

**THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE PARTY
IN CHINA DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD
FROM 1967-1976**

by

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Introduction

The Chinese Communist leaders have maintained that the Communist Party of China (hereafter, the Party), should always lead the army.¹ As Party Chairman, Mao Tse-tung (hereafter, Mao) said,

all our officers and fighters must always bear in mind that we are the great people's Liberation Army, we are the troops led by the great Communist Party of China.²

During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (hereafter, CR) in China (1965-1968), the above principle was still being maintained!

Our Principle is that the party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party.³

At the same time, the Chinese leaders also fully recognize and appreciate the essential role played by the army. Mao, for example, has pointed out that experience in class struggle "teaches us that it is only by the power of the gun that the working class and labouring masses can defeat the armed bourgeoisie and landlords. In this sense we may say that with guns the whole world can be transformed."⁴

The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement for the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and for all other countries.⁵

Therefore, the army as an essential instrument must be kept strong:

According to the Marxist theory of the state, the army is the chief component of state power. Whoever wants to seize and retain state power must have a strong army.⁶

The Chinese leaders further pointed out, "every Communist must grasp the truth, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun".⁷

Furthermore, they do not regard the army as merely a fighting force. To them, the army is also a political force:

The Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political task of the revolution. . . . The Red Army should certainly not contain itself to fighting; besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength, it should shoulder such important tasks as doing propaganda among the masses, organizing the masses, arming them, helping them to establish revolutionary political power, and setting up Party organizations.⁸

In addition to encouraging the army (i.e., Red Army or the PLA) to become a political force, Mao also urged them to involve themselves with more party work. In 1942, for example, Mao called for the elevation of such militarily responsible persons as commanders, political commissars and directors of the political department in the army to various parts of party organizations.⁹ It has become clear here that "political commissars" are part of the "militarily responsible persons".¹⁰

In the light of the Chinese leaders' emphasis on the supremacy of the party, on the one hand, and their insistence on the essential role of the army, on the other, this paper will examine the relationships between the army and the party in China from 1967 to the present.

This particular period has been chosen for this study because it has witnessed a series of events which seem to be crucial to the relationship between the army and the party. These events, among others, were:

- 1) The CR which started in 1965 finally came to an end in 1968 after the military intervention in 1967.

- 2) The Ninth National Party Congress of the Party was held in 1969.
- 3) A large number of members of the party apparatus were either purged or dismissed between 1967 and 1971. Many key figures were purged, among them Liu Shao-chi, (hereafter, Liu), and Teng Hsiao-ping (hereafter, Teng).
- 4) Lin Piao, the Defense Minister, and a Party Vice-Chairman, and many key military leaders in the PLA who supported Chairman Mao during the CR (hereafter Lin Piao faction) were promoted to prominent positions. Lin Piao, after the CR, became the sole "Vice Chairman" of the Party and the officially designated successor of Chairman Mao.
- 5) The Tenth National Party Congress was held in 1973. At the Congress, the Lin faction was either dismissed or removed from their key positions in both the party and the army. However, the powers of Chairman Mao and his supporters, Premier Chou En-lai (hereafter Chou) and Chiang Ch'ing (Mrs. Mao, hereafter, Chiang), remained intact.
- 6) In 1975, the Fourth National People's Congress was convened.
- 7) Finally, after Chou's death in February, 1976, Teng was severely attacked. The campaign against Teng and his faction has since been intensified.¹¹

The Emergence of Military Prominence

At the beginning of the CR or before 1967, Mao probably did not plan to involve the army.¹² His initial plan was, probably, to replace the party apparatus which was dominated by the Liu/Teng faction. There was even less evidence that he intended to replace the party apparatus permanently with the military apparatus.¹³

However, in or around 1966, Mao began to experience strong resistance from the party apparatus of all the six Regional Party Bureaus. Consequently, in January 1967, an order was officially issued by the Central Committee of the Party, the State Council, the Military Affairs Commission of the CC, and the Central CR Group of the CC to the Army to intervene in the CR in support of the Maoist faction.¹⁴ The joint order announced the "resolute support of the PLA for the revolutionary masses of the Left."

The People's Liberation Army is a proletarian revolutionary army personally created by Chairman Mao. . . . In this great struggle of the proletariat to seize power from the bourgeoisie, the PLA must firmly take the side of the proletarian revolutionaries and resolutely support and help the proletarian revolutionary Leftists.¹⁵

The type of assistance the army was expected to render to the "revolutionary Leftists" was also specified:

Active support must be rendered to the broad masses of revolutionary Leftists in their struggle to seize power. When genuine proletarian Leftists ask the army for help, the army should send out troops to support them positively.

Counter-revolutionaries and counter-revolutionary organizations who oppose the proletarian revolutionary Leftists must be resolutely suppressed. Should they resort to force, the army should strike back with force.¹⁶

By the end of 1967, the army had taken over most of the responsibilities which normally belonged to the central and local civilian government and party organization.¹⁷ All provincial and municipal governments were being gradually replaced by the "Revolutionary Committees." Each Revolutionary Committee was required to consist of three groups: The "revolutionary mass organizations (i.e. CR faction)", the PLA (the military faction, mainly Lin's faction), and the "revolutionary cadres (i.e., the Maoist party faction)".¹⁸

By the end of 1968, all 29 Revolutionary Committees were set up. The military dominated almost all key positions in the Committees. For example, 24 of the 29 Chairmen of the Committees were military cadres, while only 8 were Maoist party faction members.¹⁹ Thus, the military not only directly intervened in the CR to purge the party cadres of the Liu/Teng faction, but also controlled almost all local governments in China.

At the 9th Party Congress held in April, 1969, Lin Piao in his "political report" pointed out that the PLA was "the mighty pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat."²⁰

At the same time, a new Central Committee (hereafter, CC) with 170 full members and 109 alternate members, was elected. The military obviously had dominated the CC: (Table 1)

Table 1

Distribution of Power in
the 9th CC (%)

| | Military Cadres | Maoist Party Cadres | CR Faction Cadres | Total* % | N |
|---------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|-------------|-----|
| Full Members | 42.9 | 34.1 | 23.0 | 100 | 168 |
| Full and Alter- nate members | 44.3 | 27.5 | 28.2 | 100 | 265 |

Of the 21 full members of the 9th Political Bureau (Politburo), 11 were from the military (e.g. Lin Piao, Yeh Chien-yin, Hsieh Fu-chih, Huang Yung-sheng).²²

[Only those members with known background are considered.]

Sources: see note 21.

By August 1971, the re-organization of all 29 municipal Party Committees was completed. The purge of party cadres in the Liu/Teng faction was quite extensive. Of the 67 secretaries and alternate secretaries in the now abolished six Regional Party Bureaus throughout China in 1966, 37 were purged and 17 were either dismissed or suspended.²³ In the local Party Committees, 20 of the 29 first secretaries in 1966 were purged.²⁴

In the 29 new Party Committees established in 1971, the army dominated most of the key positions, 22 of the 29 first secretaries were military cadres. (Tables 5 and 7)

Therefore, both during and after the CR, the military appeared to have dominated the party apparatus. It also appeared that the fundamental doctrine that the Party must always command the army had been discarded.

The Maoist faction seemed to have anticipated such a tendency. A closer look at the events which occurred during the CR has indicated that from the very beginning, the Maoist faction already called for the re-building of the Party and its centralized leadership. They have also taken steps to reduce the power of the military. The rest of the paper will be examining these steps during the period from 1967 to the present.

Party Rebuildings and the Promotion of Centralized Party Leadership

As mentioned above, the military intervention during the CR was ordered by the CC of the Party and its Military Affairs Commission. Reportedly, the army intervened in the CR only reluctantly.²⁵ Moreover, even during the intervention, the army was always under the constant supervision of the party. Thus, in April, 1967, when the army began to antagonize the CR faction, the Military Affairs Commission immediately issued an order which severely curtailed the power of the military.²⁶ In March, 1968 while in the midst of the CR, Lin Piao's first lieutenant, Yang Cheng-wu, the Acting Chief-of-Staff of the PLA, was dismissed by Mao. Lin Piao reluctantly complied with the order without any signs of resistance.²⁷ Furthermore, in 1969, Mao accused Lin Piao and his faction of over-purging the Liu/Teng Faction during the CR and of over-reacting to some of the activities of the CR faction. The army appeared to have accepted these criticisms and admitted their "short-comings and mistakes".²⁸

The Party's Order and Supervision of the Military Intervention During the CR

As soon as the Liu/Teng faction was effectively purged, Mao began the task of party-building. The need for the party's centralized leadership was emphasized.

The new party leadership will be based on the following three general and, sometimes, over-lapping groups; the Maoist party faction and the Chou's "faction":

- a) Chiang and her "revolutionary masses of the Left" including the Red Guards—the CR faction;
- b) the party cadres who had supported Mao during the CR—the Maoist party faction;
- c) Chou En-lai, the Premier, and his State Council—Chou's "faction".

(Since Chou did not have a personal power base of his own, the word "faction" is being used loosely here to include some of the members of the State Council such as Li Hsien-nien).

(The combination of these three groups of cadres in this paper is regarded as "the Maoist faction").

The campaign for party re-building was intensified. After the 9th Congress, a joint editorial of the three official organs (People's Daily, Liberation Army Daily, and Red Flag) on June 8, 1969, emphasized the need for internal unity of the party. On July 1 ("the party day"), another joint editorial stressed the importance of centralized leadership of the party and the essential role played by the party in the founding of the country. It also identified the Party as the central leading force in China and pointed out that the PLA as well as other organizations had to accept the centralized leadership of the party. The 1970 new year joint editorial called for firm grasping of the task of party rebuilding. Both joint editorials on the "party day" (July 1) and the "army day" (August 1) in 1971 stressed the importance of the Party's centralized leadership. Other articles in these three organs throughout 1971 made similar statements.²⁹ A joint editorial of the three official organs on January 1, 1973 specified that the main task ahead was the strengthening of the Party's centralized leadership. The local Party Committees were urged to follow the leadership of the Party's central authority, the Central Committee. In the light of the overwhelming military representation in these Party Committees, the editorial clearly called for the reduction of the power of the military in the Committees.

As the 10th National Party Congress held in August, 1973, Premier Chou, in his "Political Report", declared that the Party was the body which exercises overall leadership over the seven sectors—industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education, the army, the government and the party.³⁰ The Constitution of the Party adopted at the 10th Congress further confirmed the leadership of the party over the army.³¹

As the purge of Lin continued into 1974,³² the importance of the army was de-emphasized, while the party leadership was emphasized. Past military victories in China were now attributed to the successful guidance of the Party, and, therefore, were not the achievements of the PLA alone.³³ The army was asked to learn

from the people.³⁴ It was emphasized that the “gun” had to be held in the hands of the “people”, implying that the army should be commanded by the party.

In 1975, emphasis was given to “unity, loyalty, and discipline,” presumably with the army in mind.³⁵ In January, 1975, Chang Chung-Ch’rao, one of the top leaders in the CR faction, in his report on the revised draft of the state constitution to the 4th People’s National Congress, reaffirmed the need for the party’s centralized leadership.³⁶

In summary, since 1967, Chairman Mao, joined by the Maoist party faction, the CR faction and the Chou’s “faction”, has begun to rebuild the centralized leadership of the party as well as the party apparatus. The launching of the CR and the subsequent military intervention were to eliminate the Lin/Teng faction in the party apparatus. The army was called in by the Central Committee and the Party Chairman to serve as an instrument in the process of party rectification (against the Liu/Teng faction) and party rebuilding (based on the Maoist faction). The immediate purge of Lin and his faction in 1971 when all local Party Committees were established, leave little doubt that the army apparatus was never expected or able to replace the party apparatus on a permanent basis.

The Reduction of the Power of the Military

In August, 1971, Lin was allegedly killed in a plane crash after an abortive coup against Mao had failed.³⁷ Many top military leaders in the Lin faction immediately disappeared. By early 1973, at least 57 top military leaders in the Lin’s faction were either dismissed or replaced.³⁸ Between 1973 and 1975, almost all Revolutionary Committees, local Party Committees, Military Regions and Military Districts were re-organized. The State Council and the Party Central Committees were both restructured. These steps were clearly taken by the Maoist faction to reduce the power of the military. They are analyzed separately as follows:

The Reduction of the Power of the Military in the Central Party Organizations

As a result of the Purge of the Lin faction, many members of the 9th CC were not re-elected to the 10th CC. Of the 45 members who did not return, 30 were military cadres, 13 were Maoist party cadres, and 2 were CR faction members. Among the 28 alternate members who did not return to the 10th CC, 22 were military cadres, 4 were Maoist party cadres, and 2 were the CR faction members.³⁹

The military representation in the 10th CC has also been reduced. Of the 195 members, 63 are military cadres, 71 are Maoist party cadres, and 57 are CR faction members; the background of 4 of them remain unknown. If both the members and alternate members are considered together, only 100 of the total 310 members and alternate members are military cadres, representing over a 10% reduction from the military representation at the 9th CC: (Table 2)

Table 2

**Comparison of Power Distribution
Between the 9th CC and the 10th CC (%)**

| | The Military | PC Faction | Maoist Party | Total * % | N |
|---------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|--------------|-------|
| 9th CC | 44.3 | 28.2 | 27.5 | 100 | (265) |
| 10th CC | 33.9 | 35.3 | 30.8 | 100 | (295) |
| change | -10.4 | + 7.1 | +3.3 | | |

The 10th Politburo has 21 full and 4 alternate members, the same as the 9th Politburo. Of the 21 members, 6 or 28.57% are military cadres, 6 are Maoist party cadres and 8 or 42.85% are CR faction members: (Table 3)

Therefore, although the reduction in membership is not very large, the military was the only casualty in the 10th Politburo. In addition, of the nine members and alternative members who were newly elected to the 10th Politburo, only one was a military strongman (i.e., Hsu Shih-yu)⁴².

* [Only members and alternate members whose backgrounds could be identified are considered here.]

Sources: see note 40

Table 3

**Comparison of the 9th and 10th Politburos
(power distribution)**

| | CR Faction | | Maoist Party Faction | | The Military | | Total * | |
|--------|---------------|---------|----------------------------|---------|-----------------|---------|---------|-------|
| | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| 9th | 4 | (20.00) | 5 | (25.00) | 11 | (55.00) | 20 | (100) |
| 10th | 8 | (42.00) | 6 | (28.57) | 6 | (28.57) | 20 | (100) |
| Change | +4 | (22.86) | +1 | (3.57) | -5 | (26.43) | | |

The size of the 10th Standing Committee of the Politburo has been increased from five to ten.⁴³ Of the new appointees, only Yeh Chien-yin belongs to the

* [including Mao himself]

Sources: see note 41

military. Four of the new appointees belong to the CR faction (e.g., Wang Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-chiao).

*The Reduction of the Power of the Military in the
Central Government Organization: the State Council*

During the CR, especially between September, 1967 and August 1968, the military had actually "taken over" the State Council. Under the order of the Central Committee as mentioned earlier, and the Party Chairman, the military set up a "military control committee" in each department and ministry in the State Council.⁴⁴

After March, 1970, however, the military control of the State Council and other civilian governments began to lessen. The military was urged to withdraw themselves from these organs. Normal government activities were gradually resumed.⁴⁵

In the new State Council appointed in 1975 at the 4th People's Congress, only 9 of the 29 ministers are military cadres. Of the 12 Vice-premiers, no more than three could be identified as military cadres. In fact, in a strict sense, only one of them, namely, Chen Hsi-lien is currently a military strongman. If all the key 42 persons in the State Council are considered together, the Maoist party faction and the Chou faction appear to have constituted the majority. (Table 4)

Table 4

Distribution of Powers in
the State Council

| | No. | Percentage |
|--|-----|------------|
| The Military | 8 | 19.04 |
| The Maoist Party Faction and the Chou's Faction | 23 | 54.76 |
| The CR Faction | 11 | 26.20 |
| Total | 42 | 100.00 |

The new State Constitution adopted at the 4th People's Congress contains new provisions to ensure the power of the party. It abolishes the post of Chairman of the People's Republic of China and, as a result, there is no longer a head of state for China. The Constitution has also transferred some of the powers which

previously belonged to the head of state to the Party Chairman. For example, it gives the title "Commander-in-Chief" of the Chinese Armed Forces, which now includes both the PLA and the militia (or the People's Arms Departments) to the Party Chairman.

| Regional Commander | Name of Military Region | Date of Appointment |
|--------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|
| Chin Chi-wei | Chengtu | May, 1973 |
| Wang Pi-ch'eng | Kunming | June, 1973 |
| Yang Yung | Sinkiang | July, 1973 |
| Ch'en Hsi-lien | Peking | December, 1973 |
| Li Te-sheng | Shenyang | December, 1973 |
| Hsu Shih-yu | Canton | December, 1973 |
| Ting Sheng | Nanking | December, 1973 |
| Yang Te-chih | Wuhan | December, 1973 |
| Tseng Szu-yu | Tsinan | December, 1973 |
| P'i Ting-Chun | Foochow | December, 1973 |
| Han Hsien-chu | Lanchow | December, 1973 |

The Reduction of the Power of the Military in the Regional and District Military Apparatus

There are, at present, eleven Military Regions and 29 Military Districts in China. After the purge of the Lin's faction, a great number of these local military cadres were either purged or were removed from their posts. By early 1973, more than 25 regional or district commanders and political commissars were removed.⁴⁷ At the district level alone, at least 112 or 32% of a total of 358 commanders, deputy commanders, political commissars (1st, 2nd and 3rd), and deputy commissars were either purged or replaced.⁴⁸ Such a large turnover has naturally uprooted the power bases of the regional and district military cadres. In 1973, all commanders of the eleven military regions were either replaced or transferred:

Many of these Regional Commanders had been in their "home regions" for quite a number of years. For example, Hsu-Shih-yu, before his transfer to the Canton Military Region, had been Commander of the Nanking Military Region since, 1957; Ch'en Hsi-lien had been in Shenyang since 1959; Yang Te-chih had been in Tsinan since 1958; and Han Hsien-chu had been in Foochow since 1960.⁵⁰

By transferring them to new regions, these Regional Commanders have been uprooted from their power bases. Moreover, when they were transferred, they, as a rule, left their army behind.

Around October 1 (the national day), 1975, a total of 59 District Commanders, regional military leaders, provincial party leaders and senior political commissars were transferred. At the end of 1975, for example, at least 10 of the 29 District Commanders were transferred out of their "home districts". These districts include Kweichow, Yunan, Kansu, Kiangsi, Chekiang, Hunan and Liaoning.⁵¹ Reportedly, there were more transfers between January and June 1976.

[Sources: see note 46]

*The Reduction of the Power of the Military in the
Civilian and Party Apparatus: the Removal of
Civilian and Party Powers from the Regional and
District Military Leaders*

Before the mass transfers of the military regional and district commanders, a majority of these commanders were concurrently Chairmen or Vice-Chairmen of the Revolutionary Committee. They were also the First Secretaries or the Second Secretaries of the Party Committees of the 29 provinces and municipalities. As a result, these commanders had monopolized all the military party and civilian powers in their hands. After the transfers, however, these commanders were stripped of their party and civilian powers. (See (E) and (F) below.)

[Sources: see note 49]

*The Reduction of the Power of the Military in the
Civilian and Party Apparatus: the Reorganization of
the Revolutionary Committees, i.e., the Civilian
Governments at the Local Level*

As mentioned above, when the Revolutionary Committees were established in 1968, there was overwhelming military representation. But the purge of the Lin faction and the re-emphasis of the party's centralized leadership have reversed the trend. For example, the number of military cadres who served as Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee was reduced first from 24 in 1968 to 19 after 1971, further to 10 in 1975 and finally to 8 in 1976 (Table 5). On the other hand, the number of Chairmen from the Maoist faction has increased from 5 (17.2%) in 1968 to 21 (72.4%) in 1976. When the number of both Chairmen and Vice-chairmen were considered together, the military accounted for only 102 or 25.6% of the 398 positions in late 1975, while the Maoist party faction accounted for 158 or 39.7% and the CR faction counted for 138 or 34.7% (Table 5).

There were no Military Regional Commanders among these Chairmen. Of the

ten military cadres, at most only two were Military District Commanders: Yu T'ai-chung, Commander of the Mongolia Military District and, possibly, Wang Chia-tao (who may have been purged in early 1976), Commander of the Heilungkiang Military District. They are still keeping their party and civilian titles in addition to their military titles in their respective provinces.

Reportedly, in January, 1976, two of the ten military cadres lost their Chairmanship in the Tsinghai Revolutionary Committee and the Kwangsi Revolutionary Committee, respectively. (Table 5).

An examination of the component of each of the 29 Revolutionary Committees indicates that the military is no longer able to control these Committees. If the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of each Committee are considered, the military is able to claim a majority in only 2 of the 29 Committees. Even in these two committees, the margins that the military enjoyed are quite small. On the other hand, the Maoist party faction is able to claim a majority in 15 and the CR faction 10 of the 29 Revolutionary Committees. (Table 6)

In the light of the fact that the Revolutionary Committees are now the only civilian governments in the 29 provinces and municipalities in China, these changes in the power distribution in the Committees are significant. The reduction of the power of the military in the civilian governments is apparent.

Table 5
Distribution of Powers in the 29 Revolutionary Committees

| Title | Approximate Date | Military Cadres | | Maoist Party Cadres | | CR Cadres | | Total Number | Source |
|-----------------------------|------------------|-----------------|-------|---------------------|-------|-----------|-------|--------------|--------|
| | | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | | |
| Chairman | September 1968 | 24 | 82.80 | 5 | 17.20 | 0 | 0 | 29 | (1) |
| Vice- Chairman | Same as Above | 58 | 29.70 | 54 | 27.70 | 83 | 42.60 | 195 | (2) |
| Chairman | Before Aug. 1971 | 21 | 72.40 | 8 | 27.60 | 0 | 0 | 29 | (3) |
| Vice- Chairman | Same as above | 90 | 36.00 | 80 | 32.00 | 80 | 32.00 | 250 | (4) |
| Chairman | After Aug. 1971 | 19 | 65.60 | 10 | 34.50 | 0 | 0 | 29 | (5) |
| Vice- Chairman | Same as above | 75 | 30.00 | 95 | 38.00 | 80 | 23.00 | 250 | (6) |
| Chairman & Vice Chairman | November 1975 | 102 | 25.60 | 158 | 39.70 | 138 | 34.70 | 398 | (7) |
| Chairman | December 1975 | 10 | 34.50 | 19 | 65.50 | 0 | 0 | 29 | (8) |
| Chairman | February 1976 | 8 | 27.60 | 21 | 72.40 | 0 | 0 | 29 | (9) |

- Sources: (1) *Asian Recorder* (October 7-11, 1968) p. 8560
 (2) *Studies on Chinese Communism* (January, 1976) pp. 21-32
 (3) (4), (5), (6), *I.S.* (August, 1972), pp. 10-12
 (7) *Studies on Chinese Communism* (December 1975) pp. 43-46
 (8) (Not indicated. Ed.)
 (9) *Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly* (January 1976), pp. 28-29, (February 1976), p. 120.

For other sources, see also *N.Y.T.*, June 3, 1968, p. 4.; June 9, 1968 p. 7; February 1, February 12, 1968. Due to different methods of computation employed in these sources the above figures cannot be used for precise comparison.

Table 6

**Power Distribution in Each of the
29th Revolutionary Committees
(Chairman and Vice-Chairmen)
(Approximate Date: December 1975)**

| LOCATIONS | Military Cadres | | Maoist Party Cadres | | CR Cadres | | Total |
|----------------|--------------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|------------|
| Anhwei | 3 | 20 | 6 | 40 | 6 | 40* | 15 |
| Chekiang | 5 | 38.5 | 6 | 46.1 | 2 | 15.4 | 13 |
| Fukien | 3 | 16.7 | 8 | 44.4 | 7 | 38.9 | 18 |
| Heilungkiang | 7 | 50.0 | 6 | 42.8 | 1 | 7.1 | 14 |
| Honan | 3 | 27.3 | 6 | 54.5 | 2 | 18.2 | 11 |
| Hopei | 4 | 33.3 | 4 | 33.3 | 4 | 33.3 | 12 |
| Hunan | 5 | 32.2 | 7 | 43.7 | 4 | 25.0 | 16 |
| Hupei | 3 | 17.6 | 10 | 58.2 | 4 | 23.5 | 17 |
| Inner Mongolia | 3 | 30.0 | 5 | 50.0 | 2 | 20.0 | 10 |
| Kansu | 3 | 23.0 | 2 | 15.4 | 8 | 61.5 | 13 |
| Kiangsi | 3 | 25.0 | 6 | 50.0 | 3 | 25.0 | 12 |
| Kiangsu | 3 | 18.7 | 5 | 31.2 | 8 | 50.0 | 16 |
| Kiran | 4 | 28.6 | 5 | 28.6 | 6 | 42.8 | 14 |
| Kwangsi | 3 | 23.0 | 4 | 30.8 | 6 | 46.1 | 13 |
| Kwangtung | 4 | 18.1 | 12 | 54.5 | 6 | 27.3 | 22 |
| Liaoning | 6 | 26.0 | 7 | 30.4 | 10 | 43.5 | 23 |
| Peking | 3 | 20.0 | 8 | 53.3 | 4 | 26.7 | 15 |
| Shanghai | 4 | 25.0 | 5 | 31.2 | 7 | 43.7 | 16 |
| Shantung | 0 | 00.00 | 4 | 66.7 | 2 | 33.3 | 6 |
| Sinkiang | 5 | 29.4 | 7 | 41.2 | 5 | 29.4 | 17 |
| Szechwan | 4 | 28.6 | 4 | 28.6 | 6 | 42.8 | 14 |
| Tibet | 4 | 26.7 | 8 | 53.3 | 3 | 20.0 | 15 |
| Yunnan | 2 | 18.2 | 3 | 27.3 | 6 | 54.5 | 11 |
| Kweichow | 3 | 25.0 | 5 | 41.7 | 4 | 33.3 | 12 |
| Ningshia | 2 | 40.0 | 2 | 40.0 | 1 | 20.0 | 5 |
| Shansi | 3 | 20.0 | 5 | 33.3 | 7 | 46.7 | 15 |
| Shensi | 1 | 12.5 | 3 | 37.5 | 4 | 50.0 | 8 |
| Tientsin | 6 | 40.0 | 4 | 26.7 | 5 | 33.3 | 15 |
| Tsinghai | 3 | 30.0 | 2 | 20.0 | 5 | 50.0 | 10 |
| | <u>3</u> | <u>25.6</u> | <u>158</u> | <u>39.7</u> | <u>138</u> | <u>34.7</u> | <u>398</u> |

*majority

Source: adapted and computed from data in *Studies on Chinese Communism* (December 1975), pp. 43-46.

*The Reduction of the Power of the Military in the
Party Apparatus: the Reorganization of the Local
Party Committees, the Supreme Local Party Authority*

At present, the chieftains in the Revolutionary Committees and the local Party Committees of the 29 provinces and municipalities are identical. The Chairman of a Revolutionary Committee is automatically the First Secretary of the local Party Committee of the same locale. Therefore, most of the above findings on the Revolutionary Committee can be applied to the local Party Committee as well. Thus, in December 1975, only 10 or 34.5% of the 29 First Secretaries were military cadres while 19 or 65.5% were Maoist party cadres. (Table 7)

In addition, it has been pointed out that as far as party affairs were concerned, the local Party Committees should have the final authority. In 1971, for example, Mao pointed out,

Now that local Party Committees have been established, they should be allowed to practice unified leadership. If decisions have already been made by local Party Committees on certain matters, is it not justified to ask military units for further discussion? 52

To this very date, i.e., June 1976, the army has shown no signs of open resistances to these steps which have been taken to reduce the power of the army.

*The Expansion of the Military, Party and Civilian Powers
of the Maoist Faction*

Over the past years, many members of the Maoist faction have been appointed to key positions in both the military and party apparatus. Thus, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao was appointed as the Director-General of the PLA Central Political Affairs Department and Wang Hung-wen, a Vice-Chairman of the Party. Other key Maoist leaders include Tseng Shao-shan (First Political Commissar of the Shenyang Military Region), Li Teh-sheng (Commander of the Shenyang Military Region), Wei Kuo-ch'ing (First Political Commissar of the Canton Military Region), Pai Ju-ping (First Political Commissar of the Tsi-nan Military Region) and Chi Teng-k'uei (First Political Commissar of the Peking Military Region).⁵³ In April, 1976, Hua Kuo-feng was appointed the Premier of China.⁵⁴

The new "three-in-one leadership" approved in the 1975 State Constitution is particularly favourable to the CR faction in the Maoist faction. It calls for the "unified leadership" among the young, the middle-aged, and the old. Since most of the members of the CR faction are younger cadres, this provision could open up more opportunities for the CR faction, and, therefore, clearly indicates a reduced emphasis on the military. As Wong Hung-wen recently pointed out:

The cultivation of millions of successors to the proletarian revolutionary undertakings is a great strategic measure and a hundred-year, long-range plan. We must grasp this great work and train successors at various levels. This training of successors has encountered few obstacles in local areas but more in military. I always advocate that we should find several men in their thirties to be the commanders

Table 7
Distribution of Powers in the 29 Local Party Committees

| Titles | Approximate Date | Military Cadres | | Maoist Party Cadres | | CR Cadres | | Total No. | Source |
|---------------------------------------|--|-----------------|-------|---------------------|-------|-----------|------|-----------|--------|
| | | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | | |
| 1st Secretary | Before Aug. 1971 | 22 | 75.86 | 7 | 24.14 | 0 | 0 | 29 | (1) |
| 1st Secretary | " " " | 21 | 72.40 | 8 | 27.60 | 0 | 0 | 29 | (2) |
| From top position to Deputy Secretary | Same as Above | — | 56.00 | — | — | — | — | — | (3) |
| Prov. Comm. Secretaries | Augst 1971 | 98 | 62.00 | 58 | 32.90 | 8 | 5.10 | 501 | (4) |
| 1st Secretaries | Same as Above | 22 | 75.86 | — | — | — | — | 29 | (5) |
| All Secretaries | Same as Above | 95 | 60.00 | 53 | 33.50 | 10 | 6.40 | 158 | (6) |
| New Secretaries | During 1972 (Jan.-Dec.) & 1973 (Jan.-Mar.) | 6 | 19.00 | — | — | — | — | 31 | (7) |
| 1st Secretaries | December 1975 | 10 | 34.50 | 19 | 65.50 | 0 | 0 | 29 | (8) |
| 1st Secretaries | February 1976 | 8 | 27.60 | 21 | 72.40 | 0 | 0 | 29 | (9) |

- Sources:
- (1) *I.S.* (December 1971) p. 53
 - (2) *Studies on Chinese Communism* (January 1976), pp.9-20
 - (3) *Current Scene* (December 1975), pp. 12-13
 - (4) *C.Q.* (July/September 1973) pp. 12-13
 - (5) *Ibid.*
 - (6) *A.S.* (December 1972) pp. 1006-1009; (October 1974), p. 881
 - (7) *A.S.* (April 1974) p. 394
 - (8) *(Not indicated. Ed.)*
 - (9) *Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly* (January 1976), p. 28-29; (February 1976), p. 120

[For other sources, see also *N.Y.T.*, May 26, 1971 p. 12; August 29, 1971, p. 18. Due to the different methods of computation employed in these sources, the above figures cannot be used for precise comparison.]

of large military regions.⁵⁵

*The Promotion and Restructuring of the Militia, i.e.
the People's Arms Departments*

The Maoist faction apparently have realized that, in order to ensure their leadership in the party, especially after Mao's demise, it is imperative that they are able to control the Armed Forces. In addition to the above steps, they have taken to control the military, they have apparently decided to establish a force independent from the PLA namely, the militia.⁵⁶

The use of the militia is by no means a new concept.⁵⁷ But it was not until 1973 when the Maoist faction began to re-emphasize the importance of the militia. Reportedly, Wang Hung-wen has been assigned to organize the new Militia.

Equally significant is the constitutional status given to the militia in the new Constitution. It stipulates that both the PLA and the militia are the workers' and peasants' own armed forces led by the Party. This device is probably to constitutionally establish the equal status between the militia and the PLA. Previously, the militia was subordinated to the command of the local PLA. Now the PLA has lost the monopolistic status it previously enjoyed. In view of the fact that the Maoist faction has, over the past years, vigorously tried to expand the militia through China, this new provision is of particular significance.⁵⁸

Since 1973, the army, the workers, as well as the party have been urged to either support or join the militia.⁵⁹ Attacks were launched against Lin Piao's "military line" which downgrades the importance of the militia.⁶⁰

*The Rehabilitation of the Military and Party Cadres
Who Were Purged During the CR*

Since 1971, but especially after the official purge of Lin Piao in 1973, a large number of the military and party cadres who were purged during the CR had been "rehabilitated" or reinstated. The purpose of this move seems to be twofold: first, the rehabilitated military cadres can be used to counterbalance the Lin Piao faction in the army and, secondly, they can resolve the problem of cadre shortage. The second point requires some explanation.

The dismissals and purges of members of the Liu/Teng faction during the CR, and those of the Lin Piao faction since 1971, have left a large number of positions unfilled. Most members, in the Maoist faction who were recruited during and after the CR are either too young or too inexperienced. The Maoist faction, therefore, have decided to rehabilitate some of the military and party cadres of the Liu/Teng faction (e.g. Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Ho Lung).⁶¹

The rehabilitation of Teng in 1973 was particularly significant.⁶² He was a Vice-Chairman and the Secretary-General of the Party before his purge during the CR. His reinstatement, therefore, could win the sympathy and support of the rehabilitated party cadres for the Maoist faction. At the same time, Teng was a

political commissar in the Second Field Army with a victorious combat record. A large number of the rehabilitated military cadres belonged to the former Second Field Army. In fact, eight of the eleven current Military Regional Commanders are either directly or indirectly related to the former Second Field Army.⁶³ Therefore, Teng's reinstatement could win the sympathy and support of the military cadres for the Maoist faction to ensure the successful purge of the Lin faction.

Summary

In summary, therefore, the essential role played by the army has long been emphasized and appreciated by the Chinese leaders. The power struggles among the leaders in the past could, by and large, be regarded as a series of struggles for military power, in order to seize the leadership in China. But, as a rule, the Party has so far been able to command the army. Thus, the military intervention during the CR was initiated by the Party Chairman and ordered by the Central Committee of the Party. The military only implemented the order. The Party's central authority was not questioned. In fact, as early as 1967, the Maoist faction had decided to rebuild the Party. Immediately after the CR, when military representation became too overwhelming and when Lin Piao allegedly became too ambitious, Mao decided to purge Lin and his faction. The purge was carried out gradually, but effectively. In order to ensure effective neutralization of the Lin faction and the smooth transfer of power, Teng and his supporters were reinstated. At the same time, the centralized leadership of the Party was continuously emphasized.

Since 1975, when the Lin faction has, by and large, been either "neutralized" or removed from powerful positions, serious conflicts between Teng and his supporters (hereinafter, the Teng faction), on the one hand, and the Maoist faction, on the other, began to emerge. From January to April, 1976, Teng had been implicitly accused of (1) placing too much emphasis on Party unity and stability while neglecting the more essential task, "class struggle," and (2) attempting to reverse the verdict against those cadres purged during the CR, including himself. Teng was, therefore, indirectly labeled as "revisionist," "unrepentant capitalist roader," and "right deviationist."⁶⁴ While it is difficult to verify whether these charges against Teng are true, the timing of Teng's downfall, as mentioned above, seems significant. Attacks on Teng began almost immediately after the transfers of all regional Military Commanders and the purge of the Lin faction were completed. In 1971, Lin's downfall also coincided with the completion of the purge of the Liu/Teng faction.

In April, less than two months after Hua Kuo-feng, a member of the CR faction, was appointed the Acting Premier following Chou's death, the Peking riot took place. On April 5, a crowd estimated at 30,000 to 100,000 people gathered at the Tienanmen Square in Peking, reportedly protesting the passing up of Teng as the Acting Premier. Immediately after the riot, Teng was dismissed from all of his party and government positions including Politburo member, Vice-Chairman of the Party, first Vice-Premier and Chief-of-Staff of the Army. Attacks on Teng have been intensified and Teng's name was, for the first time, mentioned.⁶⁵

At present, the question to answer is whether or not the Maoist faction could again rely on the army to ensure their leadership vis-a-vis the Teng faction. The

Maoist faction could "use" the army either directly (using military intervention as during the CR) or indirectly (using the army as a deterrent) to ensure their control of power. Any attempt to answer this question must, of course, be entirely speculative. But our findings, so far, seem to indicate that either alternative is possible. The events that took place in 1975 and in 1976, so far, seem to further support this assumption. For example, in July, 1975, when there was some unrest in Hanchow, about 6,000 regular soldiers were sent there to restore order immediately. Similar army involvements were also reported in other locales such as Liaoning and Yunan.⁶⁶ On February 20, 1976, six directives were issued by the Central Committee urging the army to support the campaign against the "rightists," i.e., the Teng faction.⁶⁷ In the same month, soldiers in the Peking Garrison were said to have participated in a campaign against the "unrepentant capitalist roaders," i.e., the Teng faction, in the Party.⁶⁸

In late April, 1976, after the Peking riot, a special ceremony was held to pay tribute to the "worker's militia, people's police, and PLA guards" for their loyal performance of duties during the riot. Except for Mao, almost all top military, party and civilian leaders were represented. In China, such a mass public appearance of leaders always bears special significance. At the ceremony, delegates of the officers pledged their support to the Party and its campaign against the Teng faction. At the same time, they expressed their determination to use "concrete deeds" to defend the Party.⁶⁹

One of the objectives of such a formal ceremony may be to endorse the intervention of these officers at the riot, and to legitimate future or indirect military intervention.

Since April 1976, all party, government, and military leaders have been asked to participate in the criticism of Teng and his faction. From information available to this date (August 1976), no military leaders, including the Regional and District Commanders, have shown any strong resistance, let alone rebellion.⁷⁰

Nevertheless, whether or not the Party can continue to enjoy its command over the army will depend on its ability to maintain its "unified" or "centralized" leadership. At present, the "unified leadership" consists of the Maoist Party faction, the Chou "faction", the CR faction and until recently, the Teng faction. But a series of events which took place in 1976 may have seriously eroded the "unified" leadership of the party beyond the level attained during the CR. These events include the following:

(1) *The deaths of Chou En-lai and Chu Teh (Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 4th People's Congress):* Both leaders have been regarded as veteran and modest mediators or "trouble-shooters" in the Party. Their deaths not only reduce the strength of the Maoist faction, but could mean that a valuable "cushion" between conflicting party leaders has been lost.

(2) *International conflicts within the Maoist faction:* Conflicts among the CR faction, the Chou "faction", and the Teng faction have already begun to emerge especially after the death of Chou and the public attacks on Teng. Furthermore, Wu Teh, the First Secretary of the Peking Party Committee (one of the 29 Party

Committees), has been appointed to succeed Chu Teh.⁷¹ A number of veterans in the Party, such as Tan Chen-lin, Neh Yun-chian, were, therefore, passed up. Since Wu Teh has been a member of the CR faction, other factions within the general Maoist faction are bound to be dissatisfied.

(3) *The Death of Mao*: Due to his personal status and broad power base, Mao had a powerful unifying force in the Party. His demise could create a great deal of uncertainty that no one can predict. At present, there are only, Hua, Wong Hung-wen, Yeh Chian-yin, and Chiang remaining in the Political Bureau. Except for Yeh, all the others are CR faction members. Reportedly, Yeh has also been under attack in recent months. But, it is doubtful that CR faction alone can maintain the centralized leadership of the Party.

FOOTNOTES

¹For analyses of Chinese military factionalism, see William L. Parish, "Factions in Chinese Military Politics, *The China Quarterly* (hereafter, *C.Q.*) (October/December, 1973), pp. 667-699; A.S.H. Kong, "Comradeship in Arms: An Analysis of Power through Associations in the CPLA—February, 1970 to February, 1974," *Asian Survey* (hereafter, *A.S.*) (July, 1974), pp. 663-677; Ellis Joffe, "China's Military Elites" *C.Q.* (June, 1975), pp. 311-317; William W. Whitson, "Statistics and the Field Army Loyalty System" *C.Q.* (January/March, 1974), pp. 146-147; For more background information, see Whitson, *Chinese Military and Political Leaders and the Distribution of Power in China, 1956-1971*, Rand, 1973; and his *The Chinese High Command, 1927-1971: A History of Communist Military Politics*, (N.Y., Praeger, 1973)

²Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. 1 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), p. 106.

³*Ibid.*, Vol. 4, p. 152

⁴*Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung* (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1967), p. 102

⁵Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Military Writings* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), pp. 242-43

⁶*Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung, Op. Cit.*, pp. 61-62

⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 62-63

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 61

⁹*Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. 1, *Op. Cit.*, p. 106

¹⁰Warren Kuo, "The Evolution of the Chinese Communist Party," *Issues & Studies: A Journal of China Studies and International Affairs* (hereafter, *I.S.*) (Feb., 1975), p. 8

See also Parris H. Chang, "Regional Military Power: The Aftermath of the Cultural Revolution," *A.S.* (Dec., 1972), p. 1011

See also Chien T'ieh, "The Chiang Ch'ing Faction and Peiping's [Peking's] Military forces," *I.S.* (January, 1976, pp. 12-30; and his "Crisis in the Leadership of the Chinese Communist Armed Forces," *I.S.* (August, 1975), pp. 35-48; Allen S.H. Kong, *Op. Cit.*, p. 674; Fan Chih-yuan, "Chinese Communist Military: Organization and Personnel," *I.S.* (January, 1975),

pp. 42-56

See below, p 8 ff

The political commissars are particularly important to the relations between the army as a fighting force and the army as a political force. They are members of the PLA but at the same time are in charge of the party apparatus in the PLA. Very often, a military commander is concurrently the first political commissar in his commanding unit. A political commissar, on the other hand, can temporarily command the army.

¹¹For discussion on the Anti-Teng campaign, see below, p. 37 ff

¹²Byung-joon Ahn, "The Cultural Revolution and China's Search for Political Order," *C.Q.* (April/May, 1974), pp. 269-270. For criticisms on Teng, see *N.Y.T.*, Nov. 2, 1969, p. 1

¹³Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese Army in the Cultural Revolution: the Politics of Intervention, *Current Scene* (Dec. 7, 1970) 1-24

¹⁴"Decision of the CCP Central Committee, the State Council, the Military Commission [i.e. the Military Affairs Commission] of the Central Committee and the Cultural Revolution Group under the Central Committee concerning the Resolute Support of People's Liberation Army for the Revolutionary Masses of the Left," (January 23, 1967), *CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967* (Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1968), p. 195

See also Fang Chun-kuei, "Military Dictatorship under Mao's Regime," *I.S.* (October, 1971), p. 25

¹⁵"Decision of the CCP Central Committee, . . ." *Op. Cit.*, p. 195

¹⁶"Decision of the CCP Central Committee, . . ." *Op. Cit.*, p. 195

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 13; see also *the New York Times* (hereafter, *N.Y.T.*), August 2, 1968, p. 3; March 8, 1970, p. 2; October 26, 1970, p. 6;

The power of the army however was not uninterrupted. On April 6, 1967 for example, an order from the Military Affairs Commission severely curtailed the power of the army. The army was no longer allowed to suppress the Red Guards without the party's approval; see *CCP Documents, Op. Cit.*, p. 409, see also *N.Y.T.*, Feb., 16, 26, and 27, 1974 for recounts. However by early September of the same year, the army regained most of its powers; see *People's Daily*, September 17, 1967

¹⁸*Red Flag (Hung Ch'ì)*, March 10, 1967

¹⁹"Chronology of Maoist Take-over," *Asian Recorder* (October 7-11, 1968), p. 8560. It is important to point out that the results of computation vary from one source to another. But by and large, the differences are not very significant. For other computations, see Lung Fei, "Personnel Changes in Provincial Revolutionary Committees," *Studies on Chinese Communist Monthly* (in Chinese) (December 10, 1975), pp. 35-46; See also below, p. 25 ff.; *N.Y.T.*, June, 3, 9, 1968

²⁰For Further analysis of his report, see Pu Sang, "Studies of Lin Piao's Political Report," *Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly* (in Chinese) (May 1, 1969), pp. 18-22; see also *N.Y.T.*, February 16, 1969, p. 5, February 7, 1971, p. 18

²¹Adapted from "Analysis of the Newly Elected 9th CCP Central Committee," *I.S.* (July, 1969), pp. 33-44; For results of different computations, see "An Analysis of the CCP

9th Central Committee" *Facts and Features: Chinese Communist Affairs*, (May 14, 1969), pp. 12-13; Byung-joon Ahn, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 273-274; Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese army in the CR: the Politics of Intervention," *Op. Cit.*, pp. 21-23; Parris H. Chang "Regional Military Power. . ." *Op. Cit.*, p. 1005; For a complete list of members and alternate members, see "An Analysis of the Newly Elected 9th CCP Central Committee" *Ibid.* See also *N.Y.T.*, April 2, p. 4; April 3, p. 1, 2, 4, 1969; William Brugger, "The Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party," *World Today* (July, 1969), pp. 297-305; *N.Y.T.*, Feb. 16, 1969, p. 5

²²This study will not attempt to analyze the problem of military factionalism in China. For the purpose of this study, military cadres are divided into two groups, the Lin faction and the Non-Lin faction. For studies of Chinese military factionalism, see Note 1 above.

²³Parris H. Chang, "Mao's Great Purge: A Political Balance Sheet," *Problems of Communism* (March, 1969), p. 7

²⁴Parris H. Chang, "Regional Military Power. . ." *Op. Cit.* p. 1011; see also H.W. Nelson, "Military Bureaucracy in the Cultural Revolution," *A.S.* (April, 1974), p. 374

²⁵See above, p. 8 ff; see also Parris H. Chang, "Regional Military Power. . .", *Op. Cit.*, p. 1003; Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese Army in the CR: the Politics of Intervention," *Op. Cit.*, p. 2; and his "The Chinese Army after the Cultural Revolution: the Effects of Intervention" *C.Q.* (July/September, 1973) 450-77

²⁶"Order of the CCP Central Military Commission (April 6, 1967)," CCP Documents. . . *Op. Cit.*, p. 409; see also *N.Y.T.*, August 2, 1968, p. 3; September 1, 1968, p. 1; See also *N.Y.T.*, February 16, 26, 27, 1974 for recounts of the events.

²⁷Tang Tsou, "The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese Political System," *C.Q.*, (April/June, 1969), pp. 63-91

²⁸Philip Bridgham, "The Fall of Lin Piao," *C.Q.* (July-Sept., 1973), p. 431

The best recount of these events is in "A Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks with Responsible Comrades of Various Places during his Inspection Tour (Mid-August to September 12, 1971)" contained in a highly classified document entitled "Document No. 12 of the CCP Central Committee", reprinted in *I.S.* (September, 1972), pp. 65-71

²⁹Joint editorial of the *People's Daily*, *Red Flag*, and *Liberation Army Daily* on July 1, 1971 (party day), August 1, 1971 (army day); see also *People's Daily*, August 27, 1971; see also joint editorial of the three official organs on January 1, 1970; *Red Flag* (December 4, 1971), and *People's Daily*, August 1, 1971

³⁰"Report to the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China" delivered on August 24 and adopted on August 28, 1973, in *The Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents)* (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1973), pp. 1-38

³¹"Constitution of the Communist Party of China" adopted by the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on August 28, 1973," *Ibid.*, pp. 59-74

³²See *Red Flag*, April, 1974, *People's Daily*, February 2, 1974, see also *N.Y.T.*, July 5, 1973, p. 7; September 2, 1973, p. 2

³³*Red Flag*, April, 1974; it carried an article on the unification of the six separate countries by Ch'in Shih Huang. In the article, the achievement of the military was downgraded.

³⁴"A Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks. . .," *Op. Cit.*, pp. 65-71

³⁵*People's Daily*, August 1, 1975; since this was the "army day," the implications were clear.

³⁶Chang Chun-chiao, "Report on the Revision of the Constitution," *Peking Review* (Jan. 24, 1975), pp. 18-20, see also *N.Y.T.*, January 18, 19, 1975; "China's Fourth National People's Congress," *Current Scene* (March/April, 1975), p. 8

³⁷*Red Flag*, November, 1974 for a recount; see also *N.Y.T.* April 21, 1974, p. 5

All key military leaders in the Lin faction disappeared shortly after Lin's death, see *N.Y.T.* October 18, 24 and 29, 1971; Lin's alleged plot against Mao was announced in 1972; see *N.Y.T.* July 23, 29, 1972

³⁸Ying-mao Kau and Perre M. Perrolle, "The Politics of Lin Piao's Abortive Military Coup," *A.S.*, (June, 1974), p. 575; see also Chien T'ieh, "The Chiang Ch'ing faction. . .," *Op. Cit.*, pp. 12-30; Hu Shu-ch'ang, "Personnel Status of the Provincial Military Districts" *Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly* (in Chinese) (Sept. 10, 1974), pp. 30-35; Allen Kong, *Op. Cit.*, p. 663. It was Kong's estimate that at least 32 top military leaders were dismissed at local level.

³⁹For data on the 9th Party Congress, see above, p. 11 ff. and Note 28.

For the 10th Party Congress, see Fang Chun-kuei, "An Analysis of the Chicom Tenth Central Committee," *Studies on Chinese Communism* (September 10, 1973), p. 29 Hsuan Mo, "An Analysis of the Chicom Tenth National Party Congress' Political Report, *Ibid.*, pp. 10-15. Hsiao Yeh-hui, "Power Infrastructure of Chicom Top Level Hierarchy and Its Future Direction of Struggle," *Ibid.*, pp. 5-9 K'ung Te-liang, "An Analysis of the CCP's Tenth National Congress," *I.S.* (October, 1973), pp. 17-30. Li Chiu-i, "An Analysis of the Personnel of the 10th CCP Central Committee," *Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly*, (October 10, 1973), pp. 22-36. Lung Fei, "An Analysis of the Personnel of the CCP Tenth National Congress," *Ibid.*, pp. 41-43.

See also *N.Y.T.*, August 20, 21, 1973; for names of key leaders, *N.Y.T.*, August 30, 1973. For a complete list of members, see "List of Members of the Presidium of the Tenth National Congress of the CPC", "List of the 319 Members and Alternate Members of the Tenth Central Committee of the CPC," *Peking Review*, September 7, 1973. Also *The National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, *Op. Cit.*, Roderick Macfarguhar, "China after the 10th Congress," *World Today* (December, 1973), pp. 514-526.

⁴⁰*Ibid.* The methods and results of different sources vary from one to another. But the differences are not large enough to affect the conclusion. Figures used here are mainly taken from K'ung Te-liang's computation which appears to be more representative.

⁴¹*Ibid.* Among members of the 9th Politburo, were Hsieh, Lin, Ch'en, Huang, Wu, Yeh, Li and Ch'iu who are purged or dead. The remaining 13 full members in the 10th Politburo include Mao, Chou, Yeh, Liu Po-ch'eng, Chu, Hsu, Ch'en Hsi-lien, Li Hsien-nine, Yao, K'ang, Tung, and Chang.

⁴²*Ibid.* Among the military cadres are Li Teh-sheng, Hsu, Shih-yu, Ch'en Hsi-lien, Yeh Chien-ying, Chu Teh, and Liu Po-ch'eng. Many of them are no longer active, Chu Teh.

⁴³Ch'en Po-ta was also purged; see *N.Y.T.*, December 2, 1974, p. 6 for background information

⁴⁴The military takeover of the State Council and other central civilian governments were ordered by Mao implemented by Lin after the Red Guards violently attacked the Council. Although attempts were immediately made to normalize the operation of the Council, military representation remained strong. *N.Y.T.*, March 8, 1970; October 26, 1970; December 27, 1970; February 7, 1972, October 22, 1972; see also *Studies on Chinese Communism* (September 10, 1973), pp. 66-75 for an article on the subject. See also above p. 9 ff.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*; see also "A Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks," *Op. Cit.*

⁴⁶*Ibid.*; see also "China's Fourth National People's Congress" *Op. Cit.*, p. 5. Teng, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Ch'en Hsi-lien have a military background. For a complete list of members of the 4th Congress, see *Peking Review* (January 24, 1975), pp. 10-11; For the text of the 1975 State Constitution, see *Ibid.*, pp. 12-17; for Chang Chun-chiao's "Report on the Revision of the Constitution," *Ibid.*, pp. 18-21; for Chou En-lai's "Report on the Work of the Government," *Ibid.*, pp. 21-25. See also *N.Y.T.*, January 18, January 19, 1975

⁴⁷The eleven Military Regions are: Shenyang, Peking, Nanking, Foochow, Wuhan, Canton, Lanchow, Chengtu, Kunming, Sinkiang and Tsinan. See also Chou Tzu-ch'iang, "An Analysis of the Chinese Communist Military Area System" *I.S.* (February, 1972), p. 39

In total, there are 25 military districts, 3 military garrison commands, 209 military subdistricts and until the recent change, 2,309 People's Arms Departments in the PLA.

⁴⁸Hu Sh-ch'ang, "Personnel Status of the Provincial Military Districts," *Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly* (September 10, 1974), pp. 30-35; by the end of 1973, more members of the Lin faction were purged, see W.P. Ting, "A Longitudinal Study of Chinese Military Factionalism, 1949-1973" *A.S.* (October, 1975), pp. 908-909; *N.Y.T.*, July 5, 1973, p. 7; September 2, 1973, p. 2

⁴⁹Chien T'ieh, "Crisis in the Leadership. . ." *Op. Cit.*, 35-48; *N.Y.T.*, January 2, 1974, p. 3, p. 6; January 4, 1974, p. 3; March 29, 1974, p. 4, June 11, 1974, p. 14

⁵⁰Allen S.H.Kong, *Op. Cit.*, p. 675

⁵¹Hsiao Hui, "An Analysis of Local Cadres: Big Switch," *Studies of Chinese Communists* (November 10, 1975), pp. 54-60

⁵²"A Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks. . ." *Op. Cit.*, p. 69. Similar calls were made in 1974, *N.Y.T.*, March 21, 1974, p. 40

⁵³Other key members in the CR faction include Wu Teh, political commissar of the Peking Military Region and Chairman of Peking Revolutionary Committee, and Mao Yuan-hsin, Political Commissar of the Shenyang Military Region. Many CR faction members were however purged for their support of Lin, e.g., Ch'en Po-ta, T'ao Chu. Some CR key members are dead, e.g. Kuang Seng. Others are too junior, e.g. Chiang Ch'ing.

⁵⁴The announcement of Hua's appointment as Acting Premier was made on February 7, 1976 (*People's Daily*). Before the appointment he was Acting Chairman of Hunan Revolutionary Committee, the First Secretary of Hunan Party Committee, member of Politburo,

Political Commissar of Canton Military Region and First Political Commissar of Hunan Military District concurrently. For further information on Hua, see "Teng Takes a Back Seat for Hua" *Far Eastern Economic Review* (February 20, 1967), p. 12

⁵⁵"Comrade Wang Hung-wen's Report at the Central Study Class - Restricted" (January 14, 1974)" This document is a "restricted" document circulated within the CCP. Reprinted in *I.S.* (February, 1975), p. 102

⁵⁶Apparently the Maoist faction is still concerned about the remaining members of the Lin faction. It is also concerned about the Non-Lin faction in the PLA which was purged during the CR.

⁵⁷Fan Chih-yuan, "Chinese Communist Military. . .," *Op. Cit.*, pp. 50-51; Yin-mao Kau, "The Politics of Lin. . .," *Op. Cit.*, p. 384

⁵⁸"China's Fourth National People's Congress," *Op. Cit.*, pp. 1-14; Parris Chang, "The Anti-Lin Piao. . .," *Op. Cit.*, pp. 871-886, see also *Studies on Chinese Communist* (June, 1974), p. 7

⁵⁹F.C. Teiwes, "Urban Militia—A New Force?" *Current Scene* (January, 1974), p. 21-23; for the involvement of the army. For the involvement of workers and party members, see *People's Daily* (editorial)- September 29, 1973

⁶⁰*People's Daily*, February 1, 1975

⁶¹For a report on the vacancies created by Lin's purge, see *N.Y.T.*, June 11, 1974, p. 14; for a report on some of the cadres who were rehabilitated, e.g. Yang Cheng-wu, former Acting Chief of Staff, see *N.Y.T.*, August 2, 1974, p. 2

⁶²For the rehabilitation of Teng, see *N.Y.T.*, April 13, 1973, p. 12; for reports on Teng's rise, see *N.Y.T.*, January, 18, 30, 1975

⁶³The commanders who were either directly or indirectly related to the former Second Field Army, are, among others, Li Te-sheng, Ch'en Hsi-lien, Ch'in Chi-wei, Yang Yung, Hsu Shih-yu, Han Hsieh-ch'u, P'i Ting-chun/

⁶⁴*People's Daily*, February 17, 1976. For other accusations and attacks on Teng, see "Setting the Stage for a Showdown," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (January 9, 1976), pp. 9-11; "The Charges against Teng Hsiao-ping" *Ibid.*, (February 27, 1976), p. 8; "Enter the Empress," *Ibid.*, pp. 8-10

The promotion of party stability and unity was initiated by Mao in the fall of 1974. But Mao pointed out that the promotion of these must not mean the sacrifice of class struggle. For further discussion on this issue, see *People's Daily*, (February 29, 1976); and "Criticism of "Taking the Three Directives as the Key Link" *Peking Review*, (April 2, 1976), pp. 6-8; see also *Red Flag* (March 1), p. 5

For charges that Teng was attempting to reverse the verdicts, see *People's Daily*, April 18, 1976, February 13, 1976, March 10, 1976

For related articles, see *People's Daily*, February 29, March 3, 11, 1976; see also *Red Flag* (February, 1976), 17-20

⁶⁵*People's Daily*, April 10, 1976; "New Upsurge in Criticism of Teng Hsiao-ping,"

Peking Review (April 23, 1976)

⁶⁶“Long March Anniversary,” *Current Scene* (December, 1975) 16

⁶⁷Peking Radio, February 20, 1976, reported in *China Times*, March 3, 1976

⁶⁸The garrison is part of the regular PLA. In this case, their activities were not specified. See *People's Daily*, February 22, 1976

⁶⁹“Leading Comrades on C.P.C. Central Committee Receive Representatives of the Capital's Worker-Militia, People's Police, P.L.A. Guards,” *Peking Review* (April 30, 1976), pp. 3-4

⁷⁰*Ibid.* When Ch'en Hsi-lien, Commander of Peking Military Region did not show up in the mass criticism of Teng after the Peking riot, many began to speculate that he could be dismissed; but he later showed up at the ceremony mentioned below. Therefore as of April, 1976, there is no evidence that any of the 11 commanders had refused to participate in the criticism of Teng.

Recently, in July, 1976, Foochou Military Region Commander P'i Ting-chu was reportedly killed “in action.” No detail was provided. Whether his death is related to any attempts of the Maoist faction to eliminate possible military dissent remains a mystery.

⁷¹*Central Daily News*, July 24, 1976