

POLITICAL CULTURE AS A FACTOR OF POLITICAL DECAY IN CHINA AND JAPAN

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Introduction

THE RELATIVE SUCCESS IN A RAPID "MODERNIZATION" OF PRE-WORLD WAR II Japan has inspired a number of comparative studies aimed at delineating the "pre-conditions" of modernization.¹ However, the single country whose modernization has not been most frequently compared with that of Japan seems to be China. The two countries indeed present an interesting contrast.² Despite the similarities in their cultural heritage, China and Japan have gone through dramatically different processes of modernization and ended up with completely different sets of political systems.

One important concept here is "political modernization." It has been often argued as if Japan was better able to "politically modernize" than China, and thus more easily achieve overall modernization. What is actually meant is that Japan enjoyed more political stability and effectiveness of government compared to China during the initial period of modernization. However, equating political stability and governmental effectiveness on the one hand with political modernization on the other hand is doing an injustice to the latter term. According to Huntington, political modernization is characterized by (1) rationalization of the procedures for the making of political decisions, (2) high degree of national integration, (3) democratization in the sense that the government will become responsive to social pressures and interests, and (4) high degree of social mobilization or participation.³ In short, Huntington regards political modernization as any combination of political institutionalization and social mobilization. When the institutionalization overbalances social mobilization, the system will become stable, effective, and thus "developed." Such was the situation in Japan during the half a century following the Meiji Restoration. When the latter outruns the former, the system will become highly unstable and ineffective, in

¹ For example, Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (University of California Press, 1964); also, Robert E. Ward and D. A. Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton University Press, 1964).

² A classical example would be Marion J. Levy Jr., "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, October, 1963.

³ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Yale University Press, 1968).

which case, the system can be said to be experiencing "political decay." Such was the case in China until the end of the Second World War. This contrast between political development and political decay in two countries will be further elaborated in this essay.

Despite oversimplification, I find Huntington's notion of political development and decay very helpful in analyzing a modernizing political system because it enables us to say much more than simply whether a system is "modernized" or not. In other words, even if a system is politically "modernized" in the sense that it shows one or more of the traits attributed to modernity, when however they are wrongly balanced, it can be described as political decay. Huntington also argues that the institutionalization can be either that of the input system (e.g., political parties) or of the output system (e.g., administrative apparatus), or both. Although Huntington stops here, I would further argue that the implications is that, the output institutions are necessary whether mobilization exists or not, and that the input institutions are necessary only when the population is "mobilized."⁴ Thus, in China, when the output institutions were found inadequate with the Western intrusion, the system fell into decay despite the relative lack of social mobilization. In Japan, output institutions were necessary—and they were available—for the rapid modernization despite similar lack of social mobilization.

It is my contention in this paper that although Japan experienced a successful modernization through an effective system of "output institutions," it was possible only because of the lack of social mobilization. With the gradual social mobilization, however, the inadequacy of input institutions is being acutely felt in the contemporary Japanese politics. It seems that such an inadequacy is largely attributable to the very kind of "political culture" that made the output institutions successful earlier. In China, on the other hand, it can be argued that the very "political culture" that paralyzed output institutions during the similar period and subsequently helped retard the process of modernization, has in the long run demanded and successfully acquired an effective input system as well as an output systems, which would lead to subsequent "political development."

The comparative studies mentioned in the foregoing statements are largely concerned with identifying the factors responsible for the contrasting course of modernization in China and Japan. Whatever factors are thus identified, it seems to have been generally agreed that they would not constitute sufficient but merely necessary conditions for the different processes, thus precluding any inevitability of the kind of development that each has had to go through. I think it can be

⁴ Here and elsewhere, the term "mobilization" is used to mean not only the people's becoming aware of the nation as an entity but also their possession of a sense of efficacy and desire for participation with expectations and demands from the state.

further argued that many of these factors constitute not even necessary but perhaps only contributing conditions without which similar developments would have been possible albeit with difficulty.

If we accept Scalapino's distinction between the "impersonal" and "personal" forces that shape the course of social and political change,⁵ it is conceivable that certain deficiencies in the "impersonal" forces can be made up with the "personal" forces. It is nevertheless clear that these impersonal forces are important, and except Norman who seems to argue that the apparent success of the Meiji modernization is attributable primarily to the "brilliant leadership of samurai-bureaucrats,"⁶ Most of the works on this subject place heavy emphasis on the "givens," including such factors as geopolitical factors, timing of external stimuli for change, and factors relating to the nature of a society's traditional heritage.⁷ Such an approach can also be justified by arguing that, after all, the so-called "personal" factors are ultimately a function of the impersonal forces in that men are necessarily "culture-bound."

It seems that the question as to what these "impersonal" factors were in Japan that contributed to the relatively rapid and peaceful conversion from a premodern to a highly industrialized society, as well as what they were in China with the opposite result, has been rather exhaustively dealt with and with persuasive answers. In this essay, I propose to examine the third of the categories of "impersonal" factors introduced above, namely the nature of a society's traditional heritage, and especially as it is relevant to political association. Here, I subscribe to the definition of political culture by Almond and Verba as "attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system."⁸

Whatever can be said about the importance of the political culture in the shaping of a political system, it cannot be claimed that it would constitute a sufficient condition or even necessary condition for a particular course that the system takes. Hence, it is conceivable that the system may be following a course of considerably different nature from that which the political culture would otherwise dictate. It is possible that Japanese "democracy" may be perpetuated despite its political culture (if my argument about its inadequacy is correct). Even as a contributing factor, however, it is worth examining. In the following, I will discuss and reproduce, in summary form, the findings of those aspects of political

⁵ Robert Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan* (University of California Press, 1962), pp. 394-395. Ward and Rustow make a similar but not entirely identical distinction; (1) those which are set or pre-determined in such a manner as to be wholly or largely beyond the control of the leaders of the modernizing society and (2) those which are amenable to some significant degree of influence or control by these leaders. *Ibid.*, p. 465.

⁷ Ward and Rustow, *Ibid.*, pp. 465-66.

⁸ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *Civic Culture* (Princeton University Press, 1963) p. 12.

culture that contributed to political development and political decay in two countries, China and Japan. In the last section of this paper, I will try to present how and why the essentially same political culture of a people would contribute to different results of political development and political decay in a different time span.

The First Stage of Modernization

China experienced a political decay during the period between the intrusion of the Western powers in the mid-nineteenth century and the end of Second World War, for reasons of the inadequacy of output institutions and later (especially after the Japanese invasion of 1937), for the lack of both output and input institutions.

In Japan, on the other hand, a "developed" political system had been sustained until the 1920s when a small portion of the population began to be "mobilized" and when the system was unable to harness the social unrest by ordinary means. I would call those periods when only the effective output institutions were necessary "the first stage of modernization."

According to Pye, the process of political development involves essentially six crises that must successfully be dealt with to become a modern nation state: (1) the identity crisis, (2) the legitimacy crisis, (3) the penetration crisis, (4) integration crisis, (5) the participation crisis, and (6) the distribution crisis.⁹ Among these, the last two crises are largely irrelevant for discussion of the first stage of modernization for the obvious reason that popular participation is excluded from this stage by virtue of definition. At the same time, by examining the political culture of China and Japan in the light of Pye's first four categories, we can say whether it could contribute to the success or failure of each country's output institutionalization and the resultant political development or political decay.

The Identity and Integration Crises

The parochial attitude of the Chinese peasant is well described by Yang in his study of the Nanching Village in Southern China. Yang characterized Nanching as multi-clan village which had been closed to outsiders as a unit of permanent community life. Despite its proximity to the urban center of Canton, the peasants in the village on the eve of the Communist takeover remained "bound to their agrarian tradition" which was largely "woven out of the social fabric of kinship relations."¹⁰ Such an attitude of the peasants was reciprocated by the ruling elite whose attitude was characterized as Lockean by Levy. According to

⁹ Lucian Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston, 1966).

¹⁰ C. K. Yang, *Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition*, (MIT Press, 1959).

Levy, it was believed that "the structure of society would function to the best interest of everyone if it were set up in accord with the will of Heaven and left as much alone as possible."¹¹

Under these circumstances, the Chinese peasantry was at best indifferent to politics of the national level, and could not be sensitized to a Communist (or Nationalist for that matter) ideology. Whatever national consciousness there was, even on the elite level, was a loose sense of Chineseness which permitted all who agreed to submit themselves to the enlightened rule of the Son of Heaven to participate as members of the Middle Kingdom. But such an ethnocentrism not only inhibited the development of a national consciousness but also constituted a lasting barrier to cultural borrowing which carried with it the stigma of inferiority and indignity.

As far as national integration was concerned, all that the Chinese shared in common was the ethical culture. Ethnically and linguistically, China was highly heterogeneous at the time of the Western arrival. In the course of China's contact with the West, other forms of social divisions began to take shape — among the elite as well as the masses. Some Chinese leaders turned to Western ideas and technology, while the rest rejected Westernization except to preserve what is essentially Chinese. On the mass level, a degree of social mobilization was to be found in the commercial coastal areas as well as major urban centers whereas the rest remained more or less untouched.

Japan was exceptionally fortunate in this respect. Her boundaries were clearcut during the early modernization period. As Ward puts it, "Her population was racially homogeneous; the same language was spoken throughout the islands; religion was not a divisive factor; and there was a tradition of national unity and identity extending back at least twelve hundred years. The major elements of a new national identification were already at hand."¹² The cultural coherence is most frequently attributed to Japan's insular position. According to Scalapino, the physical separation permitted the society to develop in relatively homogeneous fashion and to become possessed of a sense of identity and a quality of uniqueness.¹³

The Japanese political culture during the Tokugawa was "parochial" if by that term we mean lack of horizontal ties with other local social units. It was certainly not parochial if by that term we mean the failure to recognize the hierarchical top. The *Shogun* demanded the *daimyo's* loyalty to the Emperor. The *daimyo* demanded their retainers' loyalty only his own to the Shogun, of at the least, to the "Emperor. The *samurai* claimed superiority over the peasants only through their own

¹¹ Levy, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

¹² Ward and Rustow, *op. cit.*, p. 448.

¹³ Robert Scalapino, "Environmental and Foreign Contributions," *Ibid.*, p. 67.

subordination to the *daimyo*. The supremacy of the Emperor in the Japanese rank-order of values could be easily translated by the Meiji leadership who gave them a new formulation and heightened emphasis in the name of the Japanese nation.

Another important factor that should be mentioned in connection with the identity crisis is education. Dore remarks that about half of the male population in the Islands could read and write as early as 1870.¹⁴ Since Japanese education, both before and after the Meiji Restoration, was not thought of primary benefit of the individual, but rather of the system, we can expect that the people would become reasonably well aware of the national entity without exploring individual demands on the system. Certainly, the contribution of Japanese education during this stage in making a good subject, although not a good participant, cannot be overestimated. By the end of the First World War, most Japanese thought of themselves as citizens of Japan, not of their respective prefectures as in feudal days.¹⁵

Ward and Rustow regard as a measure of political modernization "a widespread and effective sense of popular identification with the history, territory, and national identity of the state."¹⁶ During a period when quiet subordination rather than creative participation was of prime necessity of the day, just how much the higher degree of national identification in Japan was instrumental in her more effective modernization, is questionable. Of far more significance, during this period would be the degree of national integration, especially on the elite level. Ward and Rustow see integration as primarily that within the governmental structure. But both in and out of government, the Japanese elite was much more homogeneous and integrated than their Chinese counterpart in terms of their social origin purposes and outlook despite the deep-rooted factionalism and regionalism. Later, Bendix writes of the Japanese elite as follows:

Japanese opinion leaders and intellectuals were principally recruited from the samurai. As such they were oriented toward action and united in their common goal to ensure Japan's greatness as a nation, however divided they were on the best way of achieving that goal. Socially and culturally homogeneous, Japan's educated elite was not alienated from the establishment of autocratic government with the Emperor as its symbolic apex.¹⁷

A relatively integrated nation and united leadership made effective "output institutions" successful. This was also possible, however, because the Japanese people at large were accustomed to be good subjects. Why they were good subjects and how it contributed to the building of

¹⁴ R. P. Dore, "Education," *Ibid.*, p. 177.

¹⁵ Scalapino, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

¹⁶ Ward and Rustow, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

¹⁷ Bendix, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

the output institutions, as well as how this picture compares with that in China, will be the subject of the following words.

The Legitimacy and Penetration Crises

No government can function properly unless the majority of the people accept its authority either passively or actively. Thus, at a time of modernization when the demand for extensive activities of the government is multiplied, the problem of reaching down into the society and effecting basic policies is directly related with the problem of the people's acceptance of, or at least acquiescence to, the authority.

One is tempted to say that the Japanese Emperor claimed more legitimacy among the Japanese during this period than the *Ching* Emperor could among the Chinese people. What matters more in comparing the nature of authority in the two countries is, however, not only the kind of legitimacy that the system claimed, but more importantly, the intensity that the respective peoples felt of their authorities.

Yang pointed out that the formal government had little to do with the life of a Wang or Lee family in the village because their respective clans performed the function of enforcing social and moral order among their members.¹⁸ Accordingly, there was an absence of state power in the village. The Nationalist government's *Pao Chia* system failed to facilitate the flow of central authority down to the village and family levels because it could not break the firm hold of decentralized particularistic social system in rural life of China. Whatever socio-economic change there was in "modern" China, therefore, was concentrated in the urban centers and failed to alter ordinary peasants' outlook.

I think Levy presents a somewhat mistaken view of social control in China when he says, "The Chinese society had developed no other forms of control that would operate effectively and stably in the absence of family controls."¹⁹ Despite the frequent argument by many literatures on the subject that the family system which had been the only means of social control in the Continent, broke down with the Western intrusion, I am inclined to believe that it was the inadequacy of family control and not the destruction of it and the failure of formal government to supplement it and not to replace it that are responsible for the political decay in China. Yang shows that the family control began to crack in most parts of China only during the last phase of the first stage of modernization.

Japan is seen in an opposite picture. Hall calls the "density of government" which was the secret of the "great peace" of the Tokugawa period and the "great leap" of the Meiji period. Hall continues: few people in pre-modern times have lived under such a heavy load of official regulation

¹⁸ Yang, *op. cit.*

¹⁹ Levy, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

and supervision as the Tokugawa Japanese."²⁰ Such a system of personal loyalty to the superior was a function of the Japanese "feudalism" if we accept Levy's definition of the term.²¹

From the rulers' point of view, they could more easily perceive than their Chinese counterparts the possibilities of manipulating social structure for purposes of control and this developing administrative apparatus. It is widely discussed that the pre-Restoration samurai had been relatively well trained in administrative tasks. While the Chinese officials (both imperial and republican) were largely incapacitated by their training to the sort of planning necessary in meeting the necessity for governmental leadership, their Japanese counterparts did know that planning and execution were under proper realm of ruling.

In short, as Levy puts it, "the differing system of control over individuals in China and Japan made for much of the difference in their respective experience with industrialization."²² But such a difference in effectiveness of the control system presupposed a difference in the class system. In Japan, the leaders were assured that their positions and those of their class would not be threatened from below, and they could embark on drastic socio-economic changes on a reasonably safe ground. China's "open class system" was in this sense a severe liability for her political development as well as overall modernization. In China, as Levy shows, ideally (and this is what counts) everybody could move upward without fixed personal hierarchy. It meant that since anyone can be as high-positioned as any other person, the position is thus obtainable as well as deprivable.

The implications of the above discussion are clear. At the risk of oversimplification and exaggeration, we can say that the Chinese society was based, at least on ideal terms, on equality. In view of the primary emphasis given to family by the Chinese over the state, it can also be argued that the Chinese were basically individualistic. The above statement may sound contradictory. Certainly, the Chinese were not individualistic when the individual was set against the family. He was individualistic, however, in the sense that he did represent the private self-interest of the family as a basic unit of society. The Japanese society was one without these atomistic units capable of exerting such private interests. Whatever units there were in Japan were subsumed under the authoritative institutions. There was no doubt that a society with built-

²⁰ John W. Hall, "The Nature of Traditional Society," in Ward and Rustow,

²¹ Levy defines feudalism as the characteristics of a society with (1) closed social classes; (2) a well-defined hierarchy of powerholders; (3) identification, at least ideally speaking, of each individual responsible to some particular individual higher than himself in the hierarchy and related to others outside of that direct line by virtue of his overlord's relation to them; and (4) a distribution of goods and services, most especially land ownership and control, primarily on the basis of ranks distinguished in the hierarchy and responsibility. Levy, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 186.

in inequality and lacking the divisive forces of self-interest could achieve "political development" much more easily than a society with the opposite traits. A politically developed society would achieve modernization more easily when the political system set it as its goal.

However, different conditions brought about by the modernization in both countries, political and otherwise, during the second stage of modernization would make the designation of "political development" for Japan and "political decay" for China not much irrelevant.

The Second Stage of Modernization

Most literatures concerning the successful process of modernization in Japan content with identifying those factors that presumably contributed to such a "success" and suggesting what lessons can be derived from this for other modernizing nation states. Some, however, stop to consider the implications of this success and drop somber "notes" on such an optimism. Scalapino among others writes a negative view on the optimism:

The central problem confronting Japanese democracy in its various attempts to find expression has lain in the difficulty of surmounting the obstacle of timing. A solution to this problem contained from the beginning the only hope of challenging effectively an overwhelmingly hostile tradition.²³

If the Japanese tradition has helped her political development and modernization, why is it to be considered as "overwhelmingly hostile" now? What is the difference in circumstances that makes the same object "helpful" during one period and "hostile" at another? The answer may be suggested in the delineation of what I could call the second stage of modernization.

As the first stage of modernization designates the period of modernization when there was a substantial need for output institutions for reasons of external demands, so is the second stage meant to designate the period when there is a great need for both the input and output institutions for reasons of internal as well as external demands; the second stage is outstanding in that, during this period, one begins to notice the emergence and growth of demands for participation in, as well as protection and advantage from, the political system. It is also during this stage that Pye's participation and distribution crises become relevant.

If my contention that the Chinese are more interest-oriented than the Japanese is accepted, there is little wonder that the social mobilization begins to take shape earlier in China than in Japan. To repeat, it was not the disintegration of family system that prompted social mobilization

²³ Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan* (University of California Press, 1962), p. 1.

and social division; rather, the nature of family system and its preponderance over other forms of authority accelerated the later developments. According to Johnson, Japan's invasion and occupation of China decisively altered the political "interests" of the peasantry. It should be noted that these "interests" are to be best understood as private interests which take the form of a demand on the political system. These interests are essentially Hobbesian in that they are aggregates of individual interests even when they amount to "nationalism." The Japanese nationalism, on the other hand, would take a Rousseauian form in that it is necessarily of public nature and not an aggregate of individual interests as such. It is not something that an individual Japanese demands from his government. For the Japanese, the best way to serve his nationalism is to serve his government.

The result of social mobilization in China was the achievement of a strong political party which would act as receptacle for the individual demands. When one considers the appearance of various "political parties" following the May Fourth Movement of 1919, it appears that the term "political party" is for them either presumption or premature as an input institution. It would be presumptuous if one recognizes that their activities limited primarily among the elite. It would be premature because whatever social mobilization there was, it was confined to a few coastal and urban areas which hardly necessitated a system of input institutions as such. When the masses were mobilized in the thirties and forties, and only then, they would attempt, and successfully so, to unseat a previously mobilized and nationalist elite. In China, social mobilization spread rather widely and quickly once its process got started while the process in Japan appeared to be remarkably slow and limited.

In Japan, the process of mobilization began considerably later than in China to begin with. The first visible sign of such a process was seen in the wake of world depression, and as in China, mostly in the urban areas. Industrial dynamism following modernization inevitably uprooted many people from the traditional social relationships (both in form and imagination) of personal obligation and imbued them with more equalitarian and individualistic ideas. The significant fact was, however, that even the process of urbanization left most of the masses of Japan on the lower stratus in their traditional modes of thinking about social relationships. It was only the intellectual and enlightened few who acquired new ideas and new modes of life, slowly and hesitantly at that. As Lockwood points out, Japanese liberalism lacked the mass support which would have enabled it to withstand the counter-revolutionary assault of the militarists.²⁴ The implications of these developments were not simply the Japanese militarism overcoming liberalism, but more sig-

²⁴ Lockwood, "Economic and Political Modernization," in Ward and Rustow, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

nificantly, those forces buttressed by overpowering traditional modes swallowing up new modes of life and human relationships.

The Japanese political parties which had hitherto existed were not political parties as input institutions. As Scalapino and Masumi remarks, they had developed primarily as protest movements—protest by the dissident elite—and were not intended or required to be channels through which self-interests would be translated, transmitted, and dissipated.²⁵ It can be summed up in Ike's words:

In the pre-war period, parties were assigned a minor role in the political process. They were able to provide only limited access to the political elite. Especially in the 1930's most of the political leaders came from the military or from the bureaucracy. On the eve of World War II, the Parties disappeared being amalgamated into a single organization known as the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.²⁶

If one had wished to see political parties with the rule as an input institution, even in ideal, he would have had to wait for the day when the American conquest and military occupation after the War would impose a new kind of political structure on the Japanese people.

How new is this new system of government? At least, it provided an opportunity for the political parties to solicit public support and pose as input institutions if such were demanded by the society. But, again, the degree of social mobilization was disappointingly low (from a democrat's point of view) and only minority sought political parties as input institutions.²⁷ The conservatives rely heavily on local notables and political bosses, while the socialists, especially left-wing factions, make use of the labor unions, both for votes and for funds. The Liberal Democratic Party which has been supported by the traditional rural population and the lowest urban bracket as well as voters of business and well-to-do sectors shows that the only "full" party can rule.

Scalapino's distinction between the "pure politicians" and bureaucrat representatives' within the Liberal-Democratic Party is immaterial for my argument here, because the "bureaucrat representatives" have already been insulated from the input process and the "pure politicians" are none other than those local notables who receive votes by virtue of the traditional modes of social relationship, an extreme form of which would be *oyabun-kobun* relationship.

Such an arrangement may be just fine as long as the population remain unmobilized. However, the precise pretention of democracy which was inevitable by the imposition of such a system by the victor as

²⁵ Scalapino and Masumi, *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan*, (University of California Press, 1962).

²⁶ Nobutaka Ike, "Political Leadership and Political Parties," in Ward and Rustow, *op. cit.*, p. 404.

²⁷ Chong Lim Kim, "Socio-Economic Development and Political Democracy in Japanese Prefectures," *American Political Science Review*, March, 1971, p. 186.

well as the ever rapid process of industrialization has fostered and nurtured participant culture and subsequent social mobilization among some sectors of the society which the ruling party is incapable of absorbing. These are not necessarily the Lockean liberals. But they can be called "liberals" in that they appear to have acquired those egalitarian and individualistic values characteristics of a "democratic" society. The paradox seems to be clear. As long as the ruling party sustains the present economic prosperity, the frequency of these individuals pouring out into the streets will not likely to increase. But if they stay "at home," it is because of acquiescence of "silent majority," not by legitimacy. Such legitimacy will most likely to take shape if these "liberals" come to feel a spontaneous "system effect" and there is no reason to believe at the present time at least, that such a process is in the making. Two possibilities can be counted:

- 1) the system may not be able to provide the kind of prosperity it has sustained during the post-War period. Or,
- 2) the number of citizens may surpass that of the subjects.

The possible consequences of these developments may be: in the first case, the streets will become noisier and a demand for the subjects who still constitute the majority of population will rise; in the second case, the creation of an ineffective system with the consequent *immobilisme* characterized by the French Third and Fourth Republic is a visible possibility. The "citizens" will have had no experience of a government capable of ruling as well as being responsive and responsible, and become ever jealous about their control of the executive and suspicious of a "strong" government. A demand for a "restoration" will be the logical response.

The above discussion dwells upon certain possibilities arising from the incongruence between the political culture of the Japanese people and the political superstructure. What seems apparent in the Japanese society is the systematically mixed nature of political culture; some are subjects and some citizens rather than the same man being both a subject and citizen. This may, in the long run, result in a violent oscillation between the two extremes of an authoritarian government and a "popular but ineffective government" after the French style. Yet, there is nothing inevitable about those possibilities. As discussed in the introduction of this paper, political culture is only one of the many factors and its destructiveness can certainly be averted by other factors such as intelligent maneuvering of the leadership, cataclysmic events, or foreign intervention. Seen through the eyes of political culture, however, the present Japanese political system anticipates political decay rather than development. The very factor that enabled an effective administration in Japan during the first stage of modernization prevented

the development of adequate system of input institutions despite its amounting needs.

China is difficult to discuss under the same framework as in Japan. China is a secretive, closed society, where it is difficult to determine at what point spontaneity ends and coercion begins. But as Johnson has observed, "totalitarianism is not incompatible with legitimacy, or nationalism or the self-appraised interests of the masses."²⁸ If coercion and/or the symbol manipulated by the thoughts of Mao is not a satisfactory explanation for the entire Chinese Communist work ethic, we have to admit that, at least to a considerable degree, the Chinese Communist Party is indeed an effective input institution which has also provided a system of effective output institutions. The failure of the Chinese to be good subjects which had been such a great liability during the first stage of modernization, has at the same time effectively prevented the creation of a political system based on those "feudal modes" during the second stage of modernization.

If we discard—as the Communist would do—the Utopian part of Marxism, and if modernization is the order of the day, private self-interest based upon egalitarian and individualistic ways of thinking will be one of the mainstays of a "modern" system, whether Communist or democratic. China has gone and is still going through difficult paths. But if Soviet Russia provides any lesson, it would be that the meeting point between spontaneity and coercion would gradually move towards the coercion end of the spectrum with increasing socio-economic modernization. If the same can be expected of the Chinese system one might in the long run expect a political development in China more properly than in Japan, in that the system will congrue with the input as well as the output needs of the individual citizens.

²⁸ Chalmer Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (Stanford University Press, 1962) p. 11.