U.N. Security Council and the General Assembly in defense of South Korea against the North, and later, against Communist China. As a gesture of strong support for the U.S.-backed South Korean government, the Philippines, in accordance with the Security Council Resolution of June 27, 1950, gave contributions consisting of war tanks and other commodities like vaccines, fresh blood, soap and rice,[8] despite its own precarious economic situation. Quirino's attempt to express Philippine support through such contributions while maintaining a policy of military non-intervention, however, failed to achieve its purpose. This was mainly due to pressure from the predominantly pro-U.S. Filipino legislators as well as from the U.S. government itself.

In a speech supporting Concurrent Resolution 16[9] before the Philippine Senate, Senator Camilo Osias described Quirino's opposition to extending military assistance to Korea on the grounds that it would be a provocative act, as an "effeminate foreign policy."[10] Senator Osias went on to declare:

> We are drawn into the present conflict for reasons varied and sundry. But the most important is that this has clearly become a struggle between communism and democracy... we are on the side of the democratic forces of the world.[11]

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[8] *United Nations Yearbook, 1950,* (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1951), p. 227.

[9] This Resolution called for the extension of Philippine military assistance to South Korea.

[10] Camilo Osias, *Philippine Support of United Nations Forces Against Communist Aggression,* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1950), p. 7.

[11] Ibid.

Among the reasons cited by Philippine legislators for sending Filipino troops to Korea, emphasis was placed on showing "our sincerity in fulfilling our part of the bargain in the military assistance pact and military bases agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States."[12]

On the other hand, U.S. pressure toward a more active Philippine participation in the American war efforts in Korea took the form of increased aid incentive. After the outbreak of the Korean War, President Truman requested the U.S. Congress for an additional $30 million for military aid to the Philippines and other "friendly countries."[13] While the Philippine Senate was debating on the Korean issue, Filipino Colonel Andres Soriano clearly stated to the press upon his arrival from the U.S., that a favorable outcome in that special Senate session would influence American decision to grant economic aid to the Philippines.[14]

In a cable to Senator Jose Yulo on August 2, 1950, Miguel Elizalde, the Philippine Ambassador to Washington, underscored the advisability of Philippine military assistance to Korea. Elizalde said that the U.S. government was "extremely anxious and would welcome an offer [from you] of even one battalion totally equipped with whatever equipment we now have there, given to us under the military assistance agreement."[15] He further explained that despite the disadvantages of sending "poorly prepared and badly equipped soldiers to be overrun and possibly suffer defeat" it would be "obviously advantageous in our relationship with the United States and to bring about a more friendly atmosphere in the Congress if you could see your way to go even a little beyond what you consider wise at this time and offer at once even two thousand men and officers to be ready in the shortest time possible to embark for Korea."[16] Elizalde then assured Yulo that such move "would be more than appreciated here."[17]

The approval of the said Resolution on Korea was passed on August 10, 1950.[18] The formal announcement by President Quirino of the Philippine decision to send troops to Korea was received with relief by Filipino officials in Washington, D.C. In a congratulatory cable to Quirino, Elizalde stressed the satisfactory reaction in Washing-

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12 Ibid., pp. 12-14.

13 "More Defense Funds to SEA and the Philippines," *Manila Times,* August 3, 1950, p. 1.

14 "PI Aid to Korea to Influence U.S. Economic Help," *Manila Times,* August 6, 1950, p. 1.

15 Cable to Hon. Jose Yulo from Hon. J. M. Elizalde, dated August 2, 1950, in Quirino Presidential Papers File, Ayala Museum and Library, Metro Manila, Philippines.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 "Quirino Advises Washington of Decision to Send Soldiers," *Manila Times,* August 11, 1950, p. 1.

ton to the Philippine decision, and he assured the President that the U.S. "will recognize our sincere efforts and problems."[19]

Romulo's Presidency in the U.N. General Assembly

Among the arguments given in support of the Philippine Congress resolution to send troops to Korea was:

> the duty of the Philippines to fulfill its obligations to the U.N. is accentuated by the fact that the Philippine chief delegate to the U.N., Secretary Carlos Romulo, is the president of the U.N. General Assembly.[20]

In his dual role as the concurrent Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs and President of the fourth session of the U.N. General Assembly, Carlos P. Romulo was caught between two courses of diplomatic actions regarding Philippine participation in the Korean War. On the one hand, as Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs, he had to inform U.N. Secretary General Trygvie Lie of the Philippine policy not to send combat troops except on a voluntary basis, due to the pressing demands of domestic peace and order. On the other hand, as chief Filipino U.N. delegate actively supporting U.S.-drafted resolutions on Korea, and more so as President of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Romulo exerted effort to work for full Philippine cooperation in the U.S.-led military efforts in South Korea. It was in his latter capacity that Romulo spearheaded the movement for Philippine military participation in Korea. In so doing, he carried his bid to the Philippine Senate. Romulo campaigned vigorously to convince the government and the public that the war against communism must be conducted not only within the Philippine territory but also in the international arena.

In his speech before a public hearing of the joint Senate committees on Foreign Affairs and the Army regarding the Korean issue, Romulo stressed:

> We have a stake in that struggle by virtue of our membership in the international community. But our stake rests upon a more intimate, and in a sense, a more compelling consideration. It was inevitable that the United States of America, in its role as a leader of the Free World, would assume the major responsibility in the field for any enforcement measures that may be taken in accordance with the charter of the United Nations. Our country is similarly bound as a member of the U.N. to offer such assistance. But our

[19] Cable to President Quirino from Ambassador J. M. Elizalde, August 7, 1950, in Quirino Presidential...

[20] See Resolution No. 16, Second Congress of the Philippines, Second Special Session, Manila: August 1, 1950.

> special relations with the United States, which have sprung from a common love of liberty, a shared allegiance to democracy and a battle-tested comradeship, contribute an element of urgency in our obligation. Pervasive and powerful in peace, these relations exert an even more potent influence in times of war.[21]

Thus it is obvious that Romulo's arguments were reflective of a decidedly pro-U.S. stand in a conflict which indicated the growing rivalry of the superpowers in an international Cold War environment. Later, in a letter to Quirino dated December 19, 1950, Romulo wrote from New York:

> The pledge of American protection has been given repeatedly by President Truman and Secretary Acheson. We have responded loyally and gratefully in kind. We have supported the American policy in Korea, and it should be stated for the record that our government decided to send Filipino troops there not only as a faithful member of the United Nations but as a loyal ally of the United States. We did what no other Asian country, with the exception of Thailand, dared to do...[22]

The War Scare and Public Pressure

The news of a war in Korea barely five years after the trauma of World War II came as a surprise to the Filipinos. The relative geographic proximity of Korea to the Philippines—Manila being approximately three and a half hours away by plane from the South Korean capital city of Seoul—precipitated a war scare among the Filipinos. There was also the gnawing fear that if Korea turned communist, the Philippines might follow suit, especially in view of the escalation of the Huk raids in the countryside after the outbreak of the Korean War.

As Romulo pointed out in his speech before the public hearing of the Joint Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Army:

> Korea is next door to us and the outcome of the struggle there will have immediate and unavoidable influences, for good or for evil, upon our country. What has happened in Korea can happen here.[23]

The immediate general reaction of the Filipino public was to rally behind the United States' Korean war efforts rather than behind their own government. This sentiment was expressed nationwide.

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[21] Text of Romulo's speech before a Public Hearing of the Joint Senate Committees on Foreign Affairs and the Army, August 3, 1950, *Manila Times*, August 4, 1950 p. 1.

[22] EQ Correspondence: "Quirino-Romulo Letters," in Quirino Presidential...

[23] Text of Romulo's Speech before a Public Hearing of the Joint Senate Committees on Foreign Affairs and the Army, August 3, 1950, *Manila Times*, August 4, 1950, p. 1.

In Laoag, the nearness of Ilocos Norte to Taiwan and Korea resulted in great fear among the people. They expressed hope that the U.S. will succeed in averting further conflicts in the region.[24] In Iloilo, the president of the Junior Chamber of Commerce, William Yotoko, urged all Jaycees to rally behind the United Nations and be ready "to spill their blood in defense of democracy."[25] In Batangas, Congressman Numeriano Babao had to reassure the people against fears of any Red invasion in the country during his Independence Day address;[26] while in neighboring Cavite, a resolution supporting U.S. efforts in Korea was unanimously passed by the retired civilian employees of the U.S. navy in that province.[27]

In Manila, five days after the start of the Korean War, an anti-communist league was formed by the members of the Committee on Un-Filipino Activities (CUFA), the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA), and several Filipino-American civic organizations. The members of the American Legion in the Ermita district endorsed the league, and the Philippine press described it as the "first tangible proof here of a popular movement against communism."[28] Also in Manila, the directorate of the National Federation of Philippine Scout Veterans representing some 31,000 veterans offered "to fight once more for the democracies headed by America" and unanimously passed a resolution reaffirming their loyalty to both the Philippines and the United States.[29]

The Korean conflict also elicited reactions from Filipinos residing in the United States. A radiogram was sent to President Quirino by the Filipino community in Los Angeles through its president, Paul Vidal, informing him that the Filipinos there were prepared to volunteer their services in the United States Army as an "indirect way of reaffirming [their] loyalty to the Philippines."[30]

Such was the war scare among the Filipinos that measures had to be taken to avoid undue national alarm. The National Emergency Committee of the Civilian Emergency Administration decided to put up a nationwide information service to advise the people on the actual war situation and at the same time inform them what had to

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24 "Anti-Communist League Formed," *Manila Times,* July 1, 1950.
25 "Jaycees to Rally Behind the U.N.," *Manila Times,* July 3, 1950, p. 12.
26 "PI Committed to World Force," *Manila Times,* July 4, 1950, p. 14.
27 "Ex-U.S. Navy Employees Offer to Serve Anew," *Manila Times,* August 7, 1950, p. 1.
28 "Anti-Communist League Formed," *Manila Times,* July 1, 1950, p. 1.
29 "31,000 Scout Vets Pledge Loyalty, Offer Services," *Manila Times,* July 7, 1950, p. 1.
30 "Filipinos in States Ready to Join USA," *Manila Times,* July 6, 1950, p. 1.

be done in case of emergency. This service was given particularly in the provinces through mass media and the community councils.[31]

A public hearing sponsored by the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and the Army sounded off public opinion on the question of Philippine implementation of the U.N. decision with respect to the Korean War. On this particular issue, public opinion was predominantly for the move to send Philippine forces to South Korea. In Iloilo, the provincial board passed a resolution urging the President to send a token force to Korea "to assist American forces there who are fighting under the U.N. Banner";[32] while in Manila, the councilors expressed disappointment over the delay of the national government in sending troops "while the allies' U.N. forces were already in a critical situation."[33] In a letter to Quirino, the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) endorsed the same move and even suggested the creation of a committee composed of representatives from civic and welfare organizations in the country to campaign for voluntary contributions for the U.N. forces and civilians in South Korea.[34]

The approval by the House of Representatives of a resolution for Philippine military participation in the War, plus Quirino's affirmation that the Philippines was ready to dispatch 5,000 to 6,000 men to Korea, elicited widespread public support. The Supreme Council of the National Confederation of Trade Union (NACTU), for instance, passed a resolution pledging full support for the President's decision.[35]

Amidst public approval of the Philippine decision to send troops to Korea, there were a few dissenting voices. In Congress, Representative Arsenio Lacson spoke against the resolution, saying that it would be "silly" for the Philippines to fight communism on foreign soil when the country could not even contain communism, like the Huk problem, locally.[36] Another vocal oppositionist was the Congress of Labor Organization (CLO), an organization of workers' unions which was against the Philippine decision on the ground of "non-intervention."[37] These dissenters, however, especially the CLO, were branded by the media as radicals.

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[31] "Filipinos Free to Volunteer for Korea War, Say EQ," *Manila Times,* July 11, 1950, p. 1.

[32] "U.S.-PI Unity is Pledged Anew," *Manila Times,* August 4, 1950, p. 14.

[33] "Councilors Urge PI Troops to Korea," *Manila Times,* August 4, 1950, p. 1.

[34] "Y's Men Suggest Korea War Fund," *Manila Times,* August 7, 1950, p. 4

[35] Korea Force Decision Lauded,"; "Labor Supports EQ Stand on Korea," *Manila Times,* August 23, 1950, p. 1 and p. 2.

[36] "Solon Urges Aid to Korea," *Manila Times,* August 4, 1950, p. 1.

[37] "CLO Will Oppose PI Action in Korea," *Manila Times,,* August 8, 1950, p. 2.

The Philippine Expeditionary Forces to Korea (PEFTOK)

As one of the sixteen U.N.-member countries that sent troops to the Korean War, the Philippines sent, in the course of the three-year war, a total of four battalion combat teams (BCT) and lost about a hundred Filipino lives.[38] Each combat team consisted of approximately 1,200 men from the Armed Forces supposedly recruited on a voluntary basis.[39] As an incentive to the PEKTOK members, a bill submitted to Congress by the AFP stipulated that officers sent to Korea were to receive twice the amount of their base pay plus allowances and longivity pay. The enlisted men were to have a higher ratio rate to be computed on the basis of the following formula: the sum of the base pay plus subsistence and quarter allowances times two plus fifty percent of the product.[40] This bill on PEFTOK salary was obviously designed to encourage "volunteers" from the enlisted men.

The initial military equipment for the Filipino troops in Korea was furnished from the mutual security funds appropriated to the Philippines by the United States. Subsequent equipment was on a reimbursable basis through the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea.[41]

Conclusion

The preceding factual discussion strongly indicates that Philippine military involvement in the Korean War of 1950-53 was primarily a function of its pro-U.S. orientation, both in the domestic and the international levels. Viewed against the backdrop of the emerging bipolarized Cold War politics in the Fifties, this involvement in a basically ideological conflict on the Korean Peninsula, irrevocably aligned the fledgling Republic with the anti-communist camp under the leadership of the U.S.

As noted earlier, the Philippine government under Quirino made attempts to explore alternate ties with other Asian neighbors of varying ideologies prior to the Korean War. This was clearly shown in the composition of participant nations to the Baguio Conference held on May 26, 1950. Such neutralist countries as India, Indonesia and Pakistan were present while rigidly anti-communist countries like Taiwan and South Korea were not invited to the Conference. The

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[38] "PEFTOK War Activities." Armed Forces of the Philippines. Office of the Chief of Historical Activities, Camp General E. Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

[39] For personal impressions of the members of the first BCT to Korea, see the press interview by Amante Bigornia, "PI Force Girds for Korea War," *Manila Daily Bulletin*, August 2, 1950, p. 3.

[40] "10th BCT to be First in Korea," *Manila Times*, August 24, 1950, p. 1.

[41] House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on Mutual Security Act of 1953, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, pp. 775-76, in Meyer, *Diplomatic History* . . . . , p. 131.

outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, however, created constraints that compelled the Philippines into making a decision which necessarily aligned her with the anti-communist forces in a Cold War environment. Thus, when the Philippines finally sent troops to Korea on September 19, 1950, it decisively signified its international commitment to the democratic forces under the U.S. banner. Within such framework then, it was not surprising that in the sixties, the Philippines (along with South Korea) was one of the few Asian states that directly supported another American war effort in divided Vietnam.

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ACHIEVEMENT ORIENTATION AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES: IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFUSION OF TECHNOLOGY AMONG THE NORTH INDIAN YOUTH*

YOGENDRA K. MALIK

Interaction between transference and diffusion of technology and socio-political change is widely recognized although there are diverse theoretical perspectives for looking at such an interaction. For the technological determinist, for instance, "there is some form of inner logic or dynamic in modern industrial technology that results in similar social consequences regardless of the settings."[1] John Galbraith, representing this view, asserts that man's freedom in determining the nature of economy is very limited. Once a decision is taken to industrialize a society there from the new technology takes on its own imperative. In his view, thereafter, "the imperatives of organization, technology and planning operate simultaneously, and we have seen to a broadly similar result, on all societies. Given the decision to have modern industry, much of what happens is inevitable and the same."[2]

Even social psychologists like Alex Inkeles seem to support the view of technological determinists. According to Inkeles, the factory is at the heart of the industrialization process and when a man coming from a traditional society works in a factory, he is likely to undergo radical transformation in his world view. The factory is not a system of production alone, it is a large scale application of both organizational and production technology. According to Inkeles, "the factory—the large scale productive enterprise, brings together a large number of men in one place, systematically—ordering their relations one to another according to rational consideration expressed in formal rules, relying on concentration to inanimate power and inno-

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[1] Frederic Fleron, Jr., *Technology and Communist Culture: Socio-Cultural Impact of Technology Under Socialism,* (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. 459.

[2] John Galbraith, *The New Industrial State,* (New York: Mentor, 1971), p. 380.

vative application of technology, and guided by hierarchy and authority laregly resting on technical skill and administrative competence." Working in such a system is likely to lead to the development of attitudinal patterns and behavioral norms found in modern (western) societies, whatever the nature of the organization or the culture of that society may be.[3]

Similarly Peter Berger, *et al.*, who look upon a production system based upon modern technology as the heart of a "modern society," find the existence of a close relationship between technology and what they term "modern consciousness."[4]

Because rationality and scientific knowledge are intrinsic to the operation of a technology-based system of production, it is assumed that with the introduction and diffusion of such a system of production there would develop "modern consciousness" in the subjective structure of individual members of such society. Furthermore, they stress that the production process based upon technology entails "human engineering," that is, the technological management of social relations control over free-flowing emotions, self-anonymization, achievement orientation and bureaucratic organization based upon compliance and rationality and so forth.[5]

Cultural anthropologists also perceive the existence of a close relationship between diffusion of technology and social structure. Leslie White has singled out four elements of a culture: the ideological, the sociological, the attitudinal and the technological. Even though he concedes that these four elements are interrelated, nevertheless he asserts "that the technological factor is the basic one, all others are dependent upon it. Furthermore, the technology determines, in a general way at least, the form and content of the social, philosophic and sentimental sectors.... It is fairly obvious that the social organization of a people is not dependent upon their technology, but is determined to a great extent, if not wholly by it, both in form and content.[6]

Following the theoretical perspective of White, the supporters of the theory of cultural evolution assert that the transference of technology from the developed to the less developed countries (LDC) leads to the development of "dominant" and "dependent" cultures. The dominant cultures, it is held, are thermodynamically more versatile; they respond more effectively to different types of environment

[3] A. Inkeles and David Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries,* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 18.

[4] Peter Berger, et al. *The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness,* (New York: Vintage Books, 1974).

[5] Ibid., pp. 32-40.

[6] Leslie White, *Evolution of Culture: The Development of Civilization to the Fall of Rome,* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), p. 19.

and they are likely to drive out less developed cultures. Because of its technological superiority, they find that "Western culture is not only extending its dominance over much of this planet, but is also attempting to extend into outer space as well."[7]

Following the same line of thought, A. B. Singham and Nancy Singham argue that presently the world is dominated by two technological-cum-military superstates which seek to dominate the cultures of technologically weaker societies. According to them, "the global system is dominated by a converging Euro-American cultural system which shares common technology and common concern to control and dominate the weaker cultural systems, despite different forms of economic and social organization in the two powerful superstates."[8] They accept and apply Roseneau's concept of "linkages" between a national-politcial system, international politics and stress that such linkages also exist between the cultures of different societies.[9]

In the context of the existence of dominant and dependent cultural systems, it is suggested that with the transference and diffusion of technology from the West, the Western culture and particularly its Anglo-American variant, with its superior scientific and technological knowledge, is likely to become the model on which the behavior pattern and socio-political organizations of non-Western cultures are likely to be built.[10] It is believed that cultural norms, values and institutional structures originating from the metropolitan societies are likely to prevail over the normative and institutional structures existing in the less developed countries.

The nature of the relationship between the cultures of European and the Third World countries may be a subject of further debate and speculation. It is agreed, however, that transference and diffusion of technology into the LDCs is likely to erode the traditional values and attitudinal patterns and create new sets of aspirations and behavior patterns on the part of individual members of a society, even though such a development may not create "dependent" and "dominant" relations between the two sets of cultures. Given the validity of this argument, I propose to test the following hypotheses in the paper:

(1) The introduction of several components of industrial and organizational techniques originating from the Western societies into traditional social systems are likely to cause

[7] David Kaplan, "The Law of Cultural Dominance," in Marshall D. Sahlins and Elman R. Service (eds.), *Evolution and Culture,* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), p. 73.

[8] A.W. Singham and N.L. Singham, "Cultural Domination and Political Subordination: Notes Towards a Theory of the Caribbean Political System," *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* vol. 5, no. 3 (June 1973).

[9] James Roseneau (edd), *Linkage Politics,* (New York: Free Press, 1969).

[10] Singham, "Cultural Domination..."

important changes in the subjective structure of an individual's consciousness. Specifically it is held that the more a person is exposed to such a technology, the higher the level of his personal efficacy and achievement orientations.

(2) Since the literature on the development of pro-democratic political predispositions establishes a close relationship between achievement orientations and democratic disposition, a corollary hypothesis is that the higher levels of exposure to technology, achievement orientations and attitude towards democracy are likely to be positively related.

(3) With increased exposure to modern technology we would also expect a decline in the role of traditional agents of socialization, such as the religious leaders, in the formulation of values in individuals and the young citizens would be more willing to accept heroes of popular culture as their models of behavior.

Setting and Research Procedure

This study was conducted in Jullundur City of Punjab, one of the three largest cities of the state. It is the headquarters of the district and the seat of administration. The city is located on National Highway I which connects it with Amritsar at the one end and New Delhi at the other. In terms of literacy Jullundur district ranks second in the state (Government of Punjab, 1971).

Before 1946, Jullundur was mainly an administrative and trading center and its total population was 135,000. Since 1946 the population of the city has reached close to three hundred thousand, Hindus constituting the dominant majority (226,856) and the Sikhs the largest minority with a population of 65,340 (Government of Punjab, 1971). Smaller minorities are the Jains and the Christians, and both communities have almost equal representation in the city population.

Although an overwhelming majority of the people still live in the older part of the city studded with Mahallas and crisscrossing narrow lanes and bylanes, nevertheless, since 1948 there has been a steady increase in the outward movement of the inner city population into suburban areas.

Since 1946 there has also taken place a radical change in the economy of the city. From a service and trading town, Jullundur has become a very important center of industry and commerce. Besides the sporting goods, the city has several medium and small-scale industrial units engaged in the manufacturing of surgical instruments, motor parts, rubber goods, engineering goods, brass and chromium sanitary fittings and electrical goods. There are various indicators of increased industrialization of the city and the district. Census data indicate that only 50% of population of the district is classified as

agriculturists or farm workers, and the ratio must be much lower for the city. Another factor which would indicate the importance of industries to the city are the facts that the three most imported commodities in the city are iron, coal and raw materials for sporting goods, and the three most exported commodities are motor spare parts/electrical goods, iron bars/agricultural implements, and sporting goods. In recent years the emphasis in manufacturing has been shifting from sporting goods to electrical goods, sanitary fittings and farm machinery.

Furthermore, in the past decade the city has witnessed the emergence of several new networks of communication. It has become the center of the vernacular newspaper industry of the state as well as book publications, and it has its own television and radio stations. There are twenty cinema houses, showing both Indian and foreign movies.

The city's population has also been exposed to the several modern organizational techniques as well as methods of mass mobilization. There is keen competition between the Congress (1) and the Jana Sangh (now it is called B.J.P.) for capturing the local and the state elective offices, and both the parties have been highly successful in setting up branches and party caucuses in each ward of the city. Besides the Congress and the Jana Sangh, the Communist, the Socialist and the Akali parties also maintain their district headquarters in the city.

With the introduction of the electorate system, the rise of several centers of political activity within the city, and the unionization of teachers, industrial workers, students, editors, office employees, traders and several other sectors of the local community, traditional loyalties based upon ascriptive ties of caste have been considerably weakened and eroded.

Jullundur city is also a well-known center of higher education. Besides having the regional campus of the Guru Nanak Dev University, it also has 12 colleges providing degrees in liberal arts, sciences, native medicines, engineering, teachers' training, physical education and several other areas.

The institutions providing college-level education in the community are of three types:

1) Denominational colleges (called private colleges, run by the Hindu and Sikh sectarian organizations).
2) Government colleges, run by the state government.
3) Exclusively women's college, run by sectarian organizations.

For a fair representation of different segments of the student population, an eight-page structured questionnaire was administered

to the first-year (freshman) and the third-year (graduating) classes of all the colleges. At the request of the college officials, the questionnaire was administered to all the students present on the day and during the class hour. The completed questionnaires were collected by the author at the end of the class hour. This procedure resulted in the collection of 2,500 usable questionnaires. This survey was conducted in the Fall term of 1979.

Findings and Analysis

In terms of testing our previously stated propositions, I may stress that we are looking mainly at the diffused feelings, values and perceptions of our young respondents rather than their actual behavior patterns. This socio-psychological approach of placing emphasis on attitudinal and ideological aspects of social change is as much a part of social inquiry as is the emphasis on the organizational and institutional aspects of a culture. Furthermore, although the changes in the respondents' attitudinal pattern are not being measured in terms of their experience in the operation of a system of production, nevertheless, their experience of going through modern educational institutions subjects them to a rationally organized pattern of authority. Bureaucracies, production system as well as modern educational institutions, are the center of what Peter Berger, *et al.*, have termed the centers of "human engineering." Even when the use of dichotomous concepts like "modern" and "traditional" are subject to serious scholarly criticism, it can hardly be denied that personalized use of such technological components as radio, television, auto, and newspapers, etc. is likely to cause fundamental changes in a person's social and political work.

The findings in terms of achievement orientations of the respondents have been summarized in Table 1.

Table 1

Frequency Distribution on Achievement Orientation Scale

Level	*Number*	*%*
High	693	27.80
Medium	1,644	65.94
Low	156	6.26
Total	2,493	100.00

The achievement scale was formulated on the basis of five items which test an individual's belief in terms of personal efficacy, job expectation, success orientation, attitude toward future and depend-

ence on the help of government for personal success (see Appendix 1). The analysis indicates that while almost 28 percent of the respondents score high, only six percent score low on the achievement scale.

My next concern is to find the interrelationship between a person's level of achievement orientation and the degree of his exposure to modern technology. An analysis of our data provides evidence for a high degree of positive relationship between achievement orientation and the level of a person's exposure to technology (see Table 2). In order to measure a person's level of exposure to technology, we constructed a Guttman scale consisting of nine items. The scale spreads from 1 to 9, indicating that a person possesses a minimum of one to a maximum of nine technological items such as radio/transistor, television, newspapers, autos, motor bikes or tractors, etc. Persons falling on the upper end of the scale are assumed to have a higher level of exposure to a modern life style. Our findings (see Table 2) clearly indicate that persons with a higher level of exposure to technology also tend to have a higher level of achievement orientation. The spread between the two groups is very striking and revealing.

It is possible to suggest that a person having larger components of modern technology may also belong to well-to-do segments of the society and thus the higher level of achievement orientation may well be the product of a person's social status rather than his level of exposure to technology. Our data, however, are unable to provide any definitive support for this proposition. A cross-tabulation of the father's occupation and achievement orientation does not show any positive relationship. Similarly, such subjective factors as religion and caste, which are, in the context of Indian society, indicative of a person's status, do not seem to have any significant relationship with a person's achievement orientation.

From different background factors, sex, place of birth and the type of degree for which a person is working are positively related to a person's achievement orientation. The rural born, the young females and the persons working for a B.A. degree show the lowest level of achievement orientation. It should be noted, however, that there is a significant (p. .0001) relation between the type of degree a person is working for and his exposure to the components of modern technology. The science and business students have the highest level of achievement orientations and they are also the ones who have a higher level of exposure to modern technology than other groups. Contrary to our expectations, there does not, however, emerge any positive relationship between the type of school a person attends and the level of his achievement orientations. Since some schools have

Table 2

Guttman Scale of Exposure to Technology
and Achievement Orientation

Level of Achievement Orientation	*Guttman Scale of Exposure to Technology*								
	High 9	*8*	*7*	*6*	*5*	*4*	*3*	*2*	*Low 1*
High	31.93	35.44	29.03	27.98	25.15	27.88	25.61	26.08	19.01
Medium	61.40	62.66	64.52	68.66	70.56	65.04	68.09	67.80	62.81
Low	6.67	1.90	6.45	3.36	4.29	7.08	6.30	6.12	18.18
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
	(226)	(158)	(268)	(186)	(163)	(285)	(492)	(441)	(121)

$X^2 = 50.42$ @d.f. 16 p .0001

sectarian basis while others are run and managed by the government and are expected to have higher level of secular organizations, nevertheless, persons attending such schools do not show higher achievement orientations than others.

Political Attitudes and Achievement Orientations

Earlier research on the development of pro-democratic dispositions and pro-system attitudes demonstrates a close relationship between achievement orientation, political efficacy and generally higher females and the persons working for a B.A. degree show the lowest level of commitment to the norms of democracy.[11] Achievement-oriented citizens are also likely to demonstrate a higher level of support for the political system. An analysis of our data supports such a pattern of relationship between democratic predispositions and achievement orientations. An achievement-oriented youth is not only positively oriented toward the operation of democracy in India, but he also decisively rejects authoritarianism (see Table 3). There is also a significant difference (at the .0001 level) in their attitude toward the use of revolutionary methods or political violence to bring about change in the organizational structure of the society. Whereas 43 percent of the achievement-oriented persons reject the use of political violence, only 27 percent of non-achievement oriented youth would do so.

Table 3a

Achievement Orientation and Attitude Towards the Working of Democracy

Only Democracy Can Solve India's Problem	*Achievement Scale*		
	High	*Medium*	*Low*
Agree	76.78	73.55	67.11
Disagree	19.35	17.76	24.85
No Opinion	3.87	8.69	8.04
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00
	(684)	(1622)	(155)
$X^2 = 19.59$ @ d.f. 4 p .001			

In order to further test an achievement-oriented person's political moderation, we developed a scale of political alienation on the basis of a person's attitude toward voting, public officials, the role of pressure groups and a general attitude toward politics (see Appen-

[11] Robert Lane, *Political Life: Why and How People Get Involved in Politics?* (New York: Free Press, 1965); G. A. Almond and S. Verba, *The Civic Culture,* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965); Yogendra K. Malik, "Trust, efficacy and Attitude Toward Democracy: A Case Study from India," *Comparative Education Review,* Vol. 23, no. 3, (October, 1979).

dix II). A cross-tabulation of achievement orientation and alienation scales clearly establishes the political moderation of the achievement-oriented persons (see Table 4). Persons with a low level of achievement orientation generally distrust public officials, doubt the effectiveness of voting, find politics too complex to understand and generally show a higher degree of negative orientation toward the national government.

Table 3b

Achievement Orientation and Attitude Towards Authoritarian System

Only Authoritarian System Can Solve India's Problem	*Achievement Scale* *High*	*Medium*	*Low*
Agree	38.25	51.31	57.89
Disagree	50.89	38.28	36.19
No Opinion	10.86	10.41	5.92
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00
	(627)	(1604)	(152)
$X^2 = 42.85$ @ d.f. 4 p .0001			

Table 4
Crosstabulation of Achievement Orientation and Alienation Scales

Alienation Scale	*Achievement Orientation Scale* *High*	*Medium*	*Low*
High	28.06	40.46	42.67
Medium	60.78	54.29	53.33
Low	11.16	5.25	4.00
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00
	(668)	(1562)	(150)
$X^2 = 5003$ @ d.f. 4 p .0001			

The youth with a higher level of achievement orientation also takes greater pride in the achievements of the political system. The relationship between high achievement orientation and positive perception of the political system is significant at the level .0001. The high achievement-oriented youth shows a greater pro-system orientation than others.

Party Identification, Achievement Orientation and the Level of Exposure to Technology

Another dimension of investigation into the relationship between political moderation and achievement orientation is to look into the party preferences of our respondents. Political parties project certain

ideological images in the minds of the citizens; they are also identified with certain specific programs and goals. In the context of the Indian political situation both the Congress (1) Party and the Bhartaiya Janata Party (B.J.P., formerly the Jana Sangh) represent political moderation, whereas Communist Parties are identified with revolutionary ideologies. The Akali party, until the adoption of its recent political posture, has also been identified with political moderation despite its strong advocacy of the cause of the Sikhs.

A crosstabulation of achievement orientation and party preference does not develop into a positive relationship between the two (see Table 5). Since this resulted in a deviation from the patterns reported in the preceding pages, I decided to run the party identification against each item of our scale. We find that a crosstabulation of party identification and such items as personal efficacy (belief in success on the basis of merit, and capability to influence political decisions other than voting) and job expectation (i.e., obtaining a job without a recommendation) result in the positive attitude toward the socio-political environment. Acievement-oriented youth, however, also displays a mix of traditional and modern value structures, since it is this group which is more positively oriented toward the the socio-political environment. Achievement-oriented youth, how-achievement orientation and with a preference for the Communist party is negatively oriented both toward the traditional norms of divine help and his future within the society.

Table 5

Achievement Orientation on the Basis of Preferred Party

	Preferred Party					
Achievement Orientation	*Congress*	*B. Janata Party*	*Communist*	*Akali*	*Independent*	*Like No Party*
High	24.56	28.54	37.74	31.37	29.44	26.23
Medium	67.68	65.49	58.49	62.75	65.26	68.06
Low	7.76	5.97	3.77	5.88	5.30	5.71
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(786)	(452)	(106)	(102)	(180)	(648)

$X^2 = 14.25$ @ d.f. 10 N.S.

When we crosstabulate the party identification with the Guttman scale of exposure to technology, there develops a highly significant relationship between the two (see Table 6). These findings fall in the pattern reported in the previous pages and confirm our basic proposition that a higher level of exposure to modern technology leads to the development of pro-system orientation and political moderation.

Table 6

Party Identification Crosstabulated with Guttman Scale of Exposure to Technology

Level		*Congress*	*B. Janata Party*	*Communist*	*Akali*	*Independent and Others*	*Like No Party*
(High)	9	11.07	7.97	3.74	9.62	8.81	11.89
	8	7.87	7.76	3.74	.96	11.92	5.36
	7	11.93	10.96	5.60	6.73	9.84	14.78
	6	8.00	6.08	13.08	8.65	6.74	7.10
	5	6.77	9.43	.93	3.85	9.33	7.68
	4	11.69	12.58	19.63	6.73	8.29	11.16
	3	23.37	22.01	21.50	21.15	19.17	18.42
	2	15.62	18.03	22.43	36.54	18.13	20.29
(Low)	1	3.68	6.08	9.35	5.77	7.77	3.34
		100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
		(813)	(477)	(107)	(104)	(193)	(609)

$X^2 = 11.26$ @ d.f. 40 p .0001

Personal Heroes and Achievement Orientation

I have stated above that with a higher level of exposure to modern life style and increased popularity of movies, television, and the movie star-oriented popular magazines, the young adults are likely to express greater admiration for the heroes of popular culture and adopt them as their models of behavior. As a consequence, the role of traditional agents of socialization such as the religious leaders would decline. However, our findings do not tend to support such proposition. Religious leaders still exercise considerable influence. Besides the religious leaders, M. K. Gandhi is the second most admired person by the youth. We decided, however, to crosstabulate the types of heroes with the level of achievement orientation. Such a cross-tabulation establishes a positive relationship between achievement orientation and political moderation. M. K. Gandhi, in his personal and political behavior, made a very skillful combination of traditional and modern values. The persons accepting Mahatma Gandhi as their hero also show the highest level of achievement orientation (see Table 7). I have demonstrated in another study that where Gandhi is the predominant agent of socialization, the youth seem to have a higher degree of positive orientation toward both their social and political environment. Such persons also exhibit a higher degree of deferential orientation toward temporal and divine authorities.[12]

From among the different components of modern technology, it is the possession of radios/transistors, newspapers and popular magazines, in that order, which seem to have the most significant impact on a person's achievement orientation. It appears the more

a person is exposed to information technology, the higher the level of his achievement orientation. And the higher the level of achievement orientation, the greater the inclination toward adopting a moderate posture in politics.

Table 7

Types of Heroes and Achievement Orientation

Level Achievement Orientation	*Popular Culture*	*Current Political Leaders*	*M.K. Gandhi*	*Religious Leaders*	*Others*
High	23.04	26.73	29.23	26.29	20.38
Medium	70.43	64.03	66.35	67.53	63.21
Low	6.53	9.24	4.42	6.18	16.41
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
	(230)	(303)	(520)	(1164)	(156)

$X^2 = 24.57$ @ d.f. 8 p .01

Conclusions and Discussion

The findings reported in the preceding pages generally tend to support the hypothesis stated in the introduction. An analysis of the data tends to indicate a strong relationship between the level of exposure to technology and the development of certain attitudinal patterns. It is the personalized or familial use of technology which seems to have significant impact on a person's orientations and attitudes than the type of school which he attends. Such objective factors as caste and religion which are likely to influence a young person's perception of his future chances within the society do not significantly relate to his achievement orientations. At this stage, however, these findings are mainly suggestive; they are not yet definitive and conclusive. The nature of the data in relation to technology is limited since we are not dealing primarily with production-oriented technology, but rather our focus is on the secondary structure of technology which is related to consumption rather than production.

If, on the other hand, we look upon the Guttman scale of exposure to technology used in this study as an index of the consumption pattern, it will inevitably lead us to conclude that it is a person with higher income and higher social status who is positively oriented toward

[12] Yogendra K. Malik, "Efficacy, Values and Socialization: A Case Study of North Indian Youth," *Political Science Review*, vol. 19, no. 1 (January-March, 1980).

both his place within the society and the political system. Such a person also identifies strongly with the political parties which do not seek radical transformation of the social and economic structure of the country. Such persons may aspire to join the ranks of the upper classes who emulate Western life style and value systems. Political moderation in this way may be actually an expression of political conservation directed toward the maintenance of the status quo. Thus, it could be argued that continuous expansion of consumption-oriented technology, especially the spread of mass media, is likely to further spread and strengthen the upper middle class outlook in the populace. Our data, however, do not provide conclusive evidence to support this proposition. Further research could demonstrate positively the existence of a linkage between class, status, exposure to technology and political orientations.

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APPENDIX I

ACHIEVEMENT ORIENTATION SCALE

(1) I believe that I can obtain a job on the basis of my qualifications without any recommendations. (Agree)

(2) I believe that everyone in our society can be successful with his own efforts. (Agree)

(3) I believe that without the help of God a man cannot be successful in his life. (Disagree)

(4) I believe that every individual in this country needs government help to be a success in his life. (Disagree)

(5) I believe that the course of my life has been set by my fate and I cannot change it. (Disagree)

APPENDIX II

ALIENATION SCALE

(1) Sometimes governmental and political affairs look so complex that I am unable to understand them. (Agree)

(2) I think that other than voting there is no other way whereby we can influence the governmental decision making. (Agree)

(3) If the government officials mistreat us we are unable to do anything against them. (Agree)

(4) The Government does not care for men like me, it is influenced only by the leaders of the groups of the Capitalist class. (Agree)

(5) Even though the civil servants and the politicians of our country are incompetent and they do not deserve our trust, I am still proud of the political achievements of my country. (Disagree)

MAK YONG: THE ANCIENT MALAY DANCE-THEATRE

GHULAM-SARWAR YOUSOF

Mak Yong is an ancient Malay dance-theatre form incorporating the elements of ritual, stylized dance and acting, vocal and instrumental music, story, song, formal as well as improvised spoken text. It is principally performed in the two provinces of Patani in southern Thailand and Kelantan, Malaysia, on the east coast of the Malay peninsula.[1] To a lesser extent *Mak Yong* also flourishes in the Rhiau Islands of Indonesia. Two other places associated with *Mak Yong* performances are Kedah on the west coast of the Malay peninsula and northern Sumatra, particularly Serdang, to which Malaysian troupes are reputed to have once travelled and even for a duration established *Mak Yong* under royal patronage.[2]

History

Myths and legends still current in Kelantanese villages support a strong belief that *Mak Yong,* like many other theatre genres of the of the region, had divine origination or inspiration. The ancient Javanese deity, Semar and his son, Turas, are credited with being its first mythical founders and performers. Other theories link *Mak Yong* with Mak Hiang, the spirit of the rice, *semangat padi,* identified with Dewi Sri, the Hindu-Javanese harvest goddess.[3] *Mak Yong* is thus regarded as a celebration of nature and natural phenomena, an idea eloquently expressed in the lyrics of *Lagu Menghadap Rebab,* the dance with which all *Mak Yong* performances commence.[4]

Yet again, to give it an Islamic colouring, *Mak Yong* is oftentimes described as having derived directly from Adam (Nabi Adam), the primeval human progenitor, through a host of spirits and mythical

[1] The exact status of *Mak Yong* in the Patani area is not yet clear as no research has been done in that area up to the present.

[2] The present writer has conducted research in both the Rhiau Islands and in north Sumatra, and the results will be published soon. There is today no *Mak Yong* in north Sumatra, that genre having in fact died out at the time of Indonesian independence in 1946 and the removal of the royalty. In Rhiau Islands folk *Mak Yong* continues to be performed by very old actors and actresses but it is certainly on the way to extinction.

[3] Mubin Sheppard, "Ma'yong, the Malay Dance Drama," in *Tenggara 5,* p. 107.

[4] The lyrics in this song describe preparations being made by the *Pak Yong* or leading male performer. The song is also, like the *Menghadap Rebab* dance intended to invoke spirits and to continue the spiritual preparations made by special rituals that are used for the opening of the theatre.

heroes. This results in its being interpreted in symbolical and mystical terms often couched in Sufi vocabulary.

Mak Yong's roots probably sink deep into animism as well as into shamanism. Some of the deeper spiritual meanings attached to *Mak Yong* and some of the symbolism operating within it certainly performed from time immemorial in the villages on the east coast of the Malay peninsula, is still seen today side-by-side with *Mak Yong* intended for entertainment *per se.* This is probably a survival of an earlier phase when ritual and healing were *Mak Yong's* principal functions. Ritual *Mak Yong,* alone or in combination with the shamanistic *Main Puteri,* continues to serve as a vehicle of exorcism or healing through a patient's active participation in a dramatic performance or, alternatively, through emotional and psychological involvement leading to release.

Historically *Mak Yong* seems to have had a continuous existence since its inception and consolidation as a theatre genre principally as a folk theatre operating in a ritual context while simultaneously providing entertainment. During the early decades of the twentieth century, *Mak Yong* was for a short duration, instituted as a form of court entertainment in Kelantan. The support thus received enabled it to develop into a refined art while continuing its erstwhile function as folk and ritual theatre. The palace period saw certain innovations including the practice of using female performers to play the principal male role (*Pak Yong*). Court support, however, ended with the demise of *Mak Yong's* principal patron, Tengku Temenggong Ghaffar, a member of Kelantan royalty. Performers who briefly received royal wages soon rejoined their rural companions, once again continuing to perform in the mainstream.

The 1970's saw a revitalisation of *Mak Yong* and its promotion as commercial theatre with the establishment of the Seri Temenggong Group of Kelantan under the charge of Khatijah Awang, herself a scion of artistic forbears. Despite current economic and other problems, Seri Temenggong remains the best known of all present day *Mak Yong* troupes, of which there are very few. The future of *Mak Yong* remains at best uncertain and like much of traditional theatre in Southeast Asia, its survival is dependent upon the energies of a handful of performers and enthusiasts.

Conventions

All *Mak Yong* performances are guided by certain basic conventions. The building of a theatre (*panggung* or *bansal*) must conform to certain principles of design and alignment. It is usually built of *attap* and bamboo, with a size of about twelve feet by sixteen, and is

open on all sides. Traditionally, the structure must not be raised above the ground, so that performers are on the mat-covered floor, and it must be placed so that the longer dimensions are aligned east-west. Present day *panggung,* often larger, are generally elevated three to five feet above ground to allow for maximum visibility. Traditional *bansals* continue to be used only for ritual or *Main Puteri* performances.

The orchestra is so arranged that the *rebab*-player, its principal musician, sits on the *panggung's* eastern side close to the central post (*tiang seri*). This allows the actresses to face east during the *Menghadap Rebab* dance, thus observing an ancient custom. Other conventions relate to the starting off of the orchestra and precautions and prohibitions that need to be observed in handling the instruments, some of which, regarded as the homes or vehicles of spirits, thereby become sacred.

In Kelantan today, female performers play the *Pak Yong* role, a practice, as already noted, begun in the early decades of the present century. Men play the comic roles (*Peran*) and a host of other supporting roles. Most of the action takes place at stage-centre, this acting area being described as the *gelenggang.* All performers remain on stage throughout the performances. They are, nevertheless, presumed to be off-stage when seated in the non-acting areas on the sides of the stage, often leaning against bamboo supports and indulging in a host of non-theatre-related activities including smoking, chewing betel-leaves or drinking coffee, and assuming their specific roles or characters almost instantly when necessary. In their off-stage positions all female performers function as members of the chorus (*jung dondang*).

As a rule few stage or hand properties are used, and these are generally multi-functional. The properties are, for the *Pak Yong,* a few strands of bamboo tied together into a wand (*rotan berai*) as well as a *keris;* and for the *Perans* wooden swords (*goloks*). Other such simple properties may be used by other performers. All basic information related to time and place regarding action is enshrined within the dialogue and song-texts. The longer of the songs are accompanied by circular dances serving a multitude of purposes including that of scene-changing.

A formal opening-of-the-theatre (*buka panggung*) ceremony and a similar one to close the theatre (*tutup panggung*) are mandatory. The former, like the *Poorvaranga* in Indian classical and folk theatre, serves the function of invoking a host of invisible beings (spirits or minor gods) and of offering them sacrifices as well as extending invitations to them with a view to gaining their goodwill and ensuring

protection for performers and audience members alike. The *tutup panggung* serves as a means of 'release' or sending off the invisible host and of expressing gratitude to them for their cooperation in ensuring a successful performance, without mishaps. *Mak Yong* is thus a sacred art, requiring special care. Actors and actresses are assumed, during performances, and particularly so during trance-sessions that are featured in ritual *Mak Yong,* to be re-enacting the deeds of the gods, the principal characters in the *Mak Yong's* repertoire of stories.

A typical performance may take several nights, commencing about eight-thirty in the evening and ending well after midnight. One-night performances, however, are not uncommon, and performers are often able to make adjustments to cut performance-time. In exorcism performances of *Main Puteri-Mak Yong* or other healing performances, however, it is a common practice to devote the first night to *Main Puteri* for diagnostic purposes, and to have *Mak Yong* on subsequent nights. Traditionally, the longest of *Mak Yong* stories, *Anak Raja Gondang* took forty nights to complete, while shorter ones lasted a good twenty nights. As a matter of practice, all performances begin with the emplacement of musical instruments and musicians in specially designated positions prior to the *buka panggung* rituals in conformity with traditional observances thereby allowing actresses in their opening dance to face both the *rebab*-player and the east, directing their salutations to the orchestra and the direction of the rising sun.

Staging arrangements for spiritual performances, though complicated by a host of additional items of paraphernalia, more or less conform with the arrangements for non-ritual *Mak Yong.* Such spiritual performances are, further, characterised by a great measure of informality and audience involvement particularly during trance sessions such as the *Lupa Mayang* (Palm-Blossom Trance) when, due principally to involuntary trance-states, control becomes altogether impossible, perhaps even unnecessary so as not to defeat the very purpose of the performances. During such performances the 'sacred area' often extends physically to include stretches of ground the *panggung.*

Repertoire

The *Mak Yong* repertoire went through several phases of expansion, beginning with one basic story, *Dewa Muda,* which is regarded also as the story which explains *Mak Yong* origins (*cerita asal*), and reaching a classical repertoire of twelve stories.[5] Additional tales have

[5] The *Dewa Muda* story is given in synopsis form in Appendix A. See page 118.

also, on and off, been borrowed from other coregional theatre genres such as *Wayang Kulit Siam, Wayang Kulit Melayu, Menora* or *Nora Chatri* and *Bangsawan.* Despite the general agreement that *Mak Yong* has twelve authentic stories, there is no complete agreement on the twelve titles which constitute *Mak Yong* repertoire due to a host of problems including possible alternative titles and the use of titles to indicate 'cycles' of stories rather than individual tales.

Based upon extensive consultations with leading *Mak Yong* personalities, the following list has been compiled as a possible complete 'authentic' *Mak Yong* repertoire:

1. *Dewa Muda;*
2. *Dewa Pechil* (with *Dewa Samadaru* as a variant title/version);
3. *Dewa Sakti* (or *Rajah Sakti*);
4. *Dewa Indera-Indera Dewa;*
5. *Dewa Panah* (or *Anak Rajah Panah*);
6. *Anak Raja Gondang* (The trilogy incorporating this play, *Bongsu Sakti* and *Bijak Laksana*);
7. *Gading Bertimang;*
8. *Raja Tangkai Hati;*
9. *Raja Muda Lakleng;*
10. *Raja Muda Lembek;*
11. *Raja Besar Dalam Negeri Ho Gading;*
12. *Bedara Muda.*

In the Kelantanese mind, all these stories are associated with gods (*Dewa-Dewa*). They deal with the adventures of gods or mythical princess (themselves the progeny of gods) and include supernatural events, so that they may be adequately described as romances or sagas.

It has not yet been possible to link these stories with the major south or southeast Asian cycles such as Somadeva's *Kathasaritsagara,* or the *Panchatantra* from India or the Indonesian *Panji* cycle. Attempts at linking them with or seeking possible derivatives from Middle Eastern and Persian cycles such as *The One Thousand and One Nights* and the *Shah-Namah* have revealed nothing. There is perhaps only one exception to all these. *Anak Raja Gondang* (*The Conch-Shell Prince*) which, apart from Malaysia is also known in Cambodia, Thailand, and Tibet, is derived from the *Suvarnasangkha Jataka* (*The Golden Shell Jataka*), one of the extra-canonical Jatakas that probably got written down for the first time in Thailand.

Some Kelantanese *Mak Yong* performers believe that *Dewa Muda,* and *Dewa Pechil* derive from possible Javanese sources. The prince,

Dewa Muda, is often identified with Raden Panji or Ino Kertapati, the hero of the medieval Javanese Panji romance.

Roles

The *Mak Yong* roles are enacted by a cast of between eight and ten performers in a ritual or rural performance and by about twenty to twenty-five performers for a more sophisticated one. In either case there is considerable flexibility and the number of performers depends upon the story selected. The numbers mentioned do not include musicians. The roles are as follows: 1. *Pak Yong,* the male lead; 2. *Mak Yong,* the female lead; 3. *Peran* or *Pengasuh,* the male attendant; 4. *Inang,* the female attendant or duenna; 5. *Tok Wak,* the Old Man; 6. *Dewa-Dewa,* the Gods and spirits; 7. *Jin* and *Gergasi,* the Genies and Ogres; 8. *Orang Darat,* the Villagers and 9. *Burung* and *Binatang,* the Birds and Animals.

Pak Yong, the male lead role, is generally played by females in Kelantan. There may be more than one *Pak Yong* in a performance, depending upon the story. He is always the *Raja* (King) or *Raja Muda* (Prince), and when both these roles are used, the *Pak Yong* role is divided into *Pak Yong Tua* and *Pak Yong,* with the former, or elder *Pak Yong* playing the Raja and the latter playing the prince. The *Pak Yong* role is central to the genre.

The *Mak Yong* is the leading female role, and is always played by females. Like the previous role, the *Mak Yong* is sometimes divided into *Mak Yong* (playing a queen) and *Puteri Mak Yong* (playing a princess). There may be several *Mak Yong* roles in a single performance.

Although generally regarded as a 'comic' role, the *Peran* is considerably more than a mere clown. Unlike the clowns in *Sandiwara* or *Bangsawan,* the *Perans* have the stature and importance of Shakespeare's 'wise fools' or the *Vidushaka* of classical Sanskrit theatre. The *Peran Tua* is infinitely more important than the *Peran Muda,* particularly in spiritual performances. They are addressed as *Awang Pengasuh* a name indicating their roles as a Raja's attendants, guardians, protectors and companions.

In more ways than one, the *Inang's* functions parallel those of the *Peran.* She serves as the attendant to a Queen or a companion to a princess. The role is divisible into several sub-categories. Of all these, the *Inang Bongsu* (or youngest *Inang*) is the most important. Her functions parallel those of the *Peran Tua.*

The *Tok Wak* (Old Man) role is an interesting one encompassing several very important characters such as the royal astrologer or for-

tune teller, the royal executioner, and various types of royal craftsmen. Of this fairly wide group of functionaries, the *Tok Wak Nujum* (Royal astrology) is the most important.

To the next group, *Dewa-Dewa* or *Dewa-Dewi* belong all benevolent gods, goddesses and spirits. These roles are generally handled by men. The *Dewa-Dewa* play the important role of the Fates, intervening in human affairs or human destiny to bring about a balance when human judgment has erred or when the malicious influence of ogres or genies threatens human characters.

The Jins and Ogres are clearly portrayed as evil, though once in a while one encounters an exception. Evil is ever present in *Mak Yong,* as in most traditional theatre of Southeast Asia. It devolves upon the hero to subdue or destroy it if necessary with the help of benevolent supernatural forces. In the symbolic presentation of good as well as evil supernatural beings, there are clearly marked Javanese as well as Islamic elements. Most of the *Mak Yong* ogres bear close resemblance to the *kasar* (coarse) figures in Javanese *Wayang.*

The final two categories of *Mak Yong* characters need little explanation.

The Use of Music and Dance

The *Mak Yong* orchestra consists of three instruments: the three-stringed *rebab* or spiked fiddle; a pair of double-headed barrel drums (*gendang*); and a pair of hanging gongs (*twak-tawak* or *tetawak*). Of these, the *rebab* is the most important, and the *rebab*-player is normally considered the leader of a *Mak Yong* orchestra. Part of the instrument's prestige derives also from its supernatural importance, something universally accepted in *Mak Yong.* Customarily, the *tetawak* are hung on the north-eastern corner of a *panggung,* their knobs facing each other, and the *gong ibu,* with its offerings hanging inside, pointed centre-stage. Apart from these standard instruments, the *serunai* double-reed oboe and the *canang* or inverted gongs are sometimes used, particularly in certain pieces such as the *Tari Ragam* and the *Lagu Berjalan,* both of which are not important *Mak Yong* pieces and seem to have been borrowed from the Thai *Menora* dance-theatre form.

The longer pieces of the *Mak Yong* repertoire, according to contextual usage, may be classified as follows:

1. *Lagu Menghadap Rebab,* the semi-ritualistic opening piece;
2. Pieces intended for giving instruction or conveying a message;
3. Pieces for walking or travel situations;
4. The *Mengulit* or Lullaby tunes;

5. Pieces for lamentation situations;
6. Pieces accompanying special activities such as those undertaken by specialised craftsmen;
7. The *Lagu Sedayong Pak Yong,* a special piece with specific functions, including magical transformations.

All thirty-five or so *Mak Yong* pieces, many of which are no longer performed, fit into these categories.

Dances in *Mak Yong,* apart from the *Menghadap Rebab,* show little variety. They are, for female dancers, basically slow and circular, with musical and choric vocal accompaniment. The male performers, such as *Tok Wak* and the *Perans,* on the other hand, have more complicated stylised dances incorporating various *tapaks* (steps), *kirats* (turns) and *langkahs* which represent complete movement-sequences ending up in specific poses. In other situations *langkahs* lead directly into the action without intermediary poses.

Hand gestures, known as *ibu tari,* are used. Their names and functions, however, are not precisely defined. Some bear close resemblance to Indian *mudras* but do not possess the same symbolic value as their Indian counterparts. The *pataka* gesture, for instance, gets profusely used and is often embellished with the fluttering of fingers. The only clearly defined *mudra*-like gesture is the *anjali,* known in *Mak Yong* as the *sembah* or salutation gesture. It is found also in other Malay dances, such as those in *Joget Gamelan* and in ceremonial usage.

As a general rule, hand gestures and the movements of arms, feet and body combine into complete sets or sequences identifying character- or role-types, and providing character-related or character-distinguishing movements. One way in which characters are traditionally classified is by regarding them as refined (*halus*) or coarse (*kasar*), their refinement or coarseness emanating, apart from movements and physical poses, through a host of other characteristics including dialogue styles, make-up and conduct.

The finest elaboration in *Mak Yong* dance is to be seen in the *Menghadap Rebab,* which combines *ibu tari, kirats* and *tapaks* with a subtle swaying of the torso enabling the dancers to weave a fantasy of movement. The individual elements are not identified as such for it is the totality of pattern that constitutes the essence of his dance, a symbolic mimesis of nature and natural phenomena replete with bird, animal and plant imagery overlaid with *adat,* the age-old code of courtly manners.

Performance Structure

As in most indigenous traditional theatre performances of Kelantan, *Mak Yong* performances are preceded by a series of elaborate

rituals known collectively as the *buka panggung*. These follow the preparation of the stage (*bansal*), the placing of the instruments in their respective positions, the stationing of the musicians, the preparation of the offerings (*bahan-bahan kenduri*). Once these preparations have been completed, a *bomoh* or *pawang*, who could be a senior member of a troupe, conducts the rituals which in effect consist of several interlinked ceremonies: the *baca kenduri* or reading of appropriate incantations; the *buka alat-alat muzik* or starting off of musical instruments; and the *buka panggung* as such in which the theatre is ritually consecrated and opened. A salutation song (*lagu bertabek*), musical prelude (*lagu-lagu permulaan*) and an entry piece (*lagu sang Pak Yong turun*) follow. The final one brings the actresses onto the stage for the *Menghadap Rebab*. The ritual preliminaries thus completed, the story can now begin.

This is usually the procedure observed on opening nights. Subsequent nights do not require the *buka panggung*, though other preliminaries are maintained.

The *Menghadap Rebab* leads on into several other musical pieces sung to the accompaniment of dances performed either in groups or solo. The upshot of the entire sequence is that the Raja (*Pak Yong*), having bid farewell to his wives (if any) and other ladies of the palace, sets out to seek his companion, the *Peran Tua*. The *Peran Tua*, then, upon instructions from his master, visits the *Peran Muda* so that both of them can appear before the Raja. When both of them finally arrive at court and kneel before the Raja in humble salutation, the Raja introduces himself, indicating his true identity, for as a matter of tradition, up to this point the story has not begun and thus the *Pak Yong* has not been identified in terms of his name or his country. The preceding activities are part of an elaborate introduction to the entire dramatic sequence that is to follow.

At this point the story begins to unfold, with the Raja, now given a name, indicating the reason for his invitation to the *Perans*. Often the Raja wishes to have a dream interpreted, as in *Dewa Muda* or wishes to go on a journey as in *Raja Tangkai Hati*, or even to go hunting as in *Anak Raja Gondang*. The plot then begins to unravel. The second and subsequent nights continue the story, starting off each time from the point where the previous night's events stopped. On the final night, having concluded the story, the *panggung* is ritually closed with a ceremony rather simple compared to the *buka panggung*. The spirits, who are assumed to have been present during the period of performance since their first arrival, are thanked for their benevolence, and for not having caused harm to audience and performers alike.

Thus concludes a *Mak Yong* performance, much in the manner in which it has for countless centuries on the east coast of the Malay peninsula, for *Mak Yong,* according to present evidence, is probably the oldest and purest of all traditional Malay theatre forms, a fascinating arabesque of music, dance and theatre, traditional in structure and yet, in spirit, intensely modern.

APPENDIX

SYNOPSIS OF *DEWA MUDA*

Episode 1

Dewa Muda wakes up from a dream, and tells his *pengasuh* (attendants) that in the dream an old man (or women) appeared to him. This person asked the prince to go into the ancestral forest (*alas pesaka*) to hunt for a white deer with golden horns. The image of the deer has appeared to himi n his dream. Upon suddenly awakening, the prince looked around him. It was then he realised it had all been a dream. *Dewa Muda* asks his two *pengasuh* if they can make anything of his dream. Even the *peran tua* is unable to do so. They are then sent to summon the royal astrologer (*wak rujum*) who, upon arrival and being informed of the dream, provides Dewa Muda with an interpretation. The interpretation is not announced, but Dewa Muda is told that he must carry out the instructions of the person who appeared in his dream. Failure to do so could lead to calamity either to the prince himself or to the country of Seluruh Tanah Jawa.

Preparations are made for the entry into the forest.

Episode 2: The Entry into the Forest

Dewa Muda leaves for the forest with his entourage. The spirits of the forests are propitiated and offerings made to them. The two *pengasuh* go ahead to look for the white deer, and the hunt begins as soon as the deer is cited. Mysteriously the deer disappears as the prince follows it. The hunting dogs sent after the deer also disappear. *Dewa Muda* and his attendants are lost in the forest, separated from other members of their company. They look for water. Dewa Muda goes to a pond they discover for his bath, and in it he finds a seven-petaled flower. On the petals there is a message: "If you wish to find me, come up into the skies."

Dewa Muda gets a violent urge to go up into the heavens. The *pengasuh* advise him that this is not really possible, since he has no wings and is not a bird. Their immediate problem is to find a way out of the forest. The *peran tua* advises Dewa Muda to make a vow (*niyat*). Dewa Muda makes the vow: if he successfully returns to the palace of his mother, Tuan Puteri Selindungan Bulan, he will fly a golden kite. The forest brightens immediately upon the completion of Dewa Muda's utterance. They meet their companions and the homeward journey begins. Upon Dewa Muda's enquiry, the *peran tua* informs the prince of the existence of a golden kite which once belonged to Dewa Muda's father, Tuk Raja Jawa, and now in the keep-

ing of his mother. They plan a ruse to acquire the kite from Tuan Puteri Selindugan Bulan. Dewa Muda performs his purification rites at a pond in Taman Banjaran Sari park. The prince and his companions return home.

Episode 3: The Flight to the Heavens

Dewa Muda's ruse to acquire the kite works. The kite is repaired and taken to the wide open fields (*padang luas sajauhana padang*). The prince seeks the assistance from a spirit of the skies, Awang Sejambul Lebat, to fly the kite into the heavens. They are both delighted, hearing the sound made by the kite, as it hangs, suspended in the skies. When it is time to bring the kite down they discover that it is stuck; it will move neither higher nor lower. Dewa Muda weeps. He gets a strong urge to go up into the skies to get it and will not go home without the ancestral kite. Awang Sejambul Lebat, failing to dissuade the prince from the mission, finally agrees to help the prince go up into the skies. There is one condition, however. Dewa Muda must promise that he will fight all ogres they encounter. The ogres are heard, but not seen. Dewa Muda, frightened, wants to give up the journey to the skies and return to earth, but Awang Sejambul Lebat will not allow that. He chastises Dewa Muda for his cowardice. They enter into a heavenly garden, eat the fruits in it, and go to sleep.

Episode 4: Meeting with the Sky-Princess

Tuan Puteri Ratna Mas and her attendants (*inang*) decide to go into their garden to pick flowers and to eat fruits. They discover Dewa Muda and Awang Sejambul Lebat. The two sleepers are awakened and some argument ensues between the youngest attendant (*inang bongsu*) of Tuan Puteri Ratna Mas and the two intruders regarding the theft of fruits. The sky-princess and Dewa Muda fall in love. As a sign of hospitality, the sky-princess offers Dewa Muda betel leaves which the *inang* fetch. Dewa Muda eats the first, which he finds is sweet; proceeds to the second which is bitter; and finally eats the third which causes him to be drowsy. He goes to sleep. The *inang bongsu* takes his *keris* as a compensation for the fruit eaten by Dewa Muda and Awang Sejambul Lebat. Tuan Puteri Ratna Mas and the *inang* return to their palace.

Episode 5: Death of Dewa Muda

Dewa Muda, awakening, finds his *keris* missing. Tuan Puteri Ratna Mas, having obtained the prince's keris from the *inang bongsu*, comes to meet Dewa Muda on the pretext of wanting to return his weapon. She invites Dewa Muda to her room and takes him in with

her in the shape of a white flower that she puts in her hair. Once inside the palace, the prince returns to his normal shape. The princess instructs *inang bongsu* to bring more food than usual for her, saying she would like to feast the spirits of the palace (*hantu anjung*). *Inang bongsu* obeys but gets suspicious when the princess does not allow her to enter her room with the food. Later, she peeps through the key-hole and discovers the truth. She notices that Dewa Muda leaves the palace as a white mouse every time he has been in the palace with Tuan Puteri Ratna Mas. One day she places an arrow at the window, and Dewa Muda is pierced by it. He is transformed into his real shape, and lamenting, crawls to seek Awang Sejambul Lebat.

Awang Sejambul Lebat knows that this is the doing of *Inang Bongsu,* but is quite helpless. He brings Dewa Muda down to earth and leaves the dead prince with his mother, Tuan Puteri Selindungan Bulan, indicating that only a certain shaman (*bomoh*) can bring the prince back to life. This *bomoh,* he says, will seek the prince out. Awang Sejambul Lebat returns to the heavens.

Episode 8: Dewa Muda's Revival

The search for a *bomoh* begins. When all seems to have failed, Tuan Puteri Selindungan Bulan orders the body of Dewa Muda to be placed in a coffin. Soon it is on its way to the lying-in-state. Along the way, the royal attendants in charge of the procession meet two persons who appear to be hermaphrodites and claim to be *bomoh.* When asked if they can revive the dead prince, they answer that they can only try, giving no guarantee. They are invited to make the effort. For the attempted revival all other persons are sent away to wait at some distance. The healing ritual starts, and soon Dewa Muda begins to revive. The two *bomoh* leave before Dewa Muda is fully conscious. A message is written for him on the blade of his keris which is placed under his pillow. Dewa Muda awakens, as if from a long sleep, discovers the *keris* and reads the inscription: "If you wish to see me, come up to the skies." He realises that he has been visited by Tuan Puteri Ratna Mas. He gets a mad desire to go up into the skies.

Episode 7: Dewa Muda's Return Flight to the Heavens

Dewa Muda summons Awang Sejambul Lebat. In his form as "the Green Horse, Manifestation of the Gods" Awang Sejambul Lebat carries Dewa Muda into the heavens. On earth, Tuan Puteri Selindungan Bulan is informed of Dewa Muda's revival and flight into the heavens. Dewa Muda, upon reaching the heavens, meets Tuan Puteri Ratna Mas in the garden as before.

There are two major versions of the ending of *Dewa Muda:*

1. Dewa Muda and Tuan Puteri Ratna Mas marry. Dewa Muda spends half his time in the skies with her and the other half on earth with his mother Tuan Puteri Selindungan Bulan.

2. Dewa Muda proposes marriage and Tuan Puteri Ratna Mas accepts. Before they can proceed any further, however, a heavenly voice prohibits them from marrying. They are both the children of the same father, a god. They part from each other. Dewa Muda returns to earth and is reunited with his mother.

THE "LEGAL VS. ILLEGAL" PROBLEM IN CPP-ML STRATEGY AND TACTICS

A. S. MALAY

Recent Philippine government initiatives toward legalization of the Communist Party have been echoed by certain sectors of the moderate opposition.[1] Assuming good faith on the part of both the regime and opposition leaders, the move to legalize seems to be animated by the spirit of "national reconciliation and unity". Once legalized, the party may be accommodated in an eventual arrangement whereby its participation in political processes (including elections) is sanctioned but kept within manageable limits as a minority force, committed to non-violence and reconciled to an indefinite postponement of its presumed objective of seizing state power (on the assumption that if it had to rely on parliamentary means, the party could not count on more than a miniscule fraction of the population to vote for its programme, or that its tolerated existence as a pressure group would not suffice to sway the State into adopting "communist" policies).

But which of the two Philippine communist parties is being considered for the experiment in the first place? The more senior Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) claims to have been accorded *de facto* legal status in 1974.[2] But if this is the case, why does the government continue to press for legalization? In any event, the PKP chooses to interpret the démarche as "a clear sign of the growing political maturity of our people" and therefore openly presents itself

> as a party that will be involved not only in electoral campaigns but more importantly in the propagation of Communist ideals of peace, freedom and democracy in all aspects of our social milieu.[3]

Indeed, the PKP's analysis of the nature of the Marcos regime stresses the latter's "positive" features, which are invoked to justify in part

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[1] Statements of President Ferdinand Marcos, 5 March and 28 February 1982; of Justice Minister Ricardo Puno in response to Assemblyman Reuben Canoy's filing of a legalization bill at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, 26 February 1982; Teodoro Valencia, "Over a Cup of Coffee", *Daily Express,* 11 Aug. 1981.

[2] See for example Jose Lava, "Clandestine Struggle, Arrests, Battles", *World Marxist Review,* Dec. 1980, p. 126, and *Great Soviet Encyclopedia,* vol. 12, p. 271.

[3] PKP central committee, "Open Letter to the Filipino People", 29 March 1982, 3 ll.

the party's long-standing decision to hew to legal or parliamentary struggle.[4]

It is clear, however, that the communist party which government and opposition leaders would like to preempt into the "system" is the Communist Party of the Philippines (Marxist-Leninist), or CPP-ML,[5] which organized the New People's Army a few months after its founding in late 1968, and which has yet to deviate from its original goal of seizing state power through armed revolution. This party and the army under its command are frequently cited by government officials as the biggest and most enduring threat to the regime. But judging by its manifest interest in legalization, the latter is not ruling out a "Western-style", nay "national bourgeois" à la Sukarno or Nehru approach, to defuse the threat. If this hypothesis is valid, legalization alone may at least achieve one tangible result: *viz.*, a split within the CPP-ML between hardline partisans of revolutionary violence as the main form of struggle on the one hand, and more conciliatory elements willing to represent *their* legalized faction of the party in national politics, on the other.

But the question of legalization begs still another: will the CPP-ML indeed accept the offer of cooptation and, in the process, revise the Maoist tenets on armed struggle in an underdeveloped country upon which it built its revolutionary programme? In a recent interview, imprisoned party founder Jose Maria Sison indicates that under certain conditions it may be desirable to achieve some *modus vivendi* between the CPP-ML and the government — "not necessarily the Marcos government".[6] National Democratic Front (NDF) leader Horacio Morales Jr. states, as conditions for a serious reconciliation, the withdrawal of government troops from Mindanao, Samar, Bicol and the Cagayan Valley; the release of all political prisoners; and government opposition to World Bank-International Monetary Fund-U.S. imperialist pressures.[7] For his part, President Marcos has said that while the party is no longer outlawed, "it would probably take some time before it could develop into a political force", since under existing laws a political party would have to obtain at least 10% of the

[4] Felipe Malaya (identified as a central committee member), "For an Anti-Imperialist Front in the Philippines" in *Communists in the Struggle for Democratic Unity;* International Symposium on the 40th Anniversary of the Comintern (Prague, 1975), pp. 171-173. See also Lava, "The New in the Philippines Orientation", *World Marxist Review* (Dec. 1977), pp. 89-94.

[5] Art. 1, sec. 1 of the party's constitution states: "The name of this organization shall be the Communist Party of the Philippines. If ever the need arises, the Party shall further differentiate itself in name and substance from the Communist Party of the Philippines (Merger of Socialist and Communist Parties) by appending the phrase Marxist-Leninist or Mao Tse-tung's Thought in parentheses."

[6] *Far Eastern Economic Review,* 6 Nov. 1981, pp. 23-24.

[7] *Ibid.,* 21 August 1981, pp. 20-21.

votes in a national election before being accredited by the Commission on Elections.[8]

The public version of the discussion seems to be confined to expediencies and *ad hoc* solutions. A review of the evolution of the CPP-ML's positions on the legal vs. illegal, the city vs. countryside debate may prove to be edifying. This study examines this evolution over the 12-year period 1968-1980, based on CPP-ML literature. The sources consulted are neither restricted nor classified: for example, *Ang Bayan* is sent to media offices here and abroad; *Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party* (*RERP*) has been reprinted by the Department of National Defense as part of its propaganda series "So The People May Know"; and the *Program for a People's Democratic Revolution* (*PPDR*) figures as an appendix to Eduardo Lachica's *Huk: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt* (Manila, 1971).*

At least in the earliest of these documents, there is evidence of a tendency to glorify the countryside-armed struggle ethic and to downgrade city-and worker-based legal struggle. But the CPP-ML never romanticizes about the peasantry in the manner of Frantz Fanon, for example, for whom it was the only revolutionary class,[9] or Jacinto Manahan and Juan Feleo, PKP leaders who in the early 1930s argued for the consideration of the poor peasantry as *the* proletariat.[10] The CPP-ML has always been categorical in its orthodoxy: the peasantry must be "guided" by the proletariat, i.e., the party.[11] However, the CPP-ML manifested an early disposition to be less rigid in practice about the "conscious shift" to the countryside than its theoretical stance might have led one to suppose. Within a year after its founding, the party's fundamental premises about city struggle and legal or parliamentary struggle began to take a less manichean aspect. By 1974 the Philippines' differences from the "Chinese model" were formally recognized; in 1976, dogmatic application of Mao Tse-tung Thought was the object of an implicit selfcriticism. But these accretive nuances had not, by 1980, displaced the basic primacy of armed struggle in the party's programme.

Anti-Urban Bias

Jose Maria Sison's earliest exhortations to the activist youth provide a foretaste of the CPP-ML's bias against the city-based strug-

[8] *Daily Express,* 6 March 1982, p. 1.

[9] *Les Damnés de la Terre* (Paris, 1968), p. 75.

[10] Gregorio Santayana, *Milestones in the History of the Communist Party* (1950), p. 20.

[11] *Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party* (henceforth referred to as RERP), 1968, p. 14; Jose Maria Sison, *Struggle for National Democracy* (Q.C., 1967), p. 115.

* It is precisely the non-confidential nature of these documents which constrains the author to issue a caveat. Not having had access to more "reliable" sources than mass-circulation newspapers and other publications of the CPP-ML, this study does not lay claim to authoritativeness. All errors of interpretation and analysis are the author's.

gle that allegedly characterized previous Philippine liberation movements. In a 1966 speech, Sison depicted the ilustrado Propagandists as "exiles in a foreign city", divorced from actual conditions in their native land.[12] Rizal himself was naive, Sison contended, to have carried out an open and urban-based struggle.[13] One of Rizal's fictional characters did not fare any better:

> Simoun is more of a putschist and is far from the Marxist-Leninist concept of a revolutionary; he thinks of the masses as a manipulator would, commanding them from the city.[14]

Contemporary counterparts of the Propagandists, charged Sison, existed in the sixties: "lazy 'leaders' fond of sitting out a revolution."[15] As subsequent polemics with the PKP would bear out (notably in *Omnibus Reply,* 1971), Sison was alluding in this passage to the leaders of the old party which, as early as 1957, and under conditions of illegality, had decided on the adoption of legal or parliamentary struggle as the main form of struggle for the nonce, and the relegation of armed struggle to a secondary position. Now, as the controversial May Day 1967 statement issued by Sison argued, it was precisely the outlawed situation of the party which "dictates that there is no path to national and social liberation except armed struggle."[16]

Not that Sison had always propounded armed revolution as the absolute answer to the problems of underdevelopment, injustice and oppression. In 1965, for example, he called for transformation, through the active use of civil liberties, of the government into a "genuine instrument of the people's welfare"[17] and in 1966 laid out as a task of the nationalist movement that of cooperating with government officials and extension workers "in their sincere work to effect land reform."[18] But between Sison the PKP cadre, subject to party discipline and the party line, and Sison the founder of the CPP-ML, there lay a wide chasm. As head of his own party, Sison was free to formulate a revolutionary project for Philippine society, devoid of the PKP's received knowledge — or rather, with the PKP's past and continuing record of failure as "negative example".[19] The founding congress of the CPP-ML articulated this frustration, even as it pointed the way out of the impasse:

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[12] *Struggle,* p. 129.
[13] *Ibid.,* p. 8.
[14] *Ibid.,* p. 6.
[15] *Ibid.,* p. 129.
[16] *People's World,* 10 May 1967 (organ of the New Zealand Communist Party).
[17] *Struggle,* p. 48.
[18] *Ibid.,* 89. Also, in a *Progressive Review* editorial, Sison could praise the Macapagal administration's land reform programme in glowing terms (January-February 1964), p. 9.
[19] *On Lavaite Propaganda for Revisionism and Fascism* or *Omnibus Reply* (henceforth referred to as *OR*), 1971, p. 19.

> Our Party has existed for the last 38 years and yet has not won revolutionary power. The failures it has incurred should be clearly analyzed in accordance with Mao Tse-tung Thought so as to enable the proletarian revolutionaries of today to act correctly.[20]

RERP, or the Countryside Reified

The choice of 26 December 1968, the 75th anniversary of Mao, for the "reestablishment" of the party was not fortuitous: the CPP-ML was intended to be a living affirmation of Mao Tse-tung Thought, "the highest development of Marxism-Leninism in the present world era". The party's basic document *Rectify Errors*... consecrates Maoism to an unusual degree. It cites "Mao Tse-tung Thought" either exclusively or in any case more frequently than "Marxism-Leninism" or the standard Chinese formula, "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought";[21] it faults the PKP leaders for their ignorance or non-application of Mao Tse-tung Thought which had allegedly "already reached the Philippines in the form of its military writings" during the second world war;[22] and it is as much a comprehensive critique of the "revisionist", i.e., pro-Soviet, PKP as it is an enunciation of the CPP-ML's theses for Philippine society and the Philippine revolution. But the quintessential Maoism of *RERP* lies in the invocation of the Chinese leader and strategist to sanction the CPP-ML's reorientation away from its urban base.

> In line with Mao Tse-tung's Thought (sic), the [Party] must consciously shift its center of gravity to the countryside. All previous Party leaderships have suffered failures that were singularly characterized by political activity that had its center of gravity in the city of Manila.[23]

To be sure, Mao never posed the problematic "setting" of the revolution in as peremptory a manner (and much less was he thinking of the Philippine when he wrote about strategic problems in China[24]). However, the point is that *RERP* professed to see, in the breach left by the PKP's unsuccessful bid for power, an opportunity to apply the "surrounding the cities from the countryside" strategy

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[20] *RERP*, p. 2.

[21] The 1977 English version of *RERP* retains the "Mao Tse-tung Thought" formula whereas the Pilipino version, also dated 1977, utilizes "Marxismo-Leninismo-Kaisipang Mao Tse-tung."

[22] *RERP*, pp. 4, 7, 14 (deleted in 1977 version).

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[24] China, when Mao wrote "Problems of War and Strategy" in 1938, had no parliament in which to conduct parliamentary struggle; Chinese workers had no right to strike. "Basically, the task of the Communist Party here is not to go through a long period of legal struggle before launching insurrection and war, and not to seize the big cities first and then occupy the countryside, but the reverse" (*Seected Military Writings*, 1967 ed., p. 270).But Mao admitted the validity of legal/parliamentary struggle in developed countries (*ibid.*, p. 269), a view reiterated by *Red Flag* (Nos. 20-21, 1960), in G. F. Hudson *et al*, *The Sino-Soviet Dispute* (London, 1961), pp. 162-167.

then associated with Mao and Lin Piao (the document precisely refers, time and again, to the Red Army marshal's 1965 thesis).

RERP's and other CPP-ML documents' review of the PKP's errors in the ideological, political, military and organizational domains from 1930 through 1964 seeks to establish that from Crisanto Evangelista's leadership onwards, the old party forfeited its opportunity to win power by neglecting the potential of the peasantry and the countryside.

1. *1930-1938:* Thus, according to *RERP,* the PKP committed the mistake of being publicly launched, and based, in Manila, without taking into account the "coercive class character of the American imperialist regime and the domestic ruling classes".[25] "Closed-doorism" mark party work, concentroted among the workers and the trade-union movement.[26] The merger of the PKP and the peasant Socialist Party in 1938 did not change the city-oriented character of the organization, even as it inflated the size of its membership. The peasantry's politicalization was given secondary importance.[27] The empiricist policy of this period gave rise to a loss of revolutionary initiative.[28] The party chose to stress "secondary" legal and urban work under the aegis of the Popular Front, instead of what should have been its principal task of arousing and mobilizing the peasant masses.[29]

2. *World War II:* With the outbreak of the war, the Manila-based party was easy prey for the Japanese invaders. It was not ready for a protracted resistance, not having made adequate preparations either for the establishment of rural bases or for a programme for agrarian revolution.[30] Those "second-line" leaders — including Vicente Lava, adjudged responsible for the disastrous retreat-for-defense policy, spontaneously fled to the province in a hasty and uncoordinated fashion.[31]

Only in September 1944 was retreat-for-defense repudiated. With the implementation of a policy of active resistance, "the strength of the people's forces increased by leaps and bounds". The people's war proved the correctness of Mao's teaching that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun".[32] Still, tardy rectification of the Party's military policy caused serious losses: the Hukbalahap failed to expand as fast as it could have beyond Central Luzon. In general, the party leadership failed to use agrarian revolution as the basis for its strength in those Central Luzon areas held by the Red Army.[33]

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25 *RERP,* p. 2.
26 *Ibid.,* p. 14.
27 *Ibid.,* p. 3.
28 *Ibid.,* pp. 11-12.
29 *Ibid..* p. 15.
30 *Ibid.,* p. 4.
31 *Ibid.*
32 *Ibid.,* p. 5.
33 *Ibid.,* p. 24; also *The New People's Army* (1969), p. 9.

3. *Postwar:* The party leadership now swung to the "right opportunist" mistake of shifting its headquarters and center of political activities (including its propaganda organs) to Manila.[34] The Congress of Labor Organizations and the Democratic Alliance were set up for legal and parliamentary struggle; but within the DA, "the Party itself was supposed to be merely one of the organizations subordinate to the bourgeois personalities leading the alliance".[35] In any event, DA representatives in Congress were ousted, "thus exposing the bankruptcy of the policy relying mainly on bourgeois parliamentarianism".[36] Concurrently, the party disarmed and disbanded Huk armed units. The one-sided repression that ensued "proved the bankruptcy of abandoning the armed struggle".[37] In 1948, heightened repression gave the party no other alternative but to take up arms again.[38] But even the resumption of armed struggle was handicapped by two false premises: the policy was decided upon on the basis of *immediate and external circumstances* (e.g., a supposedly impending split in the local ruling classes, the clear victory of the Chinese Red Army, etc.); and worse, the PKP failed to recognize that armed struggle under prevailing conditions in the archipelago would have to be *protracted.*[39]

4. *1950-1964:* Instead, the Politburo decided on quick military victory within two years. The so-called Politburo-In and the secretariat remained in Manila, from where the central leadership issued orders to the field. The so-called Politburo-Out was similarly isolated in the Sierra Madre end of Laguna province, far away from the Huk forces in the Central Luzon plains.[40]

Severely disrupted and demoralized by the series of military defeats that followed the mass arrest of Politburo officers and the surrender of Huk *supremo* Luis Taruc, the party swung back to "Right opportunism and flightism". Parliamentary struggle once again became an attractive option, in 1956: the advent of "revisionism" in the Soviet Union at about this time encouraged the PKP leadership to give up armed struggle.[41] By implementing the unusual "single-file" policy, the clandestine city-based leadership only accelerated the process of the party's disintegration. The *coup de grace* came with Jesus Lava's arrest in May 1964, "in the urban mouth of the reactionary whale".[42]

Rectification of the party's errors, *RERP* declared, assumed special urgency at a time when the "local revisionist renegades" were allegedly intensifying efforts to develop a "city-based and city-oriented

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34 *RERP,* p. 5.
35 *Ibid.,* p. 6.
36 *Ibid.*
37 *Ibid.*
38 *Ibid.,* pp. 6-7; *OR,* pp. 42-43.
39 *RERP,* p. 7. Note that the PKP admits the first error but not the second.
40 *Ibid.,* p. 8.
41 *Ibid.,* p. 10; *The NPA,* p. 11; *OR,* p. 60.
42 *RERP,* p. 11.

party that is afraid of armed struggle".[43] The influence of contemporary events like the Cultural Revolution, the Vietnam war, and student-worker mass actions in Western countries, on the CPP-ML and the movement it spearheaded, cannot be discounted. Filtered through the Maoist optic, the prevailing national and international mood projected clearly in favor of revolutionary armed struggle. Beyond the armed-struggle mystique lay an implicit acceptance of Mao's thesis that

> in the revolution in semi-colonial China, the peasant struggle must always fail if it does not have the leadership of the workers. But the revolution is never harmed if the peasant struggle outstrips the forces of the workers.[44]

CPP-ML's Theses for Armed Struggle: a Schema

The objective condition of the Philippines' *underdevelopment* is at the core of the CPP-ML's argument for rural-based armed struggle as the main or primary form of struggle. The fruit of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism,[45] underdevelopment translates into a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society in stagnation. American imperialism maintains and relies on feudalism as its "social base"; the landlord class has persisted as "the most important ally of U.S. imperialism and the comprador bourgeoisie in the perpetration of feudal and semi-feudal relations in the vast countryside".[46] The Philippines, Sison wrote in 1971, "is still semi-colonial and semi-feudal and will remain so until the triumph of the new democratic revolution".[47] Taking place in this setting, the Philippine revolution must necessarily be an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal (national democratic) revolution. The primacy of the anti-imperialist struggle does not detract from the main content of the revolution which is the land problem, affecting as it does the overwhelming majority of the population.

Now, Philippine society's underdeveloped, semi-colonial and semi-feudal condition, precisely, rules out the luxury of parliamentary struggle as the primary form of struggle. Whereas the PKP not only

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[43] *Ibid.*, p. 28. William Pomeroy cites, in *An American-Made Tragedy* (New York, 1974), p. 89, plans, in the months preceding the imposition of martial law in Sept. 1972, for the creation of a "socialist or labor party outside of the ruling parties that could function legally".

[44] "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire" (1929) in *Selected Military Writings, op. cit.*, p. 71.

[45] As of the party's founding, burcaucrat-capitalism was not yet part of the "basic problems of the Filipino people". The three-part formula (more in conformity with the Chinese model) appears to have been adopted only in 1971, with *Philippine Society and Revolution.*

[46] *Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution (PPDR)*, 1968, p. 1.

[47] *Laban sa Maling Haka-Haka* (1971), p. 4.

seriously envisaged legal or parliamentary struggle as early as 1956, and even held in 1964 that neither the Nacionalista nor the Liberal parties were any longer "docile instruments of American policy",[48] the CPP-ML refused the "illusion of democratic choice" between "Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola" parties and the "false drama of neo-colonial politics".[49] *Omnibus Reply* belittles the PKP's "reformism" as an essentially misplaced tactic:

> Today, in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country like the Philippines, the Lava revisionist renegades imagine themselves to be in an imperialist country like tsarist Russia and think of "revolutionary situation" in terms of being able to launch a strategic offensive on the cities and seizing political power within a short period of time after a protracted period of parliamentary struggle.[50]

Putting the stress of party mass work in the cities would lead to either one of two errors: the "left" opportunist one of "seizing power mainly on the basis of the mass strength of the proletariat in cities without adequate support from the peasantry"[51]—and in any case, the country's semi-colonial and semi-feudal state, again, has resulted in a small proletariat[52]—or the right opportunist one of "relying indefinitely on parliamentary struggle and compromises with the imperialists and the ruling classes".[53]

Parliamentary struggle—rather tendentiously portrayed by the CPP-ML as exclusively reductible to participation in elections and termed as "reformism"—is secondary, and in its "reformist" aspect is *contradictory* to revolution.[54] In any event, "as a proletarian revolutionary party, the [CPP-ML] should not be tied down by legalist and parliamentary struggle".[55]

Armed struggle is the main form of struggle for the Philippines, and "this will not change until the total destruction of the political power of the class enemies".[56] As a matter of fact, the downfall of the so-called "ruling classes" will be precipitated by armed struggle.

> In the Philippines today, the ruling classes are in serious difficulties in ruling the old way. They cannot prolong the present balance of forces indefinitely... armed opposition now will aggravate their dif-

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[48] William Pomeroy, "Sur la Montee des Forces Nationales aux Philippines", *Democratie Nouvelle* (Paris), Nov. 1964, p. 31.

[49] *Struggle,* pp. 12, 48-55; *Philippine Society and Revolution* or *PSR* (Manila, 1971), p. 206.

[50] *OR,* p. 107.

[51] *PSR,* p. 281.

[52] *Ibid.,* pp. 257, 279; *RERP,* p. 29.

[53] *PSR,* p. 281.

[54] *OR,* pp. 85-86. The polemical intent of *Omnibus Reply* surely accounts for its extremist positions.

[55] *PPDR,* p. 4.

[56] E. Tagumpay, "Review of the History of the NPA", *Ang Bayan,* 30 March 1971, p. 9.

> ficulties and hasten the maturing of what is now discernible as a revolutionary mood among the people.[57]

This struggle is necessarily protracted. Two factors dictate, rather than merely render possible, recourse to protracted war. The first is, once again, the Philippines' being a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country: "Because of the uneven development of politics and economy in the era of imperialism, the weak link of bourgeois state power is to be found in the countryside".[58] Also, the dispersion effect works both ways: "because the main body of the party (its cadres and members) is in the countryside, we cannot be destroyed at one blow", claims the CPP-ML, even if a massive repression were to be launched in the urban areas.[59]

On the other hand, cities offer no strategic advantages. (1) The area for maneuver is extremely limited in these "bastions of bourgeois state power".[60] The party claimed in 1972, in fact, that U.S. counter-insurgency policy had resulted in the deforestation of Rizal, Quezon and Laguna provinces, in order to create an artificial "counterguerilla ring of safety" around the Manila-Rizal region.[61] (2) For reasons of static defense alone, the "enemy" will always be compelled to deploy large military contingents in cities, major camps and main lines of communication and transportation.[62] (3) Development of armed revolutionary power cannot be carried out in secret.[63]

The second factor is geography. "It would require a protracted period of time for the Party to convert into a revolutionary advantage the initial disadvantage of fighting... in an archipelago like the Philippines".[64] But the archipelagic nature of the country is offset by its mountainous terrain. Such terrain, especially if sufficiently populated along foothills, clearings, plateaux, riversides or creeksides and naturally endowed with thick rain forests, is ideal for guerilla warfare. This environment makes it possible to "lure the enemy in deep" and likewise to make use of even primitive weapons like bolos, spears, crossbows, traps, as well as grenades, land mines, shotguns and homemade explosives.[65] In the Philippines mountains form natural boundaries (thus making it possible for the NPA to economize

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57 "Main Tasks of the Party", appendix in Lachica, *op. cit.*, p. 295.
58 *RERP*, p. 31.
59 *OR* p. 111; *PSP* p. 256.
60 *RERP*, p. 31.
61 *Ang Bayan* statement on the Cnetral Luzon floods, 4 Aug. 1972, p. 1.
62 *PSR*, p. 282.
63 *RERP*, p. 31. This observation is deleted in the 1977 version. Note moreover that Sison debunks Carlos Marighela, urban warfare strategist, as a "minor current" together with Regis Debray and Che Guevara, *OR*, p. 169.
64 *RERP*, p. 17. The archipelagic theme was another bone of contention between Sison and the PKP before 1974: *RERP*, pp. 20, 31; *OR*, p. 113; *Laban sa Maling...* pp. 27, 55.
65 *Ang Bayan*, 6 Oct. 1972, p. 22.

on manpower): the Sierra Madre links nine provinces; the Cordillera and Ilocos mountains, as many as eleven, the Tarlac-Zambales chain, five, etc. Mindanao has even more mountains and forests than Luzon.[66]

Peasantry: Fighting Force In Situ

Thus schematized, Philippine socio-economic-political variables and the geographic constant all converge to objectively favor a certain social class, the peasantry; and to bestow on this class its strategic (ultimate?) value: its role as "main force" of the revolution, i.e. in practical terms its function as principal source of fighters *in situ* for the NPA.[67] The majority of the country's population belongs to the peasantry, or in any case "is in the countryside". Now, the majority of the peasantry are landless poor peasants and farm workers.[68]

This differentiation is not alien to the over-riding concern of the party for the promotion of armed struggle: these classes' deprivation of their essential means of production presupposes their receptivity to radical change. Lower middle peasants, poor peasants and farm workers are the social base of the revolution and will continue to be so regarded during the "dictatorship of the proletariat" stage.[69] In contrast, the rest of the middle peasants are merely "won over"; rich peasants are "neutralized". Revolutionary agrarian reform is thus a potent motivational factor where the rural poor are concerned (hence, in part, the CPP-ML's insistence on the "absurdity" of the idea that U.S. imperialism will consciously liquidate feudalism).[70]

Significantly, fishermen along maritime coasts are considered as "mainly peasants" and characterized as victims of, *inter alia,* landlords who fence them off fishing grounds. Poor and middle fishermen, especially, are important for strategic purposes in the archipelago: they can be entrusted with communications between future guerilla bases and zones along sea coasts; develop sea warfare and warfare in rivers, lakes and estuaries; and provide food.[71]

Poor settlers and ethnic minorities represent another "special group" to which attention must be paid. Victims of land grabbers,

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[66] *Specific Characteristics of Our Peope's War* (henceforth referred to as *SCPW*), 1974, pp. 15-16.

[67] This point is explicit in *RERP,* pp. 28, 29; *Maikling Kurso* (1980), p. 86.

[68] There is a certain confusion in the figures advanced by *PSR* and *SCPW:* the former pegs the peasantry at "75% of the Philippine population", with 75 to 80% being poor peasants and farm workers, p. 249, 254; the latter states that 85% of the national population "is in the countryside", with poor peasants and farm workers comprising about 75% of the rural population (p. 5). Another issue is the addition of "lower middle peasants" to the category of rural poor, an addition dating back probably to 1972. See *Ang Bayan,* 1 Nov. 1972, p. 2.

[69] *RERP,* pp. 30-31.

[70] *Laban sa Maling...*, pp. 2-17.

[71] *PSR* pp. 270-271; *SCPW* pp. 6, 18.

"they are very receptive to revolutionary propaganda";[72] living in neglected hinterlands, hilly areas and forested mountain regions, they occupy a choice position in the terrain most propitious to the kind of warfare favored by the people's army.[73]

The 1970 "Storm": City Serves the Countryside

The strategic importance of the countryside did not obscure the tactical importance of the cities. There occurred a historical event in early 1970, the CPP-ML's policy towards which indicated a capacity to maximize the advantages gratuitously offered by urban struggle, if not postpone the "conscious shift" decided upon in 1968. This event was the so-called First Quarter Storm, that series of urban uprisings *par excellence* which shook the Greater Manila region in January-March 1970 and whose after-effects could still be felt up to the eve of the declaration of martial law in September 1972.[74]

While its occurrence was not entirely unpredictable, given the numerous demonstrations, rallies and other forms of militant mass actions that had begun in 1961 (the CAFA investigation and rally to protest the threat to academic freedom) through 1966 (the Manila "summit" conference) till 29 December 1969 (the demonstration against U.S. Vice-President Spiro Agnew), the First Quarter Storm seems to have been spontaneously generated, i.e. unplanned by the CPP-ML or its youth organizations. Indeed, the incident that detonated the outburst was from all accounts imputable to the moderate "social democrat" demonstrators who were determined, even then, not to make militant action the exclusive province of the Kabataang Makabayan, the Samahan ng mga Demokratikong Kabataan, etc. But once the escalation of incidents dating from 26 January 1970 had developed enough momentum to merit the posthumous name of "storm", the party lost no time in issuing a series of statements for "inspiration and guidance"[75] which sought to link the youth and students to the peasants and workers, Manila to the provinces, street fighting to guerilla warfare. The 26 January demonstration was thus deemed by *Ang Bayan* to be the "inauguration of a nationwide campaign to make the students aware of the real state of the nation and the despicableness of fascism and to enmass them into the fold of the national revolu-

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[72] *SCPW* p. 16.

[73] *PSR* pp. 272-275.

[74] Among other things, the First Quarter Storm hastened the reconciliation of the Kabataang Makabayan and the Samahang Demokratiko ng mga Kabataan; the isolation of PKP organizations from the Movement for a Democratic Philippines, and the alienation of a dissident group from the PKP; the radicalization of a significant sector of Catholic moderates, etc., developments which are beyond the scope of this study.

[75] *OR*, p. 143.

tion". While the CPP-ML organ called for bigger mass actions of nationwide proportions, it also urged students to go to the countryside and link up with the peasants, as "quite a number" had already done.[76]

Ang Bayan took a bolder step in its next issue, which took note of the higher level of struggle during the 30-31 January and succeeding demonstrations. These were hailed as a "rich source" of prospective party members and NPA recruits[77] to whom would be distributed the *Guide for Cadres and Members of the CPP,* Mao's *Selected Works, Quotations,* etc.[78] The call for students to "go to the countryside and promote revolution" was backed up by a similar appeal to "go to the workers"[79] *Ang Bayan* optimistically summed up the First Quarter Storm atmosphere: "The revolutionary situation has never been so excellent."[80]

But what was the revolution doing in an urban setting, in apparent contradition with the "conscious shift"? The answer may very well be found in Jose Maria Sison's admission, in 1971, that the "cultural revolution" being carried out by the Movement for a Democratic Philippines in Manila could "not avoid starting in the national center of politics and communications".[81] Also, as specular as the First Quarter Storm may have appeared, it was not yet *the* revolution. The mass media's extensive, and in many cases live, on-the-spot coverage of the escalating violence may have unwittingly created a popular impression that Manila had come that close to the verge of an insurrection. Yet Sison declared that this was just the forerunner of "greater storms to come"[82], while reasserting the superiority of armed struggle in the countryside where post-Quarter Storm recruits had "better chances of fighting back with revolutionary violence".[83] Even after youth activists had stormed the grounds of the presidential palace on 30 January, the party reiterated its condemnation of putschism and reaffirmed its commitment to protracted war in the countryside. The rural-urban dialectic had to be placed in the proper perspective. As the party stated the following year:

> While so far the urban legal mass organizations have aroused and mobilized the masses in several tens of thousands for each public meeting at Plaza Miranda and have made recruitment of members from them *only in part,* the Party and the New People's Army have brought under local organs of political power and barrio mass organizations at least 300,000 people in Northern Luzon and Central

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[76] Undated *Ang Bayan* statement reprinted in *First Quarter Storm of 1970* (Mania, 1970), pp. 34-35.
[77] *Ibid.,* pp. 44, 65.
[78] *Ibid.,* p. 68.
[79] *Ibid.,* p. 65.
[80] *Ibid.,* p. 45.
[81] *Struggle*...1971 ed., p. 41.
[82] *Ibid.,* p. 44.
[83] *Ibid.,* p. 45.

> Luzon. This figure does not yet include those in the guerilla bases and guerilla zones in other regions.[84]

The capital would not fall that easily; the armed struggle was just beginning in a number of Luzon provinces. But the urban-rural frontier proved to be a porous one, as the so-called Diliman Commune of 1971 proved (taking into consideration the vulnerability of the sub-urban campus to armed invasion).

Armed city partisans constituted the NPA's urban presence, with the special task of "disrupting the enemy and punishing traitors in cities".[85] But the ACP's potential for action was extremely limited in the pre- and especially post-martial law period, and the CPP-ML made it a point to draw minimum attention to their existence. (This is the impression one gathers from reading the party's news and propaganda organs of that period.) For the time being, in the post-Quarter Storm, pre-martial law interim of repression in the cities, the party evolved a policy of encouraging the prudent and defensive building of a clandestine network, or the formation of party organizations in every district of the Manila-Rizal region within all possible mass organizations, places of work or neighborhoods. *Ang Bayan* made it clear however that the underground urban network must coordinate with the NPA in the countryside.[86]

Finally, the CPP-ML's ability to obtain maximum tactical gains from unpromising situations is illustrated by its response to martial law. In 1971, the party had predicted that a hypothetical coup or martial law would enable the armed struggle in the countryside to advance even more rapidly.[87] When the state of emergency was indeed imposed — in part, according to the official version, to quell the "Maoist rebellion" — the party leadership was not only ready, but even found in the new and difficult conditions a means to disseminate CPP-ML influence nationwide. The central committee noted in October 1972 that mass activists and even those with marginal links with the movement had gone into hiding as a result of indiscriminate repression. This, pursued the party, was "an opportunity to recruit and develop more cadres, and deploy them to hitherto unorganized areas of the country".[88] While it is impossible to determine the exact number of activists or "fellow travellers" who took to the Philippine maquis after 21 September 1972 (or, for that matter, those who came back), it is an undeniable fact that the party and NPA's implanation throughout the archipelago registered a tremendous increase during

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[84] *OR*, p. 118.
[85] *The NPA*, p. 2.
[86] *Ang Bayan*, 3 May 1971, p. 2.
[87] *OR*, p. 155.
[88] *Ang Bayan*, 12 Oct. 1975, in *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Sept. 1973, pp. 41-44.

the years 1973-1980. In 1972, on the third anniversary of the NPA, areas of activity were limited, outside of Manila-Rizal, to 800 barrio organizing committees or barrio revolutionary committees in Northeast Luzon, Central Luzon, Southern Luzon and the Western Visayas.[89] By the end of 1980, the party could justly boast of 27 guerilla fronts covering more than 400 municipalities in 43 provinces.[90]

Demaoization, or "Specificity"?

Yet this success had not been achieved without a price. The party's experiment with a "Yenan" in Isabela province had resulted in the quasidecimation of the NPA concentrated there. The years 1972 through 1976 were, all in all, a dark period for the armed struggle.

> Up to the middle of the last decade, the people's army experienced a lot of difficulties and sustained heavy casualties due to the fierce onslaughts of the dictatorship and to our own serious limitations in terms of experience, skills, organizations, equipment and mass support. The enemy repeatedly assaulted our initial guerilla fronts with the result that almost all of these were reduced in size, and there were even a few we had to complete leave temporarily.[91]

From these bitter experiences sprang the realization that the Maoist model for protracted war based on the absolute necessity for a liberated area would have to be adapted to local conditions. In this regard, *Specific Characteristics of Our People's War* (1974) is more than a simple manual: it is also an attempt to recast revolutionary strategy and tactics in a Philippine mode, and in so doing subject Mao Tse-tung's teachings to fine tuning. This pamphlet thus enumerates seven conditions particular to the Philippines that influence the conduct of revolutionary struggle in this country, of which three depart somewhat from the Maoist formula: (1) "we are fighting in a mountainous archipelago"; (2) "a fascist dictatorship has arisen amidst a political and economic crisis of the ruling system"; and (3) the country being dominated by one ruling imperialist power (the U.S.), there is a unified armed reaction, except in Southwest Mindanao. (The other four characteristics, at least in their formulation, bear the Maoist stamp, viz. "U.S. imperialism is on the decline in Asia and throughout the world and world revolution is advancing amidst general crisis of the world capitalist system"; "our people's war is in line with the national democratic revolution of a new type"; "we need to wage a protracted war in the countryside"; and "the enemy is big and strong while we are still small and weak".)

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89 *Ang Bayan*, 29 March 1972, p. 2.
90 *Ibid.*, 26 Dec. 1980, p. 3.
91 *Ibid.*, also 15 Sept. 1978, p. 5.

But did the insistence on specificity necessarily signify a wholesale abandonment of the Chinese model and/or Mao Tse-tung Thought? It is obvious that on the whole, *Specific Characteristics* does not radically depart from the Chinese theses. Since 1974, the party has been very circumspect in its "demaoization." (The central committee's message of condolence on Mao's death studiously avoided any mention of the Gang of Four or Teng Hsiao-ping, as if to avoid foreclosing its options in the post-Mao era.) Shortly after Mao's demise and on the eighth anniversary of the CPP-ML, a more substantial clue came in the form of a self-criticism: "We realize that there are no ready-made, complete solutions to our specific problems from books or from abroad."[92]

Dogma vs. "Politics of the Possible"

Critics of the CPP-ML and the movement it led were quick to point out and denigrate its "cowboy ideology", its leadership's petty bourgeois origins, its appeal to petty bourgeois students itching for revolution, etc. These charges were to a large extent true, and magnified by the party's own tendency to regard criticism from the enemy as a "good thing", as proof *per se* of the correctness of the party's line. However, the left adventurist rhetoric diverted attention from the party's knack for a "politics of the possible". Where its theoretical stance was intransigent, its practice was often flexible and non-dogmatic. The CPP-ML's handling of the First Quarter Storm, we have seen, illustrates this flexibility. Insofar as it pitted unarmed youths and students against the sophisticated weaponry and material of the urban anti-riot squads, insofar as it took place at all in the so-called bastion of reactionary bourgeois power, insofar as it did not spread to the countryside or even the factories, the First Quarter Storm could have been, by the party's own theoretical and practical standards, written off, if not condemned, as so much exercises in steamletting disguised as "urban guerilla warfare". As it turned out, the central committee's response to the spontaneous urban outburst manifested a shrewd capacity to accommodate and even promote city-based uprisings, *provided it enhanced the armed struggle* in the countryside.

Another area where the party has belied its reputation for dogmatism is that of legal struggle. For example, the message of imprisoned leaders to Kabataang Makabayan activists in late 1970 took pains to point out the tactical gains that could be had from workers' strikes and mass work within "reactionary organizations".[93] In late

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[92] *Ibid.*, 26 Dec. 1976, in appendix to *RERP* 1977 version (London), pp. 48-49.

[93] Nilo Tayag and Leoncio Co message to 3rd KM National Congress, 10 Dec. 1970.

1971, after the Supreme Court endorsed the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the party issued a statement justifying armed struggle, while urging peaceful protest campaigns "to test the limits of reactionary laws".[94] In its 1975 Labor Day issue, *Ang Bayan* referred to the usefulness of existing labor laws, while warning against reformism and economism.[95] By 1980, the call was for the promotion of both strikes *and* economic struggles, but with the long-range objective of raising economic struggles to the level of political ones.[96]

The party's stand on electoral struggle has also undergone some evolution. In the early 1970s, particularly after the First Quarter Storm, the "parliament of the streets" was the party's privileged form of agitation (and significantly, martial law had yet to be declared). The Constitutional Convention was therefore denounced as a farce, a formalist exercise that did not even hold the promise of reformist tactical gains. But the imposition of martial law in 1972, and the hardships it entailed, constrained the party to reassess its basis for rejection of parliamentary struggle. It is clear that the new, softer line which emerged in early 1978 did not imply any fundamental revision of the CPP-ML's disdain for parliamentary or legal struggle as the main form. What was new, and understandably so, given the restrictions of martial law, was the refusal to reject elections outright. Political detainees thus announced their intention in 1978 to "probe the government's sincerity" by taking up the latter's offer for them to run for seats in the Interim Batasang Pambansa. But their acceptance to run was placed under certain conditions, foremost of which was their immediate release from detention. Whether they would indeed gain satisfaction or not on this point (they did not), it is significant to note the detainees' reasoning: "We have to take seriously any initiative that would lead to the release of as many political detainees as possible".[97] Elections, they said, could be used to advance the struggle for true freedom and democracy — but the struggle would not end with the polls. The CPP-ML praised the opposition party LABAN for its courage, but commented that it could play the opposition role for only a time.[98]

With the impending lifting of martial law, the CPP-ML proclaimed its readiness to "take advantage of any relaxation of restrictions, not to tie its own hands". At the same time, it took note of

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[94] *Ang Bayan,* 15 Dec. 1971, p. 1.
[95] *Ibid.,* 1 May 1975, pp. 6, 7.
[96] *Ibid.,* 26 Dec. 1980, p. 10.
[97] Typewritten "press statement of political detainees on the National Security Council's decision denying release of detainees intending to run for the IBP", c. Feb. 1978.
[98] *Ang Bayan,* 15 March 1978, pp. 2, 3.

the appeal which electoral processes still exerted on the population, especially its "backward sections".

> The dictatorship has tight control over modern instruments of communication that it can use to overwhelm the people with its lies and promises. The bigger part of the population has not been effectively reached by the revolutionary movement; a consequence is that this part of the population might be taken in by the parliamentary illusions being spread by the dictatorship.[99]

Legal Struggle for White Areas

The restrictions of martial law were strong enough to inhibit the kind of mass actions that characterized the years 1970-1972 (in spite of the party's prediction of more First Quarter Storms to come). But in 1976, protest actions on a relatively large scale began to resurface; three such rallies took place in Manila in the month of October alone. At year's end, the party called for "open mass struggles" in the cities.[100] If any doubt persisted as to what this meant, the central committee spelled it out in May 1977: "In contrast to our guerilla zones in the countryside, the main form of struggle in Manila-Rizal as well as other white areas is clearly non-armed and legal. We must make use of every possible legal means to arouse, organize and mobilize the masses".[101]

"Masses" referred primarily to the workers, whose percentage in total party membership, it was claimed, was unprecedented. Moreover, "in due time, the overwhelming majority of party members in the [Manila-Rizal] region should be workers".[102] The contrast is striking between the May Day 1977 directive and the *RERP* of 1968, which faulted Crisanto Evangelista's and succeeding PKP leaderships' policy of carrying out work in the city-based proletarian milieu. A plausible reason for this volteface was the growing confidence of the party: it could now "afford" to pay more than lip service to city work, having insured that armed struggle had become an irreversible trend elsewhere. Indeed, even as the party called for recruitment of more city workers, it also specified that they should be asked to join the NPA.[103]

Feudalism and the Countryside Revisited

Specific Characteristics. . . already hinted at a reappraisal of the Philippine countryside's potential for the realization of a liberated area, even in the vast mountainous terrain of Northeastern Luzon. Fighting in a countryside shredded into so many populated islands,

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[99] *Ibid.*, 26 Dec. 1980, p. 8.
[100] *Ibid.*, 26 Dec. 1976, in appendix to *RERP* 1977 version (London), p. 51.
[101] "Two Major Responsibilities", *Ang Bayan*, 1 May 1977, p. 2.
[102] *Ibid.*
[103] *Ibid.*, 30 Sept. 1978, p. 1.

with the two biggest being separated by the "clutter" of the Visayas, and with the additional consideration that the archipelago has no contiguous frontiers with other countries, obliged the CPP-ML to implement a policy of *centralized leadership and decentralized operations*. It would be foolhardy, said *Specific Characteristics,* for the party's central leadership to concentrate all party personnel and efforts in one limited area in Luzon, and consequently invite concentration of enemy forces there.[104]

The party likewise anticipated, by 1974, that for the U.S., "the stakes are bigger in the Philippines" than in Vietnam, or elsewhere in Asia, because of American investments, military bases and personnel in the islands.[105] The struggle would therefore be even more protracted than if it had taken place in the China of the 1930s and 1940s. In this regard, it is useful to recall that before the voluntarist rhetoric of *RERP* and other CPP-ML literature had set into the party's style, Jose Maria Sison had taken a more realistic measure of American capacity to withstand attempts to dislodge the U.S. bases from Philippine territory.[106] Especially in the late 1970s, with the reinforcement of the bases' perimeters, and the heightened presence of government military/superstructural installations were such as to make any point in Central Luzon accessible by a variety of means of transportation within ten minutes, realistic nuances of this kind regained their pertinence.

In a parallel evolution, the party's policy toward the landlord class has undergone a number of what may tentatively be termed as tactical changes. The preservation of feudalism was previously considered to be "a matter of prime necessity" for U.S. imperialism, to an extent that *Philippine Society and Revolution* could theorize that "if landlord power were to be overthrown in the countryside, U.S. imperialism would have nothing to stand on and it would have to face a colossal force that can drive it out of the country."[107] The 1977 ten-point programs of the National Democratic Front reversed the causality of the problem in this wise:

> The land problem, especially the problem of ownership, can be finaly settled throughout the country upon the complete overthrow of U.S. imperialist and comprador-landlord rule. Then the conditions shall have been laid for unhindered industrial expansion and balanced economic development.[108]

The 1980 primer (*Maikling Kurso*) for the study of *Philippine Society*. . . conspicuously refrains from restating the "social base" theory.

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[104] *SCPW,* pp. 11-12.
[105] *Ibid.,* pp. 36-37.
[106] *Struggle*. . . p. 23, deleted in 1971 version.
[107] *PSR,* p. 202.
[108] *Ten-point programme,* 1977, p. 15.

The effects of land reform, both of the NPA and of the government, may have something to do with this modification, which presumably also took into account the diminishing linkage between the objective needs of U.S. imperialism and the capacity of the native landowning class, especially the middle and small categories, to cater to these needs. If the 1968 party programme's provision for confiscation of land from the landlords implied the monolithic nature of this class, *PSR* and, later, *Specific Characteristics* carefully made a distinction between those who "have vast holdings, who have acquired these by sheer grabbing, who hold political power and who are despotic" on the one hand, and on the other, "enlightened gentry who endorse and follow our policies and who support our revolutionary war".[109] The latter category was promised "more fields for fruitful endeavor" after the victory of the revolution.[110]

The party's call, after the declaration of martial law, for a primarily anti-fascist united front (with the relegation of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal fronts to secondary and tertiary importance, respectively) resulted in the *de facto* reclassification of landlords as a less important target for the moment. The party granted the landlords a concession in the form of a directive to its cadres to allow 20% rent of the current actual crop to small landlords, 15% to middle landlords, and 10% to big landlords.[111] This temporary measure had the anticipated advantages of broadening popular support for the anti-fascist struggle and making a "widely accepted beginning [for agrarian reform] even among the tenants".[112] For their part, landlords were "urged" by the NDF to a minimum programme of rent reduction and elimination of usury, as a number of them had allegedly already consented to do.[113]

This general policy aims at splitting the feudal class, isolating the most diehard landlords, while keeping violent struggle to a minimum (in the sense that the NPA will not resort to armed coercion unless the landlords in question put up a fight—hence implying a choice, which was not explicit in previous policy). The party claims that its new "mass line" is succeeding. *Ang Bayan* has noted that

> More and more small and medium landlords are accepting that they cannot and should not resist the Party's minimum programme of land reform, especially in the guerilla zones. Those who follow the policies of the Party may be categorized as enlightened landlords. This is particularly true of small and medium landlords who have also become members of the national or upper petty bourgeoisie.[114]

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109 *PSR* p. 237, *SCPW* p. 7.
110 *Ten-point programme,* 1977, p. 15.
111 *Ang Bayan,* 6 Oct. 1975, p. 22.
112 *Ibid.*
113 *Ten-point programme,* 1977, p. 14.
114 *Ang Bayan,* 21 Sept. 1977, pp. 8-9.

This statement is less significant for its categorization of landlords than for its acceptance of the objective process of differentiation of the "class enemy" in the countryside. It is in this light that the CPP-ML central committee's 1980 instruction, "give due attention to advancing the struggle of progressive sectors in the countryside, other than those of the peasant and farm worker masses",[111] may be appreciated.

Conclusion

As the CPP-ML advanced in age and experience to emerge, 12 years after its founding, with the reputation of being the leader of the only viable guerilla force in non-communist Southeast Asia, it inevitably had to revise a number of its original principles to conform with Philippine realities. Evidence at hand does not warrant the conclusion that these revisions had anything to do with the devaluation of Mao Tse-tung Thought in China or with the capture of the CPP-ML's first-line leaders. The 1976 reference to "readymade solutions from books or abroad" significantly criticized Mao Tse-tung Thought's wholesale application to the Philippines more than it does Mao Tse-tung Thought itself.

The party's newspaper *Ang Bayan* continues to run in its masthead the blurb: "guided by Mao Tse-tung Thought". A certain historico-sentimental attachment to the late revolutionary leader seems to stand in the way of demaoization—a demaoization that may be more apparent than real, incidentally. The party's successes so far outweigh its failures, and its record over the past decade would appear to validate its abiding trust in armed struggle. The latter is practically an article of faith which has withstood the relatively minor changes that the party has wrought in its revolutionary project. And while the CPP-ML's 12th anniversary statement scrupulously avoids mentioning Mao either in praise or in blame, it cannot avoid sounding "Maoist" when it declares that "the gun has played a decisive role in the overall advance of the revolutionary struggle in the past several years. And the gun certainly will become even more important in the coming higher level of struggle..."[116]

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[115] *Ibid.*, 26 Dec. 1980, p. 10.
[116] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

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