asian Studies

CONTENTS

Re-Thinking Area Studies

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Area Studies was one of the programs the University of the Philippines in Diliman wanted to establish in 1994. The intent was to coordinate the teaching of various academic programs in different colleges and departments which have something to do with specific countries and regions of the world. For many reasons, however, the project never got off the ground. Nonetheless, in my view, the need for an Area Studies program in UP remains relevant.

In advocating this idea, I do not wish to promote what the United States pursued during and immediately after World War II and at the height of the Cold War. The US Area Studies program was primarily a superpower agenda intended to provide intellectual and material support to the US policy of "containment" against the Soviet Union and the socialist camp.[1] Indeed, the complicity of several prestigious American universities and research institutions in this effort, as well as its inimical effects on academic freedom, on the careers of individual scholars, and on the focus and direction of scholarly inquiry, are very well documented.[2]

In contrast, the University of the Philippines, if it ever establishes such a program, should seek precisely to re-define Area Studies from our own national perspective. Our studies of other countries should not be left to the vagaries of what is fashionable in academic circles in the West; neither should they be automatically drawn into the conceptual and ideological debates of other countries. Instead, Area Studies must be couched first and foremost on what we want to achieve as a nation. This, in turn, would entail an examination of what we believe to be our role in the community of nations, that is, whether we shall remain passive pawns of superpowers, or become active participants in shaping world affairs.

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Such a scholarly endeavor should not be seen as a form of spying.[3] In any democratic society, the broad base of its citizens must be well informed about national and international affairs to enable them to make rational and intelligent decisions. Who else is in a better position to provide organized knowledge and training in this regard than the universities? As institutions charged to train scholars and undertake researches with full guarantees for academic freedom, the universities are best equipped to inform our citizens of their responsibility to make the right decisions for the general good of society.

In this context, Area Studies in UP may have the following objectives:

(1)   To train experts and other specialists who possess in-depth knowledge and understanding of the peoples, languages, cultures, history, social, economic and political institutions and processes, etc. of a country, region or area of specialization, and who will undertake sustained research on them, so that they will be consistently prepared to respond to issues and problems that may arise in our relations with these countries, regions or areas;

(2)   To promote better understanding and friendship with the people of the country, region or area of one's specialization in order to help create a congenial climate of opinion for our nation;

(3)   To enable us to have mutually beneficial economic, political, cultural and people-to-people relations with that country, region or area;

Having clarified these points, I shall now explore the nature and scope of Area Studies and how it could potentially contribute to our understanding of societies and peoples. Since I specialize in Asian Studies, most of my examples shall be drawn primarily from Asia. Nonetheless, this article shall hopefully help shed light on some of the issues and concerns which have been raised regarding the proposal to establish an Area Studies program in the University.

Defining the Field

Area Studies involves inter- and multi-disciplinal approaches to the study of a geographical as well as a cultural area. Units of study are conceived as those areas of the world which not only share geographical features,[4] but more importantly, serve as the environment where peoples and cultures evolve, as well as their languages and literatures, their social institutions, arts, philosophies and religions.

Area Studies aims to provide a holistic understanding of a culture in a given area. It is an integrated study of the various aspects of a society and its culture in relation to a geographical unit, although that culture may eventually disperse beyond its original homeland and undergo drastic changes in time. An example is Islamic civilization. Beginning with the simple, essentially tribal and desert culture of the prophet Muhammad (7th c. A.D.), Islamic civilization later evolved into a highly sophisticated one by blending Islam and the Arabic language with the legacy of the more ancient civilizations of Egypt. Islamic civilization eventually gained greater force as it dispersed beyond the Arabian peninsula to Africa, Europe and the rest of Asia (13th c. A.D.).[5]

At this point, it should be stressed that culture is considered in the anthropological sense, as the total system of transmitted beliefs, values, attitudes, behavior patterns, social institutions, technology, etc., possessing an inner logic and internal structure, with each aspect linked up in particular ways to the whole system. However, Area Studies goes further than anthropology in that it considers the historical dimensions of a culture as indispensable to a fuller understanding of any culture area. It entails the study of both internal processes of growth and development as well as external forces as they impinge on that culture.

For purposes of analysis, it is also necessary to distinguish "culture" from "civilization" or "Great Tradition." The development of a culture into a high level of sophistication in all aspects -- social, economic, political, philosophical, literary and artistic -- and its integration into a recognizable whole through time -- makes it a civilization or a Great Tradition.[6] Unlike a culture which is confined to a relatively smaller spatial and temporal unit, a civilization is more encompassing, affecting entirely different groups of people under different circumstances and historical periods.[7]

A civilization or a Great Tradition has the capacity to absorb new elements while maintaining its basic cultural features. At the same time, it is broad enough to encompass almost all facets of life, such that it could be adjusted to fit the peculiarities of a specific culture at any given time. This is what makes a civilization of a Great Tradition a useful concept in Area Studies. It helps us identify the fundamental cultural features that make up the Great Tradition, as well as the general contours against which we can elaborate the specific changes, differences and distinctiveness of its sub-culture or variants.

The Judeo-Christian civilization illustrates how the concept of a Great Tradition can serve as basis for defining the units of study in Area Studies. Judeo-Christian civilization arose from the amalgamation of Judaism with the earlier religions of Pharoanic Egypt and Sumer at around 1,500 B.C., and later, with the heritage of the Greco-Roman civilization from the 4th century B.C. to the first 500 hundred years of the Christian era. The events occurred in the region now known as Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. Propelled by the vigorous missionizing efforts of the Roman emperor Constantine, this civilization spread from West Asia (Middle East) to the Mediterranean and the European continent.

The basic philosophical-religious assumptions of the Judeo-Christian civilization (including accretions derived from Greek and Roman philosophies) are founded on the belief in one Supreme God, manifested in human form as Jesus Christ of Nazareth whose brief sojourn on earth (ca. the 1st century A.D.) shook the foundations of the ancient Hebrew institutions and challenged the imperial power of Rome in the Levant. It stresses the equality of all human beings before God, direct individual communication with the Divine, the assurance of salvation for all based on faith alone, belief in paradise, eternal life after physical death, and the injunction that all must live life on earth in accordance with God-given laws as embodied in the ten commandments. All these provide the bases for greater emphasis on individual conscience and freedom within the framework of universal law applicable equally to all.

One of the many legacies of this civilization is the Christian church. It began simply as a community of believers, but soon evolved into a hierarchical institution headed by the papacy. By the medieval period, the Pope acted not only as the guardian of the Christian community, but as the instrument for

propagating the faith to non-believers. Christianity expanded swiftly all over Europe and by the 10th century, no king could survive for long unless he acted in support of the Christian church. Christianity thus became the legitimizing spiritual cum social force that buttressed military and political power.

From this brief overview, we can thereby compare and contrast the different manifestations, variants and subcultures of Judeo-Christian civilization.[8]

Finally, in studying culture areas and civilizations, it is also important to understand the process, manner and timing by which the legacies of civilizations have been transmitted to other parts of the world. For instance, it is interesting to note that, of the four great civilizations in Asia, only the Judeo-Christian tradition was adopted in the West, while the other three have endured primarily in Asia.

Survival Strategies

Another convenient starting point in Area Studies is to analyze the survival strategies that groups of people employ in a given geographical area. This may be done first at the micro-level by examining smaller segments within a geographical unit, and then at the macro-level by comparing and relating the various groups or populations of the larger area over time. The micro-level analysis will deal with culture, while the macro-level analysis will deal with civilization. We must bear in mind that while it is generally assumed that culture evolves into civilization, it does not necessarily follow that all the aspects, segments or bearers of the culture will fit harmoniously to the whole.

Survival strategies are complex phenomena. More than just adaptations to the environment, they entail interactive mutual transformations of peoples and their habitats. In the process of transforming their physical environments, peoples change and are themselves transformed. Considering too that no part of the world today, including the Antarctica and the South Pole, has not been transformed or affected by human intrusion, and likewise, no group of people has lived in total isolation from the whirling changes of global events, it is necessary to study external factors, influences and forces which impinge on peoples in a given area. [9]

Micro-level approach

To illustrate the analysis of survival strategies at the micro-level, let us take the Bedouin in the Arabian peninsula and the Tuareg of the Maghrib (north Africa facing the Mediterranean) as examples. Up till World War II, they were desert nomads or semi-nomads whose main livelihood was animal husbandry supplemented by handicrafts, trading, soldiering and raiding. Forced to travel in search of pasture and water for their animals, they were dependent on or linked together with settled farming communities, which in turn supplied necessary foodstuffs particularly cereals, fruits and vegetables. They also relied on towns and cities for trade specially in manufactured goods and arms.

For centuries, the Bedouin and Tuareg played an important role in trade and commerce, serving as carriers of merchandise and as mercenaries for whoever would hire them to protect the trade routes. Fierce tribal loyalties, mobility, agility with weapons and a hardened desert existence which enabled them to withstand long deprivation, made them consummate mercenaries in the harshest environment. Whenever central or regional authorities weakened, which happened regularly, these nomadic tribes quickly became raiding bands.

The consolidation or break up of these fissiparous, warrior tribes have been recurring themes in the political formations in the Arabian peninsula, Iraq, Iran, the Maghrib and surrounding areas. Their conversion to Islam and submission to succeeding Caliphates affected not only peace and order in the desert areas, but also spelled profound social and cultural transformations. By the end of the 7th century, diverse populations, including the desert nomads, have been absorbed into one Islamic civilization.[10]

Still, even in contemporary times when motorized vehicles have replaced the camel and governments strive to settle the nomadic and semi-nomadic groups into permanent villages, the legacy of nomadic life underlay the Islamic *ummah* (community) in West Asia. These semi-nomadic groups pose a constant threat to the body politic of the new nation states in West Asia. They create inner tensions within the Islamic *ummah* even though they subscribe to the major tenets of Islam. These tensions have been dramatically demonstrated in repeated uprisings by the Kurds[11] and their distant cousins, the Mujahedeens of Afghanistan, whose desire to secede from the central

government have been motivated by inter-ethnic conflicts which played into the hands of superpower manipulation.

Macro-level approach

Let us now consider the area of East Asia which is composed of China, Korea and Japan, in order to illustrate how we can formulate broad conceptualizations of East Asian or Sinic civilization. Geographically, East Asia is characterized by seemingly impenetrable internal barriers with almost unrelieved diversity of peoples and cultures.[12] Despite these diversities, the region is seen as belonging to one civilization whose configuration was already being delineated by the time of Qin Shih Huang-ti (Chin Shih Huang-ti) at the end of the B.C. era.

By at least 1500 B.C., peoples in this area have been interacting by land and sea so that by 300 A.D., inhabitants of the Yellow River and Yangtze Valleys, as well as Koreans and Japanese, have begun to share a recognizable pattern of socio-cultural development, albeit with clear local characteristics. Indeed most scholars believe that Chinese influences in language, literature, philosophy, principles of government and political institutions greatly contributed to the formation of Korean and Japanese cultures within a Sinic or East Asian civilization.

What are some of the major cultural features and recurring themes characteristic of this civilization? The most obvious is the Chinese system of writing and literature, together with the modes of thinking and conceptions about the universe. So important is the writing system that it is imbued with an almost sacred, magical character. Calligraphy is therefore one of the highest forms of art and means of expression in East Asian or Sinic civilization. Another important feature is the value placed on the writing of history. Indeed, the judgment of history is believed to exercise a moral force in Chinese society.

Likewise, the syncretic philosophical system known as Neo-Confucianism is shared within the region. Formally established in the Sung Period (10th-11th c. A.D.), Neo-Confucianism was transmitted and adopted in varying forms in Korea, Japan and Vietnam. Neo-Confucians synthesized Confucian values with Taoist, Buddhist, and other belief systems which evolved in China.

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From Taoism, they drew the idea of intimate love, harmonious relations with nature and natural processes, and the continuous evolution and transformation of all of creation where humans are a small part. From Buddhism, they derived the concepts of tolerance, compassion and mercy towards all creatures including one's enemies; equanimity in the face of violence and suffering; and salvation from all suffering through one's personal spiritual quest. [13]

The social foundation of Neo-Confucianism is a hierarchical social and political system based on Confucian teachings. Hierarchy runs as a continuous thread from the imperial government down to the individual household. Although all social relations are asymmetrical, that is, between superordinate and subordinate, Neo-Confucianism stresses benevolence, mercy and generosity of the superior towards his or her inferiors, who are expected in turn to be obedient, loyal and forbearing. Leaders and superiors are expected to be exemplars of morality, ethical behavior and wisdom.

The emperor is considered as leader and protector of the nation from all kinds of threats from the environment. The litmus test of good government is when society runs smoothly, whereby the leader is believed to possess "the mandate of heaven." Failure in government, whether it results in the destruction of crops and infrastructure or the outbreak of violence, is seen as a failure of leadership. When conditions become oppressive, people can rebel and resort to violent means to replace the tyrannical leader who has lost the mandate of heaven.[14] Indeed, for much of Chinese history, dynastic changes were achieved through violent means. However, there were also long periods of peace, usually lasting 150 to 200 years, which allowed for social mobility through individual effort and exertion.

Though Chinese society is hierarchical, upward mobility could be achieved through the acquisition of wealth, seizure of power by force, talent and good luck. In this light, a significant institution is the Chinese imperial examination system which allows anyone to attain a high government position as long one passes the rigorous test. Such institution has important philosophical and social implications. It attaches great value on individual merit and effort, promotes respect for education and learning, and assures continuity and stability of service in the government bureaucracy, whose members are chosen on the basis of meritorious performance.

Corollary to this is the obligation to revere one's ancestors and elders which is attended by elaborate rituals and ceremonies. The Chinese emperor as head of the entire social hierarchy is considered the paramount ancestor and father of the nation. Ancestor worship requires the faithful performance of mutual obligations for the well-being of the older and younger generations. Hence, individual behavior must always consider the welfare of the family and clan. Hard work, industry, patience and humility are the qualities inculcated in each individual who must seek to live harmoniously within one's family, society and nation.

As seen from the preceding discussion, Area Studies examines the interrelations of the various socio-cultural and economic factors to explain developments and processes in a given society or a culture area. It tries to plot the basic features which have endured over time and space, and the patterns of change and development in a given area. This, however, does not preclude the application of social science theories on any society or area of study. Indeed, Area Studies provides fertile ground for testing social science theories.

Area Studies also provides a coherent, general framework for conceptualizing a culture area which can serve as a basis for comparison, contrast, and for more detailed analysis of individual parts in order to make tentative generalizations or formulate broader concepts. Thus, Area Studies would give more substance to such sweeping categorizations of countries as "advanced industrialized," "newly industrialized," or "underdeveloped," based, for example, on the degree of elaboration of social institutions accompanied by advancement in economic and technological organization.

Towards a Holistic View of Societies

What are the uses of Area Studies which departments and disciplines cannot easily provide? We have already alluded to the advantages of a holistic and integrated approach to a culture area, country, region or civilization. By utilizing different disciplinal methods and various perspectives on an area, Area Studies enables us to gain more insights about a country and its people, thus helping expand our cultural horizons.

Let us take Japan as an example. Economists tend to view Japan as an advanced industrialized country and our largest trading partner from whom we buy a host of manufactured goods. But if we consider its geopolitical location in the easternmost fringes of the Pacific close to China, Korea and Russian Siberia, we see the vulnerable side of Japan. Its vulnerability becomes more apparent when we consider how much Japan is beholden to the United States for its post-war reconstruction and protection. Granted that Japan's advanced industrialized position today stems from the dogged industry, resolve and purposiveness of its people, these internal conditions, by themselves, do not explain the phenomenal rise of Japan as one of the world's strongest economies.[15] Equally important is that Japan benefited from US science and technology.

During the post-World War II period, the United States supported Japan, together with the anti-communist and pro-US Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea, as economic and political rivals of China and the USSR. Japan in particular was made the US surrogate in Asia. Although China and the USSR suffered tremendous devastation during the war, they received neither aid nor reparations from the US and its allies. Being socialist countries, they were, in fact, the object of economic and technological blockade. In contrast, Japan benefited from US scientific and technological advances, beginning with the post-WW II period, through the Korean and Vietnam wars, and the Gulf war in 1990. Japan's dramatic surge as one of the world's industrialized and commercial giants was therefore due to the combination of US Cold War policy and the strategy of profiting from industrial production geared for war and peace.

Japan is dependent on OPEC countries for more than 70 percent of fossil fuels, and to the rest of the world for the strategic raw materials needed by its industries, the bulk of which must pass through Southeast Asian seas. It is America's protective umbrella which has kept conservative political parties in power over Japan for 50 years, and will remain so in the foreseeable future. Moreover, though it enjoys unprecedented trade advantage vis-a-vis the US and almost all of Southeast Asia, Japan is seeking to extricate itself from US political and military hegemony. Apparently, its goal is to create a new, more independent role for itself within the Asian community of nations in view of trade disputes with the US. This explains, to a large extent, why Japan is

undertaking concerted cultural, educational and economic assistance efforts in Southeast Asia and the Philippines.

Sub-regions can also be defined not only in terms of geographical proximity, but by close social, cultural and most significantly, economic and commercial integration. Early examples include the mercantilist economic tie-ups which were imposed by western imperialist powers from the late 17th to the 20th centuries. Here, local economies of subjugated nations like the Philippines were tied up and subordinated to the interests of the so-called "mother country," the United States. From the time the US conquered our country in 1900 up to the 1960s (and some would say even to the present), the Philippine economy has been closely intertwined with that of the US.

In contemporary times, the phenomenon of areas of economic integration variously called special economic zones, free trade zones or growth triangles have received worldwide attention. These new economic and industrial enclaves have replaced or are fast replacing Cold War alignments based on ideological and political orientation. In addition, there are hosts of sub-regional organizations and realignments based on geographical proximity such as the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Also, there are organizations formed by virtue of their common cultural and historical ties, organized mainly as a response to western pressures such as the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) or those whose members possess similar resources or produce the same commodities such as OPEC and the nuclear powers. Finally, international organizations such as the United Nations and its numerous agencies, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) should interest scholars more since these powerful institutions are not usually subjected to critical scrutiny. [16]

Area Studies therefore makes us see countries and issues in regional and global dimensions. It makes us knowledgeable about the philosophies, values and attitudes which undergird the economic and political policies of a country. Such knowledge provides us a better understanding of peoples, their interests and problems. It helps us deal more adequately with international problems so that we may work more systematically and effectively for our national interest, without creating, or at least minimizing, international tensions.

Training and Qualifications of Area Specialists

Besides thorough training in one or two disciplines, area specialists must have comprehensive knowledge of the geography, history, as well as socio-political and economic developments of the country or area of his or her specialization.

One of the most essential prerequisites is to have a grasp of the language of the country or area being studied. In addition, it is important to have at least a reading knowledge of the scholarly and other significant writings on the country or area, in whatever language they may be written. For example, to study the history of the Philippines, a reading knowledge of Spanish is important; that of Indonesia, Dutch; while French is needed to analyze the history of former Indochina states.

It is equally important to experience living in the area or country for long periods of time, with subsequent visits. Field experience, in other words, is indispensable to this endeavor. Area specialists should be constantly aware of their own perspectives as well as the theories and analytical methods they employ. Moreover, they should be able to understand the inner workings of the culture area, and if possible, empathize with the bearers of that culture. This way, area specialists can make informed analyses about developments in their country or area of concern, and ascertain what aspects of its past and present are most relevant to an issue at hand.

The success of an Area Studies program likewise depends on the nature and amount of institutional support given to it. Some of the most essential needs are adequate scholarships, support for language training and field research, competent staff, and above all, an excellent, well-equipped library and other research facilities. The collaboration of all scholars from different disciplines is likewise extremely necessary for a thoroughgoing program on Area Studies. Finally, if ever Area Studies will be implemented, our priority should be on Asia.

Conclusion

Because of the complex and the multi-faceted nature of societies, we need to seek out methods of analysis and interpretation offered by various

disciplines and examine issues from different perspectives. This requires breaking away from the rigid compartmentalization of the disciplines and theoretical assumptions. Moreover, we need to reexamine western-derived theories and avoid the predilection to assume that they are "international," "universal" or "global". Political, economic and other social science theories must be constantly tested against the actual people, events and surrounding circumstances being studied.

An Area Studies program which seeks to understand societies, and peoples, as well as their history, traditions, languages and literature, rather than their political and economic affairs alone, can help in this direction. By enabling one to gain an insight of other peoples and societies, Area Studies can develop one's ability to compare different peoples and cultures. At the same time, it can provide the impetus for reexamining one's own culture.

In turn, the insights gained from such effort can serve as an important corrective not only to various forms of chauvinism, prejudice and discrimination, but to the cynical manipulation of people whether for political, religious or pecuniary ends, as what occurred during the Cold War. The tragic consequences of manipulative area studies are still with us today, in the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan issue, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, Palestine, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This ought to remind us that how we view the world, approach problems and define units of study, are not simply academic and theoretical issues toyed around within the safe confines of university classrooms and libraries. What we study, how we study, how we formulate questions, and how we go about solving them have direct repercussions on the lives of real people and real societies.

NOTES

1. Within this policy framework, the world was divided between the "free, democratic world" versus the "totalitarian, communist countries" led by the former Soviet Union. Under this rubric, the Philippines, for example, was placed within the Southeast Asia military theater of operation, a region which must be contained within the US "democratic" camp against any kind of encroachment by the USSR and the People's Republic of China. Countries like India, Indonesia and Cambodia, which tried to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy independent of the US and the USSR, were not spared US criticism and attack. This had the unfortunate consequence of intensifying internal, local and regional conflicts.

2. See for instance Mark Selden, ed., "Asia, Asian Studies, and the National Security State: A Symposium," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (January - March 1997).

3. The fast pace of information technology as well as the ease of travel and communication preclude secretive operations which were more prevalent during the Cold War. People who have access to computers and the Internet, for example, can readily check information and communicate with almost anyone around the globe. Openness of information systems affects the way advances in scientific, technological and business operations are generated and disseminated. A determined and talented hacker can break into the secret codes of the Pentagon and banking systems. Espionage, in fact, could be counterproductive in the sense that one could be fed the wrong information. The best way to learn about another country is to conduct honest to goodness scholarly research which is open to public scrutiny and evaluation by peers.

4. These include land forms, meteorological and other climatic regimes, biota, physical boundaries, etc. which are the primary subjects of the discipline of geography.

5. Akbar S. Ahmed, *Discovering Islam: Making Sense of Muslim History and Society*, Routledge, Kegan and Paul, New York, 1988.

6. Robert Redfield, *The Little Community*, University of Chicago Press, 1955 and *Peasant Society and Culture*, University of Chicago Press, 1956. Redfield developed concepts which regard the relationships among the tribe, village, town and city as indications of an ever increasing complexity in social structure and organization in spatial and temporal terms. For a more detailed discussion

of the concept of "Great Tradition" and its interaction with the "Little Tradition," viewed from philosophical, historical and anthropological perspectives, and as a range of variants within the Indian civilization, see also: M. N. Srinivas, "Sanskritization and Westernization," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (August, 1956): 481-496; and *Journal of Asian Studies*, May 22, 1963: 481-496.

7. It should also be remembered that within each broad area of civilization, are individual, distinctive pockets of culture such as the semi-nomadic Kurds in Turkey, Iraq and Iran; the Altaic shamanistic Tungus on the border of Korea, China and Siberia, and the minuscule Tasaday hunting-gathering band in the interior upland of Cotabato, on the Philippine island of southwestern Mindanao Their existence should remind us of the many exceptions to what is often considered a "national" or "regional" culture; they also show that not all peoples march in step towards the same developmental goals.

8. John Leddy Phelan's book, *The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses, 1565 - 1700*, takes such an approach by looking at the evolution of Christianized institutions in Luzon and the Visayas from the 16th to the 18th centuries. Phelan's study focuses on Spanish aims, the nature and modes of cultural transmission, the development of Hispanic institutions, and the governmental structure and administration, with emphasis on the church and the clergy.

9. For instance, in studying how Palestinian self-definition and self-consciousness as a "nation" emerged, it is important to examine not only their long historical domicile and experiences in the region of Palestine and areas now known as Jordan and Syria, but also their reaction to Zionism in the 1930s and the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948.

10. Austin Kenet, *Bedouin Justice: Law and Custom among the Egyptian Bedouin*, F. Cass, London, 1968. See also P.M. Holt, Ann K. Lambton and Bernard Lewis, eds. *The Cambridge History of Islam*, 2 vols., London, 1970.

11. The Kurds comprise a transhumance group, that is, their movements are vertical, up and down the rugged mountains of Turkey, Iraq and Iran.

12. Geographical divisions on the continent itself comprise deserts, high mountain ranges of the Pamirs, the Tien Shan, the Tibetan highlands in the north and northwest; the Amur river and rugged steppes in the northeast, the Himalayas in the southwest and Szechwan basin in the south. The Korean peninsula is

separated from China by the northeast uplands, and the sea separates Japan from the continent.

13. Arthur Wright and Mary Wright, eds, *Confucianism and Chinese Civilization*, Athenaeum Press, New York, 1965

14. H.G. Creel, *Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-tung*, Mentor Book, New American Library, New York, 1964.

15. There is a whole school of thought which tries to explain the Japanese "economic miracle" in terms of the uniqueness of Japanese culture. Dubbed as the "Chrysanthemum school," adherents of this school claim that cultural features drawn from Confucian values predispose the Japanese to be industrious, to strive hard in order to avoid shame for one's self and one's group, and to derive a sense of pride in their work. This school also points to the Japanese socialization process as contributing immensely to the success of the Japanese way of doing business. Accordingly, from infancy to adulthood, the Japanese are moulded to be more disciplined and to be strong enough to forego individual preferences for the benefit of their family, corporation and country. In contrast, the American socialization process stresses individuality which often results in an anarchic and adversarial business and corporate management. See Ruth Benedict, *Chrysanthemum and the Sword, Patterns of Japanese Culture* New York, 1940; and John K. Fairbanks, Edwin O. Reischauer and Austin M. Craig, *East Asia, the Modern Transformation*, Houghton Mifflin, New York, 1965.

16. Vivencio R. Jose, ed., *Mortgaging the Future: The World Bank and the IMF in the Philippines*, Foundation for Nationalist Studies, Quezon City, 1982. This work is a critical evaluation of the role of a global institution in a developing country like the Philippines.

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Asia Without America:
A Vision For Peace in the 21st Century

*Benito O. Lim**

One of the pleasant surprises of the 21st Century Forum was the debate, argument and disagreement this paper elicited. After my presentation, George P. Shultz, who served as Secretary of State to former US President Ronald Reagan and later George Bush, asked if he could have a few words with me. I said "Yes."

"Do you know what will happen if the US and Japan did not renew the Security Agreement?" Secretary Schultz asked.

"You have a way of putting me on the spot. I have no idea," I said.

"Well, let me tell you," Secretary Schultz said. "Do you know that the Japanese now have the capability to produce a nuclear bomb within 40 days? Without the treaty, do you know what the Japanese will do in a year's time? They will go nuclear." With my attitude and view, "the Asia-Pacific region will be ruled by Russia and Japan in the next millenium." Mr. Shultz went on and on for 15 minutes, outlining the dangers of an Asia without America, an Asia with a nuclearized Japan, and an Asia with Russia lording it over with its nuclear preeminence. He concluded that the renewal of the Japan-US Security Agreement was in Asia's welfare, but particularly in China's interest.

When we met for the open forum, Secretary Schultz had left for other engagements. But Nobuo Matsunaga, former Japanese Ambassador to the US and currently, President of the Japan Institute of International Studies, and Dr. Ezra Vogel, Director of the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University, pursued the argument of George Schultz. Ambassador Matsunaga and Dr. Vogel asserted that the Security Treaty was not intended "to contain China." In fact, Ambassador Matsunaga contended, "the agreement is meant to preserve peace in Asia. The treaty does not provide for the rearming of Japan."

I called Ambassador Matsunaga's attention to the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement signed on April 17, 1996 by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto, wherein the US would supply ammunition, arms and arms production-related equipment and almost every conceivable logistical item Japanese military leaders deemed important. I then asked whether the "Joint Japan-US Declaration on Security - Alliance for the

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21st Century" could be interpreted in the spirit of Article 9 of Japan's Constitution which declared: "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order," the Japanese people forever renounce war and the threat or use of force "as a means of settling international disputes." Ambassador Matsunaga smiled but gave no comment while Dr. Vogel insisted that I "misinterpreted the treaty."

When George P. Schultz delivered his closing remarks, he returned to the subject of the importance of America in Asia and warned that America could not be ignored in the 21st century, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.

Asia is on the verge of a new historic passage - moving from a position of weakness for most of this century to a more positive leadership role in the near future. Once called by Western scholars as a "living fossil" or the stronghold of "arch-reaction and arch-conservatism," Asia is now the center of "economic miracles" and most political and economic analysts predict that it will lead the rest of the world into the 21st century. No one had foreseen that the most modern of technologies and economic transformation could settle in the most antiquated and outmoded lands of "retrogressive" Asia. This revival and growth deserves to be compared to the historic instances of massive, incremental and peaceful change of political and economic institutions.

During the past 25 years, with the end of violent political conflicts in Indochina, economic growth of China, the end of the Cold War, the dialogue between Pyongyang and Seoul, and Vietnam's entry into the ASEAN as a full-fledged member, Asia has become more peaceful, cohesive and prosperous. For more than a decade, the region's economies have grown at an average of 6 percent, higher than the growth levels of most Western countries. China, Taiwan, Hongkong, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia have attained annual growth rates of 8 to 10 percent. Even less fortunate countries like the Philippines and Vietnam are achieving growth rates that impress the critical eyes of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). There is no doubt that compared to some 10 to 15 years ago, the living standards of Asians have risen remarkably; hence, their governments now confidently speak of meeting unappeased national aspirations long frozen by superpower rivalry.

Asian leaders are aware that this favorable environment is due to a combination of distinct geopolitical circumstances such as lack of conflict,

peace and stability in the region, as well as dynamic domestic economic programs. They also recognize that conflicts brought about by larger forces beyond their control could change conditions in the region abruptly. Even the spillover of a United States - Japan or United States - China trade war could plunge the rest of Asia once more into the backwaters of economic underdevelopment. Having been dragged into wars not of their own making, and now faced with a less than benign international economy, Asians know by heart that their peace and fortune have been inextricably linked to major power competitions, their political, economic and military dealings for the region and Asian countries' responses to these events and movements. Any struggle for regional leadership by the big powers, say between an insatiable America against a rising Japan or China, could once again swallow them up or divide them along new issues, interests and doctrines.

For these reasons, many Asian leaders want to bury old suspicions and rivalries and get on with the shaping of a new cradle of humanity based on mutually beneficial arrangements in the economic, political and security domains. They took the 1993 declaration of the new US President William Jefferson Clinton to heart when he announced that "the United States cannot solve every problem and must not become the world's policeman." They expect the era of *Pax Americana Pacificus* to come to a close and look forward to the start of new approaches and forging of a new world order.

Futurology, like commemoratives, often engender in people the wish to speak of where they are, how they got there and in what direction, if any, they should be going. All too often, however, the unveiling of such scenario is circumscribed by people who refuse to look beyond their national agenda and ideology. Their memories and analyses of world events are confined to what serves their national interests at the moment.

Thus, however much Asian leaders would like to believe President Clinton's declaration, subsequent developments showed that his policy of "engagement and enlargement" marked, not the end of the United States' active engagement in Asia, but the reformulation of a new Cold War policy against likely adversaries, such as the rising economic and military powers of Asia, particularly China. On the surface, American policy has concentrated almost exclusively on ensuring "peace" and, in the words of Samuel P. Huntington, the dramatic shift or movement of the world toward "political

democratization and economic liberalization." But that is a question-begging proposition. The search for peace by going to war has been the battlecry of the West since World War I. What the US wants is not simply to remain as a rich and powerful country and to interact with other nations on a normal state-to-state basis for mutual benefit, but to be a world leader - one that seeks to create other nations in its own political image, and now uses the new dogma of economic liberalization to keep these nations subordinate to the American economy.

Of course, the most inhibiting constraint on American policy are countries that pursue their own brands of democracy and economic dogma. In spite of condescending talks about understanding different historical, political and economic circumstances and stages of development, it is clear that during the Clinton administration, the US, in many instances, has gone too far in considering competition from any other dominant center as undesirable. Accordingly, such competition does not only restrict America's national objectives and freedom of action, but threatens American supremacy, as well.

It appears that current US policy makers do not welcome the new developments taking place in Asia. They are disturbed by Asian economies growing at a rate considerably higher than in other regions. China, for one, is expected to become the world's second largest economy; its national capital is already equivalent to that of Japan, at least when measured in terms of international price parity. This means that world economic activities will no longer center solely on Japan and the US, but around the US, Japan, China and other Asian countries.

US trade will depend more on Asia. According to one estimate, by the year 2003, the US is expected to have twice as much trade with Asia as with Europe. Asia's intraregional trade will continue to expand and thus reduce America's share in the Asian economy. This means that US friction with Asian economies will grow, but America's traditional strategy of threatening unilateral action to block access to its domestic market will become less effective. Moreover, despite being the only remaining superpower in the world, the US no longer possesses overwhelming economic and political clout to lead multilateral organizations, as it once did.

So that the US will not be overtaken by these developments, its policy of "engagement and enlargement" includes the use of all resources and existing agreements at its command, to protect, maintain, and expand US role in Asia. Policy makers at the White House, Department of State, and National Security Council, along with Republicans in the US Congress, favor a strategy of engagement, confrontation and destabilization in dealing with China. In the words of former Secretary of State Warren Christopher, American policy should be to "peacefully evolve China toward democracy."

This explains why the US is keeping its old security agreements with Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines, although today these agreements have different tactical objectives. For instance, the Japan-US Security Treaty is no longer purely for the defense of Japan against any third party attacks, as many conservative Japanese see it, but is designed to keep Japan under American control. It is not clear how the US will react if the attack emanates from South Korea, or how South Korea will react if a third party like Russia attacks Japan. What is clear, although unstated, is that all these security arrangements are important instruments not only for the protection of American commercial and security interests in Asia, but also for dividing and ruling the region in the 21st century.

Seen in this light, the forward deployment of US forces becomes a condition for maintaining American power and for containing China, specially now that Asia has become the global center of economic dynamism. The US Congress, for instance, has allowed single-issue lobbyists to dominate Congressional positions on China. China's policies on "birth control, imprisonment of dissidents, prison system, restricted speech, religious restrictions and constraints on Tibetan monks," were viewed as "inimical to American national interests" and became the bases for the 1995 China Policy Act. In the executive branch, President Clinton acted with new ferocity in dealing with China's military exercise over the Taiwan straits in March 1996. President Clinton interfered in China's internal affairs when he ordered the Seventh Fleet and other nuclear vessels to move closer to the Taiwan straits, despite US recognition, along with Britain, France, Japan, Australia, the ASEAN countries, India, and Russia, that Taiwan is an integral part of one China and should be governed by Beijing. Such actions demonstrate how little America regards bilateral commitments in pursuit of domestic politics.

It will go to the extent of containing China and frustrating its emergence as a world economic and military power.

Of course, many western political analysts justify American action by claiming that uncertainties remain about the precise form Asia will take in the next century. Asia at the end of the 20th century is an animated area in which a number of powers, not only China and Japan but ASEAN, Russia, India and soon a united Korea, are jostling with one another. American presence is thus said to be needed to hold a fragile peace in the region. These critics conveniently ignore Chalmers Johnson's observation that the closing of the United States' two largest military bases outside the US, namely Clark and Subic in the Philippines, "produced not even a shiver of instability" in Asia.

In order to justify the deployment of US forces in Asia, America's new engagement and enlargement policy includes the construction of a scenario whereby all rising economic and military powers, unless they have security agreements with the US, are deemed dangerous to peace and prosperity in the region. In this scenario, other Asian countries should be outwardly friendly but inwardly wary of China's economic growth, as it spells competition for their growing economies. China's military modernization should also be a cause for alarm for it means that China will one day use it to strike at rival Asian powers.

The US-Japan Security Treaty as well as the new Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement which allows the US to supply Japan ammunition, arms and arms production-related equipment and nearly all logistical items, is clearly a treaty for the containment of China. Thus, despite Article 9 of Japan's Constitution, the "Joint Japan-US Declaration on Security - Alliance for the 21st Century," signed between Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President William Clinton on April 17, 1996, made Japan literally an Asian-NATO ally.

President Clinton has signed the treaty again for domestic political reasons. He can silence domestic detractors who criticize the US-Japan Treaty as onerous as it provides a security umbrella to the Japanese but takes away American jobs with cheap exports. President Clinton can report that Japan, which will pay for the realignment cost of $10 billion, will add to the nearly $6 billion Japan defrays on the 47,000 US forces in its soil. Americans tend

to explain their double standards by adverting to their democratic processes. Political decisions, other nations are told, are made in particular political contexts and many elements must be factored into the equation of policy.

There is no doubt that the new treaty will pave the way for Japan's plan to revise Article 9 of its Constitution which stipulates: "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order," the Japanese people forever denounce war and the threat or use of force "as means of settling international disputes." In order to accomplish this, "land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized." Yet Japan has an army, a navy, and an air force, called the Ground Self-Defense Forces (SDF), Maritime SDF and Air SDF. Its defense budget adds up to $47 billion a year, the second largest in the world. There is no doubt that the Americans have commenced the remilitarization of Japan with the new treaty. They have paved the way for the eventual revision of the Japanese Constitution for this purpose.

In view of the new treaty, there is a feeling among the two signatories that a wall against China has finally been established. It gave confidence to Japanese thinkers to talk of Japan's leadership role in Asia. Mineo Nakashima, a noted Japanese expert on China, believes that Asian security could advance if China breaks into pieces and Japan "assumes leadership of the Asian nations."

Just as the scenario feeds other Asians with the fear of rising Asian powers, it also creates higher rationales for America's continued presence in the region. America must remain in Asia not to pursue, maintain and guarantee its commercial interests but to ensure peace. The US is not only a fair and just mediator; it also champions the cause of the weak.

There are many reasons why, for the moment, American leaders are training their targets on China. First, the fear that China may become a superpower in every sense of the word. China does not only have a fast growing economy but has 1.2 billion people with a proud 5,000 year history. China is currently already more than a nation; it is a civilization with ethnic links to all the countries of Asia and a cultural force that has influenced its neighbors throughout history. Second, China's new status suggests that it can shape regional politics. This means that in the 21st century, a different style of cultural, political and economic leadership will likely emerge in Asia.

Third, China is a nuclear power, exports high-tech equipment and arms, and is therefore a direct competitor in this market. Above all, China is a member of the United Nations Security Council with a veto vote. This means it can frustrate America's goal of pursuing its narrow national agenda in the UN.

The US wants to portray itself as the most reliable buffer between China and the other Asian states. The most obvious move in this direction is America's attempt to label China's military modernization as a sign of its ambition to become the new superpower in Asia. Though aware that China is militarily a poor third in its air and naval power, Washington nonetheless portrays China's modernization of its armed forces as a military threat. Through crafty propaganda and subterfuge, the US makes it appear that China's military modernization is aimed at other Asian countries, therefore, they must lobby against it and press for American presence in Asia in order to neutralize China.

Because other Asians have been bombarded with propaganda pointing to China as the new, rising evil empire of the 21st century, American Cold War allies passionately argue for continued American dominance in Asia. In most Asian media that rely on Western wires and satellite feeds for international news, every sort of information about China is robbed of its sense of reality. Indeed, not since the Cold War years has the resurrected China bogey waxed over more pervasively.

No doubt, the American scenario requires accomplices who are willing to enter into a pact. The individual accomplice who joins the pact agrees to regard the American scenario as the conditions of Asian reality. Such is the case of Japan who, in extending its Security Agreement with the US, has agreed that China, Russia and North Korea could be the likely future enemy.

I make these quite obvious points to underline the kinds of challenges we face in pursuit of our respective national policies as we move into the 21st century.

The American-created mentality in the last days of the current century should be replaced with the new realities of Asia. For instance, in the economic sphere, the US is already facing off Japan, China and South Korea, and has begun to reveal itself not as a fair or just mediator, but a fierce partisan competitor and a biased intercessor.

Until America accepts Asian realities, particularly the rise of China as an equal and the likely new peacemaker of Asia, the conflicts of the 20th century will be dragged into the next century. In most of Asia, the character of the post-World War II period has been defined by policies instituted by the US during the Cold War. America's policy, strategy and negotiating style of using threats, pressure and destabilization clearly are not part of the solution but part of the problem in Asia.

When I point to the US as a part of the security problem in Asia, I do not mean to imply that if the Americans were to vanish tomorrow in Asia, or in an Asia without US dominance, there would be no more security problems in the region. Of course, America will be very much around Asia in the 21st century.

While Japan, China, Russia, India and the Southeast Asian countries are all encountering a difficult phase in their relations with the West, particularly with the US, on issues of trade or security, they are also experiencing many difficulties with one another. Bilateral relations among these countries have not been close and have seen extreme fluctuations. Although they want to redefine their respective relations with the US on a more just and equal basis, they scrupulously avoid the onus of being branded as anti-American and anti-Western. While they recognize that cooperating more extensively and forging a common front in dealing with the US could improve their bargaining chips, none of them, except a small nation like Malaysia, has proposed the building of a strategic Asian partnership.

Even in purely tactical terms, the mere idea of gathering together to strengthen their respective positions is unthinkable to some Asians. The Japanese, for instance, prefer to be under the protection of the American nuclear umbrella while getting richer, planning and plotting to become the eventual leader of Asia. Meantime their scholars insist that the US and its Western allies will not accept a new center of power, nor will it be possible, for now, for Asian nations to abandon the American market and sustain a new arrangement of their own.

There are feelers like the first ever Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Bangkok in March 1996 where leaders from 15 countries of the European Union (EU), seven member states of ASEAN and the three East Asian nations,

China, Korea and Japan, met to explore and eventually evolve a new partnership. The leaders agreed to discuss what they considered important, "in full awareness of the differences." In the words of Lamberto Dini, Italian Prime Minister and President of the EU: "If our aim is to bring about a partnership between Europe and Asia, this meeting must first and foremost prepare the ground for a deeper understanding of the problems of the two areas. Only through a shared view of our problems shall we be able to carry our collaboration forward." Evidently, the Italian Prime Minister wants to put behind the era of European colonial exploitation of Asia.

Notwithstanding such diffidence, most Asian countries are trying to improve their bilateral relations "to develop a strategic partnership of equality, mutual confidence and mutual coordination" by the 21st century, as in the case of Sino-Russian relations. "I can't name a single question on which we would have different opinions," President Boris Yeltsin told the Chinese in a toast to seal their new partnership. Of course not all Asian leaders talk of their relations with one another in the manner of President Yeltsin.

Among some Asian countries, there are very real differences involving conflicting territorial claims over areas like the Sakhalin islands, the Spratlys and Paracel, Diaoyu islands, East Timor, Sabah and Kashmir. However, the leaders of most of these countries now appear to prefer to go to dialogue rather than engage in aggressive posturing, having realized that the persistence of territorial conflicts seriously constrains their ability to pursue mutually beneficial arrangements. Indeed, many seem to be ready to make appropriate adjustments over delicate and difficult issues in order to build a new and progressive framework of interdependence among themselves. Thus, after two years of mutual denunciations in the much publicized conflict over the Paracel and Spratly islands of the South China Sea, all sides have become more conciliatory, having realized the futility of holding on to a static position which turned out to be unproductive over time. They also know that prolonged controversy could make them once more the battleground of rival powers, or fall prey, at the very least, to superpower and big power intrigues.

Today, China has taken a big step in assuring its smaller neighbors of its desire for a cooperative and consensual framework of relations. It has agreed to discuss contentious issues with the ASEAN members and to respect freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. It has also ratified the 1982 UN

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which incorporates a mechanism of settling water disputes through international arbitration, and has published a white paper on its defense policy.

No doubt mutual ambivalence is still apparent among some Asian leaders in the way they avoid talking about new interlinkages for the region. Clearly, there are still many sensitive issues and differences that need to be resolved. However, the end of the Cold War as well as the objective conditions within the region, have made clear to these leaders that time is of the essence as perceptions are changing, and that new policy frameworks and diplomatic initiatives are required to resolve these issues.

Yet, however much we would like to believe that America is part of the problem in Asia, many ASEAN members still consider the United States as a close ally. Nonetheless, the failure of the US lobby against Myanmar's application for ASEAN membership revealed that Americans could longer take the ASEAN leaders for granted. Only a decade ago, the US and most European countries could still exercise a major influence over ASEAN affairs through their various security and commercial interlinkages. But now their ASEAN allies not only talk back but make independent decisions.

The situation is not any different on the other side of the coin. China and Japan, the likely early contenders as leaders of Asia in the 21st century, are still looked upon with suspicion. For Japan, the suspicion is rooted in its aggressive militarism and savage cruelty against its Asian neighbors at the turn of the century up to the end of WW II. In the case of China, it is the short and unhappy alliance with the Soviet Union during the early years of the Cold War. But Japan appears more than willing to cede temporary leadership to the US while stalling to make the best arrangement for its own ascendancy. Most Japanese leaders and academics argue that an American military presence is an absolute condition for the security of Japan since the Self-Defense Forces, which are conditionally barred from engaging in offensive action, cannot defend Japan by themselves. Some Japanese even claim that the 150,000 SDF ground troops combined with 45,000 American troops garrisoned in Japan are still not enough.

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Accordingly, American marines in Okinawa are trained and equipped primarily for offensive missions, with the capability to make rapid amphibious landings and establish a beachhead anywhere in the Far East. Similarly the air wings based in Japan not only watch over Japanese airspace but patrol the skies over the northern Pacific. The Seventh Fleet in Sasebo, which has 60 warships and 50,000 sailors, covers the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean — Washington's key linkages for defending US interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

Most Asians view Japan's lobby for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, its recent moves to amend the Constitution to make a Japan a "normal nation again" and its renewal of the security treaty with the US as selfish and self-serving. Clearly these moves are not intended to build a mutually beneficial partnership with its Asian neighbors nor to defend these countries' national sovereignty against the onslaught of America's New World Order, but to promote Japanese interests. Many believe that Japan is actually preparing itself for a collision course with China, which explains its unwillingness to write off the US-Japan Security Treaty despite bilateral tensions over trade and other commercial arrangements.

Although there has been greater warmth in China's relations with its neighbors in recent years, many Asians still fear that any cooperative arrangement with China beyond commercial issues may be seen as anti-Western. Indeed China's rise as a military power, which comes at a time when the US is the sole remaining superpower, is seen as a "dangerous development" in the sense that, historically, it has always been a problem for a rising power to come to terms with a bigger one - specially if the goal is balance of power. The mutual perception that the other country challenges core national interests will remain indefinitely. Even in purely tactical terms, Chinese manipulation of military power for its own survival is not acceptable to the United States. Indeed, it reinforces American apprehensions that China is deliberately threatening its commercial and national security interests in the Asian region - a perception that has been bolstered by the distinctly anti-hegemonic, anti-big power politics and anti-bullying posture that China has taken vis-a-vis the US in recent years. This is unfortunate since Chinese responses have been mainly reactive - derived mainly out of modern Chinese history, the "century of shame and humiliation," and the recent hustle and tussle with the US over issues of trade, intellectual property and human rights.

China will not feel safe until it has achieved some degree of parity with the US and the US ceases to act as an imperial superpower.

It is fashionable among Westerners to deny that China has any special lead role in the Asian region. We may hear from Western analysts that any Chinese aspiration to play the part of one of the leaders betrays a presumption that Chinese record does not justify. As far they are concerned, it is brazen, at best a foolish ambition. For the Westerners, there is no room for accommodation with a Chinese leadership in the region. But historical passage is a political opportunity that cannot be put off by the dark wishes of the prophets of doom. Therefore the relevant question for the Chinese is not whether China should try to lead but rather how and under what circumstances should China seek to exercise its leadership. There is little doubt that China will have to lead Asia sometime in the next millenium. Can China do it and will it succeed?

Here we may do well to consult history. When the Chinese communists seized political power in 1949, they were confronted with more daunting problems. The nation faced massive starvation and famine characteristic of China's worst times. The new government took over the most ruinous inflation and monetary breakdown in world history. Its agricultural sector was disintegrating under a backward technology and the persistence of traditional feudal socio-economic relations, while its inadequate system of transportation was in shambles. Large areas of China had yet to come under the control of the new government. Though Chiang Kai-shek had already fled to Taiwan and the military power of the Kuomintang had been broken, it still terrorized much of South and Southwest China. Remnants of the KMT army and various warlord armies occupied many parts of West and Northwest China. Worse, the key instrument for preventing the development of China was economic isolation by the West led by the US. Moreover, on June 27, 1950, US President Truman ordered the United States Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan straits.

In 1960, the forces of nature inflicted even crueler blows. More than 60 percent of China's cultivated area suffered from flood or drought and agricultural production plunged below the plummet line. Yet with all the problems and difficulties that confronted China - the menace of two hostile

superpowers, economic underdevelopment, and periodic political upheavals, China has survived to become one of the fastest growing economies and powers of Asia near the end of the 20th century.

If China is to negotiate the historic passage mandated by national survival, pursue new priorities as it grows in power, wield global influence, as well as ensure peace and stability in the region, it has to overcome serious constraints internally and externally, and provide a strategic doctrine that will link its interest with Asia and the rest of the world.

Among other things, China may have to move away from its defensive and reactive policies and develop "a strategic partnership of equality, mutual confidence and mutual coordination towards the 21st century." Another is to project the positive side of China's political and economic development. Forms of government, whether democratic or socialistic, are not necessarily good or bad in themselves. It is the leadership and the men and women in the bureaucracy that make or unmake governments. History has shown that not all elected officials are good and non-elected officials bad people. Moreover, very few Asians are aware of China's technological advances since 1949 and the kind of technical and scientific skills China can offer to some of its developing neighbors and global friends. China must also seek common ground in solving problems shared by all developing countries such as unfair trade practices and pressures imposed by the advanced industrialized countries.

With regard to contested territories and waters, China must take the lead in promoting commonly acceptable solutions, including development programs for the areas, instead of just shelving sovereignty claims. In the Spratlys and Paracel islands, for instance, if China can come up with a joint development program that will prove more beneficial to all claimants than their individual aggressive posturing, there is little reason why these parties will not give such program a chance. All claimants understand that there is no realistic alternative to a mutually beneficial settlement. Certainly this is not only a conciliatory gesture but a more pragmatic approach to beneficially share contested resources. Avenues for confidence-building include joint undertaking of research into areas of common interest, exploration of underwater resources and ecological preservation of the South China Sea.

By and large, most Asians admire China's economic development and growth in the face of so many obstacles and problems. At the same time many of them feel that China will become their economic rival in the global market. Since most Asian countries are trying to attract foreign investments into their economies, they generally look at China as a formidable competition. China must make clear that it has no clash of interest — whether economic, political or strategic — with the developing countries of Asia. Rather it has to develop a comprehensive engagement program of its own to transform these developing countries into dynamic trading partners and progressively build an interdependent market which will work to their common advantage.

Since the United States will still be very much around by the 21st century, at least during the first decade, China must find a way to deal with the reality of the US as a fading superpower. While improvement of relations does not mean cordiality on all fronts, there is a need to change Washington's negotiating style which combines threats and sanctions. One school of thought in Washington believes that unless the Chinese are badgered, pressured, threatened and harassed, they will not yield an inch. Supporters of such thinking include a large segment of Americans who want to induce change in China. These Americans somehow nurture the belief that Christian precepts and democratic ethos are superior to China's over 2,000 years of civilization. Unlike other nations who seem satisifed to deal with China on a normal state-to-state basis for mutual benefit and profit, they want to change China socially, politically, and economically. The Chinese have correctly refused to be imposed upon, but the future cannot be defined by a combination of some cooperation where interests coincide and a lot of threats where differences cannot be resolved.

A basic policy China must eventually pursue is to hasten the end of American hegemony in Asia, initiate a new dialogue and eventually build a mutually beneficial doctrine of economic, political and security relations among Asian nations. The task amounts to restoring to Asians a sense of the reality and an understanding of their own role and destiny as a region. Chinese and other Asian leaders should clear Asia of the American dogma that has dominated the region for almost a century, if only to bring a politically and psychologically cleansed Asia into the 21st century.

What we should remind ourselves during this conference is that Asians have a unique history. Asia is the cradle of several great civilizations. We are one region whose civilizations can be traced back to thousands of years before the birth of Christ and whose inventions have been offered as the heritage of humanity. The Chinese invented, among other things, gun powder, the printing press, silk culture, porcelain ware technology and the compass, but they never badgered nor pressured any country for compensation or violation of intellectual property rights. We are resilient peoples who survived, during the late 19th and throughout the 20th centuries, aberrant periods of wars, Western colonization, imperialism, and superpower rivalry, which stifled our independent development and doomed our peoples to second class status.

What we need is to regain our human rights from the West, particularly the United States of America, reassert our Asian heritage and go on with our business of pursuing Asian traditions and ideals of a peaceful and stable world of equals and virtuous friends. Otherwise, we may suffer the fate of the American Indians - isolated and quartered in reservations in their own homeland. It is a simple agenda that cannot be met without strong Chinese leadership. To get through the challenging century ahead will not test merely the wisdom, but the will and vigor of all Asians. It will not be easy but we have done it long before, we can do it again.

MANAGING TERRITORIAL DISPUTES

*Aileen San Pablo-Baviera**

That Southeast Asia is now a recognized center of economic growth (together with other East Asian countries) has often been attributed to the correct policies carried out by effective governments encouraging the dynamism of the private sector. It can also be attributed, in no small measure, to the success of multilateral cooperation efforts among these countries, amid a favorable international climate, which have helped preserve a peaceful and stable political-security environment for economic growth to take place.

However, territorial disputes continue to threaten the peace and prosperity that have dawned, or are beginning to dawn on the countries of Southeast Asia. While such disputes have existed for a long time, they appear to have gained fresh impetus in recent years with the removal of the Cold War overlay[1], the growing interdependence as well as economic competition among regional states, and — because many of the disputes are maritime in nature — the enforcement of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Fortunately, Southeast Asian countries now appear more inclined to the peaceful settlement of disputes among them, and to negotiation and compromise, as indicated by the proliferation of dialogues and meetings taking place at official and non-official levels. The Western Pacific already has at least 15 delimited maritime boundaries[2] and three bilateral cooperative agreements over shared petroleum resources.[3] Another example of cooperation taking precedence over sovereignty was the establishment of the

Mekong Committee. But while there appears to be agreement on the basic approach to dispute settlement, much remains to be done in actually resolving many of the conflicting claims.

This paper focuses on the management of maritime territorial and jurisdictional disputes. A big number of such disputes exist among Southeast Asian states; there are even more when we expand the area under discussion to the Western Pacific, including both SEA and the South China Sea. The disputes typically originate from questions of sovereignty, jurisdiction over maritime zones, and access rights to living and non-living resources. Some of the disputes are bilateral in nature while others involve three or more countries. The most complicated disputes thus far are those over the Spratlys in the South China Sea, which involve six claimants.

International law does not offer adequate solutions to maritime boundary questions. In fact, from a purely legal perspective, that is, disregarding political and security considerations, international law sees no urgency in resolving sovereignty questions. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), for instance, says that maritime as well as land boundaries may remain undefined over long periods without this uncertainty affecting the rights of states concerned.[4] From the points of view of international politics and security, however, we have seen all too well and all too often the dangers and pitfalls of undefined limits of sovereignty. For this reason, we now find a burgeoning industry centered on developing modes of confidence - building, preventive diplomacy and conflict management and resolution.

Maritime disputes are somewhat different in nature from land disputes, particularly since it is difficult, although no longer technologically impossible, to determine boundaries on water for purposes of enforcement of jurisdiction and exercise of sovereign rights. However, states appear to conceptualize their maritime boundaries in the same way they do land boundaries — that is, as political dividing lines, rather than maritime zones that generate different sets of rights and responsibilities.

The crux of the problem is that either on land or in water, but even more so in water, there are no such things as purely "natural" boundaries.[5] Ultimately all boundaries are political. Due to security considerations, our maritime boundaries have become political boundaries at sea, thus giving rise to a tendency for "territorialization" of even the 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs).[6]

Consider the following instances:

(1)   Thailand has fishing disputes with Vietnam, Myanmar and Malaysia. In December 1995, a Thai newspaper, *The Nation*, reported that the Malaysian navy shot dead two Thai fishermen, one of them a 14-year old boy, who were ostensibly caught fishing in their overlapping EEZs. The Royal Thai Navy was subsequently reported to have said that it will not recognize Malaysia's self-declared EEZ, and to have asked the Thai Foreign Ministry to communicate the same to the Malaysian government.

(2)   Earlier in 1995, China's occupation of Mischief Reef (130 kilometers off the Philippine province of Palawan) under the guise of setting up shelters for its fisherfolks was roundly criticized, not only by the Philippines but by ASEAN and other international organizations who are growing seriously concerned over China's long-term intentions in the South China Sea. The area has long served as fishing grounds for Filipinos, Chinese, Vietnamese and other nationals, but this seems to be the first time that fisheries access has been used as an excuse to justify the occupation of a disputed territory.

(3)   In mid-1994, there was a brief confrontation between Chinese warships and a Vietnamese drilling vessel. Vietnam, China and the Philippines have been granting oil exploration/survey grants particularly to Western oil companies. These actions were not solely in pursuit of energy

programs; they were partly demonstrations of sovereignty, with the involvement of foreign companies seen as a hedge against attack by hostile rival claimants.

These examples underscore the serious conflict that may arise in the region, not just between ancient enemies China and Vietnam, but between erstwhile close neighbors China and the Philippines, as well as between long-standing ASEAN partners Malaysia and Thailand.

Ironically, the fundamental requirements of successful management of maritime territorial and jurisdictional disputes have long been present in the region. These requirements are precisely what this conference is all about: shared values and interests. And these shared values and interests have been enshrined as basic principles subscribed to, either explicitly or implicitly, by most Southeast Asian countries and other East Asians as well.

As early as Bandung, we agreed on the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes through dialogue and negotiation, and to pursue cooperation based on equality and mutual benefit in the interests of all countries concerned and of the region as a whole.

In the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TACSEA), we stressed the need for mutual respect of independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. We declared that states have the right to be free from external interference and coercion. Chapter IV of the treaty, which concerns the pacific settlement of disputes, even provides for the establishment of a High Council at ministerial level to deal with disputes which the parties concerned may voluntarily bring to it.

In the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, we advocated self-restraint and the non-threat or use of force in dealing with this specific dispute, then called on the parties to explore possible functional cooperation in maritime navigation and communication, protection against pollution of environment and cooperation against piracy, armed robbery and drug

trafficking in the South China Sea area. We also invited other countries to subscribe to the TACSEA, particularly non-ASEAN parties to the South China Sea disputes, underscoring our belief in common security and the inclusive, cooperative approach. We proposed that TACSEA be the basis of an international code of conduct in dealing with such disputes.

International principles also guide us on the range of options available for dispute settlement. Chapter VI, Article 33 of the United Nations charter enjoins parties to a dispute to first seek a solution "by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."

For a long time, ASEAN preferred to sweep its internal conflicts under the rug and concentrate on common interests, building regional resilience on the basis of domestic stability. It was a good approach, to which we owe our ability today to speak of ASEAN as having shared identities and values. But it is also an approach which may no longer be viable under the present circumstances. I refer most specially to the increased wealth, and therefore increased confidence, assertiveness and nationalism not only within ASEAN but among ASEAN's neighbors as well. I also refer to increased interdependence, which not necessarily homogenizes but at times may lead to greater cleavages, as between more developed and less developed Southeast Asian nations. Wealth and interdependence -- things that are good in themselves -- may lead to cleavage and possibly conflict at a time when no clearcut security regime is yet in place in the region.

One important question thus faces this Southeast Asia Forum. Assuming -- and hoping -- that the full membership of Vietnam and the anticipated entry of Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar proceed without insurmountable difficulty, will ASEAN today, or in the future, be ready to further expand its common ground by addressing the outstanding issues among its member states, rather than by sweeping them under the rug? Are we now ready to make the difficult

compromises of sovereignty that will enable us to pursue further together our vision of common security and prosperity — or, in other words, to suffer short-term pain for long-term gain?

Because the South China Sea (SCS) dispute is often said to be the most intractable, let us take it as a case in point. There have been many proposals for the resolution of the disputes, as well as for the prevention of conflict pending resolution of the sovereignty issues. The Indonesian-sponsored conferences on Managing Potential Conflicts (MPC) are banking on functional cooperation in areas of common benefit as the key to encouraging habits of cooperation and confidence-building among the various claimants. Under the MPC framework, SCS claimants and other littoral states are now exploring cooperation in the following areas: resource assessments (possibly including joint hydrographic surveys of dangerous areas, multilateral scientific expeditions); marine scientific research (information exchanges, sea-level and tide monitoring, biodiversity); safety of navigation, shipping and communications; marine environmental protection; and anti-piracy. When it does take place, concrete cooperation is to be based on principles of step-by-step approach, cost-effectiveness and starting from least controversial issues.

MPC is also now looking into models of joint development. The main advantages of MPC have been its inclusiveness, the presence of non-claimants particularly those willing to serve as mediators, and its involvement of experts, thus expanding the arena of decision-making beyond officials and politicians. Its main difficulties have included the need to skirt the issues of sovereignty, failure to generate discussions on specific confidence-building measures such as demilitarization, and its inability thus far to elevate policy recommendations for adoption by governments of the respective countries. While MPC continues to be a valuable process truly deserving of regional support, it could not prevent, for example, the occupation of Mischief Reef by China, or the threat to fisherfolks posed by overly zealous armed guardians of sovereignty.

Bilateral and even trilateral solutions may provide some answers where multilateral ones are thus far unable to, or where, in the case of the ASEAN

Regional Forum and the ASEAN-China Senior Officials Meeting, the terms of addressing the issue are yet to be defined. The major contribution of initiatives at the bilateral and possibly trilateral level would be in negotiating interim codes of conduct and undertaking confidence-building activities. The talks that have been held in recent years between pairs of major claimants (China-Vietnam, China-Philippines and Philippines-Vietnam) have led to reiterations of principles earlier mentioned: self-restraint, commitment to non-threat or use of force and to peaceful negotiations, cooperation on the basis of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit. It remains for the parties to translate agreement on principles into concrete demonstrations of sincerity.

For Southeast Asian claimants, whose own SCS claims overlap with each other, it has been said that there is a need for us to agree on common approaches and to resolve our own disputes first. Our preparedness to do so will indicate whether we are speaking of ASEAN's shared identities, interests and values as an objective reality, or still as an elusive ideal.

NOTES

1. The concept of a Cold War "overlay" in regional relations was first developed by Barry Buzan.

2. Johnston and Valencia, cited in Ong and Hamzah, "Disputed Maritime Boundaries and Claims to Offshore Territories in the Asia-Pacific Region," a paper presented at a conference on International Boundaries and Environmental Security: Frameworks for Regional Cooperation. June 14-17, Singapore.

3. 1979/90 Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Agreement, 1989 Australia-Indonesia Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty, 1992 Malaysia-Vietnam Memorandum of Understanding, cited in Ong and Hamzah.

4. ICJ deliberations on the North Sea, 1969.

5. Prosper Weil, *The Law of Maritime Delimitation-Reflections*, Cambridge: Grotius Publications Ltd., 1989, pp. 30-31.

6. Ibid, p. 93.

JAPANESE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS: IMPLICATIONS TO PHILIPPINE SECURITY INTERESTS

Romulo D. Peralta *

A discussion on Japan's economic and political developments is a fairly straightforward matter given well laid out plans for its long-term program. The Japanese are quite predictable. The difficulty lies in the eye of the beholder — and how they react to, and understand Japan.

Americans in particular, and Europeans to some extent, are most often unwitting victims of this lack of comprehension. Filipinos too are included here, perhaps because of our veneer of European/American culture and ethics. East Asians, such as the Chinese, Koreans and Vietnamese, and Southeast Asians with a deeply embedded traditional culture, such as the Thais, Malaysians and Indonesians, seem to have less of a problem.

The difficulty is complicated by something typically Japanese. Since their plans are utterly logical from their point of view, precisely laid out and documented, they in turn expect precise reaction, to which they would have a ready set of responses. If the reaction is very much different from their expected array of responses, they become unsettled. But even their reactions are also predictable: they could be immobilized by bewilderment, or they disengage as they take stock of the situation and wait for a consensus on what is to be done, or they stonewall it and try to stick to the old plan. Failing that, if too much loss of face is involved, ordinary suicide, ceremonial "harakiri" or a "kamikaze" reaction is resorted to as the situation requires.

Therefore, to comprehend the implications of Japanese developments on the Philippines and its security interests, we have first to understand Japan.

This requires examining two items: the history of Japan as this has a direct bearing on modern Japanese society and how we should understand it; and Japan's plan for the 21st century and its politico-economic environment, specially its relations with the United States, China and the rest of the Asia-Pacific.

A Brief History of Japan

In 1640, Japan began a self-imposed isolation *(sakoku)* from the rest of the world to keep its culture from being polluted by "European barbarians." Christian missionaries were particularly unwelcome. For the Japanese, priests brought with them a religious culture (Roman Catholicism) which provided the groundwork for the political and economic exploitation a target population. Prime examples for them were the East Indies (Philippines) from where Spanish priests tried to penetrate Japan, and China where Portuguese priests spearheaded European incursions from Macau. This lasted until 1853-54 when Commodore Perry forcibly opened Japan with a powerful naval squadron.

Perry's incursions underscored a lesson brought clearly to Japan during the Anglo-Sino Opium War of 1839-42 (the war that resulted in British monopoly of the opium trade in Asia, and between Asia and Europe, and the ceding of Hongkong and Kowloon to the British): that Western policy was backed by overwhelming force, and that Japan must adapt to, and adopt Western ways in order to avoid being subjugated like the rest of Asia.

Japan then began to undertake one of the greatest, and perhaps most successful experiments in social engineering — or revolution to use a political term — in modern history. The Japanese called this "structural adjustment." The first phase of the adjustment started in the Meiji period (1862-1912) and lasted until the 1920s. Japan's economy, politics, culture and military were systematically reoriented to lay down the foundations of a modern industrial society.

The Japanese found it remarkable that the most powerful European nations were small- to medium-sized states which gained their strength through trade carried by a wide-ranging merchant marine; were protected by a strong navy and an efficient, well-disciplined army capable of surgical strikes and holding territory; and were politically administered by a professional and efficient civil bureaucracy under a parliamentary system.

The Japanese appreciated British economics and politics, industrial management and police system; French culture and diplomacy; and Prussian educational methods, mechanical precision, personal discipline and military (army) tactics. Likewise, they thoroughly studied European economic and political theories. Marxism made a strong impression and complemented their concept of national social responsibility and consensus-building, although the organizational systems related to Marxism in Europe were rejected. Capitalism was also seriously studied to enable them to take on the West on its own terms of trade. Some say they was even a serious assessment as to whether the French language should replace Nihongo in the educational system to speed up the process of adapting to the West.

Following the Western model, Japan began carving an Asian market by invading Korea, then a Chinese protectorate and the only Asian country (aside from Thailand) that had not been taken over by Europeans, ostensibly to "help bring about reforms." In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, Japan won using its new European weapons and tactics. China had to pay an indemnity of US$158 million in 1895 terms, with an additional US$24 million later; Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores (Matsu or Kinmen) were also demanded as bases for trade with the Fujian (Fukien) coast of South China. This new method of capital accumulation enabled Japan to purchase modern industrial machinery from Europe, including top-of-the line battleships from Britain.

Japan also increased its resource base and market by attacking Russian-held territories in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. The Russian Far East Army was utterly destroyed at the Battle of Mukden while the Pacific Fleet

of the Russian navy was blasted to bits by Japan's new battleships. The Russian Baltic Fleet sent from Europe was likewise annihilated at the Battle of the Japan Sea in 1905. This enabled Japan to gain a foothold in Northern China (Manchuria). Japan's strategic objectives were clearcut and simple: to gain access to Manchurian shale oil for industry, soybeans for tahu, and kaoliang (a grain similar to sorghum) for noodles and animal feed. With Japanese peasants streaming to the factories, food in vastly greater quantities had to be obtained and the only source was through downstreaming.

Japan had by then become a political, military and industrial power to reckon with — the only Asian country in a region controlled by European colonialists.

As a footnote to history, some Japanese maintain that they incidentally enabled the Bolsheviks led by Lenin to launch the Great October Socialist Revolution. Accordingly, the Japanese had given the Russian navy and army such a disastrous defeat, it pushed the Russian power elite on the verge of collapse. In any case, the Tsarist regime was given a deathblow by Japan.

The second adjustment took place from the 1920s to the 1960s although it was briefly interrupted by World War II. This stage saw the booming of heavy industry, textile, chemical, petrochemical, electrical and electronics industries. It was characterized by Japan's expansion into a regional and then a world class power.

The Japanese learned two very important lessons during this period. First, a medium-sized country like Japan, with no nearby and real political allies and no internal sources of raw materials, could not win over a huge, industrially-advanced, resource-rich country such as the United States using convential armed warfare. Second, Asians would no longer tolerate another overlord, even an Asian one bearing the slogan of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, specially at a time when they were advancing their movements for national liberation against their colonial and imperialist masters.

In understanding the Japanese mind and its extensions into current economic and political relations, we must carefully note some observations which bear significantly on how the Japanese relate to Filipinos and other Asians. One is that the Japanese take pride in neither having been colonized nor successfully invaded, even by the Chinese, despite attempts such as those by Kublai Khan. They were also able to resist earlier European incursions. On the other hand, most Asian nations, except Thailand, fell before Europeans to the extent of willing servitude. The Japanese also take note that in WW II, most Asians who were colonized by Europeans resisted the invading Japanese, even as they fought the remaining colonialists. The exception were the Filipinos who willingly fought for the Americans and welcomed them as liberators.

The Japanese thus look at other Asians as not quite up to their standards, with Filipinos even lower. As for Americans, they are seen as barbarians to be temporarily tolerated as they have more money and bigger guns — but they too will be worn down. The Chinese are the only people they look up to, more so now. There is, of course, a strong element of racism in this view.

Japan's Security Interests

The third and current structural adjustment deals with Japan's preparations as it enters the 21st century from a position of strength. This calls for the shifting of heavy industry, petrochemicals, electronics, etc., from Japan to its Asian neighbors while Japan itself concentrates on higher value-added and "high information" industries at home. For Japanese policy planners, this move is imperative if Japanese products are to remain competitive in the 21st century. This will also dramatically expand Japan's economic and political power base, integrating the region into a *de facto* realization of its pre-WW II Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere concept.

The current structural adjustment underscores Japan's thrust to become the preeminent eco-political power in the Pacific basin within the first two decades of the next century, and to keep this position until around the

2050s — when the Chinese are expected to take over as a superpower. Key to this process is the implementation of reforms outlined in the General Security Strategy of the State (GSS), i.e., the Japanese state. Drafted in the mid-1960s and formalized in the mid-70s, the GSS is the Japanese government's instrument for promoting "peace and democracy" -- two politically-loaded terms in the Japanese context. These Western liberal values have been appropriated and given Japanese philosophical meanings, and are now being used to consolidate power, both in Japan and internationally.

"Peace," which indicates harmony within Japan and between Japan and other countries, is seen as a prerequisite to economic and political expansion. "Peace" here does not just mean the absence of war, or friendly relations. It is a philosophical concept of complete harmony and integration of being and purpose within the ambit of a common weal, defined under, or better yet, within Japan's leadership. On the other hand, "democracy" is more than just electoral participation or the parliamentary system. It goes beyond the original Greek concept to mean the process of consensus-building at different social or bureaucratic levels and between social classes, within Japan and between Japan and other countries, that is required for effective "peace management."

The salient reforms prescribed in the General Security Strategy (GSS) include:

(1)   Structural reform of industry;

(2)   Labor reforms, specially the unification of the Labor Front;

(3)   Administrative reforms that will more efficiently integrate government bureaucracy with that of business and industry;

(4)   Educational reforms aimed at instilling a new sense of national purpose and identity, as well as technical skills for the new generation of Japanese; and

(5)   "Internationalization" or cultural reprogramming of the Japanese people as befits a world power, and getting Japan

accepted more fully by the international community, which
is considered as the first step to "peace." "Internationalization"
has also been expanded to imply projection of a revised
Japanese culture and its acceptance by its target (i.e.
international) population. Naturally critics have called this
cultural imperialism but it is more a case of cultural
engineering.

Not surprisingly, the name given to the current imperial era is *heisei* -
or the age of "enlightened peace." Here, the major strategic thrust of Japan
is *zenhoi haiwa gaiko* or "omni-directorial peaceful diplomacy," spearheaded
by the *kaisha senshi* or "corporate warrior" under an atmosphere of
kyosei -- meaning "living together in symbiosis." It is interesting to note that
kyosei, a "democratically" derived concept, has been proposed to Europeans
and Americans at the corporate and government levels over the past several
years under the leadership of an informal team from the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry, Nomura Research (representing finance),
and the outspoken chairperson of Sony Corporation (representing consumer
manufacturing).

It will help to remember these terms as the projection of Japanese security
interests will stem from the implementation of their practical implications.
Another term should be added to the list: *keizai kyoryoku*. This has been
loosely translated as "official development aid" or ODA, and has subsequently
caused a great deal of frustration and misunderstanding between Japan and
the Philippines. "Aid" here is not aid, as in assistance in its Western value
implication. The Japanese meaning is strictly "economic cooperation" within
the integrated concept of "peace."

It will be noted here that military considerations have not been included
in the top security interests mentioned. The defense of Japan's territorial
integrity is important, but the Japanese believe that there is no immediate
military threat to their country at this stage. Resources therefore are cost-
efficiently used for industrial production in Japan and in the region. This

approach also helps lay the foundation for "peace" and prevents the need for military confrontation at least within the region.

There is, or course, a great deal of military preparedness specially around the need to keep Japan's commercial sea lanes open. A large part of this job, however, is left to the Americans under the terms of the US-Japan Security Treaty, with Japan paying the bill while Americans take the risks. Perhaps not incidentally, it ties down American resources to non-productive military expenditures that irritates other countries and reduces America's political base. It also reduces marketable US manufactures which are then replaced by Japanese exports. To illustrate, it is estimated that 80 percent of the US annual US$300 billion defense budget is used to maintain its position as a global superpower. That is a lot of money and technology taken out of the productive market.

For over two decades, Japan has pursued a policy of "independence" from the US in strategic economic planning and military research and development. Now the Japanese have an independent aerospace and military electronics industry. An all-Japan-designed cruise missile with greater payload, range and accuracy than US-made ones has been tested. Ceramic engines for armored vehicles are being tried out. A propellerless submarine whose thrust will be derived from water electromagnetically expelled through a central tube, is also being designed. The submarine, which will be extremely important for keeping Japan's sea lanes open, will be similar in a way to Japan Railways' experimental magnetically-levitated trains. Its speed, noiselessness, payload and maneuverability will supposedly be superior to Russian and American counterparts.

Japan's military capability can be gleaned from a 1988 report which features Japan top industrialists as having said that if the export ban is lifted, they can corner 45 percent of the world's sale of tanks and motorized artillery, 40 percent of military electronics, and 60 percent of warship construction. Japan is not a nuclear power at the moment, but if necessary, it has the technical

and financial capability to become one in a short time. All it needs is a regional political base.

The Politico-Economic Environment in the 21st Century

The 21st century is widely acknowledged to be the Asia-Pacific century. However, the term "Asian century" may be more appropriate since the greatest economic growth will be in the Asian landmass and the surrounding archipelagic states.

The initial areas of greatest growth are Japan, South Korea, the metropolitan centers of Southeast Asia and the coastal areas of China. This is expected to expand towards Asian Russia, Indochina, India and possibly Australia.

An Asian megamarket is coming about, stretching from Beijing to Shanghai, Kanto and Kansai (the megalopoli surrounding Tokyo and Osaka), Seoul, Taiwan, Xiamen, Hongkong, Guangzhou, Hainan, Hainoi and Haiphong, Ho Chi Minh, Bangkok, Metro Manila, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Brisbane, Sydney, and on to Calcutta, Bombay and New Delhi. How Asia is preparing for this market is indicated by the fact that of 11 new mega-airports to be completed around the year 2000, 10 are in Asia and only one is in the US — Denver, away from the action.

Major regional animosities spawned by American strategic interests during the Cold War are giving way to the regional cooperation required by Asian countries' own strategic interests. Japan, for one, is quickly expanding economic and political ties with all countries in the region, specially those in Southeast Asia and China. On the other hand, China is vastly improving its relations with Russia. Its top leaders visited Russia in late 1993 to stress the need for cooperation, removal of border troops and missiles aimed at each other, and the enhancement of trade worth at least US$7.5 billion per year. On top of this, China was reported to have purchased US$5 billion worth of Russian arms in 1995. China's Foreign Minister Qian Quichen said "the visit

has positioned bilateral ties towards the 21st century." Likewise, India, which has considerable ties with Russia, has arrived at a *quid pro quo* with China regarding their border problem, and practical terms of cooperation are being worked out.

A politico-economic bloc consisting of the world's largest and most populous countries has begun to take shape, with direct linkages to other Asian countries. This is resulting in a demand for finance capital, capital equipment, consumer goods, technical skills, advanced engineering and research, fuel and power, food, health care, services and labor on a scale the world has never known. Global supremacy will greatly depend on how much of these resources a country will be able to control and supply, and how much of the ensuing benefits will be apportioned to its people, and be used as additional capital. Japan is angling to supply or finance much of the technical requirements.

The preeminent position of the US is being challenged by these developments, and the strategic implications of such challenge surpass that posed by China and the USSR after WW II.

At the start of the so-called "new world order," the cross-Pacific trade is already bigger than the trans-Atlantic. This early, the US is hard put to cope with its trade imbalance which amounts to US$50 billion with Japan alone, not to mention Korea and China. This is expected to get worse as China and the rest of Asia gear up their manufactures.

Current figures are indicative of the trend. It is estimated that of Asia's 25 percent share of world mechandise trade from 1980 to 1992, exports rose from 16 percent to 25 percent, while imports increased only from 17 percent to 21 percent. It is conservatively projected that of the increase in total world imports from 1992 to the year 2000, East Asia alone will supply 33 percent; the US, 19 percent; the European Union, 24 percent; and the rest of the world, 24 percent.

It is of strategic concern to the US that most of Asia's trade is now intra-Asian and bigger than the cross-Pacific. From 1985 to 1992, intra-Asian trade's share of total Asian exports rose from about 34 percent to 43 percent, Asia to US trade fell from 33 percent to about 24 percent, while US to Asia trade increased slightly from 21 percent to 26 percent. In the case of Japan, exports to Asia rose from about 24 percent of all exports in 1985 to 35 percent in 1993. In the same period, Japan's exports to the US declined from 36 percent to 29 percent. Asia is now Japan's largest source of trade surplus.

Analysts project that by the year 2000, the US economy will create an estimated $1 trillion in new wealth. In comparison, Japan, with a smaller economy, will create the same amount. Japan and the rest of East Asia are expected to produce $2.5 trillion. The US will need to capture a large share of this market. Failure will mean a tremendous increase in the region's trade surplus with the US, and a decrease in US manufactures and capital exports. This is a situation the US cannot tolerate if it means to keep its status as a first-rate economy. For now, the US is, to a large degree, out of this market. This is a major reason why the US has been pushing hard for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) where it can be the first among equals, and has been opposed to the East Asia Economic Cooperation (EAEC) where it will be excluded.

If we take the combination of Japanese and Korean finance, technology and management, Chinese skills and lower labor costs, and cheap and plentiful Russian resources, into consideration, then the US will be effectively shut out from the Asian market for reasons of uncompetitiveness.

Some of the projects being proposed promise to create great impact. These include the Tumen River Industrial Complex at the confluence of the borders of North Korea, China and Russia, that will most likely be financed mainly by Japan and South Korea. Another is the high-speed, high-capacity rail line from Vladivostok to Europe that is reported to be under study by Japanese planners. This will link with an expanded Chinese railway which in turn will be connected to a modernized version of the old British railway in

Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. The net result will be an increase in trade between Europe and Asia via the land route (the old silk route?), and perhaps a decrease in the trans-Atlantic trade where the US still enjoys a surplus. Technical skills, wealth and demand for more manufactures, food, services and goods will flourish along the route. Japanese finance and technology will be at a premium.

An oil industry is also being developed along the Asian continental shelf on Cambodian, Thai and Vietnamese territories, as oil wells in China and Russia are being upgraded. At the same time, nuclear power plants and hydroelectric projects are on the rise. Aside from providing a market for Japanese capital and technology, these will lessen Japanese and Asian dependence on American-controlled Middle East oil.

All these developments will require a tremendous degree of "peace" management and "internationalization" on the part of Japan. They will also require a redefinition of the role of the American politico-military umbrella in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as well as changes in international strategic security concerns. Japan has already been identified by the US as its immediate strategic enemy in the post-USSR era. The role of US bases in Japan and Korea is beginning to change.

Implications to Philippine Security Interests

Developments in Japan and in the region have a direct impact on Philippine interests. The difficulty, however, is in trying to pin down exactly what these interests are, the rhetoric of "Philippines 2000" notwithstanding.

The elusive character of Philippine national goals stands in sharp contrast to those of the other countries of the region. In the case of Indonesia, its main goal is to become a major industrial and political power, for which reason it has built Southeast Asia's biggest and most advanced aircraft facility near Bandung, where parts of both commercial and military aircraft are manufactured, assembled or maintained. During its last independence day

celebration, an Indonesian-designed and manufactured commercial turboprop airplane flew for the first time. President Suharto has promised that by 2010, the first Indonesian commercial jetliner will fly. Indonesia is also putting up a US$1billion facility for the manufacture and maintenance of naval vessels, in addition to having purchased much of the former East Germany's naval craft. Finally, one million hectares of new riceland will be put into production within ten years to ensure food security.

Other Asian countries likewise have clearcut interests. Singapore's objective is to remain the region's primary commodity, finance, trading and industrial service center, while Brunei aspires to be a regional finance clearing house. Malaysia, on the other hand, aims to be a leading industrial manufacturer and agricultural products processing center. It is also geared to eliminate the Philippine edible fats and oils industry.

Thailand is already a major agricultural exporter and tourist center. Likewise, it has laid the grounds for industrial export production. By 1996, Toyota alone is projected to manufacture one million cars in Thailand for export. Meanwhile, South Korea, which is already a leading heavy industrial and electronic producer, has begun exporting capital. It is also poised to enter the aerospace industry with a joint Samsung-Fokker project that will design and manufacture medium-range passenger aircraft. Finally, Vietnam, which is now a major agricultural exporter, seeks to become an industrial manufacturer within ten years.

The major security interests of these countries are defined by their strategic goals. In common, they consider it crucial to establish basic agricultural and industrial policies, hold national capital firmly in the hands of national entrepreneurs, and take government action to establish, protect and maintain markets, as well as support research and development. They are part of an Asian bloc characterized by strong Japanese technological and financial influence.

These countries have placed a premium on the establishment of universities to generate the necessary technological support. They have ensured internal peace and order and have maintained rational, long-range and comprehensive national development plans, with the corresponding political will to implement them.

In contrast, the Medium Term Philippine Development Plan crafted by the Philippine government does not seem to be at par with other Asian countries' programs. This leaves out the Philippines as the odd man of Asia.

Since Japan and nearby countries cannot afford to have one country that is out of tune with the rest of the region, they will be sorely tempted to engage in some form of action to push the Philippines in the desired economic or political direction. The complication is, as the US loses ground in Asia, the Philippines may remain as its last area of influence. It will try to keep the Philippines out of synch with the rest of the region for its own advantages, or use it as its entry point to Asian markets, as the Philippines itself volunteered at the APEC meeting in Seattle. To illustrate, in a very recent case, Asian airlines were disappointed when the Philippines opened the backdoor of the lucrative regional air cargo business to the previously excluded US air cargo lines.

Unless the Philippines clearly identifies itself with Asia, it might turn out to be the regional pariah and the battleground of Asian-US strategic interests. In this case, what, in reality, are our security interests as a nation and as a people?

PHILIPPINE-VIETNAM RELATIONS:
A PRELIMINARY STUDY

M. Ragos-Espinas *

A Historical Overview

Relations between the Philippines and Vietnam started many centuries ago. Evidences show that inhabitants of both countries had already engaged in maritime trade prior to the coming of the Europeans.[1] The great trading port of Vietnam then was Vandan in the Gulf of Tonkin and ships from the Philippine island of Luzon were among those which regularly visited the port. These maritime trading relations were interrupted by the Europeans' conquest of the Philippines and Vietnam in the 16th and 19th centuries, respectively.

Philippine-South Vietnam relations were resumed only in 1964.[2] In South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem took the helm of government in October 1955 after Bao Dai abdicated, and after a year, Diem was finally nominated as first President by the New Legislative Assembly.[3] In the meantime, Ramon Magsaysay had become President of the Philippines in December 1953. Interestingly, the state of South Vietnam, which came into existence in 1950 and was supported by France, the United States and Great Britain, was not recognized immediately by the Philippines. It was only in 1954 that official contact was established between the two countries.

From 1956-1960, President Diem embarked on a diplomatic campaign to gain wider acceptance in Asia. The information connection linking Saigon to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) offered opportunities for contacts with some members of the Western camp, such as the Philippines and Thailand. President Diem made state visits to various countries such as Thailand, India, Korea, China, Malaysia and the Philippines, which in turn were reciprocated by the Heads of State or Prime Ministers of these countries.[4]

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In light of President Magsaysay's foreign policy to improve and strengthen "the existing friendship between the Philippines and other nations of the free world particularly that of Asia and the United States, and to contribute to the cause of world freedom and peace through the United Nations,"[5] it was only a matter of time before the Philippines would extend diplomatic recognition to South Vietnam. In one of the breakfast conferences in Malacañang, President Magsaysay presented the issue to his congressional leaders.[6] Senator Claro M. Recto argued against recognition, claiming that the Philippines was merely being used by the United States to further its interests in Asia, and that Philippine recognition of Vietnam would prove most embarrassing because the communists would topple the South Vietnamese government in a matter of months. Recto's objection, however, was to no avail. On July 14, 1955, President Magsaysay decided to grant recognition to South Vietnam, a move which needed no Senate sanction.

In the meantime, without waiting for the debate concerning recognition to end, some Filipino Jaycees, with the strong support and blessings of President Magsaysay, flocked to Saigon to help in all kinds of humanitarian endeavors: refugee work, relief, sanitation and medical care. Their work crystallized into what was then known as "Operation Brotherhood" which later broadened into a worldwide movement as other nations joined hands with the Philippines in organizing relief and mobilizing support for the Vietnamese refugees. Though Operation Brotherhood was a humanitarian undertaking, it carried political overtones. The name itself alluded to the Armed Forces of the Philippines' doctrine of bringing about a "brotherhood" between soldiers and civilians during the Huk rebellion. According to then US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Operation Brotherhood was a "dramatic" response by the "free world" to Vietnamese problems.[7]

Following official recognition of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in 1955, the Philippine Congress appropriated funds for the establishment of embassies in the three states, with residence in Saigon. The Philippine government opened its temporary office in October 1955 with Delfin Garcia as *charge d'affaires*. On December 1 of the same year, a suitable site for the chancery was located at No. 1 rue aux Fleura where the Philippine flag was first unfurled from a public building in Vietnam. The first ministers exchanged were Cao Thai Bao and Mariano Espeleta for Vietnam and the Philippines, respectively.

During the term of President Carlos P. Garcia, the Philippines signed a Treaty of Friendship with the Republic of Vietnam in 1959.[8] President Garcia also made a state visit to South Vietnam on April 22-26, 1959 to show official support to the latter.

Under the Macapagal administration, the Philippines sent technical aid to South Vietnam. President Macapagal even hinted to American leaders that the Philippines would join the United States in the fight against communism, if requested.[9]

South Vietnam's request for assistance from the Philippines in its fight against communist forces from the North dates back to July 1964, when Major General Nguyen Kanh, then Chair of the Military Revolutionary Council of South Vietnam, addressed a note to then President Macapagal, indicating his hope for such assistance. On April 14, 1965, Phan Huey Quat, Prime Minister of South Vietnam, likewise sent a letter to the Philippine President, stating that South Vietnam was in "dire need for (*sic*) engineering troops, transportation companies and many types of military specialists."[10] In his letter, Prime Minister Quat expressed hope "to see about two thousand Filipino soldiers here as soon as possible."[11] President Macapagal asked Congress to appropriate the amount needed for the request.

On February 2, 1996, under the first term of Ferdinand E. Marcos, the South Vietnamese government reiterated its request for aid in terms of army engineers with security support. President Marcos asked Congress to deliberate on this request, upon which Congress approved a second Philippine aid to South Vietnam. The bill became known as Republic Act No. 4664 and was signed by President Marcos on July 14, 1966.[12]

There were several reasons why the Philippines extended support to the Republic of Vietnam. The Philippines participated in the Manila Summit in October 1966 where seven member countries committed to help South Vietnam in its fight against the North and to support its efforts to achieve economic stability and progress.[13] The Philippines also signed the SEATO Treaty whereby it agreed that any attack on any of the signatories would be considered a threat to the security and peace of the others.[14] Another justification given for Philippine support to South Vietnam was its membership in the United Nations (UN). The UN Charter provides for the creation of

mechanisms to ensure international peace and security. It empowers members of the organization to form regional security arrangements for their own defense. Hence, on the bases of UN provisions for the maintenance of security and peace, as well as its membership in SEATO, the Philippine government strongly supported South Vietnam's fight against the North. It can be said that the bilateral relations between the two countries were primarily political. The Philippine government, at the time, followed the United States' policy of containing communism in Southeast Asia, hence, its involvement in the Vietnam War.

In the cultural sphere, there was no significant effort from both governments to develop cultural ties, as they were more engrossed in seeking international support for the war efforts in Vietnam. In the case of the Philippines, the government met strong opposition from the people, specially among intellectuals, workers and students, on the issue of sending PHILCAG to South Vietnam. During the Manila Summit in October 1966, a massive demonstration was held by students, professionals, labor unions and other citizens groups to protest Philippine involvement in the Vietnam War. Even in the halls of Congress, there was a significant minority who consistently opposed the proposed Vietnam Aid Bill. [15]

In the economic sphere, however, many members of the Filipino business community as well as workers went to South Vietnam to establish businesses on their own or in partnership with Vietnamese nationals to cater to the wartime needs of the economy. Thousands of Filipino laborers worked for American construction firms not only in South Vietnam but also in Cambodia and Laos. [16] Others found work in bars, night clubs and other service centers which catered to the needs of American soldiers during the war. These Filipinos were among the thousands of refugees who fled upon the seizure of Saigon by North Vietnamese forces in 1975.

The Philippine Embassy in Saigon was closed on April 29, 1975 as Ambassador Agustin Mangila left the country, along with two embassy staff, who had stayed on to supervise the evacuation of Filipinos stranded in the beleaguered city. [17]

Philippine-SRV Relations Under Marcos

Even before the defeat of the Saigon government, the Philippine government had begun to open communication lines with North Vietnam preparatory to the establishment of diplomatic relations. President Marcos had reportedly authorized Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to make direct contacts while she was in the Middle East for state visits in early 1975.[18] The Marcos government stressed that developments in Indochina, such as the fall of Cambodia and encirclement of Saigon and its impending fall to the communist forces, made it urgent for the Philippines to establish direct communication lines with Hanoi.[19]

This political move should not be surprising in light of the new directions that President Marcos had begun to set for Philippine foreign policy. Faced with a growing need to make foreign policy serve the nation's interests, the Marcos government sought to establish political relations with socialist countries in order to broaden opportunities for economic and trade relations. This new pragmatism was clearly reflected in a speech before the Manila Overseas Press Club, where President Marcos said that Asia must come to terms with China, a large continent with a teeming population that was bound to influence regional politics. The same theme was articulated in his 1969 State of the Nation address where he expressed the need to have an open mind concerning relations with socialist countries.[20]

Seen in this light, the Philippine overtures toward Hanoi even before the collapse of the Thieu government in the South were clearly made in anticipation of the changing realities in Indochina. President Marcos must have realized that the United States could no longer guarantee against communist expansion in Asia. The fall of Vietnam was thus a signal for the Philippine government to review its foreign policy orientation. Regional cooperation among Asians, whether communist or not, was the dictate of the times. Thus, the Philippine government sought to normalize relations with the new communist states in Indochina.

On July 9, 1976, Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien arrived in Manila to discuss the formal opening of diplomatic relations with the Philippines. This visit by a ranking Vietnamese official was part of a diplomatic offensive by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) to forge friendly ties

with all of its Southeast Asian neighbors. On July 12, 1976, the Philippines and Vietnam formally began diplomatic relations, making the Philippines the fourth country in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to do so.[21]   Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore had earlier simultaneously normalized ties with SRV.

Representatives of the Philippine and Vietnamese governments signed a joint communique articulating the following principles as bases for their relationship:

(1)   Respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; non-aggression and non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality, mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence;

(2)   Not to allow any foreign country to use one's territory as a base for direct or indirect aggression and intervention against the other country or other countries in the region;

(3)   Establishment of friendly and good neighborly relations, economic cooperation and cultural exchanges on the bases of equality and mutual benefit.

(4)   Promotion of cooperation among countries in the region for the benefit of genuine independence, peace, prosperity and neutrality in Southeast Asia, thereby contributing to peace in the world.[22]

Vietnam and the Philippines set up their respective embassies in 1978. The first problem faced by the newly opened Philippine Embassy in Hanoi was the repatriation of 14 Filipinos and ten Vietnamese families who were still in Ho Chi Minh City. There were also attempts by Vietnamese nationals to enter the Philippines illegally by passing themselves off as members of Filipino families.[23]   Reports of Filipinos being involved in illegal trading and black market activities were also received by the Philippine Embassy.[24] These were some of the irritants that plagued Philippine-Vietnam relations up to the early 1980s.

On January 9, 1978, the two countries signed an agreement on economic, scientific and technical cooperation covering various fields such as trade,

transport, communications, agriculture and natural resource-based industries.[25] They likewise signed a trade agreement which provided for a "most-favored-nation" treatment in all matters relating to: (1) customs duties and charges of any kind, including the method of levying such duties and charges, imposed in connection with imports and exports; (2) rules and formalities connected with customs clearance; (3) all internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with imported and exported goods; and (4) issuance of import and export licenses.[26]

A top Philippine official summed up the bilateral relations between the Philippines and Vietnam under the Marcos administration as "warm" and "friendly," with both governments seeking to develop more cultural and economic contacts for their mutual benefit. The same official observed that the Philippine government supported private efforts to develop cultural as well as trade relations even if it was critical of Vietnamese presence in Cambodia.[27]

In terms of socio-cultural activities, both countries promoted exchange visits among scholars, scientists, government officials and members of their respective business communities. In 1981, about 118 Vietnamese nationals were received as guests by the Philippine government.[28] On the whole, however, more Filipinos have visited Vietnam since the opening of diplomatic relations.[29] Both governments have also shown documentary films on culture, history and national progress.

During the early 1980s, the Philippines enjoyed a positive balance of trade vis-a-vis Vietnam as shown below:[30]

PHILIPPINE-VIETNAM TRADE
1980-1983
(in US $ million)

YEAR	EXPORTS	IMPORTS	TOTAL TRADE	BALANCE OF TRADE
1980	5,872	-	5,872	5,872+
1981	3,069	9,000	3,078	3,060+
1982	2,259	-	-	2,259+
1983	698	-	698	698+

Philippine exports to Vietnam consisted mainly of food, construction materials, chemicals and related products. According to a top official of the Philippine International Trading Cooperation which oversees trading activities with socialist countries, trade with Vietnam during this period was *non-productive* (underscoring supplied) in the sense that it did not serve Philippine economic development thrusts.[31] A major obstacle to better trade between the two countries was the difference in their trading mechanisms. Vietnam had informally proposed barter as a means of economic exchange, but the Philippines did not welcome this idea since barter was deemed inefficient in modern international economic transactions. In addition, the low trading with Vietnam could be interpreted as the Philippines' tacit expression of support to US economic sanctions on Vietnam for its military occupation of Cambodia.

RP-Vietnam Relations Today

Bilateral relations between the Philippines and Vietnam levelled off during the Aquino administration due to the following: ASEAN's policy of isolating Vietnam in Southeast Asia because of its occupation of Cambodia, the instability of the Aquino administration, and Vietnam's own problems concerning its internal reconstruction. Nonetheless, it was during the Aquino administration that the two countries began to hold annual bilateral consultations to discuss economic and political matters of mutual interest.[32] As a result of these consultations, as well as the visit of H.E. Von Van Kiet, Chair of the Council of Ministers of SRV who came to the Philippines on February 26-28, 1992, three agreements were signed, all aimed at developing trade and investments between the two countries.[33]

Aside from visits to Vietnam between 1988 to 1991 by key government officials, no outstanding event concerning Philippine-Vietnam relations took place during the time of President Aquino. Despite the open door policy of the Vietnamese government, the Aquino administration did not seize the opportunity to vigorously pursue investment initiatives. This was in contrast to its ASEAN neighbors, specially Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia, who, despite ASEAN's policy of confrontation against Vietnam, nonetheless increased their investments in the latter. Furthermore, little effort was taken to enhance people-to-people contacts in order to improve knowledge of each

other's tradition and historical experiences. Cultural contacts are important in bringing about mutual understanding of each nation's problems and aspirations and for encouraging greater cooperation.

In recent years and specially during the Ramos administration, economic and trade relations between the two countries have undergone remarkable improvements, specially after the visits of President Fidel V. Ramos to Vietnam in March 1994, and President Le Due Anh to the Philippines in November 1995.[34]   Such visits have been the driving force in deepening the friendly relations and economic cooperation between Vietnam and the Philippines. Indeed, it was during this period that Philippine business ventures in Vietnam increased.[35] But compared to other countries, the amount of Philippine investments in Vietnam is still ranked the lowest. Likewise, trade between the two countries is limited to a few types of products. In December 1995, however, the Philippine government imported about 200,000 tons of rice from Vietnam to avert a possible shortage.[36] Though they too had a difficult rice harvest, the Vietnamese agreed to the sale as "a gesture of friendship."

Vietnam is now the world's third largest rice exporter, a significant feat for a country that was totally devastated by war. In fact, it has overtaken the Philippines in terms of rice production. The Philippines, though, still has the upperhand in terms of trade and investments: in 1995, Philippine exports to Vietnam reached a total of $66 million while imports amounted to only $11 million.[37]

The Philippines and Vietnam will have to re-assess their economic cooperation in light of the economic conditions of both countries. Since both countries generally produce the same types of goods, it may be necessary to focus their trade on certain products or services in order to maximize specific advantages.

Politically, while the two countries are rival claimants to the Spratly Islands, both have recognized the importance of joint cooperation in the development of the South China Sea without prejudice to existing sovereignty claims. In April 1996, a joint RP-Vietnam marine research team undertook a cooperative effort to explore "the physical and biological processes in the

South China Sea."[38] Such activity was significant in that it demonstrated the symbolic role both countries could play in reducing international tensions over the Spratlys.

On the whole, RP-Vietnam relations has developed favorably in recent years. There is a growing interest among Philippine business groups to invest or undertake joint ventures in Vietnam. In terms of cultural exchange, Filipinos are beginning to appreciate the dynamism of the Vietnamese people as they struggle with the challenges of national reconstruction and economic development. More and more Filipinos wish to visit Vietnam to witness the heroic effort of its people to rebuild their country.   Hopefully, this will be a telling lesson for many Filipinos.

NOTES

1.   Le Thanh Khoi, *Le Vietnam Histoire et Civilisation* (Paris: les Editions de Minuet, 1955), P. 150. *Vietnam, A Historical Sketch* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1974), pp. 17-18. Aurora Roxas-Lim, *The Evidence of Ceramics as an Aid in Understanding the Pattern of Trade in the Philippines and Southeast Asia* (Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 1987), pp. 20-21.

2.   *The Republic of Vietnam,* Embassy of the Republic of Vietnam, Manila, October 1962, p. 31.

3.   *Ibid.,* p. 20.

4.   *Ibid.,* p. 32.

5.   Jesus V. Merritt, *Magsaysay, Man of the People* (Manila: Far Eastern Publishing Co., 1953), p. 75.

6.   *Ibid.*

7.   J.L. Vellut, *The Asian Policy of the Philippines, 1954-1961* (Canberra: Australian National University, 1965), p. 28.

8.   Signed in Saigon, April 26, 1959, *Republic of the Philippines, Treaty Series* (R.P.T.S.), Vol. III, No. 3, pp. 10-16.

9.   *Past Report* (Saigon: Republic of Vietnam, October 1965), p. 3.

10.   "Communique of the SEATO 11th Council Meeting," *Selected Documents on International Affairs* (Canberra, Australia: Department of External Affairs, December 1966), pp. 51-52.

11.   Diosdado Macapagal, *The Philippines Turns East* (Quezon City: MacPublishing House, 1966), p. 87.

12.   Ferdinand E. Marcos, "Address on the State of the Nation," *Congressional Record*, Vol. I, No. 1, 1966, p. 19.

13.   Ferdinand E. Marcos, *A Battle for Peace.* Speeches and Statements of President Marcos on PHILCAG and Vietnam and Documents of the Seven-Nation Summit Meeting in Manila. Manila, 1968.

14.   SEATO Treaty, Article 3.

15.   Among the prominent legislators who opposed any form of aid to South Vietnam were Senators Lorenzo M. Tanada, Jose W. Diokno, Ambrosio Padilla and Congressmen Ramon V. Mitra, Juan R. Liwag, Sagun and Agbayani. Among the prominent ones who favored were Speakers Villareal, Pendatun, Raul Manglapus, Lorenzo Sumulong and Jose J. Roy.

16.   Jeanne L. Arquiza, "Filipino Businessman Makes Good in South Vietnam," *Republic Weekly* (March 13, 1970):9.

17.   Louie Perez, "Filipino Nationals in Saigon Evacuated," *Bulletin Today*, 29 April 1975, p. 1.

18.   Government to Set up Ties with North Vietnam, *Bulletin Today*, 21 April 1975, p. 1.

19.   *Ibid.*

20.   Ferdinand E. Marcos, "The Filipinism: The Turning Point," State of the Nation Message to the Congress of the Philippines, 27 January 1969.

21.   "Vietnamese Delegation Arrives in Manila 9 July," *United States Foreign Broadcast Information Services: Asia and Pacific IV* (July 12, 1976): p. 1.

22.   *Ibid.*, p. 2.

23.   Interview with a top government official, Manila, Philippines, 22 July 1986.

24. *Ibid.*

25. Benjamin B. Domingo, *Philippines Trade and Economic Agreements* (Manila: Foreign Service Institute, 1983), 89-90.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94.

27. Interview with a top government official, Manila, Philippines, 22 July 1986.

28. *MFA Document*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 July 1986.

29. Interview with Mr. Phan Trong Thai, Embassy of the Socialist First Republic of Vietnam, Manila, Philippines, 29 July 1986.

30. *Foreign Trade Statistics of the Philippines*, National Census and Statistics Office, 1985.

31. Interview with Mrs. Minerva Fajardo, Philippine International Trading Corporation, Makati, Metro Manila. 24 July 1986.

32. DFA, "Chronology of Philippines-Vietnam Relations."

33. The agreements were: Agreements on the Establishment of the Joint Communique on Economic Cooperation (JCEC) and the Joint Communique on Trade (JCT); Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments; and Agreement on Maritime Shipping.

34. *World Affairs Weekly. Special Supplement*, 1996, p. 21.

35. Among the prominent Philippine investors are: San Miguel Brewery, Victorias Milling Co., San Miguel Glass, UNILAB, Liwayway Industrial Food Company, Jollibee, JSN Laboratories, Ligo Marine Products, Philippine Animation, et al.

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37. "RP-Vietnam in new trade pact," *Manila Chronicle*, 4 December 1995, p. 11.

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THE CHINESE IN THE PHILIPPINES: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

Teresita Ang See *

China's growth, coupled with its open door policy in recent years, has attracted considerable investments from Chinese overseas, specially from Southeast Asian countries. To a certain extent, this has created a "China fever" in the form of an investments and development rush into China. This in turn has led to new speculations about the cultural renewal and reorientation or "resinicization" of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. All these recent developments — investments rush, China fever and discussions on the possibilities of resinicization — raise a pressing need to reexamine the ethnic Chinese problem specially for those who espouse integration to the mainstream as a solution to this dilemma.

The growing interest and preoccupation with China certainly challenge the prevailing thought that, for the ethnic Chinese, the only direction or alternative is to be an integral part of mainstream society and be an inseparable weave in the fabric of the nation where they chose to sink their roots into. Hence, in discussing the problem of continuity and change in Southeast Asian ethnic Chinese communities, I have chosen to make an exploratory analysis of the new wave of "China fever" in relation to the integration of the Chinese community into Philippine life.[1]

Background on the Philipine-Chinese Community

There are between 800,000 to 850,000 Chinese in the Philippines, making up roughly 1.3 percent of the total Philippine population of 68 million. It is the smallest ethnic Chinese population in all of the Southeast Asian countries, both in absolute number and in relation to the native population. Eighty-five percent of the early immigrant Chinese who found their way to

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the Philippines hailed from the province of Fujian in China and 15 percent from the province of Guangdong.

The history of the Chinese presence in the Philippines dates back to pre-Hispanic times. Since then, the Chinese community in the Philippines has slowly evolved from that of an immigrant community to a well-integrated one. The earlier community was composed mainly of members whose dreams were of doing well in their temporary home and one day triumphantly going back to their mother country. The present day community is largely composed of a new generation of Chinese Filipinos whose commitments are to that of their country of birth. Eighty-five percent of the ethnic Chinese population now are composed of local-born second, third and fourth generations who were raised and educated in the Philippines.

The Immigrant First Generation

Although the history of the Chinese in the Philippines dates back to more than a thousand years, the appearance of the local-born second generation had been delayed until the end of World War II for various reasons. Among them were the massacres and mass expulsions during the Spanish regime[2] which wiped out a big part of the population at that time, and the implementation of the California Exclusion Act in the Philippines during the American regime.[3] These historical incidents greatly limited the number of Chinese in the Philippines and resulted in the split family system typical of many early immigrant communities. The head of the family was in the Philipines but the wife and small children were left behind in China. Thus, the sons were born and raised in China and were brought to the Philippines only when they were old enough to be of help to the father. The cycle was repeated when the son returned to China to get married.

Hence, it was mainly just after World War II when whole families, including the women, immigrated to the Philippines, that the native-born generation appeared. Therefore, except for a few who came to the Philippines much earlier and had been assimilated completely into the Filipino mainstream, the first generation in the contemporary Chinese Filipino community are mostly composed of those who immigrated to the Philippines before the war and during the 1970s and 80s.[4] Their local-born children now make up the second and third generations.

Because of this particular historical condition, many of the first generation immigrants remain alive today, and in fact, still exercise leadership in the Chinese community through their organizations. Traditional organizations in the Chinese community as well as Chinese schools and Chinese language newspapers could not exist without them. Naturally, the younger second or third generations also play a certain role, but as long as the first generation parents are still around, their thoughts, sentiments and actions usually become the basis for describing the make-up of the local Chinese Filipino community.

At present, if we say China fever or *hua-wen* fever (strong, preoccupation with Chinese language education) in the Chinese Filipino community, it is mainly reflected in the first generation immigrants and their organizations. Given their nature and emotional sentiments, this does not come as a surprise. However, beyond this very limited circle of people, the situation is vastly different. Although the first generation immigrants have exerted great efforts to teach the second and third generations to follow in their footsteps and hew their line, or to be as engrossed as they are regarding their hometowns in China, the outome has been very limited. As a result of the environment and historical forces, the changes in the nature, sentiments and aspirations of the younger generations are as inevitable as "flower falling from its stem."

The Local-born Young Generation

This brings to fore another problem — when we study the Chinese community in the Philipines, do we use the viewpoint of a community in flux or one that is stagnant? Do we look at the majority local-born generation or the minority first generation who, however, wields positions of influence? Do we consider the long-term or limit our analysis to the short-term? The positions on these issues would largely affect the way we perceive the Chinese community in the Philippines. Different studies have been done about the changes that have been taking place among the post-war local-born generation. Some of these changes revolve around dimensions like first language, reading habits and outlook on intermarriage.[5] More recent studies, however, reinforce the observation that while the older generation immigrant Chinese have persisted in the preservation of Chinese culture, the tide of change among the younger generation could no longer be turned back.

In 1991, the Philippine-Chinese Language Education Research Center and an exchange scholar from the East Asian Studies of the University of Tokyo undertook a research on the cultural background and identity of students of the Philippine Cultural High School (PCHS), the oldest Chinese high school in the Philippines and the one with the highest standard of Chinese language education. The survey was conducted among freshmen to senior high school students (first to fourth year) with ages ranging from 12 to 19 years. Some of the data obtained were quite revealing.[6] One of the questions asked was the number of times the students have gone to China. Their responses were:

Not at all	70%
Once	10%
Twice	7%
Thrice	3%
Four or five times	1%

Because of their age and financial capability, the number of times a student has gone to China will certainly be vastly different from the adults; but the figures still show that at least among high school students, one cannot see the ardent China fever in existence, as only 10 percent of them have been to China. When the students were asked about the subjects they liked most, the result was:

English	79%
Filipino	72%
Chinese	46%

As to the subjects they liked least or do not like, the answers were:

Chinese	14%
English	1%
Filipino	2%

Quite interesting is the response to the question that, in a competition among the sports teams of China, Taiwan and the Philippines, which one will you root for? Those who expressed support for the Philippines were twice those for China and five times those for Taiwan. This again is a strong

indication that among the younger ones, China fever does not exist. We have to emphasize that PCHS is located near the center of the so-called Chinatown area; not only is its Chinese language standard among the highest, it also has the most links with China. If other schools had been chosen, like those which are more westernized in approach or those outside the cities or in the provinces, the results of the survey would have probably been more revealing. This survey reinforces our earlier contention that among the younger generation, not only is China fever difficult to whip up but their sense of identification with the Philippines has already been firmly established. Hence, their integration into the mainstream remains to be the historical direction and choice that Chinese Filipinos can opt for.

In terms of background, upbringing, orientation and education, there are indeed significant differences between this younger generation and the older immigrant generation, a summary of which is given below.[7]

The younger generation	The older generation
Born after World War II	Born before World War II
Born in the Philippines, usually has adopted a Christian name	Born in China, usually has a Chinese name
Identify more with the Philippines and have no first hand experiences of China	Have deep sentiments toward China and first hand or at least childhood experiences of China
Can easily cross ethnic barriers; socialize both with Chinese and Filipinos; at ease in both environments	Confine their lives and activities within the Chinese community socialize more with Chinese
Join Filipino groups like Rotary, Jaycees, Lions Club, etc.	Join family and hometown associations, local chambers of commerce, etc.
Have greater facility in using Filipino or English	First language is Chinese

The younger generation	The older generation
Attend Philippine colleges or universities	Attend only Chinese-language schools or minimal college
Westernized in taste, values and lifestyle; observe minimum of traditional Chinese rites	Very Chinese in outlook and lifestyle, observe Chinese rites and traditions, use Chinese form of social conventions and etiquette
Consider the Philippines as home and have no deep attachments toward China	Consider China as Motherland and the Philippines as second home

With this as background, this paper will examine the issue of continuity and change within the community specially at it relates to the problem of recent developments in China, the so-called "China fever", resinicization, Chinese language education, publications and other indicators of change specially among the younger local-born generation.

Philippine-Chinese Investments in China

Like the rest of the ASEAN countries, members of the Chinese Filipino business community have also made a beeline into China's investments market. There are big, medium and small scale investments from the Chinese Filipinos and the number continues to grow.[8] However, in contrast to the ethnic Chinese from other ASEAN countries whose investments are mainly due to the pull of the lucrative Chinese market and favorable business climate in China, in the case of the Chinese Filipino business community, we have to add the push factors. These include the widespread kidnapping of Chinese Filipinos since the last half of 1992 and the grave power crisis in 1993 that resulted in 6-12 hour brownouts.[9] Both these pull (i.e. favorable business climate in China) and push factors (i.e. adverse conditions in the Philippines) have been responsible for the investment rush into China on the part of the Chinese Filipino business community. Hence, clearly such move is not necessarily purely due to China fever or rekindling of interest in China; much less is it due to patriotic reasons or *ai guo ai xiang* (love of country and hometown) sentiments as many want to conclude.

We do not have accurate figures on how much capital has been pulled out of the Philippines and chanelled into investments overseas specially at the height of the kidnapping of Chinese Filipinos, but we can extrapolate from other sources. For instance, in a paper on "Ethnic Chinese in Philippine Banking," Go Bon Juan reported a drop in the share of total assets and deposits of ethnic Chinese-owned banks among all the commercial banks in the last quarter of 1992 and the first quarter of 1993 (see Fig. 1 below).[10] This period coincided with the time when the Chinese community was most beset by kidnappings; this was also the first time in the last six years that a drop in the share of Chinese-owned banks was seen. Although the percentage of drop was small, it still meant billions of pesos in absolute value considering that the share in total assets and total deposits was P700 billion and almost P500 billion respectively.

	Last quarter of 1992	**First quarter of 1993**
Drop in total assets	0.71%	0.66%
Drop in total deposits	0.06%	0.42%

Fig. 1. Drop in total assets and deposits of ethnic Chinese-owned banks

Because 85 percent of the ethnic Chinese in the Philippines hail from Fujian province, their investments and development projects in China are confined mostly to Fujian province, specially in Xiamen, Shizi, Jinjiang and other hometowns of origin. However, we cannot just conclude that this preponderance of investments in the hometowns is a manifestation of overseas Chinese resinicization, returning home fever or a patriotic gesture (*ai guo ai xiang*), much less as a desire to go against the tide of integration into mainstream Southeast Asian societies.

From the size of investments, most of the big investors in China are still confined to the *taipan* class (elite) like Lucio Tan, Henry Sy, George Ty, and John Gokongwei. However, even if we put the big *taipan* investors and the small and medium scale businesses together, the quantity and proportion of their investments are still quite small in the following respects: (a) their investments and assets in China in proportion to their total investments and assets in the Philippines; (b) total investments and assets of Chinese Filipinos in China in proportion to total investments and assets of all Chinese Filipinos

in the Philippines; and (c) total number of Chinese Filipino investors in China in proportion to the number of Chinese Filipino businessmen and women in the Philippines. The amount may be considerable in absolute numbers, but its total proportion to what the Chinese Filipinos have in the Philippines is still very small specially if we delineate the true definition of what constitutes the Chinese community, and if we recognize that this class of businessmen and women really forms a very small sector of the latter.

Problems in Definition

In the academic community, we have a more accurate and acceptable definition of who is considered an ethnic Chinese and how a Chinese community is delineated. We also take the differences between the immigrant and local-born generations into consideration. In general practice, however, specially in the case of the Philippines, when one mentions the Chinese community, the reference point is usually the older generation immigrant Chinese who are generally active in the affairs of the community, wield some positions of influence, and are mostly members and leaders of various Chinese organizations. As a result, the understanding and impression the public gains about the Chinese community are based mostly on the activities, outlook and thinking presented by this group of people, their organizations or their leaders.

Such perceptions are often one-sided and inaccurate, specially since a number of these Chinese organizations are still heavily influenced by Chinese (i.e. China and Taiwan) politics. The partiality and limitations of such generalizations become even more serious because scholars on overseas Chinese often base their research on local Chinese papers which report mainly on the activities of this group of people. The inaccuracies are perpetuated once these scholarly studies get published.

Based on the definition of an ethnic Chinese or based on their age, birth, upbringing and education, the local-born second, third, or even fourth generation who are well-integrated into mainstream society and who already identify with the Philippines, make up more than 85 percent of the ethnic Chinese population in the country. Among them, those in their 30s or 40s have already started to take over the reins of businesses from their parents. In fact, some have even gone beyond the accomplishments of their parents and opened up new ventures on their own successfully. The problem is, in a

traditional Chinese community, as long as an elder (from the older generation) is still around, he is the one who holds the power and generally makes public appearances. Under such circumstances, therefore, the recognized heads or leaders of the community all come from the first generation and though much smaller in number, they and their activities, like heavily investing in China, are considered as representative of the Chinese community.

Chinese Language Education and Newspapers

The far-reaching changes in the Chinese community can also be seen from the problem of Chinese language education. Although support for Chinese language education has not been lacking and not a few businessmen-philanthropists have spent a lot of money and effort towards its reform and improvement, Chinese language education proves hard to revive and continues to deteriorate. So far, *hua-wen* fever is seen mainly among the first generation and some Chinese associations. From time to time Chinese language dailies play up attempts to revive interest in Chinese composition, Chinese literature, or *hua-wen* in general. However, the real target of Chinese language education — the Chinese students — remain disinterested and unenamored with what they consider a very difficult subject. We should learn from such experiences and the people who continue to whip up a non-existent China-fever should be wary of self-delusion or false satisfaction.[11]

The same analysis is true with Chinese language papers. The ability to read Chinese language papers is now confined largely to the first generation; in fact, these papers serve mainly as their public forum. The younger generation cannot read Chinese language papers much less do they find these papers reflective of their sentiments. This can be seen from the five Chinese language dailies published in the Philippines, each of which has a different stand on China or Straits politics. The China-Taiwan schism, however, does not have a market for the younger generation. China politics is a non-issue for them, they do not understand it nor are they even interested in debates on it. Chinese language papers certainly do not reflect or represent the whole Chinese community and using these papers to do research or to know more about the Chinese community, at least in the Philippines, has many serious limitations and drawbacks.

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We do not deny, however, that there are certain groups of people who are still engrossed with developments in China. We do not deny also that there is still enthusiasm among some sectors for an upgrading of Chinese language education. But we have to dispassionately see and understand that all of these are confined to just a small sector within the minority, whose views, unfortunately, are often taken to represent the entire community.

Even if there is such a resurgence of interest in China, or an existence of China fever, we believe that, specially from a long term point of view, the integration of the ethnic Chinese into mainstream society is still the historical direction for the Chinese community. Most of the businesses and livelihood of the ethnic Chinese are rooted overseas and started overseas; their businesses, assets, interests and properties repose in their countries of residence and not in China. Their identification is with the country of residence and their interests, problems and concerns are thus inseparable from the fate of those countries. Even if their investments and development projects in China have grown, in general these are still very small compared to their total investments in their own countries.

In this connection, we suggest that what overseas Chinese, scholars specially, must pay attention to is a different kind of fever, that is, the "going abroad fever" from within China itself. This prevalence of people leaving China affects not only the image of China itself but also the development and evolution of Chinese communities overseas. In fact, this reality serves to negate the China fever. The new wave of migration adds pressure on and complicates the problems of existing Chinese communities.[12] It reenacts the history of the Chinese overseas all over again although this time, the process of evolution is likely to be shorter. By working in Chinese newspapers (e.g. as typesetters and proofreaders), teaching in Chinese schools or serving as assistants in various Chinese traditional oganizations, these new immigrants reinforce the cultural and educational institutions in their community, serving to strengthen them and ensuring their continuity. Without them, most of the ethnic Chinese community's cultural and educational work would not be possible.

Cultural and Economic Outlook in the Community

Aside from the possibility of studying the phenomenon of new migration from China and its impact on existing Chinese communities, another development worth examining is the local Chinese community since the 1970s. The 1970s marked a very significant decade for the Chinese community in the Philippines. It was during this period that mass naturalization took place followed closely by the nationalization of Chinese schools. These two executive fiats, however, had contrasting effects -- an upturn and a downturn -- on the Chinese community.

The mass naturalization allowed the majority of the alien Chinese to become citizens of the country. It resulted in a big economic boost, a period of rapid development since it removed a tough barrier to identification with their country of residence. With citizenship or legal identity, people became more confident in building and expanding their businesses. On the other hand, the Filipinization of Chinese schools contributed to the deterioration of the standards of Chinese language education.[13] The Filipinization of citizenship created an upturn, a development of the Chinese community economically and socially while the Filipinization of schools, in contrast, resulted in its downturn or deterioration. Economically, the community moved forward and became more developed but culturally, the community moved backward and became weak .

This opposes the popular belief that the growth of Chinese businesses or the economic development of the Chinese community is explained by the presence of Chinese culture. In this particular example, economic development took place in a period where Chinese cultural development deteriorated. This view may be an oversimplication but bringing it up is meant to highlight the ironic contrast. In truth, the historical development of the Chinese overseas economy is actually a history of their identification with the country they chose to reside in. As the ethnic Chinese identify more with their country of residence, so are they likely to find common interests with the latter, specially after they obtain citizenship and political identification develops. With a stronger political identity comes a greater capacity to fight for their rights as citizens. Moreover, as their roots sink deeper into the country, so can they become more developed economically. Their businesses and industries can no longer be uprooted overnight.

This trend is also reflected in the cultural development of the Chinese community. As the ethnic Chinese absorb local language and culture to a greater degree, so will they find it easier to deal with the native population. The more integrated they are with the mainstream, the faster their economic growth and the stronger the conditions for success. In other words, as the ethnic Chinese become more Filipinized and exposed to Philippine education and the Filipino business circle, so will their advantages for growth and development increase.

Conclusion

We have explored a new way of looking at the so-called China fever and resinicization of the Chinese overseas. In the case of the Chinese comunity in the Philippines, we have shown that such sentiments are confined mainly to the first generation immigrants. More importantly, we have pointed out that, in order to avoid misinterpreting developments in the Chinese community, we should examine the community as a whole and not focus only on what is true for a small sector. Seen from this perspective, we believe that integration into mainstream society still represents the better direction to secure the future of succeeding generations of Chinese Filipinos.

The problems of the ethnic Chinese community are not narrow parochial concerns of the community alone, much less can they be solved by looking towards China or Taiwan. During the height of the kidnapping menace, the older generation Chinese had hoped that China and Taiwan could exert their political and economic clout on the Philippine government so that it would put a stop to these activities, but they were bitterly disappointed. The local Chinese learned their lessons — that they can depend only on themselves and the cooperation of the native population on problems that affect them.

In the past two years, the ethnic Chinese in the Philippines have personally experienced the various political and economic difficulties, in addition to the natural disasters, that have affected the rest of the country. These experiences have firmly driven the lesson that their future in the Philippines is closely intertwined with the future of the country itself. They have underscored the unity of interests and concerns between the minority Chinese community and the majority mainstream society and the need to work together so that permanent solutions could be found for these problems.

In truth, the recent years have been a test not just for the resilience of the ethnic Chinese, but also for the validity of integration and their identification with the country. The Chinese say that true gold is tempered only from the hottest of fires; only when the local Chinese went through the most bitter trials did they realize their true place and role in Philippine society.

NOTES

1. The issue of integration has been explored in various studies like in the works of: Teresita Ang See, "Integration and Identity: Social Changes in the Post World War Philippine-Chinese Community" in *The Chinese in the Philippines: Problems and Perspectives*. Manila: Kaisa Para sa Kaunlaran, 1990, pp. 1-17; Gerald McBeath, *Political Integration of the Philippine Chinese*, Berkeley, California: Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies, 1973; and Charles J. McCarthy, S.J. *Philippine Chinese Profile: Essays and Studies*. Manila: Pagkakaisa sa Pag-unlad, Inc., 1974.

2. For reference on the Chinese during the Spanish rule, the most useful are the two volumes of works by Felix Alfonso, *The Chinese in the Philippines, 1570-1770* (vol. 1) and *1770-1898* (vol. 2). Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1969.

3. For the American period, refer to: Khin Khin Myint Jensen, *The Chinese in the Philippines during the American Regime 1898-1946.* (M.A. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1956); Dr. Edgar Wickenberg. *The Chinese in Philippine Life 1850-1898*, Yale University, 1965.

4. Chinben See, "Education and Ethnicity," in Teresita Ang See, ed. *The Chinese Immigrants - Collection of Writings of Prof. Chinben See*, pp. 119-129.

5. Teresita Ang See, "Chinese in the Philippines: Assets or Liabilities" in See, ed. *The Chinese in the Philippines, Problems and Perspectives, op. cit.* pp. 107-119.

6. Liao Zhe Yang, Huang Duan Ming and Yang Mei Mei, "A Survey on the Cultural Background and Identity of High School Chinese Students," in *Edukasyong Tsino.* Vol. III, No. 3. November 15, 1993 (in Chinese).

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7.   Teresita Ang See. "The Chinese in the Philippines: Changing Views and Perceptions" in See, ed. *The Chinese in the Philippines, Problems and Perspectives, op. cit.* 94-106.

8.   Felicidad Tan-Co. "1. 17-B Strong Consumer Market Provides Motivation to Invest in 'Mother China'" in *Into the Dragon's Lair.* 6th Anniversary Report of the *Business World.*

9.   Teresita Ang See. "On Kidnapping, Election and the Political Position of the Chinese in the Philippines". Paper delivered at the International Conference on the Legal, Political and Economic Status of the Chinese in the Diaspora, University of Berkeley, November 26-29, 1992.

10.   Go Bon Juan. "Ethnic Chinese in Philippine Banking" in *Tulay Monthly,* Chinese Filipino Digest (October 4, 1993). Also refer to "The Myth of Chinese Dominance" in *The Far Eastern Economic Review.* Vol. 156, No. 46, November 18, 1993.

11.   Victor Go, Lily Chua, and Rosita Tan have written several articles about the problems of Chinese language education which were published in *Crossroads: Short Essays on the Chinese Filipinos.* Teresita Ang See and Lily T. Chua, eds. Manila: Kaisa Para sa Kaunlaran, Inc., 1988. pp. 43-75.

12.   In the Philippines, the problem of illegal or overstaying aliens (mostly Chinese nationals) has always been a thorn in the Chinese community since politicians and the Bureau of Immigration are often fond of harassing them to the detriment of the larger community. Refer to Ang See, "The Chinese in the Philippines: Assets or Liabilities" in See, ed. *The Chinese in the Philippines, Problems and Perspectives, op. cit.,* 107-119.

13.   It must be noted, however, that there are other reasons for the deterioration of Chinese language education, aside from the Filipinization of schools.

Irrigation Systems, Management and Central Power: A Study of the Relationship Between Hydraulic Technology and Society in Sui and T'ang China

*Hans Hestvang Jørgensen**

Introduction

Within the geographical framework in which China's fascinating history is enacted, the nature-given contrasts are immediately visible. Throughout the length and breadth of the country, the landscape interchanges between barren mountain chains and fertile lowlands. Arid desert reaches are succeeded by enormous plains with copious rainfall and many rivers. This is the heterogeneous geographical pattern of the country.[1]

Although the Middle Empire can hardly be claimed to comprise a homogeneous unit, the Tsinling mountain chain in central China does draw a clear line of demarcation between two main types of society. From the Kunlun massif in northern Tibet, the Tsinling chain stretches to the east and west and marks a solid, climatic borderline. Here, the subtropical southern zone is left behind and replaced by the northern temperate zone -- hereby radically changing the premises for agriculture. The precondition for irrigating fields disappears on the arid plateaus where wheat and millet take better root in the dry soil. In a comparison between north and south, it is the unequal conditions for cultivation which characterize the portrait of China.[2]

In spite of the relatively unfavorable climatic conditions in northern China, it was nevertheless here that Chinese agriculture originated, specially near the Yellow River's (Huang Ho) central reach and around the loessial soil

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of this river valley which, as soon as it receives water, is ideal for agriculture.[3] Unlike southern China, precipitation in the north is irregular and often inadequate. Under the burning sun of the north, the small amount of rain and the nature of the soil mean that water supplies are an indispensable condition for agriculture. The foundation for Chinese agrarian society has therefore always been found in the great river valleys and this provides an indication of the decisive significance of rivers.[4]

Fortunately, the area beneath these remote skies was enriched by nature's hand through a superabundance of rivers. The entire hydrological basin of two of the world's most extensive river systems, the Yellow River and the Yangtze Kiang, are within Chinese territory and respectively north and south of the Tsinling mountain chain. The sources of the Yellow River and the Yangtze Kiang both rise in high-lying mountain areas and have an extremely great fall in their respectively 4,300 and 5,100 kilometer long, meandering courses from the west to the east. Year in and year out, the Yellow River drains the greater part of northern China proper, while the Yangtze Kiang drains an area twice the size in the south.[5]

Enormous distances, impassable mountains, unusual soil and climatic conditions and endless rivers, all created a natural basis for the development of irrigation systems of various kinds. South of the Tsinling chain the need was for irrigation systems in general, while irrigation systems in the north primarily took the form of canals.[6]

The Chinese society, where control of the agrarian-based economy was dictated by considerations connected with the fundamental division of labor between town and country, was thus dependent on irrigation systems. This was also the case in China under the Sui and T'ang dynasties (589-618 and 618-906), which were characterized by a relatively powerful central government, and the pursuit of extensive construction projects. But the central question is, was the power of the state built, for climatic reasons, upon the need for such irrigation systems,[7] or was the opposite of this controversial claim the case? Was there room between these two extremes for a smaller and more flexible contractor than the state when it came to constructing irrigation systems? In order to reduce this investigation to manageable proportions, the following article, which takes the period under the Sui and

T'ang dynasties as its point of departure, examines the classic question of the degree to which the state was actually involved in the construction of irrigation systems.

The Administration System

A storied myth asserts that the founder of the Hsia dynasty (2200 BC-1766 BC), the hero Yu, fought floods and regulated the rivers in the area where his people lived. This ancient legend is rather doubtful, however. Slightly less than a thousand years later, when the Shang dynasty (1766 BC-1122 BC) held the central power, there was more dependence on precipitation than on irrigation systems as far as agriculture was concerned.[8]

The story of Yu and his unflagging efforts cannot be verified for a simple, yet decisive reason: the absence of source material. To date, the legend has therefore typically been ascribed to literature in the guise of poerty. The first written evidence which can supplement the archaeological material appears only under the Shang dynasty. The nature and extent of this source material, however, excludes a more precise determination of dates. From the Chou dynasty (1122 BC-221 BC) there is a more evenly distributed source material of such a character that it allows China to enter the unambiguous light of chronology in 841 BC.[9]

We should thus be on more secure ground with the Sui and T'ang dynasties (589-618 and 618-906). This historical period has left a material situation which is both rather weak and very strong at the same time. By far the larger part of the material stems from a unique find made in the Tun-huang caves at the beginning of this century. Among thousands of documents - the main source of our knowledge of the administration of irrigation systems - a rolled fragment of paper was found.[10]

Thanks to two other well-preserved collections of documents from the T'ang dynasty, *Po-shih liu-t'ieh* and *T'ang liu-tien*, a more detailed identification of the fragment became possible. In 1913, scientist Lo Chen-yu believed that he could identify the fragment as an elaborated and more detailed version of a shorter passage from *Po-shih liu-t'ieh*, which is ostensibly quoted from "The Statutory Instrument for the Department of Waterways" *(Shui-pu shih)*. With the help of various dating techniques, Lo Chen-yu also

demonstrated an internal connection between the fragment and *T'ang liu-tien*, which was published in 739.[11]

On the basis of this research, among other things, in 1936 the Japanese historian, Niida Noboru, could place the fragment from Tun-huang in a more precise framework. Noboru was thus able to prove that the fragment was actually part of the so-called Statutory Instruments *(Shih)* which were published in the autumn of 737. In 1940 the historian Masajiro arrived at the same result. Since then there has been broad agreement that the fragment is best understood as being "The Statutory Instrument for the Department of Waterways" itself.[12]

Although it is true that our knowledge stems mainly from this Statutory Instrument, on the other hand, it is also a relatively comprehensive source, containing 34 preserved regulations. In the nature of things, no precise, complete picture of the administration of irrigation systems throughout the Sui and T'ang dynasties can be expected solely on the basis of this treasure from an oasis town, Tun-huang, near the borders of Central Asia. But it does provide a snapshot from 737. This significant feature of the material situation naturally color research to a great degree.[13]

Two organs were in existence in the metropolis, Ch'ang-an, under the Sui and T'ang dynasties, the Department of Waterways *(Shui-pu)* and the Directorate for Irrigation *(Tu-shui t'ai*, later *Tu-shui chien)*, both of which were concerned with the domain of irrigation systems (see Fig. 1). The Department of Waterways was a subsidiary department under the Ministry of Public Works *(Kung-pu)*, which was also the lowest in rank with regard to prestige of the six ministries *(liu-pu)* under the State Department. In addition to the administration apparatus proper, the emperor had five directorates at his disposal, one of which was the Directorate for Irrigation.[14]

On paper, the Department of Waterways and the Directorate nevertheless did encroach on each other's preserves. This mutual overlapping was partly taken into account by the Statutory Instrument for the Department of Waterways, which was perhaps the primary motive for its publication. The Instrument was custom-made for co-ordination, both between centrally-situated authorities and between the authorities at a lower administrative level.

Fig. 1. The administration of irrigation systems under the T'ang dynasty.
Only the main branches of the administration have been included.

    The areas of responsibility which were assigned to the Department of Waterways and the Directorate for Irrigation were characterized by a lot of duplication. The responsibility for irrigation, river control, fishery, bridges, fords, waterways and water transport rested on the shoulders of both

institutions. Where the former also had supervision of watermills as part of its program, the Directorate had responsibility for swamps, canals, dikes and dams as well as shipping. To help it, the Directorate had two subordinate sections, the Office of Rivers and Canals *(Ho-ch'u shu)* and the Office of Shipping *(Chou-chi-shu)*, which relieved the pressure higher up in the system.

This assistance was more than needed. The Directorate itself was extremely understaffed with only five civil servants. In the Department of Waterways things were even worse. Four civil servants were all that could be obtained to perform the many tasks of the Department. This hardly confirms the opinion that the state was deeply engaged in the administration of irrigation systems.[15]

There are thus indications that the administration was more nominal than effectual. The combination of a small number of civil servants and a comprehensive register of tasks placed a natural limitation on the capabilities of the two institutions. Supervision of the irrigation plants and the strategically important bridges, which was among the responsibilities of the Department of Waterways, was thus limited to the area around the metropolis; whereas the Directorate failed completely to live up to its obligations in these areas. With regard to water transport and fishery, there is no relevant information and it has been assumed on good grounds that the long arm of the state did not even reach as far as the fringes of the irrigation systems.[16]

A number of other activities were also above the heads of the civil servants in the Department of Waterways and the Directorate in more than one sense. Larger regional projects were placed in the hands of the Ministry of Public Works *(Kung-pu)*, which also cooperated closely with another of the five directorates, namely the Directorate of Public Works *(Chiang-tso-chien)*.[17]

The stream of activities which flowed through the Directorate of Irrigation could hardly be regulated. The initiative shown by the Directorate was actually limited to the posting of supervisors. From time to time, a Supervisor of Canals *(Ch'u-chang)* or a Supervisor of Locks *(Tou-men chang)* popped up in the prefectures *(chou)* or the districts *(hsien)*, where their visits were considered an honor.[18]

Where the Directorate's outgoing duties were of an investigative character, the activities under the Department of Waterways were more continuous. As part of the structure of the administrative apparatus, the Department had the advantage of being able to operate both at the level of prefecture and district via locally placed civil servants. Thus, at the level of the prefecture there was an Office of Public Works (*Shih-ts'ao-ts'an-chun-shih*), which at district level had the company of a corresponding Office of Public Works (*Ssu-shih-tso*).[19]

All the same, the local prefect often had to allow matters to take their own course. But when it came to supervising the irrigation plants and waterways he could have recourse to old, experienced hands within his profession. The prefect had the authority to appoint four former civil servants (*ch'ien-kuan*) who willingly lent a hand in a good cause.[20]

Waterways

Since the Han dynasty's (206 BC - 220 AD) golden age, China's agricultural center of gravity had gradually moved from the northwest to the central and lower Yangtze valley. This gradual movement from north to south created no great administrative problems during the Period of Disunity (220-589) as these areas were politically independent of each other.[21]

While the administrative center had remained in the northwest after the creation of the second empire at the end of the 6th century, the most important agricultural area was now completely in the hands of the landowners in the rich river valleys near the Yangtze Kiang. Here, China's rice granaries sprouted in the most literal sense. In its embryo state, the Sui dynasty's administrative and agricultural centers were thus staggered without being suitably connected. If the newly-won political unity was to last, the empire would necessarily have to be turned into a well-knit economic unit as well.[22]

In addition to this national aspect, the new central power also had a security problem - the defense of the empire. Outwardly this meant protecting the country against the always present danger posed by the neighboring nomadic societies of the northwest. On innumerable occasions, the uninvited foreigners had demonstrated their impressive riding technique on well-trained horses. Confronted with such skills, the self-sufficient local

militias were forced to throw in the towel, which emphasized the necessity for permanently garrisoned troops in the border regions.[23]

Under the T'ang dynasty, the idea of standing military colonies of a more professional character (*chien-erh*), which would be capable of taking up the challenge, was to become a reality. Although this military apparatus was not so expensive to maintain as the European mercenaries, for example, the solitary Chinese military colonies still had to be supplied with clothing and provisions.[24]

The empire's administrative center also had a similar everyday problem at close quarters. In the region which surrounded the metropolis, poor harvests occurred at regular intervals as a consequence of the unstable climate. And precisely in the metropolis, there were many mouths to feed with the high concentration of civil servants and other non-productive people who had no calluses on their hands as a result of laborious work in the soft loessial soil.[25]

Thus at the beginning of the dynasty's lifetime, approximately 6.1 million liters of grain had to be transported annually to the metropolis, mainly using the long and arduous route from Ho-nan. From this relatively modest beginning and in step with the development of a more complicated and expansive machinery of power, an almost insatiable need for grain began to make itself felt in the empire's administrative center.[26]

Ho-nan itself, however, was an extremely unpredictable larder. In the eastern province, Huang Ho was an eternal source of catastrophe when the river overflowed its banks. Through the almost 30-year reign of the Sui dynasty no fewer than seven severe floods were registered, all of which took place in Ho-nan or in the immediate vicinity of the province - a pattern which repeated itself under the T'ang dynasty. Of 305 registered floods, Ho-nan and the surrounding area were afflicted with approximately half; and, as if these were not enough, Ho-nan had to put up with periodic droughts.[27]

The first Sui emperor, Wen-ti (589-604), was not blind to all these conditions. Before China was ready for a new unity, he added a link to the network of waterways which would later bridge the deep gulf between north and south. As early as 584, Wen-ti ordered the brilliant architect, Yu-wen K'ai, to reconstruct a canal from the days of the Han dynasty, in these words:

> My rule over the country is dedicated to the promotion of beneficial
> things and the removal of the harmful. I regret both defects in the
> realm of public and private life. Therefore, starting from T'ung-
> kuan in the east and leading the water of the Wei from the west, a
> canal should be cut by human effort. The work is easy and can
> be accomplished.

The defects that Wen-ti referred to were largely caused by the silting up
and seasonal drying out of the River Wei. A navigable canal which would
connect the metropolis to the T'ung-kuan passage close to the confluence of
the Huang Ho and the tributary Wei was therefore very much on the emperor's
mind.[28]

Nobody should be able to say of Wen-ti that he had no sympathy for the
sweated labor actually involved in the onerous task of canal building.

> I know that in the hot summer, work easily brings fatigue; but without
> temporary labor, how could permanent rest be made possible?
> Proclaim this to the people; they should know my wishes.

Yu-wen K'ai humbly took note of the emperor's orders and went about
his business with a will. He fulfilled expectations completely when in 589, he
proudly presented the Son of Heaven with an approximately 150 kilometer
long canal which ran parallel to the River Wei. Significantly, the new
connecting link was christened the Canal for Extended Connections (*Kuang-
t'ung Ch'u*).[29]

Emperor Wen-ti was not an idle man. He used the period between 584
and 589 to restore a very old canal, Shan-yang tu, which had become silted
over the years. In 587 he gave orders that this canal should be improved "to
facilitate the transportation of tax grain." The Shan-yang tu canal now started
at Yang-chou and described a gentle curve towards the north and Ch'u-chou
so that the two waterways, the Yangtze Kiang and Huai, were connected.
In this way, north and south became linked by what was only an approximately
150 kilometer long canal. Although the Shan-yang tu canal was hardly
imposing, it was of great strategic importance.[30]

Wen-ti's second son, Yang-ti (604-617), however, had an even clearer view of the possibilities of waterways. As soon as Yang-ti assumed the imperial throne, he began his remarkable efforts to unite the empire completely by using the art of canal building. With Yang-ti, a perspective opened up which directed the construction of canals away from the petty, regional aspect and towards a national waterway system. Doing things by halves was not part of Yang-ti's constitution, which is why during his first five years as emperor, events followed one another in rapid succession towards the fulfilment of his great ambitions.[31]

Yang-ti took a rigorous line from his first year as the Son of Heaven. In an edict from 605, he ordered his faithful subjects to construct a canal, Pien-ho, (*T'ung-chi ch'u*) in order to connect Lo-yang with Ssu-chou, which lay close to the River Huai. By exploiting the existing rivers together with the Shan-yang tu and Pien-ho canals, an invaluable waterway was established between the Yellow River and the Yangtze Kiang. This enabled Yang-ti to celebrate his first triumph in the knowledge that the many, extensive branches of these two river systems had been interwoven for the first time in the history of the empire.[32]

Yang-ti stopped at nothing in connection with the construction of the Pien-ho canal. According to the Sui dynasty's standard history, (*Sui shu*), he mobilized more than one million laborers at the stroke of a pen. These men and women came from great distances. Workers streamed in from the prefectures between the Yellow River and the River Huai to take on together the enormous task of constructing the 40-meter wide Pien-ho canal. The project also included the construction of an imperial road along the canal with resting places situated regularly along the way. Shady willow trees were planted parallel to the imperial road. It was necessary to commandeer this enormous number of workers to prevent Yang-ti from being dishonored.[33]

Actual numbers vary from source to source. A detailed description of those employed on the Pien-ho construction is supplied in a section of a contemporary, anonymous source, "Record of the Opening of the Canal" (*Kai-ho Chi*):

> All men between the ages of fifteen and fifty were ordered to assemble
> by royal edict, all who tried to hide were punishable by decapitation...
> The laborers thus assembled numbered 3,600,000. Then each family
> was required to contribute a child or an old man, or woman, to
> prepare meals for the workers. Five thousand young and brave
> soldiers were ordered to be armed with sticks (to maintain discipline).
> Together with section chiefs and other administrators, the whole
> number of people employed in the canal amounted to 5,430,000.

Able-bodied or not, this staggering figure comprised more than ten percent of the country's population at that time.[34]

Looked at through these unofficial spectacles, Yang-ti's extravagant canal construction was thus accomplished through the ruthless exploitation of the human workforce. Here, brutality was the order of the day and the result was that, "when the workers were counted, two million and a half laborers and twenty-three thousand soldiers had been lost." Although the reliability of this source is doubtful, the figures recorded give an indication of the high price the population had to pay for the Pien-ho canal.[35]

When Yang-ti inspected the completed canal, the contrasts were placed in even greater relief. The emperor was a man who knew how to conduct himself and woe to that person who failed to fulfill his demand for 500 beautifully decorated dragon boats for him and his entourage. With much ado, Yang-ti examined the canal thoroughly, and on his way, repaid the compliment for this expensive canal trip, according to the "Record of the Opening of the Canal," with torments and tortures. Not quite without foundation, some grumbling was probably heard in out of the way corners as to the modest level of imperial appreciation. If nothing else, the ordinary people standing in Yang-ti's shadow could sense the atmosphere of the higher social strata and console themselves with the exotic stench that was their portion: the court's fragrant "perfume could be smelled for a distance of a hundred *li*!.[36]

After the success of the Pien-ho canal in 605, Yang-ti had really tasted blood. A new and longer canal, Yung-chi ch'u, would come into being in 608. The canal started from the Yellow River and ran in a northeasterly direction towards the Cho district in northern Ho-pei, i.e. in the area around

modern Beijing. No punches were pulled in connection with this canal either. "Over one million men and women from the various prefectures north of the Yellow River were mobilized by imperial edict to undertake the task." These words from the *Sui shu* can naturally be called into question, but under any circumstances the Yung-chi ch'u was completed in 609. Hereby, a direct waterway was constructed between the heart of China and the regions towards Korea, regarding which, it would shortly become apparent, Yang-ti had plans which would hardly bear the light of day.[37]

Yang-ti also made his influence felt at the other end of the country. In 610 he was thirsting after a connection to the regions around Hang-chou so that one of China's most significant rice-growing areas could also be drained of its wealth. In the same year therefore, an approximately 400 kilometer long, 35 meter wide canal was excavated, the Chiang-nan ho, which stretched from Jun-chou to its terminus at Hang-chou. After the completion of this work, Yang-ti could lean back with a sigh of satisfaction and note that in his time, the empire had been connected both in a north-south line and in an east-west direction.[38]

More canals were added later. But considered together, these five sections, Kuang-t'ung ch'u, Shan-yang tu, Pien-ho, Yang-chi ch'u and Chiang-nan ho, combined with smaller rivers comprised the famous Grand Canal - an appropriate designation for a work of construction which contributed to the fall of the Sui dynasty and still remains as a tremendously impressive piece of engineering work. While all succeeding generations, in general, would benefit from the Grand Canal, it was the T'ang dynasty, in particular, which would capitalize from this investment.[39]

Irrigation Plants

The laborious task of wresting the nutritious rice from the soil was particularly primitive until the 6th century. The typical method of cultivation, broadcasting, meant that peasants limited themselves to harvesting rice from the fields, where it had been sown with no other form of preparation. Such method had a number of problems. In the initial phase of cultivation, for example, the seeds often simply remained on the surface of the mud, where

the birds and strong winds were potential hazards until the rice seeds had established roots. Furthermore, this method of cultivation excluded adequate fallow periods, thus leaving the soil inadequately weeded and treated.[40]

During the T'ang dynasty, the peasants began to practice a more efficient method of cultivation called transplanting. In this method, small rice plants were grown in special beds and later transplanted manually in flooded fields. When harvest time approached, the water was drained off and the rice ripened. Although it was tedious process, transplanting made better use of the limited space and supply of water. It also promoted tilling, made weeding easier and opened the possibility for selecting the best and strongest rice plants, which together gave higher yields than broadcasting. This method of cultivation, incidentally, has remained largely in use up to our time.[41]

Methods of cultivation within agriculture were not the only ones which changed; new implements also made their appearance during the T'ang dynasty. Epoch-making inventions such as the harrow (*p'a*) and the ricefield plough, for example, gained a footing during this period. The areas worked by the harrow and plough, however, also had to be flooded before rice could be planted - a task which formerly required an enormous amount of manual work as water had to be lifted from one level to another. In a society based on rice cultivation, a labor-saving irrigation plant was therefore not to be sneezed at by the peasants who did all the work.[42]

Fortune smiled on the farmers when a more rational irrigation plant, known as *shui chhe, fan chhe* or, more colloquially, *lung ku chhe* came into general use around the year 600. *Shui chhe* differed from the ordinary irrigation plants because of an excellent mechanism: gearing. A chain of troughs lifted the water with the help of a crank; this technique relieved the peasants no matter whether the motive power was water, animals or people.[43]

Eventually, news of the *shui chhe* filtered through the metropolis. The emperor apparently looked benevolently on the *shui chhe* and evidently felt that it was absolutely necessary to put the machine into more or less systematic production. According to one of the T'ang dynasty's two standard histories, *Chiu T'ang shu*, the following was given out from the highest circles:

> In the second year of the Thai-Ho reign period, in the second month...
> a standard model of the chain-pump (*shui chhe*) was issued from
> the palace, and the people of Ching-chao Fu were ordered by the
> emperor to make a considerable number of machines, for distribution
> to the people along the Cheng Pai Canal, for irrigation purposes.

Regarding the conditions of production, the emperor thus let it be known that uniformity was a basic principle which would benefit the whole.[44]

Broadly speaking, the new method of cultivation and the improved implements meant greater rice yields so that southern China could gradually work up a larger surplus of rice seed. Thanks to the extended waterway system, the extra production could be shipped north where rice gradually came into favor with the people, at the expense of wheat. In the more elevated circles of the empire, rice actually became the favorite food in the 7th and 8th centuries. Apart from their worn out, bowed backs, the rice farmers, armed with patience, had thus won the draw with respect to the way they earned a living.[45]

Conclusions

China was preeminently an area of irrigation systems for many reasons. Floods, which have been entered into the annals of Chinese history with terror, could occur in the catchment areas of rivers. After such incidents, enormous areas would be saturated so that year after year farmlands would be waterlogged. At the other extreme, drought was a risk when precipitation was modest or completely nil. The loessial soil of northern China, from which the Yellor River derives its characteristic content of sediment, was only self-fertilizing when there was sufficient water. On the other hand, after rain, the highlands would be uniquely fertile. Other significant factors were the great distances and difficulty of transport between the country and the towns, which often went along pathways and roads that followed a certain route in impassable terrain. In the soft loessial soil of the north, a relatively heavy product such as grain, for example, which was a typical tax payment, was extremely difficult to carry over longer regional distances.

The state's administration of irrigation systems was not adequate for an efficiently functioning hierarchy. The Department of Waterways and the

Directorate for Irrigation were both instruments at the disposal of the state which could be used in many areas in connection with irrigation systems. The Directorate's role in the local community was less in evidence than that of the Department of Waterways. The prefects and district civil servants were at the disposal of the Department. They, however, were only able, with difficulty, if at all, to fulfill the demands made upon them, and typically had to let things slide. This void was filled at the sub-administrative level, where the primary responsibility for monitoring functions and the supervision of waterways rested.

Although the degree of competence at the sub-administrative level was not clearly defined, the distance between top and bottom was much greater. A certain inertia could also be felt with regard to communication. As the lack of civil servants was not compensated for within the framework of the administrative apparatus, it became almost meaningless and this implied inadequate control. The hollow administrative system meant that the peasants themselves must have taken up the problem of irrigation on their own initiative. This shows that the connection between the state and the irrigation systems at the local level was very tenuous. The dogma that, on climatic grounds, the power of the state was based on the need for irrigation systems is thus disingenuous.

The imperial rule of the agrarian-based economy was dictated by considerations regarding the division of labor between town and country. At the national level, a type of staggered division of labor between intellectual and manual work did exist. While the administrative and agricultural centers merged geographically under the Han dynasty, they gradually moved away from each other during the Period of Disunity. This problem was exacerbated under the Sui and T'ang dynasties as the empire's metropolis and the agricultural center of gravity were located in the highlands of northwestern China and the river valleys of the Yangtze Kiang respectively. Thus, canal building was undertaken with the goal of unifying the state.

The establishment of a national system of waterways solved the problem of the growing need for grain in the metropolis, thus reflecting the political realist attitudes of the state. But canal construction was still a two-edged sword for the Sui dynasty. On the credit side, the country gained a transport network through which the wealth of southern China could be steered

northwards to satisfy the need for rice and other necessities of life. In this light, the establishment of waterways must have been a success as it brought grist to the lucrative mill of commerce. On the debit side, the monumental task of canal construction drained the energy of the population on which the Sui dynasty relied. After less than three decades at the helm, the power basis of the state withered and the Sui dynasty fell.

The waterway system had yet another small advantage. The system could also provide water for irrigation, which was essential for the surrounding loessial soil and rice fields. Within the broad framework of irrigation systems, the interplay between different innovations, such as the *sui chhe*, allowed more efficient cultivation and higher yields. This probably released part of the labor force, which was the principal element in the massive canal building projects.

The Grand Canal was built on these premises. In combination with smaller rivers, the Grand Canal comprised five canal sections which were constructed according to an overall plan. Canal construction was thus conceived not on the basis of climatic conditions, but as an answer to the difficulties involved in distribution between the administrative and agricultural centers. Its motive was the burning question of the dynasty's survival, which is why construction progressed in giant steps, and in only five years, the empire was pieced together by a national waterway system. At this tempo, canal construction must have been extremely unpopular with the general population. But under any circumstances the Grand Canal stands as an example of *realpolitik* in its prime. The credit for this monument is still accorded to the extravagant emperor, Yang-ti. But the drudgery was left to the sorely tired Chinese peasants.

NOTES

1.   Rhoads Murphey, "A Geographical View of China" in John Meskill, (ed.), *An Introduction to Chinese Civilization*, New York, 1973, pp. 516-550, esp. 531-532.

2.   Ch'ao-ting Chi, *Key Economic Areas in Chinese History: As Revealed in the Development of Public Works for Water-control*, New York, 1970, (1936),

pp. 30-31. John King Fairbank, *China: A New History,* Cambridge, 1992, pp. 4-5. W. M. S. Russell, *Man, Nature and History,* London, 1967, p. 122.

3.   Kwang-chih Chang, "Chinese Archaeology" in John Meskill, (ed.), *An Introduction to Chinese Civilization,* New York, 1973, pp. 380-415, esp. pp. 392-393. The loessial soil of the Huang Ho valley was probably deposited by the violent storms of the Ice Age. John King Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation,* London, 1973, p. 11. Ray Huang, *China: A Macro History,* New York, 1990, p. 20.

4.   Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, *op. cit.,* pp. 10-11. Karl A. Wittfogel *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas: Versuch der wissenschaftlichen Analyse einer grossen asiatischen Agrargesellschaft,* Leipzig, 1931, p. 88 and p. 229.

5.   Murphey (1973), *op. cit.,* pp. 516-550. When the Yellow River enters the lowlands it deposits yellow silt which stems from the great loessial plateaus in the west, hence its name. The Yellow River thus runs for the final 800 kilometers through fertile plains and delta areas deposited by the river itself. Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, *op. cit.,* p. 9 and p. 11.

6.   Chi, *op. cit.,* p. 12 and pp. 24-25.

7.   The most prominent 20th century exponent of this view *is* Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power,* New Haven, 1957.

8.   Derk Bodde, *Chinese Thought, Society, and Science: The Intellectual and Social Background of Science and Technology in Pre-Modern China,* Honolulu, 1991, p. 53. Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, *op. cit.,* p. 21 and pp. 30-31.

9.   Wolfram Eberhard, *A History of China,* London, 1950, pp. 14-15. Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, *op. cit.,* pp. 20-22. John Meskill, "History of China" in John Meskill (ed.), *An Introduction to Chinese Civilization,* New York, 1973, pp. 4-338, esp. p. 6.

10.   Meskill, op. cit., p. 93. Denis C. Twitchett, "Some Remarks on Irrigation under the T'ang", *T'oung Pao,* Series II, Vol. 48, pp. 175-194, 1975 (1960), esp. pp. 176-177.

11.   Denis C. Twitchett, " The Fragment of the T'ang Ordinances of the Department of Waterways Rediscovered at Tun-huang", *Asia Major,* New Series, Vol. 6,

Part I, pp. 23-79, 1958, esp. pp. 23-24 and p. 42, note 15. Denis C. Twitchett, *Financial Administration under the T'ang Dynasty*, Cambridge, 1970 (1963) p. 335.

12.   Twitchett (1958), *op. cit.*, p. 24. Twitchett translated the Instrument into English, apart from the introduction and conclusion which are missing.

13.   Jacques Gernet, *A History of Chinese Civilization*, Cambridge, 1982, p. 246. Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China, Vol. 4, Part II: Physics and Physical Technology. Mechanical Engineering*, Cambridge, 1965, p. 410. Twitchett (1958), *op. cit.*, p. 38 and pp. 67-68.

14.   Needham, *op. cit.*, p. 19, Twitchett (1958), *op. cit.*, p. 37. Twitchett (1975), *op. cit.*, pp. 177-178. The six Ministries (*liu-pu*) functioned under the State Department as follows: Revenues (*Min-pu*), Rites (*Li-pu*), The Military (*Ping-pu*), the Judicial system (*Hsing-pu*), Public Works (*Kung-pu*) and Personnel Matters (*Li-pu*). This distribution of the administration's executive organs can be recognized under all following dynasties right up to the 20th century. Michel T. Dalby, "Court politics in late T'ang times" in Denis C. Twitchett (ed.), *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, Part I: Sui and T'ang China, 589-906*, Cambridge, 1979, pp. 561-681, esp. p. 590. Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, op. cit., p. 105. Arthur F. Wright, "The Sui Dynasty (589-617)" in Denis C. Twitchett (ed.), *The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 3, Part I: Sui and T'ang China, 589-906*, Cambridge, 1979, pp. 48-149, esp. p. 82.

15.   Wittfogel exaggerates on the question of the state's engagement in the administration of the irrigation system under the Sui and T'ang dynasties. See Twitchett (1975), *op. cit.*, pp. 193-194.

16.   Twitchett (1958), *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38. Twitchett (1975), *op. cit.*, p. 179.

17.   Twitchett (1958), *op. cit.*, p. 38 and p. 63, note 127.

18.   *Ibid.*, p. 40. Twitchett (1975), *op. cit.*, p. 184.

19.   Twitchett (1958), *op. cit.*, p. 38.

20.   Twitchett (1958), *op. cit.*, p. 27. Please see note 36. Twitchett (1975), *op. cit.*, p. 180.

21.   Chi, *op. cit.*, p. 9. Twitchett (1970), *op. cit.*, p. 84.

22.   Etienne Balazs, *Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy: Variations on a Theme*, New Haven, 1964, p. 60. Chi, *op. cit.*, p. 9 and p. 113. Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-102.

23.   Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-156. Gernet, *op. cit.*, p. 247. Oven Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, New York, 1949, p. 58 ff. Karl H. Ranitzsch, *The Army of Tang China*, Yorkshire, 1995, pp. 10-16, esp. p. 13. Twitchett (1970), *op. cit.*, p. 85.

24.   Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, *op. cit.*, p. 102. Rhoads Murphey, "The City as a Center of Change: Western Europe and China", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 44, pp. 349-362, 1968, esp. p. 358. Twitchett (1970), *op.* cit., pp. 85-86.

25.   Meskill, op. cit., p. 83. Twitchett (1970), *op. cit.*, p. 84.

26.   Twitchett (1970), *op. cit.*, p. 85 and p. 89.

27.   Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-10. Shan-yu Yao, "The Geographical Distribution of Floods and Droughts in Chinese History, 206 B.C.-A.D. 1911", *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 2, pp. 357-378, 1942-43, esp. pp. 367-368, table IV and p. 368, table V.

28.   The passage is from Chi, *op.cit.*, p. 119. Fairbank (12), *op. cit.*, pp. 77-78. See also Arthur F. Wright, *The Sui Dynasty: The Unification of China, A.D. 581-617*, New York, 1978, p. 178. Wright (1979), *op. cit.*, p. 114.

29.   The passage is from Chi, *op.cit.*, p. 120. See also Wright (1978), *op. cit.*, p. 178. Wright (1979), *op. cit.*, p. 115.

30.   Quoted from Chi, *op. cit.*, p. 117. See also Chi, *op. cit.*, p. 118. Twitchett (1970), *op.cit.*, p. 188.

31.   Raymond Dawson, *Imperial China*, London, 1972, pp. 48-49. Wright (1979), op. cit., p. 115 and p. 134.

32.   Chi, *op. cit.*, p. 116. Twitchett (1970), *op. cit.*, p. 187.

33.   Chi, *op. cit.*, p. 116. Gernet, *op. cit.*, p. 239. Wright (1978), *op. cit.*, p. 179. Wright (1979), *op. cit.*, p. 135.

34. From Chi, *op. cit.*, p. 123. Wright (1979), *op. cit.*, p. 128.

35. Quoted from Chi, *op. cit.*, p. 123. See also Chi, *op. cit.*, p. 124. Huang, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

36. Quoted from Chi, *op. cit.*, p. 124. See Twitchett (1970) on the course of the Pien-ho canal, *op. cit.*, p. 187. *Li* is a Chinese linear measure corresponding to approximately 500 meters.

37. Quoted from Chi, *op. cit.*, p. 120. Huang, *op. cit.*, p. 90. Twitchett (1970), *op. cit.*, pp. 188-189. Wright (1978), *op.cit.*, p. 179 and pp. 192-193. Wright (1979), *op. cit.*, p. 135 and pp. 144-145.

38. Balazs, *op. cit.*, p. 73. Chi, *op. cit.*, p. 114 and 118. Ranitzsch, *op. cit.*, p. 16. Twitchett (1970), *op. cit.*, p. 188.

39. Chi, *op. cit.*, p. 114 and p. 120. Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, *op. cit.*, p. 96. Huang, *op. cit.*, p. 90. Meskill, *op. cit.*, p. 84. The present-day Grand Canal has a different course and is shorter than during the Sui dynasty. Chi, *op. cit.*, p. 114. For change over an eight-century span beginning in T'ang, see Robert Hartwell, "Demographic, Political, and Social Transformations of China, 750-1550", *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 42, pp. 365-442, 1982, esp. p. 391.

40. Francesca Bray, *Agriculture*, Vol. VI Part 2 in Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China,* Cambridge, 1984, pp. 251-252 and p. 288. Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, *op. cit.*, p. 12. Gernet, *op. cit.*, p. 265. Meskill, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

41. Bray, *op. cit.*, p. 288. Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, *op. cit.*, p. 13. Gernet, op. cit., p. 265. Meskill, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

42. Mark Elvin, *The Pattern of the Chinese Past,* Stanford, 1973, p. 118. Gernet, *op. cit.*, p. 265. Needham, *op. cit.*, p. 330.

43. Gernet, *op. cit.*, p. 265. Needham, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

44. Needham, *op. cit.*, p. 347.

45. Gernet, *op. cit.*, p. 265. Meskill, *op. cit.*, p. 62 and p. 99.