THE PROBLEM OF IN-MIGRATION AND SQUATTER SETTLE-MENT IN ASIAN CITIES: TWO CASE STUDIES, MANILA AND VICTORIA-KOWLOON

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IN AUGUST 1963, THE MANILA COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE HANDED DOWN a decision that in order to effect an abatement of public nuisance, squatters in the city could be required to vacate their premises.[1] This decision, based upon a provision in the city charter, circumvented a previous court injunction against the eviction of squatters which had prevented action by the city authorities. In December, following the failure of the squatters to vacate their premises voluntarily, the city authorities undertook a large-scale eviction operation within the walls of Intramuros (the original core and fortress part of the city) which, after its devastation during the second world war, had become largely occupied by squatters entering the city as part of a large scale movement of in-migration (Fig. 1, Plates 1 and 2). Within two weeks, 2,877 shacks were demolished in the area and some 11,000 squatters moved to Sapang Palay, a small municipality of about 600 persons in Bulacan Province, some sixteen miles from Manila. The squatter areas were completely razed by fire, in accordance with previously announced plans for the restoration of the ancient Spanish walls of Intramuros, the re-paving of its streets and its transformation into a cultural center through the construction of a national museum, a city university, an open amphitheater, an art gallery, an auditorium and a convention hall.

Trucks carrying the squatters from Manila to Sapang Palay were at first turned back at the boundaries of several neighboring local government units, including the municipalities of Makati, Mandaluyong and Caloocan in Rizal Province and Quezon City (Fig. 2), on the grounds that some of the squatters might decide to settle in them. At Sapang Palay, the *Manila Chronicle* commented,[2] "There seemed to be no planning at all in the allocation of sites for squatters' new homes. They were just dumped anywhere around the community and left alone to themselves to build *barong-barongs*."[3] A representative of the national government

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[1] Details from the *Manila Chronicle*, December 1-14, 1963.
[2] *Manila Chronicle*, December 9, 1963.
[3] Temporary huts.

claimed that the action of the Manila City authorities had taken it by
surprise, though this may well have been intentional on the part of the
national government because of a running conflict with the city author-
ities as to whether squatters were primarily a local or a national respon-
sibility. A government agency, the People's Homesite and Housing Cor-
poration, with assistance from the army, thereupon started work upon
rows of single-story wooden bunkhouses roofed with corrugated iron and
partitioned off into fifteen by fifteen feet rooms, each room to serve
as temporary accommodation for one squatter family. The delivery of
additional water supplies to the site by tanker lorries was arranged, though
little could be done for the 600 children of school age who should have
been attending classes in Manila. On the spot investigation into the
problem of providing employment for the squatters within the rural area
into which they had been taken, were begun by officials of the national So-
cial Welfare Administration, the Emergency Employment Administration
and the National Cottage Industries Administration. The hope seemed to
be that small-scale manufacturing and cottage industries could be started
and the products sold in Manila. Subsequently, the President issued a
proclamation transferring responsibility for housing at Sapang Palay from
the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation to a steering committee
led by the National Economic Council with a view, it was stated, to
transforming the area into a model agro-industrial estate which would
demonstrate the feasibility of systematic squatter relocation. A national
Squatter Resettlement Agency was also established by a Presidential Exe-
cutive Order, but has since been practically inoperative because of lack
of funds.

Urbanization in the Underdeveloped World.

It is the theme of this paper to relate this somewhat confused situa-
tion to a wider context, to outline some of the more important problems
facing Metropolitan Manila through in-migration and to suggest lines
along which answers might be sought. The *barong-barongs* of Manila,
the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro, the *villas miseria* of Buenos Aires and the
barriadas of Lima are all part of a wide pattern of urban development:
illegal squatter settlements are a characteristic feature of the present rapid
urbanization of the underdeveloped world. In Africa, and to a large
extent in South America also, squatter settlements are more usually found
in a peripheral distribution around the city limits on previously uninha-
bited land. But in Asia, their growth on the peripheries of the cities has
been limited by the fact that the land is often intensely cultivated up to
the city limits, and squatters have therefore penetrated in large numbers

FIGURE 1

Not Mapped

Pasig River

|		
✚		Cathedral
✠		Church
		Other religious use
		Schools & colleges
		Community use
		Planned open space
		Vacant land
		Squatter settlement
		Private housing
		Shops
		Commercial
		Industrial
		Government use
		Office use (non-government)
		Other uses
		Ruins of Fort Santiago
– – –		Line of the walls

0   yards   400

r.d.

Land use in the Intramuros district of Manila, September, 1961. (Based upon a field survey by the writer.)

PLATE 1

Central Manila, 1961. To the left of the road is the Port Area. To the right is Intramuros. (Note the squatter shacks within its walls.) Across the Pasig River from Intramuros is Manila's central business district. (Philippine Tourist and Travel Association photograph.)

PLATE 2

Squatter settlement in the Intramuros district of Manila, September, 1961.

FIGURE 2

Local government units in Metropolitan Manila.

into the hearts of the cities as, for example, in the Intramuros area of
Manila.   Besides sterilizing potential building sites, they have frequently
occupied land within the cities that is unsuitable for permanent dwellings.
It may consist of swamps, as in certain districts of Bangkok, steep hillsides,
as in Hong Kong, low ground subject to flooding, as in Kuala Lumpur,
or even city refuse dumps.

Between 1800 and 1950, the population of the world living in cities
of 20,000 or more inhabitants increased from an estimated 21.7 millions
to 502.2 millions, or 23 times.[4]   During the same period, the total world
population expanded only 2.6 times.   The fact that the rate of world
urbanization (that is, the proportion of population living in towns and
cities to that of total population) shows no signs of slackening suggests
that the end of this process is not yet in sight, and that possibly the peak
has still to be reached.[5]   Nevertheless, within the general trend, there
are two distinct facets.   The industrialized countries are showing declin-
ing rates.   But because they embrace only one quarter of the world's popu-
lation, this has not been sufficient to retard the trend.   The massive popu-
lations of the world's underdeveloped countries, in contrast, are still in
the early stages of "an urbanisation that promises to be more rapid than
that which occurred earlier in the areas of northwest European culture." [6]

Because of the size of its population, Asia—with about 13 per cent
of its people resident in cities of 20,000 or more—is as yet the least ur-
banized of the continents, except for Africa (9 per cent).   Yet, already
Asia has more large cities and more people living in them than any other
continent.   Moreover, the rate of urban growth in Asia during this cen-
tury has far exceeded that of Europe or North America.[7]   Paradoxically
though, the rate of urbanization in Asia and the size of its major cities
are—as throughout the underdeveloped world—more expressions of lack
of economic development than the results of it.   In general, it appears
that the recent rapid urbanization of the underdeveloped world has not
been accompanied by proportional increases of workers in industry.[8]   When
the more developed countries were recording their highest rates of ur-
banization, on the other hand, they were also showing substantial in-

    [4] United Nations Secretariat, Bureau of Social Affairs, *Report on the World
Social Situation* (New York, 1957), p. 113.
    [5] Kingsley Davis, "The Origin and Growth of Urbanization in the World,"
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 60 (1954-55), p. 447.
    [6] *Ibid.*
    [7] P. M. Hauser (ed.), *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East*, U.N.E.S.C.O.
Tensions and Technology Series (Calcutta, 1957), Foreword (n.p.).
    [8] U.N. Secretariat, Bureau of Social Affairs, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-125..   For a dis-
senting view see N. V. Sovani, "The Analysis if Over-Urbanization," *Economic
Development and Cultural Change,* Vol. XII (1964), pp. 113-122.

creases in their proportions of industrial employment. It also appears
that the underdeveloped countries of today have less industrial employ-
ment as a share of total employment than did the developed countries
when the latter were at the same stage of urbanization. A large part of
the urbanization of the underdeveloped world represents at present little
more than the transfer—through in-migration of rural poverty into the
cities—where it often becomes concentrated and conspicuous in squatter
settlements.[9]

Of the many complex and integrated causes of the situation, three
are outstanding for our purposes. The first is that in the present un-
balanced state of economic growth in most Asian countries, in which a
fragile superstructure of modern industry is being erected úpon a found-
ation of a stagnant agricultural sector, even a small increase in industrial
development may cause disproportionate urban growth. From smaller
towns, in which the effect of establishing one factory or other modern
enterprise is observable, it has been reported that the increment in em-
ployment resulting specifically from such a project may well be accom-
panied by an increase in unemployment and in casual and irregular em-
ployment within the town.[10] This is because the new source of wealth
attracts large numbers from the countryside seeking to obtain some benefit
from it, usually indirectly in rendering services to those employed in
the new enterprise.

Secondly, as the primate cities [11] of Asia are still largely commercial
and administrative centers, a relatively large population of their residents
depends directly or indirectly upon the fortunes of trade with the more
developed world. Thus, the continuing industrialization and mounting
national income of the more developed countries provide indirectly a
basis for expanding city populations in Asia. The other side of the coin
here is that imports of relatively cheap manufactured goods may damage
village industries, throw the local weaver, blacksmith and potter out of
work, undermine an important basis of village life and add to the char-
acteristic poverty of the rural areas. This leads to the third point, which
is that much of Asia's recent urbanization has not occurred in response to
an economic need for large urban population concentrations, that is, from
employment opportunities in industrial development within the towns
and cities. It has primarily been the result rather of "push" factors arising

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[9] U.N. Secretariat, Bureau of Social Affairs, *op. cit.*, p. 112.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 126.
[11] See Mark Jefferson, "The Law of the Primate City," *Geographical Re-
view*, Vol. XXIX, (1939), pp. 226-232.

from the low level of rural development and, sometimes, from conditions of physical insecurity in the countryside.[12]

It is extremely difficult to estimate the volume of rural-urban migration and its precise contribution to the growth of Asia's cities because of the lack of official published data on the subject. Still, more difficult is it to estimate the numbers in each city who are illegal squatters. Some scattered estimates of the latter indicate, however, that the squatter element is considerable in most Asian cities. Thus, in 1961, Djakarta was said to have 750,000 squatters and they constituted 25 per cent of its total population.[13]   Of Delhi's 1959 population, 200,000 are estimated to have been squatters (13 per cent of the total population).[14]   There were 100,000 squatters in Kuala Lumpur in 1961 (20 per cent of the total population)[15] and 580,000 in Hong Kong in 1964 (17 per cent of the total population).[16]   Of the City of Manila's 1.4 millions in 1963, 320,000, or 23 per cent, were squatters.[17]

The problems of the Manila area have been brought into sharper focus, within the changing matrix of population distribution in the Philippines, by the publication of the 1960 national census of population.[18] This has confirmed that there has been an unprecedented growth of population in the Philippines since the second world war and that, in fact, the rate for the period 1948-60 was 3 per cent per annum, which was one of the highest in Asia. Much of the growth of population has resulted from a falling death rate, but from the evidence available, it seems that the Philippines crude death rate is still above that of Malaya, Ceylon and Taiwan, the only Asian countries with higher rates of population growth during the 1948-60 period. For this and other reasons, therefore, a United Nations study has estimated that the Philippine rate of population growth could well accelerate to 3.9 per cent by 1977.[19]

The significance of this is that the rapidly increasing growth of population in the Philippines is resulting in important movements of people

[12] Hauser, op. cit., p. 33.

[13] W. A. Hanna, Bung Karno's Indonesia (New York, 1961), p. 4.

[14] G. Breese, "Urban Development Problems in India," Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. LIII (1963), p. 263.

[15] W. J. Bennet, "Kuala Lumpur: A Town of the Equatorial Lowland," Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie, Vol. LII (1961), p. 329.

[16] Speech of the Governor of Hong Kong to the Legislative Council, as reported by Hong Kong Government Information Services, February 28, 1964.

[17] Manila Chronicle, December 3, 1963.

[18] See P. D. Simpkins and F. L. Wernstedt, "Growth and Internal Migrations of the Philippine Population, 1948 to 1960," Journal of Tropical Geography, Vol. XVI (1962), pp. 197-202.

[19] United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Growth and Manpower in the Philippines, New York (1960), pp. 6-10.

away from the most congested rural areas. The Philippine population is very unevenly distributed throughout the islands. The area of most concentrated settlement extends from the Ilocos coast of northwest Luzon, southward through the Central Plain and into parts of the hilly country south of Manila; other areas of dense settlement are found in the Visayan islands, especially the narrow coastal plains bordering Cebu, Leyte, northwest Negros and southeast Panay. These densely peopled areas in Luzon and the Visayas comprise less than one-third of the total area of the Philippines but contain two-thirds or more of the total population. Throughout much of them, according to Simpkins and Wernstedt,[20] the point of rural population saturation has been reached, if not exceeded, at their present level of development. Population densities commonly exceed 1,000 persons per square mile of cultivated land, and fairly large numbers of the agricultural population are seriously underemployed. In Luzon especially, there are also tenancy problems,[21] and a state of physical insecurity existed over large areas of the Central Plain during the early part of the intercensal period due to the Hukbalahap rebellion.

The result over the 1948-60 period appears to have been a large measure of out-migration. The central Visayas, the north coast of Mindanao and the Ilocos coastlands of Luzon, for example, increased in population at a much slower rate than the national average. Had their populations increased at the same rate as the national average, two million more people would have been recorded in these areas in the 1960 census.[22] This figure is a crude indication of the volume of population movement currently taking place. Part of the migration is to new land in central and southern Mindanao, Mindoro, Palawan and the upper Cagayan Valley of Luzon, but a significant part also is towards Manila and its suburbs. It is not possible to be precise about the volume of rural migration into Metropolitan Manila because of boundary changes in its constituent local government units during the intercensal period.[23]

Looking to the future, the United Nations study already mentioned suggests that as a minimum, the ratio of the population of Metropolitan Manila to the population of the Philippines as a whole can be expected

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[20] Op. cit., p. 198.
[21] See D. J. Dwyer, "Irrigation and Land Problems in the Central Plain of Luzon: Comment on a Sample Study," Geography, (in the press).
[22] Simpkins and Wernstedt, op. cit., p. 199.
[23] For details see Carlos P. Ramos, "Manila, Quezon City and Suburbs, A Study on Metropolitan Growth," paper prepared for the U.N. Regional Seminar on Public Administration Problems of New and Rapidly Growing Towns held in New Delhi, December, 1960 (mimeographed), Table 1, p. 3.

to increase from the 7.1 per cent of 1948 to 12 per cent in 1977 (that is, if a gradually slackening rate is assumed).[24]   This would mean a population of about 5.1 millions in Metropolitan Manila in 1977, compared with a 1960 figure of 2.1 millions.   On the other hand, should the population of the Philippines continue to rise at its present high rate, and should the past trend in the ratio of the population of Metropolitan Manila to that of the total urban population of the country be maintained, then by 1977, Metropolitan Manila could well have 6.2 million inhabitants, or one-third of the total urban population.   The latter projection could well be nearer the truth, for the United Nations considers that it may turn out to be the more realistic if Philippine industrialization continues to be highly centralized in the capital,[25] and there is no sign as yet of any stiffening in official attitudes on this point.

From these projections, a brief glance may be taken at the possible role of in-migration in the future growth of Metropolitan Manila.   National plans for economic development in the Philippines call for a shift of workers from agriculture to manufacturing and other industries: this alone will almost certainly increase the proportion living in urban areas. It has been estimated that, if development proceeds according to plan, an increase in the urban population of 10.5 millions, or 130 per cent, can be expected during the twenty years, 1957-77.[26]   As far as Metropolitan Manila is concerned, its population total for 1977 based upon a 3.2 per cent annual natural increase alone (the projected national average rate of population growth for the period 1955-77) would be 3.7 millions.   If the United Nations "high estimate" of a total of 6.2 millions by 1977 proves true, therefore, there will be a net in-migration of 2.5 millions to be dealt with during the period.   This would comprise not only migrants from the rural areas but also those from the smaller towns and the poblaciones.[27]   Even the "low estimate" for Metropolitan Manila of 5.1 millions by 1977, which seems unlikely, includes 1.4 million in-migrants.   It will be evident from these calculations, as inexact as they may prove to be, that Metropolitan Manila's present urban problems, particularly those of squatter settlement, are not now as serious as they will undoubtedly become in the forseeable future, in the absence of any radical new attack upon them.

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[24] United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

[25] Ibid., p. 15.

[26] Ibid., pp. 12-14.

[27] Each municipality, into which the provinces are divided, has a number of rural centers or barrios and one poblacion in which the municipal buildings are located.

The Problem in a National Context.

The point has already been made that a large part of the problem of internal migration towards Asia's cities—as of the present Asian level of over-urbanization—is attributable to economic underdevelopment and particularly to the inbalance between efforts to develop manufacturing industry in the primate cities and the almost unchanging face of rural poverty in the countryside. The rural hinterlands of Asia's cities are relatively untouched by modern farming techniques, by community development projects or by those elements of an infrastructure that would facilitate the wider distribution of industry. Hence the few great cities attract the bulk of new enterprise and continue as the only centers of modern production. As Mansani has written of India, "By rural standards all town dwellers, including industrial workers were a privileged class. While the bulk of taxation was borne by the agrarian classes, the State spent most of the money in the cities and towns." [28] Clearly, in these circumstances, a large number of the answers to problems of in-migration and squatter settlement must be sought on a national level. There can be no overall solutions except within a context of relatively rapid economic growth and, if the problems of the agricultural sector prove intractable, ways must at least be found of spreading some of the fruits of such growth in the towns into the rural areas.

Whether rural development can in itself be expected to decrease the volume of rural-urban migration is, however, highly questionable.[29] Unless there is a substantial (and unlikely) growth of village industries, for example, it would appear that a general improvement in farming techniques should increase productivity and therefore reduce rural manpower requirements. New roads will make it easier to market crops, but easier also to travel to the cities. There is some evidence that the provision of a few years of education is a powerful stimulant for young people to leave the villages for the cities. It has also been suggested that it is not necessarily the lowest levels of rural life that migrate, and that migrants in fact often came rather from the strata that is not overwhelmed by apathy and ignorance. Rural development can, nevertheless, contribute significantly to raising the overall level of national economic development since in many underdeveloped countries slow rates of increase in agricultural production are being offset by a high level of increase in rural population,

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[28] M. R. Mansani, *The Communist Party of India* (New York, 1954), p. 14, quoted by R. I. Crane in "Urbanism in India," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. LX (1954-55), p. 465.

[29] See United Nations Secretariat, Bureau of Social Affairs, *op. cit.,* pp. 128-129.

and imports of food for many of Asia's cities are absorbing capital that might otherwise be spent upon economic development.   This is particularly true of the Philippines, which has one of the lowest overall yields of rice in Asia.   Another, and in the long run more important, aspect of this situation is that with each increment of rural development, some expansion of the market for manufactured goods produced in the cities should occur.

Lastly, only within the framework of an infrastructure created as part of successful rural development can there take place the expansion of smaller urban centers, particularly those inland, that is necessary to provide urban growth points alternative to those of the primate cities and capable of receiving a share of migration from countryside.   As Watts has pointed out, in most countries, a proportion of migrants arrives at the metropolis after having stopped at one or more smaller towns on the way and failing to find employment in them.[30]   He contends that general living conditions for the migrant are likely to be better in all respects in a smaller town than a metropolis, but that the vital part of what the smaller towns lack at present is a measure of industrial employment.   If this is so, a crucial question for each Asian government in respect of national policy towards rural-urban migration and the problem of squatter settlement then becomes whether it is possible, politically as well as economically, to encourage some of the new industries to seek locations in smaller towns rather than in metropolitan areas.   The attractive advantages enjoyed by the primate cities in respect of industrial location are many, but they are not necessarily insuperable.   A recent seminar on industrial estates convened by the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East concluded that "Although the location of industrial estates in or near metropolitan and other big cities offered a number of undoubted economic advantages, such as the availability of basic facilities at low cost, industrial climate and market near at hand, a point was reached beyond which countervailing social considerations would make it necessary to locate estates at sufficient distance from the cities.   Among these considerations were overstrained capacity of public utilities, population congestion, growing pressure on space and soaring land prices . . . location of estates in the rural areas presented problems of an opposite kind—comparative shortage or almost lack of basic facilities, difficulties of transport and absence of industrial atmosphere—but held out promise of providing employment and income to workers nearer their places of residence." [31]

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[30] Kenneth Watts, "Small Town Development in the Asian Tropics, Problems and Possibilities," *Town Planning Review*, Vol. XXXIV (1963), p. 21.

[31] United Nations, E.C.A.F.E., *Report of the Seminar on Industrial Estates* (1961), quoted by Watts, *op. cit.*, 23-24.

The Example of Hong Kong.

Even within a context of sufficient national economic growth, the fruits of which are well distributed, problems of in-migration and squatter settlement are likely to remain unsolved unless local situation are carefully analyzed and individual policies for each city well thought out, co-ordinated on a national level and speedily executed. In this respect, more has probably been achieved to date in the Victoria-Kowloon urban area of Hong Kong than in any other of Asia's major cities.[32] Hong Kong's pre-war population of 1.6 millions had expanded to 3.1 millions by 1961 due mainly to the influx of over one million refugees from Mainland China since 1948. Many of the refugees crowded into tenement buildings in the urban areas that were subdivided into minimal rooms, cubicles and even mere bedspaces (see Table 1). In addition, flat roof spaces were let, and many families found sleeping room on the pavements and elsewhere. The code plan for the 1961 census of Hong Kong included designations for cocklofts, staircases, passages, hawker stalls, caves, tunnels and sewers.[33] But even such human infilling as this failed to accommodate the rising population, and from 1949 onwards camps of squatters—previously only a minor expression of the postwar housing shortage—began to mushroom in and around the cities (Fig. 3). As an official Hong Kong account put it, "Their need was so great and so pressing that they had no thought for the ownership of the land and it would have required an army of police to have restrained them. Virtually every sizeable vacant site that was not under some form of physical or continuing protection was occupied, and when there was no flat land remaining, they moved up the hillsides and colonized the ravines and slopes that were too steep for normal development." [34]

It has been estimated that between 1949 and 1956 the squatter population of Hong Kong rose from 30,000 to 300,000 persons; [35] as has already been mentioned that by 1964, it had become 580,000. The total area of the Colony is only 390 square miles, and land was extremely scarce even for the squatter. The result was a density of settlement in single story huts that in places reached 2,000 persons an acre, and a proliferation of huts subdivided into mere cubicles, which in some cases held five or six persons in a space of 40 square feet. The largest of the squatter camps

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[32] See T. D. Vaughan and D. J. Dwyer, "Some Aspects of Postwar Population Growth in Hong Kong," *Economic Geography*, (in the press).
[33] K. M. A. Barnett, *Hong Kong: Report on the 1961 Census*, Hong Kong Vol. I (1962), p. xxv.
[34] Hong Kong Government, *A Problem of People* (Hong Kong, 1960), pp. 12-13.
[35] Hong Kong Government, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1956* (Hong Kong, 1957), p. 16.

became that of Shek Kip Mei on the outskirts of Kowloon (Fig. 3), which at its peak held 80,000 persons. Within the close, almost impenetrable density of this huge and squalid settlement shops, small factories, schools, opium divans and brothels flourished without the knowledge of the government, and there was a continued risk of epidemics and fire. The former fortunately did not occur, but squatter fires became usual with each dry season. In addition to fire, health, moral and possible political hazards, those squatter camps within the Victoria-Kowloon urban area sterilized land urgently needed for permanent housing and industrial development. Large concentrations of squatters had by 1954 brought the expansion of Kowloon almost to a stop. At its height, a belt of squatter settlement stretched in a six-mile "conurbation" of illegal camps across the northern fringes of the city, not only occupying valuable building land but also obstructing access to potential sites further out.

After an initial small-scale resettlement scheme, which was started in 1951 and had proved patently inadequate by 1954 (9,000 units of single story hutted accommodation were provided during this period and 30,000 persons resettled), the Government of Hong Kong began a major resettlement program which is still continuing.[36] In it the Government decided to assume direct responsibility for the squatters and to enter the field of resettlement using public funds and its own constructional resources. Its immediate occasion was a fire in the Shek Kip Mei squatter area on Christmas night, 1953, which rendered 50,000 persons homeless but also cleared 45 acres for redevelopment. To deal with this situation, a new government department—the Department of Resettlement—was established with authority over registration, clearance and all the processes of resettlement. It was accepted that the problem could not be solved unless the squatters were rehoused in areas substantially smaller than they had occupied in squatter conditions, and this led to resettlement taking place in buildings of six or seven stories (Plates 3 and 4). The acceptance of this principle, and with it extremely high density housing (up to 2,000 persons per acre), has made it possible for the majority of the resettlement estates completed so far to be located in the suburbs of Kowloon, where the bulk of the squatter working population has been able to find employment in Hong Kong's booming industries. Separate wholly industrial resettlement blocks have also been built to house squatter factories removed from land required for permanent development.

By February 1964, 605,000 squatters had been resettled in estates.[37] The resettlement blocks now being built consist usually of seven stories,

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[36] *A Problem of People, op. cit.,* pp. 19-22.
[37] Speech of the Governor of Hong Kong to the Legislative Council, as reported by Hong Kong Government Information Services, February 28, 1964.

with flat roofs strengthened and fenced so as to add space for recreation, and shops or schools occupying the ground floors. Communal bathing rooms on a scale of one to every 35 domestic rooms are provided; no water is piped into them, however, and washing must be done by bucket and scoop. The basic design of each block is an H shape, the long arms of the H consisting of separate rooms, one for each family, and the cross-piece containing communal water supplies, latrines and an open space for washing clothes (Fig. 4). There are four staircases, one at each corner of the building. Each room is 120 square feet in area and access is by a balcony running completely round the long arm of the H. Electric light is provided. The average density of resettlement is five adults to a room (a child of ten years or under counting as half an adult) and smaller families are required to share a room. As the Hong Kong authorities themselves state, "The allowance of 24 square feet to an adult may represent a considerable degree of overcrowding by normal standards, but this was emergency accommodation; it was sanitary, weatherproof, and fire-proof, and it was more realistic to judge it by what it replaced rather than by arbitrary standards of what is desirable." [38] It is worth noting that this attitude was recently endorsed by UNESCO and the United Nations Bureau of Social Affairs in considering problems of urbanization in Latin America. Urging experiments in mass housing involving some measure of departure from present standards of space and amenities, they contended that "Most housing agencies . . . may have no choice if they are to reach the masses of the shanty towns." [39]

Besides the detailed squatter survey, transfer and other resettlement methods employed by the Hong Kong Government's Resettlement Department, which are explained in its annual reports,[40] the economics of resettlement in multistory buildings may well prove applicable, at least in part, to other Asian cities. It has been found in Hong Kong that, given an efficient building industry, a seven story resettlement building can be completed in about eight weeks, once the piling is completed, and that it is possible to relate rentals to the cost of construction and still keep them within the means of the squatters.[41] The only subsidy the government gives the resettlement program is land for the schemes at one half the market price. It does, however, advance funds for capital expenditure on a 40-year loan at 3.5 per cent interest per annum. In 1956 a block containing 432 rentable rooms could be constructed for 795,600 dol-

[38] Hong Kong Government, A Problem of People, op. cit., p. 25.
[39] P. M. Hauser (ed.) Urbanization in Latin America, UNESCO (Paris, 1961), p. 318.
[40] See, for example, Annual Departmental Report 1962-3, Commissioner for Resettlement Hong Kong Government (Hong Kong, 1963).
[41] Hong Kong Government, A Problem of People, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

TABLE 1

Classification of Accommodation

Hong Kong Island and Kowloon (1961 Census)

TYPE OF ACCOMMODATION	NO. OF PERSONS			TOTAL
	HONG KONG IS.	KOWLOON *	NEW KOWLOON *	
Space not in a building	11,441	7,004	10,228	28,673
Room, bedspace etc. in wooden house or shack	52,103	28,276	55,194	135,573
Whole wooden house or shack	90,119	24,418	107,948	222,485
Whole concrete brick or stone house	51,270	36,202	53,917	141,389
Concrete brick or stone house:				
1. Self-contained flat	228,326	119,372	82,074	429,772
2. Room or cubicle	436,152	389,464	480,490	1,306,106
3. Bedspace	67,197	47,861	22,637	137,695
4. Basement	9,338	1,763	919	12,020
5. Veranda or cockloft	23,484	28,387	14,050	65,921
6. Non-domestic living space	17,715	16,662	12,825	47,202
Roof	17,730	25,768	12,567	56,065
Total	1,004,875	775,177	852,849	2,632,901

* The areas designated as Kowloon New Kowloon in the 1961 Census were together somewhat larger than the actual urban area of Kowloon (see Barnett, *op. cit.*, Census Plan No. 1). The proportional relationship of the figures for the various groupings can, however, be taken as fairly representing housing conditions in Kowloon.

Source: Barnett, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 1.

lars (i.e., Hong Kong dollars, six of which equal one U.S. dollar). It would require 23,000 square feet of building land which, at half price, might be valued at 230,000 dollars. A further 65,239 dollars covered such outgoings as amortization, crown rent, maintenance, administration and miscellaneous recurrent expenditure. To pay off these sums, a rent for each room inclusive of rates, of 12.5 dollars was necessary, but to this were added one dollar for water and 50 cents for bad debts, giving a total monthly rental of 14 dollars. Although the rents from multistory estates were running at that time at 3.5 million dollars a year, only 1,213 dollars had been written off as irrecoverable arrears.

FIGURE 3

Squatter areas and resettlement estates in Hong Kong, 1963.   The city of Victoria
lies along the north coast of Hong Kong Island.

PLATE 3

The Wong Tai resettlement estate, Kowloon. When this photograph was taken, the estate held 50,000 persons and was being extended to take an additional 20,000. (Hong Kong Government Information Service photograph.)

PLATE 4

Close-up of part of a Hong Kong resettlement block. Squatter shacks occupy the hillside in the background. (Hong Kong Government Information Service photograph.)

FIGURE 4

Floor plan of a typical seven-story resettlement block in Hong Kong.

The Situation in Manila.

It will be clear from earlier sections of this paper that if problems of in-migration and squatter settlement are to be tackled successfully, most of Asia's primate cities will, in the immediate future, probably be called upon to produce an effort not far short of that of the Hong Kong Government within the Victoria-Kowloon urban area. As far as Metropolitan Manila is concerned, there would seem to be a series of significant obstacles to an attack of such intensity upon the problem (even if it is not to take place along the same lines). These arise partly from fundamental differences in forms of government and local administration between the Philippines and Hong Kong, but in part also from the necessity of certain reforms and changes in attitudes within the Philippines.

A major and irreconcilable point of difference is that colonial rule in Hong Kong, which involves no measure of popular control, has enabled government officials to work within an atmosphere of benevolent despotism rather than one in which it is necessary to trim public policies carefully in response to pressure groups, the clamor of the most vocal sections of the population and the necessity for keeping at least half an eye on the next election. Further, in Hong Kong there is no division of interests between the government of the cities and that of the colony as a whole, since separate city government is almost non-existent. As Szczepanik has pointed out, in Hong Kong the Urban Council does not enjoy the municipal functions usually associated with such a title.[42] It has no revenue from rates or taxes; its expenditure is regulated as that of a government department; in fact, it simply replaced the Sanitary Board in 1935 and exists almost solely to carry out its duties. All land in Hong Kong belongs to the Crown. Private development is through leases sold by auction, and the terms of these usually include a building covenant in order to prevent land being held idle for speculative purposes and to control its use. Since the second world war, a Town Planning Ordinance that was enacted before the war has been used by the Public Works Department to prepare and enforce zoning plans [43] and to lay out two new industrial towns adjacent to Kowloon, which themselves have been used in part for sites for squatter resettlement estates.[44]

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[42] Edward Szczepanik, *The Economic Growth of Hong Kong* (London, 1958), p. 15.

[43] See, for example, Director of Public Works, Hong Kong, *City of Victoria: Central Area Redevelopment Plan* (Hong Kong, 1961), and Planning Division, Public Works Department, *Tsuen Wan and District Outline Development Plan* (Hong Kong, 1963).

[44] See David C. Y. Lai and D. J. Dwyer, "Tsuen Wan: A New Industrial Town in Hong Kong," *Geographical Review*, Vol. LIV (1964), pp. 151-169.

In the politically conscious and administravely highly centralized Philippines, in contrast, a major point currently at issue is the relationship between city administrations and the national authorities.[45]   A Local Autonomy Law (Republic Act No. 2264) was passed in 1959, and a further attempt to decentralize functions and powers further to local government (S. No. 553) was introduced into the Senate recently.   The mayors of twenty-four of the twenty-eight chartered cities in the Philippines are at present appointed by the national government, the exceptions being those of Manila, Ozamis City, Bacolod and Tacloban, who are elected every four years.   Often, the appointed incumbents and the persons they bring with them into city government have more political than administrative virtues.   If, as has happened, on the other hand, an elected mayor is a member of an opposition party, he can expect little co-operation from the national authorities.   City charters are created, revoked or altered by Congress.   They are often out of date, but change can easily be blocked in Congress by interested pressure groups.   The city government of Manila is currently seeking to set up a new Social Welfare Bureau which is to deal in part with relocation and rehabilitation of squatters, but to do so it has had to seek to amend the city charter and has had to file a bill for this purpose (H. No. 8885) with Congress.   Because of internal political jockeying, not only the quality but also the level of execution of city government is frequently low.   Liaison men have in the past had to be employed in Manila to improve communication between the Mayor and the Municipal Board.[46]

As was indicated during the removal of the squatters from Intramuros to Sapang Palay, relations between adjacent local government units fre· quently lack cordiality also.   Metropolitan Manila is composed of three cities—Manila, Pasay and Quezon cities—and five municipalities belonging administratively to Rizal Province—Caloocan, Makati, Mandaluyong, Para· ñaque and San Juan (Fig. 2.).   There is as yet no body to co-ordinate their often diverging interests and to make overall policy decisions for the urban area as a whole.   This kind of situation is by no means unusual in large cities—as a recent United Nations study has stated, "The problems of administration and local self-government arising from the spread of cities beyond their nominal boundaries have not been solved even by the countries with the longest experience of urbanisation" [47]—yet, perhaps Bogota could here provide an example for Metropolitan Manila.   Faced

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[45] See J. H. Romani and M. Ladd Thomas, *A Survey of Local Government in the Philippines*, Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines (Manila, 1954).
[46] Ramos, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
[47] United Nations Secretariat, Bureau of Social Affairs, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

with similar problems of city growth, in-migration and squatter settlement as are being experienced in Asian cities, the Colombian authorities created in 1954 a Special District to control the metropolitan area of Bogota; in the arrangement, certain functions were retained by the constituent municipalities.

A feature of Manila and other Philippine cities is that there are large tracts of unoccupied urban land obviously being held for speculative purposes. This is partly a result of the failure to levy and collect a realistic property tax, which minimizes the out-of-pocket costs of idle land.[48] The maximum tax rates the cities are permitted to levy on property are set out in their respective charters. They are usually extremely low, but even so are not often levied in full. According to Golay, in 1956, the actual levy in 22 cities was only one per cent and only five cities levied the permitted maximum.[49] Quezon City, for example, imposed a tax of 1.25 per cent, whereas it could have taxed at a maximum of 2 per cent. The city of Manila (1.5 per cent) imposes the maximum permitted by its charter but, as in the case of other Philippine cities, its assessed values are frequently well below market values. Furthermore, it is general for large amounts of assessed property taxes to be waived for various reasons (including, in case, rat infestation [50]), and high rates of tax delinquency are common. In Naga City, for example, 50-60 per cent of the property taxes have been delinquent in recent years.[51] While landowning interests predominate in both national and local politics, there are few grounds for expecting this situation to be fundamentally reformed.

Lastly, there is room for considerable improvement in national and local attitudes towards the physical planning of towns and cities and the implementation of such plans. Physical planning in the Philippines has for too long been at the mercy of political whim for any major city improvements to have emerged from its application. An Urban Planning Commission was created in 1946 to prepare general plans for the zoning and subdivision of urban areas.[52] With the inauguration of a new national administration, the Commission was supplemented in 1947 with a Real Property Board to deal with problems involving real estate in connection with the planning of the city of Manila. Neither body, however, had any effect. A Capital City Planning Commission was created in 1948 and charged with the preparation and execution of a master plan for the new

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[48] F. H. Golay, *The Philippines: Public Policy and National Economic Development* (Ithaca, New York, 1961), p. 209.
[49] *Ibid.* p. 207.
[50] *Ibid.,* p. 208.
[51] Romani and Thomas, *op. cit.,* p. 105.
[52] Details from Ramos, *op. cit.,* pp. 6-9.

national capital at Quezon City. The plan was completed in 1949, but so far no action has been taken on it except for the purchase of a few lots for offices by the national government and the adoption of a zoning and subdivision ordinance by the Quezon City authorities in 1956.

With a change of government in 1949, the Capital City Planning Commission, the Real Property Board and the Urban Planning Commission were abolished and their powers transferred to an agency within the office of the President known as the National Planning Commission. A master plan for the city of Manila was completed by the National Planning Commission in 1954.[53] The Municipal Board of Manila conducted public hearings on the plan but has since failed to enact new zoning ordinances for the city. Ramos attributes this to internal dissension on the Board and points out that the city of Manila continues to grow on a 1940 zoning ordinance, which itself was based on a town plan designed in 1928, when about half a million people occupied an area that now holds more than twice as many.[54] Meanwhile, the Local Autonomy Law of 1959 empowered local municipal boards and city councils to adopt their own subdivision and zoning regulations. Although the National Planning Commission might be consulted, it reserved to local interests (in the case of Metropolitan Manila each of its eight constituent parts) the final decision on master plans prepared by the national government.

In a recent bill that has so far failed to pass Congress (H. No. 8518), the national government now proposes to create an Urban Development Authority to bring together the existing People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, the National Planning Commission and a new Urban Financing Commission in order to take charge of urban redevelopment and the floating of bonds for the purchase of the necessary land. It remains to be seen whether this proposed body will be able to provide the kind of radical reforms that are needed to solve the problems of in-migration and squatter settlement in Metropolitan Manila.

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[53] National Planning Commission, *Master Plan, City of Manila*, (Manila, 1954).

[54] *Ibid.* p. 7.