Asian Center
University of the Philippines
Diliman 1101 Quezon City
ISSN: 0004-4679

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Printed in the Philippines by READYSET.

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THE PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION (1896-1901)  
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ASIAN HISTORY:  
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ANTI-COLONIAL MOVEMENTS IN ASIA, 1857-1918

Oscar L. Evangelista *

This paper situates the Philippine Revolution against Spain and the United States, 1898-1901 within the context of anti-colonial movements in Asia, 1857-1918. The year 1857 was chosen as starting point of the study as it commemorates the Indian (Sepoy) Mutiny of 1857-58, an important landmark in Asian History. It marked the intensification of Western imperialism in Asia, and served as symbol of resistance against imperialism. In turn, 1918 was the end of World War I, another landmark which brought significant changes in the tempo of Asian nationalist movements and paved the way for later revolutions. The paper asserts that by examining the Philippine Revolution against the events of this period, we see that it was well ahead of time. Other nationalist revolutions, with the exception of China, took place in the 1940’s and 1950’s.¹ To understand the place of Philippine Revolution in Asian history, it must be compared with other colonial movements in Asia that occurred during the period under study.

Anti-colonial movements took different forms. Before the advent of Asian nationalism in the mid-19th century, resistance against western imperialism was expressed through revolts, millenarian/messianic movements, social banditry, etc. The Philippines, stemming from various motivations.² Indonesia and Java in particular, had many peasant revolts in the 19th century.³ These were signs of anti-colonial discontent. It may well be argued that no colonial revolution took place in Asia before 1900, except that of the Philippines.⁴

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A Western author considered 1900 as the beginning of the era of the "Awakening of Asia". There is reason for this since nationalist movements had taken roots in India, China, and parts of the Arab world; and were beginning to manifest in Burma, Vietnam and Indonesia. But the only other political revolution during the period under study was the Chinese Revolution of 1911.

It is therefore against the backdrop of mid-19th century pre-nationalist anti-colonial movements, and the nationalist stirrings between 1900 and 1918 that the place of the Philippine Revolution in Asian history will be situated. A survey of the tightening of colonial rule from the mid-19th century, and the corresponding responses of the colonized Asian countries follow, to further highlight the place of the Philippine Revolution.

The 1850's was a turning point in the expansion of Western colonialism in Asia. The Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution made the European powers stronger politically, and wealthier economically. Add to these factors the rise of European nationalism, with its emphasis on the glorification of the nation-state, and you have the motivations for more colonial ventures. Petty economic concessions and indirect influences over Asian territories no longer sufficed, as bigger stakes beckoned.

The first county to 'fall' was China. Between 1840 and 1860, China was subjected to political and military pressures through the Opium Wars, inevitably being opened up through equal treaties imposed on her, first by Great Britain, and later by other European countries which invoked "Most Favored Nation" clause to obtain similar privileges given to the British. This was to be the beginning of China's woes which will culminate in what is referred to as the "slicing of China like a melon" in the first decade of the 20th century. The Manchu leaders were, however, slow in responding to these pressures, although there were peasant uprisings which were more anti-Manchu than anti-western powers.

The first positive response to Western imperialism in China was K'ang Yu Wei's "100 Days of Reform"(1898) but since this was basically still in Confucian terms, the reform movement did not succeed. It was the entry of Sun Yat Sen and his Kuo Min Tang party that set the stage for the Chinese Revolution of October 10, 1911, and the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912. Of relevance to this paper is Sun's San Min Chu I (Three Principles of the People) where he defined his concept of
nationalism as one of love for China. The Republic unfortunately met one reversal after the other under Yuan Shish Kai. By 1916, China was a divided country with the northern area under warlords, and the south under Sun. While it is beyond the concern of this paper, the entry of Communism in China and its utilization as a nationalist ideology by Mao Tse Tung made civil war a necessity in the 1940’s.

Japan was the next target in East Asia. In 1853, Commodore Perry became the instrument to likewise impose on Japan unequal treaties which forced Japan to terminate its seclusion policy started in 1640. Unlike the Chinese, the Japanese leaders responded more positively, and in the ensuing internal struggle for power, the Shogunate was abolished, the western Daimyos spearheaded what would be called the Meiji Restoration.


In Southeast Asia, Britain acquired Burma in a three-pronged annexation move: 1823; 1853; and 1886, to safeguard the integrity of the British Indian Empire against possible French encroachments. The latter was slowly building its own empire in Mainland Southeast Asia by the conquests of Cochin-China in 1862; Annam in 1867; and Tonkin in 1883; Cambodia in 1863; and Laos in 1893. France’s occupation of “Indo-China” was motivated by the need to have access to China.

There was resistance from the local powers. Burma’s Konbaung dynasty tried diplomacy and negotiation to ward off British presence in Burma, and in 1886, there was a rebellion in Lower Burma led by the Thugyiis, which lasted for five years.6 The Nguyen dynasty of Vietnam offered military resistance to French, to no avail. These types of resistance, although anti-colonial, were defensive in nature, involved only the ruling class, and were not nationalistic in nature.

Burmese nationalism manifested itself in the first decade of the 20th century, and drew inspiration from Buddhism. One of the early arms of Buddhist nationalism was the Young men’s Buddhist Association,
obviously pattered after the YMCA of the West. Until the end of World War I, no radical movement developed in Burma.

The tradition of nationalism in Vietnam had a long history dating back from their long struggle against China. Vietnam was not lacking in reformers like Bui Quang Chieu and his Constitutionalist Party, and Pham Quynh’s Tonkinese Party. As in Burma, no extremist group existed prior to 1925.7 Ho Chih Minh used communism as a nationalist ideology in fighting French colonialism.

Siam remained independent largely because of its “remarkable kings and officials” for leaders, 8 and for its policy of “dancing with the wind”. Sensing that the British were in an expanding mood, the Chakkri dynasty decided to give economic and extra-territorial benefits to the British. Under Mongkut and Chulalongkorn, Siam underwent a modernization process that opened up the country to western influences.

With a national identity securely in place, Thai nationalism was directed against Chinese interests in the early 1930’s.

In Island Southeast Asia, the Netherlands East Indies had become a national unit, directly ruled by the Dutch Government by the mid-90’s. Dutch colonialism in what would become modern Indonesia share similarities with Spanish colonialism in the Philippines. The Dutch East India Company (V.O.C) started its commercial ventures in Java in the early 17th century, eventually moving into the outer islands, completing a process of colonization by the 1820’s. While the Dutch ruled Java indirectly through the local rulers until the 1820’s, the Dutch presence in Indonesia is as long as the Spanish presence in the Philippines. This is important to consider since the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaya were creations of Western imperialism. The process of becoming a nation was a long one considering the diversity of cultures and peoples that had to be welded together.

By the first decade of the 20th century, a form of cultural nationalism appeared in Java, with the formation of Budi Utomo in 1908 by Dutch educated Javanese. With the establishment of Sakerat Islam in 1912, a mass movement was gradually formed, and during the fourteen years of existence, “groups of every persuasion enrolled under its banner.”9 Starting off with anti-Chinese feelings, the issues expanded as the movement for change gained grounds, and the organization became
militant. Local rebellious incidents in 1919 were met with force by the Dutch government.¹⁰

British Malaya came into being with the incorporation of the ports of Malacca, Penang and Singapore into one unit, and the addition of the Federal Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang) in the 1870’s. Due to the nature of the plural society that emerged, with the Chinese and the Indians forming the community with the Malays in the lead, no visible nationalist movement emerged until the 1940’s.

The case of the Philippines is an exception to the rule as far as colonialism is concerned. The Spaniards, who established a colonial government in 1565, managed to control most of the Luzon and Visayan regions by 1665, making Filipinas the first true colony of Asia. The establishment of a centralized government, putting the different regions of the country under one system of law and administration, was a first step in gradually welding together the different ethnic groups. This was followed by the Christianization of the ethnic groups, again giving the Philippines a somewhat dubious distinction as the only Christian country in Southeast Asia. The 333 years of Spanish colonial rule were punctuated by revolts. By the middle of the 19th century, Spain succumbed to the lure of international trade, and had completely opened the country to foreign trade. This was a key factor that would bring dramatic changes to the economic and material life of some mestizos and natives who began as marginal recipients of the economic progress, and later became the intelligentsia called ilustrados.

In British India, the Indian (Sepoy) Mutiny of 1857-1858 is significant for the Indians as it is regarded by nationalist Indian historians as its war of independence.¹¹ The British East India Company had ruled India since 1762, and the completion of the empire in the succeeding decades brought in several grievances of political, economic, cultural and military nature resulting in a collective grievance against the British rule. Although it was led by the Indian elites, and confined to Delhi, the United Provinces and parts of central portion of India, the fact that the mutiny lasted for eighteen months was a testimonial to the support that it obtained from the different groups of Indians. For the British, the mutiny was the signal to terminate the rule of the British East India Company, and to put India under the direct rule of the British Parliament. Gradually, a core of educated Indians led in the development of Indian nationalism under the aegis of the Indian National Congress. Other Hindu-oriented groups
emerged to give the early phase of Indian nationalism, a Hindu type of nationalism.

After 1900, B.G. Tilak espoused a radical nationalism, but it was Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violent movement that attracted the masses of Indians in India’s fight to obtain Swaraj from the British. The base of the mass movement was in place by the end of World War I.

Over in West Asia, by the mid 1850’s, the Ottoman Sultan had become a figurehead, with the Western Powers propping him up for their individual ends. Britain and France had shown interest in Egypt since the advent of the 19th century because of the strategic passageway that it offered through what would become the Suez Canal. France managed to build the canal, but the British maintained their presence, and when opportunity permitted with the bankruptcy of Khedive Ismail, a dual control of Britain and France was set-up and in 1885, Britain occupied Egypt. British presence in Egypt lasted until the 1950’s.

Russian interest in the area lay in its desire to have a passageway to the Black Sea, while Germany wanted to have public works concessions linking their interests in the region.

In response to Western encroachments, West Asia resorted initially to Arab nationalism, a movement idealizing the greatness of the past, the common language, territory, culture, and aspirations for independence. The word “Arab” assumed a political, national character and became a basis for identity regardless of ethnic or racial background. H.A.R. Gibb thus defined Arab as “all those ... for whom the central fact of history is the mission of Mohammed and the memory of the Arab Empire and who in addition cherish the Arabic tongue and its cultural heritage as their common possession.”

Syrian Christians influenced by the Syrian Protestant College, later to become the American University of Beirut, first broached the idea of Arab nationalism directed against the Ottoman Empire. Eventually, the direction turned to British and French imperialisms as the Ottoman Empire disintegrated after World War I to become secular to Turkey, but the weakness of the movement lay in the national character of the supposed participants. Egypt had always been a reality as a badge of nationality from early times even when Britain and France had to curve up the Arab World into Palestine, Lebanon and Transjordan. Iraq was likewise a creation of the British which was an aftermath of the settlement
with the Hashemite family for supporting the British through the Arab revolt in 1916.

Thus far, the survey of the period 1857 to 1918 has the following implications:

1. The mid-19th century was a significant dividing line in Asian History since from that point there was an obvious tightening of Western imperialist control over Asian countries in response to the demands of international trade and the ensuing rivalry that it espoused. Aside from direct rule, as in India and the Netherland East Indies, other forms of control were imposed. China, Japan and Thailand, among others, had to subscribe to other treaties; spheres of influence were set up in China, the Mandate system was used in West Asia.

2. Anti-colonialism during the period under study, took different forms: pre- and proto-nationalist revolts, millenarian/messianic movements, social banditry, brigandage, defensive wars’ and the nationalist revolutions of the Philippines and China.

3. Nationalist movements before 1900 were confined to India, some parts of the Arab World, and the Philippines. After 1900, there was a general awakening of Asia as Burmese, Vietnamese and Indonesian nationalism began to stir; Indian nationalism was expressed through Sun Yat Sen’s movement; and Japanese nationalism turned to expansion.

Clearly, the Philippine Revolution stands out as the first nationalist anti-colonial revolution in Asia. Why is the Philippine revolution a special case in Asian history?

First of all, compared to other colonized areas, Spanish colonization lasted for three centuries, longer than other colonized areas. The 333 years of Spanish exploitation and oppression brought both beneficial and negative results. On the beneficial side, the different ethnic communities were welded together into one community under a common system of law and governance. The Catholic Church and the missionary groups did their share in molding a basically Filipino-Christian community. On the negative side, the three centuries of oppression and exploitation took their toll in providing common grievances against Spain, and help explain why the time was ripe for a revolution, given other factors that shaped the nationalist movement in the Philippines.
The Philippines benefitted from the turbulent 19th century Spanish history where the struggle between the forces of liberalism, influenced by the ideals of the French Revolution, and the forces of conservatism represented by the Crown, the Church and the Military, affected Spanish plans and policies in the Philippines. For one thing, conservative and liberal regimes alternated with each other, bringing repressive regimes, and liberal ones. It was under a liberal administration that the Philippines was opened to World Trade, a momentous event because some Indios and mestizo Sangleys benefitted from the economic progress that followed the opening of the Philippine ports to foreign trade. From these families came the *ilustrados* who led the campaign for reforms and conceptualized the idea of a Filipino nation. These elites articulated the issues and fought for change. With economic progress, a leadership, an oppressed people, and the formation of a radical mass-based organization, the way was paved for a revolution.

The first phase of the Revolution against Spain ended in a truce and by December 1897, the Filipino revolutionary leaders went on voluntary exile to Hong Kong. The revolution resumed in May 1898 as an alliance was forged with America, then engaged in her own war against Spain. A “dictatorship” was initially formed, and as the revolutionary government replaced the dictatorship and strengthened its hold against the enemy, Spain withdrew and America decided to keep the Philippines. The Filipino-American war was a one-sided affair, but the Filipinos drew a heavy toll against the Americans through guerilla warfare.

The revolution was a failure in liberating the Philippines from colonial bondage, but in the context of Asian history, it had notable achievements. Aside from being the first anti-colonial revolution in Asia, the Philippines was also the first country to declare its independence. A republican system of government was established, guided by a constitution that recognized the separation of Church and State, gave more powers to the President because of the war-time conditions, had a cabinet, a supreme court, etc. It had an educational system from the primary to the tertiary levels, topped by the creation of the *Universidad Literaria de Filipinas*, the forerunner of the State University.

The Philippines is celebrating the centennial of the Revolution of 1896, but outside of Southeast Asia, the Revolution has not been given its due honors. Asian history textbooks, especially those written by Western scholars, rarely mention the Philippine revolution. Even
Southeast Asian and Philippine history textbooks have confined themselves to stock knowledge about the Philippine Revolution, ignoring the changes in perspectives, and recent studies that give new directions to Philippine nationalism and the revolution.¹⁴

Presently, even Philippine history textbooks continue to perpetuate and accept as historical facts popular notions about the nationalist movement and the Revolution, such as the following: (1) Nationalism was first imbibed by the ilustrados, and later filtered down to the masses; (2) the leading propagandists were reformers; (3) the La Liga Filipina founded by Dr. Jose Rizal in 1892 was a reformist organization; (4) Andres Bonifacio and the leaders of the Katipunan, the secret organization whose aim was separation from Spain, were of plebeian origin; (5) the Katipunan membership was confined to Luzon, etc.

In the last fifteen years, mainstream research with new perspectives like the Nouvelle Histoire inspired by the French Annales, and recent studies in the U.P. Department of History under the perspective called Pantayong Pananaw¹⁵ have enriched the literature on the Revolution, and provided revisionist interpretations of the perpetuated popular notions, and many more controversial issues.

On nationalism as an ideology, Romeo V. Cruz’ pamphlet, “Ang Pagkabuo ng Nasionalismong Filipino” argues that the idea of nationalism first took root among the Peninsulares, Spanish residents in the Philippines born in Spain, who were then called “Filipinos”. The Peninsulares were influenced by developments in Europe and in Spain as the ideals of the French revolution spread throughout the continent. Cruz identified different types of nationalism starting out with the imperial type. The ilustrado Propagandists exemplified the liberal-imperial type of nationalism. Radical nationalism emerged with the establishment of the Katipunan, and the outbreak of the Philippine Revolution in 1896. Cruz’ contribution to our history was to show that nationalism did not begin with the ilustrados, but that the Peninsulares had a role to play in the development of Philippine nationalism.

Reynaldo Ileto’s controversial, if not monumental study, Pasyon and Revolution may eventually revolutionize the history of the development of nationalism as it debunks the earlier notion that the development of nationalism was an elite phenomenon. Ileto’ study, using the “history from below” perspective, argued that the idea of kalayaan was
indigenously imbibed by the masses through the *Pasyon*, the popular reading fare especially during the Holy Week. Christ was not only the martyred son of God, but was himself a revolutionary figure. Using the *Pasyon Pilapil* version, Ileto focused on the Lost Eden/Fall/Redemption sequence of the passion of Christ as argument for the revolutionary effects on the masses. To Ileto, the idea of *kalayaan* among the masses was quantitatively different from the *ilustrados'* concept of *independencia*.

Onofre D. Corpuz' two-volume work *Roots of the Filipino Nation* published in 1989 puts in a new perspective certain aspects of the Propaganda Movement and the revolutionary situation. Where the Propaganda Movement tended to be called a failure in that it was directed at *Madre Espana*, Corpuz cites "unintended" effects like radicalizing some *ilustrados*, and politicizing young non-*ilustrados* in the Philippines like Andres Bonifacio and Emilio Aguinaldo. The twin development "promoted the revolution of nationalism, from reformism, through radicalism to revolution".

Some of the radicalized *ilustrados* who later joined secret societies and eventually the Revolution were Graciano Lopez Jaena, Antonio Luna, Jose Alejandrino and Edilberto Evangelista. Jose Rizal himself abandoned reformism when he left Spain to go to Hong Kong where he planned the formation of *La Liga Filipina*, on his return to the Philippines. The structure of the *Liga* was proof that he was no longer associating with Spain. That the Liga Filipina was a secret organization patterned after the Masonic structure was proof of the revolutionary character of the organization, and the change of heart of Rizal about reformism.

Where Teodoro A. Agoncillo speaks of the "Revolt of the Masses" and the plebeian nature of its leaders, there are now studies, among them Fast and Richardson's *Roots of Dependency, Political and Economic Revolutions in 19th Century Philippines*, showing that Andres Bonifacio was of lower middle class status based on his work as a *bodegero* and the salary that he was receiving. That Bonifacio and other leaders of the first phase of the Revolution were of elite status changes the nature of that phase of the Revolution as a mass-based movement in terms of leadership.

The foregoing samples of revisionist studies have been the product of mainstream research using the Positivist School of history, with the exception of Ileto's study which is social history, and therefore has made use of literature and related fields to reflect the history from below
perspective. Another group based in the U.P. Department of History has come up with the *Pantayong Pananaw* perspective which is anchored on culture as the root of history, and is written in the Filipino language. It goes beyond the study of the document, and makes use of ethnography, ethno-linguistics, hermeneutics and other multi-disciplinary tools. A new periodization is presented in which continuity is the rule and colonialism as a landmark is not given the importance that most textbook writers have given it. The interpretations of this group on the Philippine Revolution add a new dimension to the continuing study on the Revolution.

The bulk of these “new studies” are compiled in the book KATIPUNAN: *Isang Pambansang Kilusan*, published jointly in 1994 by the U.P. Department of History and the Historical group called ADHIKA. As the title connotes, the *Katipunan* as operative in the Revolution of 1896, is seen as a national movement. Following the *pantayong pananaw* framework, the Revolution is no longer studied as a political phenomenon alone, but is seen in its totality, and in the lasting effect that it has had on the nation. The important point is that a regime fell and it was replaced by a structure shaped by the revolutionist in the name of the people. The Revolution may have been waged by members of a small group, but in their movement, they formed a strong force that joined the fight against the Spanish Government.  

To show that the Katipunan was a not just Tagalog based, the book mentions initial studies of the presence of the organization in Batanes; in Piddig, Ilocos Norte; Bicol; Palawan through the more than 200 deportees in 1896 who had connections to the Katipunan and the Revolution; and in Cebu. There were uprisings in Misamis, in Cotabato, and in Zamboanga, all in the southern island of Mindanao, but these were not necessarily Katipunan-inspired.

Ferdinand Llanes, the editor of the book, provides the various dimensions in the study of the Revolution. The “totality” covers such topics as local issues, cultural, intellectual, organizational, demographical, and sectoral (women, military, professional) concerns.

Between the mainstream and new studies on the Revolution briefly discussed here, one can see the changing face of the Philippine Revolution, and the interest that Filipino scholars and Filipinologists are giving to further stress the importance of that Revolution not only to the Philippines, but to Asian history as well.
In conclusion, this paper has examined the anti-colonial movements in Asia between 1857 and 1918, and has shown that the Philippine Revolution was ahead of its time with the Philippines being the first Asian country to wage a nationalist political revolution against Western Imperialism. Only China waged a similar revolution, but this took place in the next decade. Other anti-colonial agitations before 1900 were either pre- or proto-nationalist, while the period 1900 to 1918 witnessed either the beginnings of nationalist movements led by the elites, or the growth of mass-based nationalism as in the case of India.

As the Philippines celebrates the centennial of its Revolution, various dimensions and interpretations of the Revolution have come out to further put in place its role both in the country, and in Asia. Our Southeast Asian neighbors like Malaysia and Indonesia have recognized the place of the Revolution. It is our hope that as more Asian history textbooks are written by Asians, a better treatment of the Philippine Revolution will be made.
Endnotes

1 For example, the Indonesian Revolution against the Dutch began in 1946, while the Vietnamese Revolution against France started shortly after World War II and ended in 1954.

2 The revolts were caused by different motivations: (a) grievances caused by Spanish oppressive practices; (b) religious issues stemming from a desire to restore the old pre-Spanish religion; (c) agrarian problems, and (d) generally a desire to regain lost freedom.


4 The Meiji Restoration of 1875 was in itself a revolution from the top, but since it was “self-induced” to make Japan at par with the Western Powers, it is an exception to the prevailing pattern of anti-colonial revolutions.


6 D.G.E. Hall, A History of Southeast Asia, p. 693.

7 Ibid., p.718.

8 Milton Osborne, Southeast Asia, An Illustrated Introductory History, Allen and Unwin, 1988, p.73.

9 Joel Steinberg, et. al., In Search of Southeast Asia, Praeger Publisher, 1971, p. 294.

10 Ibid., p. 295.

11 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, Oxford University Press, 1985 edition, p.323

12 Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History.
For example, Michael Edwards' *Asia in the European Age, 1498-1955*, Thames and Hudson, 1961, dismisses the Philippine Revolution with this one line: Revolutionary activities amongst the Filipinos resulted in some relaxation of clerical rule. G. Robina Quale's *Eastern Civilizations*, Meredith Publishing Co., 1966, had also one line in reference to the Revolution of 1896: "In 1896 armed revolts began."

See my paper "New Studies on the Philippine Revolution: An Analysis", read at the International Conference on Philippine Studies held in Honolulu, Hawaii, April 14-17, 1996.

The *Pantayong Pananaw* was pioneered by Zeus Salazar and other faculty members of the U.P. Department of History in the early 1980's. The word "pantayo" is translated as "among us", connoting an inclusive relationship. Thus writing in the Filipino without pretensions to addressing the outside world, nor being apologetic or defensive for what the Filipino and his culture is.


Llanes, p. iv.
TEXT AND POLITICS: TRANSACTIONS OF POWER IN
THE EARLY PROVINCIAL PHILIPPINES

Danilo M. Gerona *

In Bikol, as in other regions of the Philippines, the work of evangelization, which began in the last decades of the 16th century and lasted till the 18th, was intimately tied up with colonialism and the appropriation of spiritual discourse for specific hegemonic ends. Though expressly concerned with transcendental ends, as it was primarily concerned with the task of winning the pagan Bikolanos to the Catholic faith, the missionaries recognized the import of secular obstacles posed by the prevailing social milieu. The Franciscans were aware that conversion could be facilitated only by radically transforming the existing elements in social clusters of society and reconstituting them according to a social paradigm consistent with their theological and cultural framework. Hence, conversion assumed the nature of a political transaction. Winning the natives to Catholicism implied their submission to the authority of the missionary-curate.

As colonial rule began to bear heavily on the Bicolanos, the friar, who in most cases was the only representative of the crown, felt the need to continually expound in most subtle ways the legitimacy of colonial authority. This took place through a religious discourse which essentially revolved around the articulation of the eschatological significance of the entire spectrum of Christianity. Thus, behind the symbolisms of Christian rituals and missionary discourses were encoded ideas which constituted the idiom of Spanish hegemony.

The 17th-18th centuries were a high point in the history of Franciscan missionary activity in Kabikolan. The chief intent of this study is not to trace the growth of Christianity but rather to map out the domain of politics in the hermeneutical terrain of religious rhetorics.

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The Metaphysical Assumptions of Religious Discourse

The project of conversion involves the process of universalizing a religious concept while at the same time articulating this idea in the context of the local milieu. Circumscribed by a standard discourse, the process of conversion involves a semiotic and hermeneutic transaction. Since it was the missionaries' belief that if the Catholic church had to take root among the heathen, its message had to be rendered in terms that were familiar and universally comprehensible to them. The result was the standard missionary practice of preaching the gospel in the native tongues of the subject people.² The use of the native tongue, however, was not without problems. Its limited vocabulary did not include the words needed for an adequate teaching of the principles of the faith. Such concepts and corresponding words for Dios, gracia, salvacion, Espiritu Santo, cruz, santos, and others were foreign to the natives and consequently not found in their language. Nevertheless, the untranslatability of these concepts into native terms gave the natives an impression of the intrinsic superiority of the Latin and Castilian languages over the local ones. This stemmed, so it seems, from the belief that these native languages were incapable not only of accurately signifying secular and transcendental realities but also of mobilizing and transforming them. In a similar vein, Benedict Anderson pointed out that the emergence of truth-language or ritual language was premised on the belief that ontological reality is apprehensible only through a single, privileged system of representation (Anderson 1983, 22). The use of Latin as a standard ritual language of the Catholic Church endowed this language with almost magical and supernatural characteristics. This explains why native healers appropriated this language into their pagan rituals in the form of mutilated Latin incantations³. On the other hand, the use of Spanish as the official language of imperial bureaucracy made Spanish the language of secular power. These impressions apparently rendered substantial aid to the missionaries' project of conversion⁴.

Translation, interpretation, and conversion, however, were premised on the assumption of an existing cultural gap between two peoples. Yet at the same time these were also hinged on the recognition of a pervasive ontological-generic unity between these different peoples allowing for the possibility of comprehension and intersubjective dialogue. Likewise, the whole enterprise of conversion was predicated on the belief that Christian ideology, though encoded in a particular symbol, expressed in another language and transported to another social reality could survive cultural, geographical, and historical shock. It appears that for the
missionaries Christianity possessed the divine privilege of preserving its original ideological substance and thereby maintaining the orthodoxy of the doctrine despite its universal applicability. For the missionaries, this was indeed a confirmation of the divine character of this religion. Its adaptability to various historical situations and cultural settings reflected its rootedness in the universal and tranhistorical being, God. Such impression was most evident in the narrative of Fray Marcelo de Ribadeneira, a Franciscan missionary who wrote one of the lengthy chronicles of the early conversion of Kabikolan. Ribadeneira mentioned a Bikolano who, upon being told of the God of Christianity, exclaimed and said: “Oh, like you Spaniards, we have always known God since childhood because we have never offended Him.”

Ribadeneira quoted this remark to buttress his belief that the God of Christianity was virtually existing in the consciousness of every people even before they had formal epistemological access to its being.

Despite the multiplicity of culture and the fluidity of historical reality, missionaries were convinced of the existence of a distinct universal human reality transcending historical conditions and cross-cutting geographical horizons. This generic relationship of humanity was made possible because of its primordial divine origin. Fray Juan de Oliver, OFM, a missionary in Bikol region in the last decade of the 16th century, used the metaphor of the family to describe the basis of universal kinship:

Everyone of us is a creature and thus the evil man is also our brother. And the poor, those without gold, should we speak evil words to them? Should we oppress them? We should not enslave them but treat them like ourselves as they are not different from us since they are our brothers, sons of our Lord God, Father of all men (Oliver 1591, 5).

For Oliver, therefore, kinship was not merely a result of random genetic selection but an encompassing metaphysical and therefore universal reality, a result of divine action. Moreover, this proposition that God was maker of all and father to all demanded necessary adjustments in all natives’ social relations. It was because this new social cosmology implied a new axiological framework which likewise necessitated a reconstitution of social structures. The basis of social merits should no longer be social and economic privileges but moral and spiritual excellence. This idea was greatly reflected in the semantic shift of death.
The natives’ elaborate rituals and the extravagant funerary materials accompanying the pre-colonial chief’s burial seemed to indicate the existence of belief in the transcendental continuity of birthright. The slaves’ uncommon virtue of resigning their life to the pre-colonial Bikol ritual of hogot⁷ or slave-killing also points to the cultural hegemony of this elitist eschatology. Belief that one’s place in the after-life is determined by his location in the social grid, made death less frightening and less uncertain. In speaking of death, Fray Pedro de Avila, a missionary-curate of the parish of Canaman⁸ in 1684, underscored his assault on this native belief, which in effect was directed to break the hegemony of the elite. The Spanish missionaries then offered an alternative eschatology which was premised on the economy of Christian morality. This implies that the human being’s journey to the after-world is regulated not by fatalism but by pious compliance with the moral canons of Christianity.

This Christian eschatology which prescribed a new moral imperative issued forth from the belief that human beings, though creatures of God (which was the basis for postulating universal equality), alienated themselves from him and therefore corrupted their nature. This view set the starting point of human history as a state of negation. “When you bring your child to the church for the Padre to have it baptized,” Fray Pedro de Avila declared, “the child is still a slave (oripon) of the devil” (Avila, 27). Then he proceeded to explain how the child was freed from the clutches of the devil: “the first thing that the Padre does at the door of the church is to expel the devil by blowing three times on the child” (Avila, 27).

For the missionaries, therefore, the imperative of conversion stemmed from the demand to transform the ontological possibilities of the natives from a state of negation to a state of spiritual perfection. Fray Pedro de Avila underscored the fundamental idiom of conversion:

Although you were all far from Christianity in ancient times, God took pity on you and sent his missionaries to baptize you and now to preach to you to avoid sin... (Avila, 349)

Hence, the whole mythic discourse of conversion revolved around the notion of human sinfulness and the tyranny of the devil, while highlighting the infinite mercy of God.⁹ It was along this perspective that the missionaries imagined the world as a locus of a cosmic battle between good and evil, between the forces of God and the devil. For the Spanish missionaries, unchristianized villages were, as one missionary in Bikol in
1685 put it, “living under the rule of the devil” (San Joseph 1685, 145) This image of the world imbued them with enormous apostolic zeal to consider themselves as soldiers of Christ waging with spiritual weapons a war to overthrow the devil’s tyranny over the pagan people.

The missionaries employed the metaphor of “darkness” to describe the conditions of life obtaining in pagan societies and contrasted it with Christianized societies which Fray de Avila referred to as “enlightened” In the words of the friar:

it may be proper to tell you of many kingdoms where many people lived without any knowledge of God because they are believers in anito and worshippers of the devil. These are the people who did not receive the mercy of God which could have enlightened (napacaluanago) their souls through the teachings of Christianity. For this reason they are bound to hell (Avila, 247).

For the missionaries, therefore, evangelization means bringing light to those living in darkness. Such tendentious categories were implicitly encoded in various forms and levels in the texts. They evinced a straddling of meaning from one pole of power to another and were apparently responsible for the multiplicity of semantic layers of various native terms. Religious rhetoric generated new semantics which defined the domain of hegemonic power. Friar discourse obviously encrypted substantial strains of political discourse. Christianization entailed drawing the natives from their narrow cultural shells into the mainstream of universal civilization. The necessary conclusion was that a thorough process of conversion was only possible under the colonial canopy of the Spanish empire. It was on this framework that the Franciscans set out to create Christian communities and transplant European civilization in the region.

**The Secular Character of Spiritual Power**

In a society where religion was a mainstay of political regime, it is not surprising that the friar was bound to assume wide non-spiritual powers. From the second decade of the 17th century, as soon as Christianity was implanted in lowland Bicol, the Franciscan missionary was often the only visible representative of the crown in the town. Thus, the laws of the civil regime and the church which should have governed the
_doctrina_ or the parish appeared to have, in most instances, dissolved into arbitrary demands of the friar. Such wide powers joined with religious character of the position made the friar in the minds of common folk, a man of enormous prestige and power.

One of the most palpable expressions of the friar's enormous powers emerged when the thorny issue of episcopal jurisdiction erupted in the early 17th century. In 1634 the Franciscans vigorously contested the pretensions of the bishop of Caceres to deprive them of the parishes of Yguey, Paracale, Albay, Casiguran, and Bacon. This highly explosive issue of jurisdiction between the bishop and the Franciscans persisted way until the 18th century. In various instances, the defiant Franciscans did not merely adopt legal means but even resorted to less dignified aggressive actions such as barricading.\(^{10}\) However, despite their frequent clashes with various bishops, the Franciscans were never dislodged from Bicol region which remained an exclusive Franciscan territory for more than three hundred years.

Furthermore, in the last decade of the 17th century reports documenting the abuses of the Franciscans in Bicol surfaced. One report in 1698 stated that "the Franciscan doctrineros there compel the _dalagas_ to pound rice for the consumption of the convents, likewise they oblige the _bagongtaos_ and the said _dalagas_ to bring their firewood and food for the pigs of the convent... all of which is so publicly known" (quoted in Abella 1954, 326). Such practice persisted beyond the 17th century since even in the beginning of the 18th century similar complaints were still heard. In 1702, an _oidor-visitador_ sent to investigate another complaint made a report showing the enormous power of the friar and thus confirming other reports of abuses committed by the friars against the natives of the Camarines provinces. The report states:

Under the pretext of needlework and embroidery, the religious compelled the _dalagas_ to be in continued attendance in the houses of the syndics and mistresses, where they not only sewed and embroidered the articles of the sacristy, but also the inner garments of the religious and the outer garments of their servants. Besides they must do whatever was commanded by the mistresses themselves, and their fiscals and syndics, and the fields of all these were sown with grain, without pay, by the wretched _dalagas_ (Quoted from Corpuz 1989, 201).
In an effort to arrest these abuses, the *oidor* recommended that the friar be provided with a coterie of ceremonial and household personnel. Aside from the two sacristans, acolytes and *cantors* for the mass, the priest would have in his disposal a church porter, some *bagongtaos* or young men to carry the priest on a hammock or litter and should also serve as his rowers during trips; two laundresses, all the young women to sew and embroider the clothes and vestments; a *celador* or fiscal to report any violation or omissions of the church rules, and a collector of accounts due the friar. Such willingness of the colonial officials to readily please the friar by giving in to his whims reflected the colonial authorities' recognition of the enormous power of the friar and his important role in preserving Spanish hegemony.

As a colonial authority, the missionary made use of some process of mystification to justify the use of his powers. Some techniques which he employed rationalized the exercise of his powers and authority. In his perception of native opposition, Fray Avila invoked the prime source of authority, God, to buttress his claim to authority:

My brothers, you should reflect the meaning of what I said to you regarding the disciples of Christ, concerning any priest who comes to your parish because that priest is the true representative of God, chosen by God to come to you to free you from your sins by way of their preaching, which binds your souls...that’s why Christ has said to the priests “I have taken you from the world so that you may become like my disciples to bring divine fruits which are the holy preachings that are beneficial to your souls (Avila, 415).

Then he likewise asserted the legitimacy of his authority by appealing to that divine mandate.

It is not only that Jesus has taken me from the Kingdom in Spain but now, God has also chosen me and He commanded me to come to you... in order to take care of your souls and bring you the sweet fruits that bring life to your souls (Avila, 414).
His attempt to articulate his sacred duty to God and the native converts was a forceful strategy not only in negotiating his authority but at the same time in concealing the actual power relations which constituted the basis of its force. By playing down his own power he, in reality, built it up.

The missionaries of the 17th and 18th century likewise emphasized the intrinsic transcendent and divine constitution of sacerdotal ministry, thereby elevating the priestly life to a higher plane of ontological existence. Fray Esteban de Gascuena, a friar-curate of the parish of Milaor in the latter part of the 18th century, quoted in his sermon what St. Francis was supposed to have said, apparently to inspire in his audience reverence for the friars:

If I see a saint descend from heaven and I also see a priest who is beside the saint, I will ignore the saint and will come instead to the priest and kiss his hand because his hands are those that hold the Son of God in the consecrated host. Is there anyone far higher than him on earth? (Gascuena c.1770, 204)

His ability to shift from one source of authority to another facilitated the process of consolidation, a process carried out through a subtle exhortative discourse. In his discourse, he often made use of analogies and frequently referred to himself as the father of the community, thereby creating an image of a stern but benevolent authority (Perttierra 1995, 43). Avila stressed this role saying:

Although it is the prime obligation of the priest to preach to the town where he was assigned because he is the father of the people, God also empowered him to criticize and to forbid them from committing sins like a father would do to his children... The priest, because of his love for the people under him (pinagbobootan), must not only preach, but should criticize and punish them if they sin... (414).

Fray Avila implied that divine mandate provided a corresponding sacerdotal prerogative, a sort of unmediated hermeneutical access to transcendental and eschatological truths. This, for him, was the underlying basis for his authority to structure the field of action of native converts by defining the boundaries of social behavior. It appeared that social
relationship was a mere secularized version of an essentially spiritual transaction mediated by the friars’ secular and spiritual authority. This, in part, explains the friar’s claim to power both in the spiritual and in the physical realms.

The power to punish the natives through flogging has become an integral part of conversion strategy, probably started about the later part of the first half of the 17th century. By this time Christian villages had already attained some degree of stability and the friars had already secured a relatively firm grip of the people. This means that the natives by this time had already acquired a sense of the legitimacy and inevitability of their own subordination. The friar, on the other hand, began to feel that he had already acquired legitimate domination. The employment of flogging, as Foucault noted in one of his studies, was a strategy designed to reproduce the structures of legitimation by a concrete manifestation of his control of power through the employment of coercive force and violence (Foucault 1979, 119). Such view was apparently true in the case of the friars in Kabikolan.

In 1647, Fray Andres de San Agustin used in his grammar book different examples of sentences referring to punishment of the natives by the friars. A clear example is this one: “The friar ordered you flogged because of your failure to attend mass” (San Agustin 1647, 5). Although used merely as an example to elaborate on a particular grammatical rule, one is immediately struck by San Agustin’s ready employment of flogging. San Agustin’s use of the term seemed to imply that flogging was a familiar and an integral element of native discipline.

Actual cases of public flogging had been documented in the 17th century. In 1694 Fray Alonso de Safra condemned an indio principal in the town of Nabua to be punished in public. This impressed the natives so much and seemingly proved to be an effective means for social control. His control of and access to various power bases made opposition difficult and dangerous. The structure of early colonial society was so designed that he assumed effective control of all the powers available in his locality. Add to all this the other sources of power and legitimation such as the Mass and confession, and the resulting picture was a theocratic society where the arbitrary rules of the friar held sway.

The Mass and confession also served as sources of implicit power for the friar, although he probably did not intend them as such. At Mass
the friar assumed the center stage of authority possessing both divine and secular powers. Since the celebration of the mass is the core of Catholic religious life, it constitutes as one of the most formal and solemn regular transactions between the parish priest and the congregation. Such regularity eventually infused the natives with a habitus of subservience. As the ritual was gradually assimilated into the organic and psychological constitution of the natives, it eventually created a relationship structured not only in terms of consent through domination but also most effectively by sheer force of repeated practice which became so much part of the mental and physical habits of the natives.

Moreover, the Catholic church prescribed that every convert should go to confession at least once a year. As evident in various sermons, missionaries heavily stressed the importance of confession in the individual’s sacramental life. For a Catholic confession possesses a regulative function in the economy of divine grace. If sin alienates one from the source of spiritual life and from the community of the elect, it is by confession that alienation is overcome. Thus, Fray Avila expounded the theological significance of this sacrament:

If someone here has committed a very serious sin called mortal, the soul of that person is not only ill but is already dead (Avila, 23).

He pointed out that the way to restore life to the soul began with repentance. But repentance alone was not enough. Sinners must confess sins to the priest for it was “God’s command that we should reveal to the priest all the sins that darken our souls, that we may know that Jesus Christ has entrusted to these priests the power to erase sins and to heal our souls” (Avila, 23). Therefore, confession as the profession of faith, the admission of fallenness and the assertion of desire to be reinserted into the network of divine transaction required objective manifestation of a subjective reality.

However, disclosure of personal sins in confession allowed the friar access into that shadowy private world of the natives often denied him. It provided the friar with an insight into the subjective moral disposition of the individual and the community in general.

The Church stressed that nothing should be held back in confession, for any attempt to withhold sins only confirmed the sinfulfulness and compounded the guilt of the sinner. In this manner, the priest was assured
a reliable cognitive apparatus not only in probing into the depths of the individual’s latent moral world but also a functional device for infiltrating and subverting the individual’s moral habitus.

With all these secular and spiritual powers wrapped up into one, the friar was assured a functional mechanism of power which enabled him to exploit the dynamics of local social relations in the transformation of the native society. Notwithstanding, the process of social transformation was not an easy task for the friar for the latent tension between the native elite continued beyond the 17th century. Nevertheless, for more than 300 years, the friarocratic hegemony in Bikol region was never contested with open violence. Except for the ripples created by the Sumoroy rebellion that swept the provinces of Sorsogon and Masbate, there was no homegrown violence that was directed to the friars until the end of colonial rule. If peace was an index of hegemony, then the friars were indeed successful.

The Maguinoo Class as Vanguards of Resistance

Spanish accounts distinguished, albeit in a sketchy manner, three estates in the pre-colonial Bikol social structure, namely: the rulers and their kin, called maguinoo; the freemen, or timawa, among the ruled; and the slaves or oripon, the disenfranchised members of society.

The head of a barangay or village was called the datu, and his kin constituted the elite group known as maguinoo. It would seem, however, that mere membership in the village elite did not necessarily qualify one to be a datu. But one who became a datu thereby became a maguinoo.

Maguinoo was an honorific title of society used to address a member of the village elite of either gender. In the early 17th century, Fray Marcos de Lisboa, a Franciscan missionary in Bikol who wrote the first Spanish-Bikol dictionary, defined both datu and guinoo as “rich and elite,” and maguinoo or hiyangta as one of special prominence (Lisboa c. 1621, 143). They were addressed as Cagorangnan, the equivalent of Lord.

The clients or followers of the maguinoo were called timawa, also referred to in the Lisboa dictionary as batac. Timawa is defined as “an ordinary man of the village, neither a chief nor a slave” (hombre ordinario del pueblo, que ni es principal, ni esclavo.) In another entry Lisboa states that matimawa means dar libertad al esclavo or “to give freedom to slave.
(Lisboa, 376).” This suggests that a timawa at least in many instances, used to be a slave, thus reflecting the flexibility in social structure.

Slave status was acquired through birth, failure to pay debts, and captivity in war. Slaves were referred to in various terms as pondoan, salpoc, pongca, sapod, but commonly called oripon. A slave by birth was called guintubo.

Of these classes, it was the maguinoo which caught the interest of the missionaries. Because of their dominant role, the friars sought relentlessly to win the adherence of the maguinoo class, if not to reduce their traditional sources of hegemonic powers. However, even in the 17th century, the maguinoo continued to exercise not only enormous influence but also substantial control over the natives. To a large extent, colonial rule had merely destroyed the traditional formal structure itself. As late as 1792 the traditional power of the datus and the deferential treatment accorded them by the lower classes remained. Luis Nee, a Spanish traveler in Sorsogon in the 18th century, took notice of the following:

The datus, the title by which among themselves they distinguish the nobility, are almost the only ones who have lands, these are worked for them by the timaguas, or plebeians, who do not have lands themselves so that in spite of the fertility of the island, it does not always supply food to its inhabitants. The timaguas maintain a great respect for their principal nobles, never do they marry with them, they obey them and cultivate their lands, when they possess public office (Quoted from Owen 1992, 297).

The social structure and power relations among the members of the village in Bikol followed similar lines.

The social structure in the 17th century Kabikolan is reflected in a sermon of Fray Avila. Using a metaphor culled from the story of the molten statues ordered raised and worshipped by King Nebuchadnezzar, he wrote:

The idol of Nebuchadnezzar is likened to a town (banuaan). The golden head of the idol (pararangpan) are the leaders (paraboot). The silver breast are the maguinoo and the
cabeza and the iron stomach are the good men of the town. While the clay feet are the poor timaua (372)

At the top of the typical 17th century village were the paraboot and the cabezas, the civil officials who generally came from the elite class, and below them were the two major groups, the maguinoo and the timaua. It was evident from the social division of classes in the 17th century that developments brought by colonial rule hardly altered the basis of social relations of the pre-colonial society. Although Fray de Avila made no mention in his metaphor of the existence of the oripon class in the 16th century, he hinted it by referring to "a person owned by another" (Lisboa, 263). It was clear that the Spaniards were able to restrict social exploitation but the missionaries failed to completely abolish slavery or the existence of the oripon as a social class. It would seem that throughout the rest of the 17th century, slavery was still part of the colonial social system (W.H. Scott 1991). In 1647 Fray Andres de San Agustin’s Arte de la Lengua Bicol was replete with allusions to the purchase of oripon as social commodities. It was only perhaps in the 18th century that slaves ceased to be a distinct social class, having been integrated into the poor timaua class. Thus, throughout the 17th century the oripon class virtually retained its essential feature of debt peonage, and thus were hardly distinguishable in practical effects from the traditional pre-colonial oripon.

The maguinoo class apparently remained as the head of the social structure in the early colonial Bicol society. Such social status remained to be essentially reckoned by lineage, even in the latter part of the 17th century and until the 18th century (Martinez 1708, 49). When asked about his social status, a maguinoo replied to Fray Avila that he was a maguinoo because his ancestors were all maguinooos. However, it is also evident from Fray Avila that social prestige was actually measured by one’s possession of wealth rather than by one’s descent.

And there are so many of you here, maguinoo, who are like that man. Because you have already become poor and that your fellow maguinoo is beginning to lose their respect for you, you try to retain your wealth by stealing from the poor (Avila, 370).

The maguinoo enjoyed the respect not only of the poor but even of their duly elected authorities.
If there was any sinful (paracasala) maguinoo here, was there any single capitán who reprimanded and punished him? None. Was there anybody who jailed him? None. Why is this so? It is because he is a maguinoo that's why he is left unpunished by the capitanes. Had he been poor he would have been immediately thrown to jail and would have been punished and also sent to the town (253).

This only shows that colonial rule had marginal effect in the horizontal relationships within the Filipino elite. In pre-colonial times, the elite employed strategies in dealing with others of their class (Ribadeneira, 50). They formed alliances, by marriages, and ritual friendship, and competitive displays of prestige, such as expensive feasting and drinking, elaborate religious rituals, sumptuary exhibitionism, and even warfare (Owen, 2).

The downward power enjoyed by the elite, particularly the datus, was hardly affected except that there existed a nominal superordinate colonial institution concretized in the authority of the friar-curate. Most villages founded in the late 16th and early 17th centuries into colonial pueblos began their civil administration with one of the former datus of the gathered villages appointed as paraboot or gobernadorcillo (Huerta 1865, 272). In 1678, shortly before the pueblo of Nabua acquired its independent municipal status, this town was being administered by three old men apparently belonging to the acknowledged ruling elite (Bajandi 1937, 73). This shows that the traditional power of the elites in pre-Hispanic times survived the impact of the conquest. The elite continued to exercise their powers, this time under the auspices of colonial administration.

The missionaries vigorously attempted to mitigate, if not to completely abolish the monopolistic display of class prestige in the customary socio-religious ceremonies. Christian values were inculcated, and pagan rites were supplanted by various pious practices coordinated by the friars and centered on the church. These rituals highlighted the moral and religious obligations rather than the social and economic privileges of a favored class.

The local elites, however, appropriated this hegemonic apparatus of the friars for their own advantage. The native elite took active participation in socio-religious celebrations as ritual sponsors. Maguiños were often chosen as marriage sponsors at the weddings of their fellow
*maguinooas* as well as those of the lower class. The parish church was generally the recipient of the elites’ social benevolence. When a highly respected *indio* principal of the town of Buhi died in 1690, the friars honored him by providing him with a Franciscan habit for his burial shroud (San Antonio 1738, 341). The friars said that such privilege was given him as formal recognition of his generosity to the church and the people. Thus, it can be inferred from this particular instance, that the underlying strength of the native elite lay in their ability to make use of colonial mechanisms to reassert their own class domination.

Marriages were already formalized in the church but the *principales*, as the elite were also called in the 17th century, married others of their class and the resultant linking of prominent families further strengthened class identity and solidarity. Although polygamy, which was another privilege of the pre-colonial elite, was condemned and eventually abolished, the elite found ways to circumvent this prohibition.

While complying with the prescribed monogamous marriage, the elite maintained illicit sexual affairs outside marriage giving rise to the preponderance of *pagsambay* or adultery. Although documents suggest that cohabitation was not merely confined among the *maguinooas* it seemed clear that it was quite strong among them. In a strongly worded statement, Fray de Avila condemned the *maguinooas’* adulterous inclinations: “And most of all some who happen to be *maguinoo* behave like animals because even if they are already married still they commit adultery sometimes even with their cousins” (Avila, 109).

Since adultery or cohabitation entailed additional financial burden to support another household, it became an index of the *maguinoo’s* economic power. Likewise, it not only extended kinship ties outside his legitimate family but at the same time provided him with potential pool of agricultural and political manpower in his concubine and illegitimate children. Economics was an important factor in this practice. Fray Pedro de Avila noted that the natives of his parish would not abandon their concubines because they reasoned out that their concubines were useful in farming and getting their money to pay their tributes. Thus, they concluded that if they abandoned them they would starve and would not even be able to pay their tributes (Avila, 197).

Furthermore, the official state monopoly of social control ended warfare as a means of contesting power directly. The elite could no longer
coerce the members of the lower class by resorting to violence. Nevertheless, they again found a powerful tool in debt peonage for securing submission through economic means.

The persistence of slavery or the oripon class in the form of debt peonage only reinforced the power of the maguinoo class. As social influence and political power remained based on wealth, the rich maguinoo continued to wield power over the poor timauas in the form of debt peonage. The elite continued to be regarded as the economic patron of the subordinate class. Avila indicated that the timauas often borrowed from the maguinooos commodities such as palay at a high rate:

Some persons who, when asked to lend palay, could give poor borrowers but the purpose is to gain several (cabulao) gantas in just a year (Avila, 187).

The inability of the poor timaua to pay their debts to the maguinoo eventually bound them personally to the maguinoo. The indebtedness of the timaua to the maguinoo hardly made his social position better than that of the 16th century oripon. On the other hand, it reaffirmed the socio-economic importance of the maguinoo and their power to appropriate the labor of another. In this manner it was an effective tool for perpetuating class domination. As the maguinoo continued to effectively structure the social system of the 17th century Bicol, the friars continually looked upon the maguinoo-principales as the backbone of local resistance.

Restructuring Social Order

For the missionaries, conversion did not simply imply an impersonal gratuitous transformation of the human being’s transcendental spiritual possibility from the realm of actual negation to a state of potential perfection. It was their belief, however, that liberation of human beings from the tyranny of the devil implied their recognition of a new cosmic order, the advent of divine hegemony. Using a metaphor comprehensible to the natives, the missionaries pointed out that their redemption from the slavery of the devil necessarily made them slaves (oripon) of God. The condition of any human being was similar to that of any debtor who, for failure to pay, becomes beholden and in fact bound to the creditor as slave. The liberation of humankind from the diabolical tyranny constituted unpaid indebtedness to God. This framework of one’s transaction with the
supernatural entity was comprehensible to the natives inasmuch as it
reflected their actual cultural process of exchange and indebtedness which
structured their social relationships. The missionaries apparently
appropriated this indigenous social framework to secure political hegemony
on the natives. The underlying logic was that the drama of spiritual
redemption assumed two different historical moments and two distinct
religious protagonists: first was Christ’s crucifixion and second was the
Franciscan’s project of conversion. It is evident that this religious claim
had encrypted substantial strains of political discourse.

However, this radical shift in the ontological status of the natives
with its concomitant recognition of their indebtedness to God and the
missionaries, necessitated a corresponding subjective commitment to a new
universal moral mandate—God’s mandate as articulated by the missionaries.
Thus, the natives’ debt of gratitude was not merely transcendental but
historical. Indebtedness was not only to God but to Mother Spain. Hence,
morality was grounded on the metaphysics of gratitude which structured
colonial relationship.

This colonialist theology prescribed a corresponding restructuring
of the existing social order based on a new moral axiom. As has been
pointed out, one’s individual worth was measured no longer in terms of
birthright but in terms of the subjective moral power to respond to the
divine mandate articulated in the moral canons codified by the missionaries.
It was along this framework that the missionaries attempted to reconstitute
a new social meaning for the natives, the maguinoos class in particular.
Echoing Christ’s dictum that good deeds are the measure of one’s being,
Fray Avila delivered a sharp scathing attack on the maguinoos. His words
are worth quoting at length:

As to you, my brother maguinoos, how many of you could
be made examples of what Jesus has said. How many? I
don’t know. But what we know is that the maguinoos have
done nothing but get drunk, they are shameless and do not
fear God. Are you a maguino? “Yes, Padre”, you
would say. But that is a lie because such behavior
does not bespeak of a maguino but of a common man
(basang-basang na tao). Are you a maguino? But your
evil deeds are known throughout the town. Are you a
maguino? Yes, Padre, because all my ancestors are
maguinoos. That is a lie, because your deeds are not that of a maguino but of an ordinary man (Avila, 207).

It is apparently clear that Fray Avila did not conceive of social classes as situated in different phenomenological moral spheres, governed by separate moral laws. Such differentiation would undermine the acclaimed catholicity of Christian morals. Thus, Fray Avila implied that human persons were not encrusted with particular moral codes appropriate to their social rank. Nevertheless, they were expected to discern higher moral consciousness as they moved up the social hierarchy. But this higher moral perception should be translated into their moral conduct and social decorum. Hence, the maguinoos were expected to be exemplars of social and moral virtues.

After giving a long moral peroration regarding the immoralities of the maguino men, Fray Avila directed his vitriolic attack on the maguino women:

Worst are the women who boast of themselves for their being maguinoos. But you know that the maguino woman is shameless, since everyone in the town knows that she is an adulteress. Is she a maguino? (Avila, 207)

For the natives, social merit and deferential treatment from subordinate classes were not earned but went with one's privileged social status. It was this indigenous social principle that the missionaries were trying to subvert. In the missionaries' view, personal merit, which was earned by submission to the rational demand of the divine will, should define social rank. Not the reverse; social rank did not determine personal merit. Thus the honorific term, maguino, began to evolve a new semantic consistent with the theoretical moral paradigm of the missionaries. What the missionaries were trying to do was to divorce the concept of maguino from its economic and social bases and introduce the notion as a code of moral behavior. Thus, it would seem, the missionaries laid the groundwork for the gradual cultural attrition of the old social order, which took place as the traditional socio-economic meaning of maguino withered away.

The elites, who possessed the necessary mechanism for appropriating social structures, even those that were essentially colonial, were attacked by the missionaries for exploiting these structures for their own advantage. Fray Avila took issue with the maguino-principales
whose power was now legitimized under the auspices of colonial administration:

But the maguinoos, even if they are full of offenses (ponong casalan), are never reprimanded. Why are the public officials (paraboot) such? They are such because God did not choose them. They are not even chosen by their fellowmen for that position but they bought their authority through their gold because their purpose is not to care and serve the community but to be served by its constituents. (Avila, 128)

Fray Avila was obviously trying to stress the notion that power and authority were subsidiary to social responsibility. Only one who has moral ascendency should possess political authority.

The term paraboot comes from the Bikol words para, a prefix used to indicate work or profession roughly equivalent to the English suffix “er” as in “doer” and boot which Lisboa translated as will, heart or the inner being of man (Lisboa, 76). Therefore, a paraboot is a “will-er,” one who does the willing. His exercise of authority is in reality a process of translating his will to power. How his will mobilizes and secures control of the people should be indicative of his effective authority in the social matrix.

The notion of power was deeply embedded in the term authority, at least among the 17th century Bikolanos and perhaps among all Filipinos, before the hispanizing efforts of the missionaries took effect. The idea of benevolence as the standard of good leadership and legitimate authority, it seems, was alien to the pre-colonial and early colonial Bikolanos. It would seem therefore, that the contemporary idea of a service-oriented and benevolent leader was due to the semantic manipulation of the missionaries who gave a new meaning to indigenous institution of leadership resulting to the inflection of its meaning.

Fray Avila’s ignorance of the natives’ socio-political tradition explains his overwhelming abhorrence of their supposedly scandalous lifestyle. Thus, he complained that the paraboot, “are the ones who lead the community in drunkenness, adulterous acts, thievery, and other forms of evils” (Avila, 128).
Having exposed the evils of the *magonoo-principales*, particularly those who had access to colonial privileges and power, Fray Avila described the character of an ideal local authority:

...a good *paraboot* is one who is appointed for that particular office. The one who asks the judge (*hokom*) for that position is not a good *paraboot* because his concern is not to serve the community but his own selfish interest (Avila, 128).

It appears therefore that the civilizing project of evangelization created a social order in which the *pueblo* was overwhelmed by the *doctrina*, and politics was an appendage of sacerdotal indoctrination. Despite the semblance of civic order, the people’s lives were, in reality, consumed in religion. They were allowed to partake in the colonial structure through their native officials (*paraboot*) in the person of their *cabezas* and *gobernadorcillos*, which enjoyed the perquisites of colonial authority, but they did not have civic life and politics in any meaningful sense. The missionaries had exerted enormous effort to inculcate the values of submission to authority, obedience, humility which inculcated among the Filipinos such culturally and politically debilitating attitudes of servility, passivity and indifference. Life in the *pueblo* did not generate the civil experience and the political institutions that should promote the values and skills for responsible self-government. The development of the Christian Filipinos as civic persons during the Spanish regime was therefore significantly arrested.

**Culture as Everyday Form of Resistance**

The friars introduced codified norms of behavior designed to facilitate the natives' integration into the western culture and Christian religion. Depreciating colonial imposition, the natives attempted to parry the violent impact of cultural domination. Their experience of the Spanish colonial power’s strategic superiority taught them to avoid the disastrous consequences of direct confrontation with the Spanish authorities. But at the same time, the natives consistently avoided absorption into the mainstream of colonial life. In this ambiguity the natives developed their unique form of resistance.
The Bikolanos' pattern of resistance to colonial imposition assumed two prominent forms. One was their direct and conscious effort to elude the missionaries by fleeing to the hills, a standard pattern of native resistance in the early period of colonization. Many of them were eventually persuaded to go back to their lowland settlements and lived under the effective control of the Church and the crown. The other was by living within the bounds of the Christian settlements under the friars' immediate authority, yet expressing their protest in a less conspicuous manner in their everyday encounter with the friar. Such mode of resistance approximated what James Scott refers to as everyday forms of peasant resistance (Scott 1986, 6). Such resistance was an insidious articulation by the marginalized of their struggle to affirm what they regarded as just or unjust, fair or unfair without coming into a more direct and violent confrontation. One specific form of this resistance was the return to their pre-colonial past to which they were stubbornly attached. Christianized Bikolanos would resurrect the shadowy realm of their pre-colonial world completely inaccessible to the probing eye of the missionaries. In other words, while the Bikolanos made a show of obedience to the formal prescriptions of the regime, they preserved or recreated their pre-colonial world. Here was a world that really mattered to them where they behaved in accordance with their customs and inclinations. This private world provided them temporary refuge from the authoritarian social system and release of their repressed cultural impulses. It was in this familiar world of the past that the natives engendered their collective discourse of resistance.

The preponderance of this shadowy world of the pre-colonial society is clearly seen in their social gatherings or abbatayo. Centered around their surviving pre-colonial rituals, these gatherings reconstituted and reinforced the collective consciousness of their distinct cultural identity. In so far as they did not brazenly conflict with the standard Christian rituals and did not threaten Catholic orthodoxy, the friars tolerated the continuance of their practice. Typical among which was social drinking.

Ritual drinking was apparently endemic in pre-colonial Philippines. It highlighted religious pagan observances of bethrotsals, weddings, and funerals. As drinking was identified exclusively with pagan festivals, the missionaries vigorously attempted to wipe out this custom (Phelan 1959, 77). Their efforts, however, merely resulted in the abolition of ceremonial drinking. But this was simply replaced with social drinking which was virtually the same except for the absence of its ritual element.
For a 17th century Bikolano, in particular, drinking was essentially a social event. The works of noted Franciscan lexicographer of the 17th century, Fray Marcos de Lisboa and his confere, the well-known grammarian of the middle part of the 17th century, Fray Andres de San Agustin, revealed substantial linguistic evidence of the social nature of drinking. According to Fray San Agustin caarac meant companion in drinking. The social function of drinking was seen in its unusual power to mediate discussions, cement friendships and enliven celebrations in less formal atmosphere. Hence, it loosened up the rigid class divisions and the rules of social convention. Social drinking, therefore, created a temporary social condition characterized by conjunction of classes.

For the natives, the prevailing reality of socio-cultural structures was conceived in the womb of the past. Hence it was this past that defined the mode of social behavior and the concomitant rules and structures of social relationships. Such view, of course, posed an obstacle to conversion. The friar attacked habitual drinking not as evil in itself but because of its adverse social and moral effects. The natives however, defended their custom by invoking its cultural rootedness. To which Avila directed this remark: “the worst sin is your belief that because it is a part of your culture it is no longer sinful” (Avila, 280). This view of a native Bikolano, which Fray Avila was condemning, revealed an implicit anti-colonialist polemic. The native seemed to indicate that morality was culturally determined and therefore relative. What the friar called sins were actually the people’s ways of manifesting their indifference to the alien values of their colonial masters.

Social drinking in the pre-colonial Bikolano culture cross-cut the boundaries of gender and social status. To the friar’s dismay, the native women were almost as inveterate drunkards as men, particularly those belonging to the maguino class:

Some women are worse than men in their drunkenness and are not even ashamed (mayon supog) to be seen by many people. Is she a maguinoo? Yes, you would say. But it is not true because a woman who has no shame (dain supog) is not a maguinoo (Avila, 207).

In a society where morality was sustained by self-regulating cultural mechanisms (such as their pre-colonial customary laws) rather than by externally-imposed theoretical moral canons, the notion of what was
shameful was defined in the context of practices or behaviors prescribed by their custom. Since drinking was apparently systematic it would be doubtful whether a rigid gender rule governed social drinking. Thus, for the early Bikolano converts, drinking did not conjure up any image of impropriety even for women.

Nevertheless, in so far as drinking was constitutive of pre-colonial life, it provided them temporary relief from the highly formal and regimented society of the parish, at the same time strengthening their cultural and social bond. It also was a social vehicle for renewing their ties, forging new friendships, and updating themselves on the developments in the village. Most important of all, it afforded them an occasion to release repressed impulses in a social group sharing the same cultural consciousness and historical predicament.

Another custom that forged greater cultural solidarity among the 17th century natives was the pre-colonial custom of ritual crying which Lisboa referred to as arang. Expressing his disapproval of this customary mourning ritual, Fray de Avila remarked: “Your crying and shouting during the wake of someone in the house do not come from your sympathy for the dead. You perform this because according to you, it is your culture” (Avila, 273). This ritual was carried out by a group of professional weepers known in pre-colonial Bikol as paraarang (Lisboa, 31). Their task, for which they were hired, was not merely to weep but to sing a dirge exulting the great deeds and virtues of the deceased during his lifetime.

This ritual was apparently widespread in pre-colonial Philippines as a similar custom which was also noted by the Jesuit missionary-historian Fr. Francisco Ignacio Alzina in the Visayas in the middle of the 17th century. Fr. Alzina called this ritual canogon, a word with similar meaning both in the Visayan and in the Bikol languages. This term, according to Alzina, meant “something regrettable, unenjoyable or a loss” (Alzina 1668, P.1 Bk.3 Ch. 15, p.36). This ritual was performed by women called parahay. “The task of these women was to sing dirges in a mournful tune, weaving in threads of praise for the deceased or their ancestors and to which the relatives, the husbands or wife of the deceased reply with some weird outburst, shouts or screams,” Alzina wrote. However, he added that these women wept without really shedding a single tear.18
Such rituals were among the privileges of the elite. In the ritual of the *arang*, the people gathered for the occasion solidified their group consciousness, and at the same time, by extolling the deeds of the dead, actually memorialized pre-colonial values which were inconsistent with those being inculcated by the friars. The friars, who apparently regarded this custom well-entrenched in the native culture but was counter-productive to their missionary endeavor, eventually appropriated this pagan ritual and transformed it into one of the most useful vehicles for conversion. It was probably from this that the most popular piece of Christian literature in the entire colonial period evolved and came to be called as the *Pasyon ni Kristo*.

The Bikolanos also manifested discontent by maintaining distance from the domain of the friars, both physically and emotionally. Avila often read their behavior as manifestations of irreverence:

It is indeed a source of great sadness for any Christian to see what takes place here. First is your consistent dislike to come to the house of God There is nothing that you detest more than to come to the church...when you come here during Sundays and fiestas it is because you are forced...you have no respect for God, the Lori of the house, who is aware of your conversations, your laughters, and all other forms of irreverence (Avila, 6).

But when caught and questioned, the natives often found ingenious ways to avoid punishment by fabricating various excuses. The most common excuse to justify the non-performance of their religious obligations was to tell the friar that they were looking for food.

The Spanish friars commanded the anomalous outward compliance of prescribed rituals, but could not penetrate the dense core of the native world. To complicate the matter further, the native converts developed and perfected techniques for keeping the friars at bay. A common behavior was to ridicule the friar by telling jokes and making fun of him behind his back. Fray Avila was apparently aware of this native sneer against them and thus complained:

When a priest is just new here you pretend to love him very much and welcome him with your goodwill. But after he
has stayed here for sometime, some of you begin to hate him, you make fun of him, you ridicule him (Avila, 101).

One of the most common topics for gossips was the friars’ occasional infractions of religious vows, particularly with chastity and poverty.

It appeared that the natives adeptly employed flattery as another way of slyly manifesting their contempt for the friar:

As to your parish priests who are the fathers of your souls, whenever you are in front of them you showed so much reverence even saying: “Padre, you are the most charitable person who deserve to be loved by the town, your commandments are upright, your teachings and your criticisms are something that we rejoice about. We pray that you would not leave us anymore.” But when the priests reprimand you at least once, what do you do to him? You mock him, you ridicule him (Avila, 364).

By fawning on the friar, the Bikolanos were able to project an objective image of social subservience. And the same device enabled them to bear colonial domination with little rancor. However, in the 18th century when Bikolanos began to feel the increasing presence of Spanish institutions in the region, taking their cue from some Spanish civil authorities, Bikolanos started to appropriate colonial machineries such as the Spanish civil officials and the legal apparatus to denounce the abuses of some friars. It seems that it was only in the 18th century when Bikolanos began to bring their complaints against the friars to court as reflected in the sermon of Fray Gascuena: “In many instances, out of sheer anger at your ministers, you hastily present complaints to the hocom (provincial governor), to the Juez de Residencia (an agent of the crown) and to the Provincial (religious superior) without considering whether such complaint is just or unjust, whether these authorities have jurisdiction over the case...you simply lodge such complaints because of your desire to get even with your poor ministers (Gascuena c. 1770, 204).” In fact, a friar even complained that some of these natives had learned to lay their hands on them. 19 Despite these emboldened sporadic assaults to sacerdotal authority in the 18th century and the deteriorating rapport between the friars and the Bikolanos, it appears that the friars were able to maintain their grip on the Bikolanos:
This superficial social rapport sustained the fragile colonial unity which held together the 17th century Bikol parishes. Thus, except for a brief period of acute tension, Spanish authority remained unchallenged in this region for almost 300 years. Although colonial control was perpetuated, the ethnic identity of the Bikolano culture was preserved and protected against the modernizing impact of Spanish conversion.

Conclusion

This brief study of the late 17th century conversion of the Bikol region has attempted to bring to the surface the political aspect of conversion through a perceptive hermeneutical analysis of literary and religious discourses. The focus is on the transaction of power between the Spanish missionaries and the native Bikolanos, particularly the maguinoo-principales.

The impact of colonial order fell heavily on the native elite, expectedly in view of the enormous power and privileges this class previously enjoyed. The friars, apparently, looked at the elites with suspicion and regarded them as obstacles to conversion, a suspicion which was not without any basis.

However, the elites were able to deflect their colonial predicament by appropriating the structures imposed by the colonial system, while clinging on to their pre-colonial sources of traditional privileges. The maguinoo-principales, therefore, evinced a capacity to submit to Spanish colonial demands at the same time preserved for themselves a privileged position within the native community. The native elites’ response to colonial rule, which appeared to be a strategy of resistance, evolved into a matter of sheer opportunism. This was because they never made conscious attempts to dissolve this dichotomous poles of power but profited in keeping them separated. Keeping them apart meant submitting to Spanish regime while continuing to invest in the Bikolano culture. These elites saw the possibility of exploiting one pole of power to profit from another. Their capacity to appropriate and benefit from the colonial system only widened the gap between themselves and those belonging to lower class and therefore heightened their class prestige. Their hold on traditional power necessitated the preservation of colonial culture. For it was through the traditional power that their mechanism for colonial adjustment was premised.
On the other hand, colonial power was vested in the hands of the missionary-curate. The friar being the only Spanish representative of the crown in the 17th century towns wielded substantial power. This enormous power emanated from the fact that unlike the other Spanish bureaucrats the Spanish missionary was seen to owe his position to something beyond royal patronage and secular legislation.

It was through him that spiritual and secular powers converged and were synthesized. He was a representative not merely of the royal will but of the divine will as well. As such he could appeal to actual bureaucratic imperial authority and at the same time could claim the power to decipher the designs of human will in terms of God's laws. It was because of this gigantic power that the natives maintained their reluctance to submit themselves completely to Christianity and resisted the friars.

If the Bikolanos (and the Filipinos in general) had difficulties with and even resisted the new religion, it was not because they abhorred Christianity. Nor was it due to their inability to transcend the narrow confines of ethnic religion and appreciate the transcendental and universal domain of their new faith. The whole gamut of their resistance was centered in the belief that transcendental realities overshadowed the legitimate demands of secular realities.

They resisted the friars not because he was a man of faith. What they were opposing was not the core idea of this faith, but the way the seed of this faith was being implanted among them. The whole discourse of resistance revolved around the secular basis of religion and its concomitant secularized spiritual powers. It was not in essence a question of faith, but rather, it was a question of power. This phenomenon underlies most religious conflicts in the colonial Philippines.
Endnotes


2It appears that the earliest attempt to preach in Spanish came only in the last decades of the 18th century, see *Informe del obispo de Camarines, Fray Antonio de Luna, sobre la R(real) C(edula) que mande se predique y enseñe a los indios el castellano*. Camarines, 1972. MSS Sign. 92/28 Archivo Franciscano Ibero-Oriental henceforth to be cited as AFIO. I wish to express my gratitude to Fr. Jesus Martinez, OFM, its present archivist, and likewise to Fr. Cayetano Sanchez, OFM, its former archivist and now head of the Archivo Ibero-Americano (AIA) for the valuable assistance extended to me during my research in this archive.


4Although it is not very clear how exactly Latin was valorized by the natives, it appears however, that Latin evoked a certain quality of “inaccessibility.” Barthes’ idea of myth, ideology and connotation offers some insight into this problem. See Kaja Silverman, *The Subject of Semiotics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 27-32.

5Fray Marcelo de Ribadeneira sailed for the Philippines in 1594 and after a brief stay left for Japan where he was held prisoner and then was exiled to China. In 1598 he left for the Philippines where he toured the various parishes under the Franciscans. Shortly after, he went back to Spain where he died in 1606. He was a prolific writer and left numerous historical and theological works. For a detailed biography of Ribadeneira, see Huerta, *Estado*, pp. 424-426.
Fray Juan Oliver, OFM arrived in Manila in 1581 and was assigned to various missions in the southern Luzon area, particularly in Bicol and Batangas. He possessed perfect command of both the Bicol and Tagalog languages. He wrote some 21 pieces of religious literature in either of these languages. His famous work, the *Doctrina Christiana*, although written in Tagalog, contained words which were distinctly Bicol. One possibility is that Oliver also wrote the Doctrina in the Bicol language which probably antedated his Tagalog Doctrina. He died in Bicol in 1599 while visiting the region. For details of his biography, see Fray Felix Huerta, *Estado Geografico*, etc. p.492. For the English translation of his original Tagalog text, see Fray Juan de Oliver, *Declaracion de la doctrina cristiana en idioma Tagalog* 1593. Ed. Jose M. Cruz, SJ. (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1995). Likewise, for his Bicol text see *Declaracion. Sobre todo la doctrina cristiana de Nuevo corregido, enmendada por nuestro hermano Fr. Juan de Oliver, Predicador de esta Prov. de San Gregorio de Filipinas* in Francisco Gainza, *Coleccion de Sermones en Bicol Publicada por el Excmo. Ilmo. y Rmo. Sr. D. Fr. Francisco Gainza, del Sagrado Arden de Predicadores, Obispo de Nueva Caceres Para Uso de Su Clero* (Manila: Establecimiento Tipografico de Santo Tomas, 1866). These collections of Bicol sermons are in four volumes: the first two contain the sermons of Fray Pedro de Avila written in 1684, the third those of Fray Esteban Gascuena written about the middle of the 18th century, and the fourth those of Fray Juan de Oliver. The Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid only has three volumes but the complete collection is to be found in Archivo Franciscano Ibero-Oriental (AFIO).

Hogot is an ancient ritual-killing of a slave upon the death of a maguinoo master, see Lisboa, p.251

The town of Canaman is located at the southern portion of the city of Caceres. It was a visita of Naga, a village in the city of Cecerces, until it attained an independent status as a parish around 1595. It was in this town where Fray Pedro de Avila wrote the sermon entitled *Platica para todos evangelios de los dominicos del ano 1684* while he was its parish priest. Fray Avila arrived in the Philippines in 1665 and was assigned to various villages of Camarines Sur and Albay from 1667 until his death in 1701. For his biographical sketch, see Huerta, *Estado*, p.521. Unless otherwise indicated, English translations of all Spanish and Bicol texts are mine.

10The details of this conflict are contained in a collection of various documents entitled *Diversos papeles referentes al litigio entre el Obispo de Camarines y la Prov. de S. Gregorio sobre que el Obispo pretendia que pasaron a la administracion de la mitra los pueblos de Ygvey, Paracale, Albay, Casiguran y Bacon*. Camarines, 1634-1637. MSS. Sign. 92/2 AFIO.

11Fray Esteban de Casguena was assigned in the region around 1752 and worked in the missions and parishes of Himoragat, Lupi, Libmanan, Milao, Libon, Canaman, Calabanga, and again in Milao. He died in Manila in 1789. See Huerta, *Estado*, p.546. Fray Esteban Gascuena left a collection of sermons entitled *Platicas Sobre la Doctrina Christiana y la Pasion en idioma Bicol*. These sermons constitute the third volume in Gainza’s *Coleccion*.

12Fray Andres de San Agustin was a prolific writer and expert in the Bikol language and had written a grammar book in 1647 called *Arte de la Lengua Bicol*. He worked in Bikol from 1626 until about the middle of the 17th century. He died in Manila in 1649. See de Huerta, *Estado* p.507. A copy of San Agustin’s *Arte* which was published in 1795 is still available in the Rare Book Collection of the Filipiniana Section of the Philippine National Library.

13For an interesting work on the pre-hispanic Bikolano society see Fray Jose Castano, *Breve noticia acerca del origen, cultura, religion, creencias, y supersticiones de los antiguos indios del Bikol* in Wenceslao Retana (ed.) Archivo del Bibliofilo Filipino (Madrid: 1895) Tomo 11, pp.335-454.

14Marcos de Lisboa, OFM, worked in various missions in Bikol from 1602 until 1616. He was the author of the first Bikol-Spanish dictionary and supposedly wrote the first grammar in the same language. He died in 1628 in Spain. See Eusebio Gomez Platero, OFM, *Catalogo*, pp. 53-54.

15Buhi is a town located on the slope of Mount Iriga in Camarines Sur. The dialect of this town has caught the interest of many linguists because of
its uniqueness among the various Bikol dialects. It is hardly similar to the other dialects and thus incomprehensible to many Bikolanos.

16 The extant 1716 baptismal records of Milaor parish notes illegitimate births which were most likely due to *pagsambay*. In these baptismal records, the identity of the biological father is concealed, "su padre no conocido," that is, the father is unknown.

17 For Franciscan reports regarding massive depopulation of lowland Christian settlements in the 17th century, see the Documentary Index in Leandro Tormo Sanz' *Lucban: A Town the Franciscans Built* (Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1971), pp. 138-149.


19 The conflict between the Franciscans and Sr. Gueruela shows that a more violent form of native resistance to the friars was in some way encouraged by some Spanish officials. See *Retractacion del Odior, Sr. Gueruela de los maldades ordenados por el en Camarines contra los Franciscanos, Carta para que los religiosos vuelvan a sus ministerios. Diversas papeles, diversas fechas*. Camarines, 1703. MSS. Sign, 92/11 AFIO; *Informe del Províl de S. Gregorio al Gob. sobre los cargos hechos por el Oidor Gueruela contra los franciscanos de Camarines*. Santa Ana, 10 Junio 1704. MSS. Sign. 92/14 AFIO.
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The Archivo Franciscano Ibero-Oriental in Madrid possesses one of the largest collections of manuscripts and contemporary printed materials on the 17th and 18th century Philippines. Since the Bikol region was virtually an exclusive Franciscan territory for more than three hundred years, these archives therefore, constitute one of the most excellent sources of documentary material dealing with the history of the christianization of Kabikolan. A substantial portion of manuscripts used in this study is from these archives.

Other manuscript materials, specifically the few 18th century parish records, are also available in the Archdiocesan Archive of Caceres (AAC).

The majority of the published materials used in this paper are to be found in the biggest private collection of rare Filipiniana materials known as the Graino Collection in the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid. Many of these, however, are also available in the Philippines, particularly in the Filipiniana sections of both the Philippine National Library and of the Ateneo de Manila University Library.

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THE POLITICIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Edgardo E. Dagdag *

The Church has played a key role in Western civil society since the dawn of history. Its ministers and key officials (or clerics) not only served as religious pastors but also as king’s counsels, de facto rulers, power brokers, and “shepherds” of men. These mixed roles inextricably placed the church at the center of social changes and political upheavals. It was never a passive or peripheral spectator in the unfolding historical events.

The Catholic Church in the Philippines performed most of these roles. It was very influential especially during the Spanish period when it was first established in the Philippines, prompting Marcelo H. del Pilar, one of the fearless Filipino reformists of the period, to conclude that there was frailocracy or monastic supremacy in the country. Historians say that the Filipinos were colonized by Spain more by the “rosary” and less by the “sword.” The revolutions of 1896 and 1898 and the American occupation led to the secularization of the Philippine state and to the adoption of the doctrine of separation of church and state. These events started the formal depoliticization of the Catholic Church as well as the mixed and, at times, competing perceptions of the doctrine by the clergy, government officials and some sectoral leaders.

Lately, some sectors are anxiously asking whether the Catholic Church, particularly the clergy led by Cardinal Sin, is violating the constitutional doctrine of separation of church and state by continually taking a “fiscalizing” or “oppositionist” stance on many political, economic and social policies and programs taken by the Ramos administration.

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Indeed, why is the church playing an active political role in the post-Marcos era? What has been the role perception of key and influential Catholic church leaders? How do the people also view the role performance of the church? What are the implications of all of these to church-state relations in the future? These are some of the questions this study addresses.

**Brief Historical Background**

As stated earlier, the Catholic Church was a major, if not the leading, political player during the Spanish period (1565-1898). This was made possible by the union of church and state and legitimized by the more permanent and pervasive presence of the religious bureaucracy (compared to the civil bureaucracy) in various parts of the country. As pointed out by a legal luminary:

“Religious officials were deemed to be persons in authority. Ecclesiastical authorities held key political positions. Four incumbents in the office of the Governor-General, the highest and most powerful office in the islands, were either archbishops or bishops. In the Board of Authorities (Junta de Autoridades), a high consultative council charged with matters vital to the security of the state, the next ranking member after the Governor-General was the archbishop of Manila. In the Council of Administration (Consejo de Administracion), another top level body which advised the governor-general on matters of finance, government and public development, the archbishop of Manila was also a member as were the heads of the six religious orders in the islands. In the Permanent Commission of Censorship (Commission Permanente de Censura), which had jurisdiction over the press and the introduction and circulation of books in the archipelago, half of the censors were friars. In the towns and pueblos, the multifarious functions now discharged by an array of municipal officials and employees were then centered in the parish priest, usually a friar, including supervision of local elections, inspection of schools and taxation, review of the municipal budget and censorship of literary productions.”

1
The political role played by the Catholic Church, particularly by the friars and the archbishop of Manila, led to periodic clashes between government and church authorities. For example:

"a member of the Audiencia was excommunicated; the Commissary of the Holy Office of the Inquisition was arrested by the governor-general; Archbishop Hernando de Guerrero was forcibly arrested in his cathedral and exiled, and Governor Sebastian Corcuera was imprisoned for five years by his successor (at the instigation of his friar enemies). In 1668, the Inquisition entered the palace of the governor general, Diego Salcedo, seized his property and papers and placed him under arrest. In 1683, the incumbent archbishop, Felipe Pardo, was exiled by the governor-general, Juan de Vargas."  

The vast powers exercised by the friars gave them the opportunity to commit abuses. A number of the local revolts that took place in various parts of the country denounced friar intolerance, forced religious conversion and friar estates. In the 1860's, the Filipino priests led by Father Jose Burgos campaigned for the secularization of Philippine parishes to stop frailocracy and to make the Catholic Church truly responsive to the spiritual needs of the Filipino people. After Father Burgos' martyrdom in 1872 following the so-called Cavity Mutiny of 1872, Filipino propagandists led by Jose Rizal, Marcelo H. del Pilar and Graciano Lopez Jaena decided to campaign not only for religious but for total reforms. They called for the application of Spanish laws in the country and the political assimilation of the Philippines as a regular province of Spain. Rizal typified the sentiments of the mainstream propagandists when he said that his opposition was directed not against the Catholic religion but against the abuses of the friars and the evils of frailocracy and religious bigotry.

The failure of the Propaganda Movement to attain its objective of prodding the Spanish authorities in Madrid to establish genuine and meaningful reforms in the country through peaceful means, among others, sparked the rise of separatist sentiments especially among the restive and toiling masses. These inevitably led to the Philippine revolutions of 1896 and 1898. These twin political upheavals heightened the struggle against frailocracy and led not only to the establishment of the first independent republic in Asia but also to the adoption of a constitution (i.e., the Malolos Constitution) which provided for the separation of Church and State. The
fact that the latter won only by one vote in the Malolos Convention (over
the provision making Catholicism the religion of the state) showed that the
Filipinos then, while critical of the abuses of the friars, were not against the
Catholic religion per se. Further evidence of this was the failure of the
Philippine Independent Church (or Aglipayan church) to supplant the
Catholic church as the "majority" church inspite of the nationalistic
circumstances surrounding its birth.

The Malolos Constitution and the religious policies of the American
occupation (1898-1946) paved the way for the secularization of the
Philippine state. These diminished the political influence of the Catholic
Church.

"The legal system became wholly secularized. The Catholic
faith lost its preferred position as the state religion. All
restrictions imposed by law on sects or religions other than
Catholic were removed automatically."

The religious sentiments expressed by the Filipinos during the 1898
Malolos Convention were rearticulated in the 1934-35 Constitutional
Convention. The 1935 Charter provided for the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference. In 1935, the call for the establishment of the Catholic Church
as a state religion was already dramatically muted.

After World War II, the Catholic Church maintained a low political
visibility. It gave more attention to its pastoral duties and to relief and
development work. Its charitable activities and social action programs
provided a number of Filipinos with food, medicine and material help so
that they could recover from the devastation and dislocation wrought by
the Pacific war. But this pastoral posture did not last long. It was alleged
that the church started to indulge in some partisan political acts in the mid-
1950s. For example, it was reported that it opposed Claro M. Recto as a
senatorial candidate in 1955 and as a presidential candidate in 1957
because of his perceived anti-clerical views and, instead, supported
Diosdado Macapagal's candidacy as Vice President in 1957 and as
President in 1961 because of his pro-poor and reformist platform. Recto
lost his presidential bid while Macapagal won the two posts he aspired for.
The church was said to be neutral in the 1965 elections which was won by
Ferdinand Marcos, a former Aglipayan who was converted to the Catholic
religion.
When Marcos declared martial law in 1972, the Catholic Church’s initial response was one of silence and acquiescence. This stance isolated it from its priests, nuns and seminarians who were active in the mass actions against the Marcos I regime. The church hierarchy was able to recover some lost ground only after it started criticizing the martial law regime. This change of tactic, however, did not succeed in winning back its priests and nuns who had already joined the revolutionary underground. The church’s critical collaboration policy towards the government was derided by its progressive elements because of its conservative stand.

Martial law intensified the politicization of the Catholic Church. The church hierarchy became the de facto political opposition to the Marcos administration due to the exile, death, imprisonment and cooptation of the leaders of the traditional political parties (Nacionalista Party and Liberal Party). The suspicious circumstances surrounding the death of former Senator Benigno Aquino in 1983, the numerous human rights violations during the martial law period, the widening poverty of the people and the escalating political violence of the Marcos regime provided moral legitimacy and urgency to the political posturings of the church hierarchy, particularly Cardinal Sin. The latter became the rallying symbol of the majority of the people who were disgruntled with the status quo but who remained skeptical of, or opposed to, the revolutionary alternative offered by the CPP-NPA. The church hierarchy filled up the vacuum caused by the absence of a strong and credible political opposition.

The political stock of the Catholic Church in the eyes of the Filipino people was further enhanced when it joined the pro-Aquino and anti-Marcos forces in condemning the conduct and outcome of the 1986 snap presidential elections. Through the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), the Church said:

“In our considered judgment, the polls were unparalleled in the fraudulence of their conduct. And we condemn especially ... the systematic disenfranchisement of voters ... the intimidation, harassment, terrorism and murder.

According to moral principles, a government that assumes or retains power through fraudulent means has no moral basis.”

The Catholic Church, particularly Cardinal Sin, played a key role in the EDSA revolt which toppled the Marcos regime and led to the restoration of democracy in the Philippines. President Aquino acknowledged her political debt by appointing a bishop, a priest, a nun and an Opus Dei leader as members of the 1986-87 Constitutional Commission which drafted the present constitution. Cardinal Sin became the unofficial spiritual and moral adviser of the Aquino administration and a number of Catholic lay leaders were appointed to key government positions. The 1986 EDSA revolution turned out to be very favorable to the Catholic Church because it boosted its political influence in the Philippines.

The Catholic Church reverted to its old role of critical collaboration with the government after 1992, when Fidel V. Ramos, a Protestant, won the presidency. Cardinal Sin and the hierarchy were generally believed to have supported Speaker Ramon Mitra for the top official post. Many policies of the Ramos administration, including the Philippines 2000 program, were negatively criticized by the CBCP and Cardinal Sin. The Cardinal became the foremost critic of President Ramos.

The Catholic Church As An Organization

The Catholic Church is a very formidable organization. It can rival, if not overwhelm, the government in terms of reach, influence and, even, resources.

According to Sister Christine Tan, the term “church” in current theology stands for the people of God, which means all Catholics. Thus, the Catholic Church in the Philippines refers not only to the Filipino cardinals, bishops, archbishops, priests, sisters, religious, and seminarians (this is the usual connotation of the term) but also to Filipinos who were baptized as Catholic.

In 1995, it was estimated that over 82 percent of the Philippine population of 65 million are Catholics. The remaining 18 percent are Protestants (5.43 percent), Muslims (4.57 percent), Aglipayans (2.63 percent), Iglesia ni Kristo (2.54 percent), born-again Christians (0.53 percent), and others (2.30 percent).

There is hardly any Philippine town or city where there is no active presence of the Catholic Church. There are 79 dioceses and 2,192 parishes
throughout the country administered by some 111 bishops, 3,407 diocesan priests, 2,165 religious priests, 9,873 religious sisters and 250 brothers. The parishes are also supported by thousands of active lay ministers and church workers. Moreover, there are more than 2,000 church-run educational institutions ranging from grade schools to universities/colleges served by over 15,000 lay teachers and with more than 1 million students.

“In addition, religious congregations of men and women own or administer hundreds of high schools and grade schools. The Church also maintains 386 hospitals and clinics as well as radio stations, publishing houses and an undetermined number of social action and social services programs... Finally, there are thousands of lay Catholic organizations, ranging from Basic Ecclesial Community (BEC) of six or eight families to national level ‘mandated’ organizations and the Council of the Laity.”

Members of the Catholic Church are everywhere: they occupy key and responsible positions in the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the national government as well as in the military and local government units and in the private sector. By sheer number and resources, the Church has the potential to “make and unmake” the Philippine government. It is both a political and social force that cannot be ignored. Except for President Ramos, all Presidents of the Philippines have been Catholics.

Obviously, the national interests will be served and promoted if there exists collaboration and goodwill, instead of conflict and distrust, between government and church leaders.

According to Bishop Teodoro Bacani, Cardinal Sin “is not the voice of the whole Catholic Church in the Philippines” and that “there is no supreme authority for the whole Catholic Church in the Philippines other than the Pope, who is in Rome.” Bishop Bacani disclosed that those who could speak for the Church are: the diocesan bishop -- for the local church is entrusted to him; the bishop of a given region -- for the Church in his region; the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), in plenary assembly or through the Permanent Council -- for the whole Catholic Church in the Philippines; the CBCP President or in his absence the Vice President -- for the whole conference when each and every bishop has given his consent; and the Permanent Committee on Public Affairs,
under certain conditions and in matters affecting Church-State relations --
for the CBCP

Notwithstanding this clarification of Bishop Bacani, there is the
widespread belief of the Catholic faithful (and of the other sectors of
Philippine society) that the spiritual head of the Philippine Catholic Church
is Cardinal Sin (and whoever heads the Archdiocese of Manila). This is
understandable considering that historically, the Archbishop of Manila post
is a position of power and prestige, politically and religion-wise. During
the Spanish period, the Archbishop of Manila acted as the de facto deputy
Governor-General.

Through the years, the Catholic Church has been successful in
grafting itself almost permanently in the hearts and minds of the Filipino
people, nurturing their sense of religiosity and Christian values and
ministering to their spiritual needs. It has emerged as the most respected
institution in the country and has served as the people’s conscience
especially during critical times. The Catholic Church has provided the
Filipinos with a “deep Christian faith and this has created so much good.”

“The current statistic is that we have one priest for every
nine thousand Catholics. The number is a little misleading.
It does not accurately represent the actual situation on the
parish level. Not all the priests are available for parish
work. A good number are doing specialized ministries.

We do not have enough priests... By necessity, we have to
settle ourselves with a mass Christianity until a miracle
reverses the trend. We have the numbers but we lag
behind in quality. With no priest to guide, church going can
dwindle into folk religion. By the same token, pastoral
ministry will have to be parish-based. The action is in the
parish church and the day in Saturday. This means that
those people are served who come to the parish church.
The priest just does not have the time and the energy to go
to the people.”

There are also reports that the Church is saddled by the clash
between its conservative and progressive factions. Cardinal Sin is
identified with the conservative faction. It was disclosed that he “... and
his allies and the progressive bloc within the Church are often at odds with
each other, although it is obvious that Sin’s more conservative faction enjoys an advantage.”

The progressive faction includes the religious radicals.

The Catholic Church is also criticized for its excess “baggage” and lack of consistency and decisiveness. Sister Tan explained this as follows:

“The Church as an institution ... has great potential, but she is muzzled for she carries too much baggage. Precisely, the miracle of EDSA was that despite all this baggage, the Roman Catholic Institutional Church got her act together and moved. Today, the lay cannot wait for the Church. The lay must lead.”

She deplored the Church’s miniscule exposure to the poor, saying:

“Malayung-malayo pa ang simbahan sa pagtuturo ng pagkakaisa. Kointing-konti lang ang madre at pari na nasa maralita -- siguro one percent -- so let us encourage these efforts because our country is dying.”

Sister Tan continued her assessment of the Church:

“Experience has painfully shown that a vast difference exists between what our church does. Our track record during the Marcos dictatorship bears evidence of the gap. We have by and large neither been consistent nor inspiring. For how many years have bishops, priests, and sisters condoned the dictatorship through public approval?

As for the present government, our actions can be confusing. Some of us condemn gambling with our lips but with our hands accept substantial donations from PAGCOR ... The institutional church is as distant as Shakespeare. There seems to be no connection with our lives.”

Bishop Capalla also criticized the lack of decisiveness of the Church, saying:

“The Church is losing its voice in the country. We are not coming out as strong as we could. What happened to our
CBCP pastoral letters? They are very diplomatic. We do not call a spade a spade and so we don’t create as much impact.

There is no sense of absolute wrong or right and the Church doesn’t seem to be doing enough about this.”

Authority for Active Church Involvement in Politics

Three events or developments are often cited by Catholic Church leaders in explaining and justifying the active involvement of the Catholic Church in Philippine politics. These are the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), the 1971 Synod of Bishops and the Second Plenary Council of the Philippines (1991).

The Second Vatican Council (or popularly called Vatican II) adopted a number of historic documents, to include the Apostolican Actuositatem (The Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity) and the Gaudium et Spes (Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World).

In the Apostolican Actuositatem, the Church emphatically states that:

“Christ’s redemptive work, while of itself directed toward the salvation of men, involves also the renewal of the whole temporal order. Hence, the mission of the Church is not only to bring to men the message and grace of Christ, but also to penetrate and perfect the temporal sphere with the spirit of the gospel.”

The document also stresses that “... pastors have the duty to provide moral and spiritual help for the renewal of the order in Christ.” This includes political renewal.

In the Gaudium et Spes, it calls on the laity who have

“talent for the difficult yet noble art of politics ... to engage in political activity. They must combat injustice and oppression, arbitrary domination and intolerance by
individuals or political parties, and they must do so with integrity and wisdom. They must dedicate themselves to the welfare of all in a spirit of sincerity and fairness, of love and of the courage demanded by political life."

The *Gaudium* document explains that

"The church, by reason of her role and competence, is not identified with any political community nor bound by this to any political system ... Their political community and the church are autonomous and interdependent of each other in their own fields.

... at all times and in all places, the church should have the freedom to preach the faith, to proclaim its teaching about society, to carry out its task among men without hindrance, and to pass moral judgment even in matters relating to politics, whenever the fundamental rights of man or the salvation of souls require it."  

The effect of Vatican II on the church and on Christian life is dramatic. A Filipino lay leader summarized this as follows:

"Vatican II underscored the need for man's total or integral development ... This means that a Christian should act out his faith in all aspects of his life, whether spiritual, temporal, economic, social, cultural or political. In other words, a Christian's integral development requires him to apply gospel values wherever he is and whatever he does, whether at home, in school, in the office, in the polling place, or when elected to a public office.

Hence the church must be wherever there is sinfulness, persecution, injustice and violation of human dignity. Christiantity means not merely salvation of souls for the next life but the liberation of man in the present life from all forms of oppression so that he may fully develop in all dimensions -- spiritual, economic, social, cultural and political."
Vatican II recognized the laity’s equality with the clergy in dignity and mission.28

The second event which has energized the Philippine Catholic Church was the 1971 Synod of Bishops. Its document entitled “Justice in the World” rearticulates the spirit of Vatican II when it says that

“Action on behalf of justice and participation in the transformation of the world fully appear to us as a constitutive dimension of the preaching of the gospel, or in other words, of the church’s mission for the redemption of the human race and its liberation every oppressive situation.”29

This document affirms the church’s role as instrument in the liberation of women from all forms of oppression. It anchors the theology of the church on human redemption and liberation.

The third event was the Second Plenary Council of the Philippines in 1991. Consistent with the spirit of the Second Vatican Council, it declares that “in the Philippines today, given the general perception that politics has become an obstacle to integral development, the urgent necessity is for the lay faithful to participate more actively, with singular competence and integrity, in political affairs.”30 The Council calls on Filipino Catholics to “participate actively and lead in the renewing of politics in accordance with values of the Good News of Jesus” and “to help form the civic conscience of the voting population and work to explicitly promote the election to public office of leaders of true integrity.”31 It also exhorts the “bishops, priests and religious, commonly identified as the Church, to refrain from partisan politics and avoid especially the use of the pulpit for partisan purposes to avoid division among the flock they shepherd.”32

The pronouncements of the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II), Synod of Bishops and the Second Plenary Council of the Philippines have bestowed on the Philippine Catholic Church and its hierarchy a messianic mission: to “save” the Filipino and enhance his freedom by actively involving itself in the renewal and liberation of Philippine society and politics consistent with the teachings of Christ and gospel values. This mission, which presently stands as the church’s theological direction, accounts for its continuing involvement in Philippine political affairs. Pope
John Paul II underscored this when he told the Filipino bishops in 1995 that the church is called

"to exercise a truly prophetic role, condemning the evils of men in their infected source, showing the roots of division and bringing hope in the possibility of over-coming tensions and conflicts and reaching brotherhood, concord and peace at all levels and in all sections of human society."

**Pronouncements of Church Leaders**

In recent times, several influential members of the Church hierarchy and priests have articulated their views on the role of the Philippine Catholic Church and its right relationship with the Philippine State (or government). Invariably, they interpreted the constitutional provision on the separation of church and state as allowing the church to take a political but non-partisan role.

Cardinal Sin argued that the state is part of a moral order that is subject to a higher law revealed by Christ. He said:

"Following the tradition of St. Thomas Aquinas and the political philosophy of the Scholastics, the Church asserts that the rights of the person, the family, the church and the associations which men and women freely organize for economic, cultural, social and religious ends constitute an order of rights prior to the State.

Since the state exists to serve the common welfare in the areas of justice, peace, security, and liberty, it comes under the moral order.

... the state is subject to judgment by a law inherent in the nature of man and by a higher law revealed by Christ."

The logical implication of this view is that the Church should provide counsel to the state (or in particular to the government); participate in the renewal and reform of the various dimensions of human life including the political; and exercise moral ascendancy over the State. Cardinal Sin hinted these when he remarked that "politics is a human
activity and thus has moral dimension. It is included in my pastoral duty because the people cannot speak. I have to speak for them.”

Bishop Teodoro Bacani, one of the most articulate clerical leaders at present, maintains that Church participation in Philippine politics is “part of the faith-response of the Catholics to the Lord in today’s situation.” According to him,

“... the Church is not a monastery, a Noah’s Ark, a judge’s tribunal or a fortress. It is a fellow pilgrim and servant of humanity. It must involve itself in the transformation of the world, and hence in political activity without which this world will not be transformed.” He describes Church participation in political activity as a battle against human sinfulness as well as a battle to make God’s grace victorious in the Philippines.

Regarding the constitutionally mandated separation of Church and State, Bishop Bacani says:

“The Philippine constitution does not forbid or prevent the Church from influencing the political life of our country. The Church has as much right as any cause-oriented group to express its mind regarding the way the country is being run. The Church is not prohibited by our constitution from proposing a political vision or expressly supporting certain candidates or political party.

The reserve that the Church keeps in this regard stems rather from the nature of the Church, from Canon Law, and from pastoral prudence.

Hence, the separation of Church and State cannot be used as an argument against the involvement of the Catholic faithful in the Church itself in shaping the political future of our country.”

The views of Bishop Bacani are reinforced by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a theologian-constitutionalist and a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
... Churchmen have every right to participate in the debate about what public policy should be. The right flows not only from the free exercise clause but also from other constitutional guarantees. In the exercise of this right, however, care must be taken that no infringement of the religious liberty of others be committed. Moreover, the dictates of apostolic prudence must be heeded lest excessive zeal alienate men of goodwill and reduce church authority to irrelevance.\textsuperscript{38}

Fr. Bernas contends that the non-establishment clause of the Bill of Rights is

“aimed not at the power of religion but at the power of the State and of abusive state functionaries ... As far as the churches and religion as well as religionists are concerned, the rule is freedom and the function of the non-establishment clause is to protect that freedom.”\textsuperscript{39}

Fr. Romeo Intengan, on the other hand, clarifies the political role of the Church by differentiating politics from political commitment. He says:

“Politics has to do with ethical matters and everything that concerns human dignity, fundamental human rights, the common good, and social justice. Politics as commitment has to do with technical matters -- concrete decisions, programs, campaigns and the exercise of power. Politics is a task of the whole Church -- and here the pastors properly exercise their teaching role. Political commitment is a task for the laity, acting with a lawful conscience informed by the Gospel.

In performing her evangelizing mission, the church claims the freedom to preach the faith, to teach her social doctrine, and to pass moral judgment in those matters which concern public order.”\textsuperscript{40}

The rule as to what the pastors and the laity can do, according to Father Intengan, is not an absolute one. He states that
"... The distinction must be seen as secondary to a more basic principle that politics, whether as a field (where politics and morality meet) or arena (where more concrete and technical politics, usually of the partisan kind, is played), like all human activities, must be exercised always in the light of the faith of the Gospel. As a corollary, the requirements of the gospel with regard to human dignity, justice, charity and the common good cannot be sacrificed to the exigencies of one's politics. The latter must be rejected when it threatens to violate or deny the non-negotiable demands of Christian faith. Concretely, this means that both pastors and laity must be involved in the political arena when field and arena are one."\(^{41}\)

These views of Cardinal Sin, Bishop Bacani, Fr. Bernas and Fr. Intengan are representative of the mainstream theological currents in the Philippines following Vatican II. If pursued to their logical end, their views are used to justify the Catholic Church's exercise of a political but non-partisan role and formalize its moral ascendancy over the state. This would obviously create complications for a secular and pluralistic state like the Philippines since it is not easy to separate and distinguish the partisan from the non-partisan political act. It may be precisely because of this problem why Pope John Paul II counselled the bishops of the Philippines "... not to take positions of a political character or to take part in partisan conflicts."\(^{42}\) The Filipino clerical leaders did not heed the papal advice in 1986 and the result was their historic role in the 1986 EDSA revolt. The bishops' action did not provoke a constitutional crisis at that time since it supported the victorious political faction and the outcome met with the approval of the people. What could have happened to church-state relations if the EDSA revolt ended differently?

**Church Stand on Selected Issues**

In the immediate past, the Catholic Church acted as an oppositionist and critical collaborator of government. It was effective and credible in the discharge of these roles. By acting as the people's shepherd in time of national crisis and anxiety and by providing moral and spiritual leadership, the Church becomes an agent of democracy and political stability. By acting as a safety valve, it assists in diffusing the heat and polarizes that which incinerates the political soul of the nation.
During the Marcos II years, the Catholic Church was less collaborative. It was more oppositionist. It called for the abolition of the Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) which was used in detaining citizens suspected of subversion without trial or bail; criticized the employment of secret marshals as a violation of the right to life and the decree-making powers of Marcos as open to grave abuse; questioned the fraud which accompanied the 1986 snap elections; appealed for renewed peace talks; and called for greater discipline among the police and the military as well as the disarming of private armies and paramilitary forces whom it saw as responsible for grave violations of life and property.\textsuperscript{43}

The Church was also consistently firm in asking the people to have the courage to testify before the courts of law when crimes were committed. It exhorted the courts to administer justice swiftly and impartially; the legislators to improve the administration of justice; the people in the media to be truthful and responsible in their manner of reporting; and the rebel groups on the Left and Right to be respectful of human rights.\textsuperscript{44}

The church was again at its critical collaboration mode with the Ramos administration. It continued to oppose government efforts to promote family planning through artificial contraception, to popularize the use of condoms to prevent the spread of the AIDS disease, and to promote legalized gambling like lotto and casinos.\textsuperscript{45} Moreover, it criticized the Philippines 2000 Program because of its anti-poor provisions; called for the suspension of the expanded value added tax law (VAT); and opposed the efforts to amend the 1987 Constitution so that the term of office of the incumbent officials, particularly President Ramos, would be extended. It was also strongly critical of the anti-criminality and anti-terrorism bills since these contained provisions that threatened the basic liberties of the people such as wiretapping, prying into bank deposits and financial papers, and allowing the arrest and detention of people without warrant in the name of national security.\textsuperscript{46}

To combat criminality, the Church (through the CBCP) recommended the following: proper coordination among government offices in the fight against crime; swift but just resolution of cases by courts of justice which must be above suspicion of collusion with crime lords; speedy purge of notorious violators from the ranks of the police and the military; strict and thorough screening of applicants to the police force and the military and their continuing values formation; provision of sufficient
personnel and material resources to all government agencies involved in the prevention and punishment of crimes; cooperation between the citizenry and media in the fight against crime; and strict enforcement of the regulation that only authorized persons be allowed to carry guns in public.  

The Church, through the CBCP, has also been trying to influence the outcome of Philippine elections by formulating a set of criteria for political candidates. In 1995, it called on the faithful to vote for candidates who met the following criteria: (a) they must have pursued with persistency and consistency the common good; (b) they must have been a vigorous defender and promoter of justice; they must be imbued with the “maka-Diyos” spirit of service; (c) they must possess an enduring and preferential option for the poor; and (d) they must have the necessary competence to effectively perform those tasks and responsibilities required by law. The bishops as well as the leaders of lay organizations called for the rejection of candidates who were power hungry; had vices and unexplained wealth; and who resorted to guns, gold and goons to win the elections. These vices included “shady deals, extravagant spending, riotous living, gambling, womanizing and excessive drinking.”

The most visible and far-reaching contribution of the Catholic Church to the renewal of Philippine elections is the formation of the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPC-RV). While the Council is regarded as a laity initiative and laity-led, it cannot be denied that it was formed principally by the church hierarchy as its arm in political action. Its Board of Advisers in composed of influential members of the CBCP with Jaime Cardinal Sin and Ricardo Cardinal Vidal as Honorary Co-Chairmen. The immediate objective of the PPC-RV is to educate the people in the responsible use of the right to vote while its ultimate goal is the promotion of the common welfare, good government and democracy. The formation of the Council serves as the Church’s formal declaration of war against trditional politicians and the politics of guns, gold and goons.

From all indications, the Church played a political role in the 1998 presidential elections. It promulgated an initial set of guidelines to assist the laity in choosing the right presidential candidate. According to the CBCP, the people should support the presidential candidate who has shown competence, honesty in both private and public life, good leadership, and good track record.
The Church and Public Opinion

It is instructive to look at the people's perception of the Catholic Church and its role in Philippine society.

Dr. Temario Rivera of the UP Department of Political Science noted that the majority of the Filipinos actually do not look with favor at a Church that interferes with governmental and electoral processes. His view is supported by the results of the July 1991 national survey conducted by the Social Weather Station (SWS) which showed that about 65 percent of respondents believed that the Catholic Church should not interfere in elections while about 63 percent indicated that the Church should not interfere likewise in government.

In spite of this perception, the Catholic Church had the highest margin of trust (+66 percent in 1989 and +65 percent in August 1990), surpassing government offices like the Supreme Court (+36 percent in 1989), Congress (+35 percent in 1989), the Senate (+16 percent in 1989) and the police (+20 percent in 1989) as well as the private sector such as the broadcast media (+40 percent in 1989), print media (+24 percent in 1989), and the business community (+20 percent in 1989). These were the results of the SWS nationwide survey of September 1989 and the SWS Metro Manila survey of August 1990.

On the propriety of church personnel being involved in the work for clean elections, SWS surveys showed that the pro group was exceeded by the anti group (30% pro vs. 39% anti in July 1985 and 34% pro vs 45% anti in April 1986). This means that there were more Filipinos who did not favor the involvement of church personnel in election-related work, even if these were well-meaning, and that their number was increasing faster than those who favored church involvement. As to the propriety of the Church supporting specific election candidates, again the anti group exceeded the pro group (30% pro vs. 39% anti in July 1985 and 34% pro vs. 45% anti in April 1986). This means that there were more people who thought that the Church should not support any specific candidate and that their number was increasing faster compared to those who believed otherwise.

In a related 1990 Metro Manila survey, Prof. Mahar Mangahas of the SWS observed that about 35 percent agreed that Church leaders wielded too much political influence while only 21 percent disagreed and the rest (44 percent) were uncertain. One surprising aspect of the survey
was the finding that the public is somewhat divided on whether churches should participate in social issues. The proportion of the pro to the anti group was 38 percent to 33 percent in July 1989 and 40 percent to 40 percent in April 1986. While the respondents were evenly divided initially, however, the number of those who favored church participation in social issues increased faster through the years compared to those who were opposed.

The results of the 1990 survey on whether churches had the right to speak out on issues like coup d'état, agrarian reform or corruption in government showed an evenly divided public: about 32 percent agreed while about 31 percent disagreed. The survey results showed an interesting regional pattern which was quite instructive: people throughout Luzon and those in urban Visayas leaned more towards the non-involvement of the Church in politics. On the other hand, people in rural Visayas and throughout Mindanao were more sympathetic to such kind of involvement.

The trend shown by the previews SWS surveys appeared to be reinforced by the public opinion surveys conducted by the Ateneo de Manila Social Weather Station. A 1986 Ateneo survey revealed that

"... Respondents were evenly divided (40% pro vs. 40% anti with 17% undecided) on whether the church should not get involved in the struggle of the oppressed. A plurality (45% pro vs. 34% anti with 18% undecided) agreed that it should not get involved in working for clean and honest elections while a larger plurality (49% pro vs. 29% anti with 19% undecided) agreed that it should not support any candidate in an election. The percentages opposed to Church involvement were larger than those registered for similar questions a year earlier, suggesting that some who were in favor of the Church’s involvement during the crisis of 1985-86 now felt that it was time for the latter to return to the sacristy."52
Ateneo conducted another church-related survey in 1991. It

"... asked a nationwide sample whether the church or church groups have a role to play in politics. The respondents were also equally divide, 43% saying yes and 41% saying no. But when asked specific activities which the church or church groups might undertake, the only one which received majority approval (84%) was protecting human rights. Strong majorities disapproved of the Church as critic of government actions, opposing government programs such that on population, indicating who should be elected, supporting politically oriented groups, and and supporting rebel groups. Even explaining side of political issues was thumbed down by a small majority (53% pro vs. 38% anti with 5% undecided)."\(^{53}\)

The surveys conducted by the Social Weather Station and the Ateneo de Manila University indicate that the Filipinos are evenly divided on the propriety of the Catholic Church taking a political role.

**Some Forecasts and Areas of Concern**

It is very likely that the Catholic Church will not modify or abandon its theology of liberation. As a result, the future will see the church and its hierarchy more actively involved in political activities that it considers as pro-poor and anchored on gospel values.

Sister Tan stated this rather dramatically: "If political power is what is needed to bring about change, then it is our duty to help the poor to be in power. But it should not be us who should be in power."\(^{54}\)

Father Intengan has a more comprehensive view on the future role of the Catholic Church. According to him:

"The situation demands that the Church stress patriotism as a Christian virtue and emphasize that one central purpose of political community should be the promotion of the common good. The Church should cooperate in efforts to put an end to the traditional
politics based on personalities and patronage, and to promote authentic politics, which is based on the rational appreciation of ideologies, programs of government and qualifications for public office. Another obvious duty of the church would be to help develop and strengthen Philippine culture, while purifying it according to gospel norms. The church is also forced by circumstances to take up suppletory function in society by setting up structures to make up for what is lacking in civil institutions. For example, the church has to help set-up livelihood and health projects, supplement the civil communications network, guard the sanctity of the ballot with organization of poll watchers, and defend the integrity of creation and the habitability of the environment through education and gallant action.”

Bishop Bacani also further predicted that in the future,

“... political activity will increase rather than wane until everyone takes it for granted that the Christian faith is to be exercised in all the dimensions of human living and that the church has also been entrusted with a mission to renew the temporal order. The Church in the Philippines will not rest content until the whole Filipino nation becomes a disciple of Christ even in its political activity.”

One may ask: where will all these exhortations lead the Filipinos? To a regime of greater freedom and human dignity (which was also the goal of Filipino priests like Father Burgos and Father Aglipay) or to a regime of religious intolerance and theocracy (or Catholic fundamentalism) which may prove repugnant to the democratic values sought to be strengthened by the church?

This question is raised in the light of some clerical statements that are quite disturbing (hopefully, these are only isolated cases). For example, Fr. James Reuter, spokesman of the CBCP, was quoted as saying that any “politician who attacks the Catholic Church is committing suicide.” Evidently, this statement induces some anxieties since it implies that the Church is omnipotent and will not tolerate criticism especially from public officials. In a democratic society like the Philippines, no organization, not
even a highly respected one like the Church, can claim to have a monopoly of righteousness and nationalism.

Another disturbing statement is the one attributed to Archbishop Manuel Salvador of Cebu. He was said to have "... urged the faithful to vote for Catholic candidates and reject bets identified with Free Masonry and non-Catholic sects." If true, this statement could encourage religious fanaticism (particularly Catholic fundamentalism) and undue polarization of the people and destroy the secular character of the Philippines state. Obviously, the more rational posture is for the people to judge candidates not according to their religion and associations but according to their platform or program of government, integrity, competence and track record. Fortunately for Philippine democracy, the CBCP shares this posture.

The statements of Fr. Reuter and Archbishop Salvador suggest one thing: that internally, the Catholic Church is experiencing some difficulty in defining its political but non-partisan role in the context of the realities and dynamics of Philippine politics and society. This is not an easy task for the Church hierarchy and any precipitous move may not be in the interest of the Church and of the greater society.

The State should not take any action that will heighten the radicalization of the Church's conservative and moderate elements, inspite of the latter's seeming anti-government stance on many issues. The government will be faced with multiple and more serious problems if Church-State conflicts undermine the secular and pluralistic character of the Philippines state and abet the rise of religious fundamentalism.

The collective interests of the people will be best served if the Catholic Church and the State work together as strategic partners, and not as mutually antagonistic competitors for the renewal and reformation of man and his political, economic and social environment. The state must accommodate, if not accept, the current dispensation that the present Church-State relation is anchored no longer on the principle of separation but on the principle of collaboration and mutual partnership, and that the modern church justifies its existence by working not only for the salvation of souls but for the liberation of man from all forms of human bondage and sinfulness.
A situation that allows the Catholic Church to relate with the government as a strategic partner and responsible critic is a big boost to the peace and order, political stability, economic development and social equilibrium of the Philippines in the 21st century. The State should manifest extraordinary patience and maturity in creating and sustaining the policy environment while it creatively builds formal and informal structures and processes that will allow ideal relationship to flourish and endure.
Endnotes


13 *World Mission Special Issue 1995*, p. 37


15 "The Philippine Church," talk to students of University of Goettingen (author not indicated), March 20, 1996, p. 1.

16 Bishop Teodoro Bacani, *Church in Politics*, p. 43.
17 Almario, Ibid., p. 11.


19 Ibid.

20 "The Church in the Political Order," p. 73.

21 Kasarinlan, Second Quarter, 1990, p. 79.

22 "The Church in the Political Order," p. 72.

23 Manila Chronicle, September 1, 1989, p. 5.

24 Bacani, Church in Politics, p. 7.


26 Quoted in Bacani, Church in Politics, p. 6.


30 Quoted in Bacani, Church in Politics, p. 2.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.


36 Bacani, Church in Politics, p. 6.

37 Ibid., p. 23


41 Ibid., p. 17.

42 Quoted in Montemayor, “The Church in the Political Order,” p. 75.


44 Ibid.


46 Bishop Bacani, Today, February 1, 1996, p. 5.


49 Quoted in Bacani, Church in Politics, p. 57.


53 Ibid.
54 Kasarinlan, Second Quarter, 1990, p. 79

55 Romeo Intengan, FABC Papers No. 68, 1994, p. 84.

56 Bishop Bacani, Church in Politics, p. 84.


When we were students of Professor Teodoro Agoncillo, I was struck by what he said was the distinctive characteristic of Philippine social structure, and the unique process of Philippine social development in the late 18th to the 19th centuries. He said that the bourgeoisie propelled dramatic changes in European social and political structure. The bourgeoisie is the middle sector of society most instrumental in promoting social reforms particularly in the formation of democratic institutions and for advancing European nationalism. By contrast, changes in Philippine society were primarily in the hands not so much of the bourgeoisie but on the "mestizo." The mestizo Agoncillo said, formed by inter-marriages between native-Spanish, Chinese-Spanish, and varying mixtures of the three, provided the vehicle for dramatic social changes in the 19th century.

Father Jesus Merino in his essay on the Chinese mestizo wrote that the Chinese mestizo "... is the most important element in the Filipino national identity, ... the Chinese mestizo has the permanence of characteristics, a strength, an influence and a dignity of his own. So much is this so, that the main ethnic stock, no matter how Spanish and Christian it may be in inspiration, in civilization and religion, no matter how American it may be in politics, trade and aspirations, has been historically and practically shaped not by the Chinese immigrant but by the Chinese mestizo."

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Many historians have recognized the crucial role of the Chinese mestizo in shaping Philippine society and nationhood when the lineages of several of our national heroes were brought to light. Dr. Jose P. Rizal's paternal great grandfather was Chinese, and he had mixed Chinese ancestry from his maternal great grandparents. Many of the leaders of the propaganda movement like Pedro Paterno, Emilio Aguinaldo and the subject of this paper, Gregorio Sancianco y Goson descended from Chinese and Chinese mestizos. They were in the forefront of the nationalist propaganda movement; they wrote, published and disseminated their ideas in the Philippines and in Europe. Many joined in the armed revolution against Spain.

Father Merino was correct in singling out the Chinese mestizos' contributions to the formation of the new Filipino identity. The mestizo born from the mixture of races and cultural backgrounds were the ones who could easily transcend tribal, localized, linguistic identities or alliances which may have been the prevailing sentiment among the majority of the Philippine populations at that time. But Prof. Agoncillo and Fr. Merino may have overstated the case. By stressing the ethnicity and racial origins of the Chinese mestizo, they may have glossed over the equally important features of this group of people. For instance, their economic, educational and social status, which combined with historical circumstances, led them to play the roles they performed in the 18th and 19th century.

The Chinese mestizos that Fr. Merino referred to, whether a mixture of native Malay stock, or Spanish, were composed of the more affluent and educated middle classes of the time. Their numbers were probably very small in proportion to the total population. For we must not neglect to point out that a larger number of Chinese and Chinese mestizos in Manila and other parts of the archipelago whose names do not figure in historical documents were poor, unlettered laborers if not totally destitute. Despite their small numbers, the Chinese mestizos discussed by Fr. Merino played a crucial role in Philippine society for they had the desire and the means of obtaining the best education available in the Philippines and in Europe where they were influenced by western liberal, progressive and democratic ideas. At the same time, since they were born and bred in the Philippines, in close and constant inter-action with the different social groups, with the Spanish colonizers and other foreigners, not to speak of other Chinese, they probably possessed a relatively broader social perspective compared to other social and ethnic groups. Furthermore, since a number of them came from families who were engaged in some
form of business, they had experience in productive enterprises. This combination of features predisposed them to take advantage of social and educational opportunities. However, they were also as vulnerable as the other native peoples were to the persecutions and harassments of colonial administration.

It is understandable therefore that the Chinese mestizo together with other social groups of different ethnic backgrounds, like the Malayan Andres Bonifacio and Emilio Jacinto, articulated the people’s grievances against the Spanish government and the Roman Catholic clergy. And in doing so, they were at the same time the harshest critics of their own frailties. Certainly we can say that the Chinese mestizo did play a very important role in the formation of Filipino identity and in advancing Filipino nationalism. But it was a role thrust upon them not so much by their ethnic backgrounds, but by the troubled social and historical circumstances. Their common experience of injustice, tyranny, racial prejudice, hypocrisy of the ruling elites, and the stifling social and religious regimen imposed by the conservative and reactionary segments of the Spanish government and its church. This combination of factors forced the Malay Filipino, Spanish and Chinese mestizos to unite. They shed their narrow identities of region, social status, language, even race, and forged a new national identity.

In 1821, their common grievances were eloquently expressed with an ironic twist by “El Indio Agraviado,” and deserves to be quoted at length:

“This is what you are saying among yourselves: If we allow the Indians to learn Spanish, some of them may turn out to be satirists and scholars who will understand what we say, dispute with us and write things against us. If we allow them to prosper they will become rich, they will mix with us freely, sit beside us, eat at the same table, aspire to high and important offices, become persons of distinction. Is it not shameful that they should be on the same level as ourselves? And so, they may never rise from their miserable condition, and that they may always be poor, that we may have them to serve us always, let us not teach them Spanish; let us leave them in their ignorance; let us not help them correct the barbarous speech and stupid ideas that among them pass for polite conversation; let us not provide them with money, that being always needy they
may learn to steal. Thus we shall be able to call them thieves and they will have nothing to say in their defense because they will be thieves. And if by a miracle they refrain from stealing, being in need they will do what work they can for whatever wage they can get. By this method or system we will always be the masters and they will always be poor, miserable and ignorant, bearing all injuries, unable to defend themselves. We will possess all, and all will have need of us. Was this not what your worships had in mind from the beginning, that you may always have the better of us, as you do? There is no doubt at all about it. What then is left for the poor Indian? If he tries to reason with you, he is impertinent; if he keeps his peace, he is a dolt.

And now let me ask you: Is this what it means to be one and the same family, one and the same nation, one and the same monarchy embracing East and West? Is this how the law is observed which enjoins ‘most strictly that no one constituted in authority, whether ecclesiastical, civil or military, should under pretext whatsoever, however reasonable it may appear, commit any injury against the person of the Indian?’ Or is it not rather oppression, despotism, arbitrary rule, and egoism?”

Let us consider for the moment the character Quiroga, as an illustration of the character of the immigrant Chinese businessman and to differentiate him from a mestizo Chinese like Gregorio Sancianco whose sense of identity was already Filipino. In one of the most satirical chapters of *El Fílibusterismo*, Rizal painted a vivid picture of a Chinese immigrant businessman in the late 19th century. In Chapter XVI entitled “La Tribulaciones de un Chino,” Rizal portrayed a character named Quiroga. Although situated in the late 19th century, the chapter has many parallels to contemporary Philippines. A wealthy businessman, he dealt with all sorts of goods and provisions much needed by the government officials and the friars. Quiroga’s operations encompassed the whole gamut of trade and commerce, from the procurement of goods, their storage, distribution, transport, and most of all supplying the needs and appeasing power holders in Philippine society. Bureaucrats, friars, soldiers, pensioners, and widows whose stipends more often than not could barely keep body and soul together relied on Quiroga for their subsistence in the form of “vale,” that
is to say, they obtained goods on credit more or less equivalent to drawing an advance on their salaries or stipends.

Quiroga wanted to establish a Chinese consulate in the Philippines for the obvious reason of looking after the welfare of resident Chinese in the country. For this purpose, Quiroga hosted a sumptuous banquet at his residence on the Escolta to which luminaries and other people of consequence were invited. The guests represented the network of power wielders and VIPs, not excluding Quiroga’s competitors, critics, enemies and other wheeler-dealers and fixers; the friars, bureaucrats, military men, and other merchants. Quiroga’s “suki,” a Fukienese word for constant customer, his closest business associates and his “Ninong.” The fact that he had a “ninong” showed that he was probably a baptized Christian. Quiroga also invited a Senor Gonzalez, a journalist whose main preoccupation was to condemn editorials on the policy allowing the entry of Chinese immigrants into the country. Senor Gonzalez could be relied upon to write about the necessity of establishing a Chinese consulate and that no one else but Quiroga could fulfill the role as Consul. Also among the guests was Senor Timoteo Pelaez, a Filipino merchant who attributed his business setbacks to Chinese competition. Other guests although unnamed included one who engaged in Mexican currency manipulation, another who kept griping about Quiroga’s buying and selling of lottery tickets in the country and in China in collusion with an influential Manila lady. To demonstrate further how insidious were Quiroga’s machinations, the chapter showed the Chinaman’s retinue of obedient and diligent servants who were overly attentive to all the needs and whims of the guests.

Among Quiroga’s guests, the friars were said to be the ones most accustomed to relax and pass the time in Quiroga’s store right before the view of the public, and even stayed in the latter’s luxurious private quarters. By contrast, Simoun the wealthy jeweler and close adviser of the Captain General arrived late, and did not partake of the feast or any of the refreshments. Although Quiroga appeared congenial to Simoun, he suspected him of, inciting animosities between the natives and the foreigners, between Peninsulares and those born in the Philippines, between mestizos and full blooded Chinese, and that these animosities led to complaints and litigations to the delight of the friars and the Spanish officials who enriched themselves as mediators among the quarreling Chinese factions. Nonetheless, Quiroga fawned on Simoun since it was
through him that Quiroga gained access and favors from high officials usually by giving valuable gifts of jewelry to the latter’s wives and women.

The guests already inebriated by the free flow of champagne engaged in spirited discussions. Topics of discussion revolved around the proposed Chinese consulate, Quiroga’s possible appointment to the post and other social and political issues like equality and citizens’ rights, the general deterioration of social and economic conditions in the country, its backwardness compared to other countries. But the refrain centered on their anxiety about the difficulties of doing business or “making a killing” from government contracts. Government legislation requiring houses to replace flammable materials like bamboo, wood and nipa roofs with adobe stones, and galvanized iron. Provisioning shoes and other supplies for the troops were other possible sources of profits, and making deals to obtain contracts were contested by the guests. Tight-lipped Simoun was the only one among the guests whose schemes guaranteed him and him alone, large profits. His latest plot was smuggling of arms supposedly for an edifying political cause. Actually, Simoun planted arms in the homes of prominent and wealthy people who had to seek his help to rescue them from certain persecution by the government. Simoun wanted to involve the frightened Quiroga in his plot by exacting immediate payment of a sizable loan.

The conversation shifted to other topics of a lighter vein from magnetism to spiritism, and to the enigmatic talking sphinx exhibited in a Quiapo feria (circus show) by an American named Mr. Leeds. The sphinx caused a lot of arguments and speculations among the guests although no one else except Juanito Pelaez, (son of the Filipino businessman Timoteo Pelaez) had seen the show. The young Pelaez tried but failed to provide a convincing explanation for the phenomenon.

To put an end to the arguments, Ben-Zayb another journalist suggested that the friars should see the show for themselves with the intent of unmasking the trickery of the show, and to prove the friars’ intellectual superiority to the credulous Indios who trooped in great numbers to watch the sphinx. The chapter ends with Simoun’s plot safely put in place while everyone else was distracted by the circus quirk show.

To this day, Rizal’s portrayal of the Chinese Quiroga served as the stereotype of the whole Chinese population in the Philippines. Quiroga was the epitome of the opportunist, totally committed to personal profit and gain. Unscrupulous and unprincipled, Quiroga was constantly engaged
in intrigues and manipulations. And yet he never failed to present himself as the helpless victim of harassments from all quarters while his business was always on the brink of bankruptcy.

On the surface, the characterization of Quiroga appeared similar to the way Father Damaso was depicted in the *Noli me Tangere*. Intent on identifying the main culprits in Philippine society, Rizal portrayed the friars and the Chinese as despicable evil doers; the friars for their contempt for, and abusive treatment of the *Indio*, and the Chinese as manipulators and profiteers. And yet, if we reflect on the meaning of Chapter XVI and look at Quiroga with the rest of the characters, we see him as a creation of the conflicting interests of the other characters as well as the historical circumstances they found themselves in as much as his own volition. Everyone, even the powerful and sinister Simoun relied on Quiroga’s help. The impoverished widow on a small pension, who thought it was demeaning to work, the soldiers, government bureaucrats, the friars dependent on the small stipend from the *patronato royal*, all turn to Quiroga for their daily needs and the accoutrements that befit their self esteem. The businessmen intent on cornering government contracts needed Quiroga’s help to obtain the necessary goods and money to bribe officials. Even Simoun had to make use of Quiroga’s resources and his network of high officials, confidantes, and informants to realize his stratagems.

In real life, Rizal’s relations with the clergy and the Chinese were not as antagonistic as portrayed in the two novels. Up to the eve of his execution, Rizal kept his friar friends among the Jesuits. And in the case of the Chinese, some of his friends and closest associates were Chinese mestizos. Rizal distinguished between the recent immigrant Chinese who were not assimilated, and the mestizo Chinese among whom were his close friends. One of them was Doroteo Ongjunc at whose house on Raja Matanda Street in Tondo, the La Liga Filipina was organized on July 3, 1892. The disparaging depiction of the Chinese, and the absence of Chinese mestizo characters in his two novels showed that from Rizal’s point of view mestizos whether part Chinese, or part European having dropped their former lineage as did Rizal, who assimilated into Philippine society, and espoused common cause with the *Indio* could not be categorized any other way except as Filipinos.

One of the most outstanding Chinese mestizos who identified himself completely with the Filipinos was Gregorio Sancianco y Goson. Sancianco was barely ten years older than Rizal. Like Rizal, he fought for
reforms in the country and in Spain. His book, *El Progreso de Filipinas* reflects his wide knowledge and deep understanding of social, political and economic issues of the Philippines and Europe. It is all the more astounding for he drew up a comprehensive and practical program of reforms at the age of 26. Sancianco was highly regarded by other Filipino activists. Jose Rizal in one of his letters to Graciano Lopez Jaena wrote of the events of 1872 as follows: “Without 1872, there would not now be any Plaridel, or Jaena, or Sancianco, nor would the valiant and generous Filipino colonies in Europe exist. Without 1872, Rizal would now be a Jesuit and instead of writing the *Noli me Tangere*, would have written the contrary. ... The day on which they lay their hands on us, the day on which they inflict martyrdom on our innocent families for our fault, farewell, pro-friar government -- and perhaps, farewell, Spanish government.”

Except for his book, very little is known about the personal life of Sancianco. He was born on March 7, 1852 in Tonsuya, Malabon which became part of Rizal province during the American regime. His father was probably Chinese, and his mother may have been Chinese or mestiza Chinese from Pampanga. He mentioned in his book that he and his family were engaged in trade along the western coast of Luzon, from Ilocos to Manila, and in inland trade to Nueva Ecija and Cagayan. At an early age, he was sent to Manila to study at a school owned by Benedicto Luna. Later on, he studied at the Universidad de Santo Tomas and was one of those who organized the *Juventud Escolar Liberal*, a student movement that sought reforms in the educational system, and obtain the rights of the Filipino clergy to occupy parishes and higher positions in the Roman Catholic hierarchy. In November of 1870, the students at the Universidad de Sto. Tomas petitioned for reforms in the prevailing antiquated educational system. The students pleaded for the employment of better-trained professors since the teaching staff consisted mainly of Dominican friars whose limited training confined instruction to Latin, theology and canon law. They asked for the inclusion of more science and mathematics subjects, increase the salaries of professors, improve school facilities, and government subsidy for education. The wording of the petition was polite to the point of sounding like a supplication. However reasonable was their petition, the University authorities reacted irrationally; they terrorized the students and their parents accusing them of sedition and heresy, considered the worst offenses against the colonial government and the church. Felipe Buencamino, who was presumed to be its leader, was dismissed from the University. More information can be found in Buencamino’s memoirs.
He wrote that the Filipinos in Madrid published a paper, *El Eco Filipino* to counteract the paper of the Spanish clergy, *La Verdad*. Obviously, *El Eco Filipino* was censored by the Spanish authorities and could not therefore be distributed openly to its subscribers. Members of *La Juventud* like Paciano Rizal (elder brother of Jose Rizal), Gregorio Sancianco and Buecamino were the couriers and distributors of *El Eco*. To avoid Spanish surveillance, the young men desguised as *zacateros* picked up the newspaper from the house of Esquivel, hid the newspapers inside the *zacate* and distributed them to the subscribers.7

The inadequacy of the Philippine educational system at that time forced Sancianco like most Filipinos of some means to go abroad. Sometime in 1872, he went to Spain and studied at the Universidad Central de Madrid and obtained the degree *Doctor de Derecho Civil y Canonico y Lecenciado en Derecho Administrativo*. In 1881, he published at his own expense his book, *El Progreso de Filipinas*. Right after its publication, he returned to Manila in January 1884 intending to practice law. On May 10, 1884, Andres Novales led a tiny group of soldiers to protest their maltreatment by their superiors in Sta. Maria de Tayug, Nueva Ecija. Due to the prevailing paranoia among the conservative, reactionary faction of the government and the church, the soldiers’ protest was blown out of proportion and dealt harshly as if it were a “revolt.” Again Sancianco’s progressive ideas made him the target of suspicion. He was arrested together with 1,700 others. Among whom were his former classmates and friends, Felipe Buencamino, Joaquin Luna de San Pedro (father of Antonio and Juan), Andres Novicio (brother of Mrs. Luna), Antonio Crisostomo, Bartolome Espiritu, and Joaquin Sebastian. The last two were tortured and forced to admit guilt and implicate others. Sebastian confused the authorities by naming several Spanish high officials and the Archbishop himself. Eventually they were all released for lack of evidence.8

In 1887 he was appointed Justice of the Peace in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija but due to some altercation with the parochial priest, Fr. Jose dela Fuente, Sancianco was forced to retire. He was then only 35 years old. He transferred to Manila where he joined the law firm of Don Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista, the one who drafted the proclamation of independence on June 12, 1897. We have no information so far of his activities during the revolution in 1896 except that he retired in Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija where he died on November 17, 18979
Sancianco's book is a mine of information about the state of Philippine economy, trade, commeree, the infrastructure, and of society as a whole. His analysis of what ailed the country are as relevant today as they were in 1881. While his main intent was to study the revenue laws of the country, the financial system, regulations and administrative practices at all levels of government, he pointed out the many anomalies and inconsistencies of the system. He attacked the contradiction between official policy of the Spanish government and its application in the colony. Spanish law required the colonial administrators to advance the material and spiritual welfare of the colony. No distinction was to be made between peninsular or insular Spaniards, white or colored. Sancianco pointed out the discrepancy between the laws and their application in the Philippines. He said that the Philippines was part of "the Spanish nation; the same government, the same constitution, the same laws and institutions, that prevail in the peninsula ought to prevail in those islands." He was, like Rizal an assimilationist who aspired for equal rights, human dignity, all the freedoms and the benefits of social and economic progress enjoyed by the Spaniards.

The practice in the Philippines, however, retarded and obstructed the implementation of reforms much less radical changes advocated by Sancianco. Foremost of the obstacles to change was lack of education. Since majority of the Indios could neither read nor write Spanish they had no means of communication with the government and the outside world. No provisions were made to instruct them to master Spanish. There were only 50 schools with 50 poorly trained and poorly-paid teachers for 9 million inhabitants. The few schools in operation were run by the clergy who confined teaching to a few prayers and catechism. Only in Manila were there good schools and colleges but even these were entrusted mainly to the Dominicans who relied on their own funds and on student fees. The excuse given by the authorities for the absence of universal education system was lack of funds. Sancianco pointed out that funds for public services could be generated by a better system of taxation. The present system of taxation was not only deficient but was riddled by inefficiency, corruption and was patently unjust. While current taxation laws exempted Spaniards from tribute and forced labor, the heaviest taxes were imposed on the shoulders of those least able to pay, the Indio small farmers and laborers. The Chinese paid the highest taxes, and were required to serve longer at forced labor. While those who could afford and should pay taxes like government officials, employees, proprietors and traders were the ones exempted. And what amounts of taxes were
collected were not utilized for provision of public services, and assurance of public safety but were often loaned to Spanish business speculators if not misappropriated for personal gain.

He suggested a more creative system of taxation based on one's ability to pay and not one imposed on the basis of race. The first requirement in drawing up a program of tax reforms was in depth study of the state of agriculture, trading, commercial activities, the professions and crafts, transportation on land and sea, in short a thorough study of all aspects of the economy. He deplored the inadequacy of reliable and up-to-date statistics which was the major setback in instituting reforms in the economy. Reforms he said should begin with changes in the way taxes were imposed. Taxes should be levied on the basis of wealth and not on race. Immovable property like farm lands, its produce such as crops and livestock; gains from industry and commerce, customs fees, identification cards like cedulas, municipal and provincial taxes, lotteries and raffles, distilleries, wines and liquors, income from crafts, employment and the professions should be taxable.

In return, the government must provide roads, ports and harbors for efficient and safe transport of people and goods, and guarantee an efficient and honest bureaucracy. He gave detailed accounts of how farmers, fishermen, traders and travelers suffered delays and losses due to bad or non-existent roads, clogged and silted rivers and harbors made even more dangerous due to lack of light houses, beacons and buoys, and by predatory Aetas and brigands. He said, at every junction of the road and port, sentries demanded exorbitant fees, documents and other unnecessary requirements. Even crews of boats were required identity documents which could be procured through elaborate procedures obtainable only at the capital. These caused farmers, shippers and employers large sums of money and wasted time. In Tondo, Manila the canal Reina Regente a major transportation highway from Manila Bay to Pasig, Marikina, and Laguna was so choked with silt that even flat bottomed boats could not navigate the river. He attacked the Tobacco monopoly or any kind of monopolistic control of agriculture, trade and commerce. Monopoly he said was not conducive to efficient production of high quality goods and services. He provided comparative data of tobacco, sugar, and rice production from Cuba, Dutch, French and Belgian colonies to demonstrate the inefficiency and backwardness of Philippine production. The net result of these inefficiencies and corruption were
higher cost of goods and services, lowering of productivity, rise of crime, and widespread discontent.

To appreciate Sancianco’s proposals regarding land ownership, land tenure, distribution, management and system of generating revenues, it is important to discuss what were the prevailing concepts and practices on land ownership and tenure during his time. The prevailing opinion in government was that the Indio had no concept of land as personal property and therefore could not be required to pay tax on land. Another argument advanced against taxing land was that since the population was still small relative to the availability of idle lands, it would only prevent land utilization. Actually, the biggest obstacle in the imposition of taxes on land was the fiction created by the Spanish government that all lands and all wealth in the colony belonged to the crown. This fiction abolished in one stroke indigenous rights to their own ancestral lands and baranganic customary laws. In place of native land rights, the Spanish king claimed that as an act of benevolence, lands were parceled out to the people for cultivation. Small plots of land (4-5 hectares) were assigned to the villagers as usufruct and reverted to the crown if these were not cultivated within a given period of time. Now, how were the Spanish colonizers and missionaries supported? How were these people who were not cultivators but soldiers and priests to be maintained in the distant colony? Funds sent by the Spanish crown were barely sufficient to cover the salaries of the colonial officials. Hence, other means had to be found to supply the needs of the colony. This was done through what was known as the encomienda. Encomienda involved a sort of land grant to the encomendero. Strictly speaking, it was not the land that was awarded but only the authority to collect tribute from the inhabitants of the lands assigned to them. Spanish officials were rewarded with encomiendas, and similar grants were given to the church and the friar orders both of whom operated like business corporations. Friar orders having been pioneers in establishing parishes and settled communities obtained the best cultivated and populous land grants. These were also lands which happened to be within cities and towns. The encomienda system, therefore, made the inhabitants of these land grants subjects of the encomendero or the friar corporations. Aside from having to pay all the state taxes, and render (servicios) personal services and (polo) labor for public works, they had to pay rent for the right to cultivate the land which they and their ancestors owned in the first place! Under baranganic customary law, whatever surpluses they generated accrued to themselves with a small share going to the Datuk as buvis (tax). Under the Spanish regime and the encomienda system, they were forced to work
harder just to meet the demands of the colonial masters. Compounding the troubles of the people were the imprecision of land boundaries, ambiguity in the arrangements of usufruct, and the many and arbitrary impositions on their labor. The people had to perform personal services for the friars, supplying their needs, and attending to the innumerable religious rites and ceremonies prescribed by the church. As more lands came under Spanish control, and agriculture intensified, the lot of the majority of the common people deteriorated. Many were reduced to landless tenants and wage earners of the estates, a status probably unknown prior to Spanish colonization.

Sancianco analyzed the system of land ownership, land tenure, and attacked the gross injustice of the cadastral laws, procedures and practices obtaining in the country. Current laws he said, allowed public lands to be acquired by the following means: (1) by simple occupation; (2) by petition to the state; and (3) by purchase. The first two methods were reserved exclusively to the native population, but prohibited to Spaniards and other foreigners. The third method was allowed to Spaniards and foreigners but the natives were preferred. Sancianco showed the loopholes in the current cadastral system. The system of land grants although intended to attract the most diligent and resourceful farmers had the opposite effect for several reasons. First, many of the landowners left their lands idle due to the many deficiencies in the economic system. Some of them he already mentioned earlier such as lack of roads and other transport and communications infrastructure, and the many bureaucratic requirements for travel and transporting of goods. He discussed how unscrupulous officials and powerful people victimized the illiterate cultivator who, having cleared and cultivated the land, suddenly discovered that someone else had title to his land. Moreover, ownership and its usufruct was poorly documented, was easily transferred, mortgaged, and sold. Whenever the original cultivator was strapped for cash, lack of legal credit facilities forced the poor farmer to turn to unscrupulous usurers who imposed high interest rates. The poor farmer could only offer his land as collateral and since he usually failed to pay the loan on time, he was soon divested of his land.

Another problem which made it difficult to tax the land was the instability of the land ownership. Establishing ownership or usufruct was difficult enough. Added to these problems was that the poor farmer was constantly prey to the uncertainties and vagaries of the weather, pests, drop in prices, and constant threat from powerful land grabbers. When
crops fail or planting season was delayed, the farmer turned to money lenders usually Chinese traders, local officials, and the friars who advanced food, seeds, farm tools, and other necessities at high interest rates. Oftentimes, the lender was the alcalde or the curate who, by law, could purchase specified amount of goods at prices set by themselves. So the farmer was caught in a bind by the credit and marketing system, the same persons who extended credit were the same ones who bought farm products cheaply at harvest time.

While Sancianco advocated taxing lands, income and profits derived from land, he also set down guidelines or criteria in assessing the value of the land for taxation purposes. He criticized the current system whereby properties of the wealthy, businesses and industries were not taxed. There ought to be a scheme whereby properties were classified and categorized by their value and profitability. On this basis, graduated schedule of taxes should be drawn up. He pointed out that the Department of Finance failed to collect the ten percent real estate tax required by law which was instituted in 1861. Inability to implement the law stemmed from lack of data and field survey, and from inefficiency. He criticized the regulation that exempted all structures used for domicile from taxes. This had the anomalous result of taxing even the humble nipa and thatch houses of the poor just because they were rented out to others. While it exempted from tax the fancy houses in Intramuros and Binondo.

Sancianco argued that what was needed was a comprehensive agricultural program and total overhaul of the cadastral and taxation system which, when put in place, would stimulate further production. His vantage point was not from the point of view of the tax collector, nor of big land owners but the position of the hapless cultivator. Most of his recommendations for agricultural reform are surprisingly applicable to this day. He already mentioned the necessity of gathering precise and up-to-date statistics. Because of rampant land-grabbing and the ease by which abusive officials and clergy encroached on the peoples’ lands, he hammered on the urgency of aiding the farmers by having the government undertake proper cadastral survey of all the lands, classification, documentation and protection of property ownership. Aside from all of these legal and administrative measures, Sancianco pleaded for the government to provide proper education for the citizens and train farmers on improved agricultural and technical methods. These were the essential preconditions that could ensure the success of a thorough-going agricultural reform program.
Sancianco fully subscribed to the concept that stability of land ownership and tenure was crucial to agricultural productivity and to social harmony. But besides ownership, Sancianco emphasized the need to attract the most industrious and resourceful farmers to work the land. For land, unless cleared and made productive, had little value. Farmers should be provided all the incentives, and remove the obstacles to agricultural production. Furthermore, there should be provision of credit to the cultivator and ensure fair market prices for farm products. Hence he devoted an entire chapter to criticize the "Regulation of 25 June 1880" which he considered inimical to the country since it led to divesting tillers of their lands.\(^{14}\) Purportedly issued to define land boundaries, grant land titles to cultivators and tillers, and "to stimulate farming and increase production," the Regulation of 1880 actually gave opportunities to unscrupulous, powerful people to seize tracts of lands from cultivators who were illiterate and had no titles to the land they had been cultivating for years. Furthermore, many of the small land owners could not afford the cost of surveying, obtaining all the legal documents, fulfilling all the complex bureaucratic requirements for titling their land, and the cost of real estate taxes which were often arbitrarily imposed. Lack of proper titles by the long time occupants and cultivators of lands was the cause of abuses by the wealthy and well connected who could meet all the legal requirements of the law. Whatever taxes could be generated from the Regulation of 1880, Sancianco said, could not compensate for the possible loss in production and the certain social unrest it would generate.

In place of Regulation of 1880 Sancianco proposed alternative legislation. Cadastral survey and careful classification of lands such as farm lands, pasture, forest, mines, etc. must be undertaken by the government. Lack of clear land boundaries, proper titles and documentation were causes of abuse and conflicts. And because of uncertainty and precariousness of land ownership and tenure, people were hindered from engaging in agriculture and productive exploitation of the land. For this purpose, Sancianco recommended the hiring of more engineers and foresters who were to undertake scientific surveys and classification of the lands. Evidently he was writing at the time when land was relatively plentiful in proportion to the population. Population was estimated at about 9 million and most of them still dispersed in different areas distant from each other. He was not yet fully aware of the environmental and ecological problems regarding intensive land use and management. While he mentioned the presence of Aetas and Negritos roaming in Bosoboso, Morong, in Porac Pampanga, and Zambales, he did not consider them in
his recommendations. His main concern was to attract settlers to the “empty” or uncultivated lands which he said should be distributed \textit{gratibus} to the cultivators. Communal lands of six square leagues was to be assigned to barrios, municipalities, towns or parishes, and eight square leagues to provincial capitals. Uninhabited lands (usually classified as crown lands) covering forest areas and mines should be designated for the use of the state.

Farm lands of two (2) kilometers square could be granted to individuals and 12 square kilometers if they had sufficient capital. Colonizing companies and entrepreneurs were to be given concessions from two to four (2-4) square leagues. While pasture or grazing land, and forest, whatever areas were requested could be granted. However, Sancianco specified conditions for land grants. Titles were not permanent unless the tiller fulfilled all the requirements. They were to be required to clear and cultivate at least 1/4 of the land the first year, and the rest of the land within four (4) years. No taxes should be imposed until land became productive and amounts adjusted in accordance to the size, profitability of the land. After four years, the tiller should pay full real property tax. In other words free land grants were temporary unless it was cleared and farmed within a fixed period of time. Furthermore, land grants must not be sold.

He identified many sources of government revenue and drew up taxation scheme which was distributed according to ability to pay based on income and wealth. He opposed the indirect tax for it was a clever means of passing on the tax burden to the consumer rather than the producer or seller. He identified income based on detailed classification of every category of property, farm lands (taxed according to size, location and productivity; agriculture products, cattle, forest products, structures, houses, etc.) He suggested that animals must be fenced and kept from roaming wild, and that the carabao, the ubiquitous beast of burden of the people, was to be exempt from tax. To ensure that the tax scheme was applied, he said that the government ought to be vigilant and carry out thorough inspection, and that engineers must be employed to undertake accurate survey and evaluation assisted by field guards. All of these procedures, of course, required honest and diligent government officials.

To encourage more trade, Sancianco argued for abolition of monopolies. He attacked the Tobacco monopoly which forced farmers to plant tobacco and deliver specified amounts at prices fixed by the
government. He discussed the many abuses committed by those in charge of implementing the Tobacco monopoly whose nefarious tactics included arbitrary pricing and grading of the tobacco leaves, use of faulty weights and measures, delayed payments, unfair exchange of goods for the tobacco crop, etc. Sancianco also criticized the rigidity of the rules regarding the tobacco monopoly. By requiring farmers to plant only tobacco at a certain time, at specified quantities, and by imposing strict quotas, the planters had no insurance against food shortages, no alternatives in case of crop failure, and price depreciation. He suggested instead that monopolies ought to be abolished. Instead, farmers were to be allowed to plant whatever crops they wanted at the time and quantities they believed most profitable to themselves. The government should however provide correct information about agriculture and build the necessary infrastructure.

Trade barriers like import and export taxes specially of industrial goods, equipment and machinery were obstacles to economic progress and industry. He suggested the opening up and building of more ports, and doing away with unnecessary bureaucratic restrictions. He stressed the importance of honest and efficient government and of public safety. He suggested that importation of arms be prohibited and strictly supervised by the Guardia Civil.

From his discussion, Sancianco comes across as moderate and pragmatic economist. In contrast to Marcelo H. del Pilar, Jose Rizal and Apolinario Mabini, Sancianco did not attack the Spanish government nor the Roman Catholic church directly. He focused his analysis on economic and financial problems of the country and proposed practical common sense solutions. He sought reforms within the framework of the Spanish colonial government. The fact that he published the book in Spain showed that he addressed his appeal not to the benighted, reactionary, and intolerant Spanish rulers in the Philippines, but to Spain of the European enlightenment, the Spain that produced the Cadiz Constitution of 1812, and waged the revolution 1868. And yet the reforms Sancianco advocated such as education for the people, honest and efficient government, increased economic production, setting up of industries, granting land to the toiler, taxing the wealthier segments of society, including the Spaniards as well as the entrenched landed principalia, and provision for public safety, would have had profound implications on society. Were his recommendations implemented they would have required a major shake-up of the status quo. Still he stopped short of advocating the overthrow of the entire colonial system. But by writing a detailed study on taxation,
land tenure, and revenue system, Sancianco obtained a hearing from the colonial government which was already in a state of paranoia. His book was serialized in the newspapers and stimulated many readers to write letters and articles. His recommendations exposed the unjust and iniquitous taxation based on race. The Spanish regime could no longer rationalize a taxation system premised on the false notion that the *Indio*, the Chinese and Chinese mestizo were of a lower breed. Sancianco laid bare the intent of the tax policy which set each race against each other. Sancianco, like his compatriots, insisted that all were Filipinos. “Don’t we all live under the same sun and breathe the same air?” he asked. As all lived and worked together so were all races involved in the many riots and uprisings that occurred since the 18th century. Spaniards, *peninsulares* and *insulares*, *Indio*, Chinese and mestizos were all involved either as leaders, or followers. They were provoked by the unjust treatment by the so-called superior race. They resented the privileges peninsular Spaniards and the clergy enjoyed at the expense of the other races and classes. Sancianco opened another vista to the oppressors and tyrants not by calling them by that name, but by warning them that their misdeeds caused their own degradation, rendered them useless, and blinded them from the truth.¹⁵ Sancianco’s treatise was a sober, practical appeal to human dignity, reason, honest hard work, discipline and productivity. His generation of nationalists a mixture of *Indio*, Chinese, mestizo and Spaniards sparked the flame of national struggle that the waning colonial regime could not extinguish, for it burst into the revolution of 1896.
This photo is taken from Nick Joaquin's *A Question of Heroes: Essays in Criticism on Ten Key Figures of Philippine History*, Makati, Mla.: Ayala Museum, 1977. p.41
Endnotes


3 El Flibusterismo by Dr. Jose P. Rizal, Ghent, Belgium, 1892.

4 Epistolario Rizaliano.

5 O.D. Corpuz, trans. & ed. National Glories, the Events of 1872, a Historico-Bibliographical Account by Manuel Artigas y Cuerva, Glorias Nacionales, los sucesos de 1872, Resena historica bio-bibliografica, Imprenta dela Vanguardia, Gunaw 26, Quiapo, 1913, Univ. of the Phil., Q.C., 1996: 28-31; 35. Among the members of the Joventud was Jose Rizal's elder brother, Paciano who was one of those exiled after the 1872 Cavite uprising.


7 Ibid., pp.112-113.

8 E. Arsenio Manuel, Dictionary of Philippine Biography, Quezon City: Philippine Publications, 1970, Vol. 2:315-317. Based on Sancianco's past record as a political and economic reformer, he sympathized with the aims of the revolution, although like Rizal he may have objected to the violent means of attaining them.

10 In 1850-1860 taxes were still imposed based on one’s race and social status, rather than on one’s ability to pay, which is the principle characteristic of a more socially progressive tax system. However, the Spanish colonial government taxed the Indio heavily. If the Indio belonged to the cailianes or working class he was required to pay the capitation tax, municipal tax, served at least forty days for building and repair of public works, or paid a fine to get exempted. He and his wife were obliged to serve the parish priest by providing him food, materials, and other necessities; and contributed to the sanctorum, or money to support the church. The Spaniards and the principalia were exempt from all these obligations. Indio principalia served as gobernadorcillo and had to attend to the many responsibilities primarily to ensure that the people complied with all the government regulations. The Chinese paid as much as 200% more than everyone else and Chinese mestizo about 50 - 100% more than the Indio.

11 Apparently at the time Sancianco was writing, the Aetas were much more numerous and widely dispersed than they are today. Moreover, they had not yet been completely subjugated to the point of what they have become today, docile little bands inhabiting the less hospitable and remote areas of the country. With respect to “brigandage,” people who were unjustly treated by the authorities often fought back by leaving their home towns, or joining settlements in the mountains. Consequently, anyone who left his place of domicile where he was listed as a tributo was labeled as a tulisan, or a brigand. This word was applied to anyone irrespective of the gravity of his or her crime. Those who escaped corvée, who could not pay their tribute, who had disputes with officials and the curate, or could not obtain justice often sought refuge among the hill tribes, or formed wandering bands. One of the best illustrations of how people were forced into “brigandage” is found in El Flibusterismo.


13 The 1880 regulation stipulated that (1) all lands not otherwise privately owned, titled and belonging to the community were all royal lands. (2)
That holders of all lands be considered owners for all legal purposes, whether the lands are communal or untitled or royal if they have held them for an uninterrupted period of ten years, with rightful title and in good faith, or twenty years without those conditions if they are cultivated lands, and for thirty years if lands are untitled. (3) That holders of lands with titles and good faith for less than ten years should renew within one year, beginning with the publication of the Regulation, their respective property titles, defraying the cost of surveying and of whatever else will be needed to obtain the corresponding new titles. If the result of the survey shows an excess over the total extent described in the original title, the excess not being more than a fifth part and is cultivated, no additional payment will be demanded; if it is more than a fifth part and is cultivated, or if it is uncultivated whatever its size, the holders will pay the Treasury for the excess at the price of the other parts with a surcharge of twenty percent if the lands are untitled. Those who hold royal lands without title or good faith can acquire ownership by paying the government their price at the time of their acquisition, whatever price may be fixed if they are untitled. Obviously, since majority of the farmers were unlettered, they had difficulty registering their land claims under the 1880 law.

14 Spaniards enjoyed many privileges. Aside from enjoying high offices, they were exempted from taxes and forced labor. They also had access to credit from charitable institutions, like the Obras pías. Furthermore, they were given free consumption of tobacco and free manufacture of rum. The incidents or uprisings mentioned by Sancianco were often provoked by disgruntled military men. In one instance, a Lieutenant of Infantry named Novales, a Creole from Mexico, rebelled in 1852 for having been bypassed by a peninsular Spaniard in the promotion. In 1854, Cuesta raised a similar uproar in San Isidro, Nueva Ecija because he was belittled and insulted in public by a Peninsular. The Cavite mutiny of Feb. 20, 1872 and student movement in Nov. 1870 were deeply imprinted in his mind when he wrote his book due to the subsequent persecutions of thousands of innocent people. The paranoid Spanish colonial regime went to the extent of censoring family letters to and from Filipino prisoners and exiles. For example, those imprisoned in Ceuta, a remote island in Southern Spain near north Africa, were banished on the mere suspicion of fomenting “subversive” plots. Punishments imposed by the authorities consisted of imprisonment, banishment to the remotest places like the Marianas, confiscation of property, torture and death. Punishments were meted out without fair trial and were based on the flimsiest evidence. Even false rumors and testimonies were admitted by the courts. O.D. Corpuz, op. cit., 1989.
HOW CPR COULD HAVE AVERTED THE VIETNAM WAR

Armando S. Malay, Jr. *

This time of year thirty years ago in the United States was a season of shock, anguish and humiliation for that nation. The portentous feeling that the most powerful military power on earth was losing the war against an underdeveloped peasant society in Southeast Asia could no longer be denied. This was the aftermath of the so-called Tet Offensive of late January to early February 1968, that lightning attack launched by some 67,000 communist troops in over a hundred towns and urban cities in South Vietnam, including Hue and Saigon. In the heavily secured capital, a Vietcong commando unit penetrated the US Embassy itself, as if to send the communists’ message that no place in South Vietnam, even the lion’s den, was safe from their strike forces. If Tet was meant to jolt Americans out of Washington’s reassuring rhetoric about “the light at the end of the tunnel,” it certainly worked. Public opinion in the States clamored overwhelmingly in favor of de-escalation or outright withdrawal; the US government gave in to domestic and international pressure and finally accepted to sit down and negotiate with the enemy. And not least, President Lyndon B. Johnson, one of the biggest victims of the Tet Offensive, was forced to renounce his bid for a second term. From then on until the final debacle of late April 1975, it was all downhill for the US. The cost of the war in terms of human lives was staggering: at least 55,000 American casualties, and over one million on the Vietnamese side. I will spare you with the familiar statistics on hundreds of thousands of orphans and cripples the war left behind, the millions of hectares in farmland rendered useless by napalm and land mines, etc. And since I have no personal knowledge of the matter, not being an American, I won’t dwell on the equally well-known theme of “the scars which Vietnam left on the American psyche”; but you know what I mean.

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The Americans’ trauma of 1968 is now largely forgotten, of course. US-Vietnamese diplomatic relations have since been normalized. But with the Vietnamese today ready and willing to start anew on a socio-political order based on free markets and pluralist politics, in short, with Vietnam crossing over to the very opposite of the ideological paradigm which the revolution was pursuing 30 years ago, the question that comes to mind is: could not the US have spared itself the trouble of this war? Was there no time enough to heed the misgivings of those well-intentioned critics of American policy who warned about the impending tragedy in Vietnam?

This morning’s gathering is therefore an opportune time to reflect on the possibility that the costly and divisive Vietnam war could have been avoided, and, with hindsight, to appreciate the fact that one of the first “doves” to counsel US government authorities and public opinion against a misreading of the motives of the Vietnamese liberation movement was a Filipino, our very own Carlos Pena Romulo. As I will suggest in this study, CPR himself was overly inclined to give Ho Chi Minh the benefit of the doubt in matters of ideological commitment. I should add that Romulo’s thesis, viz. that Ho Chi Minh was a nationalist rather than a communist, was not that outlandish or eccentric, quite a number of other people, Vietnamese included, have said as much. But then, how does CPR’s reputation as a pro-American square with his audacity to argue with US officials and tell them they were wrong about Ho Chi Minh and for that matter even about Asia?

The desire to believe that Ho was non-communist, this honest mistake if we may call it that, had its origins in Romulo’s perceptions of the strong yearning, in pre-war Asia, for freedom and national sovereignty. As is well known, CPR’s Pulitzer Prize-winning series of analytical articles on the prevalent sentiments of colonized Asian societies quite accurately predicted that should Japan attack its neighbors, the ensuing war would itself intensify the struggle against Western colonialism. The journalist CPR sensed as much in the countries he visited on the eve of Pearl Harbor: China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma and Indochina. But he could not perceive communist sentiments as the dominant ideology in their liberation movements at the time. It was only after the war, he wrote, that “some of the nationalist movements in Asia began to be suffused with influence and to be described as communist-inspired. To be sure, these nationalist movements developed strong leftist strains, reflecting the universal trends.”1
“Leftist” did not necessarily mean communist, as left-of-center leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru or even Sukarno, whom Romulo counted as a close friend, were well aware. But even for the communists among the Vietnamese, CPR found non-hostile, nay conciliatory things to say. Where their struggle was concerned, Romulo argued that it was not so much because of “the intrinsic appeal of communism” but because the communists were identified with first the anti-Japanese, then with the anti-French movement, that “the leadership fell into communist hands.” Later, in his 1987 book *A Third World Soldier at the UN*, CPR would elaborate: “Ho Chi Minh was not a communist leader until ... US pressure made him one.” And furthermore, the so-called Free World was at fault: “The Vietnamese were getting to be communists because they were getting no support from those who were anti-communist. They were not fighting for communism, although they were sympathetic to the communists because the communists were supporting them.” Romulo later on criticized the Western countries for being tolerant with their own communists while being “extremely suspicious of communism in other regions, to the extent that any liberal or nationalist movements tended to be viewed as subversive to the democratic status quo.”

These unorthodox arguments are best understood in the context of the fluctuating US policy of the 1940s towards Vietnam. Before his death in 1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt had broached the idea of an international trusteeship program for Indochina, which would effectively take the colonies therein away from French control but (as a side effect) promote the idea of the US as the sponsor of freedom and national liberation in Vietnam and other countries still under the colonialist yoke. Quite naturally, Ho’s independence movement enthusiastically responded to Roosevelt’s project, to the point of seeking American support for his armed resistance against both the Japanese invaders and French colonialism. The problem however -- the problem for the US and CPR, but not for France -- was that Ho was also an active and deeply committed communist, not just a leftist; in fact he was one of the founders of the French Communist Party in 1920, and later worked as an operative of the Moscow-based Comintern in charge of Southeast Asia. Official French opposition to the Rooseveltian idea of trusteeship, therefore, made France seem both anti-independence and anti-communist, indeed more anti-communist than the US was at that time. But for as long as World War II lasted, the US was not averse to helping the Vietnamese communist forces (just as it was not averse to cooperating with Mao’s Red Army in China). This united-front concept would later be reprised by Romulo, this time
pitting Ho Chi Minh against, in Marxist-Leninist jargon, the "primary contradiction," i.e. the communist bloc.

In any event, Roosevelt's demise and the rapid evolution of the balance of forces in postwar Europe marked a shift in US policy towards Vietnam. The trusteeship project for Indochina was quietly shelved, with CPR finding himself fighting a rear-guard battle against the French and their opposition to decolonization for Vietnam. "I must confess," he told a hearing at the UN on 25 November 1946, "to some embarrassament in trying to hold to the great French nation the mirror of their own glorious history. I feel all the more so because my allusion to the principles of the French revolution may be received with a wry, cynical smile, as if I were talking of ancient and outmoded things." American support for Ho Chi Minh's independence movement was revised in favor of the "solution" formulated by the French government, i.e. recognition of the last Vietnamese emperor Bao Dai, as the nominal leader of the Vietnamese nation but a nation still under French control.

Bao Dai was the powerless, discredited "playboy" sovereign who represented the last anti-Communist leadership that could be found by the French. But in pushing for the Bao Dai solution, the French government knew that the post-Roosevelt dispensation in Washington could not and would not refuse to support France because henceforth the priority for US foreign policy, as articulated by the so-called "Six Wise Men" -- Dean Acheson, George Kennan, Robert Lovett, Averell Harriman, John McCloy and Charles Bohlen, all convinced Atlanticists -- was to rebuild Europe and reinforce the Western alliance. For Washington, trans-Atlantic solidarity now reigned as the paramount consideration, not the interests of a small Southeast Asian national liberation movement headed by a communist at that. In their official valorization of Europe, the Americans specifically needed French support for both NATO and the US program for the postwar reconstruction of Germany, and could ill afford to alienate France by siding with Ho Chi Minh. Besides, the French government was faced with its strong domestic communist opposition at that time; for the US to disown Paris on the Vietnam problem was to strengthen the hand of the French communists, and send the wrong signals to the rest of the Western world. Even the other major Western colonial power in Southeast Asia, Great Britain, was reluctant to encourage the Vietnamese, because of the undesirable effects which such an endorsement would have on its own independence-minded colonies in the region. In short, in the late 1940s
CPR -- the right man with the right message -- had fallen victim to wrong timing.

CPR's "reading" of Ho Chi Minh's intentions as being "simply" nationalist may have been influenced by certain reassuring gestures previously made by the Vietnamese communists. In an apparent move to downplay possible objections to a communist-led national liberation movement, the Indochinese Communist Party (forerunner of the Vietnamese Communist Party) announced its own formal dissolution in 1945. Although short-lived, the US connection certainly helped: America was a potential ally, even an ideological inspiration for Ho's movement. American military officers were present in the proclamation of the so-called Republic of Vietnam on 2 September 1945 in Hanoi. The formal declaration of independence of the new republic did not hide its American parentage: "All men are created equal; they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights; among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness," go the first lines of the Vietnamese document. (Only later does the declaration cite the French document Rights of Man and the Citizen, to wit: "All men are born free and with equal rights, and must always remain free and have equal rights.) Finally, the American example of promising eventual independence to their Filipino colonial wards was an encouragement to the Vietnamese resistance: asking for the US' moral support, Ho Chi Minh often told the American military intelligence officer in liaison with him how he wished that the Vietnamese had the same kind of relations with the Americans as the Filipinos had.  

For these reasons, Ho during the 1940s appeared to CPR and other sympathizers to fit the profile of the simple "patriot." His international image was that of a leader more democrat than Bolshevik, more nationalist in the moderate Nehru-U Nu-Sihanouk mold than a radical Mao Ze-dong or Kim II Sung. In CPR's judgment Ho was preferable to the French protege Bao Dai, who represented nothing of nationalist value. Writing in 1950 to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Romulo contended that the US was wrong in backing Bao Dai, and that American perceptions gave the Vietnamese communists, and the communists alone, the "enormous advantage of being projected as "anti-imperialist" before the Vietnamese masses. Romulo further told Acheson that Ho struck him as "a man who could make all sorts of trouble for Stalin," and as someone who "may not allow himself to be a tool of the Kremlin." Adverting to the increasingly anti-Stalin tendencies of the Yugoslav leader Marshal Tito, CPR asked Acheson: "Suppose now that Vietnamese communism should
assume the shape of Titoism, would the United States still prefer Bao Dai to a Titoist Ho Chi Minh?" This hint of a lesser evil, this appeal to nuanced realpolitik might have swayed Acheson's mind at an earlier time, before the collapse of Chiang Kai Shek's regime, the Chinese communists' victory and the outbreak of the Korean War. But the "wise Man" at the helm of the State Department was apparently not interested in a debate, he did not even bother to acknowledge receipt of CPR's letter (which appended the 1949 New York Times Magazine article explaining Ho's nationalist appeal).  

A fair extrapolation of CPR's thinking would yield this premise: that the Philippines, in the early 1950s and even through the Cold War, would willingly enter into friendly relations with a communist Vietnam, its Southeast Asian neighbor, as long as it were not a Soviet puppet. In other words, if Vietnam were a "nationalist communist state", as China would not take that long to become vis-a-vis the USSR a propos, it is interesting to note that for Romulo, the Chinese revolution bore the stamp of a nationalism that was necessarily anti-Soviet: "China itself is too vast and populous a land, too massive and unwieldy, too heavily overgrown with the traditions of individualism and tolerance to be recast on the iron mold of a doctrinaire ideology."[9] In the same vein, CPR envisioned a future China that would be rid of its acquired Marxist-Leninist praxis and reconciled to its pre-communist habitus.

There will be a time -- a long time it is almost certain -- of internal reorganization and adjustment, of agrarian reforms in government, but the basic characteristics of the Chinese people will reshape instead of being reshaped by the mold of the imported systems.  

In hindsight, some 50 years later, CPR's prediction seems to have come true in China. Indeed, nationalism as a moving force has been known to confound received ideas about "proletarian internationalism". It would precisely be Chinese nationalism, chafing under Soviet-Russian hegemony in the 1960s, which wittingly or unwittingly forced Vietnam's hand and drove the Vietnamese ruling party closer to the Soviet Union than it would have wished, thus making it lose whatever character of autonomy and equidistance -- that is, in relation to China on the one hand and the USSR on the other -- that it used to have.
Consider the effects, on little Vietnam, of the tug-of-war which pitted the two giants of the communist camp. The Sino-Soviet conflict was a struggle for leadership of the communist world, a protracted duel which put Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese communist leaders in a delicate position of having to maintain ties of ideological solidarity -- while appearing non-partisan -- with two feuding allies and sources of moral and material support at the same time that Vietnam was fighting the world's No.1 military superpower. Of the two communist allies, the Soviet Union had an advantage of representing the first Marxist-Leninist state; it was Lenin's homeland; and Ho Chi Minh had always stood by the Kremlin as a matter of principle. But could Vietnam afford to make a clean break with China, the other ally, while it was fighting France, and later the US? Ho Chi Minh's famous testament (1969) eloquently expressed the Vietnamese dilemma: "I have dedicated my life to serving the revolution, so the greater my pride in seeing the growth of the international communist and workers' movement, the more I suffer from the dissensions which divide brother-countries."

The geopolitical factor, I think, clinched the odds in favor of the Soviet Union starting in the mid-1970s. On the one hand China, the one-time suzerain of Vietnam and thus a reminder of Vietnam's first proto-nationalist impulse, gigantic China was Vietnam's immediate neighbor to the north, a permanent presence whose shared ideology with Vietnam did not exactly inspire confidence in Ho Chi Minh's mind, it seems. On the other hand there was the equally huge Soviet Union, but a very safe distance away, and in a position to exert pressure on Vietnam. As a final factor in making Vietnam decide in favor of the Soviet Union, there was the Chinese policy of support for the Khmer Rouges, Vietnam's erstwhile allies who became its detractors and enemies soon after the victory of the Vietnamese communists. After the glorious days of anti-colonial nationalism, it was now the turn of the downside of the post-colonial order, where old resentments against troublesome neighbors easily answered to the name of nationalism. All in all, Asian nationalism proved to be stronger than Marxist ideology; and it seems from the evidence that Marxist-Leninists, whatever be their factional tendency, have failed to provide a universally acceptable, lasting solution to the problem of xenophobia and other manifestations of ethnic exclusivism.

To resume the Asian mood of the early 1950s: Cold War reflexes now dominated the main actors' behavior. Americans were asking themselves: "Who lost China?", perhaps forgetting that some of their so-
called China hands had once described the communists as innocuous "agrarian reformers". For his part, Ho Chi Minh no longer entertained any illusions about Washington's intentions. His government henceforth identified the US, poised to succeed France as the nemesis of Vietnamese communism, as the main enemy, while downgrading France to a "secondary contradiction". Ho Chi Minh was a genuine communist, after all: the recognition given to his regime first by the newly proclaimed Chinese people's republic, then by the USSR and other Soviet-bloc states, confirmed it. On top of it all, the Korean war broke out and further deepened the "communist-vs.-capitalist" divide. In the Third World context of the Cold War, nationalism played second fiddle to communism as a defining issue; and even nationalism became suspect in so far as it was felt to harbor anti-American sentiments. Ideological nuances and shadings of gray gave way to the black-and-white manichaeism practiced by John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State who abhorred even the idea of neutralism. The 1950s were also an ideological high tide for Senator Joseph McCarthy, in whose judgment any left-of-center American could only be a "commie". In Indochina, the US inexorably slid into the role vacated by France: the role, decried by CPR, of the White colonialist. In the anti-communist frame of mind of Washington D.C., a military solution in Vietnam became the inevitable response, the only possible manner in which to engage the enemy. The agonizingly slow and seemingly mindless sinking of the leader of the Western world into the quagmire of Indochina's swamps and jungles would soon ensue.

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CPR's gallant but ill-fated defense of Ho Chi Minh evokes a number of personal observations which, I would like to stress, have been influenced by the particular configuration taken by the outcome of the Vietnam war. The denouement of the Soviet empire's crisis in the late 1980s and the ensuing general critique of the Marxist-Leninist paradigm of development also contributed to crystallizing much of the following arguments.

1. A two-stage nationalism characterized the ideological behavior of Ho Chi Minh, and for that matter the behavior of any Communist leader of a national liberation movement of the 1940s-1960s in Asia. In the case of Vietnam, appeals to patriotic sentiments were useful, nay indispensable during the periods when the enemy was clearly a foreign invader, French,
then Japanese, and for a brief period (Kuomintang) Chinese, then French again, and lastly American. In this sense Marx was wrong: contrary to what he proclaimed, nationalism, in Vietnam during the so-called First and Second Indochina wars, was compatible with socialism and even the concept of internationalism. The objective of uniting the alien enemy/enemies was easier to realize using nationalist symbols and discourse, rather than the arcane theories of Marxism which only a miniscule fraction of the population could understand. But when the successive waves of alien invaders were finally defeated and the struggle moved on to the second stage, the (allegedly higher) plane of socialist construction, from 1975 on, nationalism gave way to the imperatives of communist ideology. Development, in communist terms, meant bypassing and/or outrightly suppressing the capitalist phase of socio-economic and political growth. At this point the Vietnamese cause seemed to falter, for not only was Marxism a doctrine of largely European intellectual origin, but even in its “Asianized” version the Marxist developmental blueprint could only aggravate the problem of agrarian backwardness, considering that reunified communist Vietnam had a dysfunctional economy -- due in part to the war -- and relatively underdeveloped political institutions to begin with.

2. The orthodox Marxist rejection of nationalism is indeed well-founded insofar as the class-based approach of Marxism to sociopolitical and economic problems refuses, ultimately or in the final analysis, to be accommodated with the sentimental, emotional and generally unproblematized appeals to ethno-linguistic-religious community and solidarity which are the staple of nationalist discourse. The basic incompatibility of the two isms has been amply illustrated in the decline and eventual collapse of the ex-Soviet Union, ex-Yugoslavia, ex-Czechoslovakia and other multi-ethnic or multi-national states founded on Marxist-Leninist principles in the 20th century. Between the two Indochinese states of reunified communist Vietnam and the so-called Democratic Kampuchea, in the late 1970s the same pattern emerged of two ostensibly allied forces sharing a common ideology -- or at least the premises of the same ideology -- which ended up fighting each other, and not just in a verbal mode. I have already referred to the ironic situation of Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorating to the extent of finally pushing Vietnam into the arms of the Soviet camp, a situation which was quite far from CPR’s reading of Ho Chi Minh as “a man who could make all sorts of trouble” for the Soviet giant. This leads me to the last point.
3. For some reasons, several ironies, certainly unintended ones, surround the sequels of the Vietnam drama. And these ironies only reinforce the gravity of the question: why was this absurd war fought at all?

* One of Washington DC’s “best and brightest” policymakers, Robert McNamara, would make a belated admission (in his book In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, 1995) that the US government had misjudged the power of Vietnamese nationalism -- thus vindicating CPR’s long-held conviction. But McNamara also voiced the surprising complaint that while the US had no dearth of advisers for policy towards the Soviet Union in the person of experts such as George Kennan and Charles Bohlen, there was none where advising on Southeast Asian affairs was concerned. What about Romulo then? Or later, William Fulbright or Edwin Reischauer, whose views on Vietnamese nationalism were identical to CPR’s?

* An ironic twist to the Vietnam drama was played out here in the Philippines after the Geneva agreement. I refer to Sen. Claro Mayo Recto’s energetic refusal, in 1955, to grant what he termed “premature” Philippine recognition to the government of Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam. According to Recto, the South Vietnamese people were fed up with the unpopular, autocratic Ngo Dinh Diem, and in their “despair” were “turning to the communists.” 11 The tone is reminiscent of CPR’s concern, expressed a decade earlier, about Bao Dai’s ineptitude and the Vietnamese communists’ growing strength. But for those with a sardonic sense of history, the point is that throughout the 1950s Recto was Romulo’s protagonist on virtually every subject under the sun -- and here was Recto berating the US for allegedly pressuring the Magsaysay administration into recognizing the American-sponsored Ngo Dinh Diem regime, just as CPR, before, was remonstrating with the US, but for a rather different reason.

* Then there is the French case. As the Western world’s “burden” of fighting communism in Vietnam shifted from France to the US, French foreign policy took a less hostile stance towards Communist regimes in Asia -- recall Paris’ recognition of China in 1964, and French withdrawal first from its military engagements under SEATO, then from the political aspect altogether -- so that by the time the US was attempting to extricate itself from the Indochinese mess and failing, France was already enjoying friendly and historically “privileged” relations with the North Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian regimes, and President Charles de Gaulle was
coolly advising the US to envisage neutralism for Indochina, a solution which the US for all sorts of reasons could not -- or could no longer -- consider. I would add that in another ironic turn of the wheel of history, it was nationalism after all, the French version of nationalism in any case, which made possible the detachment, by a Western nation-state, from the US' "official line" of anti-communism. Wasn't Romulo a critic of this anti-communist line himself, in the late 1940s? (I understand however that CPR was later decorated with the French Legion d'Honneur: apparently there were no hard feelings on either side.)

* One final irony remains to be pointed out, or rather retold through CPR's pen. As we know, the US failed to vanquish the enemy in Vietnam, but in the light of events unfolding since 1975, can one call the outcome a real victory, a lasting and definite victory, since the so-called victors have started adjusting their economic system and perhaps later will liberalize their political system as well -- to more closely parallel those of their capitalist neighbors? Whatever be the verdict of future historians, it is intriguing to read in Romulo's memoirs that as far as he was concerned (or so he told the Vietnamese Foreign Minister) the Vietnamese did not much defeat the Americans as that "the Americans defeated themselves": the Americans, he felt, were a divided people when they fought Ho Chi Minh's people. To second-guess CPR one last time: If the Vietnamese were the opposite of the divided Americans, it was because they were united under nationalism's banner. Now, Romulo's advice about Ho Chi Minh certainly did not lead the Americans to defeat themselves; but it contained a kernel of truth which, if it were only heeded, could have -- just might have -- deflected the course of history in Vietnam.
Endnotes


2 Ibid.


4 Ibid., p. 107


8 The text of CPR’s letter to Dean Acheson is reproduced in A Third World Soldier, op.cit., pp. 107-112. A copy of the same may be found in the Romulo Papers collection at the UP Main Library archives, folder # 336, document #13733.


9 “The Crucial Battle for Asia”, op. cit.

10 Ibid.


12 Carlos P. Romulo, A Watershed in Multinational Diplomacy, pp. 34-35.
DECEPTIVE NATIONALISM AND THE 1998 PHILIPPINE CENTENNIAL COMMEMORATION: A PHILIPPINE MUSLIM'S VIEW

Abraham P. Sakili *

In a country like the Philippines where people are not homogenous, the concept of nationalism and its associated notions of national interest and national consciousness can be misleading and deceptive. This view is supported by the fact that in this country, the so-called nationalist elite -- among them politicians and academicians -- have been marginalizing the national minorities and disenfranchising them of their rights to indigenous property and identity. Through the instruments of the mass media and books and reinforced by “sacred” symbols and imposed consciousness, these “nationalists” are responsible for alienating the minority groups from their very notion of nationhood, which has perpetuated their marginalization as a people.

Framed within a highly centralized and unitary structure of government, the elite notion of nationalism assumes the form of internal colonialism which has been eroding the life supports of the nationalist minorities and the trust of these people in the central authority. In such unitary set-up, these minority groups are stagnated in their disadvantaged conditions making them vulnerable to all forms of exploitation and elite manipulation. A classical case has been experienced by the Muslims as citizens of this Republic. In a particular case of Philippine history, the Muslims in the Philippines have been victims of Philippine historical manipulation.

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Muslim Side of Philippine History

The Muslims as citizens of the Philippine Republic, have been demanding that their right to Philippine history be given justice. Their right to an honored place in Philippine history has been denied by the so-called Filipino nationalist historians, such as Teodoro Agoncillo, who, according to Azurin, "is oversimplifying the history of the Philippine revolution by associating it only with Bonifacio, Rizal, Aguinaldo, and their associates in the Propaganda Movement and the Katipunan."¹ This kind of chauvinism had disenfranchised the Philippine Muslims of their glorious and heroic participation in the struggle for Philippine national liberation, for which the "nationalist" scholars are guilty of intellectual bias and selective scholarship which ran counter to the facts of true Philippine history. The Muslims as citizens of the Philippine Republic deserve an honored place in that history. Such important role should be given recognition, not only in history books, but also in national symbols, such as the Philippine flag, where Agoncillo, in particular, was the most stringent oppositionist to the clamor of the Philippine Muslims in the 1970's to add a ninth ray to the Philippine flag's sun to symbolize the long anti-colonial struggle of the Muslim communities. Azurin, in his article, reveals that Agoncillo debased such clamor as ludicrously unhistorical.²

Two Faces of Philippine Revolution

Cesar Adib Majul, a highly-respected scholar on Philippine Muslim affairs, argues, on behalf of the Muslim citizens, that "if the Philippine revolution is to be considered not just a movement of some Christian natives against Spanish colonialism, but of the Filipino people, then there is no reason why the more than three centuries of Muslim struggle against Spain and America cannot be considered as a significant part of the Filipino struggle for freedom."³ Surely the Muslim struggle was not a mere case of revolt, as being belittled in Philippine history books. It was a patriotic struggle of the duration, scale, and magnitude, which may even surpass that of northern Philippine revolution -- albeit struggling for the same goal of national liberation.

Philippine national historians should not blur the fact that in the Philippines there were parallel struggles of racially and ethnically related peoples -- the Muslims and the Christians, with the former defending hard to maintain their in dependence as the latter were struggling to
regain their independence that was lost to the colonizers. Both peoples helped to bring about the present situation where they find themselves trying to integrate into the nation of Filipinos.\textsuperscript{4}

\textbf{Questionnable Philippine Independence Day}

In the light of this clarification and in consideration of the foregoing historical arguments, the present Ramos administration, through its Centennial Commemoration committee, must reassess its position on the date June 12 as Philippine Independence Day. The June 12 Independence Day declaration was a product of Aguinaldo’s military dictatorship “which was bloated by the dictator’s \textit{kabayan} as historically valid and nationally representative.” Actually, the June 12 Aguinaldo’s declaration lacked civil participation and people’s endorsement. In the words of former President Macapagal: “Aguinaldo’s 1898 declaration was made in his capacity as agent of \textit{[U.S. admiral]} Dewey who brought him back from Hongkong, armed him and told him to resume his fight with the Spaniards.”\textsuperscript{5}

Macapagal Proclamation No. 28 declared in 1962 the transfer of Philippine Independence Day from July 4 to June 12. Hurt by the US Congress rejection of the bill on Filipino Veterans claims, and probably aroused by some sense of nationalism, Macapagal branded July 4 as “tantamount to the celebration of the Philippine subordination to and dependence on the United States ... [and] recollects more the peaceful independence mission to the United States and not to the heroic and successful revolution against Spain.”\textsuperscript{6} Macapagal deserves sympathy for these comments. However, his choice of June 12 as the alternative date of Philippine Independence, does not do justice to historical events. This can be gleaned from the following text of Macapagal Proclamation No. 28, which has no historical basis:\textsuperscript{7}

\begin{quote}
“Whereas the establishment of the \textit{Philippine Republic} by the \textit{Revolutionary Government} under Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo on June 12, 1898, marked our people’s declaration and exercise of their right to self-determination, liberty and independence” (Underscoring mine).
\end{quote}

The “Philippine Republic” nor “the Revolutionary Government” referred to by Macapagal was not yet existing on June 12, 1898. The so-
called “First Philippine Republic” was claimed to have been established on June 23, 1899 and the Revolutionary Government was organized after the June 12 declaration. Besides, the June 12 declaration did not carry the blessings of the Filipino people’s representatives. There was no congress to mention for even the Malolos Congress was established only three months after on September 15, 1898 at Barasoain Church in Malolos, Bulacan. June 12 proclamation was an Aguinaldo-dictated independence day. Even Apolinario Mabini seriously expressed the opinion that June 12 independence declaration was the exclusive handiwork of the military without people’s endorsement on popular criteria. Macapagal’s “people’s declaration” is a gross misinterpretation of that fact of Philippine history.  

**Muslim View of Philippine Independence Day**

To the Muslim citizens in the country, the June 12 independence declaration is the act of Aguinaldo alone as “Commander-in-Chief” of his military which cannot be Philippine or national in scope, involving all the inhabitants of the Philippines. June 12, 1898 did not include the Muslims who were then still independent, albeit trying hard to maintain it. In fact, Aguinaldo’s message to the Malolos Congress on January 1, 1899, “proposed that his government be empowered “to negotiate” with the Moros (Muslims) of Jolo and Mindanao for the purpose of establishing national solidarity upon the basis of a real federation with absolute respect for their beliefs and traditions.” (Underscoring mine) This message of Aguinaldo manifests the recognition of an independent government of the Sultanate of Sulu and Mindanao and the independence maintained by the Muslims at large, otherwise, he could not have proposed “a real federation” and “a national solidarity”  

What should therefore be the appropriate Philippine Independence Day? “Without personal feeling to determine history,” Ambassador Pacis proposed July 4 as the independence of all inhabitants of the Philippines. He argues that “as there was no united national aspiration and no common independence goal among the Philippine inhabitants prior to American colonization, the cause became common only when the whole Philippine archipelago was subjected to American colonialism and the struggle of the Filipino peoples became common which was to regain their lost independence.”  

Ambassador Pacis was right in calling attention to the fact that Gen. Aguinaldo’s independence declaration has no connection with the Philippine Independence obtained in 1946. June 12
which precedes American colonization has no meaning as far as freedom
from American colonialism is concerned. If an argument, like that of
Macapagal, is raised to the effect that “a nation is born into freedom on the
day when such people moulded into a nation by a process of cultural
evolution and sense of oneness born of struggle and suffering, announces
to the world that it asserts its natural rights to liberty and is ready to
defend it with blood, life, and honor,” then certainly, that day was not
June 12, 1898. Way back in the past, this had been the cry of Rajah
Sulaiman, of Sultan Kudarat and of several other Philippine Muslim
revolutionaries, whose vision of a nation greatly surpassed the Aguinaldo
notion of Philippine nation. The best expression of this vision was the
extent of jurisdiction of the Sultanate of Sulu which was symbolized in its
flag composed of a crescent moon with five stars set against a green
background. The five stars represented the areas of Sulu Sultanate
territories which include: 1) Kalimantan, Indonesia with Balikpapan and
Batarakan as the seat of power; 2) Sabah with Sandakan and Marudu as
the seat of power; 3) Palawan, as overseer of Visayas and Luzon; 4)
Basilan, as overseer of Mindanao, and 5) Sulu, as the overall central
government. The statutes of the Sulu Sultanate as a sovereign and
independent state were recognized by the Spanish Crown, its chief colonial
adversary, as well as by the British, the French, the Dutch and the
American governments in most of their treaty relations with the Sulus.
Commenting on the Peace Treaty of 1737 between Spain and Sulu, a
Jesuit scholar named H. de la Costa made the following comment:

“... it is important to note in view of later developments that
it was a treaty, strictly so-called, that is one between two
sovereign and independent states, each recognized as such
by the other.”

A noted Philippine Muslim historian, Najeeb Saleeby, pointed out
that the power of the Sulus all over Luzon and the Visayan islands, the
Celebes Sea, Palawan, North Borneo and China Sea, and their trade
extended from China and Japan at one extreme to Malacca, Sumatra, and
Java at the other.

Historical facts show that the Muslims maintained their own system
of government separate and independent from the Christianized Filipinos,
who lost their independence to the Spanish colonizers. In the process of
the Filipino Christians struggle to regain their independence, the Muslims
had no participation as they were busy struggling to maintain their
independence which the Spaniards tried to wrest from them but failed to exercise control. This is why the Muslims did not have participation in the Propaganda Movement, the Katipunan, the Aguinaldo’s dictatorial government and the declaration of the Philippine independence on June 12, 1898.

**Conclusion: In Search for a More Meaningful Philippine Independence Day**

In our time, the concept of one national community should not be based on one side, however socially powerful and numerous they are. The revolution of 1896 and the consequent declaration of independence on June 12, 1898, could not be truly considered Philippine revolution and Philippine independence declaration. At most, it was a Tagalog rebellion or an armed uprising. Philippine historians, like Agoncillo, tend to credit Tagalogs, Pampango, and other northerners as the only nationally significant opposition to colonialism because they are the ones writing and interpreting Philippine history. Even then, they are not licensed to manipulate facts of history for which they are morally and intellectually bound to defend its integrity and accuracy. Commenting on Agoncillo’s scholarship, Glen May (1992) reveals that Agoncillo self-consciously juggled his data and analysis to suit his bias or his intention to write hagiography of his own fellow Cavitenos and kinsmen. That Agoncillo was the strongest opposition to the Muslim clamor for honorable place in Philippine history through symbols such as the Muslim clamor for the ninth ray of the sun in the Philippine flag as already mentioned, is a manifestation of this regional, if not religious bias.

In sum, since June 12 is a strange Philippine Independence Day -- which is historically incorrect, a one-man dictatorial proclamation without popular or Congressional consent and limited in scope, there is a need to change this Philippine independence day and to forego the 1998 Centennial Commemoration. For the Philippine Muslims, the Centennial celebration has no meaning. Whatever amount of money being appropriated for the celebration should better be channeled to the indigenous communities where such resource is very much needed. Filipinos, especially national minorities do not want to be fed with symbols which suffer from lack of integrity and national representation.
July 4 is not also an appropriate national independence day for valid subjective reasons. Macapagal was right in declaring that “July 4 perpetuates unpleasant memories of subordination and dependency to American colonialism.” In addition, even after July 4, 1946, the Filipinos have been suffering under the pseudo state of so-called freedom and independence which was an euphemism for neo-colonialism.

Since June 12 and July 4 do not symbolize true independence day for the Filipinos, what could be the appropriate Philippine independence day? That day should be historically correct, nationally representative, and FOUGHT FOR, NOT OFFERED.

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Endnotes


2Ibid.


6Ibid.


8Ibid., p. 117.


Bibliography


BHinneka Tunggal Eka: The Development of a National Language in the Philippines

Juan R. Francisco *

Introduction

It is proper that the title of the essay be first explained. Many, perhaps, do not know the meaning of Bhinneka Tunggal Eka. In the Indonesian national experience, it became the main focus of the government in forging unity among its many ethnic societies in developing national consciousness. In developing national consciousness, the general culture was the central focus. The diversities among the various groups were recognized as important components of the national identity, with each never losing its individual ethnic character.

There are many elements of culture that can be identified to illustrate the ideals embodied in the linguistic construct. However, I would like to focus on language which is considered the most sensitive among all cultural elements essential in the understanding of a given society. Like Indonesia and Malaysia, the Philippines has to contend with various ethnic societies speaking a variety of languages -- intelligible or quasi-intelligible or not intelligible to each other. Hence, the need for developing a common medium of communication on a national level. The success of Indonesia and Malaysia in finally solving the problem of multi-linguality in their societies must be taken as models for the many societies that are embroiled in the throes of contending linguistic identities in developing a common medium of communication at the national level. Thus, the Philippines looks at the construct which, at this point in time, is considered a model concept for national unity.¹

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Historical Background

In discussing this concept in the Philippine context, I would like to present the history of the development of the national language.

As early as 1981, four periods have been recognized in this development (Constantino 1981:28-39), namely: (a) 1900-1935, the period that was characterized by the struggle between Tagalog and English, (b) 1936-1945, the triumph of the Balantina ng Wikang Tagalog; (c) 1946-1970, the battle between the Tagalogs and the non-Tagalogs; and (d) 1971 onwards, characterized by the conflict between Filipino and Pilipino. I would add a fifth period: (e) 1981 to the present. This falls within the context of the bilingual policy, characterized by later developments that are significant in the pursuit of a more stable national language.

Each period will be elaborated on in order to give a much better view of the discussions that will follow. I will use the descriptions by Constantino which, to me, seem more precise:

(a) 1900-1935. There was only one linguist in the country at that time, i.e., Cecilio Lopez, who trained in Germany. With him were non-linguists, identified as Tagalistas (Hispanized form of Tagalog speakers), namely Sofronio Calderon and Lope K. Santos, who organized groups composed mostly of Tagalog writers to support Tagalog as the national language of the Philippines.

... These people were afraid that English was going to be the national language because that was the desire of the Americans. The Americans actually had two objectives with regard to English in the Philippines: they wanted to make it only the medium of instruction and the lingua franca all over the islands.  

This group was very much concerned about the "denationalization of the Filipinos." Each member of the group wrote books, grammars, essays in Tagalog and worked extremely hard to make Tagalog the national language of the Philippines.

As a counter-balance to the Tagalistas, there was a group lead by Santiago Fonacier and Norberto Romualdez, both non-Tagalog speakers,
who supported the view that the Philippine national language must be based on the many Philippine languages. "They wanted a fusion of major Philippine languages and ... out of this fusion would develop a language which they wanted to be the national language."4

The most important national event during this period was the Constitutional Convention in 1935 which adopted the provision that "the national language should be based on one of the existing languages of the Philippines ... everyone knew that that one language was to be Tagalog because it had been said that for one thing that was the desire of [Manuel Luis] Quezon,"5 who was then the President of the Philippine Commonwealth. Thus, the Constitutional Convention marked the "death" of the pan-Philippine resource for the development of the national language; but which, of course, was to be resuscitated in the coming years.

(b) 1936-1945. The period was marked by the writing of grammar books elucidating that the national language was based on Tagalog. Giving support to this contention were two developments: the Constitution mandated that Tagalog became the foundation for the development of the national language; the Japanese rule in the Philippines during the Pacific War favored Tagalog as the national language6 of the Philippines. During this period, the Balarila ng Wikang Pambansa by Lope K. Santos became the guide book for the teaching of the national language, with Tagalog as its unopposed basis. Given these two crucial events, Tagalog thrived high in the minds of the Filipino people, but not without the resentment of others who did not speak Tagalog as their mother tongue.

(c) 1946-1970. Marked by the very intense battle between the Tagalogs and the non-Tagalogs. The controversy centered around the activities of the Institute of National Language. In the perception of the non-Tagalogs, the Institute was all for Tagalog to become the national language. Of course, this perception could not be otherwise. The directors of the Institute were all Tagalog speakers, and the proponents of this view were Lope K. Santos, Cecilio Lopez, Jose Villa Panganiban and Ponciano B.P. Pineda. Tagalog, however, has now taken the name Pilipino.

On the opposite camp were Inocencio Ferrer and Gerunco Lacuesta. Each had his own organization which was very actively involved in the serious criticism of the Institute of National Language. The Institute was also supported by equally strong organizations to propagate Pilipino
which was not viewed however as pan-Philippine in orientation, but as Tagalog masquerading as Filipino.

(d) 1971-1986. This period, characterized by a major event in the history of the Philippines, provided very significant implications on the development of the national language. This event was the Declaration of Martial Rule in 1972 and which lasted until 1986. The period also saw the promulgation of another Constitution where Filipino was recognized as the National Language. Organizations like the Linguistic Society of the Philippines, the Philippine Association for Language Teaching and Samahan ng Lingguistikang Filipino declared their support for Filipino.

It was during this period that the confrontation between Filipino and Filipino was fiercest. It was also during this period that the purists were in direct conflict with the non-purists. The purists were supporters of Filipino, which was Tagalog-based grammatically as well as lexically, with the coining of words as an adjunct of the process. The non-purists were for Filipino, a pan-Philippine language resource with very limited utilization of non-Philippine sources where the ideas or concepts expressed may not be found in the Philippine languages, given the centuries-old Philippine exposure to languages belonging to other families of languages.

(e) 1987-1993. The fall of the Marcos dictatorship brought about another Constitution calling for the promulgation of a language policy that would finally resolve this very sensitive, if not socio-culturally, divisive issue. In 1991, the Congress of the Philippines enacted Republic Act No. 7104, creating the Commission on the Filipino Language. This Republic Act mandated the development and investment of Filipino as the national language. The discussions on the language issue in both the Constitutional Commission and in Congress as well as outside the session halls of these two bodies were highly charged, for every one involved had an interest to protect -- his own intellectual patrimony, his language.

Some General Comments on the History of Language Development in the Philippines

Ninety-two years ago, when the notion of a unifying national language began to stir the psyche of the Filipino, it was never thought that such a notion would remain high in the cultural priorities of the people. However, the languages of the colonial powers that dominated the
Archipelago, i.e., Spanish and English, on the administrative, as well as on the religious missions level, had a very deep impact upon the intellectual development and perspectives of the Filipinos. Although on a more basic level their local languages performed the role of unifying their ideals and notions of their being. Inevitably, therefore, despite the dominance of these foreign languages (belonging to another family of languages), the innermost core of their psyche expressed in their natural media of communications had surfaced with great strength of spirit and character. Hence, as we have narrated in the five periods of Philippine national language development, the knowledge gained and understood in terms of the impact of this exercise on the general view of the Filipino people is even related to its journey into its current state.

The journey of Filipino, from the time it was conceived and nourished through the years in the minds of our people, has its parallel in the development of English from a “dialect spoken by great mass of people to being accepted as a language of the University, setting aside Greek and Latin to become primarily the media of the Church.” And in this context, the confrontation becomes equally significant in what Gerald T. Burns predicts ... while English still dominates the scene particularly on the University-level, eventually Filipino will become the medium through which “the sources of inspiration: intellectual, aesthetic, spiritual” will eventually prevail.

Indeed, though unrelated to what Burns had written about, there has already been some kind of a recognition of the issue of a common language being sought to be spoken in the Philippine setting:

... the Philippines [as] linguistically unique. It is one of the few countries in the world [where] bilinguals and trilinguals outnumber the mono-linguals. It has a great number of different languages in relation to its overall land area. Most of its literates become literate in a second language which is entirely unrelated in structure and type to their mother tongue. To top it all, here is a land which has not yet found a unifying linguistic force in the development of national consciousness inspite of the close relationship of all major tongues....

Note that these were pronouncements made thirty years ago. What was true then is still true today. As late as a decade ago, an attempt to
resolve the country's multilingual problem was made through an act of Congress (Batasang Pambansa) as mandated by the 1972 Constitution (Saligang Batas) making bilingualism the order of the day. Mandated, therefore, was the use of the English language and Filipino (which is naturally Tagalog in another dressing). This became the policy of government and implemented by the Department of Education and Culture in Executive Order No. 25, S. 1994 in the elementary and secondary levels of education and gradually would be used in the college/university levels. However, the policy did not prosper because of the recognized inequity that it inevitably spawned.

... the Bilingual Policy of Government is inequitous and discriminatory. It discriminates against all other Philippine languages, and gives undue advantage to Tagalog, which has been tagged as Filipino ... promotes injustice and disharmony.\textsuperscript{11}

The policy had its strongest opposition in the Cebuano-speaking areas, particularly represented by the Cebu province. This opposition was institutionalized in an ordinance promulgated by the Cebu Provincial Government prohibiting the use of Tagalog, i.e. Filipino, in all transactions having to do with government -- both local and national. All transactions of the Provincial Government were done through the medium of Cebuano.\textsuperscript{12}

It is yet too early to comment on, or perhaps pass judgement upon Republic Act No. 7104 (1991), mandating the creation of the Commission on the Filipino Language, and declaring that there shall be

... a policy of government to ensure and promote the evolution, development and further enrichment of Filipino as the national language of the Philippines, on the basis of existing Philippine and other languages ... (Section 2).

The Commission has already been organized and functioning, hopefully as expected. Whether or not it will be a major catalyst in the development of the National Language is yet to be seen. Yet, we have a situation where media, particularly the broadcast media, is enjoying some kind of a license in hispanizing every concept, every word that to them does not seem to have an equivalent in Filipino. As such, it is feared that the expected resulting Filipino would in the long-run be merely a creole or
a pidgin, that does not lead to becoming the "source(s) of intellectual, aesthetic and spiritual inspiration." It is not within the power of this writer to make prescriptions to this effect, but the Commission is expected to work with media to achieve a more literary Filipino -- very intellectual, very aesthetic and very spiritual -- in the transmission of information. In other words, the Language Commission should take the lead in the fulfillment of the "principles of equity, justice, fairness and harmony in terms of our continuing attempt to establish a stable society and culture" represented primarily in the language of the people -- the National Language, Filipino.

Language Planning in the Philippine Context

From all the available documents examined, there seems to have been no definitive planning for the development of a national language. There are those who say that there was planning made, but this does not necessarily correct the impression that there was, indeed, some amount of serious planning made.

The most credible among all these works -- documents, monographs, studies -- appear to have been those by Andrew B. Gonzales, FSC (1980/83). These monographs, which appeared in 1980-1983, dealt with the history of the developing national language -- from what he termed correctly, the First Republic: nationalism without a national linguistic symbol (1896-1898), the period of the Revolution against Colonial Spain and the founding of the Republic. This, however, was cut short by the dubious entry of the United States which took over the gains of the Revolution and the Republic.

The coming of the United States ushered in the American colonial period, characterized by the Commonwealth period (1901-1935) and up to the 1946 Post-War era. This period was interrupted by what has been called the Second Republic (October 14, 1943-August 17, 1945) which was actually the Japanese occupation that started in 1942. It was a brief period described by Gonzales (1980:60ff) as one in which "a linguistic symbol of unity" has been attained, and Tagalog became the "basis of the National Language".

By mid-1946, the Third Republic was inaugurated with the proclamation of Philippine Independence by the United States of America,
a period characterized by the "rise and fall of Tagalog-based Filipino", and also by the "search for a national language to be called Filipino ... based not on one but on all of the existing languages in the Philippines\textsuperscript{14} as mandated by the Constitution of the Martial Law Regime in 1973. If there is anything that could possibly give the Martial Law Regime some positive development, it may be said that the mandate to develop Filipino from the existing Philippine Languages is, indeed, the beginning of the move towards the direction of equity among all Philippine languages, where each will have a role in the development of a national language. I will say more about this when I present the paradigm for the language development.

Gonzales' monograph ending with an epilog entitled "Toward the Fourth Republic and Filipino" appears "prophetic" in the context of events that ushered in the 1986 People Power Revolution. To Gonzales, this was a period that resumes the search and strengthening of a linguistic symbol. He was very precise when he expressed this essence to

... look[s] towards the future, the renewed search for a common national language mandated once more, this time by the 1973 Constitution. It concludes with general and theoretical considerations concerning language development and returns to the basic theme of the book, the Filipinos' search for authenticity in a linguistic symbol of nationhood, taking a realistic picture of the prospects of success of such a search given the polyethnic situation of the Philippines and the language loyalties of ethnic groups and their regional ties.\textsuperscript{15}

At this juncture, I would like to advert to what he calls the "Inadequacy of Language-Planning Models"\textsuperscript{16} throughout the three periods during which the linguistic symbol of national identity/unity was the primary objective. Even with the Fourth Republic this process continued.

Gonzales was quite precise when he wrote that language planning of any type or model aimed at developing a national language is "difficult in a multilingual society where groups will not accept a language [that] is a rival to their own." With this premise he suggested the Swiss model which declares "all main languages official," so that no one language stands out exclusively over the others. Or to consider a Philippine model that is still emerging ... "that of creating a name for a code that is still in the process of formation." The "Code" referred to seems to be Filipino or Filipino.
Both models are rejected, i.e., “in the former Swiss model, there is no national language in reality although there is one in aspiration.”

Another is the neutral language model ... “wherein no major group is threatened, because it gives no edge to any other group.” The Indonesian model in Bahasa Indonesia is considered ... “a successful one, and an ideal one, in so far as the neutral language happened to be an indigenous rather than a foreign one.” A sub-model which seems quite acceptable, though “less successful,” and that possesses “high-prestige value ... available only to the elite and worse a non-indigenous language” is the case of English as seen in the Philippines, Singapore, India and Ireland, and Spanish in South America.

I agree with Gonzales particularly in pointing out the inadequacy of the language models because the situation in the Philippines does not duplicate the situations in the models described above. The Indian situation, on closer examination, may be considered similar to the Philippines, but much more complicated than one would recognize under any circumstance considering the nature of the language problem obtaining there.

In concluding this section, allow me to advert again to Gonzales’ very precise view of the inadequacy of the language planning activities in the Philippines:

... a country which has gone through all phases of language planning, repudiated this development, and began the process of deliberate planning for the future once more. What makes the Philippine case unique is that formation, not selection, is contemplated, a formation that envisages development in an undefined sense. Will it entail prior cultivation, in lexical elaboration, intellectualization? Once formation and development are completed, adoption by a formal process ... is planned. Then, presumably dissemination and propagation follow.17

Since he was writing during the period of Martial Law, he was refering to a plebiscite where a National Assembly vote could formalize the selection of the language, “especially a language that is meant to incorporate features of all the languages of the Philippines.” But, he also rejected the process through plebiscite, because it would certainly exclude
other languages. He further wrote: "the better alternative would be to plan not to plan and to let social factors, as yet fully unknown to us, take over. For some countries, benign neglect is a better alternative to deliberate and explicit language planning."\(^{18}\)

But, it seems to me, that was just the situation which would propel the language problem to a more systematic and deliberate search for its resolution as the Fourth Republic was ushered in by the 1986 bloodless revolution.

**The Proposed Paradigm**

The previous discussions showed us that there was, indeed, a very serious attempt to develop a national language symbolic of Philippine linguistic identity, when viewed primarily from the desire to achieve national unity. And we have shown in particular the enactment of RA No. 7104 (1991) and the creation of the Commission on the Filipino language. The Republic Act certainly fulfills the "prophecy" of Gonzales in his 1983 monograph. Its promulgation was accompanied by serious discussions inside and outside the halls of Congress.\(^{19}\) The Commission was organized in 1992.

The Paradigm/Framework herein presented illustrates the systematic development of the symbol of national language identity and unity. While it can be described generally, I would rather that we focus on the language, a cultural value that sits foremost in our perception as crucial to a society's existence, and survival as well.

This paradigm was devised more than a decade ago but it had undergone revisions for a better understanding of its message and meanings (See Bibliographic Notes). For a start, let me describe each of the blocks in the paradigm before I discuss their relationships (See Figure 1). Please take note also the direction of the arrows.

Perhaps the paradigm ... "could be the basis on which we can adequately understand the distinctions between ethnic [language] identity and national [language] identity."

The **National Unity** (NU) block constitutes the philosophical "godhead" which every society or culture aims to achieve. The **Ethnic**
Identity (EI) block forms the foundation of the concept of oneness on which the building blocks laid one over the other to effect the notion that we have just advanced. These building blocks are the *Mechanisms to Effect Balance and Equity, Fairness, Justice and Harmony* (MEB), and the *Transcending Distinctions* (TD). Each of these two blocks is crucial. While MEB constitutes the external interventions in a given society, such as the Government or NGO’s, TD is an internal mechanism that engenders the recognition of the existence of National Unity and Ethnic Identity. TD is effected through mechanisms which I call enculturation and socialization. A brief definition of each may be made here to give us an initial understanding of what I really intend to convey. *Enculturation* is the process by which one learns and internalizes the values, norms and

Figure 1. **Framework for Effecting National Unity Without Losing Ethnic Identity**

- **NATIONAL UNITY (NU)**
  - **TRANSCENDING DISTINCTIONS (TD)**
    - **CULTURAL VALUES**
      - language, rituals, belief systems, oral traditions, riddles, wisdom literature, etc. (CV)
    - **MECHANICS TO EFFECT BALANCE AND EQUITY, FAIRNESS, JUSTICE AND HARMONY (MEB)**
  - **ETHNIC IDENTITY (EI)**
lifeways of the society. It is sometimes used interchangeably with the term socialization. More references to these will be made in a full discussion of locus classicus.

The Cultural Values (CV) block forms the pool of all identifiable elements of culture -- language, rituals, belief systems, oral traditions, folklore, folktales, wisdom literature, etc., which, moreover, constitutes the commonalities that identify both NU and EI, as well as the characteristics distinctive only to the ethnic group that identifies them as such. CV provides the dynamics of the movement to and from all directions which return to it again to undergo revitalization, then again ramifying into the four other blocks with each receiving revivification in a continuous cycle.

If we are looking for a perfect example of synergism, the paradigm provides it. Individually, each of the boxes in the paradigm is useless in terms of our understanding of the notion within a given society. The synergism is shown by the arrows that connect each of the blocks in a single and/or two-way relationship. The arrows moving in clock-wise direction connect all the blocks in a continuous circle. The two-way arrows connecting all the five blocks provide the continuing relations between them. What do these arrows mean in the context of the synergistic relations we have just referred to? The answer to this question lies in what we had earlier referred to as the revitalization-cum-revivification of each block in the process of dynamic pulsation in a given social order, and in a continuing relation.

The Philippines as Locus Classicus

The geography of the Philippine archipelago finds close similarity with the locus classicus of the notion under investigation. It shows us a classic example of socio-cultural diversity. "More than seven thousand islands are no small evidence of the potential forces that make islanders insular in their perceptions, and consider the other islanders as causes of conflicts among them should these come in contact with each other." In this instance, geography does not serve as impediment to interchange but rather it is something that strengthens it. This notion brings to full understanding that insularity is no moment here, as the seas are no "barriers towards unity of the development of one single perception of similar phenomena." The seas had, somehow in the past as it has in the present,
been the main avenue, and they have played an important role in the continuing contacts between cultures. They were the highways through which cultural inter-changes occurred." The arrows that connect the blocks in the paradigm are the seas through which contacts among the islands (blocks) are effected with precise and synergistic efficiency.

In the practical application of the paradigm, the various elements of culture (CV), define the notion of national identity (i.e. unity) with Ethnic Identity (EI) as the underlying foundation of the former. One such cultural element we want to underscore is language. We believe it is easiest to verify because of its daily usage among speakers of various languages and/or dialects.

In an earlier paper I wrote sometime in 1980, I discussed the problems that impede the attainment of national unity. One of the problems is the ethno-linguistic problem.

The ethnic and linguistic identities of each of the groupings in the country has contributed to much of the division of the Filipinos according to these identities. This is recognized by languages spoken by each group, and the emphasis had been primarily on the level of differences rather than on the level of commonalities.

The intelligibility of Philippine languages would range from 35% to about 70% on a very conservative estimate. This would, therefore, belong to greater Austronesian (formerly called Malayo-Polynesian) family of languages. The range of the intelligibility of these languages within this great family is 25% to 65%. Historically, before the intrusion of the western world in Austronesian regions, when various colonial experiences occurred, the range of intelligibility would be higher.

With Filipino developing as the lingua filipina with Tagalog as its grammatical base, a common vocabulary must be developed from all the languages spoken in the Philippines. However, there would be no attempt to obliterate the various ethnic languages. Rather, they should be allowed to develop and continue creating their individual literatures. They should even be encouraged with
government support to publish their literatures in their own ethnic languages to make them speakers of not only the *lingua filipina*.

Perhaps, to engender greater consciousness for the other languages spoken by the various ethno-linguistic groups, the tri-language formula adopted by the Indian Government must be examined for what it is worth in the context of Philippine conditions. In brief, the formula is that every Filipino, on the basis of the Language Policy enunciated by Government, must learn English as a tool for higher education and international communications. He must also learn the National Language which is *Filipino*. The native Filipino speaker must learn any of the major Philippine languages, namely Iloko, Bikol, Sugbuhanon, Hiligaynon, Waray, Tausog, Maranaw, Magindanao. This will certainly satisfy the principle of equity, which creates a sense of unity in a highly volatile situation, where the only lasting possession of these peoples would be their cultural heritage expressed in most vivid terms, the living language.

If we recognize that commonalities do exist among various languages spoken in the Philippines, then a proactive effort on the part of the Government (MEB) has to be taken to in-put all these in the development of a National Language (NU), with TD operating on its own to smooth out some inherent difficulties that arise in the process. The distinctive traits will then fall into EI, recognizing them to constitute the basic elements of its language/linguistic identity. But to leave it alone to effect a unity through TD would take a long period of time as to negate all the expectations of national identity.

In the context of the quotation above, let us be more specific. Inevitably, when we speak of unity, the notions of fairness, equity and justice loom large in order to achieve for the country that “unity in the state of diversity.” The imposition of a language on the national level, which is seen as imperialistic or colonial in nature, will surely create problems. Hence, there is the need for a much more acceptable mechanism (MEB) by which acceptability manifests justice and equity.

We know that the Bilingual Policy of Government is inequitable and discriminatory. It discriminates against all other Philippine languages, and
gives undue advantage to Tagalog, which had been tagged as Filipino. It is a mechanism that promotes injustice and disharmony. It is, therefore, the argument of this essay that a much fairer and most equitous MEB must be taken. It is further argued that the tri-language formula be the solution to this problem. And to emphasize this proposed tri-language formula, let me advert back again to Gonzales who made a similar observation which I also underscored in 1980. I wrote then:

... short of a massive upheaval or radical change in the politics of the region, the Filipino will be multilingual, at least tri-lingual, using the vernacular as the language of the home, Tagalog-based Filipino as an unborn lingua franca, and English as the language of commerce, legislation, government and international relations, perhaps using Filipino and English as the languages of education, and paying lip service to the continuing formation of a common national language called Filipino.

I was then very explicit about the equity that each of the languages in the “triangles” enjoys, much more so with the local languages (not vernacular) developing on the same level as the national language, i.e., Filipino. This alternative formula I was proposing would bring legitimacy to every language spoken in the archipelago. Each language then could be a contributor to the formation of the national language symbol, thereby giving a meaningful essence of practical reality to the theoretical construct herein presented.

Concluding Remarks

I can only hope that this serious controversy over the language issue will be resolved following the principle of equity and what Filipinos expect the Commission on National Language will do as mandated by law. But it is certain that it will find resolution, inspite of the concomitant difficulties that such a crucial issue is heir to. It is also certain such a resolution can be effected if the construct Bhinneka Tunggal Eka could be the framework that shall guide the development of the national goal symbolized by a language that will provide the single identity of a nation-state, and with all elements identifiable within the broader perspectives represented in the ethnicity of each of the contributing languages.
The Philippines is unavoidably moving toward tri-linguality -- a local or regional language, a national language and an international language.²³ The third language, the international language, is already resolved for the English language which has somehow become the international language of communication by the Filipinos. While it is true that the English language has become part of the language environment in the Philippines, it may not necessarily figure in the national language issue in the context of the development of the national symbol of language identity. Rather, the local regional (ethnic) languages will play a crucial role in the full realization of national unity, as shown in the paradigm.

One word of caution must not, however, be overlooked in the whole process of development. In the process, it must be recognized that the society is dynamic and pulsating and, therefore, change occurs. Language is not an exception. "Changes in language involve changes in people." Because language is a cultural element, "changes in language take place in response to other aspects of culture change." What I am trying to point out here is that inspite of the seeming rigidity that is "prescribed" in the paradigm, some room must be given for the changes occuring in the whole process of the development of the national language.

Finally, the Philippines has its models in the Bahasa Indonesia and the Bahasa Melayu/Bahasa Malaysia experiences. The process may take a quarter of a century to achieve but, at least, it could be said that the principles of equity and equality, harmony and justice had been considered. In the end, the language -- by whatever name it shall be called (it could be Filipino) will certainly be the "source(s) of inspiration: intellectual, aesthetic, spiritual."²⁴ And, that could have, indeed,

... require[d] a very great collective act of work and of will, and not simply metaphysically, of love, to embrace Filipino as the heart of Philippine education. But the results, the fruits of that embrace may in the long run prove worthy whatever effort the act required.²⁵

This, we can at least say, that the whole process of developing our national symbol of language identity has not been achieved without the necessary sacrifice of the whole Philippine nation.
Postscript

Discussing the Indonesian construct as a model for language planning and language use will gain better appreciation by also discussing the Bahasa Malaysia model which on closer examination provides a more structured framework, if in an extended level. In discussing the case of English and Bahasa Malaysia, Asmah Haji Omar utilized the concept of nationalism and nationism in language planning and language use, as earlier examined by Joshua Fishman (1968). She wrote ...

... He defines nationalism as a ‘process of transformation from fragment and tradition-bound ethnicity to unifying and ideologized nationality!’ ... the tie between language and nationalism represents a more ideologized historical interaction (in terms of mass ideology) since nationalism so commonly elaborates upon language as one of its markers of symbolic unity and identity!

... nationism is a process ‘where the political boundaries are most salient and most efforts are directed towards maintaining and strengthening them, regardless of the immediate socio-cultural character of the populations they embrace.’ ... in nationalism the development of self-identity and group-identity is through a common language, in nationism it is the question of efficiency or group cohesion that is important.

Asmah Haji Omar argues that these concepts were the bases for the development of Bahasa Malaysia as the language of national unity and identity, and the English language was and is “essential in Malaysia’s rise to become a developing and industrial nation and to take its place in internationalism.” (emphasis mine).

Concluding her exposition, she comes up with what she calls “The Tripartite Ideology” (Figure 2) consisting of Nationalism, Nationism, and Internationalism, with Nationalism as the core, viz.:
Figure 2. **The Tripartite Ideology**

Each of these is not exclusive of the other; each supports the other. Nationalism is strengthened by the two. In other words, the synergy that is effected in the process of interrelationship is fully achieved, thus strengthening the bonds of unity and identity in the Malaysian society.

What were earlier discussed in this paper are reflective of the Tripartite Ideology, i.e., nationalism. Nationism, on the other hand, is expressed in the recognition of the ethnic boundaries in terms of the cultural values that define the identities which also include national identity. The reference to English as the language of international communications defines the third item in the Ideology. While Malaysia has already reached full realization at the ideological level in its language development, the Philippines is moving towards it at a pace which hopefully will parallel Malaysia’s achievement.

In the report I made regarding my participation in the Symposium for which the paper was earlier written, I wrote in the evaluation which stated, in part:

... the development of the National Language, i.e., Filipino, MUST consider, with greater effort, the infusion of its lexical terminologies from the Philippine languages that are identifiable with those in Bahasa Indonesia/Bahasa Malaysia/ Bahasa Melayu. In other words, the broader commonalities between and among Bahasa Indonesia/ Bahasa Malaysia/ Bahasa Melayu and the developing Philippine National Language MUST be the MOST important consideration. The tendency to hispanize the
National Language MUST be last in our priorities in the lexicographic development of our language, the NATIONAL SYMBOL OF OUR IDENTITY. In the longer term, our Asian identity will be strengthened because our roots will be expressed in terms of our language symbol.

The above statement was not written in a vacuum, rather it was triggered by a paper presented in the Symposium, entitled Perbedaan Di Antara Bahasa Indonesia Dan Bahasa Melayu Dalam Lingkungan Dunia (The Difference Between Bahasa Indonesia and Bahasa Melayu in the World Context) by Laurent Metzger. While recognizing the differences between Bahasa Indonesia and Bahasa Melayu (spoken and written form, lexicon, syntax, semantics and language style), Laurent Metzger discussed the varied areas of unity and commonalities of these two languages, including Bahasa Malaysia and Bahasa Melayu Singapura. To achieve this unification, he took efforts at seeking the areas of unity and identity within each and among these languages. He further adverted to the fact that both Bahasa Indonesia and Bahasa Malaysia are now in constant contact with each other to seek those commonalities that exist between them, within which the proposed Bahasa Melayu Singapura and Bahasa Melayu Brunei can well become part of and to benefit thereby. Moreover, he also proposed that to make the unification more meaningful, the languages maybe unified under the name Bahasa Nusantara -- Archipelagic Language. And this seems logical considering that all these languages belong to the greater Austronesian (Malaya-Polynesian) language family.

In seeking our Asian connection, it is in this language that we seek its roots. I think I was not wrong in using Bahasa Indonesia/Bahasa Malaysia for my models in the development of the Philippine national symbol of language unity and identity. For it cannot be denied that the Philippines is not only geographically of Asia; its languages are Asian as well, and classified together with all the languages in the Southeast Asian regions within the greater Austronesian family.

To conclude, while the non-Asian languages in the Philippines -- Spanish and English -- continue to have a very strong influence in the current language scene, it should be borne in mind that these, particularly English, will fall under the category as language of internationalism. Considering the long history of Spanish in the Philippines, it is to be noted that the language provided the lexical terminologies of ideas and concepts that had been introduced during its ascendancy. It lost many of its
features, however, to the native languages through the centuries. It will have to give way to the introduction/reintroduction of other terminologies from the other Philippine languages and Bahasa Indonesia/Bahasa Malaysia/Bahasa Melayu, to fulfill both the concepts of nationalism and nationism. English, having sunk its roots in the country, fulfills the internationalism side of the triangle.

To make these happen will be conditioned by factors -- political, cultural, and social -- for which there is no time, at this point, to devote for their discussion.
Endnotes

1The framework of this paper was inspired by the Indonesian *Bhinneka Tunggal Eka*, “Unity in Diversity” model, which hopefully will contribute to the final unification of the Filipinos in the formation of their national symbol of language identity. It does not, however, preempt whatever have been attained through earlier efforts at language development. Rather, the paradigm or framework is a small contribution to make all those involved in the formation of the national language recognize that the ethnic component of the National Unity is, beyond doubt, crucial in achieving that unity. At the same time, this paradigm/framework sends the message to the same group of people to rethink their position in merely *Filipinizing* or *Hispanizing* every English word and call it *Filipino*, which ends up to *Castenggalog* (Castillian, English and Tagalog). In other words, the framework makes it easier for bringing to the National Language the other ethnic languages -- large or small -- that can truly express the National Psyche, thus sending the message to these ethnic groups that they are part of the National Community. These ethnic groups can no longer be ignored; they must be made part of that continuing attempt at nation-building. For it cannot be denied that language is the soul of a people!

2Renato Constantino 1981:28-39

3*Ibid.*, p.28


6cf. Constantino1981:30

7cf. Yabes1981:183

8Gerald T. Burns 1992:130-167


10Larson 1963

11Francisco 1992; cf. Francisco 1980

13 Francisco 1992

14 Ibid., p. 97

15 Ibid., p. 8

16 Ibid., pp. 155-157

17 Ibid., p. 157

18 Ibid.


20 cf. Francisco 1980

21 Andrew Gonzales 1983:157

22 Ibid.

23 cf. Larson 1963

24 Ngugi Wa Thiong’o, in Burns 1992:165

25 Ibid.

26 Asmah Hajo Omar 1992:61-81

27 Ibid., p. 66

28 Ibid., pp. 78-79
Bibliographic Notes and Selected References

To this writer, the language issue in the Philippines is indeed serious in terms of the total equity in the final development of that national language symbol of identity. Hence, as early as 1966, the issue was partly tackled in a paper “Notes on the Language Problem of India (Philippine Journal of Language Teaching, Vol. IV Nos. 1-2 [1966] pp. 1-17). The question came up again in two essays I wrote -- “Language and Cultural Identity Crisis: The Case of the Philippines,” prepared for the AILA (International Congress of Applied Linguistics), August 21-26, 1978, Montreal, Canada; and “National Identity” in Policy for the 1980's (F. Miranda and M. Mangahas, Eds., Quezon City, 1980). Moreover, reading through Indian history, society and culture made me realize that the largest example, classic as it is, of the history of unity in diversity, i.e., *Anekaa evam ekaa*, is India herself. The paradigm used in this essay had its first appearance in an essay I wrote for the SEAMEO-INNOTECH Indigenous Learning Systems Project in 1982. Titled “Indigenous Systems: the Philippines,” the paradigm served as the archetype.

In this essay, and in another one written in 1992, the paradigm has been refined for a better understanding of the notion of the construct *Bhinneka Tunggal Eka*.

Other very important works that prompted this writer to get involved in the language issue are:


Conference in Local and National History, October 15-17, 1992, Mindanao State University, Tawi-Tawi.


Proceedings


“Specialists’ Conference-Workshop (First of the Series), Language Policy Conference Series” sponsored by: Manila Studies Program of the College of Arts and Sciences, U.P. Manila; De La Salle University; Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila; and Center for Continuing Education, U.P. Los Banos, on January 12-13, 1990.


In 1905, just a few years after the United States had declared the end of the Philippine-American war and had begun enacting colonial rule, the U.S. Secretary of War and a party of U.S. Congressmen held public hearings in Manila. Apparently, it was to let the Filipinos air their opinions about the new colonial relationship in which they had found themselves. As it marked one of the first discussions among the Americans and the Filipino elites (Cullinane 1989: 201). It also marked, according to the nationalist historian Maximo M. Kalaw, the historical passage of Filipino politics out of the “period of suppressed nationalism” (Kalaw 1927: 294). At these hearings, one particular Filipino elite, Senor Vicente Ilustre, stood before the visiting committee and argued that the United States should grant more political autonomy to the Philippines, claiming that the Philippines was a country of very high “political capacity”, that it was, contrary to the Americans views on the matter, quite capable of “self-government.” He then submitted a petition signed by him and others which read in part:

If the Philippine archipelago has a governable popular mass called upon to obey and a directing class charged with the duty of governing, it is in condition to govern itself. These factors ... are the only two by which to determine the political capacity of a country; an entity that knows how to govern, the directing class, and an entity that knows how to obey, the popular masses, (Hearings 1905: 12).

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What is so remarkable about the petition is that the authors intended it to be an argument for more self-rule and autonomy—remarkable because the elite’s proposition that there are two classes, a directing class and the popular masses, must have had little effect upon the Americans but to lend credence to the very imperial discourse which was preventing the Filipinos from having political autonomy in the first place. Indeed, American policy-makers and administrators had justified their possession of the Philippines on the grounds that without America’s imperial “benevolence,” control over the islands would fall into the hands of the local Filipino elite “half-civilized” by the Spaniards, who did know what “liberty” and “free government” meant, and who would thus perpetuate a “tyranny” and “oligarchy” where they ruled “despotically” over the “ignorant” and “creduulous” masses (Special Report of Taft 1908 [hereafter referred to as SRT:75; Stanley 1974:66). The Philippines as fundamentally feudal, and mired in a state of political primitivity, had no doubt informed the Americans’ imperial project in “democratic tutelage,” and the Filipino elites’ talk of “directing” and “directed” classes must have helped perpetuate the image. Key colonial policy-makers such as Elihu Root and W. F. Taft, in fact, later derided the ideas expressed in the petition, referring to them as further documentation of the Filipino elites’ tyrannical orientation, their ignorance of “free government” and therefore exemplary of the need for continued American control (SRT 1908:25).

Considering that the authors of this petition would soon make up the leadership of Nationalista political party2 (the party which would dominate internal colonial politics for the rest of the American period), American policy-makers and administrators were quite on the mark in treating the petition of 1905 as indicative of the Filipino elites’ political orientation.3 They were less on the mark, however, in their characterization of that orientation and in dismissing the ideas expressed in the petition as evidence of the elites’ “tyrannical” and “despotic” nature. This is not to say that the Americans’ characterization on this account is surprising. They were merely localizing the signs offered by the elites at the hearings into their extant teleological schema, one which inserted the Philippines into a low point on the narrative of political, social, and cultural development that ran from a Hobbesian state-of-nature (embodied by “uncivilized”, “chaotic”, and “non-Teutonic” peoples) up towards the epitome of the scale: the liberal-democratic social contract (Moses 1905). They were also relating the ideas expressed by the elites to their post-Jacksonian (and post-bellum) populism cum early-Progressivism, which purported to defend the rights of the “common” Filipino man, or tao,
against the brutalities of an "aristocratic" Filipino elite. This is to say, though, that in so localizing, administrators such as Taft and Root were tearing the ideas in the petition from their local referents, conducting in effect, an act of epistemic violence.

Below, I map out those local referents, to demonstrate that the ideas expressed in the petition carried the traces of an elite political subjectivity which was not contained nor fully apprehended by the terms of the Americans' colonial discourse. The elites' notion of a "directing class" and an "obeying class" in other words, carried a host of meanings and associations whose complexity and internal logic remained irreducible to the temporalities and images into which it was inserted by the policy-makers and administrators. The "directing class" idea was but one aspect of a larger set of Filipino elite visions and imaginings about what their "state" (both as a political cosmology which prescribed certain definitions of social and political relations, of proper governance, of legitimate political leadership and adequate types of authority -- all of which were quite different from the American point of views.

Historically concurrent with but not the same as an elite nationalism, the cosmology of the state articulated by the elites made up more than an simple political "ideology." Nor is reducible to a set of supposedly-essential set of "values." It rather helped constitute an historically-constructed political field which, in its own way, defined political propriety, prescribed schemas about the proper structure and operation of political relations, and offered notions about what is good, desirable, and legitimate in politics. Upon this field and through its structuring principles, then, would elite political action and practice unfold throughout the American regime.

This elite political cosmology and its attended field of action has yet to be fully problematized in Philippine historiography. Just as the Americans' colonial discourse had folded the multivocal discourses and practices of the Filipino political elite into their narrow post-Enlightenment narratives of political progress and Reason, so have dominant strands within Philippine historiography reduced them, through their own particular way. As Paredes (1988) argues, a nuanced understanding of the elite has long been impeded by a certain brand of nationalist historiography which, in effect, has relegated the Filipino elite to the analytic confines of a "resistance" vs. 'collaboration' dichotomy. This dichotomy, Paredes continues, creates unavoidable gaps in (historiographical) perception and
impeded a systematic analysis of the character, role, and behaviour of the Filipino elite” (1988:4-5). Much in the same way that the colonial knowledge has reduced the subjectivity of the rebellious Filipino peasant into weighted terms such as “banditry” -- and likewise the orientation of the elite into terms as “caciqueism”—so have extant scholarly studies reduced the subjectivity and practices of the Filipino elite to the narrow categories of “resistor” or “collaborator.”

Due in part to this unfortunate state of historiography, my attempt to map out the visions and imaginings of the Filipino elite is necessarily tentative. At its most basic level, my attempt will involve a reading of a few representative texts and documents contextualized within the historical conditions of their emergence and articulation. As we will see, these texts taken together worked through a set of metaphor and imagery which provided particular and particularized ideas regarding reciprocal relations and the codification of those relations into political practice and the political institutions of colonial rule. The petition of the 1905 which we earlier underscored is but one of these texts which I hope to unpack, and will do so, first in relation to the political ideas and ideals emerging in the midst of the Philippine revolution (1890’s), and second, in relation to other Nationalista political documents and texts (such as Tagalog civic guides) written during the first decades of American rule. Lastly, I will relate the ideas expressed in the texts to elite political practice. Through this exploratory interrogation, then, we will be taking a tour through more than the Philippines’ “directing class” and its “popular masses”, but through the Philippines’ body, reason, and power—or more precisely, the Philippines’ el cuerpo, razon, and kapangyarihan.

Reciprocity and the Social Order

I reiterate that the elites’ “directing class” idea cannot be reduced to a set of Philippine “values.” That is, it should not be treated as “essential” or inherent, but socially and historically-constructed through the events and happenings, changes and developments preceding its enunciation. To begin, then, a bit must be said of its historicity.

One of the most prominent, overriding and consistent social logics evident amidst the discontinuities of Tagalog history is that of reciprocal exchange, involving personalized relations of obligation and debt. While something of a universal phenomenon, reciprocal exchange within the
Tagalog order has had its own particular manifestations and localizations, applying at a number of registers. Extended kinship ties throughout the pre-Hispanic period to this day, for example, have been established and sustained upon bilateral, contingent relations of debt and obligation, not upon matrilineal or patrilineal genealogies (Kaut 1965; Scott 1994:217-219). In the realm of political authority, the datus of the pre-Hispanic period and Filipino municipal elites in the Spanish administration rose to power through their ability to position themselves at a certain place within circulations of reciprocity and exchange (as we discuss in more detail below). Socio-economic life was often structured in reciprocal terms as well-- say for example, in relations between landlord and tenant, hacendero and peasant, or even through communitarian types of organization such as the sugu system (Fegan 1982:97-98; Larkin 1993:81-84; McLennan 1982:66). Attendant to such objective practices has been a certain subjectivity or habitus of the actors involved, manifesting in various ways. The Tagalog concepts of utang na loob and hiya most often provided the schemas of this subjectivity. The patron-client ties which defined socio-economic relations in the 19th and early 20th centuries, for example, had involved a sense of heartfelt obligation or affection (utang na loob) on the part of both parties.

Such practices and their attendant sensibilities might be said to have been more or less hegemonic for much of Tagalog history. That is, they made up the unquestioned taken-for-granted realm of quotidian Tagalog life. Thus they provided the conditions into which new elements from the outside would be inserted. Rafael (1993), for example, has shown how reciprocity played into the Spaniards’ attempts to convert natives to the terms of Castilian Catholicism. The Tagalogs’ sensibilities regarding utang na loob and hiya which had been for so long rooted in their daily reciprocal practices-- provided the terms by which elements of Catholicism were localized so as to form novel ideas about death and hunting, most often exceeding the Spaniards’ missionary effort (Rafael 1993). Reciprocal sensibilities were also employed by various peasant-based movements of the Spanish period. The utang na loob relationship between the mother and her children, for example, served as a basis for anti-colonial rebellions, as peasant movements scripted Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines as a reciprocal pact unjutly broken (Illet01979).

I suggest that the predominance of reciprocal ties in structuring Tagalog life provided the practical conditions for ideal or idealized notion of reciprocity to figure not only as a primary trope in peasant ideologies,
but also as a cornerstone and basic structuring principle of Filipino elite thought as well.\textsuperscript{14} Social types of reciprocity were discursively objectified by the elites; the more unconscious reciprocal practices of everyday life became conscious through often politically-charged and reflective writings and debates occurring in the late 19th century. Reciprocity, as a socially-constitutive set of practices and sensibilities, became in a word, “ideological.”\textsuperscript{15}

The late 19th century was, to be sure, a profound and determining period in Filipino intellectual and cultural history. The anti-colonial propagandists’ and ilustrados’ imagining of the nation, their hitherto-unwritten histories of the Philippines, the emergence of Filipino literature, and art, and philosophy; such signifying practices were indicative of that which had not happened before in Philippine history -- that is, ‘Filipinos’ actively and consciously reflecting upon ‘Filipinos’-- constructing in fact that very identity. Privileged European educated members of the elite, as well as their colleagues, became for the first time conscious of themselves as people, conscious of their society, and reflective upon their predicament resulting in a multiplicity of self-representations manifested in literature, art and philosophy (Schumacher 1991). The Filipino social and political philosophy written in the midst of the movements against the Spaniards were no small part of this process. And these works, I suggest, professed a host of ideas about reciprocity, giving the quotidian practices a certain philosophical and politicized form. Indeed ideas about reciprocity precisely informed the elites’ visions of social relations, upon which would be based on ideas about proper governance, political legitimacy and authority.

Reciprocity as an ungrounded concept, of course, is by definition an abstract notion. But various Filipino elites put their own particular spin upon it, figuring it through various metaphors and imagery, and relating it to a number of social and political practices. Let us begin then with one influential thinker of the late 19th century in particular, Apolinario Mabini. Writing against the grain of Spanish imperial rule, Mabini perhaps had the most integrated and systematic ideas about man and society. His definition of “society” is as follows:

La sociedad es una reunión de hombres que se ayudan \textit{mutuamente}, para que cada uno disfrute de la mayor suma posible de bienestar, que por sí solo y sin ayuda de otros no podría alcanzar. (1931 II: 68; my italics) Society is an association of men who are together for mutual help, so that
each could enjoy the highest possible well-being; a situation that can never be arrived at by the sole efforts of individuals without the aid of others.

Here, Mabini must have employed local notions of reciprocity, exchange, and debt to formulate his definition of society, just as the peasants had relied upon notions of reciprocity to formulate their ideas about death, hunting and rebellion. Mabinis's definition of society as an association of men for "mutual help" figures here as but another term for dyadic reciprocal relations. Indeed, in related portions of his thought, Mabini raises the idea that "mutual exchange" between persons is the necessary condition for life (1931:22-23).16

Of course, Mabini's idea of "mutual help" and "mutual exchange" seems to mimic the ideas regarding social relations and exchange articulated by European thinkers such as Rousseau, Hobbes, or Adam Smith-- ideas upon which were founded Anglo-Western liberalism. A closer examination, though, reveals how Mabinis's vision of social relations and exchange particularly turned upon dyadic reciprocity whereas the European social contract theorists did not. Hobbes, for example, believed that the state of nature was one in which the atom-like individuals pursue their self-interests and their natural lust for power. Consequently, "society" was only possible when said individuals could come into a codified agreement or social contract (making up something like a civil society with a state) so that the violent and brutish state of nature could be transcended. This idea of Hobbesian state of nature and social contract had fed indirectly into American imperial ideology, as the Americans had feared that the Philippines would "retrogress" into "chaos" without their intervention. Mabini, though, proposed no such Hobbesian idea of Man-in-nature. Instead, he folded his concept of the state of nature into his definition of society. He proposed that "natural laws" existed purely in the social realm, in 'la sociedad'-- which is to say that the "natural" state of Man was the state of mutual help and mutual exchange (Hartendorp 1965:13; Majul 1960:283). Unlike Hobbes who saw man in nature as 'brutish' and 'nasty', and unlike James Madison and Jeremy Bentham after him, Mabini saw man in a state of nature as necessarily and mutually helping one another (Majul 1960:286-87). This is why, again unlike Rousseau and Hobbes, Mabini believed that society was prior to the state; that it could actually exist without it (Hartendorp 1965: 13; Majul 1960: 285). Persons in society (i.e., man in nature) could sustain themselves without a state or social contract precisely because their life-sustaining
activity of exchange was naturally beneficial to both. The activity of “mutual help” was, in other words, reciprocal. By contrast, the assumption underlying the European social contract theorists’ idea about the necessity of some sort of state or social contract was that man in a state of nature was ‘nasty’ and ‘brutish.’ If exchanging at all, man would more or less self-destruct, exchange would not be mutual nor reciprocal. Some sort of social contract or codified agreement was logically needed in order to ensure against “chaos.”

As Mabini imagined “society” to be a web of reciprocal ties between persons engaged in mutual exchange, his views on morality and rights preceeded logically from these ideas. Morality and virtue (‘virtutef’) to Mabini was nothing but the “conformity of man’s actions to natural law”; that is, conformity to the terms of reciprocity (Majul 1960:289). Relatedly, ‘freedom’ figured in Mabini’s thought as the unhindered ability to play take a position in the necessary and definitive circulations of mutual exchange (Mabini 1931 II:271).17 It was not, as the European social contract theorists and later the American democratic theorists had it, a condition in which power-seeking, calculating and egoistic individuals could pursue their self-maximizing interests in accordance with terms of a social contract. Lastly and similarly, “rights” and “justice” unfolded, for Mabini, from the basic right to exchange mutually and hence survive. That which was “just” was that which adhered to the terms of reciprocity, and one had a natural “right” to engage in reciprocity (Mabini 1931 I 104; Majul 1960:288-289).

To match all of these ideas, Mabini had a specific notion of reason (la razón). Mabini defined razón as, in Majul’s (1960:285) terms, “a regulative power constraining men from violating the rights of others to self-preservation.” This idea appears not unlike that of those such as Hobbes. For the latter, Reason was the faculty which restrained the actions of man so that their self-perservation could be secured. But since Mabini and Hobbes had very different ideas about self-preservation, these two apparently similar definitions of Reason meant different things. For Hobbes, man needed a social contract in order to secure his self-preservation. Without it, man would remain in constant war leading to self-destruction. Reason thus dictated that man needed some sort of social contract. For Mabini, however, self-preservation was possible through natural reciprocal exchanges and mutual help. Razon for Mabini was therefore that faculty which helped enable and sustain mutual help and exchange.
The Tagalog equivalent to 'razon'- catouriran (or katwiran)- condenses Mabini’s connections between reciprocity, reason, rights, and justice. Katwiran (derived from ‘tuwid’ which means ‘straight’) translates into more than “reason” / ‘la razon.’ It also means “right” (as in political or moral right) and “justice” (Nigg 1904). We have seen how for Mabini “justice” and “right” were intimately embedded in reciprocity: that which was just facilitated reciprocal exchange, and one’s fundamental “rights” were based upon the basic right to engage in reciprocal exchange. Thus, as ‘razon’ facilitates reciprocity, so it is also the condition for ‘justice’ and ‘rights.’

We will return to these ideas below. For now, let us consider the 1905 petition presented by the Nationalistas within the context of Mabini’s philosophy. The notion of a ‘directing class’ and an ‘obeying class’ proposed in the petition, in fact, parallels ideas about reciprocal relations very much akin to Mabini’s. Like Mabini, the elites writing the petition perceived relations between people -- in this case, between the ‘directing class’ and the directed class -- as based upon ties of mutual exchange. In referring to what might have happened had not the Americans occupied the islands, the petition holds:

If the country should have ruled its own destinies, far from being tyrannical -- according to the scruples of some people -- the government established would have been a model of justice, for neither the culture of the directing class is great enough to impose obedience in a tyrannical sense nor is the culture of the popular masses so wanting as to allow themselves to be tyrannized. It is only where there is positive want of equilibrium between the culture of one class and the ignorance of another that a government is able to tyrannize a people, which condition does not exist in the Philippines where the culture of one and the ignorance of the other is merely relative (Hearings 1905: 12 my italics)

The ‘equilibrium’ here conjures up Mabini’s idea of mutual dependence. Like the latter’s idea, the idea in the 1905 petition implies a mutual state of exchanges and a converge of interests between the parties. A 1917 article written by one of the writers of the original 1905 petition, Macario Adriatico, confirms this. Elaborating upon this idea of ‘equilibrium’ between the classes, Adriatico contended that when there is a
‘directing class’ leading the masses, “there would not be the danger of one class ... governing the rest, because even so there would be no clashing of interest ... because there would be mutual dependence among the several elements of which it is composed” (1917:42; my italics). 22

Note also how both the Nationalista texts counterpose ‘equilibrium’ and ‘mutual dependence’ to ‘tyranny’. In the elites’ view, when there is a directing class leading the masses in an ‘equilibrium’ and a mutually dependent relationship, there is no ‘tyranny’. Mabini makes the very same counterposition between mutual exchange and help, on the one hand, and ‘tyranny’ on the other, as we will see in a moment. Note further, how the elites chose to describe the qualifications for self-government in terms of a ‘directing class’ that knows how to rule and the “popular masses” who know “how to obey.” This was fundamentally different from the American administrators’ list of qualifications, which included governmental rationalization and legal-rational offices, the existence of a set of liberal institutions, and certain economic conditions measured in quantitative terms such as GNP, levels of taxation, etc. (Perkins 1962:218). Instead of these abstractions, the Filipino elites considered government secondary to social relations -- as if, in other words, they felt society preceded the state.

Imagining their social order to be made up of reciprocal ties, then, the elites at the 1905 hearings did not at all find it problematic to speak before the Americans of a “directing class” guiding the “popular masses.” To them, the existence of these two classes did not mark tyranny nor Hobbesian chaos. Paralleling Mabini’s ideas, their existence marked but the natural and legitimate state of things. Thus, such notions of reciprocity served as a basis by which to legitimate calls for self-rule. And as we will now see, such notions provided the discursive structure for an imagined logic of state. They provided a basis for ideas and ideals about political practice and political institutions, for political leadership and authority, as Mabini and the pre-Nationalistas would take notions of reciprocity to another register -- a political institutional one, and would figure them through a number of Spanish and vernacular terms.

The Social Body, Authority, and ‘Razon’

If the natural social order was made up of mutually-beneficial ties that operated prior to a state or social contract, why would the likes of
Mabini find a government necessary at all? There were very good reasons for a “state”, in Mabini’s view. First was the idea that within society it was possible for ‘injustices’ or ‘exploitation’ to occur, such that the natural and normatively positive state of reciprocal exchanges might be threatened. Such a possibility existed because although razón was the facilitator and regulator of reciprocity, it was not infallible. These are cases in which the medios de vivir of others are appropriated without proper return, i.e., through force. In such cases the terms of reciprocity are transgressed, and are therefore unreasonable, immoral, unnatural, not virtuous (Mabini 1931 II:23; Majul 1960: 288). Thus arose the utility of a state. For Mabini, a state or government-- or more precisely in his terms, an ‘authority’-- could guard against instances when ‘razón’ functioned improperly.

The other reason for a state was that it could give the natural condition of mutual help and exchange some further direction. The condition of mutual help and exchange was, for Mabini, adequate to sustain life and happiness, no doubt. But such a condition unfortunately ran the risk of being “without direction, order, or coordination.” Such a condition Mabini likened to a “dead body.” To give it life, then the body of society needed a soul. “This soul, wrote Mabini, “is Authority”-- or in other terms, a state” or “government” (Mabini 193 II: 68).23

That Mabini saw the need for a government does not mean that his view can be reduced to those of European social contract theorists, recall, a state or some sort of ‘third term’ was integral and necessary for the functioning of ‘society.’ The natural state of Man in their eyes was that, without a third term, Man would fall into a chaotic state to the detriment of all. For Mabini, to the contrary, any lack or fault within society which was to be remedied by a state or institutionalized contract was a deviation, not a norm or necessity. It was the improper or the unnatural functioning of razón. Mabini thereby treated the state to be, while useful for the natural condition of reciprocal relations, secondary at best, supplementing an already-existing norm or reciprocity which could ideally sustain by itself the social order. At the level of Mabini’s philosophical logic there was no necessity for there to be a state in order for there to be a society.

If there was in Mabini’s view no logical necessity for a society to have a state, there was an urgent historical necessity for the Philippines to overthrow Spanish rule and institute a new government, precisely because the Spaniards had deviated from ‘razón.’ Like M. H. del Pilar, Andres Bonifacio, and Felipe Agoncillo, Mabini alluded to the idea that the
Spanish had broken their "blood compact" between Sicatuna and Miguel Lopez de Legazpi--a break which dissolved the "obligations willingly assumed by Filipinos" (Majul 1960: 313-17). In other words, the Spaniards had transgressed the "natural" and "moral" state of reciprocity. Thus did the Spanish figure as the embodiment of the improper use of *razon*, of non-virtue and immorality--of in fact tyranny itself (Mabini 1931: 184). Revolution against Spain, consequently, was morally justified by Mabini, and a new state was necessary to guard against further deviations from *razon* and hence, from the natural tenets of reciprocity. "A revolution," wrote Mabini, "is the violent means utilized by a people ... to destroy a duly constituted government, substituting it another more in consonance with *razon* and justice"(Mabini 1931 I:108 italics mine).

Such ideas fed into the makings of what would be the temporary independent Malolos government formed in the midst of the revolution against Spain, as indeed Mabini was of one the key makers. The government consisted of three branches: a judiciary, an executive, and a legislature, not unlike the formal structure of the American state. The content and operation of this Philippine state structure, however, was to be very different than the federalist American system. One key difference was that, while the three branches of the American system were built according to the balance-of-power principle, the Malolos government was to be guided by the legislative branch, which was prioritized over the other branches. Mabini proposed that the judiciary and the executive were to be subordinate to the legislature; to follow its dictates and its direction. Another related difference was that the three branches were to move together as a unified entity led by the legislature (Hartendorp 1965: 51). Whereas in the American system disagreements among the various branches was integral to the system of checks and balances; it was not to be so for Mabini. In fact the very notion of 'good government' for Mabini was harmony among the branches (Mabini 1931 II:69).

The primary justification for the primacy of the legislature and a harmony among the branches has to do with the way in which Mabini, as have already intimated, metaphorically scripted the state as the 'soul' of the social body, Mabini wrote:

La sociedad, pues, debe tener un alma: la autoridad. Esta autoridad debe tener una razon que guie y dirija: el poder legislativo. Una voluntad que haga y haga obrar: el
ejecutivo. Una conciencia que juzgue y castigue a los malos: el poder judicial (1931 II:69).

Society should have a soul: authority. This authority needs an intellect to guide and direct it: the legislature power. It also needs a will that is active and will make it work: the executive. It needs a conscience that judges and punishes what is bad: the judicial power.

Mabini thereby privileged the legislature because it was the embodiment of *razon*: the intellect. "The power to legislate," wrote Mabini "is the highest manifestation of authority, just as the intellect is the noblest faculty of the soul" ["es que la potestad de legislar es la manifestacion mas alta de la autoridad, como la razon es la potencia mas noble de nuestra alma"] (Mabini 1932 II:69). Mabini also wrote that the executive and judiciary "should be subordinated to the first, in the same manner that both will and conscience are subordinate to the intellect" ["los dos ultimos deben subordinarse al primero, com la voluntad y la conciencia son subordinadas al razon"] (ibid). In other words, since the state was the 'soul' of society, and the legislature embodied razon, the legislature at the same time embodied that which was good and just, regulating the natural state of reciprocity. So it was to be prioritized, to guide the other branches in "order and harmony" such that from such a harmony, led by razon, could "the greatness of society and the well-being of its members" be furthered ["el buen gobierno rinde el engranadecimiento de la sociedad y el bienestar de los asociados"] (ibid).

It is noteworthy on this count to reiterate that *razon* translates into Tagalog as *katwiran*. **Katwiran** means 'right' and 'justice', as we have discussed above, but it also can mean "lawfulness" (Nigg 1904). Indeed, Mabini imagined law to flow from razon -- he imagined it to be its institutional expression. This derived logically from the scripting of the legislature, and because the legislature was the embodiment of razon, so were laws to be the extension of razon (Majul 1960:298). By definition, then, to follow the laws laid down by the legislature was to follow the natural laws of reciprocity and its regulator, razon.

These basic elements of Mabini's state, premised upon the ideal of reciprocal elements, informed the visions of governance articulated by political elites under the American regime. In fact, the idea of the legislature as razon regulating reciprocal regulations provided the basis for
how the elites viewed themselves and structured their practices as elected officials and bureaucrats within the ostensible hegemony of the American colonial state apparatus.27 As we will now see, political elites would take razon and its associated norm of reciprocity to a logic of political leadership and colonial state power; or more precisely, a logic of state kapangyarihan.

From Malolos to the American Colonial State:
La Razon to Kapangyarihan

Expanding upon the 1905 idea of the “directing class”, Macario Adriatico in 1917 referred to that class as “the aristocracy of intelligence.” This “aristocracy” was for Adriatico not quite the same as the fuedal European aristocracy in that it was to have as its institutional base the modern legislature, first constructed as part of the American colonial state structure:

Las Camaras legislativas son los centro nerviosos de las sociedades modernas; por lo mismo, deben ser tambien el Cenaculo de los hombres de privilegiada inteligencia pues, asi como la salud del individuo dependene en gran parte de la buena organizacion de su sistema nervioso, no de otro modo el bienstar de un pueblo depende casi siempre de la buena organizacion de su poder legislativo. (1917: 4)

The legislative houses are the nerve centers of modern society and for this reason they must also be the meeting place of men of privileged intelligence, because just as the health of the individual depends largely upon the proper organization of his nervous system, so does the welfare of a people almost always depend upon the pro organization of its legislative power.

Like Mabini, the elites under the American regime construed the legislature as the embodiment of intelligence and razon. Adriatico’s idea of the legislature as the nerve center brings this out quite brilliantly. The term “nerve center” connotes the brain of the body; thus it makes a reference to Mabini’s notion of the legislative power as the ‘intellect’ and razon of the social body, also at the same time refers to the center which organizes and
processes the multiplicity of nerves in the body -- that is, the brain which animates, facilitates, and regulates the "nervous system." What we see here is the way in which Adriatico envisioned the legislature, as razon, to be the animator, facilitator, and regulator of the web-like networks of reciprocal ties that make up the social body. He imagined it to be the primary nodal point or center of circulations of reciprocal exchange. Much in the same way that the razon of the social body provides for its well-being by its central role in structuring reciprocal ties, so was the legislature to provide for "the welfare of a people" (as Adriatico puts it) by structuring the "mutual dependence" among the "elements" of which society is composed (1917:42). For the Nacionalistas, then, the relationship between the directing class and the masses was to be codified and institutionalized in the state apparatus. The social condition of mutual help and exchange between the directing class was to facilitate and structure their 'mutual dependence' with the rest of the Filipinos through their position as state managers and legislators.

Such a vision of governance was more than extension of Mabini's Malolos ideals, wherein the legislature, embodying razon, was to guide and lead the state and society, regulating and facilitating reciprocal exchange. It was also an institutionalized extension and historical continuation of the role which political leaders had long played in Tagalog society. For, in imagining political leaders as center of reciprocal exchange, the Nacionalistas were making a gesture to the political leaders of pre-Hispanic times: the barangay puno or datu and his kin, the maginoo. Some brief words on these leaders highlights the logic of state and political leadership as envisioned by Adriatico.

As Raphael points out (drawing from the work of W. H. Scott) the position of the pre-Hispanic datu had been dependent upon their "ability to initiate the establishment of obligations with others (1993:139)." He explains:

To lead in Tagalog is mamono, from the root word pono, 'a leader who governs', but also a conduit of sorts, in that it refers to the roots and trunk of a tree. In the expression Mamono ca, "You lead," it implies beginning something ... [T] he datu, as the pono of the village, was able to lead his followers in war and trade with other villages. He would thus be regarded as the most capable of securing the surplus with which to engage in a series of
reciprocal exchanges with others in the community. As a pono, the datu was the initiator of indebtedness... (139-140)

The maginoo similarly, were defined by, and attained their position by, their position within circulations of exchange -- that is, their ability to render debts from others in the barangay: “Maginoo referred less to the distinct social class than to a code of behavior attendant upon a certain position on the map of debt transactions” (Rafael 1993: 142). In this way, certain people in the barangay were naturalized as leaders through a series of contingent actions which had the effect of placing them in the center of circulations of reciprocity and exchange. Logically, anyone could attain such a position. But regardless, once in that position, they were rendered tokens of respect for their paternalistic actions, and were thereby naturalized as leaders and benefactors.29

Adriatico makes a direct reference to the naturalized, benefactive position of the barangay leader: “Our directing class has derived its gifts of government from the past, because the chronicles30 tell us that in the infancy of our people, the directing class ... was nothing but the best friend of the barangays”(1917:44; my italics). Here Adriatico envisions, and rather precisely, the new directing class under the American regime to be the historical and logical extension of the pre-Hispanic datus.31 This means that he envisioned the Filipino political elites under the American regime to be the ones who, like their historical predecessors, would animate and center the social circulations of reciprocity through their position as state managers and legislators sitting at the “nerve center” of society.

To further apprehend this imagined connection between the pre-Hispanic and Nationalista political leaders, note that makapangyarihan was one common name in Tagalog for a political leader of legislator in the American period (e.g., Lopez 1915:12). Makapangyarihan simply means “one in power” but it carries much more weight than that. It is derived from kapangyarihan, which, since pre-Hispanic times, was the name given to the “spiritual substance that ‘animates’ the universe and [which] is often concentrated in certain power-full beings and objects” (Sidel 1995:150). The pre-Hispanic datus were believed to have access to the cosmos and thus to have the ability to mediate between that cosmos and the earth (Rafael 1993:14; Sidel 1995:150). Datus demonstrated this capacity -- or “prowess” or “lakas” -- through supernatural feats and bravery in battle, provision of sumptuous feasts, and prodigious generation of offspring.”
amongst other acts (Sidel 1995: 150). Such acts served to provide a surplus from the outside to be inserted into circulations of debt and exchange and at the very same time to neutralize one as makapangyarihan, as having the power to be initiators and center of reciprocal exchange (Rafael 1993: 14). Hence, material and spiritual access to the ‘outside’ (access to material surpluses and access to cosmos) combined into a singular instance or moment, giving the certain individuals who had that access a leadership position. This combination, wherein “culture” or the spirit is inseparable from the “material” of power, is reflected in the many meanings of the word kapangyarihan. Even during the American period, the word meant more than cosmic or mystical power. It could also mean “authority, jurisdiction, means, command” -- plus much more, as we will see (Nigg 1904: 51). Thus to refer to a political leader as makapangyarihan was to situate that leader not only as having a political position, but also as having the certain ‘prowess’ and ‘lakas’ to access and bring in surpluses from the outside and distribute it to their followers. And this is precisely the idea of the ‘directing class’ preferred by the likes of Mabini and Adriatico. Legislators and political leaders were to be the ones who secured surpluses for their communities and the ones who thus placed them into local circulations of reciprocal exchange. In this way they were to be the bearers of ‘razon’ (the facilitator and regulator of reciprocal exchange), the epitome of ‘virtud’ (the act of or adherence to reciprocity), and they would be makapangyarihan, mediating between the inside and outside so as to enact reciprocal exchange. They were to be all of these at once -- as indeed, all three were related to the fundamental ideal of reciprocity. Hence, as Mabini referred to the government as ‘la autoridad’, so did ‘la autoridad’ in Tagalog carry the meaning of capangyarihan (Ignacio 1922: 85; Noceda and Sanlucar 1860: 47). Similarly, ‘la virtud’ when translated into Tagalog meant kapangyarihang makagawa and lakas, and kapangyarihan in English could mean in turn, “virtue” (Ignacio 1922: 534; Nigg 1904: 51). As the legislators and political leaders were to therefore act as such -- to be at once makapangyarihan, the embodiment of ‘razon’ and the epitome of ‘virtud’ - - the legislature was to be the arena through which their acts were institutionally-solidified.

The state apparatus as a whole was to be one instance of kapangyarihan to which these political elites had access. This logic is clear in Adriatico’s discussion of the directing class as he perceived them to have been operating in the first decades of the American regime:
La actual clase directora, que podría ser la “aristocracia de la inteligencia”, da hoy la medida de lo que ella ha de ser en el porvenir. Por medio de la Legislatura y de los gobiernos provinciales y municipales, sus obras son la conversación del orden, el desarrollo de la instrucción, el mejoramiento de las carreteras, puentes y edificios públicos, la introducción de métodos sanitarios o higiénicos, la creación del Banco Nacional, el establecimiento de sistemas de riego, la revisión de los Códigos... la nacionalización del ferrocarril y la adopción de medidas de todo género para el bienestar de la comunidad. (1917:44)

The present directing class, which could be called the “aristocracy of intelligence”, gives us now a measure of what it will be in the future. Through the legislature and the provincial and municipal governments, it has achieved the preservation of order, the development of education, the improvement of roads, bridges, and public buildings, the introduction of sanitary or hygienic measures, the creation of a National Bank, the establishment of irrigation systems, the revision of the codes... the nationalization of railroad, and the adoption of measures of all kinds for the welfare of the community.

Such was the Filipino ‘modernization’, if you will, of the practices of the datus of old. Instead of bringing in surpluses attained through their access to the cosmos (kapangyarihan), the modern directing class are portrayed by Adriatico as bringing in new infrastructural developments to their local communities through their access to the state-- now conceived of as the political-institutional articulation of kapangyarihan.

In professing such notions, Adriatico was describing exactly what had happened since the onset of American rule. With the introduction of the new American-style political institutions, extant personal ties of exchanging political resources took on a dimension unprecedented. The hierarchical form, national reach, and Filipinization of the new colonial state apparatus had pushed personal ties of exchange into outward directions, traversing local space. Through the establishment of local governments in the first years of colonial rule to the creation of the National Assembly in 1907, connections between the local and national
leaders were connected at a national scale, as factions were triangulated into one large national pyramid of exchange networks (Anderson 1988: 11-12; Cullinane 1989: 217-56; Hutchcroft 1991: 421; McCoy 1993: 11-12). In this way, personal ties of exchange were melted into the very institutional hierarchy of the colonial state apparatus and political parties (Paredes 1988:44: Lande 1965). The National Assembly became a forum in which infrastructural and educational resources, state funds, and political appointments became new bases of patronage flowing from the capital center to the provinces and municipalities, all in exchange for votes and other resources flowing in the opposite direction (Hollsteiner 1963:188; Sidel 1995:151). This formed, in effect, what Bayart (1993:220) has called in another context a state “rhizome”: an “infinitely variable multiplicity of [reciprocal] networks” institutionalized as the state.

American administrative discourse, of course, coded the practices associated with this state rhizome as “pork barrelling” and “corruption.” Adriatico, however, was able to describe such practices, and perhaps idealize them, in more local and specific terms, informed by his and others’ visions of reciprocity and *kapangyarihan*. In Adriatico’s political cosmology, ‘pork-barreling’ or ‘corruption’ was but a grafting of *kapangyarihan* and its natural, associated logics of exchange -- deemed necessary and good for the existence of society -- onto the nexus of modern state institutions.\(^{34}\) Today, in fact, the state center from which resources get distributed down to the local level is referred to as *kapangyarihan* (Alejo, et. al. 1996:88). The “outside” power or *kapangyarihan* to which the *makapangyarihan* were to have access included more than state coffers and material goods and resources. It also, at the same time, meant all that which was ‘outside.’ Given the socio-spatial and political map of the archipelago, everything ‘outside’ as single community could figure as a totality: the *labas*.\(^{35}\) As *loob* (or the inside of the community) figures not merely as a material, spatial, or physical dimension but also as a “container” or “receptacle” for reciprocal exchange within the *loob* (Miranda 1989: 77-79; Rafael 1993: 124-26). One such element from the ‘outside’ besides state resources was knowledge which lay outside of the local community typically unavailable to the *tao*. The *makapangyarihan*, or political leaders, were to be intellectually-oriented, that is, to have a good education; which meant in a sense that they were to have had access to centers of knowledge in Europe.

To understand this, recall how legislators and political elites were to be, as both Calderon and Mabini had said, embodiments of ‘*la raison*’
and the ‘intellect.’ ‘La razón’ and the ‘intellect’ of course meant the facilitation and regulation of reciprocal exchange. But it seems that it was at the same time conflated with educational attainment as well, as if education or intellectualism was, in part, a credential which proved one’s ‘la razón’. In other words, the capacity to bring in a material surplus and insert it into circulations of exchange and debt for the good of the community was conflated with the possession of intelligence and education. The history of education under the Spanish regime shows this. Education of certain Filipinos under Spanish rule had created social divisions between those with access to Spanish knowledge and higher education and those without. Education had indeed created the very category of *ilustrado* itself, in fact (Cullinane 1989: 35-48). Those with higher education thereby had access to Spanish laws and codes through their ability to read and write Spanish, and had access to the bureaucracy, as Spanish-educated *indios* or *mestizos* took up positions in the colonial state apparatus. With such access to the outside, the educated elites could mediate between the outside and their localities, ostensibly for the good of their community (Cullinane 1989: 40; Corpu 1957: 110; Palma 1972 II: 531-532; Robles 1969:202, 206; Rafael 1993: 163-66; Sidel 1995: 150-151.) With such access, the educated elites had the ‘lakas’ and ‘prowess’ associated with *kapangyarihan*. Ignacio’s *Diccionario Hispano-Tagalo* (1922) defines ‘inteligencia’ as *kasalayan* derived from *sanay*, which in English means “experienced, able, skillful, capable, fit, adroit, graceful, deft, dexterous” (Nigg 1904: 126).36

Another sort of ‘outside’ to which the elites were to have access was a temporal outside. Take, for example, Adriatico’s discussion of the role of the directing class during the “middle ages” (the Spanish period). “In our middle ages,” he writes, “the directing class (...the aristocracy of valor, morality, and sentiment) delivered the people from the oppression and iniquities [sic] that follow in the wake of every conquest” (1917: 42). The idea of ‘deliverance’ here equates in no small sense with the “millenarian” visions of the peasantry which looked towards the idyllic future state of national independence from the standpoint of the unfulfilled present (Iletó 1979; Sturtevant 1976). The difference of course was that Adriatico situates the Filipino elites as the “deliverer.” Like the *principales fiscales* who mediated between life and paradise by initiating prayers for the dying *tao*,37 the directing class in Adriatico’s vision was to deliver the Filipinos and the Philippines to the idealized goal of national independence. They were the ones who would mediate between the colonial present and the the post-colonial future, wrestling from the American colonial masters
the promised goal of national independence. It is not surprising, then, that Filipino politicians consistently made millenarian appeals to national independence (kalayaan) in their fiery public orations, regardless of what their “real” stance on independence might have been. In making such appeals, the elites could portray their continuity with the nationalist martyrs of the revolution, thereby displaying their kapangyarihan.38

Political Legitimacy, Authority, and Practice

The vision that the political leaders, managers, and legislators were to be, in the aforenoted various ways, the embodiments of ‘la razon’ and kapangyarihan laid down the logics for what would be considered legitimate political practice and political authority -- logics which differed from the Americans’ conception wherein legal-rational norms were to prevail (on this latter point, see Go 1996b: 2-5). Given that the legislators and political elites were to ideally sit at the center of circulations of exchange, for example, it is no surprise that the key issue for Filipino elites was access to state resources for their local communities and the autonomy to use those resources without hindrance from the Americans. Most of the bills introduced by the Philippine Assembly, for example, were oriented towards securing sources for distribution to the local level and for securing more local autonomy (Jenista 1971). Moreover, it is no surprise that ‘corruption’ at the local level seemed so prevalent throughout American rule. In order to sustain their political positions, and indeed fulfill their obligations as the animators of reciprocity and the bearers of resources from the center, the elites often distributed resources acquired from the state center to their friends and followers and used the prerogatives of office in ways which often transgressed the Americans’ beloved bureaucratic ideal (Cullinan 1971; Forbes 1928 I: 155, 164-7; Hayden 1950: 278-285; Sidel 1994: 118). So necessary was such distribution that local Filipino officials sometimes used their own money to construct school buildings, waterworks, and the like (Forbes 1928 I: 158-9).

It followed similarly that in order to qualify for office, a candidate had to display their kapangyarihan -- their ability to mediate between the inside and the outside. Observers of pre-election activities in Tarlac thereby found that the candidates held meetings to which the candidates brought “such things as wine, soft drinks, liquor, cigars and cigarettes and even money to be given to the people. One month before the election, the candidates tolerate the practice of making the electors eat in their homes
everyday at any time. Those candidates even invite the voters from remote villages and barrios conveying them gratuitously in trucks, carromatas, and on horsebacks for them to dine at the candidates’ home” (Reyes 1930: 191-2). Of course, such acts might be easily read, as they were by the American colonial administrators, as simple instances of ‘vote-buying’. In some cases, this may have been true, but it could not have been so for all cases. Most candidates were wealthy or had access to wealthy patrons, such that it could be assumed all of them practiced ‘vote-buying.’ Thus, a majority would not be attained only by the pre-election distribution of goods, lest the election turned into a free market in which votes spiraled upward to ridiculous costs. Indeed, if vote-buying was all that was needed, then the many elaborate and expensive pre-election parades and public gatherings sponsored by political parties, at which some 10,000 to 20,000 often attended, would have had no use; especially since the electorate had been originally limited to the elite portion of the populace (Hollsteiner 1963: Reyes 1930:200). Similarly, candidates oftentimes handed out less important goods than wine or food. One report noted the prevalence of handling out cards containing the candidates’ signatures (Reyes 1930: 192-3). Perhaps, then, what underlie such practices was not so much the attempt to “buy” votes than it was the necessary attempt to display one’s *kapangyarihan* by showing one’s ability to command various resources (however minor such resources may have been) and circulate them, and at the same time by showing one’s ability to attract a large, public following - as indeed, the ability to attract the latter was itself, as it had been in the pre-Hispanic period, a sign of one’s *kapangyarihan* (Scott 1982:102) Massive, colorful demonstrations of songs and dance, public oratories connecting the speaker with the martyrs of the past, the distribution of personalized items and cards listing the candidate’s educational achievements, inviting people to one’s home, the practice of *compadrazgo*, and so on: all of these made up the necessary rituals of Philippine elections in which *kapangyarihan* was to be displayed. Power served pomp, as Geertz (1980:13) might say, not pomp power.39

Many of the campaigning methods clearly reveal the display of paternalistic ‘razon’ and *kapangyarihan*. It was said in a campaign speech in 1925, for example: “Vote for Don Claro M. Recto because he is a man of rare ability and of uncommon achievement. He possesses many titles and degrees. He is a poet, a novelist, an essayist, a scholarly jurist, a brilliant lawyer, a defender of the poor, a Filipino patriot” (Reyes 1930:268). Other examples show candidates tried to undercut the ‘razon’ and *kapangyarihan* of the rival candidate. In the 1905 elections in Leyte,
campaign cartoons showed the rival “holding-up an elector at the point of a revolver with a demand for his vote or his life”—an image which condensed Mabini’s notion that the improper functioning of ‘razon’ was the resort to force. Another cartoon showed the rival being carried by an eagle “from the land of light (Leyte) to the land of darkness (Oblivion)”--a dark and dramatic display of daya; that is, a false or deceptive deliverance on the part of the leader (Fifth Annual Report of the Executive Secretary 1906: 40; Ileto 1984:332).

But in any case, even the practice of what is called “buying votes” was not to be derided by the Filipino elite. While complaints to the American authorities about vote-buying in election periods, as well as other ‘illegal’ activities, were most likely read as but another display of a candidates’ ‘prowess’ and ‘lakas’ (Gleck 1976: 304-5, 317; Romualdez 1925:30). Fegan (1993) finds that today, acts of illegality and ‘corruption’ are bragged about by political actors as an attempt to show their “extraordinary” abilities (38-39).40

In sum, then, practices so antithetical or deviant to the Americans’ vision of a rational-legal, democratic system were deemed normal, legitimate, and even necessary within the elites’ ideo-logic. The localized norm for political practice was not the bureaucratic ideal, but the norm of providing for community welfare by bringing resources and paternalistic care through their access to the labas and kapangyarihan. The norm was to dictate political action: reciprocal exchange between spaces -- between the inner spaces (or loob) of individuals in ‘la sociedad’ or between the labas and loob of spaces between communities, cultural formations and knowledges, state branches or levels, and so on. It followed, then, that a “bad” leader was not necessarily one who transgressed the bureaucratic ideal, but one who did not embody the proper use of ‘razon’, one who could not mediate between the outside and the inside, who could not provide surpluses for their community.

The traces of such ideas about political legitimacy can be seen in various civics texts of the period written in Tagalog by Filipino elites.41 Let us then conclude our substantive analysis with one such text, written by Honorio Lopez.42 In his Mga Katuiran ng Filipino (1905), Lopez offers the following notions about leadership:

Kapag naman ang punong sino pa man, ay di maalam magbigay sa kanyang pinagpupunan, ay maaring isakdal
sa lalong puno ang kakulangan, ó kung di kaya naman ay ihiyao sa kalahatan upang pagkaisahang iya’y alisin sa tunkol ó halinan ng ibang maalam gumagalang sa kanyang pinamumunua, at kung ang lalong kapunupunan ang magkulang sa sarili naman ó ng kalahatan ay ipaglaban at ipaaminao ang iniinis na katuiran ng maunaua ang kaniyang kamalian; sapagkat ang katuiran ay ang kalayaang hindi lamang dapat nating tunikin, kundi talagang kahambuan ng tao. (1905:21)

If any leader does not know how to give to his subjects, one can bring an action against him to a higher leader on account of his shortcomings or one can shout to all so that everyone can unite towards overthrowing him from this position or replacing him with someone who knows how to respect his subjects, and if the highest leader fails to satisfy he should defend and clarify to himself and to all the *katuiran* that he violates in order to make everyone understand his mistake, because *katuiran* is the freedom that is not only made into a duty, but the real cleansing of people.

Lopez here qualifies a leader who deserves to be removed from office as one who “fails to satisfy”, and more tellingly, as one who violates *katwiran*. Neither of these qualifications rely upon the bureaucratic-ideal or rational-legal norms. Indeed, had Lopez wanted to qualify leadership in the latter terms, he might have more precisely used the words *batas* or *kautusuan* for *katuiran* — words which were also used at the time and were used even by Lopez in other portions of his text to refer to “law.” Instead, however, Lopez specifically uses the word *katwiran*. Whereas the former terms, *batas* or *kautusuan*, are devoid of a normative sense of justice and hence equate more clearly with the Americans’ use of the word ‘law’, *katwiran* thus shows how Lopez, like his Nationalista counterparts, wished to express the idea that the norm for political leadership was adherence to the terms of reciprocal exchange.43

In another section, Lopez discusses corruption during election periods:

Ang humalal naman ng sa paraan ng pagkakaibigan o sa pagkukumpari o napakuartahan kaya ng may nasang
mamuno, ay nanagot din ng isang pagkakasala, at kung ang mahalal ay lumabas pang masama, sila ang ugat na buntunan ng sisi, paghihirap at kasauian ng tanang namamayan. (1905: 15)

The vote based on friendship, compadrazgo, or bribery [napakuartahan, literally, “to have money given”] of the one who wishes to rule will also take responsibility for sinning [pagkakasala], and if the ones voted turn out to be evil, they are the source to be blamed for the poverty and the state of depression of the entire citizenry.

In this passage Lopez seems to treat votes based on personal ties which violate the legal-rational norm (friendship, compadrazgo, or ‘bribery’) in a negative sense. There is, however, a strong sense in which Lopez undercut this predictable legal-rational normativity. He construes votes based on personal ties as detrimental only if their effect is negative, not because they transgressed the bureaucratic ideal. It is only, he writes, “if the one voted turns out [humabas] to be evil” that votes based on personalized connections are to be denigrated. To be sure, Lopez equates an evil elected leader with the emergence of “poverty” and a “state of depression” in the community that the action of voting on the basis of personal connections is to be deemed wrong. It is therefore not surprising that Lopez uses the word pagkakasala, or in English, “sin” or “act of sinning”, to characterize the act of voting on the basis of friendship, compadrazgo, or bribery. The word pagkakasala, notes Rafael (1993: 132-33), carried heavy weight from the Spanish period onward. Its root and sometimes its synonym, sala, could also mean “fault” (inflected as “magbigay-sala” or “bigyang-sala”, it meant “to blame” or “find fault with”). Such meanings as played out in Lopez’ passage thereby connote that for one to vote based on personal relations is to act in such a way so as others can blame said person for any negative effects which that act might have. That is, one who votes on personalized connections can be blamed if the elected one turns out to be ‘evil’. Here, contingent results, not abstract norms of legality and the bureaucratic ideal, provide the measure of a bad leader.

There is another related sense of the word sala which brings out this elusion of legal-rationality even clearer, “Sala denotes an error in counting”, notes Rafael, “Sala is also synonymous with ligaw, to become lost, to become confused and disconcerted. Thus, sin as sala receives the
charge of *hiya*, that is, the sense of being remiss in one’s acknowledgment of one’s debt to another” (Rafael 1993:132-33). To vote in a way which transgresses legal-rational norms is only a “sin” in its effectual activation -- it only receives its full force or its realization when the act results in the violation of reciprocal exchange and mutual help, thereby gaining the force of *hiya*. Again, in the Filipino elite political imagination as evidenced by Lopez, the rational-legal norm is eluded and the norm of reciprocity takes its place. Just as the ideal of reciprocity had provided the basis for alternative visions of “society” and state operations, so did that ideal (once taken to the level of a political logic structured around its personification, the *makapangyarihan*) serve as an alternative to the terms of legal-rationality so crucial to the Americans’ conception of political office and leadership.44

**Conclusion**

I have stressed from the onset how the Filipino elites’ visions and imaginings eluded the terms of American “democratic tutelage.” The latter’s construction of the elite as “caciques” and “tyrants” surely failed to capture the Filipino elites’ own particular imaginary, one which hardly saw elite political practices as “tyrannical” at all. But if American colonial discourse failed to attend to elite subjectivity, so does extant historiography and scholarship. Even the proliferation of studies which have been part of, and which have followed, Paredes’ seminal volume on elite politics (1988) have remained mired in a new sort of reductionism. The previous terms to describe the elite, such as ‘resistor’ and ‘collaborator’, have been replaced by other problematic terms, such as “cacique”, “oligarch”, or “boss.” The use of these latter terms clearly mark something of a regression to (or reinsertion of) colonialist epistemology. As we have seen, those very terms to describe the elites were used by the American colonialists themselves. In this way, post colonial historiography, in denying the specificity of political practices by eliding the semantical content of their operation, has perpetuated the discourse of American colonial rule. The alternative to these extant approaches is to identify local concepts of social relations, governance, political leadership and authority, to try to grasp the elites’ political practices in their own terms. This has been my attempt here.

We might already hear the objections. Does not such an analysis romanticize the violence exercised by the Filipino elites? Does it not provide justification for the corrupt elite form of rule which has been so
long determinant in Philippine politics? Does it not simply reproduce another kind of hegemony, replacing that of the American colonialists with that of the Filipino tyrants? In addressing such questions, we must keep in mind the grounds upon which they would necessarily based. No doubt, the standpoint would be one which purports to step outside of local contexts and critique from without. It is one which tries to move analytically above local concepts and discourses and elucidate how they mask or hide the “real” or “true” nature of power. Many extant studies of the elite, for example, take a critical stance back from what is known as the elite “language of paternalism” (Sidel 1995) and attempt to show how, in reality, such a language or discourse masks and legitimates the true nature of Philippine politics -- which, it is so often asserted, lies not in reciprocity nor paternalism but in ‘corruption’, ‘bossism’, ‘cacique-ism’, and so on. Such an approach seeks to take an objective position outside of local concepts and ideologies -- a move which allows one to, ostensibly, step outside power and make certain claims about its ‘real’ bases. It also, by implication, enables one to make claims about the falsity or ‘ideology’ associated with local political concepts and cosmologies. It is from this standpoint, then, that one can question any sort of analysis which remains within the boundaries of local political concepts and cosmologies. It is from this standpoint that one can contend that a romanticization or idealization of local concepts and cosmologies reproduces the “real” bases of power.

Without diminishing the substance nor intent of such a position upon which many extant studies are based, it must be clear that the standpoint which they take is, again, not unlike that of the American colonialists themselves. It was the American administrators who went to great lengths to deride the Filipino elites’ “innocent ideals” of governance which, they said, had no real “practical ground.” It was they who could affirm that the “real” nature of power in the Philippines was ‘tyrannical’ and conclude that it demanded alteration from above. In this sense, claims about the “real” nature of power in the Philippines are not at all outside of power relations. They are embeded within the very knowledge/power complex upon which imperialism has been based and through which it has operated.

The point is not to get into the endless and fruitless game of which analytic standpoint is more complicitous with imperialism or not. Nor is it to affirm an ostensibly “native” knowledge position over a “Western” one. Rather, the point is much like Marx’s point in Das Kapital: a
critique should be immanent to its object. In our case, rather than stepping outside of the object (elite political discourse and practice) so that one can view it "objectively" and hence 'benevolently' change it, a critique should be adequate or immanent to the terms of that object, to the terms of *kapangyarihan*, in other words. This might mean stepping within the elite political field and challenging the claims to paternalism and reciprocity on the very grounds of paternalism and reciprocity -- to find, as Marx did in the commodity-form, their internal contradictions and tensions. It might mean something different.\(^46\) But in any case, in order to conduct such a critique, it is crucial to understand the terms of elite political discourse, on its own grounds. Mapping out elite cosmologies might thereby help to not only better apprehend elite subjectivity and practice, but also to enact engagements with post-colonial criticism.\(^47\)
Endnotes

1 The petition is found in Hearings Before the Secretary of War and the Congressional Party Accompanying Him to the Philippine Islands (1905). Hereafter referred to as Hearings.

2 Many of the ideas presented by this pre-Nationalista group at the Hearings of 1905 are comparable to the ideas evident in the later Nationalista document, Memorial Politico del Partido Nacionalista (1911). For purposes of simplicity in our discussion, though, we will remain focused on the 1905 document.

3 The organization endorsing the petition was a part of the short-lived Comité de Intereses Filipino, whose membership included Rafael Palma, Fernando Guerrero, Alberto Barreto, Sergio Osmeña, Jamie C. de Veyra, Pablo Ocampo, and Macario Adriatico, amongst others (Cullinane 1988: 104; 1989: 191-203).

4 This double-definition of the “state” comes from Comaroff and Comaroff (1991:5).

5 I lay out a theoretical discussion of discourse, practice, and fields in Go (1996b: 405-409).

6 In this sense, the political field articulated by the elites may be said to make up an alternative “governmentality.” Mapping it out is thus intended as a critique of Scott’s (1995a) Foucauldian formulation of “colonial governmentality” which elides the possibility of alternative political modernities. I have registered a more complete critique of Scott in Go (1996a). On the general issue of alternative political modernities, see Bayart (1993) and Membre (1992). See also the controversy in Public Culture (Fall 1992) which erupted from Membre’s essay. In the Philippine context, moments can be found in Rafael (1993).

7 On historiography and the Filipino peasant, see Geologo(1990); 1994: 1-4); Ileto (1979).

8 We might say that the ultimate purpose of our discussion is to consider the existence, and perhaps the perpetuation, of an alternative political modernity, one perhaps long lost not only in the codings of American.
colonial discourse but also in historiographical translation. Attempts to rethink political modernity in ways which are not exhausted by extant social-scientific or historiographical categories can be seen in Bayart (1993) and Mmeme (1992). See also the controversy in Public Culture (Fall 1992) which erupted from Mmeme's essay. In the Philippine context, moments can be found in Rafael (1995).

9In this section and in other parts of the paper I draw from literature on the Tagalog-speaking region, and specify it as such. The cosmology I map out though, is not to be confined to that region, as many of the Nacionalista elites I discuss came from other areas. I use the term "Filipino" elite cosmology as shorthand to refer to the basic ideological commonalities evidenced by these cross-regional political elites.

10Even with the advent of export-oriented production, and the concomitant integration of many parts of the Philippines into the capitalist world-market (1780 to 1920), much of rural economic life remained structured as such, however oscillating between contractual, quasi-contractual, and less formalized reciprocal arrangements (Fegan 1981; McCoy 1982:6-10; McLennan 1973; Rivera 1982; Pelzer 1945: 94).

11The literature on these concepts is extensive and inappropriate use of them at times has been controversial. Early studies were forwarded by Bulatao (1964), Hollsteiner (1973), Lynch (1973), Kaut (1961), Sibley (1965). Criticisms, some more implicit than the others, can be found in Bennagen (1985), Gonzales (1982), and Enriquez (1994:68-70). Other discussions and usages, with varied inflections and emphases, include Alejo (1986) de Mesa (1987), Salazar (1981), Samonte (1973), Rafael (1993: 121-135), Mercado (1974: 53-65), Miranda (1989).

12Kervllet's discussion of the paternalistic sensibilities of the landlord, Manuel Tinio, and the affection returned by his tenants, is but one possible example among many on this count (Kervllet 1979: 5-8). Patronage, notes Gellner, is at once "a system, a style, a moral climate" (Gellner 1977:1).


14Indeed, reciprocity involves both parties, such that even elites (e.g. landowners, political patrons) had to engage in it.
On the movement from the hegemonic to the ideological, see Comaroff and Comaroff (1991: 19-32).

The fundamental element of reciprocity in Mabini’s thought seems to have been aluded in extant studies. Once elucidated, I would contend, much of his philosophical elements are cast in a different light. What follows, then, is my reading of elements of Mabini’s thought and secondary treatments of Mabini in precisely that light.

Whereas in a state of society (without government) freedom consisted mainly in doing what was right, in a civil society, it consisted in obeying the laws, provided that government was legitimate in the sense that it expressed the will of the people. This was ‘true freedom.’ It may be suggested too, that Mabini considered freedom to consist of doing actions that tended to produce ‘order’ or ‘unity of action’ in society, in order to attain the general well-being” (Majul 1967: 63-4).

See Ileto (1979: 86-87) for the masses’ Pasyon-oriented meanings of katwiran.

Hispano-Tagalog dictionaries of the period also translate “razon” as katarungan which translates into English as “justice” also (Ignacio 1922: 450) Katarungan is derived from tarong which means ‘straight, upright, appropriate, correct.’ They also translate ‘razonable’ as carampatan, from dapat, signifying fitting, appropriate, correct, all with normative overtones (Diokno 1983: 6).

Mabini, of course, was not of the same socio-economic class of many Nationalistas. But his education would have made up for that fact partially, since social divisions in Philippine society were based on education as well as on mere wealth (Cullinane 1989: 15-48). In fact, Mabini was no small figure to the early 20th century elites. Rafael Palma, one of the members of the Comité, elevated him to the status of Rizal (Palma 1931: 91). Quezon’s advisor Kalaw as well had clear appreciation and respect for Mabini’s ideology, taking the effort in fact to publish a tract on his ideology and to edit the 1931 publication of La Revolucion Filipina in which would be found Mabini’s social and political thought (Kalaw 1995: 108). Further, Mabini’s role as advisor to Aguinaldo and as one of the framers of the Malolos Constitution must be remembered, especially in light of the fact that most of signers of the 1905 petition were involved in the revolution. At least five of them, we
note, had been delegates to the Malolos Congress (Justo Lucban, Jose Ma. de la Viña, Alberto Barreto, Felix Ferrer Pascual, Miguel Zaragoza). Of course, Mabini represented only one side at the Congress, conflicting at some points with Calderon’s contingent. However, as Majul (1969: 160-182) notes, the differences and conflicts within the Congress had less to do with ideology than it did with differences over what type of organization was most preferable during crisis periods such as wartime.

Adriatico was a representative to the Philippine Assembly from Mindoro until 1912.

no habria peligro en que clase ... gobierno a las demas, porque aun asi no habria intereses encontrados ... porque habria mutua dependencia entre los varios elementos que la integran.”

The idea of a “social body” appears to have been quite prominent in this period. Rizal, of course, spoke of the “social cancer” of the body, referring to the evils of Spanish colonial rule. The metaphor of the “body” for society or “the social” was prominent even in the United States, as various thinkers conceived of the interconnections within society as making up a whole body. There were major differences, however. For Mabini, parts of the body were connected through reciprocal exchange and mutual dependence. For the late 19th to 20th century American thinkers, by contrast, the parts of the social body were imagined to be connected through the abstractions of capitalism, e.g. industry and the wage. On this, and its relation to the conceptions of the industrial workers’ body, see Go (1996b). Agpalo (1996) would later find the body metaphor as crucial for understanding politics in Mindoro in the post-war era. He would also use the metaphor himself for the various writings on what he called a “pangulo” regime (1996: 161-234).

It also included a federalist system of local governments, a constitutional bill of rightss, and elections. See Guerrero (1982: 159-65).

We might note here how the idea of harmony among the state elements must have fed into the ideas of Quezon and Osmeña, who placed great emphasis upon and actually pursued “harmony” and “cooperation” among the branches of government and various interest groups (see for example Osmeña 1926: 10-11; McCoy 1988; Hayden 1950:377). The idea of harmony might also be the basis for what Agpalo calls “the politics of incorporation” or pakiusap (Agpalo 1996:213).
This was not an isolated or marginalized notion in the milieu of the revolutionary government. Mabini’s idea of the legislature’s primacy was shared by the other key framer of the Malolos government, Felipe Calderon. Calderon also scripted the legislature as the ‘intellect.’ The “congress would be,” he wrote, “composed of the most intelligent elements of the nation” (Majul 1967:163). Relatedly, then, Calderon believed in the separation of powers without checks and balances, as instead the legislature should guide the other branches (Majul 1967: 173-4).

The structure of American colonial state apparatus was but a colonial version of the liberal-democratic state at home. It consisted of three branches, but the American-dominated Philippine Commission, as the executive branch, had ultimate veto power over the entire system, including the Philippine Legislature. It also consisted of local governments, whose officials were mostly elected Filipinos but who were supervised on the side by American field agents of sort.

Adriatico’s metaphor here must have been drawn from Rizal, who in 1889, wrote that the ilustrado class would be the “brains of the nation” leading the nation’s “nervous system” (Rizal 1922:151; Cullinane 1989:39).


The 1880’s and 1890’s had brought forth a proliferation of new histories written by Filipinos about the Philippine past. These works, written by propagandists and ilustrados such as Isabelo de los Reyes, Pedro Paterno, T. H. Pardo de Tavera, and even Rizal, portrayed the pre-hispanic barangays in idealized terms, as well-ordered “Tagalog kingdoms” wherein there was no slavery and wherein “justice” had been administered to its fullest (Paterno 1892; Morga 1890; Schumacher 1991: 108-116). The petition of 1905 drew precisely from this idealized image, contending that “historical data affirm that the Filipino people, prior to Spanish domination, had a civilization and culture of their own, derived from the purity of customs, moral practices, and conditions of its native inhabitants. It is evident that at that time an orderly government existed in the Philippines; property rights were not violated nor personal prerogatives profaned...” (11).
Much like the *datus* and the *maginoo*, then, many Filipino elites demanded signs of deference and respect from others, as when Pedro Paterno suggested to the Philippine Commission, in 1901 that “decorations” and “orders of nobility” be bestowed upon political officeholders (Williams 1913: 284) or when municipal officials protested to the Executive Bureau that they were not receiving the proper salutes from other officials visiting their locality (Forbes 1928 VII).

In the Spanish period, the local political leaders’ position as mediator between the outside and inside was perpetuated by that leaders’ ability to appropriate the power offered by the Spaniards and deploy it within their own municipalities (Rafael 1993: 163-4; Sidel 1995: 150-1).

There is a strong sense in which this meaning of *kapangyarihan* remained even through the early American period and beyond. The wearing of amulets believed to embody *kapangyarihan* was a common practice during the revolutionary period, and many elites believed in their power (Alvarez 1992: Osias 1971: 49).

One particular instance of how normal the elites thought such patronage practices to be, at least in the early years, can be seen in Daniel Williams’ account of Pedro Paterno’s speech before the Philippine Commission in 1901. Williams noted that, in speaking before the Commission, “the only thing the speaker [Paterno] wanted was that members of the Municipal Board should receive $1,000 a month instead of $4,500 a year, as provided, based on the theory that they would be so beset by the churchmen and landowners generally that they should have big pay” (Williams 1913: 284-5). Paterno here not only assumed that he would have to dole out money to “churchmen” and “landowners”, but he also gave it no second thought to admit as much to the Americans.

On the concept of the *labas* and its many semantical inflections and possible personifications, see Alejo, et. al (1996: 88-110) and Geologo (1989).

The connection between *kapangyarihan* and intelligence/education is perhaps why the *illustros* and theorists of the revolution, from Rizal to Mabini to Calderon, never questioned the elite intellectuals’ proper place as the leader of the revolution and as the managers of the Malolos government (Majul 1967:38, 163, 196). This was also perhaps why under the American regime, most if not all of the Filipino elites endorsed
the literacy restrictions on the electorate to those with knowledge of Spanish and English; knowledge derived from the ‘outside’. Whereas in the Americans’ view, such requirements were to differentiate between the “educated” and “ignorant”, in the Filipinos’ view, the requirements must have figured as gesturing towards the division between those with some semblance of kapangyarihan and those without.

37 On the role of the principales-fiscales in administering rites of passage to the dying, see Rafael (1993: 167-209).

38 See Ileto (1984). Fiery, and to the Americans’, often flowery, oration was one of the typical practices of Filipino elites during this period, perhaps another display of kapangyarihan. See the various Westerners’ reactions to such a practice in Dauncey (1906:326-7), Fee (1910: 131, 144-5), Williams (1913: 238). For a copy of one telling text which captures the display of kapangyarihan, see the text written by Dominador Gomez in support of the Nacionalista candidate Osario in Cavite (printed in the Manila Times, 3 February 1907).

39 These and other campaigning techniques can be seen in the various Reports of the Executive Secretary, in Reyes (1930: 189-268), in the Manila Times, (esp. 1-10 July 1907, 1909, 1912), and in Sidel (1995: 156-161).

40 I have discussed this display of illegality in relation to political code-switching in Go (1996c).

41 E.g., Lopez (1905, 1915), Calderon (1908).

42 Lopez was an aid to Gen. Artemio Ricarte during the Revolution. He also served under Gen. Mariano Trias. Under American rule, he was a prolific writer, dramatist, essayist, and journalist in Tagalog. He was editor of Tagalog sections of various nationalist papers, and later, in 1916, was elected to the municipal board of Manila, and eventually became technical assistant to Presidents Magsaysay and Garcia (National Historical Institute 1992 III: 154).

43 Indeed, in discussing the “respect” which a citizen should have towards the government and political leaders, Lopez refers to katwiran as a norm for mutuality between the citizen and government. “In our respect [for government leaders]”, he writes, “we should not however be fooled nor
should our rights be trampled upon because as I have said we are equal in front of *katuiran*. The respect that we should give is equal to the respect the government should give” (1905: 20).

44 On the centrality of legal-rationality within the Americans’ notion of democracy, see Go (1996c). The point is not, of course, that the ideal of reciprocity was always realized. Rather, the point is that the ideal of reciprocity was in fact an ideal within the political cosmology of the Filipino elite, and was related to an entire host of associated local meanings and concepts.

45 Both positions, in any case, are not essential “traditions” or “values” but are, as we have seen above in part, historically and socially-constructed.

46 Chakrabarty (1996) of the Subaltern Studies Collective offers what I see as a brilliant and seminal way of criticizing historiographical knowledge from within, drawing from both the mature Marx and Derrida.

47 See for example the strategic type of criticism proferred by Chakrabarty (1992) and Scott (1995b), amongst others.
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*The Manila Times*.


BAYANI AT PAGPAPAKABAYANI

_Prosporo R. Covar*

Unang Bahagi
Pag-aaral ng Isang Kilusan

Noong dekada sisenta, pinag-aralan ko ang Iglesia Watawat ng Lahi bilang kilusang panlipunan. Sinikap kong bumuo ng isang balangkas at doon ay ikinahon ko ang Iglesia Watawat ng Lahi. Gaya nang kaugalian sa paraan ng pananaliksik, ang balangkas ang nagdidikta sa pangangalap ng datos.

Sa aking binuong balangkas, nilagyan ko ng periodisasyon ang panahunan. Ito’y hinati ko sa apat na bahagi: (1) Preliminary Stage, (2) Popular Stage, (3) Formal Stage, at (4) Institutional Stage. Sa ganitong lapit, nasusundan at nasusubaybayan ang paglago/ paglalaho ng isang kilusan.

Bilang isang phenomenon, ang kilusan ay may iba’t ibang salik. Limang salik ang pinag-ukulan ko ng pansin: (1) dominant social forms, (2) characteristic conditions ng social forms, (3) typical processes, (4) effective mechanisms, at (5) types of leaders. Sa ganitong lapit, ang bawat salik ay masusundan at masusubaybayan habang ito’y umiiral, nagbabago o dili kaya’y maglalo.

Pinag-ugnay ko ang dalawang lapit sa isang balangkas. Ang balangkas ay isang matrix. Tingnan ang Table 1.0. Sa matrix na ito, ikinulong ko ang dalumat ng Iglesia Watawat ng Lahi bilang kilusan. Dalawa ang implikasyon ng lapit na aking isinagawa: una, sa pamamagitan ng matrix gusto kong mahuli ang kataalan at kalikasan ng Iglesia Watawat ng Lahi bilang isang kilusan; ikalawa, gusto kong maalaman kung valid ang matrix na aking binuo.

* Prospero R. Covar, Ph.D., Propesor ng Aghamtao, Unibersidad ng Pilipinas, Diliman, Quezon City.*
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<th>CONCEPTUAL TOOLS</th>
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<th>II. Popular Stage</th>
<th>III. Formal Stage</th>
<th>IV. Institutional Stage</th>
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<td>1. Characteristic conditions</td>
<td>1. general restlessness a. traditional values disrupted 1) tension increases 2) attention wanders 2. differences with ecclesia singled out as source of discontent</td>
<td>1. beginning of social movement discernible a. definite ideas are circulated 2. tentative program of action is presented</td>
<td>1. definite formulation of aims and doctrines 2. systematic code of rules and procedures polished</td>
<td>1. permanence a. attitudinally established b. more or less permanent permanent organization 2. drive for social acceptance</td>
</tr>
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<td>2. Typical processes</td>
<td>1. milling or circular interaction a. individual flounder b. tentative gesture or corporate action sought</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1. reference of orientation a. agitation b. suggestion c. imitation d. propaganda</td>
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Hanggang sa kasalukuyan, ang mga mananaliksik sa Pilipinas ay hati kung anong punto-de-bista ang dapat umiral. Maraming mag-aaral ang naiipit sa nag-uumpang bato.

Nang dekada sitenta, nang muli kong tinutukan ang datos ng Iglesia Watawat ng Lahi bilang isang kilusan, atap na *social forms* at nalantad. Ito ay ang mga sumusunod: (1) simulain, (2) samahan, (3) katipunan, at (4) kilusan. Ang bawat *social form* ay may kani-kaniyang katangian. Nagpapahayag din ito ng pana-panahong pag-angat o antas ng isang kilusan. Akin ding napasin na ang pag-angat ng isang kilusan ay depende sa uri at kalidad ng liderato. Ang liderato ay maaaring iugnay sa *social form* gaya ng sumusunod: simulain = *agitator*; samahan = *prophet*; katipunan = *reformer*; at kilusan = *statesman*. Sa totoo lang, hindi ako kumportable sa nasabing ugnayan ng *social forms* at liderato.

*Be that as it may*, ano ang kabuluhan nitong unang bahagi ng aking pagtalakay sa ating paksang “Bayani at Pagpapakabayani?”

Ikalawang Bahagi

“Pag-aanyo ng Pagkabayani sa Agos ng Kasaysayang Pilipino”
ni Propesor/Doctor Zeus A. Salazar

Si Propesor/Doktor Zeus A. Salazar ng Departamento ng Kasaysayan, Unibersidad ng Pilipinas ay may dalawang panayam na ginawa tungkol sa ating paksang tinatalakay. Ang pamagat ng kaniyang panayam ay, “Ang Bayani bilang Sakripisyo: Pag-aanyo ng Pagkabayani sa Agos ng Kasaysayan Pilipino.”

Bumuo si Dr. Salazar ng walong panahunan ng periodisasyon ng kasaysayan ng Pilipinas mula sa panahon ng estadong etniko ca. 300 NK
hanggang 1986 and beyond. Ang pamagat ng bawat panahon ay ang mga sumusunod:

I. Panahon ng Kabuuan (bago 1565)
II. Panahon ng Krisis (1565-1745)
III. Bagong Kabuuan (1745-1815)
IV. Bayan at Nacion (1815-1875)
V. Pagtutuus (1872-1913)
VI. Pagsasaayos ng Kabuuan (1913-1972)
VII. Mga Anyo ng Pagkabayani (1972-1986)
VIII. Tungo sa Kabuuang Pambansa (1986- )

Lumabas sa panayam ni Prop. Salazar na ang bawat panahon at estado ng lipunan ay nagbubunsod at nagbubunga ng pagpapakabayani. Ayon kay Dr. Salazar, “may konteksto sa panahon (pook pangkasaysayan) ang kabayanihan.

Sa panahon ng kabuuan (bago 1565), ang pagiging bayani ay gawain at tungkulin sa lipunan para sa bayan. Mayroon itong dalawang saklaw: (1) upang mapanatili ang kaayusan/kabuuan ng (a) sariling lipunan, at (b) ng santinakpan; (2) upang mapanatili ang pagkakaugnay-ugnay ng komunidad ayon sa kinagsisang ugali, kagalingan, at sampalataya. Ang mga bayaning nabanggit sa panahong ito ay: dato, maharlika, karaniwang tao, katalonan/babaylan. Kaugnay ng bayani sa digma ang pamumugot ng ulo at pagsasakripsisyo ng tao. Ang pagsasakripsisyo ng tao ay upang mapanatili ang lakas ng araw; pagsasaayos ng init ng araw.

Sa panahon ng krisis (1565-1745) papasok ang konsepto ng hero ng Kastila. Lilitaw sa lipunan ang tatlong uri ng pagkabayani: (1) mga bayaning mananatili ang dating tungkulin, (2) indibidwal at pansariling bayani, at (3) mga taong ang modelo ng kabayanihan ay si Jesus.

Sa bagong kabuuan (1745-1815), madadagdagan ang uri ng bayani.

Sa ika-apat na panahon (Bayan at Nacion - 1815-1875) lilitaw ang konsepto ng nacion.

Sa panahon ng Pagtutuus (1872-1913), [pagtatayo ng nacion, ani: Paghiwalay sa Espana, ang batayan ng pakikibaka ay bayan bilang dating estadong bayan.
Sa ika-VI na panahon (1913-1972) ang *nacion* bilang prinsipyo ng pagkabuo ng lipunan ay magtatagumpay. Ang mga *national heroes* ay kaanyo ng *heroes* ng Kanluran. Hindi ituturing ang mga ito na mga bayani.

Sa panahong 1972-1986, maipapasok ang kabayanihan ng mga grupong *peripheral* -- kabayanihan ang pakikibaka. Si Ninoy ang magiging simbolo ng kabayanihan sa panahong ito. Ayon kay Dr. Salazar, dalawang direksiyon ng pagkabayani ang lilitaw.

Mula 1986 hanggang sa kasalukuyan, ang bayani ay yaong mga nagtataguyod sa pagbubo ng isang bansa.

Pinatunayan sa panayam ni Propesor/Doktor Salazar na ang bawat panahon ay nagbubunga ng kani-kaniyang kabayanihan. Nakasentro ang lapit pangkasaysayan sa pangunahing aktor at aktres na kusang itinampok ng kasaysayan at historiador.

*Ika-tatlong Bahagi*

**Ang Bida Bilang Bayani sa Pelikulang Bakbakan**

Taong 1989, kinumisyon kaming dalawa ni Dr. Zeus A. Salazar ng Cultural Center of the Philippines upang panimulang pag-aralan at dalumat ang pelikulang bakbakan. Ang dinalumat ni Dr. Salazar ay “Ang Kulturang Pilipino sa Harap ng mga Institusyong Panlipunan sa Pelikulang Pakbakan.” Akin namang pinag-aralan ang “Paniniwala, Pananampalataya, at Paninindigan sa Pelikulang Bakbakan.”


Makabuluhanhang pagtutoon ng pananaliksik ang sining bilang kinapapalooban ng “*Bayani at Pagpapakabayani*.”
Ika-apat na Bahagi
Ang Pagkatao ng Bayaning Pilipino


Ang talambuhay na lapit tungkol sa bayani at pagpapakabayani ay dapat pagtuunan ng pananaliksik.

Ika-limang Bahagi
Ang Bagong Bayani ng Bansa

Beyond 1996, better still 1998, sa palagay ninyo, ano ang magiging saligan ng kabayanihan? Ang inyong hinuha is as good as mine.

Ika-25 ng Enero, 1996
Vargas Museum