

# SOVIET AND CHINESE REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY: COMPARISON AND EVALUATION AT THE PRESENT

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FOR TOO LONG THE STUDY OF COMMUNISM AND COMMUNIST movements has preceded as *sui generis*, with no concern for its relation to broader academic areas of inquiry or for some of the more pertinent questions of the epoch. Scholars in Communist affairs have passed their colleagues working in other areas of academic inquiry like ships in a foggy sea, heading for similar destinations and using analogous navigational aids yet relatively unaware of each other's existence. The study of political development and modernization is uniquely suitable in bridging this gap and enabling the ships to pool their resources. It is the purpose of this paper to make this linkage and establish this synthesis.

Political modernization is characterized by the extension of the power of the central legal, administrative, and political agencies of society. Potential power is extended to wider groups in the society and the former are incorporated into a "consensual moral order."<sup>1</sup> Traditional commitments are eroded and people become available for new socialization patterns.<sup>2</sup> The main focus of commitment for most individuals is transferred from "community to society and from the local to the national sphere."<sup>3</sup>

Tension and potential conflict are endemic in this process of dynamic forceful change. As the long established values and traditions of the old society are called into question, simultaneously the possibility arises of drawing broad groups into society and alienating other groups from the emerging new political constellation, especially those who resist change. Incipient conflict becomes centralized and the focus of the entire social system.<sup>4</sup>

The elites coming to power in these transitional societies must create a broad identification with the new polity, and mobilize support for their programs. They must maintain themselves in power and come to grips

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<sup>1</sup> S. N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics: a Reader*. (New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 583.

<sup>3</sup> C. E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization. A Study in Comparative History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967) (Torchbook edition), p. 24.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66.

with outstanding social, economic, and political problems.<sup>5</sup> They must create a viable government as part of a social system that can continuously innovate without falling apart. This includes a basic acceptance of the legitimacy of change, differentiated, flexible social structures, and a social framework able to provide the skills and knowledge requisite for a technologically advanced world.<sup>6</sup>

But it is in this precise area, that of creating a political system and social structure capable of absorbing continually changing problems and demands, that modernizing systems are woefully inadequate. The level of institutionalization of these systems, the adaptability, complexity, and autonomy of the organization and procedures of the political system is low.<sup>7</sup> The new political centers, heirs of the old colonial regimes, command but little identification and civic allegiance. With the high level of demands arising from the rapidly mobilized masses, the elites, in seeking broad support may be unable to "assume the initial institutionalization of political frameworks capable of absorption of change."<sup>8</sup> New political forces emerge, creating demands on the elite and splits within its ranks, weakening the already shakey central institutions. Thus a dual crisis emerges, one resulting from traditional groups who resist modernization, the other from a massive increase of demands on the political system from newly politically active groups. The system's "circuits" are overloaded and a situation of almost chronic chaos emerges.

### The Soviet Experience

Eisenstadt develops the concept of "split-up modernization" to describe societies where the push to modernization historically was split-up between different groups in society. Historically, this produced greater and greater conflicts between them as modernizing tendencies proceeded. An intelligentsia developed, closed in itself, alienated from the centers of power, inactive in the economic and civic sphere, yet intensely concerned with the problems of modernization on an ideological and political level. The ruling oligarchies or autocratic regimes lost their ability to control the modernization process in their societies, with war culminating the ongoing crisis after the defeat of the incumbent rulers. In the case of Russia, the process of alienation had proceeded much further than in internal nationalist systems like Turkey and Mexico. The new elites had

<sup>5</sup> Eisenstadt, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

<sup>6</sup> David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967) (paperback edition), p. 67.

<sup>7</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII, No. 3. (April 1965), p. 394.

<sup>8</sup> Eisenstadt, *op. cit.*, p. 123. Huntington notes that in systems affected by social change new groups seek to participate in politics. If the political system is not autonomous such groups gain entry into politics without acquiescing in established political procedures or becoming identified with the prevailing political organization. Political organization and procedures cannot stand up to the new social forces. (*op. cit.*, p. 402).

much broader international orientations and sought a "total transformation of the symbols of identification of the society," and the establishment of a "new social order, based on the revolutionary ideological tenets."<sup>9</sup>

The Soviets have considered their early situation analogous to that of today's "emerging" societies. They have professed to believe that their very existence provides a "model" useful for replication, at least as a system of power, if not in all particulars.<sup>10</sup> In this connection Black has observed that "Communism, like any other highly disciplined political organization, has distinct advantages if it is competing with less power-conscious groups in times of national emergency and disorder."<sup>11</sup>

Huntington has contended that one highly institutionalized party is a prerequisite to stability where traditional political institutions are weak or non-existent. In this sense the Bolshevik concept of the political party is relevant to modernizing societies. Seeking to expand political participation, the Communists' "specialization is organization," their "goal the mobilization of the masses into their organizations."<sup>12</sup> The attraction of communism as a result of the Soviet Union's existence and its successes in the material and technological realm has been attested to by other students of the subject.<sup>13</sup> In addition to its militant anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism in the international sphere, Communist ideology provides a policy of forced savings and planned investment in the name of "socialist industrialization." It gives a meaning to the uprooting of traditional life, and all the frightening aspects of social and technological change.<sup>14</sup>

Societies seeking to industrialize experience malintegration in the institutional and organizational spheres and, already burdened by the crisis of industrialization, become vulnerable to totalitarian ideologies.<sup>15</sup> This is the motive force behind what Apter calls the party of solidarity with an "institutionalization of leadership, ideology of authority, and organization of structural relationships along strongly articulated lines."<sup>16</sup> The party answers the need to hold movements and society together after the heroic aura of national leaders like Toure, etc. begins to fade, espe-

<sup>9</sup> Eisenstadt, *op. cit.*, p. 106. He also applies this concept to China.

<sup>10</sup> See Richard Pipes, "Communism and Russian History" in Donald W. Treadgold, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Communism. Similarities and Differences* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967 (paperback edition), pp. 3-24.

<sup>11</sup> Cyril Black, "Political Modernization," in Kurt London, ed., *Unity and Contradiction. Major Aspects of Sino-Soviet Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 17.

<sup>12</sup> Huntington, *op. cit.*, pp. 425, 428.

<sup>13</sup> See, for example, Peter Worsley, *The Third World. A Vital New Force in International Affairs* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 99.

<sup>14</sup> Richard Lowenthal, "The Points of the Compass," in John H. Kautsky, ed., *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries. Nationalism and Communism* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962), p. 340. See also the essays by Kautsky and Watnick.

<sup>15</sup> Apter, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 197.

cially after independence. The party of solidarity seeks to develop a different form of consciousness and morality and human investment in mass action to undertake development projects. The party demands total allegiance from the individual in all spheres of life. The party of solidarity is part of a "mobilization system," designed to inculcate the state as a living organism embodying the people into a mystical whole. Such a system seeks to combine wide participation in social and material life and militantly disciplined political control to enhance stability and organization in the name of sacrifice and lofty objectives.<sup>17</sup> Such a party and system sound strikingly, but misleading, like a Communist vanguard and the ideology and organizational structure of the latter have a certain attractiveness.

### The Soviet Revolutionary Strategy

Revolution has been described in various ways by students of the subject. Janos considers it the "ultimate and most extreme form of the crisis of authority. It is the complete dissolution of ties between rulers and ruled, and the rise of new loyalties and structures of force in the place of old ones."<sup>18</sup> Johnson characterizes the phenomenon in terms of "goal culture."

When the goal culture of an insurrectionary ideology envisions the recasting of the social division of labor according to a pattern which is self-consciously unprecedented in the context of a particular social system, then we should use the term "revolution". Revolutions of course also involve attacks upon certain persons, all insurrections have that as a goal. But revolution intends to accomplish more. It is distinguished from its nearest rival, the ideological rebellion, *by its conscious espousal of a new social order*, the ideal of 'self-determination', or the principles of 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.'<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 210, 259, 304-305. He says that the extreme case of this system is totalitarian but adds that "Most new nations fall far short of that", a point which will be elaborated. In addition, ideology is a means of legitimating a new, unprecedented order of authority, a rationale for a new pattern of political obligations. Government in a new nation, limited and thwarted in its modernizing drive by traditional commitments of loyalty and social relations, needs an ideology that encourages and justifies a new common loyalty to the nation, not a doctrine of individuation of social pluralism. See Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, Crawford Young, *Issues of Political Development* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1967), pp. 147-198.

<sup>18</sup> Andrew C. Janos, *The Seizure of Power: A Study of Force and Popular Consent* (Princeton, New Jersey: Research Monograph No. 16. Center of International Studies. Princeton University, Feb. 17, 1964), p. 3.

<sup>19</sup> Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston: Little Brown and Company), p. 138. (author's italics) Or consider Rosenau's distinction between personnel wars, authority wars, and structural wars. Only the structural war seeks to: 1. Change the occupants of existing roles in the existing structure of political authority. 2. Alter the assignment of roles in the structure of political authority. 3. Alter either other substructures of society or major domestic and foreign policies. See James Rosenau, "Internal Wars as an International Event," in James Rosenau, ed., *International Aspects of Civil Strife* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), p. 63.

One might well ask whether the Soviet Union is properly a revolutionary power at all, based on these criteria. Current developments within the Soviet Union and the apparent decline of revolutionary fervor provide grounds for doubt. Despite this, however, the Soviets still envision international relations as existing in constant flux and seek to transform the structure of societies and the international system itself. The Soviet Union seeks to exploit and if possible direct the course of development in the emerging areas in the face of nuclear weaponry and its desire to avoid war with the United States.<sup>20</sup> It seeks to protect the security of the Communist international system by restricting the influence of the advanced countries and their allies, promoting neutralism in the uncommitted countries, and promoting a "transition to socialism" in the new and developing countries, *i.e.*, the eventual establishment of Communist power.<sup>21</sup>

Some Soviet commentators believe that many of the socialist programs adopted by the modernizing elites in the developing areas will eventually transform the social structures of transitional societies into something approximating that of the Communist states. This will occur if only they will change their policies and convert to communism. The growing military, political, and economic might of the Soviet Union, the availability of Marxism-Leninism as a "scientific" theory of modernization, especially in the context of the aforementioned legitimacy-institutionalization crisis and the existence of Communists in these countries to "push" the nationalists in the right direction will all facilitate this goal.<sup>22</sup>

Since the time of Lenin,<sup>23</sup> Soviet writings and stratagems have manifest the possibility of limited collaboration with nationalist elites in the developing countries. One Soviet analyst contended that "At the contemporary historical stage a real possibility exists of utilizing transitional

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<sup>20</sup> See Klaus Knorr, *On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 135. For a restatement of the Soviet view that war is not necessary for revolution and may even be harmful, see A.M. Kovalev, "War and Revolution" (*Filosofie Nauki*, 1965, no. 2) translated in *The Soviet Review — a Journal of Translations*, VI, No. 4. (Winter 1965-1966).

<sup>21</sup> Thomas P. Thornton, "Communist Attitudes Toward Asia, Africa and Latin America," in Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, ed., *Communism and Revolution. The Strategic Uses of Political Violence* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 247. Thornton adds that security takes precedence over the seizure of power but Soviet doctrine on this point would still regard the eventual establishment of Communist (pro-Soviet) power as most effectively guaranteeing security and therefore to be preferred as an eventuality.

<sup>22</sup> See Donald S. Zagoria, "Russia, China, and the New States," in Treadgold, *op. cit.*, p. 412. The article is invaluable for a detailed, documented survey of Soviet writings on the subject.

<sup>23</sup> For a current restatement of Lenin's position espousing collaboration with non-Communist elements in the developing countries, as opposed to M.N. Rõy's, see A. Reznikov, "V. I. Lenin o Natsional 'no Osvoboditel' nom Dvizhenii" (V. I. Lenin on the national liberation movement), *Kommunist*, No. 7. May, 1967.

links, steps, and examples capable of facilitating the transition of society from precapitalist relations to socialist." There is such a drawing together of the national democratic and socialist revolutions that "at times it would be difficult to trace out a sharp boundary between them." It could be said that "the national-democratic and socialist revolutions are in contemporary conditions two different but organically connected stages of a single revolutionary process."<sup>24</sup>

In another article in a leading Soviet journal on international affairs, the same author argued that such an interweaving of the tasks of the national-liberation, national-democratic revolutions and socialist-revolutions had occurred that "Currently the struggle for democracy has become in the final analysis a struggle for socialism."<sup>25</sup>

This analysis of the course of circumstances in the developing areas would appear to suggest that a socialist transition was inevitable. Yet other Soviet statements demonstrate that this is not the case by any means. The belief expressed that the national-democratic revolution would "go over" to socialism appears at times more of an aspiration than a "scientific" prediction.

For example, in a recent conference in Moscow, perhaps responding to criticism, the same commentator contended that "the practical experience gained by the peoples of the U.A.R., Algeria, Burma, Syria and other countries on the non-capitalist way helps considerably to *broaden the base for Socialist revolution* by involving in the revolutionary process, via transitional intermediate changes, *peoples who for various reasons are not yet prepared to carry through a Socialist revolution.*"<sup>26</sup> Plainly, this more cautiously optimistic statement implies that the Communists are in no position to seize power in the developing areas, nor is Communism about to be adopted. The "objective situation" does not allow it. Communist parties in the "third world" are woefully small in size, have a qualitatively weak (low proletarian) class composition, and are burdened with a correspondingly low ideological level. They are

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<sup>24</sup> V. Tyagunenکو, "Ot Natsional 'noy Revolyutsii k Sotsial' noy" (From nationalist revolution to socialist), *Azia i Africa Sevodnia* (Asia and Africa Today), No. 2, (1967), pp. 3-4. Algeria, Burma, Guinea, Mali, and UAR and a number of other countries are listed as places where such developing national-democratic revolutions are occurring.

<sup>25</sup> V. Tyagunenکو, "Oktyabr' i Sovremennaya Natsional 'no-Osvoboditel' naya Revolyutsia," (October and the Contemporary National Liberation Revolution), *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodniye Otnoshenia* (World Economics and International Relations), no. 1 (1967), p. 9. Tyagunenکو adds that the construction of socialism in the USSR and other socialist countries shows that socialism is the most radical and rapid way to liquidate technical and economic backwardness. The Soviet East is particularly singled out as an example of "going over to socialism" through the aid of the "victorious proletariat" of the more developed areas of Russia, p. 12.

<sup>26</sup> V. L. Tyagunenکو, "Capitalist and Non-Capitalist Development," *International Affairs* (Moscow), May, 1967, p. 58. (my italics).

characterized by loose discipline and are sorely beset by active rivals on the non-Communist left. The "frantic Soviet endeavors to develop and strengthen the right kind of 'revolutionary workers' parties in the 'third world' and preserve communism's unity have thus far yielded only mediocre results."<sup>27</sup>

Taborsky's analysis sheds light on the fundamental dilemma of Soviet policy in the developing areas. Too close an insistence on Communist integrity and hegemony would cut the Communists off from nationalist allies. This would constitute the sin of sectarianism, particularly damaging to Communist parties so ineffectual in their own efforts. Too loose a joining with nationalist allies would result in "kvastizm" ("tailism"), Communist parties left in the lurch of undependable nationalist types who might betray their Communist "allies" at the first opportunity. Soviet policy, accordingly, has shifted from absolute insistence on proletarian purity to cooperation with the bourgeoisie, along with unsatisfactory "middle ground" variants.

What have the Soviets done in this impasse? First, there is a continuing attempt to build up Communist parties, as previously indicated. In accordance with this effort, although working class elements in the developing areas are weak at the present time, they are still considered supremely important and depicted as the "vanguard force" of revolution. The Soviets hope that industrialization and factory discipline will instill collectivism and a greater capacity for united action in the workers. Trade unions will be isolated from Western contacts and play an important role in the class struggle and proletarian activities in the Third World.<sup>28</sup>

But what of the interim, while "objective circumstances" are unfavorable? Here, Soviet specialists on the subject sharply disagree. In some countries, one Soviet commentator argues, noncapitalist development is possible where a numerous and influential working class is lacking and there is no developed national bourgeoisie. Here, socialism may be constructed *without the dictatorship of the proletariat*. The views of national democratic leaders will lead to the left, the toiling masses, not the right, or bourgeoisie nationalism. In one intriguing phrase the Soviet writer contends that:

The Communists, who in the facts of actual operation show to the revolutionary democrats the correctiveness of Marxism-Leninism, play a large role in the working out of genuine revolutionary world views, *impelling the revolutionary workers to take two steps on the side of socialism where they were about ready to take one.*<sup>29</sup>

<sup>27</sup> See Edward Taborsky, "The Communist Parties of the 'Third World' in Soviet Strategy," *Orbis*, XI, No. 1, (Spring, 1967).

<sup>28</sup> See Edward Taborsky, "The Class Struggle, the Proletariat, and the Developing Nations," *Review of Politics*, 29, No. 3 (July, 1967), pp. 370-386.

<sup>29</sup> V. Tyagunenko, "Ot Natsional 'noy Revolyutsii k Sotsial' noi, *op. cit.*, p. 4 (my italics).

Apparently, this strategy would renounce the activities of independent Communist parties as such and adopt a policy of "licensed infiltration,"<sup>30</sup> win the natural democratic leaders over, step by step, to a socialist policy, occupy positions of power under them, and transform their ruling parties into Communist-type parties, perhaps on the model of Cuba. This would presumably goad one-party regimes which are showing signs of deficiency in political stability and ideological unity. Others analysts contended that the world socialist system itself could provide the necessary proletarian leadership.<sup>31</sup>

Such a strategy, of course, has obvious weaknesses. Eschewing direct intervention because of fears of escalation and possible nuclear confrontation,<sup>32</sup> the Soviets seek to avoid a Western intervention provoked by more militant elements in the "Third World."<sup>33</sup> For example, one Soviet source reputedly indicated that the Soviets wanted to goad Nasser into a near confrontation with Israel in the June, 1967 crisis, presumably to increase the already considerable Soviet influence in Egypt, but not push Nasser into actual war, with all its attendant dangers. If the latter occurred, the Soviets would stay out if the United States, too, failed to intervene.<sup>34</sup>

Other weaknesses are inherent in the strategy. One obvious one is a decline in Communist militancy within each of the revolutionary state parties. Another one is that the Communists cannot make nationalist leaders take actions, either domestically or in foreign policy, which are not in the interests of these leaders, nor can they prevent the overthrow of sympathetic nationalist leaders who are toppled precisely because they are being "infiltrated" or other elites think they are.<sup>35</sup>

The strategy has been adopted with misgivings from the very beginning. There were always parallel currents of skepticism regarding

<sup>30</sup> Richard Lowenthal, "Russia, the One-Party System, and the Third World," *Survey*, No. 58 (January, 1966), pp. 55-56.

<sup>31</sup> "An Alternative to Communist Parties?" *The Mizan Newsletter*, 8, No. 2, (March/April 1966). See especially p. 55.

<sup>32</sup> See Stephen P. Gilbert, "Wars of Liberation and Soviet Military Aid Policy," *Orbis*, X, No. 3 (Fall, 1966). Gilbert adds that Soviet aid to such movement is always heavily qualified, partially due to the fear of escalation. See also T. W. Wolfe, *The Soviet Military Scene: Institutional and Defense Policy Considerations*, RM-4913-PR, June, 1966 and Wolfe, *Trends and Defense Policy Considerations*, RM-4913-PR, June, 1966 and Wolfe, *Trends in Soviet Thinking on Theater Warfare, Conventional Operations, and Limited War*, RM4305-PR, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, December, 1964 for a similar argument, although Wolfe indicates there is some possibility that this innate fear of escalation may be somewhat abating, with corresponding changes in Soviet military capabilities. Recent developments in Soviet naval capabilities are significant in this regard.

<sup>33</sup> Uri Ra'an, "Tactics in the Third World — Contradictions and Dangers," *Survey*, no. 57 (October, 1965), p. 29.

<sup>34</sup> "The Soviets, the puppet," *Atlas*, 14 no. 2 (August, 1967). The Soviets later denied the authenticity of this report.

<sup>35</sup> Lowenthal, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-58. Lowenthal cites the overthrow of Algeria's Ben Bella as evidence of the failure of the strategy.



the real situation and prospects of Asian and African countries and leaders. Some described a "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" in the state apparatus in some of these countries, a basically reactionary force that impeded the move to socialism, and were no better than the traditional "reactionaries" in their class orientations. Others openly talked of a shift to the right in the developing countries and cautioned that looseness, lack of unity, and diffuseness of ideology must be overcome. Generally, increasing doubt was expressed concerning any easy "going over" to socialism, although care was taken not to criticize the developing countries too directly and confidence was expressed that they would move to socialism if only they followed Soviet experience closely. Increasingly circumspect language was used in discussing transitional stages to socialism and the reliability of nationalist elements.<sup>36</sup>

There are several reasons why "objective circumstances" have disappointed Soviet hopes. One is that the Soviet model, while demonstrating a method by which leaders can utilize skills and resources for thoroughgoing modernization, has not been without its human costs, costs not overlooked by leaders in the developing areas.<sup>37</sup> In addition, the Soviets in their seizure of power inherited a tradition of centralist political controls unmatched elsewhere.<sup>38</sup> In contrast, the very backwardness of the developing countries in terms of strongly articulated modern secondary associations, which serves as a barrier to classical-Western type parliamentary democracy, also serves as a barrier to totalitarianism. In the past these societies were stateless, with no structures of specialized, centralized political authority. Men ran their affairs themselves, with a large degree of local autonomy. While this hardly constituted

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<sup>36</sup> See G. Mirskii, T. Pokataeva, "Klasy i Klassovaya Bor'ba v Razvivayushchikhsya Stranakh," (Classes and the Class Struggle in developing countries). *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodniye Otnoshenia* (World Economics and In-bourgeoisie and its alleged responsibility for military defeat in "When War ternational Relations), no. 2, February, 1966 and no. 3, March 1966 on the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie." See also Soviet treatment of the Egyptian military Stands at the Threshold." Soviet Journalists Describe the Situation and Mood in the UAR. After the Israeli Aggression. Igor Belyayev and Yevgeny Primakov, *Za Rubezhom*, no. 27, (June 30, July 6, 1967) in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XIX, No. 26, (July 19, 1967), pp. 6-8. See also in the *Mizan Newsletter*, "Socialism and the New States: A Stronger Soviet Line." 8 no. 5 (September/October 1966) "The Ebb Tide," 8 no. 5 (September/October 1966) and "The National Liberation Movement: A Lower Soviet Rating?" 9 no. 2 (March/April 1967). The latter contains the text of a pointed Soviet attack on Tyagunenko's position.

<sup>37</sup> For example, see Worsley, *op. cit.*, p. 120. He quotes Mamadou Dia, an African economist, "We are vitally interested...in industrialization. Without it our society cannot effectively decolonize itself. But not industrialization a'l outrance (fiat industrialization), not autarchic, closed economics, or the sacrifice of human happiness to the requirements of heavy industry or of one generation for the benefit of the next."

<sup>38</sup> See Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization*, *op. cit.*, p. 125, and W. Donald Bowles, "Soviet Russia as a Model for Underdeveloped Areas," *World Politics*, XIV, no. 3 (April, 1962), for differences between the Soviet Union economically in its early stages of development and today's "emerging areas."

parliamentary democracy, some free discussion was present.<sup>39</sup> Furthermore, Apter argues that while there is a possibility that "mobilization systems" in the developing areas will move toward greater totalitarianism they tend not to because such control structures require "either a more elaborate technology and managerial staff or a small and very simple society. The first is out of the question in modernizing nations, and the second is precisely what they are repudiating. Hence, there is not much chance that modernizing societies will become vigorously totalitarian."<sup>40</sup>

Nor is ideological parallelism an irresistible attraction. Leaders in the developing areas reveal an increasing skepticism and criticism of Marxist-Leninist tenets, choosing eclectically those sections of the doctrine which suit their needs, particularly anti-imperialism and the "humanism" of the early Marx but ignoring other elements. Socialism itself has manifold meaning in the developing areas. Some socialist states use government as a tool of development, others pursue aims not too different from states that are non-socialist.<sup>41</sup>

One interpretation advances the thesis that the new ideologies have bypassed Marxism, since they arose in conditions different than those envisioned by Marx or Lenin. They accept the Leninist vanguard theory, with intellectuals as the vanguard, but wield power not in the name of a non-fully conscious proletariat but of an "undifferentiated people" who won't become a proletariat "because industrialization is not to be allowed to take place under capitalist auspices." While accepting Marx' anti-capitalist ethos, their consciousness is not class but national consciousness. Their dictatorship is not that of a proletariat or a vanguard in the name of the proletariat but a dictatorship of the sovereign people, of the Rousseauitic general will. Both "Western" and Soviet theoretical principles are regarded with suspicion. The new ideologies have their roots in a pre-Marxist and preliberal system of democracy and are not so much bits and pieces of the ideologies of the advanced countries as growths from an earlier stem, with grafts taken from modern growths to the extent that they can be accommodated to the existing growth. Grafts are needed because the old system is not entirely suited to the new soil.<sup>42</sup>

One can say, however, that while the Soviet Union has had many setbacks in the Third World it has still extended its influence, if one implies by this projection rather than dominance. Economic aid is continued, the relevance of the Soviet example is cited, close cooperation

<sup>39</sup> Worsley, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

<sup>40</sup> Apter, *op. cit.*, p. 388.

<sup>41</sup> Anderson, von der Mehden, Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 208, 234.

<sup>42</sup> C. B. McPherson, "Revolution and Ideology in the Late Twentieth Century," in Carl Friedrich, ed., *Revolution Notes VIII* (New York: Atherton Press, 1966) p. 135, 153.

of "revolutionary democratic leaders," where appropriate, is emphasized. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, does not overestimate its own possibilities, either for exercising greater influence in friendly countries, supplanting Western influence in pro-Western ones, or promoting any quick or easy "transition to socialism."<sup>43</sup> It will probably continue to display its characteristic caution, probing for opportunities but probably not about to make any startling breakthroughs.

### The Chinese Revolutionary Strategy

The appeals of Communism in Asia, as elsewhere in the developing areas rest on the same qualities of discipline, hierarchy and unquestioning obedience potentiality useful for societies in transition. Here security, order, and a meaningful place in the world are involved.<sup>44</sup> In addition sharp divisions within society created by class, religious, ethnic, linguistic, or regional differences, and a weak central government that cannot sustain uniform and consistent control over the country create a potential for violence and conflict. It is in this context that the Chinese strategy may become relevant.<sup>45</sup>

Chinese strategy may be described as an amalgam of an objective assessment of the situation in the developing areas, a natural projection of the Communist Chinese leadership's experience internationally, and a peculiar political consciousness which often appears as much neo-Augustinian in spirit as Marxist-Leninist.

The Chinese Communist government has long witnessed an interaction between militant and military struggle and organization. As Schurmann has noted, "Triumphant revolutionary movements often tend to be military, not only because of the importance of armed struggle, but because armies are by their nature pure organization." He adds that "the type of organization which a revolutionary movement creates in its formative phases, and the kinds of leaders which it recruits, have a decisive influence on the kind of society it builds up after victory."<sup>46</sup>

This sense of struggle is joined to an ideology that constantly stresses conflict and organization, the latter theoretically preventing the former from leading into disintegration. Struggle and organization are inseparable. Without organization one would have merely a nationalist movement, providing its members a sense of identity in the world but fur-

<sup>43</sup> See David Morison, "Soviet influence: Prospects for 1967," *The Mizan Newsletter*, 9 no. 1 (January/February, 1967).

<sup>44</sup> Harry J. Benda, "Reflections on Asian Communism," *The Yale Review*, XI, No. 1, (October, 1966), p. 3.

<sup>45</sup> Lucian W. Pye, "The Roots of Insurgency and the Commencement of Rebellions," in Harry Eckstein, ed., *Internal War* (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 163-164.

<sup>46</sup> Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. x.

nishing no rational instruments for action.<sup>47</sup> Without struggle, both within the organization and within the individual,<sup>48</sup> one would have "routinization" and backsliding. On the international level, an absence of struggle in the developing areas would have other undesirable consequences. For generally only a party that gains power through military means can create a genuinely "homegrown" totalitarian party, not dependent on the Soviet Union, not installed in power by the Soviet army and not at the mercy of the bourgeoisie. The very act of seizing power in this way, it would appear, promotes the obedience, discipline, and "totalitarianization" vital to the party. Political activity carried on by the Communist organization simultaneously consolidates the power already gained and accelerates the other processes pushed forward by struggle.<sup>49</sup>

Mao's thought is not a body of doctrine to be offered revolutionary movements — but a way of thinking to be learned. The world-wide revolutionary forces are the national liberation movements. These movements, the Chinese realize, operate in national context different than China's, so Mao's thought can only be a model, not a body of doctrine.<sup>50</sup> As the greatest of the world's underdeveloped countries and the first to have undergone total social revolution, however, they see themselves as carrying the burden of world proletarianization over the faltering Soviet Union. This example is said to be of major significance for the underdeveloped nations.<sup>51</sup>

"The Chinese do not insist that armed struggle is the *only* correct way to seize power, any more than the Russians eschew support for wars of national liberation."<sup>52</sup> But the great bulk of Chinese writings

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>48</sup> For example, "In making revolution, we must likewise make revolution against ourselves. Failure to make revolution against ourselves means that the revolution cannot succeed." "Hail the Big Character Poster by the Young Dongfanghong Fighters by the Shanghai Tiyu Zhanbao Commentator." *Peking Review*, no. 10 (March 3, 1967), p. 16. Or, as Schurmann notes, each individual member of the organization must repeat what Mao did, thus emerging with a manner of thinking similar to that of Mao. (*op. cit.*, p. 45).

<sup>49</sup> Harold Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics* (Boston, Houghton-Mifflin, 1966), pp. 57, 59, 60-61. Schurmann notes: "The whole Chinese Communist conception of 'the people' implies a continuing revolution, at home as well as abroad." ... "For the Soviets, the revolution has been completed in theory and in practice. For the Chinese it still continues." *op. cit.*, p. 118.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>52</sup> For example, "Communists would always prefer to bring about the transition to socialism by peaceful means. But can peaceful transition be made into a new worldwide strategic principle for the international Communist movement? Absolutely not... The proletarian party must never base its thinking, its policies for revolution, and its entire work on the assumption that the imperialists and reactionaries will accept peaceful transformation." Or, "The superiority of the socialist system and the achievements of the socialist countries in construction play an exemplary role and are an inspiration to the oppressed peoples and the oppressed nations.

"But this exemplary role and inspiration can never replace the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples and nations. No oppressed people or na-

stresses the need for armed struggle through indigenous guerrilla movements, and not only against nations allied or friendly to the United States.<sup>53</sup> The Chinese have, of course, qualified their call for armed struggle by a consideration of local conditions, as implied above, and have not been heedless of risks. For example, in a New Year's day statement a Chinese writer argued that "*Mao-Tse-tung's military thinking is a universal truth that can be applied everywhere; this is why it is the invincible weapon that guarantees victory in revolutionary wars.*" After making this flat statement, however, he notes that "History has time and again proved that a people's revolutionary war, *if and when it conforms to Mao-Tse-tung's military thinking, develops successfully and wins final victory; it meets setbacks and even ends in failures when it does not.*"<sup>54</sup>

One hesitates to apply this to Viet Nam because onrushing events may disprove the most prudent analysis. But some commentators have argued that the Chinese use of qualifying conditions for "wars of national liberation" is connected with their caution about direct physical involvement. Two analyses of Lin Piao's famous September 3, 1965 statement "Long Live the Victory of People's War" contend that the Chinese were criticizing the North Vietnamese and N. L. F. for premature transition to frontal tactics, that both should rely primarily on their own efforts, and that the Chinese preferred to follow "the lower risk policy of indirect conflict."<sup>55</sup> If so, this would correlate with the gen-

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tion can win liberation except through its own staunch revolutionary struggle." See "Mao's Case: China's Revolution Upgraded." (Full text of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement June, 1963) [Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963] in John Wilson Lewis, ed., *Major Doctrines of Communist China* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1964), pp. 252-253, 256.

<sup>53</sup> "Revolution and revolutionary wars are unavoidable in class society... Chairman Mao has said... It is only by the power of the gun that the working class and the laboring masses can defeat the armed bourgeoisie and the landlords, in this sense we may say that only with guns can the whole world be transformed... the only correct way for the oppressed nations and peoples to overthrow imperialist and revolutionary rule and completely emancipate themselves is to rely on the masses and fight people's wars." "Study Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War. 1. Take up the gun and the Revolutionary War to Wipe Out Counter-Revolutionary War." *Peking Review*, No. 3 (January 13, 1967), p. 15. See also Guy Searls, "Cambodia Shies from Peking," *Christian Science Monitor*, September 15, 1967, and "Peking Vilifies Burma," *Christian Science Monitor*, August 28, 1967.

<sup>54</sup> Tung Ming, "The Invincible Weapon That Guarantees Victory in People's Revolutionary Wars," *Peking Review*, No. 1 (January 1, 1967), pp. 22-23. (my italics) He adds, "Of course, each of the revolutionary wars of the people of different countries has its specific conditions. In practice, they will work out lines and methods for generations in accordance with their own conditions."

<sup>55</sup> See D. P. Mozingo and T. W. Robinson, *Lin Piao on People's War: China Takes a Second Look at Vietnam*. Rand Memorandum RM-4814, November, 1965 and Shwer Ojha, "China's Cautious American Policy," *Current History*, vol. 53, No. 313 (September, 1967). Ojha argues that Mao, Lin, and Chou were essentially arguing for a strategy of indirect confrontation and protracted conflict, while another faction argued for more direct confrontation ia

eral, well-known doctrine of protracted war that the Chinese have expounded, *i.e.*, a general desire to avoid nuclear war, in accord with the Soviet Union but a belief that "wars of national liberation" do not carry the escalation potential that the Russians think they do. The Chinese charge that

In recent years, certain persons have been spreading the argument that a single spark from a war of national liberation or from a revolutionary people's war will lead to a world conflagration destroying the whole of mankind. What are the facts? Contrary to what these persons say, the wars of national liberation and the revolutionary people's wars that have occurred since World War II have not led to world war. The victory of these revolutionary wars has directly weakened the forces of imperialism and greatly strengthened the forces which prevent the imperialists from launching a world war and which defend world peace. Do not the facts demonstrate the absurdity of this argument?<sup>56</sup>

By reason of the internal dynamic of their version of Marxism-Leninism their assessment of conditions in the Third World, and perhaps as a consequence of their own military capabilities, adequate for indirect supply of guerrilla forces but apparently inadequate for major conventional war<sup>57</sup> the Chinese have emphasized revolutionary violence in the form of "national liberation wars" and disciplined parties. In arguing this they hope that Communist parties will come to power and/or ruling communist regimes will be persuaded to pursue what the Chinese consider to be a correct line, even if these regimes are not under specific Chinese control. Apparently, the Chinese hope that regimes that have gained power by means somewhat analogous to the Chinese way and opposing the United States will support the Chinese because of interests in common, a paralleling of goals and situations. In addition, they would perhaps be slowly weaned away from the Soviet Union, because of the incompatibility of aims and styles of rulership between themselves and the "senior" Communist state. North Vietnam would be a case in point. Even though the North Vietnamese have a historical fear of China, *any* China, a certain parallelism of interests would hopefully be forged between China and North Vietnam.<sup>58</sup>

Vietnam. Neither study, of course, ruled out direct Chinese intervention under any circumstances. See also Morton Halperin, "China's Strategic Outlook," in Alistair Buchan, ed., *China and the Peace of Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 105 on the Chinese emphasis on "local conditions" as essential for success in "wars of national liberation."

<sup>56</sup> Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

<sup>57</sup> Samuel B. Griffith, III, *The Chinese People's Liberation Army* (New York: McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967).

<sup>58</sup> See Halperin, *op. cit.* See also statements by Lucian Pye and Donald Zagoria in *Sino Soviet Conflict*. Report on Sino Soviet Conflict and its Implications — by the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs — House of Representatives. March 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 23, and 31, 1965. One cannot, of course, exaggerate this parallelism as implied Chinese criticism of the North Vietnamese and N.L.F. and perhaps reservations by the latter might attest.

### Critique

Chinese statements recently, despite setbacks in Asian and African countries, have if anything been more insistent in propagating a revolutionary message abroad.<sup>59</sup> What then are the prospects for success?

These Chinese are aided by a number of circumstances including the appeal of Communism to modernizing elites and revolutionary insurgents, and the ability of the Chinese to play on regional, ethnic, and cultural cleavages. Chinese exploitation of such cleavages within Asian countries has been impressive.<sup>60</sup> In addition the nature of the international system, as well as the actual or potential presence of violence in the developing areas, all seem to lend support to Chinese theses. The "climate of international opinion," while not necessarily sympathetic to all "national liberation struggles" is certainly not opposed to them in principle, especially when the current "ruling formula" of that international system is itself in dispute. Because of this, the Chinese may believe, these struggles will alter not only the character of the societies in which they take place, but also replace the current international "ruling class" and "formula" with others more congenial to them. Such struggles offer opportunities for carrying the revolutionary "formula" to new countries. Minorities throughout the system who are disaffected will be attracted by the prospect of aid and support, and will seek to counter the domestic legitimacy of the incumbent by the external legitimacy of the aspiring revolutionary system.<sup>61</sup> The Chinese think that their success has already had this diffusion or contagion effect, and apparently hope that each new victory will have a similar effect on other movements in the system.

But aspiration, hope, and certain general factors making for success are not the same as the historically inevitable victory of liberation wars which profit from the Chinese example and experience. Scalopino, for example, in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of Communist parties in Asia asks whether a Communist party can utilize or capture the nationalist movement. Can it develop mass formations, especially among the peasantry, which could provide a broad base for military and poli-

<sup>59</sup> See "China: A Revolution for Export." *The Mizan Newsletter*, 9/no. 2 (March/April 1967) for Chinese statements directed to Asian and African audiences.

<sup>60</sup> See Donald Zagoria, "Communism in Asia," *Commentary*, 39, No. 2. (February, 1965).

<sup>61</sup> See George Modelski, "The International Relations of Internal War," in James Rosenau, ed., *International Aspects of Civil Strife*, op. cit., pp. 32-37, especially for the discussion of "international ruling class" and "international formula." Thus, the U.S. fear of the falling dominoes. Or, as Christopher Jencks noted in an article reporting conversations with North Vietnamese and N.L.F. representatives, "the Vietnamese revolutionaries believe they have a special mission: to prove that America is not invincible. They believe that they have met this challenge, and that subsequent generations of revolutionaries and indeed the whole underdeveloped world, will be in their debt." Christopher Jencks, "Negotiations Now?", *The New Republic*, 157, No. 15, (October 7, 1967), p. 21.

tical activities? Does it have the capacity of neutralizing, capturing, or discrediting the prevailing national leader and his party? What are the cultural legacies and ethnic divisions and who can best exploit them? How united and skillful are the party's opponents? Do the party leaders possess adequate organizational skills? He concludes that the answer to these questions are negative in most of Asia.<sup>62</sup>

It has also been argued that conditions in the developing areas themselves are not as propitious as might first appear. The very weaknesses of Communist parties in Africa, Asia, and Latin America have confronted the Chinese more forcefully with the dilemma that the Russians have somewhat soft pedaled: the problem of wooing certain nationalist leaders and attempting to turn them against the United States while simultaneously trying to subvert them. Chinese setbacks in Africa and the somewhat nebulous case of Indonesia are in point. Instant social revolution and a chronic anti-Americanism for its own sake are not perpetually alluring to modernizing leaders, even if couched in the somewhat more strident tones of Chairman Mao and presumably more appealing than Soviet "academese." In most of the armed struggles that have taken place, the local Communists did not play a leading role. Nor are large sections of Asian Communism necessarily psychologically prepared to fight protracted wars under primitive conditions for a generation.<sup>63</sup>

Communist successes can provide lessons as readily as Communist failures. The Vietnam case immediately emerges into view. Vietnam's peculiar history is illustrative, offering as it does a country with a vast area of rural discontent, which Diem and his successors were not able to handle, a military elite which could not be unified, and bitter, easily exploited communal divisions. The Communists were able to effect a synthesis of Communist and nationalist appeals and create an organizational instrument that "was, in effect a society within a society, with its own social structure, values, and coercive instruments."<sup>64</sup> Such organizational structures are created only over a period of many years and are not

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<sup>62</sup> Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *The Communist Revolution in Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 34. Using these criteria as a basis for judgment, he concludes that the Chinese model failed in Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Burma, particularly because of failures in mobilizing the peasantry (pp. 35-36). Failure, as in the Philippines, may not be permanent, however. See also Chalmers A. Johnson, "Civilian Loyalties and Guerilla Conflict," *World Politics*, XIV, no. 4 (July, 1962).

<sup>63</sup> See Donald Zagoria, "China's Strategy. A Critique," *Commentary*, vol. 40, No. 5, (November, 1965), and Zagoria, "China's Crisis of Foreign Policy," *The New York Times Magazine*, May 1, 1966.

<sup>64</sup> Benjamin Schwartz, "Chinese Visions and American Policies," *Commentary*, 41, No. 4 (April 1966), p. 55 and Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), p. 374. Pike also notes that the NLF made a conscious effort to extend political participation, even if manipulated, to "invoke the people in a self contained, self supporting revolution," p. 373.



easily replicated elsewhere, nor are other aspects of the Vietnamese case necessarily transferrable.

Finally, there is the basic uniqueness and partial nontransferability of the Chinese case itself. Johnson has argued that before the Japanese invasion the Chinese economic appeal was insufficient to attract a mass following. The Communists were successful only when supporting them was synonymous with advancing the interests of China by opposing the Japanese invader. While the deficiencies of indigenous political institutions and the land tenure problem played a part the "boiling point" was reached during the Japanese invasion.<sup>65</sup>

The providential arrival of a foreign invader is not an experience easily repeated. Nor does recent Chinese domestic experience offer any evidence that Mao and his government have created an organizational instrument and model suitable for fully overcoming the problems of modernization and industrialization and "institutionalizing" revolution. The Chinese, after the Great Leap failure lost some of their former projected omniscience, *i.e.*, that they somehow knew how to cope with problems that other people were unable to solve. With the Cultural Revolution a similar loss of mystique has occurred. It has become "clear that the system that once seemed to be able to solve all kinds of organizational and mobilization problems does not have magic."<sup>66</sup>

### Conclusion

The Soviets and Chinese have not uncovered any models that can provide a universally adaptable "quick fix" for modernization, social mobilization, industrialization, and social revolution. Internally, both societies have only partially been able to overcome the conservatism of traditional groups, especially the peasantry in the Russian case, and the

<sup>65</sup> Chalmers A. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary Asia* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962) (paperback edition). "Communism did not mobilize the Chinese and Yugoslav masses; rather, Communism was legitimized by the nationalistic credentials established by Communist parties in the period of mobilization." (p. 184) Griffith, *op. cit.*, argues that the Chinese Communist military contribution to the war against the Japanese was rather small but the aforesaid identification was successfully made. In the Vietnamese case, of course, the French played the role of the Japanese.

<sup>66</sup> Lucian W. Pye, *The Authority Crisis in Chinese Politics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago. Center for Policy Study, 1967), p. 21. Pye argues that Mao sought deliberately to create disorder to prevent stabilization and a bureaucratic "decline of political religion, with mixed results at the present. This could be instructive, perhaps, to leaders in the developing areas who may have thought that the Chinese had successfully and smoothly institutionalized the permanent revolution and political zeal present in the mobilization stage of a nationalist movement. For further discussion see Ezra F. Vogel, *Politicized Bureaucracy: Communist China* (paper presented at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, N.Y., September 6-10, 1966 and Donald W. Klein, *Chinese Communist Leadership: Some Problems of Control, Mobility and Policy Making*. (paper presented at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association).

possibility that more groups might develop, with demands going beyond the limits originally set by the elites.<sup>67</sup> Nor has either society been able fully to overcome the basic problem of such systems, that of accurate information that the elite must possess after the initial spurt of mobilization and modernization has passed.<sup>68</sup> Too great a concession to "objective reality" and relaxation of coercion would weaken the aura of infallibility of the elite, its omniscience in applying the "scientific truths" of Marxism-Lennism to shape reality as the regime desires. Inadequate concessions would make such regimes maladaptive and "dysfunctional" in terms of their domestic and international environments.

Nor does the related question of foreign policy offer any instances of a particularly exceptional ability to manage and manipulate recalcitrant and refractory forces in other societies. While one can hardly make facile assumptions that the future in the developing areas belongs to the "free world," one can nevertheless derive some small comfort from Communist difficulties.

### Remarks

I have hoped to illuminate in this study certain questions for future research. To wit, building on present studies, under what condition does Communism appear a viable alternative in transitional societies? What is the relationship between domestic conditions prevailing within a society and the perceived states of Communist movements abroad, ruling and contending, for the eventual fate of that country's Communist or Communist-tinged movement? Will the confrontation of the Soviet Union, China, and other Communist states with the "brute facts" of a refractory environment, subtly and imperceptibly work changes on the nature of those movements themselves? These are admittedly difficult questions to answer and difficult to "operationalize" but they must at least be asked if Communism as a phenomenon of modern life can begin to be understood in its manifold aspects.

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<sup>67</sup> Eisenstadt, *op. cit.*, p. 102. The dilemmas of functional specialization within the Soviet Union have been discussed by several writers, especially Meyer and Brzezinski. For the Chinese case and the red-expert dilemma see Schurmann, and Klein, *op. cit.*

<sup>68</sup> On this point see Apter, *op. cit.* Apter concludes that mobilization systems rapidly lose their utility in the developing areas and may soon give way to other systems.