THEORIES OF EXTERNAL-INTERNAL POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS: A CASE STUDY OF INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES

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ONE OF THE CHIEF INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF the upheaval in Indonesian politics that began late in 1965 has been the termination of former President Sukarno's policy of *Konfrontasi* aimed at the Federation of Malaysia. Most analyses of the repercussions of that policy have concentrated, understandably, on Indonesia and Malaysia and on those major powers with interests in Southeast Asia. There has been relatively little attention, scholarly or otherwise, to the implications of *Konfrontasi* either for Southeast Asia as a whole, or for individual countries in that region. A study of the latter kind, aside from helping to fill that gap, could also be designed to contribute to the investigation of a more general problem — that of developing and testing conceptual schemes for the systematic exploration of the relationships between the external and internal political behavior of states.

These are the major objectives of this paper, which examines the impact of *Konfrontasi* on a third party, the Republic of the Philippines.[1] The primary purpose of this essay is to ascertain the validity and utility of certain theoretical frameworks formulated to handle the external-internal dichotomy mentioned above. This will be attempted in Sections IV-V. To achieve this end, however, will require first a case study, which is presented in Sections I-III. Its goals are to describe Philippine political developments during the "era of *Konfrontasi*," and to assess the nature and extent of that policy's influence on those developments. In addition, the case study should reveal whether the perspective it employs — the added dimension provided by a "two-level" analysis — results in a more satisfactory explanation of Philippine politics than does the usual single-level approach.[2]

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[1] This study is an outgrowth of a paper prepared for a panel on "The Rise and Demise of *Konfrontasi*: Impact on Politics in Southeast Asia," and delivered at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, March 20-22, 1967. The material in the original version is substantially equivalent to that in Sections I-III of the present study.

[2] On this general issue, see J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," *World Politics*, XIV (October 1961), pp. 77-92. See also Singer, "System Transformation," in Singer, ed., *Human Behavior and International Politics* (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1965), pp. 453 f.; Singer, "The Political Science of Human Conflict," in E. B. McNeil, ed., *The Nature of Human Conflict* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 139 ff. Also see Fred A. Sondermann, "The Linkage Between Foreign Policy and International Politics," in James N. Rosenau, *ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 8-17.

It is relevant to caution here that a study of this kind may expect to encounter some serious difficulties. In brief, since the focus is on a country that was only indirectly involved in the dispute between the two principals, it is likely that many of the effects of *Konfrontasi* on Philippine politics were felt in indirect and intangible ways. This assumption is reinforced by the consideration that foreign policy matters seldom have become important domestic political issues in the Philippines, and *Konfrontasi* was no exception to this rule. As a result, to show the connection between *Konfrontasi* and Philippine politics will require some rather speculative arguments. Aside from the fact that evidence is lacking to support these arguments, two additional points should be noted to justify such an approach. First, such speculative arguments as are presented herein are not primarily intended to serve as explanations of the issues explored below; rather, they are advanced to indicate directions that might fruitfully be pursued in seeking empirically verifiable explanations of those issues. Second, resort to this approach is necessary in order to utilize the theoretical frameworks examined in Sections IV-V.

A final point: for the purpose of this paper, the era of *Konfrontasi* covers the period 1962-1965 inclusive. By early 1962, discussion of the proposed Federation of Malaysia (the idea for which had been broached in mid-1961 by Tenku Abdul Rahman) commenced to gain momentum and began to provoke Indonesian — and on a lesser scale Philippine — opposition. By the end of 1965 it seemed clear that the upheaval in Indonesia, which had started at the end of September, would be sufficiently far-reaching to bring about an end to the policy of *Konfrontasi* in the near future, effectively even if not formally. It is important to note that this period coincides almost exactly with the term in office of former Philippines President Diosdado aMcapagal, who served from December 1961 to December 1965. This is significant because many aspects of the relationship between *Konfrontasi* and Philippine politics can be explained only in terms of the role of Macapagal. This can be seen most clearly in the following brief introductory survey of Philippine foreign relations during the early 1960's which emphasizes the domestic political considerations underlying President Macapagal's foreign policy actions.

I

The event which provoked *Konfrontasi* — the announcement in mid-1962 of the decision to establish the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 — was also an event which embroiled the Philippines in Southeast Asian affairs more deeply than ever before. To understand President Macapagal's role in this development, it should be kept in mind that, during the 1961 presidential election campaign, his stance was "pro-American" whereas that of his opponent, incumbent President Carlos P. Garcia, was

generally regarded as "anti-American."[3] But Macapagal's "pro-Americanism" came to an end in the spring of 1962, after the United States House of Representatives failed to approve a long-standing Philippine war damage claims bill. Within a short time came several "anti-American" actions by Macapagal, including cancellation of his scheduled trip to the United States and changing the date of Philippine independence day from July 4 to June 12.

These steps were followed by more drastic ones, designed at least in part to demonstrate Macapagal's independence of United States influence. One was the June 1962 decision (in the face of explicit American disapproval) to lay formal claim to North Borneo. This will not be discussed here because both its causes and repercussions were limited almost entirely to the international realm, from the Philippine standpoint. In filing the claim, for example, the Macapagal administration was not motivated by domestic considerations, such as a desire to distract Filipinos from their internal problems. Nor did the claim become a political issue, not even a minor one.

The same holds true for a second major Macapagal initiative, initiated as Sukarno began to launch *Konfrontasi* in 1962-1963. This was his call for setting up a new regional international confederation, dubbed "Maphilindo" after the initial syllables of the names of the three proposed member-states. This idea was a logical culmination of Macapagal's independent foreign policy, from the viewpoint both of his personal objectives and of his desire to help resolve the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute. Maphilindo was forgotten, of course, when the Federation of Malaysia was created and *Konfrontasi* became a reality; but the attempt to put it into operation before the Federation was set up seemed to indicate a growing convergence between Philippine and Indonesian interests and objectives. It was not long before Sukarno was supporting the Philippine claim to North Borneo, and this, combined with skilful Indonesian diplomacy (especially at the August 1963 Manila summit conference, attended by the Malaysian, Indonesian and Philippine heads of state), won considerable Philippine sympathy for Indonesia. Also a factor was the possibility that the Philippines might be able to mediate the Indonesia-Malaysia crisis, thus benefitting Philippine prestige as well as Southeast Asia generally.

These developments, and the opportunity they presented, apparently led the Macapagal administration to think that it could "achieve the goal of establishing a Philippine identity, apart and distinct from [its] colonial past, and a dignity as an Asian nation fully cognizant of her geographical roots, her destiny and her varied mixture of culture and

[3] On this and on Macapagal's role in particular, see Meadows, "The Philippine Claim to North Borneo," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXVII (September 1962), p. 322.

tradition."[4] By early 1964, however, the grandiose vision already had begun to fade. There was considerable criticism of Macapagal's approach and policies in the nation's press and from leading figures in both major political parties, administration Liberals and opposition Nacionalistas alike. Macapagal himself continued his efforts to achieve his grand design, but eventually — particularly following the failure of the Tokyo summit meeting of mid-1964 — it became evident that a reorientation of his foreign policy was in order. Several other factors contributed to recognition of this necessity during the latter part of 1964, including escalation of the war in Vietnam and increasing "anti-Americanism" in the Philippines (not to mention the impending presidential election of 1965).

By the end of 1964 it was clear to all concerned that Sukarno had been trying to use Maphilindo for his own ends, and conversely that Macapagal espoused a moderate policy which would not permit the Philippines to join with Indonesia in *Konfrontasi.* As 1965 began, therefore, a mutual hardening of positions occurred on the part of the Philippines and Indonesia. In the Philipine press, for instance, could be found a constant stream of reports about the potential dangers to the country of various Indonesian activities and policies.[5] By mid-1965, any illusions as to Philippine-Indonesian collaboration were pretty well dispelled, and the upheaval in Indonesia later that year came as welcome news to most Filipinos (though governmental and press circles reacted with restraint, being prudent enough not to gloat over the misfortunes of the P.K.I.).

This brief account of the rise and fall of Philippine-Indonesian cooperation in Southeast Asian affairs not only provides necessary background for this study, it also indicates that *Konfrontasi* had some effect upon Philippine domestic politics. The nature and extent of this impact will be examined next.

A thorough analysis of the relationship between *Konfrontasi* and Philippine domestic politics generally should endeavor to ascertain whether the relationship was reciprocal or one-way. In order to trace the impact of Philippine politics on *Konfrontasi,* the centrality of Macapagal's role makes it necessary to approach this problem by way of two separate but related questions: what was the effect of Philippine politics upon the stance of the Macapagal administration *vis-a-vis* Indonesia, and what was the effect of the Macapagal administration's stance on *Konfrontasi?*

[4] O. Villadolid, *Manila Bulletin,* January 15, 1965, p. 4.

[5] To cite a few examples, there were stories about the infiltration of Indonesian spies, an Indonesian plot to take over the island of Mindanao by 1970, Indonesian involvement in a Communist "axis" aimed at securing control over Southeast Asia, the alleged Communist orientation of a newly appointed Indonesian ambassador to Manila, a crackdown on Filipinos in Indonesia, a *Konfrontasi* policy aimed at the Philippines, construction of secret Indonesian military installations near the southern Philippines, interference with diplomatic messages from the Philippine embassy in Jakarta, and on and on.

On the first question, the most that can be said is this: if Macapagal intended to go farther than he actually did in his courtship of Sukarno, then domestic political considerations may well have served to restrain him from doing so. During 1962 and early 1963, when Filipinos presumably were most favorably disposed toward Indonesia, Philippine public opinion on this matter did not greatly influence Macapagal, both because it did not manifest itself in political terms, and because Macapagal's "anti-American" reaction (described earlier) would have occurred regardless of the state of public opinion concerning Indonesia. And, even granting that public opinion did support the Indonesian position and that this did influence Macapagal during the early part of his term in office, it was not long before *Konfrontasi* entered the picture, and its implications were hardly more welcomed by Filipinos (including Macapagal) than by Malaysians. As for the effect on Macapagal of post-*Konfrontasi* public opinion, it is significant that the closest thing to a foreign policy "issue" in the mid-term senatorial elections of 1963 was a Nacionalista Party allegation that Macapagal and Sukarno were close friends and that both leaders were advocates of "guided democracy" in the form of presidential dictatorship.[6] Actually it would probably be more accurate to speak of post-*Konfrontasi* Filipino sentiment as reinforcing rather than restraining Macapagal's intentions; it is extremely unlikely, to say the least, that Macapagal would have pursued his plan for alliance with Sukarno (even if public opinion had favored such a move) without concrete evidence that the alliance was achieving Macapagal's basic foreign policy objectives (rather than — or even in addition to — Sukarno's objectives).[7]

As for the impact of the Macapagal administration's foreign policy posture upon *Konfrontasi*, strictly speaking this does not fall within the bounds of this paper, but it is worth noting that Sukarno benefitted greatly from that posture during 1962-1963. While his is obvious enough, it may not be so obivous that Macapagal's foreign policy stance worked to Indonesia's advantage partly because it harmonized with his domestic policies — that is, it seemed quite consistent with his highly nationalistic and "anti-American" outlook generally. On the other hand, it may be misleading to make too much of this point; there is little question that Sukarno would have pursued his policy of *Konfrontasi* regardless of the Philippine position on the matter.[8]

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[6] Nacionalistas frequently accused Macapagal of displaying "dictatorial tendencies" during his term as President

[7] Macapagal's objectives — basically, to moderate Sukarno's position and to keep the latter from becoming exclusively dependent upon Communist support, internally and externally — were not necessarily incompatible with Sukarno's aims concerning the Federation of Malaysia.

[8] Indeed, it could even be argued that a hostile rather than a friendly attitude on Macapagal's part, and overt Philippine opposition to *Konfrontasi*, might well have prompted Sukarno to adopt an even more (rather than less) aggressive policy toward Malaysia. That is, Sukarno might have felt that more forceful measures would be necessary to achieve his aims in the fact of such widespread opposition.

Turning now to the impact of *Konfrontasi* on Philippine domestic politics, this question will be explored in terms of the two campaigns and elections conducted during the Macapagal administration (Macapagal's election in 1961 is not discussed here since it antedated the emergence of *Konfrontasi*). In the 1963 senatorial elections, the opposition Nacionalistas won four of the eight seats at stake. Several factors would seem to argue against the possibiliy that *Konfrontasi* affected the campaign or the outcome: the even division of the seats, which would not appear to be a victory for either party; the fact that off-year elections are even less influenced by foreign policy issues than are presidential elections; and, most important, the consideration that senatorial elections normally are decided almost entirely on the basis of the personal political appeal of the individual candidates. Nevertheless, the results were interpreted as constituting both a setback to the Liberal Party and a personal rebuff to Macapagal. This is because the latter's involvement in the 1963 campaign was greater than that of any previous President in mid-term elections.[9] And because of Macapagal's role in the campaign, it is conceivable that *Konfrontasi* had something to do with the outcome of the voting. In fact, during the campaign the opposition, as already noted, maintained that Macapagal's views closely resembled those of Sukarno. It is unlikely that this allegation, or the issue of *Konfrontasi per se*, had much if any *direct* effect on the Philippine electorate; but it is not unreasonable to assume (at least with the benefit of hindsight) that Nacionalista charges concerning Macapagal's relations with Sukarno contributed in some measure to the climate of opinion reflected in the 1963 election results. In any event, that election had a number of significant implications for the 1965 presidential election.

By 1965 the positions of the Nacionalistas and Liberals on the "Indonesian issue" seemed to be completely reversed, compared with their respective stands in 1963. Macapagal once again was espousing a "pro-American" line, whereas Nacionailistas presidential candidate Ferdinand Marcos (a former Liberal) had the open support of the more nationalistic and "anti-American" elements in the country. And, since the ultranationalists tended to sympathize with Indonesia's "anti-colonial" posture and since "anti-Americansm" had reached a post-World War II peak early in 1965, it would appear that there was a basis for the development of an explicit Indonesian issue in the 1965 campaign. The

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Thus, perhaps Macapagal's foreign policy *did* achieve its objectives, albeit in a limited (and intangible) fashion. It would be risky, therefore, to argue (as some writers have argued) that Macapagal and Sukarno shared common interests and purposes during 1962-1963. (On the other hand, it would be prudent not to go to the other extreme and to maintain, for example, that there was a correlation between the appearance of an explicit anti-*Konfrontasi*, anti-Sukarno position on the part of the Philippines, and the decline and fall of *Konfrontasi* and its proponents — although the possibility of such a correlation should not be dismissed out of hand.)

[9] For details, see Meadows, "Challenge to the 'New Era' in Philippine Politics," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXVII (Fall 1964), pp. 304 ff.

extreme nationalists were debarred from raising such an issue, however, not only because of Macapagal's earlier pro-Sukarno orientation but because many Nacionalista leaders had been critical of that orientation in 1962-1963. Similar considerations applied to the Liberal Party. Finally, the state of public opinion on this matter, discussed earlier, gave either side any reason to raise such an issue.

If *Konfrontasi* exerted any influence on the 1965 campaign and election, therefore, it was in an indirect manner. Oddly enough such influence most probably came in connection with the American role in the campaign. This statement can best, and most briefly, be explained with reference to a belief widely held in the Philippines (and elsewhere), namely, that serious presidential candidates in the Phiilppines jeopardize their prospects if they arouse the opposition of United States interests (diplomatic, military and economic). The contention of this paper is that, if there was American intervention in the 1965 election, it was exerted on behalf of Marcos and, moreover, largely for reasons connected with *Konfrontasi* and its implications.

Before elaborating on this proposition, two possible objections to it must be considered. First, the Macapagal administration was extremely "reasonable" (from the American standpoint) during 1964-1965; this was of special importance in light of the increasingly strained relations between the Philippines and the United States at that time. Second, Marcos was handicapped, it would seem, by the support of the ultra-nationalists, by Nacionalista opposition to Macapagal's proposal to send Filipino personnel to Vietnam, and by his status as a more or less unknown quantity compared with the once again "reliable" Macapagal. But that is just the point: Macapagal, having followed an "anti-American" line in 1962-1963, might have been regarded by United States interests as too erratic and/or opportunistic to be fully relied upon in the future.[10]

Whatever the American attitude, however, the fact remains that, as election day approached, there were many reports in the Philippines that American interests had reached an "understanding" with Marcos and would support his candidacy.[11] In this connection, the element of timing is one of several significant points that merit attention. The reports of a "deal" did not begin to circulate until late in the cam-

[10] These points are discussed, in a somewhat different context, in Meadows, "Implications of the 1965 Philippine Election," *Asian Studies,* IV (August 1966), pp. 388-389.

[11] For speculation on a "deal" and on an American "double-cross" of Macapagal (after the latter had acted in accordance with United States desires during 1964-1965), see, e.g., L. Beltran, *Evening News,* November 18, 1965, p. 5, and November 29, 1965, p. 5. Macapagal himself has asserted that the United States supported Marcos in 1965, supposedly in return for the latter's efforts on behalf of congressional passage of an aid-to-Vietnam bill and for Philippine recognition of Malaysia (both of which were achieved by mid-1966); see N. Rama, "The Foreign Affairs of Marcos," *Philippines Free Press,* June 11, 1966, pp. 3 ff.

paign, *after* the Indonesian upheaval had gotten under way. This means that an American decision to support Marcos might have been swayed by the likelihood that the P.K.I. and *Konfrontasi* were on the way out and that it no longer mattered whether Macapagal or Marcos won the election. Additionally, evidence based on public opinion polls indicates that Marcos led Macapagal early in the campaign (in late 1964 and early 1965), lost his lead by the middle of 1965, and regained the lead toward the end of the campaign.[12] If that is what happened, it could mean either that the late Marcos surge resulted at least in part from an American decision to support him, or that other factors were responsible for his upswing and that United States interests simply decided to join the bandwagon (for the reasons mentioned above, rather than in an opportunistic spirit), or both. This argument is further substantiated by various developments since the election. Shortly after his victory, for example, Marcos revealed that he intended to follow the "pro-American" policies of his predecessor, and his subsequent actions surprised and angered his more nationalistic backers. During hs first year in office came such major steps as Philippine diplomatic recognition of Malaysia, congressional passage of the Vietnam personnel measure at the insistence of Marcos (who had opposed the bill in 1965[13]), the Marcos state visit to the United States, and the October 1966 seven-nation Manila summit conference.

The preceding analysis, needless to say, is purely speculative at best. The United States may have been scrupulously neutral in the 1965 campaign; indeed, it may have backed the Macapagal administration, for the reasons already described. But, assuming for the sake of argument that American influence was exerted on behalf of Marcos, and that it was motivated at least in part by considerations connected with *Konfrontasi* this raises another question: in view of the outcome of the 1965 election, were the effects of *Konfrontasi* on Philippine politics on balance harmful or beneficial to the latter? It is of course much too soon to answer such a question, if an answer is possible at all. Nevertheless, it may well be that Macapagal's defeat will prove to be unfortunate for the Philippines in the long run. This position, it should be emphasized, is based neither on a positive evaluation of Macapagal's achievements nor on a negative appraisal of Marcos, but on a much broader hypothetical argument.

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[12] Such polls are fairly reliable; see Meadows, "Public Opinion Polls and the 1961 Philippine Election," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* XXVII (Spring 1963), pp. 19 ff.

[13] For some interesting parallels between Marcos and President Lyndon B. Johnson on the Vietnam issue, see Meadows, "Johnson and Marcos," *New Republic,* CLV (September 17, 1966, p. 12. On the implications of Vietnam involvement for the Philippines, see Meadows, "The Vietnam Crisis and Philippine Foreign Policy," *Manila Chronicle* (U. S. Edition), September 13, 1966, p. 8, and September 20, 1966, p. 4.

Briefly, the argument runs as folfows. Filipinos would have had little to lose, and might have gained much, had they curbed their understandable desire for a change and voted to return the incumbent to office in 1965. As Macapagal stressed throughout his campaign, no Philippine President has served the constitutional maximum of two terms; he argued that, as a "non-political" chief executive (ineligible, that is, for reelection in 1969), he would be able to accomplish far more than he did during his first term and more than did any of his predecessors, for that matter. The opposition, of course, dismissed this as a purely self-serving argument, and in fact seized upon it as a confession of failure. And, speaking realistically, it must be admitted that any "breakthrough" during a second Macapagal term would have been unlikely. Still, since it has never been tried, and since nothing else has seemed to work, it would have been interesting and desirable to see the "experiment" attempted. As it is, by the time that Marcos had just completed the process of learning the political ropes of his office, he was confronted with the 1967 mid-term elections; and the 1969 campaign in effect will get under way almost immediately afterward, if recent Philippine political history is any indication.[14] With Filipinos becoming increasingly disillusioned with their political system, a Marcos failure to achieve tangible gains for the masses may not only cost him the Presidency in 1969 (unless he can use the above approach more persuasively than did Macapagal), it may — in view of the Marcos activist-leader image — lead to a general reaction against the system as a whole.[15]

In summary, it is difficult to assess with confidence the impact of *Konfrontasi* on Philippine politics generally. If its impact was as delineated above, the consequences could prove to be detrimental to the Philippines. Such a conclusion, of course, is based on grounds too speculative to be accepted without more convincing evidence. To some extent such evidence is provided by a survey of the relationship between *Konfrontasi* and *specific* sectors of the Philippine political system, to which we now turn.

III

The impact of *Konfrontasi* on specific aspects of Philippine domestic politics is only slightly less difficult to detect than is its influence on Philippine politics generally. It is possible to show the linkage a little

[14] The effect of increasingly longer election campaigns is noted in David Wurfel, "The Philippines: Intensified Dialogue," *Asian Survey*, VII (January 1967), p. 48

[15] See Meadows, "Implications of the 1965 Philippine Election," pp. 386-387. For evidence concerning Filipino patience and optimism, see Hadley Cantril, *The Pattern of Human Concerns* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965), pp. 143 ff.

more clearly here; but at many points the analysis still enters the realm of the speculative and the intangible. This is most evident in connection with the first of the three areas to be discussed in this section, that of political parties, least so with pressure groups and the mass media.

Political Parties

The following examination focuses not on the two major parties but on a third party, which was formed in 1965. Third parties are not at all unusual in Philippine politics, particularly during election campaigns; their candidates, however, have met with little success, at least at the national level.[16]

The most recent manifestation of the third-party phenomenon came in the form of the Party for Philippine Progress, or PPP, which was organized primarily to contend for the Presidency and the Vice Presidency although it also fielded some senatorial and congressional candidates. The PPP, or Third Force, justified its existence on the grounds that the Philippines has a one-party, two-faction system rather than a two-party system; that the PPP offered the electorate a genuine choice for the first time in Philippine history; and that a PPP victory would result in effective implementation of the promises the voters had been hearing for two decades. In the light of Philippine political history, it is not surprising that the PPP fared no better in the electorate arena than had any of its predecessors. It would seem hazardous, therefore, to attempt to relate the PPP experience in 1965 to *Konfrontasi*. Nevertheless there may be a connection between the two.

This view is based on three major considerations. In the first place, although the PPP suffered from the usual disadvantages that hamper minor parties in the Philippines, it also enjoyed certain advantages as compared both with the two major parties and with earlier minor parties.[17] Second, most if not all political observers believed that the PPP would do much better at the polls than it actually did. Significantly, while early reactions to the formation of the PPP tended to belittle and downgrade its prospects, these reactions (particularly in the press) became increasingly respectful as election day approached.[18] My own in-

[16] A notable instance both of third-party proliferation and of impact on voting results came in 1957, when there were no less than three "serious" minor-party and independent candidates; see Meadows, "An Interpretation of Philippine Politics," *India Quarterly*, XVII (January-March 1961), p. 40. Independent and third-party Senators have been elected, but (prior to the 1967 elections) typically as so-called "guest candidates" on the tickets of the major parties. In 1961, an independent, Sergio Osmeña, Jr., finished second in the vice-presidential race, ahead of the Nacionalista candidate; for details, see Meadows, "Philippine Political Parties and the 1961 Election," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXV (Fall 1962), p. 268

[17] The PPP, for example, was not handicapped by the effects of the "Stonehill affair" issue which burdened both major parties (on this issue, see Meadows, "Challenge to the 'New Era' in Philippine Politics," pp. 300-301).

[18] See, e.g., A. Batalla, *Manila Bulletin*, June 17, 1965, p. 4; F. V. Tutay, Philippines Free Press, September 4, 1965, pp. 5 ff. The PPP nominees received

quiries during the campaign not only confirmed these views, they indicated that the PPP, given a few of the proverbial "breaks", might come spectacularly close to upsetting the major-party candidates. Finally, there has been no fully convincing explanation of the PPP failure to live up to expectations, although many have been advanced, such as the claim that the voter who expressed a preference for the PPP candidates did not necessarily follow through in the voting booth because he did not want to "waste his vote" on a party which had no chance to win. The explanation of the PPP debacle may be as simple as that, but there appears to be something lacking in the various post-election accounts.

At the risk of unnecessarily complicating matters, it is suggested that perhaps *Konfrontasi* can supply the missing element. To begin with, there is considerable evidence that Filipinos were becoming increasingly worried by the Communist threat generally and by Indonesia specifically during 1965.[19] If so, then the electorate might well have been disturbed by the alternatives presented by the major parties: Macapagal, with a record of "coddling" Sukarno; and Marcos, backed by ultra-nationalists, anti-American elements, and the pro-Indonesian press. In support of this conjecture is the fact that the Indonesian threat was played up in the mass media throughout 1965, as already noted. At least equally significant in this regard were the positions of the presidential candidates on the Communist issue. It did not go unnoticed during the campaign that both of the major-party nominees avoided that subject. This is understandable, since Macapagal's discussion of the issue — whether in terms of its internal (Huk) or external (Indonesian) aspects — would have reflected unfavorably on his administration; on the other hand, Marcos may have been silent on the issue to keep from alienating his more nationalistic supporters. In sharp contrast, PPP candidate Senator Raul Manglapus emphasized the Communist threat, internal and external; nor was his running mate, Senator Manuel Manahan, quiet on the subject either.[20]

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only about seven per cent of the total vote in 1965. (In a pre-election newspaper advertisement, the PPP cited the results of a poll as follows: PPP, 35.9%; Marcos, 34.1%; Macapagal, 24.5%; and 5.5% undecided.)

[19] See, e.g., the Robot-Gallup poll results published in the *Manila Times*, July 25, 1965, p. 11; and November 21, 1965, p. 10.

[20] As one writer put it, Manglapus was criticizing Macapagal's "approach towards Indonesia and Malaysia at a time when Marcos, as a Liberal Party senator, was rallying support" for Macapagal; see O. Villadolid, *Manila Bulletin*, November 9, 1965, p. 6. Also see the *Bulletin*, October 22, 1965, p. 6. On Manahan's position, see the *Bulletin*, March 3, 1965, p. 6. To compare the Macapagal and Marcos stands on the Communist issue, see their responses to a questionnaire in the *Bulletin*, October 6, 1965, pp. 1, 4. For editorial comment concerning the silence of leading politicians on the Huk issue during the campaign, see *Manila Times*, November 28, 1965, p. 4. Relevant also were news reports that the Huks were divided as to whether to support Macapagal or Marcos (see, e.g., *Bulletin*, September 17, 1965, pp. 1, 2); there was no reported Huk support for Manglapus.

From the foregoing it can be deduced that the upheaval in Indonesia, coming hardly more than one month before the Philippine election, contributed to the unexpectedly poor showing of the PPP. In other words, the anti-Communism uprising in Indonesia, still fresh in the minds of Filipinos on election day, may have served to sharply decrease the salience of the Communist issue to the electorate. In turn, this would have allowed the voter to resolve the cross-pressures that had been operating on him: he could now back one of the major-party candidates in good conscience, and thus could avoid "wasting his vote" on the third-party nominee.[21]

Assuming the validity of the preceding analysis, it would have to be concluded that the net effect of *Konfrontasi* upon the Philippine party system was harmful rather than beneficial or mixed. Very briefly, if Filipinos are becoming increasingly disillusioned by their political system, as maintained earlier, the only constitutional way in which they can express their discontent is via the ballot-box — more specifically, by voting, say, for new political parties which appear to be more radical than the old-line major parties. According to the above argument, *Konfrontasi* — or rather the decline of *Konfrontasi* — served to prevent just this from happening. The point is not that a victorious third party necessarily would be more successful than the major parties have been in instituting socio-economic reforms; the point is that a growing percentage of the total vote cast for third parties might well be a means of applying pressure on the major parties to "produce" or else lose their monopoly. If peaceful change proves to be impossible within the context of the existing party system, the Filipino voter's only recourse will be to violence, of one kind or another. Thus the failure of the PPP in 1965 was a damaging blow to the Philippine party system as a whole.

Pressure Groups

The influence of *Konfrontasi* was felt most directly by two opposed (and opposing) segments of Philippine society: the armed forces, and the Huk insurgents. The Huks, of course, are not a "pressure group" in the conventional sense, but they can be regarded as such in terms of their impact on Philippine government and politics. As for the military, the fact that it can be regarded as part of the political process, rather than above and in control of it, is a tribute to the Philippine political system, especially in view of the dominance of the military in many of the developing countries. The discussion will be limited to these two

[21] Another possible reason for the PPP failure relates to the American role (if any). Some political observers were of the opinion, prior to the election, that Manglapus would make the best "American candidate" since it would be advantageous to both the Philippines and the United States if he were elected. To the extent that the Indonesian upheaval late in 1965 prompted American interests to back Marcos rather than the PPP (assuming that the United States favored Manglapus to that point), then that upheaval hurt the PPP chances.

groups because few if any connections can be detached, other than those of the broadest and most superficial kind, between *Konfrontasi* and other elements. This section will be brief, partly because *Konfrontasi's* impact is rather obvious and partly because its political implications are not as crucial as are those of the other areas covered in this paper.

From the standpoint of the Huks, *Konfrontasi* clearly was of considerable assistance while it lasted. At the least, the Huks (or Huk leaders) undoubtedly benefitted psychologically from the influential position in Indonesia, and from the moral support, of the P.K.I. More concretely, the Huks may have received aid in the form of military equipment and supplies smuggled in from the south. These factors may help account for the apparent Huk revival in 1965.[22] *Konfrontasi* also may have benefitted the Huks less directly, as seen in the following examination of the Philippine military.

In a country with a tradition of civilian control of the military, the latter is no more immune to attack, particularly by the mass media, than is any other social group. One frequent criticism is that the military, like its counterparts elsewhere, overinflates its annual requests for congressional appropriations, and justifies these requests by concocting scare stories, with customary subject being the Huks. In 1965, according to the critics, the many reports of sinister Indonesian activities aimed at the Philippines were inspired by the armed forces, largely for budgetary reasons. The concern here is not with the validity of this charge, especially since Konfrontasi is now ended and since it ended before Congress approved military requests to construct new bases in the Southern Philippines, among other things. The key question is whether military preoccupation with *Konfrontasi* — whether genuine or spurious — adversely affected the performance of its anti-Huk activities. This possibility is suggested by the fact that the peak of the alleged Indonesian threat coincided with the revival of the Huk movement in mid-1965. But there is no way to demonstrate a causal relationship here, and in any event there is no reason why the military could not cope with the Huks as well as with *Konfrontasi.* The most that can be said is that military preoccupation with Indonesia, if such it was, may have been one, but only one, of several factors that contributed to the Huk revival in 1965.

This conclusion, however, does not necessarily hold true with regard to military concern over another problem — Vietnam. On this point, too, critics charged that the end of Indonesian threat late in 1965 led the military to turn its attention to Vietnam as a convenient tool for budgetary purposes; but again this question is not at issue here. What is relevant is that the debate over the proposal to send Filipino per-

[22] The question of whether there was such a revival will not be explored here; for present purposes, it is assumed that a Huk resurgence did begin in 1965.

sonnel to Vietnam provoked so prolonged and intense a controversy that the military, by virtue of its involvement in the debate, may indeed have neglected other problems.[23] (It has also been claimed that the Huk resurgence was a direct response to, and an attempt to forestall, Philippine involvement in Vietnam, just as the Huk threat of the early 1950's was designed to prevent such involvement in the Korean War.[24] This argument is rather far-fetched, but it suggests another interesting idea: perhaps the recent Huk revival was aimed, at least in part, at distracting military attention from Indonesia, prior to the upheaval there late in 1965.) How does military preoccupation with Vietnam tie in with *Konfrontasi*? Only in the sense that such preoccupation became possible when *Konfrontasi* came to an end. Moreover, the military may also have felt that, since the Huks would be affected adversely, if at all, by the downfall of the P.K.I., the Vietnam crisis could and should receive its full attention.

In summary, the impact of *Konfrontasi* on the military and on the Huks is most clearly evident when each group is considered separately and individually; the impact is hardest to detect in examining the interrelationships between the two. On the whole, *Konfrontasi* would appear to have had harmful effects on the Philippines, insofar as the Huk problem and the military reaction to it are concerned. But these effects are not overly significant, first because the Huks are not (at least as yet) powerful enough to pose a military threat *per se* and second because in any event the Huk question is not one that can be resolved through the use of force alone.

Mass Media

The relationship between *Konfrontasi* and specific aspects of Philippine politics is clearest, and easiest to trace, in connection with the mass media of communication. Attention here will be limited to the press, which is by far the most important of the mass media in the Philippines, and specifically to the Manila newspapers, which in turn dominate the Philippine press and are well-known for being among the most free (and, some would say, the least responsible) in the world.

The stage was set for journalistic involvement in the "Indonesian issue" in 1964, when what was undoubtedly the most serious crisis in Philippine-American relations since World War II began to emerge.[25]

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[23] Curiously, and perhaps significantly, it was precisely during this period that (according to later accounts) there was "cooperation" and "collaboration" — "peaceful coexistence," as one writer described it — between the armed forces and government officials on the one hand, and the Huks on the other. See, e.g., F. V. Tutay's articles in the *Philippines Free Press,* July 9, 1966, pp. 6 ff., and July 23, 1966, pp. 5 ff.

[24] See T. P. Boquiren, "Why the Huk Resurgence?" *Philippines Free Press,* August 20, 1966, pp. 7 ff.

[25] See Meadows, "Recent Developments in Philippine-American Relations," *Asian Survey,* V (June 1965), pp. 305 ff.

To some extent this was an outgrowth of a vigorous campaign by a Manila newspaper, and one of the indirect consequences of the crisis was the polarization of the country's leading newspapers — and columnists (who are unusually influential, and unusually numerous, in the Philippines) — into opposing camps over the issue of "anti-Americanism." When the press began to emphasize the Indonesian question early in 1965, this division of opinion carried over into that issue. Those newspapers which encouraged the upsurge in nationalist sentiment and advocated a hard line toward the United States tended to play down the Indonesian menace; conversely, those newspapers which advocated caution and moderation in Philippine-American relations were those which looked with alarm upon Indonesia's potential as a trouble-maker. Eventually, the debate erupted into a full-scale war, especially among the leading daily columnists.

Also involved in the controversy were questions concerning the United States press, whose criticisms of pro-Indonesian and anti-American Filipino newspapers added more fuel to the dispute. Filipinos were already resentful of what they regarded, usually with good reason, as lack of objectivity on the part of American publications in reporting on Philippine-American relations. The American press, for example, tended to equate Filipino nationalism with anti-Americanism, and to explain the latter in terms of Communist influence. As the debate over Indonesia began in the Philippine press, some American newspapers and magazines alleged that the growing anti-Americanism in the Philippines was attributable mainly to Indonesian Communist agents and their hirelings in the Philippine press. Immediately, the "Indonesian lobby" issue became an integral part of the controversy within the Philippine press.[26]

At this point it is necessary to turn to two other related developments which affected Philippine journalism in 1965. On the one hand the press became the focus of a good deal of governmental attention, much of it in the form of proposed legislation designed to curb the notoriously uninhibited Philippine newspapers.[27] On the other hand, meanwhile, leading journalistic figures had been discussing the possibility of setting up a Press Council in the Philippines. Such a body, along the lines of similar organizations that exist in several countries (such as Great Britain), would be designed to "police" the Philippine press and, in general,

[26] This issue became involved, for example, in annual election of officers by the National Press Club. These developments goaded the Indonesian press itself to enter the fray, with accusations that "imperialist agents" were attempting to inflame Philippine-Indonesian relations; see the *Philippines Herald*, February 21, 1965, p. 6.

[27] Proposed legislation bearing upon the press (none of which became law, however) included two so-called "press gag bills" and one to nationalize the press. In addition, some members of Congress called for investigations into such matters as the National Press Club elections mentioned in footnote 26, and the general issue of alleged "Indonesian subversion" of the press.

to deal with its principal shortcomings. The idea of a Press Council had been raised before in Philippine press circles, but it had never received serious consideration. In 1965, however, the situation was different, and, no doubt partially in response to governmental pressure, a Press Council finally was established, coming into being in August 1965.

This development was highly encouraging, to say the least, from the standpoint both of the evolution of the Philippine press and of the future of Philippine democracy. It occurred largely as a result of the introspection and self-evaluation that accompanied the intense press battles of 1964-1965. For perhaps the first time, the press found itself unable to ignore certain basic questions pertaining to its role and function in a democratic system of government. It is unlikely that a Press Concil would have been established — certainly not as early as 1965 — if not for the events described above. In essence, the whole "Indonesian issue" helped precipitate the reappraisal that culminated in the creation of the Press Council, and in so doing it contributed to the strengthening and maturing of the Philippine press. At least in the case of the mass media, therefore, it could be argued that *Konfrontasi* had a beneficial impact on the Philippines (assuming, of course, that the Press Council will help curb the excesses of the press and make it a more responsible institution of society).

On the whole, however, it is evident from the preceding case study that *Konfrontasi* had rather mixed effects upon the Philippines. Moreover, whether its overall impact will prove to be beneficial or not cannot, of course, be estimated at this time, since a number of its consequences and potential consequences remain to evolve and develop. In any event, the purpose here is not to make such an estimate but to deal with broader theoretical questions.

IV

On the basis of this examination of the impact of *Konfrontasi* on Philippine politics, an attempt will be made to evaluate certain conceptual frameworks formulated to guide research in the general area of the relationships between the external and internal political behavior of states. This subject, long neglected by political scientists, particularly in terms of theoretical approaches, recently has been receiving an increasing amount of attention. One notable example is a collection of essays published under the title *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*.[28] The purpose of the remainder of this paper is to use the preceding case study to assess the utility and validity of that volume's two principal conceptual schemes, one by Karl Deutsch and one by James

[28] R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966). Most of these essays were prepared for Northwestern's 1964 Conference on Comparative Politics and International Relations.

Rosenau. The aim here is not to formulate hypotheses; rather, the ensuing analysis, to stretch an analogy, is equivalent to a "pre-test" of the Deutsch and Rosenau approaches.

First we shall consider Deutsch's paper, "External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States." A diagrammatic presentation of his model depicts two main units, the external environment (E) and the political system (S). These are linked by foreign input channels and domestic output channels (F). Within S are its purely domestic flows (D) and its "linkage subsystem" (L); the latter is "more weakly bounded against E and more receptive to outside inputs" than is D. Since D can operate upon L, the latter may be both a target of receptor flows (flows from E to S) and a source of effector flows (flows from S to E).[29]

Before applying the model to Indonesian-Philippine relations during the era of *Konfrontasi,* it should first be determined whether the situation being investigated conforms with Deutsch's definitions of two key terms, "boundaries" and "autonomy." Deutsch defines "boundaries" in terms of "marked discontinuities in the frequency of transactions and . . . of responses . . . ." This is an operational definition which makes it possible to distinguish between "external" and "internal." As for "autonomy," a system is autonomous "if its responses are not predictable" externally, and if internally it is "characterized by a combination of intake and memory . . ." among other things.[30] As to the question of boundaries between Indonesia and the Philippines, it is true that there are a number of striking similarities between those two countries — more, perhaps, than between any other pair of Southeast Asian countries. But the "discontinuities" between them are significant enough to be described as "boundaries" in the Deutschian sense, so there is no problem here.[31] Similarly with autonomy; the Philippines is a sovereign state both because "its decisions could not be commanded or reversed *dependably* from the [external] environment" and because it possesses "a stable and coherent decision-making machinery within its boundaries."[32]

[29] Karl W. Deutsch, "External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States," in Farrell, ed., *op. cit.;* see Figure 1, p. 9. See also the suggestive discussion in Deutsch, "Nation and World," in Ithiel de Sola Pool, ed., *Contemporary Political Science: Toward Empirical Theory* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 204-227.

[30] Deutsch, "External Influences . . .," pp. 5, 7. (Interestingly, similar criteria — boundaries and autonomy — have been applied in the realm of philosophy to distinguish kinds of knowledge; see Alvin W. Gouldner, *Enter Plato* (New York: Basic Books, 1965), pp. 270-271.

[31] Neither the differences nor similarities will be detailed here; for a good comparison of the two countries, with emphasis on economic factors, see Benjamin Higgins, *Economic Development* (New York: Norton, 1959), pp. 59 ff., 744 ff. For a comparative overview stressing political systems, see Lucian W. Pye, "The Politics of Southeast Asia," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 65-152, *passim.*

[32] Deutsch, "External Influence . . .," p. 7, italics added — to deal with the argument that the Philippines is an American puppet state. As recent events have indicated, Philippine political behavior, domestic or external, is far from "dependable" from the American standpoint.

Assuming that the Deutsch model is applicable here in these general terms, it can now be tested in more concrete fashion. Deutsch's objective, after delineating his model, is to demonstrate how external influences on political systems can be increased or decreased. He views this question from both directions, showing how a would-be influencer could increase external pressure on another state, and what the recipient of such pressure could do to "preserve its autonomy against foreign messages or pressures."[33] In either case, the model makes it possible to pinpoint "sensitive spots" (i.e., to identify the "linkage mechanism") that would be affected by such external-internal interaction processes. Applied to the Indonesian-Philippine semi-confrontation, the model should clarify the nature of the Philippine reaction to the external pressures allegedly exerted by Indonesia.[34]

There are a number of ways, according to Deutsch, in which a target state can strive to reduce external pressure.[35] The three methods most relevant to this case study will be considered briefly. One way is to "break any one of the links" between E and S. Ignoring "unlikely" possibilities — e.g., disappearance of S, or even of E — normally this method would involve attempts by S to control the input from E. In turn, this would tend to affect the mass media in particular, within certain types of societies. From this case study, it is evident that the Philippine press was an inevitable focus of Indonesian pressure, because "the competitiveness and wide coverage of the mass media in open societies [such as the Philippines] provide opportunities for the foreign manipulation of public opinion on foreign policy."[36] In turn, this vulnerability undoubtedly served to intensify pressure on the press that would have been forthcoming anyway, in the form of governmental action aimed at controlling the external information input. It was not wholly coincidental, in other words, that there were several attempts to intervene politically in the affairs of the mass media during the era of *Konfrontasi*, even though these attempts appeared to be responses to purely internal developments and did not succeed in terms of formal legislative action. Nor was it solely by chance that this pressure diminished as the *Konfrontasi* crisis came to an end. In sum, the Deutsch model helps

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[33] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[34] The concern here is not with how Indonesia applied pressure, but with how the Philippines attempted to "preserve its autonomy" against that pressure. For a discussion from the perspective of the influencing state, see *ibid.*, pp. 19 ff.

[35] See *ibid.*, pp. 10 ff.

[36] R. Barry Farrell, "Foreign Policies of Open and Closed Political Societies," in Farrell, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 196. A good way to illustrate this point would be to compare the roles of the Philippine and Indonesian press; on the latter, see John H. Sullivan, "The Press and Politics in Indonesia," *Journalism Quarterly*, XXXXIV (Spring 1967), pp. 99-106.

explain why and how the Philippine mass media became a "sensitive spot" during the era of *Konfrontasi*.[37]

A second way to cope with external pressure is to "reduce the relevant linkage groups or institutions.[38] This could be done in several ways — for example, by pressuring the relevant linkage groups ("adjustment"), or by cutting the links between those groups and the national community ("isolation"). Pertinent in this regard, of course, were those Philippine governmental actions aimed at the alleged illegal immigrants from Indonesia. The latter comprised the only important linkage group directly involved — or apparently with the potential to become directly involved — in the Indonesian-Philippine entanglement.[39] As described earlier, the Macapagal administration sought to return the immigrants to their homeland, or at least to demand their return. But the resultant pressure appeared to affect not all the immigrants but primarily those who were least "integrated" into Philippine society — that is, those who were most vulnerable to accusations of subversion because they did not have jobs, had not married Filipino citizens, and so on. Thus the administration's objectives included "adjustment" as well as "isolation," since its pressure on the Indonesians served — whether deliberately or not — to encourage their assimilation into Philippine society.[40] In this respect, the utility of the Deutsch model is especially evident because it "predicts pressures on linkage groups and in some cases a trend toward the partial destruction, alienation, expulsion, or else assimilation or absorption of many such groups."[41]

Finally, the political system may seek to work back on and alter the external environment ("attempted environment control").[42] The influence of this strategy was most obvious in the realm of foreign policy. During 1962-1963, many Filipinos feared a threat from the proposed Federation of Malaysia, not from Indonesia. This fear was based on

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[37] Also significant in this connection, in terms of drawing governmental attention, is the tendency of the press (according to a study of the American scene) to focus on one "big story" at a time in the field of foreign affairs; see Bernard C. Cohen, "Mass Communication and Foreign Policy," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), esp. pp. 203-204. For an indication that such a tendency existed in the Philippines on the Indonesian issue, see note 5 above.

[38] Deutsch, "External Influences...," p. 10.

[39] Strictly speaking, the press was not a linkage group *per se;* it became a sensitive spot because it was at the receiving end of the foreign input channels — that is, because of its functional role rather than because of the composition of its membership, for example. As for the Huks, being "beyond the pale" and legitimate targets of governmental force, their involvement was indirect rather than direct.

[40] For ethnic groups as similar as are Indonesians and Filipinos, assimilation is not the problem that it is, say, for Chinese minorities, in the Philippines and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

[41] Deutsch, "External Influences...," p. 18.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

the reasoning that the Federation would be dominated by its Chinese population, the latter in turn would owe primary allegiance to Peking, and thus the propinquity of the Federation would constitute a grave danger to the Philippines. In this light, Macapagal's foreign policy moves which puzzled many observers at the time — such as the Philippine claim to North Borneo, and his intended rapprochement with Sukarno — can be explained as policies of attempted environment control (as can his more "rational" responses, including his support of Maphilindo). The same is true of Macapagal's actions during 1964-1965, particularly his return to a "pro-American" position. On the other hand, the domestic manifestations of a strategy of attempted environment control are harder to detect; however, developments affecting political parties and the armed forces may be relevant in this connection. As has been pointed out, the apparently encouraging early prospects of the PPP, and its dismal showing in the 1965 balloting, possibly can be attributed at least partially to the effects of the Indonesian issue — to the facts that the party's candidates in essence spoke out for a policy amounting to attempted environment control (in contrast to the silence of their opponents on the matter), and that this stand presumably lost its appeal following the Indonesian upheaval shortly before election day. As for the military, regardless of whether or not it genuinely believed that Indonesia posed a danger to the Philippines, it advocated a similar policy during the era of *Konfrontasi*. In turn, the preoccupation of the armed forces with such a policy may have contributed, as noted, to the Huk revival during that period.

From this brief account, the usefulness of the Deutsch model is clear. Equally clear, however, is that, in Deutsch's words, this is only a "crude mechanical model."[43] In applying it to a specific situation, for example, a determination of the types of states involved must be made independently of the model. To illustrate, in terms of this case study it is assumed that the Philippines is not invulnerable to external pressure — i.e., is not a closed society. This leads to the question of internal influences on external political behavior, and here we turn to Rosenau's essay in the volume cited earlier.

V

The title of Rosenau's paper is "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy." He calls his own approach a "pre-theory" because its basic purpose is to render "the raw materials [of external-internal relations] comparable and ready for theorizing."[44] The purpose here, to

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 18

[44] James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in Farrell, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 40. For a good "introduction" to this essay, see Rosenau, "The Premises and Promises of Decision-Making Analysis," in James C. Charlesworth, ed., *Contemporary Political Analysis* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 189-211.

repeat, is not to "theorize" but to ascertain whether Rosenau's pre-theory shows promise for guiding research aimed at theory construction.

Rosenau's principal concern is to determine the "relative potencies"[43] of — i.e., to rank in the order of their importance — the major sets of variables that affect the external behavior of different types of societies. He distinguishes five such sets of variables: (1) idiosyncratic, encompassing "the idiosyncracies of the decision-makers who determine and implement the foreign policies of a nation"; (2) role, pertaining to "the external behavior of officials that is generated by the roles they occupy"; (3) governmental, covering "those aspects of a government's structure that limit or enhance the foreign policy choices made by decision-makers"; (4) societal, consisting of "those non-governmental aspects of a society which influence its external behavior"; and (5) systematic, including any actions occurring abroad that condition or otherwise influence the choices made by its officials."[45]

As for types of societies, these are distinguished according to four categories: geographic and physical resources (large vs. small countries), state of the economy (developed vs. underdeveloped), state of the polity (open vs. closed), and the extent of the sharpness of the national-international distinction (penetrated vs. non-penetrated).[46] On the basis of these four categories, Rosenau arrives at a classification consisting of 16 different types of societies — ranging, for example, from those which are large, developed, open and penetrated, to those which are small, underdeveloped, closed and nonpenetrated.

In order to "differentiate degrees of penetration as well as the structural differences to which they give rise," Rosenau then makes an additional distinction between types of issues, or "issue-areas." He does this because "the functioning of any type of political system can vary significantly from one issue-area to another." And this is just as true of external as it is of internal political behavior. Rosenau's typology of issue-areas (which he admits is "largely arbitrary" because of insufficient data) assumes that "all behavior designed to bring about the authoritative allocation of values [occurs] in any one of the four issue-areas: the *territorial, status, human resources,* and *nonhuman resources* areas . . ."[47] Rosenau's task therefore, becomes the formidable one of ranking the

[45] Rosenau, "Pre-Theories . . .," p. 43. The aim, it should be stressed, is to determine relative, not absolute, potencies; "There is no need to specify exactly how large a slice of the pie is accounted for by each set of variables" (*ibid.*, pp. 43-44).

[46] Rosenau defines a penetrated political system as one in which "nonmembers of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals." *Ibid.*, p. 65 (italics in original).

[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 71, 82. For a definition of the issue-area conception, see *ibid.*, p. 81. A more general distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy issue-areas is spelled out in Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as an Issue-Area," in Rosenau, ed., *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy,* pp. 11-50.

five major sets of variables for each of four issue-areas under each of 16 different types of societies — in effect, for 64 distinct categories of analysis.[48]

To test Rosenau's pre-theory in terms of this case study, we must first decide in which category to place the Philippines. There is no difficulty on this score: the country is small (population around 34 million, area about 115,600 square miles), underdeveloped (e.g., average annual income per capita is well under the equivalent of $200), open (basically patterned on the American model), and penetrated (as exemplified by the relationship between the Philippines and the United States). For this particular type of society, Rosenau ranks the relative potencies of his five sets of variables, differentiated according to issue-areas, as follows:

	issue-areas		
	status	nonhuman resources	other (territorial and human resources)
variables	systemic	systemic	systemic
	idiosyncratic	idiosyncratic	idiosyncratic
	societal	role	role
	role	governmental	societal
	governmental	societal	governmental

The next problem is to select the chief foreign policy issue-areas that engaged Philippine decision-makers during the era of *Konfrontasi*. There were two dominant issues, the status and the territorial, and each was the focus of attention during a different period, as will be shown.[49] This will simplify the next task, that of gauging the relative impact on each major issue of the five sets of variables.

From the Philippine standpoint, the era of *Konfrontasi* encompassed two distinct periods: 1962-1963, when the proposed Federation of Malaysia was thought to pose a threat to the Philippines, as described earlier; and 1964-1965, when Indonesia came to be looked upon as the principal danger. Throughout both periods, the overriding influence on the Macapagal administration's foreign policy actions was exerted by two related elements, the imperative of geography, and "ideological challenges from potential aggressors," both of which Rosenau regards as systemic variables.[50] In view of these external challenges (whether

[48] Actually, instead of having 64 categories in the visual schematization of his approach, Rosenau has only 48 (see his "Pre-Theories...," Table 4, pp. 90-91); this is because he combines two of the issue-areas ("territorial" and "human resources") into one, thus leaving three issue-areas under each of the 16 types of societies.

[49] See Rosenau's discussion, *ibid.*, p. 86, where a 2 x 2 matrix (involving tangible and intangible means, and tangible and intangible ends) explains how issue-areas may be identified.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

real or imagined), it might seem that the issue of territorial integrity would have taken precedence over other issues in both periods. The fact is, however, that the nature of the perceived challenges differed in accordance with their sources; and this difference explains why the Macapagal administration emphasized status goals during the first period and territorial goals during the second. A number of reasons support this conclusion. For one thing, the proposed Federation of Malaysia posed a relatively long-range rather than an immediate challenge. More importantly, not all Filipinos were convinced by the argument that the Federation would endanger the Philippines. Indeed, some felt that the issue was simply a rationalization for certain administration moves, such as the North Borneo claim. Finally, the emergence of the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia gave the Macapagal administration an opportunity to pursue status-oriented policies (aimed at building Philippine prestige internationally) rather than — or in addition to — territorial goals (checking the Malaysian threat).[51] On the other hand, none of these considerations influenced the administration's attitude toward Indonesia during 1964-1965; at that time, with the external challenge more immediate and more convincing, and with little room to maneuver, the Philippine government emphasized territorial over status goals. This was evidenced by Macapagal's renewed "pro-Americanism," his unaggressive stance on the North Borneo claim, and his disregard of the Maphilindo idea.

Assuming the above analysis is accurate, we can proceed to the task of assessing the relative potencies of the five major variables for each of the two major issues operative during the era of *Konfrontasi.* Starting with the status issue, we have already confirmed the first-place ranking of systemic variables. Moving on to idiosyncratic variables, we must focus almost exclusively on the personality of President Macapagal. The available evidence indicates not only that he was the key foreign policy decision-maker in his administration, but that none of his subordinates played more than a very minor role in foreign policy formulation.[52] Indeed, there is little question that Macapagal's "values, talents, and prior experiences" (in Rosenau's words) were secondary only to systemic variables in influencing his foreign policy initiatives of 1962-1963 — and, for that matter 1964-1965. The most noteworthy illustration is the North Borneo issue, in which Macapagal first became involved as

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[51] A more detailed discussion of status goals and policies follows below, in connection with societal variables. Examples of "status policies" included Macapagal's "anti-American" posture, his "flirtation" with Sukarno, his Maphilindo proposal, and the North Borneo claim. That these policies were motivated primarily by status rather than by territorial aims is indicated by the fact that, while all were designed to promote Philippine prestige, some conflicted with territorial defense goals (e.g., an "anti-American" stance despite Philippine dependence on American military power for protection against external threats).

[52] See note 55 below.

early as 1947.[53] Other instances include his shifting positions *vis-a-vis* the United States, and his goal of Indonesian-Philippine cooperation based seemingly on nothing more solid than his personal relationships with Sukarno. In brief, this discussion appears to validate a second-place ranking for idiosyncratic variables; but it will also be relevant in considering role variables.

First, however, we turn to societal variables, with emphasis on "the major value orientations of a society, [and] its degree of national unity . . . ."[54] The influence of such factors during 1962-1963 can be detected in their interaction with systemic variables. Since its independence, the Philippines has been confronted with a conflict between its geography and its history. Specifically, it has sought to reconcile its Asian location on the one hand, and on the other its Spanish-American colonial background. The latter has inculcated Western ideals and values in Philippine society; for example, the country is the only one in Asia with a predominantly Christian population. It has been said that Filipinos, partly as a result of this dichotomy between geography and history, lack a sense of "identity" and a feeling of "national unity." Yet many Filipinos believe that, precisely because of this dichotomy, their country has the potential to serve as a "bridge" between two worlds — that, by virtue of its unique heritage, the Philippines can help bring together the divergent socio-cultural patterns and philosophical world-views of East and West. Success in promoting such a synthesis would, according to this view, enable Filipinos to resolve their crisis of identity. Since it is no easy matter to specify just how this mission could be achieved, however, the quest for identity has manifested itself in other ways, particularly the continued Philippine efforts to become fully independent of the United States and to convince its neighbors that it is truly an Asian nation rather than merely a nation in Asia. The influence of such attitudes on the Macapagal administration's foreign policy actions during 1962-1963 should be evident from this case study — witness its "anti-Americanism," its attempt to establish and solidify a Philippine role in Southeast Asian affairs via Maphilindo, its efforts to act as an intermediary between Indonesia and Malaysia, its interference with the "neo-colonial" Malaysian Federation by claiming North Borneo, and so on. And this in turn should be sufficient to explain why societal variables should be ranked ahead of role variables, which are dealt with next.

The earlier discssion of idiosyncratic variables makes it possible to distinguish between their effects and those of role variables during 1962-1963. While Macapagal's actions during that period to a certain extent were governed by role constraints, it is highly unlikely, to say the least, that any other individual who might have been President at that time

[53] See the reference cited in note 3 above.
[54] Rosenau, "Pre-Theories...," p. 43.

would have responded in the specific ways Macapagal did; such things as the flirtation with Sukarno, the idea of Maphilindo, and the North Borneo claim clearly are attributable to idiosyncratic rather than to role variables. And, while a different President might have pursued basically the same objectives Macapagal did (although by other means), this would have been more the result of societal — and of course systemic — factors than of role pressures.

Nonetheless, the latter probably were more significant than were governmental variables during 1962-1963. This conclusion rests mainly on the fact that the political power of the Philipine chief executive, who is the paramount figure in the country's unitary form of government, is especially pronounced in the field of international relations. Since the Philippine governmental system is based on the principle of separation of powers, and since politics is no less competitive there than elsewhere, the presidential dominance in foreign affairs undoubtedly is attributable chiefly to the influence of role variables. This executive predominance prevailed during the era of *Konfrontasi* despite — or because of — the unusual stresses and strains of that period. For example, there was very little congressional interference, or even attempted interference, with Macapagal's foreign policy initiatives of 1962-1963, partly for the reasons just cited and partly because those initiatives did not require any kind of legislative approval. It appears, therefore, that governmental variables merit their fifth-place ranking.[55]

In brief, the evidence of this case study supports Rosenau's estimates of the relative potencies of all five sets of variables for the status issue that presumably dominated the Macapagal administration's foreign policies of 1962-1963. We shall now attempt to assess the impact of those variables upon the territorial issue. It will be recalled that, by 1964, the administration's chief concern had shifted from Malaysia to Indonesia and from relatively long-range status goals to the immediate problem of territorial defense. Despite these shifts, however, many of the arguments discussed in considering the earlier period also apply here.

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[55] An example of Macapagal's relative freedom of action was his willingness to pursue a "revisionist" policy on such issues as North Borneo, even though such "tendencies in a leader of an open society may be controlled by the checks and balances of the [governmental] system" (Farrell, in Farrell, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 206). With regard to Macapagal specifically, several idiosyncratic factors help account for his freedom of action in foreign policy matters; for example, his education (he holds a Ph.D. in Economics) presumably enabled him to avoid undue reliance on others for data and/or analysis. (For hypotheses concerning the effects of educational achievement on official decision-makers, see *ibid.*, p. 183.) This factor is important, since public officials are as likely as most people to "feel more frustrated and less competent toward issues in the foreign area than they do toward those in the domestic area" (Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as an Issue-Area," p. 35). (Interestingly, during the 1965 election campaign, some opposition party members implied that Macapagal's doctorate was spurious.)

This is particulary true of both systemic and idiosyncratic variables, which again can be ranked first and second, respectively, for essentially the same reasons advanced above. Specifically, the proximity of Indonesia to the Philippines, and the former's "ideological challenge" to the latter, leave no doubt as to the predominant influence of systemic factors. For instance, the exigencies of defense considerations — i.e., Philippine military dependence on the United States — dictated Macapagal's return to a "pro-American" position in 1964-1965. Similarly, his other new approaches of that period clearly were influenced by idiosyncratic variables, not only as to their content but also in terms of *how* the changes in policy were carried out. To elaborate on the latter point, the policies that Macapagal altered were closely linked in the public mind with his personal "style." This meant that he had to make these changes rather circumspectly, because considerations of "face" were involved in modifying (and thus tacitly admitting the shortcomings of) his previous policies. Thus the very process of reversing his 1962-1963 actions reflected the impact of idiosyncratic elements.[56]

As for the other three variables, one change in their rankings should be noted before they are discussed. Rosenau places role variables fourth in the status issue-area but moves them up to third in the territorial issue-area, while societal variables drop from third to fourth. In both cases governmental variables remain fifth. On the basis of this case study, it seems a plausible estimate that role factors did indeed have a greater impact on the territorial issue than did societal variables. A negative reason is that the societal attitudes mentioned earlier were no longer operative. Moreover, the ones that *were* important in 1964-1965 — the Filipino commitment to democracy and hostility to communism — served to reinforce the role constraints acting upon the President. If a different set of societal variables had been dominant, and if they had been in conflict with role variables, no doubt the latter would have prevailed over the former. For, given the systemic and idiosyncratic forces described above, it can be assumed that any President would have reacted to the Indonesian threat in much the same *general* fashion as did Macapagal, and that the reaction would have occurred whatever the nature of the leading societal variables of the period.[57]

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[56] Though rather involved, this argument can be applied empirically; it helps explain, for example, why Macapagal seemed intent on continuing his "flirtation' with Sukarno long after deteriorating Philippine-Indonesian relations had raised considerable doubt among many Filipinos as to the wisdom of such a policy.

[57] It might be argued that, given the systemic pressures of 1964-1965, any President would have reacted *generally* as Macapagal did, regardless of idiosyncratic variables; in other words, role variables should outrank idiosyncratic variables. But the greater influence of the latter is evidenced by the fact that Macapagal changed his 1962-1963 policies at all; that is, he could have reacted to the Indonesian threat by continuing his rapprochement with Sukarno and

The only question concerning Rosenau's rankings arises with regard to societal and governmental variables. It could be maintained that, given Macapagal's (idiosyncratic) reaction to the Indonesian (systemic) threat, and given the influence of role constraints, then the specific actions necessary to deal with the external challenge — e.g., constructing military bases in the unguarded southern ilsands closest to Indonesia — would have required legislative sanction (including congressional appropriations) regardless of societal attitudes on the matter.[58] To support this view, the Macapagal administration's policy changes during 1964-1965 could be cited as evidence that it was responding to the prospect of increasing legislative-executive friction and/or opposition party criticism in foreign affairs following its 1963 off-year election "setback." On the other hand, had Macapagal presented recommendations to Congress for meeting the Indonesian danger, there is little question that Congress would have supported them, partly because of the President's political predominance and partly because Congress itself would have had to go along with the major societal attitudes of the period. In any event, it should be stressed that the Macapagal administration could have relied on American military power for protection against external aggression, regardless of legislative factors. Thus it is likely that societal variables had a greater impact during 1964-1965 than did governmental variables.[59] The case study, therefore, tends to confirms Rosenau's rankings of the five sets of variables for the two issues surveyed here.

In summary, this examination of the impact of *Konfrontasi* on the Philippines appears to have significant implications. In terms of the case study *per se*, the "two-level" approach used here not only reveals

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deciding to support Konfrontasi. That he did not do so must be attributable more to idiosyncratic than to role variables. For an analysis centering on the relationships between these variables, see Rosenau, "Private Preferences and Political Responsibilities: The Relative Potency of Individual and Role Variables in the Behavior of U. S. Senators," in J. David Singer, ed., *Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 17-50. Related matters are discussed in the essays by Dean C. Pruitt, "Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action," and James A. Robinson and Richard C. Shyder, "Decision-Making in International Politics," in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966).

[58] In other words, when the territorial issue began to affect the allocation of Philippine domestic resources, it impinged upon the domestic as well as the foreign political system; see Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as an Issue-Area," p. 49.

[59] The relatively slight influence of societal and especially governmental variables is further indicated by the fact of Macapagal's freedom of action in altering his policies. As Farrell points out, "Deliberate quick shifts of extreme magnitude are...rare in the foreign policies of open political systems" because the official decision-makers must take into account the attitudes of the public, pressure groups and legislators; see Farrell, *op. cit.*, p. 201. It is revealing that a recent study of Philippine legislators did not deal with foreign policy areas; see Robert B. Stauffer, "Philippine Legislators and their Changing Universe," *Journal of Politics,* XXVIII (August 1966), pp. 556-597.

the likelihood that *Konfrontasi* affected Philippine political developments during 1962-1965; it also indicates avenues that might be followed to seek more satisfactory explanations of those developments than have yet been advanced. In addition, application of the Deutsch and Rosenau conceptual frameworks for handling the problem of external-internal political relationships leads to the conclusion that those frameworks help to explain and clarify the nature of *Konfrontasi's* impact on the Philippines. If this analysis is valid, it would seem to justify a recommendation for further development and application of these theoretical schemes