

Asian Studies

Philippine History and Society in Retrospect

Introduction

Ricardo Trota Jose

A Proto-Political Peasant Movement in Spanish Philippines, The Cofradia de San Jose and the Tayabas Rebellion of 1841 (1970)

David Sweet

Guardia de Honor Revitalization Within The Revolution (1966)

David R. Sturtevant

The Datus of the Rio Grande de Cotabato Under Colonial Rule (1977)

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Leonard Wood: His First Year as Governor General (1966)

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Guerilla Press of the Philippines 1941-1945 (1970)

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Rapid Change Among Igorot Miners (1974)

William Henry Scott



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Introduction

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This issue of *Asian Studies* is one of a series of retrospective issues featuring the best articles published in the journal over the last five decades. The papers reprinted here, written during the late 1960s and the 1970s, are some of the landmark and path-breaking works on Philippine history and society. Several threads tie them together; first, all were written by foreigners (mainly American) who had done fieldwork in the Philippines or had gone over previously unexamined archival documents – or both. Secondly, some were preliminary works that culminated in doctoral dissertations, while others were initial studies that explored different perspectives on various periods, personas, or places in Philippine history. Most importantly, they broke away from the then-standard approaches to Philippine historiography, which focused on decision makers, political events, governors-generals, and the elite. Instead, they sought to look at history from below and give life to the “silent masses.” Delving into archives, conducting interviews, and engaging in fieldwork, they brought to the fore the lives and views of peasants, rebels, Igorots, Muslims, and World War II guerrillas. This style of historical research is now part of mainstream thought, but it wasn’t so when these articles were first published. They broke new ground back then, opening up fresh historical vistas and pioneering novel research methodologies.

This was before the age of computers, the Internet, digitized archives, and ubiquitous photocopiers. Notes had to be taken by hand, and interviews required bulky equipment. Despite relying on older technology, these articles remain relevant as ever; they feature interviews of individuals who experienced firsthand some of the events they speak about. The papers thus preserve what are now virtually irretrievable sources of information, many of which are no longer open to direct scrutiny; for instance, most of Benedict Kerkvliet’s Huk informants are now gone, as are some of then-available resources, including captured Huk documents and guerilla newspapers. The first-generation Igorots whom William Henry Scott interviewed have now passed away. Of course, other materials have appeared since, but they do not render these papers obsolete. Quite the contrary; many of the newer primary sources verify the conclusions of these articles.

A few of these papers (mostly done by the authors when they were graduate students) benefitted from reviews and discussions because of their

publication in *Asian Studies*. Some became chapters of dissertations and/or were published as books, which are now standard references in their respective fields. This was the case with Kerkvliet's paper; Sturtevant's went directly to his 1976 book on Philippine uprisings. Many of the other authors became specialists in the topics they wrote about in the journal: Michael Onorato on Governor-General Wood; John Lent on Philippine mass media; and William Henry Scott on the history of the Filipino residents of the Mountain Province.

The articles in this issue cover various locales and span a substantial part of Philippine history from the mid-nineteenth century to the 1960s. The topics include the so-called "popular uprisings," one in the 1840s and another in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century; the Central Luzon peasants in the mid-twentieth century; the Muslim elite in Cotabato, covering the Spanish, American and Japanese colonial periods; guerrilla presses during the Japanese occupation period; and Governor-General Leonard Wood.

The first article, written by David Sweet, provides an in-depth analysis of the Cofradia de San Jose of Apolinario de la Cruz (Hermano Pule) and the Tayabas Rebellion of 1841. He used the limited available sources to study the economic and geographic conditions in Tayabas at that time. Digging into the varied and obviously biased Spanish sources, he explains why people joined the cofradia and why they chose to fight when the Spaniards became suspicious and took steps to stamp out the potentially threatening movement. He also analyzes the failure of its leaders, which led to the movement's defeat. Although the author concedes that the paper is a draft, it is complete and valuable by itself. It serves a model for the study of Philippine peasant movements under colonial rule, showing how the use of various and seemingly unrelated sources provides glimpses into the lives and thoughts of the heretofore-undocumented Filipino peasants.

David Sturtevant's paper on the Guardia de Honor deals with another peasant movement, which had a religious orientation like the Cofradia de San Jose, but took on a different character. Unlike Hermano Pule's movement, the Guardia de Honor did not align itself with the Filipino revolutionaries and was thus branded as bandits and troublemakers, both by the Philippine republic and by the American military. Sturtevant also makes use of limited archival sources to understand the motives of the movement's members. He particularly focuses on the folk-religious nature of the Guardia de Honor and discusses how it escaped American scrutiny while engaging in seemingly unlawful activities. The paper is a preliminary report and does not provide deep analysis, but it does look at its subject in a way that does not fit into the standard molds of Philippine historiography. Moreover, Sturtevant gives an outsider's perspective by writing a narrative that makes for an interesting comparison with Sweet's analysis of the Cofradia. Later, he developed this article to become a chapter in his now classic work on Philippine secular movements.¹

The third article, written by Jeremy Beckett, explores the history of Maguindanao datus from the late Spanish period to the American and Japanese occupation and beyond. Then a graduate student from the University of Sydney, Beckett discusses the dynamics of Muslim leadership in the province of Cotabato in the southern Philippines. He explains why the datu system remained in force throughout the colonial period. Aside from archival and published materials, Beckett extracted fresh and important insights from personal interviews with Maguindanao datus and scholars. He became a specialist on Muslim ruling families and contributed a chapter on this topic in Alfred McCoy's acclaimed book, *An Anarchy of Families*.² In retrospect, it is interesting to note that one of the ruling families he mentions is the Ampatuan clan, made infamous by the "Maguindanao Massacre" in November 2009.

Michael Onorato's paper on Leonard Wood presents an unconventional view of the American governor-general of the Philippines. Eschewing hasty generalizations, Onorato carefully analyzes archives to show a more "human" side of Wood, in contrast to his image as an unreachable politician. Furthermore, Onorato disproves the many misconceptions about the governor-general, who, for instance, had been thought to be anti-Filipino. The article, however, shows that Wood – at least in his first year – maintained friendly ties with Manuel L. Quezon and Sergio Osmeña. Focusing on Wood's first term from 1921 to 1922, Onorato discusses Wood's relationships with Filipino politicians; the orders he received from Washington; and his efforts to carry these out without ruffling any feathers. The paper reveals that Wood was not entirely successful in carrying out instructions, bending instead to practical considerations that Washington did not know of. Later on, Onorato would write on other aspects of Wood's administration and the American regime in the Philippines.

The Huks in Central Luzon are the subject of Benedict J. Kerkvliet's paper.³ He interviewed many former Huks during his fieldwork in Talavera, Nueva Ecija, a province north of Manila. He also had rare access to Huk documents, which at the time were held by the Philippine Constabulary (precursor to today's Philippine National Police), but have since been unfortunately lost. Using these resources – interviews and important primary documents – Kerkvliet helped pioneer history-from-below-research on the Philippines. In his article, he analyzes the reasons for peasant unrest in Central Luzon, looking into the geographic and economic conditions of the time, as well as the political developments during the American, Commonwealth and Japanese periods. Kerkvliet also provides deep insights into the Filipino peasants' lives and motivations. His paper sets a standard for research on Philippine social history.

The sixth paper is John Lent's preliminary study on the Philippine guerrilla press during World War II. In the mid-1960s, when Lent was a graduate student, he went to the Philippines to interview and interact with several Filipino journalists and radio professionals. His article highlights the courage of Filipino guerrillas who published and circulated uncensored news, and paid for their lives by doing so. Using interviews and (then extant) guerrilla newspapers, Lent extracts key information on the underground press. He later wrote histories of Philippine newspapers and media, as well as other articles on Asian media. His contribution to *Asian Studies* serves as an introduction to a topic that has not been fully explored.

The last article, by William Henry Scott, deals with Igorot miners during the 1960s. An anthropological study, it provides important narratives about the impact of the mining industry on the lives of the local people, who were uprooted and resettled in new environments. Scott probes deeply into the economic, behavioral, and even spiritual effects of this new life: what changed and what beliefs remained. This study is extremely relevant today, especially when mines, both legal and illegal, have sprouted all over the country and whose impact on miners' lives has not been studied sufficiently. Scott's interest on the mountain peoples of Luzon led him to write more about their resistance to American incursions and their indigenous Filipino culture before and during the Spanish colonial rule.

The collection of papers in this issue of *Asian Studies* set fresh standards on research methodologies and opened up new areas in the study of Philippine history and society. Unparalleled and still classic references in their fields, these papers inspired a generation of scholars. It is hoped that veteran academics can look back at these work and the historical context(s) in which they were written, perhaps with the benefit of hindsight; and that younger scholars can use these articles as a guide, if not inspiration, for their own research on Philippine history and society.

February 2013

Notes

¹David R. Sturtevant, *Popular Uprisings in the Philippines, 1840-1940* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976).

²Alfred W. McCoy (ed.), *An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1995).

³The Huks are members of Hukbalahap, *Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon* (literally, People's Army Against the Japanese). After the Second World War, they adopted a new name, Hukbong Mapagpalayang Bayan (literally, People's Liberation Army).

Errata

Please take note of the following corrections.

- p. 33, 2nd paragraph, 10th line . . . The soldiers'
- p. 36, 1st paragraph, 17th line . . . movement when it unleashed its righteous fury on the poor
- p. 40, 4th paragraph, 6th line . . . Wood and J. Ralston Hayden, but Cotabato engaged their interest less
- p.73, 3rd paragraph, 12th line . . . after the Japanese occupation
- p.82, 2nd paragraph, 4th line . . . difficulties. Names of haciendas experiencing incidents repeatedly occur over
- p. 89, 2nd paragraph, 6th line . . . little by helping other farmers at harvest time and doing odd jobs in and
- p. 119, 4th paragraph, 5th line . . . Manahan, "Gumsy" Alba and Alfredo Filart were too weak to help
- p. 123, 1st paragraph, 3rd line . . . Not a few Thomases shook their heads in doubt. Japs and more Japs were
- p. 124, 3rd paragraph, 5th line . . . following stations: KGEI San Francisco; KWID San Francisco
- p. 124, 6th paragraph, 5th line . . . up were the publishers that sometimes pad paper (the kind used
- p. 127, 4th paragraph, 5th line . . . attics to hear William Winters or Sidney Rogers of KGEI San
- p. 127, 5th paragraph, 1st line. . . KGEI, "This is San Francisco," was the station Filipinos risked
- p. 128, 2nd paragraph, 8th line . . . their son who did the "Mariano" digests.³⁶ Other broadcasters on KGEI
- p. 128, 7th paragraph, 2nd line . . . engaged in anti-Japanese propaganda in Manila. Manuel Arguilla led...
- p. 128, footnote 36 . . . Anonymous, "This is San Francisco," Sunday Times Magazine, September

**A PROTO-POLITICAL PEASANT MOVEMENT IN THE
SPANISH PHILIPPINES:
THE COFRADIA DE SAN JOSE
AND THE TAYABAS REBELLION OF 1841 ***

DAVID SWEET


A LOOK AT THE STANDARD TEXTBOOKS OF PHILIPPINE HISTORY CAN GIVE an unwary reader the idea that it all really began with the Cavite Mutiny of 1872. The history of the Islands before that time is barely sketched in—the lifeless annals of bureaucracy in an insignificant backwater of the Spanish Empire. It is a history in which Filipinos rarely make an appearance, and which is therefore apparently not thought to be a subject of much potential interest to Filipino students today. This is unfortunate, if history is important for filling in the details of a national self-conception and self-respect, because it leaves the Filipino people with very little of it. There are presumably people still alive today who were growing up at the time of the Cavite Mutiny.

There was, of course, a great deal of Filipino history before 1872, and even before the arrival of Spanish colonialism with Legaspi in 1571.¹ The problem for social historians is how to write the Filipinos, and in particular the Filipino peasants (the great majority of Filipinos at any time in history), into it. This is a difficult task, because of the scarcity of archival resources and the primitive stage of such auxiliary studies as the history of land use, historical archeology and historical demography. But there are some elementary jobs of conventional historical research which can be done with materials available in libraries, and which ought to be done as soon as possible to lay the ground for more ambitious projects.

The easy way to “write the peasants into history” is to write about their revolts, those brief moments in which the inarticulate and unnoticed “objects” of history become its outspoken and undeniable subjects. There are documents concerning such events. Rebellions, or at least the problems of suppressing them, were matters the colonial

* This is the second draft of an article intended for publication. I will be very grateful if readers can find the time to return to me in writing their detailed criticisms and suggestions regarding any aspect of it.

¹ A useful introduction to the colonial secondary literature on Philippine revolts is [Pedro Murillo Velarde, et al.] “Insurrections by Filipinos in the Seventeenth Century,” in Blair & Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*, Vol. 38, pp. 87-240. See also the index to the same series under “Insurrections” in Vol. 54.



authorities usually took the trouble to write reports about. Unlike most of the doings of peasants, moreover, revolts were unique events with causes and implications for the future which can be speculated about today by a historian with a conventional kit of concepts. A case in point is the violent outbreak which took place in the southern part of the Province of Tayabas (Quezon) in 1841, under the leadership of a charismatic Tagalog religious leader named Apolinario de la Cruz.

Apolinario is mentioned briefly in the standard histories, as a distant precursor of the 1896 Revolution; but whereas the Spanish colonial historians expanded considerably upon his career as a dangerous aberration and threat to the public order, more recent writers have been content to characterize it as little more than a curiosity. The story of the Tayabas rebellion merits closer examination and more sympathetic analysis than it has received. It is a story which is full of indications that even in the "dark ages" of the Colony, the Filipino people had a dynamic cultural and institutional life of their own, in which the processes of social change operated to a considerable degree independently of the projects and purposes of the Spanish authorities.

The Philippine Islands have a rich tradition of "primitive rebellion"² dating from the sporadic anti-colonial revolts of the 17th and 18th centuries, which includes a variety of millenarian manifestations and widespread banditry, and culminates in the well-known 20th-century movements of the Aglipayan Church, Sakdalism and the Hukbalahap guerrillas. Most of this activity seems to have been concentrated in the tenant-farmed "rice bowl" of central Luzon, in the overpopulated coastal plain of Ilocos, and in the frontier areas of northern Luzon and Mindanao. The movement with which this study is concerned took place, however, in a region which had neither an oppressed landless peasantry nor a pagan or Muslim population resisting the inroads of Christianity and modernization — a region which has at no other time in history been distinguished as a focus of popular resistance.³

Southern Tayabas and Laguna provinces are located in the mountainous region of south central Luzon, to the south and east of the Laguna

² "Primitive rebels" is the term applied by Eric Hobsbawm in a book with the same title (Manchester, 1959) to a variety of proto-revolutionary popular resistance movements in pre-modern Europe, ranging from banditry through millenarianism to Luddite machine-wrecking. It is in no sense derogatory, and on the contrary implied movements which are rational and progressive in essence, however "unrealistic" they may appear in their goals or the means chosen to achieve them.

³ There is some question about the existence of important bandit activity in Tayabas. David Sturtevant includes neither Tayabas nor Laguna in his list of the main *tulisán* areas of the 19th century. "Philippine Social Structure and Its Relation to Agrarian Unrest" (unpub. Ph.D. Stanford, 1958), pp. 111-12. Another writer suggests, however, that there were enough bandits on the slopes of Mounts San Cristóbal and Banahao between Laguna and Tayabas to justify the construction of a military post for protection against them (at Uambahan, near Majayjay) in 1833. Juan Palazón, *Majayjay (How a Town Came into Being)* (Manila, 1964), p. 179.

de Bay (see map at end of paper). In the period with which we are concerned, their Tagalog-speaking inhabitants were for the most part hard-working peasant proprietors, growing dry rice on tiny hill farms and reasonably prosperous. There was a rich tradition of cooperative activity and communal recreation through *turmuhan* spontaneous work groups, the tightly-knit extended family and *compadrazgo* networks. The region was relatively underpopulated, and free of the exploitative systems of absentee landlordism and debt-bondage to *caciques* which were beginning to establish themselves on the central plain. Unlike the farmers of the Cagayan Valley tobacco country, they were free of any obligation to produce specific crops for delivery to an abusive government monopoly. There were no extensive "friar lands." The peasants raised cattle and grew some wheat and maize, cacao, coffee, sugar cane, coconuts and fruits and vegetables in addition to rice; they engaged in small-scale cottage industry and exported limited quantities of grain and other produce to the larger towns of the vicinity. Transportation was exceedingly difficult, however, since the few roads were impassable in the long rainy season. The markets for most products were at a great distance, and road tolls were prohibitively high. The result was that there was not much profitable commerce outside the region.⁴

The principal complaints of these peasants in the early 19th century seem to have been forced labor and taxes, and a series of annoying rather than truly oppressive government economic regulations. There were small obligatory deliveries of produce for the maintenance of civil and ecclesiastical officials, which were paid for at fixed rates which took no account of fluctuations in market value — or which might not be paid for at all. A conflict between Spanish and traditional land law meant that people were discouraged from clearing the land for cultivation, and that cleared land might be abandoned and reclaimed by the forest because of the uncertainty of Western-style title to it. It is possible that on a small scale Tayabas was experiencing the breakdown of communal land rights and incursion of private property which has contributed so mightily to the exacerbation of rural social tensions in Latin America during the past century (e.g. Mexico beginning in the 1860's). An old prohibition of the killing of cows and carabaos

⁴ Fray Bartolomé Galán, "Informe sobre la provincia de Tayabas" (1823). (Ms. in Newberry Library, Chicago). For the contrast between this situation and that prevailing in Central Luzon, see the good summary of the socio-economic system of the latter area during the 19th century in Sturtevant, "Philippine Social Structure. . .," pp. 85-104. Notes on the communal traditions of the Tagalogs in Sturtevant, pp. 38-39. The population of the province must have been about 82,000. A compilation of fragmentary census data gives 54,000 for Tayabas in 1877, when it contained about 1% of the total population of the Islands. In 1840, the total population was 3,219,000. José Montero y Vidal, *Historia general de Filipinas desde el descubrimiento de dichas islas hasta nuestros días*, Vol. 3 (Madrid, 1895), p. 156.

(dating from the time when cattle were being introduced into the Islands) discouraged people from breeding any but beef cattle — with the result that the carabaos indispensable for cultivation were so expensive that the poorer peasants could not afford them.⁵

An additional irritant in the early 1840's was the government's determined effort to oblige all Filipinos to adopt regular surnames for administrative purposes. The Tagalogs had been made to abandon their Tagalog surnames when converted to Christianity in the 17th and 17th centuries, and had since taken to using Christian saints' names, or words from the liturgical vocabulary, indiscriminately fore and aft. The same names might be used by members of different families, and different names within the same family, which was confusing to the authorities.⁶

The peasants of Tayabas and Laguna, like all other adult rural Filipinos in those days (except the perhaps five per cent who were *cabezas de barangay* or *gobernadorcillos* and their families, retired soldiers, more than sixty years of age, or descended from individuals granted exemptions for outstanding service to the colonial regime), were subject to an elaborate set of taxes, levied annually upon each nuclear family and payable in cash or in kind: ten *reales* in tribute or poll-tax; one *real* in tithe (*diezmo predial*) for the maintenance of the Church hierarchy (virtually a branch of the government in the Spanish colonies); three *reales* in church dues (*sanctorum*) for the maintenance of the local priest and church building; one real for the village treasury (*caja de comunidad*); and 40 days of labor service (*polo*), remissable for 3 pesos (24 reales).⁷ In addition, labor service might be exacted by the village priest whenever he chose — and the priest might have the peasant who protested against any such arbitrary imposition flogged publicly.⁸ The total tax burden of nearly five pesos must have re-

⁵ Galán, who claims that peasants without carabao might be driven to stealing to support their families. Juan de Plasencia noted in the 16th century that Tagalog farmers who cleared land were entitled to the harvests taken from it, whether or not they were members of the barangay to which the land belonged. This traditional law was gradually giving away even then to Spanish notions of private property in land. "Customs of the Tagalogs" in Blair & Robertson, Vol. 7.

⁶ Palazón, p. 122. A list of members of the Cofradía de San José, the religious organization with which this paper is concerned, shows that all of the members used the by then traditional system of naming themselves: Isidro de Santa Rosa, Apolinario de la Cruz, etc. Unfortunately, it is not clear from Palazón's account whether the government pressure for Western-style surnames was applied *before* 1840 so that this usage might be interpreted as a symbol of defiance of the "modernizing" authorities. It is one of Hobsbawm's major points that the eruption of liberal, modernizing "Jacobin" reforms which threaten traditional institutions has frequently been the major cause of millenarian movements among peasants. *Primitive Rebels*, p. 67.

⁷ Manuel Buzeta y Felipe Bravo, *Diccionario geográfico, estadístico, histórico, de las Islas Filipinas*, Vol. 2 (Manila, 1851), pp. 129-30, 133.

⁸ Palazón, pp. 21-22. Priests were omnipresent in the province. There were 15 of them in 17 townships, or about one for every 2,000 people. See table in Buzeta, Vol. 2, appendix, and Note 3 above. Cf. approximately one priest for

presented a substantial portion of the annual income of the average upland rice farmer⁹ — and a heavy drain on his fund of working days not required for farming.

The collection of taxes was performed by the provincial governments through their appointed *cabezas de barangay*, and was the occasion for serious abuses. A critic of the colonial administration wrote in 1842 that the taxes had traditionally been paid in kind (that is to say, in manpower) because of the fact that cash was seldom available to most families. By limiting the kinds of produce receivable, moreover, the government could channel agricultural productivity into the directions it thought suitable. But the commodities received had for the most part to be sold by the government to produce revenue, and this opened the door to graft. Provincial governors commonly deflated the official cash values assigned to produce collected from the taxpayers, so as to obtain merchandise worth two or three times the established rate of tribute. Then they sold the accumulated stores, and paid the smallest amounts they could get away with into the Treasury at Manila. In effect, it was a system of tax-farming to members of the official Spanish colonial service. A royal order of 1835 guaranteed the peasants that tribute commodities would be received at full market value, but in 1840 there was apparently still no sign of its being put into effect.¹⁰

As the costs of government (and of storing produce) increased in the 19th century, pressure began to be applied from Manila for the

every 1,000 Catholics in the U.S. or every 10,000 in Mexico today. All of the towns indicated on the map at the end of the paper were “pueblos” with resident priests and *gobernadorcillos* at approximately the time of the rebellion. Francisco Coello de Portugal y Quesada, annotated map of the “Islas Filipinas” in *Atlas de España y sus Posesiones de Ultramar* (Madrid, 1852).

⁹ It is difficult to establish the real value of the *peso* for Tayabas peasants in 1840. Galán gives figures for the peso value of annual rice production which permit the very hazardous calculation that five *cavanes* (ca. 600 lbs.) of unhusked *palay* were worth about 3 pesos. Modern upland rice cultivation will produce about 20 *cavanes* to the hectare, which may be taken as a maximum figure for the probable annual production of a single family’s swidden operation in the period in question. (José Endrigo, personal communication, February, 1969). On that basis, five peso in taxes would represent just under half the value of an average annual rice crop — very heavy taxation indeed, and a figure which suggests that most peasants must have worked off their *polo* obligations rather than paying the three pesos. On the other hand, a travel account for ca. 1850 suggests that common laborers in Manila were being paid a quarter of a “dollar” a day — if the “dollar” is a peso, two *reales* — and that this was enough to keep one man in food for two to three days. This permits the equally hazardous calculation that in the urban setting, 5 pesos might have been roughly equivalent to two weeks’ food budget for a family of five. Robert MacMicking, *Recollections of Manila and the Philippines during 1848, 1849 and 1850* (London, 1852), p. 150.

¹⁰ Sinibaldo de Mas y Sans, *Informe sobre el estado de las Islas Filipinas en 1842* (2 vols.; Madrid, 1842), Vol. 2 (chapter on taxes), p. 14. Europeans and European *mestizos* paid no tribute; Chinese and Chinese *mestizos* paid at least twice as much as Filipinos, and more if they were wealthy. Also, Buzeta Vol. 1, pp. 129-30.

payment of taxes in cash. At first glance, this was an opportunity for relief of the peasants from local extortion. It may, indeed, have been desirable from the point of view of a province which had a ready market for cash sales of its products, but it must have occasioned considerable hardship in subsistence farming areas such as Tayabas. The general tendency toward monetization of the rural economy of which the policy was a part can only have accentuated the frustrations of those who had little to sell. By 1841, Tayabas was the only province in the Philippines which continued to pay all of its tribute in kind.¹¹

The tribute in those years was paid in caulking material derived from coconut palms which the peasants of Tayabas had been obliged to plant some years earlier, and which had been the subject of disgruntlement since the palm grew wild almost everywhere else in the Islands and the plantations occupied land which might better have been planted to rice. The caulking was used by the government shipyards at Cavite. But beginning in the late 1830's, the shipyards were overstocked with it and complained that it could not be stored over long periods because of the climate.¹² There is no record of the impact of this development on Tayabas—but it may be surmised that it led to some disaffection. Hundreds of acres were given over to coconut trees whose products could not be sold, and (in part because of this misallocation) the cash for paying tribute was scarcer than elsewhere.

Apolinario de la Cruz was a young Tagalog from Lucban in Southern Tayabas, a town with exceptionally poor farmland whose people were famous in the region for their enterprise as traders and which included more "rich men" than any other town in the province.¹³ Born in 1815 of peasant parents, he received a religious primary education and went to Manila to seek admission to the priesthood some time around 1830. As a Filipino, he could not qualify for the novitiate of any monastic order, but was accepted as a lay brother at the Hospital of San Juan de Diós—a 250-year-old charitable institution run by Spanish friars for the benefit of indigent Spaniards.¹⁴ In such an environment, he must have experienced discrimination frequently. A contemporary described him as a "quiet, sober, unobtrusive young man, exhibiting nothing of the hero or the adventurer."¹⁵ The humble *donado* picked up scraps of Biblical and

¹¹ Mas y Sans, Vol. 2 (chapter on taxes), p. 16; Buzeta Vol. I, pp. 131-2. The monetization of tribute payments was nearly complete by 1850.

¹² Buzeta Vol. I, pp. 132-33.

¹³ Galán. There is a suggestion in this document that some of the "rich men" may have been Chinese *mestizos*. If this can be established, it may be a factor in explaining the ethnic exclusiveness of the *Cofradía*.

¹⁴ Buzeta, Vol. I, pp. 165.

¹⁵ Sir John Bowring, *The Philippine Islands* (London, 1859), p. 70, quoting Sinibaldo de Mas y Sans, who claimed to have known Apolinario when he was hospitalized for a time at San Juan de Diós.

theological knowledge by listening to the sermons at church, and in time seemed to have become an accomplished lay preacher.¹⁶

It was while he served in his menial capacity at the hospital that Apolinario helped organize a group of 19 Catholic laymen, friends from Tayabas who settled in the poor suburbs of the capital, into the Hermandad de la Archi-Cofradía del Glorioso Señor San José y de la Virgen del Rosario (Brotherhood of the Great Sodality of the Glorious Lord Saint Joseph and of the Virgin of the Rosary). The members attended Mass together, and were expected to obey certain rules of moral conduct in their everyday lives, among which was the saying of seven Our Fathers and seven Hail Marys each day.¹⁷ Associations of this kind, concerned exclusively with devotional and charitable activities, were a normal feature of popular religious life in the Spanish colonies.

What distinguished the Cofradía de San José from most others in the Philippines was the extraordinary degree of authority which Apolinario managed to achieve within it, the absence of any supervision of its affairs by a Spanish priest, the exclusion of Spaniards and *mestizos* from membership, and the fact that in later years the membership was not limited to a single locality. Soon after its founding, the organization applied to the Archbishop of Manila for recognition as a legitimate lay brotherhood, but was informed that no license was necessary so long as it remained small and made no use of the Holy Sacraments (that is, did not usurp the functions of the ordained priesthood) in its gatherings.¹⁸ Lacking any political objective or orientation, the brotherhood was able to continue unnoticed by the authorities for several years after its founding. During that time, however, it developed an atmosphere of secrecy, an administrative centralization and a degree of loyalty in the membership which were bound to arouse suspicion when its affairs became public.

Beginning in 1839 or 1840, the Cofradía moved into a stage of rapid expansion. The reasons for this have not yet been made clear. Trusted representatives of the Founder were sent out to the villages of Tayabas and neighboring Laguna and Batangas provinces to recruit members. Each was charged with signing up twelve people, who would pay one *real* a month in membership dues. The man who achieved this became a leader (*cabecilla*) of the new local unit, and a member of the governing

¹⁶ Gregorio Zaide, *Philippine Political and Cultural History*, Vol. I (Manila, 1957), p. 364. Zaide gives Apolinario's birth date as July 31, 1815 in the barrio of Pandak, Luchan. This suggests that someone has uncovered the prophet's baptismal record, but no reference is cited for the information.

¹⁷ Apolinario de la Cruz, "Declaración de..." *La Política de España en Filipinas* Año 2, No. 32 (1892), pp. 113-14. Matta puts the founding of the Cofradía in 1832, when Apolinario was 17 years of age. Most sources assume that he was the founder, but normal practice would have been for a priest to perform that function.

¹⁸ Cruz, p. 114.

council of the brotherhood. Council members had one vote for every twelve people recruited; in the mature organization, the most influential *cabecillas* had four votes each. Dues were used to pay the expenses of a monthly local gathering, with the supplies being forwarded by courier to headquarters in Manila—a circumstance which later led cynical observers to the conclusion that the Cofradía was nothing but an elaborate means of collecting money from the guillible peasants.¹⁹

Meetings were held on the 19th of every month, when the members would come together to hear a high Mass in honor of San Jose sponsored by the organization. Afterwards, they would retire to a private house to say the Rosary, hear a reading of inspirational letters and directives from Brother Apolinario (Manong Pule, as he was called familiarly in Tagalog),²⁰ and enjoy a community supper. The meetings were peaceful, but conducted entirely in Tagalog and open only to members. They were kept as inconspicuous as possible, to avoid alarming the authorities.²¹

A major set of questions which needs to be answered with regard to this movement has to do with its ritual and ideological content. None of the presently available documents refers to this crucial matter at all, except to qualify the *cofrades* as “superstitious,” and all that can be said about the subject at this stage is in the nature of hypothesis. The cult was certainly not strictly “nativistic” or anti-Christian; it was syncretic. Some very indirect and fragmentary evidence of the folk religion which was probably practiced by the members is available from recent ethnography of the immediate region. Despite four centuries of unremitting Catholic religious indoctrination and the predominance of foreign priests in local community life, some very heterodox practices survived intact—and have only begun to disappear with the spread of secular public education after World War II. Among them are ritual formulae for the propitiation of evil spirits, such as the use of *anting-anting* amulets (among which some of the most efficacious are fragments broken off of church images and furnishings) or the recitation of Latin liturgical phrases possessed of supernatural powers; and the use of pagan alongside Christian images in home worship.²² The followers of Apolinario de la Cruz were illiterate or semi-literate peasants and tradesmen who professed, it seems reasonable to suppose, a syncretism which Christian rituals and beliefs served to *supplement* rather than to replace completely

¹⁹ Cruz, p. 114. The view that the Cofradía was a “con game” is put forth by Montero y Vidal, Vol. 3, p. 37; Felipe Govantes *Compendio de historia de Filipinas* (Manila, 1877), p. 378; and Juan Manuel de la Matta, “Apolinario de la Cruz. Relación en que se da cuenta de haber estallado la conspiración en Tayabas” (November 16, 1841) (Ms. in Newberry Library, Chicago).

²⁰ Palazón, p. 162.

²¹ Fray Manuel Sancho, “Relación expresiva de los principales acontecimientos de la titulada Confradía de San José...” (Ms. copy in Newberry Library, Chicago), pp. 14-17.

²² Fermin Dichoso, “Some Superstitious Beliefs and Practices in Laguna, Philippines,” *Anthropos* 62 (1967): 61-67.

their traditional ones. This perspective will allow us to conceive of the development of the *Cofradía de San José*, with exotic practices in a conventional framework, as a gradual and moderate shift in the *emphases* of religious behavior and belief, rather than as the violent and heretical break with Catholicism which is suggested by the Spanish clerical sources.

The center of the *Cofradía's* activities seems to have been Lucban, Apolinario's home town, where by April of 1840 as many as 500 people from several nearby *pueblos* were gathering for the monthly celebration. The members were mostly married couples and single women (recruitment seems to have depended largely on appeals to female piety, and a few women even served as *cabecillas*). Meetings were held at the home of Francisco de los Santos (Cabeza Isco Paminta), an ex-*cabeza de barangay* who had been in trouble with the law a few years earlier when he and his wife were found conducting secret devotional sessions in honor of the Virgin of Antipolo in their home. The leader and secretary-treasurer of the group was an articulate younger man from Majajjay in Laguna Province named Octavio Ignacio de San Jorge, who claimed complete authority over the assemblage as Apolinario's official representative.²³

Among the Founder's acquaintances in Manila were a well-to-do Creole²⁴ businessman, Domingo de Rojas, and his confessor, a Filipino secular priest named Ciriaco de los Santos. The nature of his relationship with these advisers remains a mystery. It is possible that Manong Pule was in touch through them with the circles of Filipino intellectuals who were just beginning to talk about the possibility of a separation from Spain. Padre Ciriaco in particular is a mysterious figure, who was associated from the start with the *Cofradía*, apparently served as its treasurer as well as spiritual counsellor, and must have shared the exasperation of the Filipino clergy in general with the discriminatory policies of the Spanish-dominated Church hierarchy—but no connection between the *Cofradía* and the "Independence Party" has ever been firmly established. It seems likely that if the dissidents in the capital were aware of the existence of Apolinario and his new sect, they would have been

²³ Sancho, p. 70. The participation of women in the direction of religious life was apparently traditional in Tagalog society. Plasencia, p. 191, describes pre-Christian rituals performed by priestesses. The same writer contributes to clearing up the mystery about how a group of several hundred people might have congregated at the home of a single family in a small town. Traditional Tagalog religion involved no permanent temple constructions; rather, religious festivals were held in large temporary structures built onto a chief's house—with the help of which the house itself was made into a temple. Plasencia, p. 186.

²⁴ This term is derived from Latin American usage, where it means "European born in the colonies." Philippine-born Spaniards were known as "Filipinos" in colonial parlance during some periods (although Sinibaldo de Mas y Sans uses "Filipino" for the natives of the Islands and "Filipino español" for the Creoles), while the Tagalogs and Visayans, etc. were referred to as "indios." "Filipino" is used in this paper in its 20th-century sense.

pleased to encourage it as a potential thorn in the side of the colonial Church and government structures. They were not, however, responsible for its existence.²⁵

In 1840, Padre Santos advised Apolinario to seek official recognition once again for the growing Cofradía, as a means of avoiding unnecessary conflicts with the local authorities in Laguna and Tayabas. With the priest's help, a respectful application was submitted to the Bishop. When this was, at length, denied, the Cofradía employed a team of lawyers retained by Rojas to state its case to the Audiencia (supreme council of government) at Manila. Explaining the legitimate and peaceful nature of the organization, they requested authorization to continue expanding it. The Audiencia considered the case and passed it to the Governor of the Islands for consultation, but took no action regarding it.

This attempt to legalize its operations seems to have been the origin, paradoxically enough, of the Cofradía's difficulties with the law. When Governor Oraá was given the particulars of the case, his suspicion was aroused by the clause which excluded Spaniards and *mestizos* from the Brotherhood. On his recommendation, the leader was dismissed summarily from his post at the Hospital de San Juan de Diós. When summoned to appear for questioning, Apolinario went into hiding in Manila to avoid arrest, and thus became an outlaw.²⁶ In these circumstances, the government moved fast; Padre Ciriaco was arrested and jailed, along with other members resident in the capital. These people "failed to provide the authorities with a clear idea of the nature and objectives of the Cofradia, but did make clear the necessity of suppressing it." An order went out to the provinces for the apprehension of all *cabecillas*.

²⁵ Palazón, 160-61; Matta, "Relación..." Mas y Sans, who lived in Manila in the period just prior to the revolt, doubts that any rebellion of "indios" can have enjoyed substantial support from the Creoles of the capital. His basis for this judgment is the view that if the Creoles ever thought of independence, it was with themselves as heirs to the peninsular authority and the Filipinos and *mestizos* continuing in their status as tributaries. They therefore viewed any manifestation of popular political activity with alarm. Cf. the attitude of the wealthy Filipinos to the Guardia de Honor movement in Pangasinan in the early months of the U.S. occupation, when the peasants were fighting the new colonial oppressor and the caciques were at pains to make a rapid adjustment to the new circumstances. David Sturtevant, "Guardia de Honor: Revitalization within the Revolution" *Asian Studies* (Manila) 4, 2 (1966), pp. 342-52. A frequent assumption regarding the political activities of dissidents in the Spanish colonies was that they were closely tied to freemasonry, but a recent study has pointed out that subversive movement was non-existent in the Catholic Philippines until after 1850. John N. Schumacher, S.J. "Philippine Masonry to 1890" *Asian Studies* 4, 2 (1966): 323-42. Nevertheless, there was certainly widespread disaffection with the regime in Manila during the period. Matta and Mas y Sans, both informed political observers, are primarily concerned with a decline of the prestige of the government due to its poverty and corruption and to the incompetence of the peninsular (and especially, in their view, the Filipino) secular clergy. Both complain of the growing "insolence" and disloyalty of all classes in the capital, and feel that any sort of rebellion represents a serious threat to a tottering regime.

²⁶ Govantes, 378-9; Matta. "Relación..."

These events occurred during the summer of 1841.²⁷ In the meantime, the Bishop had set his own mechanism into action against the group.

The principal Catholic hierarch of Tayabas province was the parish priest of the provincial capital. In September of 1840, he received instructions to look into Apolinario and his pretended Cofradía, which he passed on to the curate of Lucban, Friar Manuel Sancho. The curate replied that he was astonished to discover that any such potentially subversive activities were taking place in his jurisdiction, and dismayed to find that he had been performing a monthly Mass financed by the same Cofradía. Thereafter, he refused dutifully to say the Mass (at a sacrifice of 11 pesos a month in income).²⁸ On the eve of October 19, the priest set out with the *gobernadorcillo* of Lucbán and several leading citizens, and made a raid on Isco Paminta's house. They arrested 243 people and confiscated the cash box, along with some incriminating letters from Manong Pule; and two large oil paintings of the Leader done in the style of popular images of the saints (with Apolinario in postures of piety surrounded by conventional religious symbols), which had been used in the religious ceremonies of the Cofradía. These paintings, and the file of the Cofradía's correspondence in Tagalog which were captured with them, may still exist in the archive which houses the papers of the Franciscan friars of Tayabas. If they are ever found, they ought to provide material for one of the very few "inside histories" of a cofradía or any other kind of popular proto-political movement which have ever been written.

Next day, both the priest and the *gobernadorcillo* reported these developments to the Governor, Joaquín Ortega, a 26-year-old military officer of apparently liberal leanings. Ortega replied that the functionaries of Lucban had exceeded their authority, that any activities of a religious brotherhood were matters of concern to the ecclesiastical authorities only, and that they should release the unfortunate *cofrades* without delay.

Father Sancho was presumably anxious to clear himself of responsibility for the fact that the suspicious organization had gotten so firm a footing in his parish and with his tacit connivance. His letters show him at exceedingly great pains to awaken the authorities to the danger which the Cofradía represented, and are undoubtedly full of exaggeration—but they are invaluable sources of information nevertheless. The priest complained that the membership of the group was growing rapidly as a result of the Governor's leniency (certainly less of a factor in fact than the hostile attitude of the Church!). The leaders, certain of eventual recognition by the authorities, were threatening anyone who got in their way. Those who withdrew from membership were treated with public

²⁷ Montero y Vidal, 37-8; Sancho, p. 2-3.

²⁸ Sancho, p. 14.

disdain by the *cofrades*, and sometimes made to fear bodily harm. He pointed out that “all of our revolution have had their origins in these secret night meetings” and insisted (although he neglected to cite any specific statement in evidence) that the captured letters from Apolinario revealed clearly their subversive intentions. In the fall of 1840, the Bishop had issued an order of excommunication against the *cofrades*, which Father Sancho had posted in Tagalog in all the barrios of Lucban — but they continued collecting their monthly dues from several hundreds or even thousands of people. Apolinario had decreed that no local leader would share in his “ultimate victory” if he failed to fulfill his quota of new memberships.²⁹

The two most serious infractions from Sancho’s point of view seem to have been the collection of dues (at one *real* a month, *three times* as much as the peasants normally gave to the Church), and the arrogation of priestly prerogatives. The fund-raising seemed to him to be a violation even of civil law, and he pointed out that the Cofradía was collecting even more than the outrageous monthly *real* by levying fines of as much as 12 *reales* (1.5 pesos) for infractions of its many rules. Brother Apolinario was promising grace and indulgences to his followers as if he were an ordained priest, and claiming that non-members would be denied entrance to Heaven.³⁰ Its was a serious enough charge, moreover, that the Cofradía represented 500 or more like-minded people who were meeting secretly and without priestly supervision.

Governor Ortega finally acceded to the curate’s insistent requests by instructing the *gobernadorcillo* of Lucban to cooperate in stamping out the Cofradía. Early in 1841, in view of the hostility of both the priest and the *gobernadorcillo*, the Brotherhood transferred its monthly meetings to Majayjay, just across the border in Laguna province. Father Sancho informed the priest there (an extremely unpopular figure for his abuses of the privilege of recruiting labor service without pay),³¹ and both curates continued to press for decisive intervention by the civil and ecclesiastical authorities. The meetings nevertheless continued to be held in Majayjay for several months, until the order came from Manila that the Cofradía was to be suppressed and its leaders arrested.

Then, on September 19, 1841, the priest and *gobernadorcillo* of Majayjay made a raid on an evening meeting like the one carried out the previous year in Lucban. The *cofrades* seem to have been warned in advance by some of the Filipino constables who were employed for the purpose, and most of them got away — but the raiders did capture several leaders, and a second lot of correspondence which was sufficient to bring Octavio de San Jorge, his parents and several others to trial. One of the

²⁹ Sancho, pp. 4-18, 69.

³⁰ Sancho, pp. 8-11, 64-65, 71.

³¹ Palazón, p. 133.

letters revealed Apolinario's hiding-place in Manila, and the government moved promptly to have him arrested there.³²

The situation was coming to a head, and it was unfortunate from the government's point of view that Governor Ortega chose those very days to make a trip to Manila. He neglected to round up the local leaders of the *Cofradía* before he left, and committed the serious political mistake of leaving the government of the province in the hands of a Filipino assistant whose loyalty to Spain could not be counted on in the circumstances. This was the *gobernadorcillo* of Tayabas, whose wife was a member of the *Cofradía*, and who was himself apparently not energetic in his opposition to it. The military contingent in the province, of which the *gobernadorcillo* took charge, consisted in a few dozen Filipino soldiers without battle experience.

At this propitious moment Apolinario, who had managed to avoid the police in Manila, escaped from the capital and came by boat at night to the town of Bay. There he was met by an armed group of the principal leaders of the *Cofradía*, now also outlaws fleeing for their lives. Their first order of business was to find a place at which to gather the faithful for a *novenario*—nine days of prayer and religious purification with which to brace themselves for the approaching conflict. Rather than risk travelling through Majayjay and Lucban where their enemies were prepared for them, they made a forced march around the western slopes of Mt. San Cristóbal through San Pablo, Tiaong and Sariaya and appeared on October 21, 1841 at the barrio of Isabang near Tayabas.³³ The *Cofradía* was successful in:

communicating this fact with incredible speed, and with the prestige of the Founder drawing a large number of people of all sexes, ages and conditions, converting that solitary place within a few hours into a large and bustling encampment.³⁴

The number of people who assembled in the first couple of days was about 3,000—including perhaps 2,000 men armed with lances and a few rifles. Within a week, the number seems to have doubled.³⁵

Many of the faithful gathered at Isabang were women, the most "fanatical" of Apolinario's followers, of whom it was said later that they had been given the task of crucifying all the Spaniards who fell into their hands when the rebellion was victorious. Many of the men there had been recruited by their wives, and the story was told of one man, not a member, who had to go to the camp to beg his wife and family to return home with him—and was barely able to escape with his children. These rumors were written down after the fact, and may

³² Sancho, pp. 12-14.

³³ Matta; Govantes, p. 379; Sancho, pp. 15-19.

³⁴ Sancho, pp. 55-6.

³⁵ Matta.

have been entirely unfounded. The unquestioned reality behind them is, however, astonishing enough—that an apparently innocuous association of local Catholic laymen's groups was transformed into a militant rebel army by a process which took place on such short notice as to be almost spontaneous.

Manong Pule's objective seems to have been to occupy the town of Tayabas and hold his *novenario* in the church there. To this end, he opened negotiations with the *gobernadorcillo* and acting governor. The transfer might have been arranged peacefully and quickly, given the size of the rebel force, had it not been for the vigorous opposition of the leading citizens of the town (who were afraid of looting) and of the parish priest, the same man who had forwarded the Bishops's orders to Lucban the year before. This staunch defender of the status quo refused to hear of any negotiations with the rebels, and assured the *gobernadorcillo* that the central government was bound to take military measures promptly to suppress such an unlawful gathering. Somehow, the *gobernadorcillo* managed to persuade Apolinario to refrain from attacking immediately and wait until the proper preparations could be made for the entry of the *cofrades*.³⁶

Returning from Manila on October 22nd, Governor Ortega was informed of these happenings and hastened to Tayabas to pull together a small army of constables and some *cabezas de barangay* who happened to be present with a contingent of *polo* laborers. While preparing for the defense of the town, he sent the *cofrades* an offer of amnesty if they would disband immediately. Apolinario, encouraged by his initial success in mobilizing supporters, refused. Ortega was then obliged to attack. On the 23rd, he went forth with some three hundred men to find the more numerous rebels full of enthusiasm for a fight. Firing some shots from small cannon in an effort to frighten them away, he succeeded only in terrifying his own troops — some of whom returned hastily to Tayabas while others went over to the rebels. The Governor was left alone on the field, where the *cofrades* captured and killed him, stripped his body of weapons and insignia, and refused to give him Christian burial. To guarantee that Ortega would not be returned to the town and buried, it was said that they had left his body in the care of a party of pagan Aetas (Negritos) who had come down from the mountain to join the fray.³⁷

Victorious in the first skirmish, Apolinario and his followers withdrew to a more strategic location at a place called Alitao — a large open field between two rivers in the forested country up against the base of Mt. San Cristobal. There they fortified themselves behind a double palisade in which they placed the cannon captured from Ortega's party.

³⁶ Montero y Vidal, pp. 40-41.

³⁷ Sancho, pp. 19-26; Montero y Vidal, pp. 41-3.

The field was criss-crossed with hastily dug canals to provide water to every location and make it difficult to march across. In the center, they built a large palm-thatched chapel of bamboo, the inside walls of which were hung with colorful hangings and religious paintings, where Manong Pule presided over the “mysterious prayer sessions and ceremonies” of the *novenario*. The Leader was installed in a small house beside the chapel, where he spent his time in “luxurious” retirement, jealously protected by an honor guard of trusted followers and served by a group of “good-looking young girls, married and single, who took turns looking after his every need and pleasure.” He allowed himself to be seen by the faithful, whose huts were spread out on either side of his own, only at certain times of day, at which he would hold court with great ceremony. No one, not even his principal lieutenant, a man called Purgatorio who was charged with preparing the defense of the place, could see him without prior permission.³⁸

When news of the death of Governor Ortega reached the Governor of Laguna, he dispatched the few dozen soldiers at his disposal and sent an urgent request to Manila for a proper military expedition to put down the insurrection. The troops from Laguna reached Tayabas with great difficulty on the 26th; it was the middle of the rainy season, and the roads were almost impassable. The rebels saw them arrive from the higher ground of Alitao, but made no move against such a pitiful force. Another small group arrived the same day, and the reinforcements met with the community leaders of the provincial capital to plan for some kind of a defense against the attack they were sure was forthcoming. They rounded up the terrorized inhabitants, established watches and sent a party to reconnoiter the rebel encampment. In the meantime, the military commander of the province, who had been ill for the several crucial days previous, was named interim Governor. A message from Manila informed him that 300 troops were on their way over the mountains, while another large force would come around by sea to land in Pagbilao, and so cut off any possible route of escape to the rebels.

The commander offered a second amnesty to the *cofrades* (all but Apolinario and his principal *cabecillas*), promising the complete destruction of anyone who failed to take advantage of it. He had the decree published in Tagalog, sent to the camp at Alitao and posted in all the towns of the vicinity. Manong Pule read this document aloud in his camp amid general laughter, and then scratched it up and burned it public. He replied that he was ready for the Spaniards, and that his followers were spoiling for a fight. In the meantime, the government forces were reinforced by peasant volunteers from the region who

³⁸ Sancho, pp. 38-39, 54. Matta notes that the reference to pretty girls in attendance on Apolinario was only a rumor.

were not members of the Cofradia and who seem to have been anxious at the apparent breakdown of law and order.³⁹

The soldiers were ready for battle on the 31st, and moved out to Alitao that night "along roads they had to travel single file with mud up to their waists." At dawn they were attacked by the *cofrades*, waving a red flag (instead of the white one which had been displayed at the entrance to their camp), and fighting "with more vigor and enthusiasm than military know-how and prudence." It later emerged that they had been convinced by the leadership of the Cofradía that bullets would not harm them, and that in the heat of the battle Apolinario would cause the earth to open and swallow the enemy forces. Within a short time, the rebels were driven back into their camp, where they defended themselves stubbornly. At a crucial moment, they were joined by a party of Aetas from the mountain, who contributed substantially to the struggle by showering the Spaniards with a steady rain of spears and arrows.⁴⁰

This participation of contingents of Negrito tribesmen in the rebellion is one of the fascinating and unexplained aspects of the story. No evidence has appeared of any proselytizing by Apolinario's followers among the Aetas, and the traditional relationship between the lowland "civilized" rice farmers and the pagan mountain people of the Philippines — occasional aggression, mutual distrust and limited trade — would seem not to be readily conducive to such an alliance.⁴¹ On the other hand, lowland rebels taking refuge in the mountains might be forced to come to terms with the "aborigines", as happened with the Magindanao Moros of the Cotabato Valley when they were forced into intimate contact with the Tiruray tribesmen after the Spanish conquest of the 1860's.⁴² A hypothesis to explain the Negrito participation is that the groups on Mt. San Cristóbal learned of the revolt through their trade contacts in Lucban, and simply decided to come down and join the fun of trouncing the Spaniards. Whatever the cause, the result was a curious combination of "primary" with "secondary" resistance to the colonial regime, and a rare instance of the participation of a "primitive" people in the struggles of the peasant people which has displaced them.

³⁹ Matta.

⁴⁰ Sancho, pp. 26-48. Belief in their miraculous invulnerability has been a common characteristic of "primitive rebels" all over the world. For several earlier Philippine examples of it, see Murillo Velarde, *passim*.

⁴¹ Plasencia, p. 195, observes that when any 16th-century Aeta died, the rest of the tribe considered it their duty to kill a lowlander in compensation — and would dispatch the first innocent passer-by they came across. The Negritos with whom he was acquainted were presumably the ancestors of the very groups who joined forces with the Cofradía, since Plasencia's missionary career was spent just across the mountain in Laguna province.

⁴² Christopher Lutz, unpublished paper. Madison, 1969.

At length, the rebel palisades were breached and the soldiers entered the camp with fixed bayonets, followed by cavalry swinging sabers. The *cofrades* defended the ground house by house, particularly those charged with protecting Apolinario's person — who died to a man defending the empty house from which the Leader had managed to escape. After four hours of combat, several hundred rebels were dead (there is no record of the government casualties), and many more (including a majority of women and children) were taken prisoner. The remainder were able to escape into the forests up the side of the mountain, assisted by a terrible thunderstorm which broke at the critical moment. The Spaniards did not pursue them, for fear of ambushes in the forest, and spent the night on the field harrassed at intervals by groups of Aetas and *cofrades*. Next morning, they returned to Tayabas with the prisoners, released the women and children and shot most of the men. The rebellion of ten days' duration had been entirely suppressed.⁴³

Manong Pule spent the night after the battle alone in the forest. The surviving *cofrades* were apparently disgusted with him because he had failed to provide the promised miracle of the opening of the earth. Purgatorio was said to have broken into his retreat at the height of the battle, threatening to kill him on the spot if he did not intervene. Next morning, Apolinario set out for the house of one of his ex-followers in Sariaya. When he got there, the owner went out ostensibly to get something to eat, and returned with four other erstwhile *cofrades* who captured Apolinario, tied him up, and delivered him to the local police. On November 3rd he was taken to Tayabas, interrogated, and sentenced summarily to be shot the following morning. It was reported that he had "revealed plans and named the persons whose blind instrument he had been," made his last confession to a priest, and then gone to his execution in a dignified manner without signs of repentance.⁴⁴ His body was dismembered, in keeping with ancient Spanish colonial practice, and parts of its displayed in the villages of the province for several months afterward as a macabre warning to others.⁴⁵

The effort to explain and "justify" the Tayabas rebellion by relating it causally to subsequent events in the movement toward Philippine independence runs into serious difficulties. The rebellion was taken very seriously by the government in its own day. In the secret reports to Madrid prepared by Sinibaldo de Mas y Sans in 1842 and Juan Manuel de la Matta in 1834, it figures prominently as a symptom of grave political and social unrest. Mas goes as far as to say that had it spread to other provinces, the colonial government might have been toppled

⁴³ Sancho, pp. 39-48.

⁴⁴ Sancho, pp. 48-55.

⁴⁵ Sturtevant, "Philippine Social Structure..." p. 117.

in a week.⁴⁶ But the threat did not materialize, and the rule of the Spaniards was secure for another half-century.

As a result of Apolinario's revelations to the military tribunal, the Creole businessman Domingo de Rojas was sent to jail and died there. Later, he was absolved by the courts of any responsibility in the affair.⁴⁷ The three lawyers who had taken the Brotherhood's case to the Audiencia were also brought to trial.⁴⁸ So far, no historian seems to have looked into the records of the judicial inquiries into the operations and relationships of the Cofradía in Manila, or the trials of the leaders arrested before the rebellion. Those documents would almost certainly provide material for an interesting chapter in the protohistory of the Independence Movement, but it is unlikely that they would open a trail leading straight onward to the Cavite martyrs or the Katipunan.

The news of the revolts and of Apolinario's execution caused much grumbling among the soldiers of a regiment from Tayabas garrisoned at Malate near Manila, which included relatives of some of the rebels killed at Alitao. Under the leadership of a Sergeant Samaniego, these troops mutinied in January of 1843, killed some European officers and marched on to the Santiago Fortress in the capital — where they were easily defeated by the loyal troops from other provinces.⁴⁹ Samaniego and the other leaders were executed, and their brief rebellion seems to have had no more immediate repercussions than the movements in Tayabas. Having taken place 14 months after the defeat at Alitao, moreover, it cannot be explained entirely as a direct result of Apolinario's revolt.

An effort has been made in the 20th century to establish the Tayabas rebellion as the direct antecedent of a series of curious non-conformist sect movements in different parts of the Islands which have been given the name of *Colorum*. According to this version, the survivors of Alitao took refuge in the forested slopes of Mts. San Cristóbal and Banahao where they established a peaceful New Jerusalem which was tolerated or ignored by the colonial authorities during the remainder of the Spanish period. The members gave picturesque biblical names to the rocks and caves, streams and waterfalls of their mountain haven, and after a few years were able to support themselves on the alms left by pilgrims from all over Luzon. They called each other "brother" and "sister," and their standard salutation was "Ave María Purísima,"

⁴⁶ Sinibaldo de Mas y Sans, *Informe sobre el estado de las Islas Filipinas en 1842. III: Política Interior*. (Manila, 1963), *passim*; and Juan Manuel de la Matta, "Matta's Report, 1843," in B&R 52, pp. 91-111, *passim*.

⁴⁷ Govantes, p. 381. This author defends Domingo de Rojas with the argument that he was "rich and honorable" and a good Spaniard, the victim of Apolinario's calumnies — which to a modern student is less than satisfactory evidence that he was not an active supporter of the Cofradía.

⁴⁸ Matta, "Relación. . ."

⁴⁹ Govantes, 379-80; Zaide, p. 365; Matta "Report," pp. 91-93.

to which the reply was “Sin pecado concebida” (conceived without sin). The name *Colorum*, first applied to this sect, was apparently derived from a corruption of the liturgical phrase, “per omnia secula seculorum.” Pilgrims to Mt. San Cristóbal are assumed to have spread the cult to other areas, where it established itself under other names, e.g. the Guardia de Honor of Pangasinan and neighboring areas of northern Luzon, which played a major role in the (counter-revolutionary) mobilization of the peasants at the time of the 1896 Revolution.⁵⁰

Fascinating though this possibility is, the connection is altogether tenuous. The several 20th-century “Colorum” outbreaks have no clear-cut identification with the *Colorums* of Mt. San Cristobal — most of them took place on other islands — and they differ widely in specific ideologies and purposes. David Sturtevant accepted the connection in the dissertation cited previously, but in a recent article on the Guardia de Honor makes no mention of it. The Guardia, as he describes it, had its origin in the work of Dominican friars in Pangasinan some years later than the revolt in Tayabas.⁵¹ Whatever the facts in the case maybe, the American writer who reported the amazing continuity in folk tradition offers no documentation whatsoever for his assertions.⁵²

For the present, therefore, it is a more fruitful exercise to discuss the Tayabas rebellion as an event of interest in itself than to try to establish it as a cause of later events. It is perhaps the isolated and mysterious character of the rebellion, together with a holdover from the Spanish historians’ view of Apolinario as a swindler and his followers as fanatics, which is responsible for the movement’s having been slighted in books of Philippine history. In the context of a search for the “origins of national independence,” the Tayabas rebellion must seem embarrassingly futile and “irrational.”

What follows is an effort to analyze and explain the Cofradía de San José and its revolt in ways which are suggested by the growing modern literature on “primitive rebels” among peasant and indigenous populations in other colonial areas of the world. It is no part of my purpose to contribute to the general theoretical discussion of such movements; for that reason, I will for the most part avoid using the jargon or referring in detail to the conceptual frameworks advanced by particular writers. The “theoretical” section of the list of sources at the end of the paper lists the writings which have been most helpful to me in understanding the rebellion in Tayabas.

Perhaps the most important thing to be said about the Cofradía de San José is that it was a genuine movement. It was a conscious

⁵⁰ Robert G. Woods, “The Strange Story of the Colorum Sect,” *Asia* 32 (1932), pp. 450-53.

⁵¹ David Sturtevant, “Guardia de Honor: Revitalization within the Revolution”, *Asian Studies* (Manila) 4, 2 (1966), pp. 342-52.

⁵² Woods, *passim*.

and purposeful effort by a group of Filipinos to recapture from the Spaniard the initiative in shaping the pattern of life and the direction of social change in the country. It achieved a board membership, integrating people from many different communities who had not previously been associated in any joint undertaking. It developed an organizational structure, with efficient communications between its hierarchical levels and between local units. It survived over an extended period of time, and it commanded a great intensity of commitment in its members. It was not a spontaneous or inexplicable outburst of passions; neither was it the result of a conspiracy of urban agitators.

Such a movement could only occur among a people subject to severe deprivation — a people chronically frustrated in the effort to achieve what it thought of as the normal satisfactions of life. A thorough study of the *Cofradía de San José* will have to take account of the nature of that deprivation for the peasants of Laguna and Tayabas in the early 19th century. What can be suggested on the basis of what we know about life for people of low socio-economic status in those areas of the colony is that the deprivation was not a matter of absolute starvation, or of extreme and unpredictable violence at the hands of the authorities. Rather, it must have been a chronic experience of humiliation and of discouragement from the practice of traditional customs, combined with exasperation at having to pay heavy taxes and labor dues to a government which made itself felt principally by imposing economic restrictions. A factor may have been the growth of the economic power of the Chinese *mestizos*; another, the increasing arbitrariness and a morality of the country clergy. The element of frustration in these disabilities was undoubtedly more important than the element of physical suffering. The peasantry sensed the inadequacy of its traditional procedures and frames of reference for dealing effectively with the changing colonial society to which it was subject (for coming to live more comfortably within it), and was prepared to seek a new “way.”

In such circumstances, what was required for a movement to get underway was a leader who could articulate the problems of the mass and propose the beginnings of a dignified solution to them. We need know no more about Apolinario de la Cruz than is known today, to assert that he was such a person, and that he was able to attract and mobilize supporters because he preached a convincing message of redemption to the Tagalog peasantry. The doctrine was a primitive one in the sense that it was not based on a “scientific” understanding of the social system and the root causes of the dissatisfactions of the people, and that it sought an escape from deprivation in separateness and religious purification rather than in political action. But it may be characterized as proto-political rather than as a political, because it derived from a determination to bring about the kind of a change in

the conditions of life which in the long run could only be achieved by political means. There is no reason to suppose that had the movement survived and spread, its leadership would not have responded to the need for a more secular and developmental program of action.

The religious character of the movement was a strength, rather than a weakness. It was its very other-worldliness which gave it organizational and revolutionary potential. The peasants were politically helpless and had no experience of politics. There was no area other than religious activity in which they could express the creative impulse to determine the quality and conditions of their own lives. A religious organization might be tolerated, moreover, in an authoritarian society which had no place for popular secular organizations of any kind. The religious mode facilitated communication between leaders and followers, and allowed the creation of new forms of authority, new statuses, new avenues of mobility, new definitions of legitimacy — a “practice run” in organization to build the basis for a viable movement. It was also a bridge between past and future, on which traditional behavior could be experienced in new contexts, and old ideas invested with new meanings.

The Spanish commentators saw the *Cofradía* as an exotic, aberrant and disruptive phenomenon, which they could explain only as a result of the manipulation of an ignorant and fanatical peasantry by a self-seeking agitator. From the perspective of at least a few thousand peasants in *Tayabas*, it was a convincing and liberating alternative to a painful existence and an opportunity to join the throng of the followers of a true prophet. It was the difference in attitude between those hostile to change and those receptive to it. Had *Apolinario's* teachings been exotic to the peasants, they would not have followed him. Had he not helped people to live more satisfying lives they would not have continued to support him in defiance of a decree of excommunication and the active opposition of their priests and *gobernadorcillos*.

In the autonomous stage of its development, when the *Cofradía* was able to function without interference from the authorities, the indications are that it grew steadily and functioned “rationally.” Its organization and activities were directed to the pursuit of the limited goal of creating within the Church a satisfactory environment for religious expression, free of the prejudices and restrictive presence of foreigners, and in which a Filipino leadership could function without handicaps. It avoided the kinds of confrontation with the vested interests from which it could not hope to emerge unscathed. By the middle of 1840, however, under increasing pressure from the civil and ecclesiastical authorities, the movement seems to have begun to conceive broader goals. What these were with regard to specific institutions in society (the peninsular clergy, the tribute and forced labor systems,

the Chinese business interests, etc.) is not yet known, but, the mood was clearly one of defiance rather than withdrawal. Very possibly, the *cofrades* were moving in the direction of political opposition. As things turned out, there was no time to formulate a program.

The explosion and rapid elimination of the Cofradía was the result not of Apolinario's policies, but of an extreme outside provocation and an apocalyptic response. Within a matter of a few weeks the leaders, who had been confident of obtaining official recognition for their organization and presumably looked forward to institutionalization and steady growth, became hunted outlaws. The situation in southern Tayabas and Laguna (where in some municipalities their followers must have been the majority of the population) seemed propitious for making the kind of a stand from which they could demand recognition. They underestimated the military power of the government, and they were greatly encouraged by the numbers of people who flocked to the camps at Isabang and Alitao. The millenarian vision of a God concerned for the safety and prosperity of the Tagalogs did the rest.

Mas y Sans and Matta agreed that the Tayabas rebellion had represented a serious threat to the government of the colony, and that had the *cofrades* chosen to split up and spread out into the provinces rather than attempting an ill-timed revolt, they might have been successful. But they were mistaken. The fundamental determination to recapture the initiative in social change was present with the followers of Apolinario de la Cruz, as was the capacity to organize and proselytize. But the mode of understanding reality was still only proto-political; it was magical as well as instrumental. When the power of a State which the Brothers only half understood and could not conceive of replacing was deployed against them, their only recourse was supernatural. The magic failed; the prophet lost his power, and there was not yet a program and a broad-based, indoctrinated apostolate which could survive him. The next leader of the people would have to start again from the beginning.

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GUARDIA DE HONOR: REVITALIZATION WITHIN THE REVOLUTION

DAVID R. STURTEVANT *

OUT OF THE STRIFE-TORN YEARS FROM 1892 TO 1902 emerged a series of contradictory social forces. The decade of discord in the Philippines—like similar upheavals elsewhere—produced intense, sometimes bitter, rivalries. *Ilustrados* and *Katipuneros*, Catholics and Aglipayans, Manileños and *provincianos*, landlords and tenants, regionalists and nationalists, pro- and anti-Americans, all contended for control of the truncated revolution. Because of their direct bearing on the development of contemporary Filipino nationalism, these factions have monopolized the attention of historians.

Often overlooked in the evaluations of rival claims to leadership is a sub-plot of provincial protest which had little or no relevance to the nerve-fraying drama in Manila, Kawit, and Malolos. While real and aspiring members of the elite jockeyed for prominent positions in the center of the revolutionary stage, and defiant young protagonists addressed themselves to the awesome tasks of nation building against the ominous backdrop of well-armed foreign troops disembarking in Manila Bay, rustic players acted out a far different scenario in remote barrios. The politically cognizant rallied to Aguinaldo, Mabini, and the men of Malolos. But many villagers followed charismatic local leaders into a series of "New Jerusalem." The anarchistic goals of the religious rebels were antithetical to the objectives of their more sophisticated contemporaries. Spanish friars, Filipino nationalists, and American conquerors found little in common. They did, however, agree on one point: all of them dismissed the bucolic experiments as gross examples of *bundok* heresy, crude superstition, primitive fanaticism, or worse.¹ Students of the period have unconsciously underlined those turn-of-the-century interpretations by ignoring the provocative innovations of provincial redeemers.

In neglecting these popular expressions, scholars have missed an opportunity to gain insights into the dynamics of rural discord in the Philippines. This is not an oversight limited to Filipinos or to foreign students of Philippine affairs. It is an intellectual "set" which threatens systematic inquiry into the social history of Southeast Asia. In the December issue of *Asian Studies* Professor Harry Benda pointed out the documentary and conceptual difficul-

* The author is examining a series of religio-political expressions in the Philippines under a Fulbright research grant for 1965-66. This article represents a preliminary report of findings on one movement. It is primarily descriptive rather than interpretative. Since materials are still being collected, please regard it as a tentative first look at the *Guardia de Honor*. Gratitude is extended to the Joint Committee of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council for a grant to Washington, D.C. during the summer of 1963. United States records on the *Guardia* were examined at that time. Neither the ACLS-SSRC nor the United States Education Foundation in the Philippines, however, is responsible for any of the views or conclusions expressed.

¹ The literal Tagalog translation of *bundok* is mountain.

ties that plague the examination of agrarian movements in this part of the world.² A kind of “conspiracy of silence,” as he so aptly put it, shields the peasantry from the historian’s curiosity.³ The student of rural unrest must work from frustratingly small and scattered fragments in his effort to reconstruct the elements of the Little Tradition. Despite the difficulties, the rewards make the quest worthwhile. Benda’s stimulating essay reveals some of the potential results. Implied within it is a rough continuum of increasingly sophisticated dissent throughout the region. At one end, was the “gentle anarchism” of the Samin Movement in nineteenth century Java; at the other, the “city-oriented” but peasant-based protest of the *Sakdalistas* on the eve of the Commonwealth’s inaugural in the Philippines.⁴ Between the two lie many forms and variations of agrarian unrest.

What prevails among the peasantry of Southeast Asia applies also to the broader context of mankind. Human beings under conditions of extreme or sustained stress—such as conquest, forced acculturation, rapid socio-economic change or breakdown—frequently become involved in what, at first sight, appears to be highly eccentric or exotic group behavior. A growing body of anthropological, sociological, and historical scholarship in Europe and the United States addresses itself to phenomena of this general type.⁵ Among the bewilderingly numerous terms in the emerging vocabulary designed to describe and explain such manifestations are the following: “cargo cults,” “chiliastic movements,” “charismatic movements,” “millenarian movements,” “nativistic movements,” “religious revivalism,” “social movements,” “sect formation,” and others.⁶ In an effort to eliminate semantic confusion and to evolve a

² Harry J. Benda, “Peasant Movements in Southeast Asia,” *Asian Studies*, III (1959).

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ See D. R. Sturtevant, “Sakdalism and Philippine Radicalism,” *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXI (1962), 199-215.

⁵ Mountainous sociological and anthropological literature on the subject assumes almost Himalayan proportions. Most helpful to historians entering the field are works by Redfield; see, for example, *The Primitive World and Its Transformations* (Ithaca, New York, 1953), and “Peasant Society and Culture,” in *The Little Community and Peasant Society and Culture* (Chicago, 1960). A pioneering sociological formulation was presented by R. D. Hopper, “The Revolutionary Process,” *Social Forces*, XXVIII (1950), 270-79. J. W. Vander Zander significantly modified the Hopper thesis in “Resistance and Social Movements,” *Social Forces*, XXXVII (1959), 312-15. Specific studies are too numerous to mention. For guidance, see Benda’s footnote on the subject *loc. cit.* A provocative essay on movements in a neighboring nation was produced by J. M. Van der Kroef in “Javanese Messianic Expectations: Their Origin and Cultural Context,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, I (1959), 299-322. The most stimulating historical treatments are: Norman Cohn, *In Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Messianism in Medieval and Reformation Europe and Its Bearing on Modern Totalitarian Movements* (London, 1962); E. J. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (New York, 1963); and V. Lanternari, *The Religions of the Oppressed: A Study of Modern Messianic Cults*, tr. by Liza Sergio (New York, 1963).

⁶ The historian who ventures into the inviting land of sect analysis enters a territory considered sacrosanct by behavioral scientists. See “Book Review: The Religions of the Oppressed,” *Current Anthropology*, VI (1965), 447-65. The animated international discussion of Professor Lanternari’s book by fifteen specialists, reveals the vitality of this field of inquiry. Another glimpse of the proliferating literature can be gained by scanning the review article’s bibliography, 464-65.

theoretical basis for uniform analysis, Professor Anthony F. C. Wallace evolved the concept of "revitalization" and outlined the stages through which such expressions seem to pass.⁷

Since his "constructs" undergird this short study, their meaning together with the processes they involve must be clarified. Wallace defines stress as a "condition in which some part, or the whole, of the social organism is threatened with serious damage."⁸ Under these circumstances begins what some sociologists call the "milling process"—increasing disorientation and a corresponding, often confused, quest for solutions.⁹ Revitalization movements appear at this juncture. He defines revitalization as a "deliberate, organized, conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture."¹⁰ Innovations of this kind run the gauntlet from extremely naive and "unrealistic" millenarianism, to sophisticated and "realistic" secular formulations. Whatever their pattern, from a strictly cultural viewpoint, they constitute highly creative endeavors to cope with a hostile world.¹¹

If they fit the "unrealistic" category—as does the subject of this paper—they usually involve a charismatic prophet who is in regular contact with a "supernatural pseudo-community."¹² Principal aides of the leader, and in many cases the bulk of their followers, become involved in similar psychological experiences. Hallucinatory states become widespread, sometimes contagious, and a kind of other wordly convulsion sweeps the membership. Propelled by mounting irrationality, the leaders and some of the followers often take the next logical if unfortunate step: they "become" the guardian spirit or spirits.¹³ Once the social seizure is established along these lines, the aberration must run its course. If the redeemer's doctrines and his disciples' conduct seriously challenge the values of the larger society, those who exercise authority suppress and, when possible, eliminate the movement.

With the inevitable tribal prostrations to the tyranny of terms completed, the major work of this paper can be undertaken. It will consist of a preliminary inquiry into the *Guardia de Honor*, an intricate revitalization effort which swept northern Luzon at the turn of the century. Its brief but highly checkered career created a unanimity of dismay among deeply discordant elements. Clerics were reduced to anxious tongue clucking. Nationalists cried counter revolution and treason. Americans fumbled and mumbled in puritanical bewilderment. The movement which forged this strange consensus will be analyzed in regard to (1) Catholic origins, (2) relations with the revolutionary regime, (3) relations with the Americans, (4) internal structure, (5) overt demise and probable survival as a secret society.

The organization made its appearance under thoroughly prosaic circumstances. Founded by Dominican fathers sometime in the middle of the nine-

⁷ Anthony F. C. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements," *American Anthropologist*, LVIII (1956), 264-81. Wallace's carefully designed rubric is used here because it generates less semantic heat than other descriptive terms.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 265.

⁹ Hopper, *loc. cit.*, 271.

¹⁰ Wallace, *loc. cit.*, 265.

¹¹ Redfield, *Primitive World*, 51.

¹² Wallace, *loc. cit.*, 273.

¹³ *Ibid.*

teenth century, its purpose was to instill devotion for the Virgin among lay members.¹⁴ Known as the *Guardia de Honor de Maria*, the confraternity flourished in Pangasinan and contiguous provinces. Originally designed to provide a devout escort for the Virgin's image during sacred processions, the society grew beyond its inceptors' expectations and gradually assumed more complex responsibilities. By 1877, the size of its membership justified division into regional and local units for more effective work among the village laity.

To this point, the *Guardia's* development followed an orthodox pattern. The revolutionary tide of the 1890's, however, shattered the Dominican's conservative handiwork. When the flood crested, it left a ruin of religiously-oriented fragments which local artisans combined into a ramshackle radicalism unrecognizable to the society's original architects and builders. The genesis of the transformation came when curates attempted to use the confraternity's influence to counter propaganda and organization work by *Katipuneros*.¹⁵ With the rise of revolutionary fortunes, many clerics in Pangasinan were arrested by provincial leaders of the new regime. Others (some assisted by members of the *Guardia*), escaped and fled to the Order's sanctuaries in Manila. Abandoned parishioners blamed the revolutionaries for the disappearance of their spiritual guides. Dynamic provincial leaders—perhaps spurred on and assisted covertly by Dominicans in the distant metropolis—organized a counter movement which soon assumed regional proportions.¹⁶

Storm signals started to flutter in the tense time of waiting, from October 1898 through January 1899. While Aguinaldo and his aides attempted to deal with the ever-increasing threat of hostilities with the United States, ominous rumbles of an approaching Jacquerie began to reverberate across the plains and through the mountains to the north. Reports from provincial authorities portrayed a highly disturbing pattern of spreading disorder. Highwaymen, brigands, and irregular military units appeared in ever-widening circles emanating from Pangasinan. Prominent families, together with barrios and administrative centers loyal to the new government, came under sporadic attack.¹⁷ By late November and early December 1898, peace and order in the provinces of La Union, Pangasinan, and Tarlac had deteriorated to the danger point. Nationalist leaders grumbled over counter-revolutionary tendencies and complained to Aguinaldo of "treason on the part of our troops and civilians."¹⁸

¹⁴ United States, National Archives, J. R. M. Taylor (comp.), *The Philippine Insurrection against the United States*, galley proofs in five volumes (Washington, D. C., 1906), I, 45; cited hereafter as Taylor, *Insurgent Records*.

¹⁵ James Le Roy, *Philippine Life in Town and Country* (New York, 1905), 129.

¹⁶ United States, War Department, Bureau of Insular Affairs, *Compilation of Philippine Insurgent Records: Telegraphic Correspondence of Emilio Aguinaldo, July 15, 1898, to February 28, 1899, Annotated* (Washington, 1903), 36; cited hereafter as BIA, *Compilation*. A footnote describes the career of a *Guardia* leader in Tarlac Province. It is based on Joaquin D. Duran, *Episodios de la Revolucion Filipina* (Manila, 1901).

¹⁷ General Macabulos to Aguinaldo, November 30, 1898. BIA, *Compilation*, 30.

¹⁸ General Pio del Pilar to Aguinaldo, December 4, 1898. BIA *Compilations*, 31.

Christmas brought the gift of chaos. Simultaneous uprisings plunged Tarlac into near anarchy. Urgent telegrams jamming the wires to General Aguinaldo's headquarter in Cavite described widespread "criminal" activities by hands of "*tulisanes*."¹⁹ A *cordon sanitaire* was hastily thrown around the feverish province in an effort to isolate the infection. Reinforcements rushed north by rail to initiate martial law and to pacify the restless populace. Tarlaqueños remained under a state of siege throughout the month of January 1899. Efforts by the regime to withdraw detachments for strategic redeployment against the Americans proved futile. Within hours after the abandonment of a *poblacion*, poised guerillas fell upon the defenseless town to sack government buildings, destroy records, and attack leading citizens. The struggle quickly assumed the character of civil war. In a revealing message, the administrative head of Tarlac captured the fears of the provincial *principales*. "Many rich people here," he telegraphed Aguinaldo, "urgently ask the creation of a . . . body of volunteers . . . formed of trustworthy and prominent persons . . . for the pursuit of robbers and to fight the Americans if necessary. We have the money," he concluded optimistically, "and only need rifles."²⁰

Aguinaldo used a more cautious approach. He tried to tranquilize the area through a dual policy of attraction and coercion. Neither element worked. Rural rowdies stole his velvet glove and parried his mailed fist. That a religious under-current propelled the rebellious forces was quickly discerned by those in charge of pacification. One troubleshooter suggested that Bishop Aglipay be sent "to quiet Tarlac."²¹ Surging peasants, however, could not be stilled by either nationalistic bishops or bullets. When amnesties failed to turn the tide of discord, members of the burgeoning movement were proscribed, hunted down, and killed.²² But the organization continued to grow and flourish. Leaders of the dissenters began to call themselves "Brigadier Generals."²³ They applied, moreover, a ruthless counter policy of terror against government efforts to drain away their reservoir of popular support. By the end of February 1899, the trouble had assumed the proportions of a general peasant uprising. San Carlos, Pangasinan, for example, requested military detachments to defend its 23,000 inhabitants from the assaults of "those who call themselves the discontented or oppressed and Guards of Honor."²⁴

The Dominicans' carefully nurtured plant had borne unpredictably bitter fruit. Within a year, further mutations produced an ugly, self-propagating specimen which even the friar horticulturists came to regard as a noxious weed. After the outbreak of Filipino-American hostilities, provincial authorities turned from peace-keeping activities to the more pressing duties created by the advancing outlanders. United States troops, concentrating on Aguinaldo's ragged but defiant legions, paid little heed to the religious peculiarities proliferating around them. Late in 1899, however, when forward elements reached the warm plains and humid foothills of Pangasinan, the problem

¹⁹ See telegrams to Aguinaldo, BIA, *Compilation*, 35-7.

²⁰ Provincial Chief of Tarlac to Aguinaldo, December 28, 1898. BIA, *Compilation*, 41-2.

²¹ Secretary of Agriculture to Aguinaldo, December 28, 1898. BIA, *Compilation*, 37.

²² Taylor, *Insurgent Records*, 45.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

could no longer be ignored. A lush undergrowth of religious dissent covered the province. From the thriving seedbed, thick runners of discord twisted north, east, and south into La Union, Ilocos Sur, Nueva Ecija, Zambales, and Tarlac.

The contagion caused the Americans as much, if not more, difficulty than it had Aguinaldo. General Elwell S. Otis, the bemused commander of "pacification" forces in the Philippines, grasped neither the military nor social realities confronting his field officers. Weaned on the Anglo-Saxon sportsmanship of the War Between the States and shaped by the primitive clarities of Indian campaigns on the frontier, he regarded the "strange fanaticism" swirling through Luzon as but another streak of oriental perversity.²⁵ "Self-declared prophets," complained the disgruntled Otis to his superiors, "were revealing and proclaiming new creeds. . . quite markedly variable in origin and nature."²⁶ The general considered the malady to be essentially inexplicable. He fell back, therefore, on a tried and tested American approach. Assuming the sects were based on the pecuniary motives of their leaders, he ordered a crackdown. Subordinates wrested an established redeemer from the arms of devout converts in Calumpit, Bulacan and threw him behind bars for "illegal money exactions from the more ignorant natives."²⁷ After taking the first step toward confining the epidemic, the general consulted local diagnosticians. Manila's "educated Filipinos" proved to be uneasy. They spoke apprehensively about the increase of . . . fanatical sects," and warned Otis that difficulty might be experienced "in handling them if they were permitted to follow their inclinations."²⁸ The general found no answers; but he concluded his ponderous observations with a provocative remark: "Whatever the cause, the fact disturbed the Roman Catholic clergy and was the subject of much animated discussion."²⁹

While Otis conducted righteous opinion surveys and priests buzzed sanctimoniously over the American commander's heretical findings, General Arthur MacArthur sought the focus of dissent. Patrols reconnoitering Pangasinan's intricate village network found a variety of secular and sacred eccentricities, but the strangest encounter was a thriving community of ten thousand people where a slumbering barrio of five hundred was supposed to be. Cabaruan, which one scandalized American called, an "ill-starred town of religious fanatics and vulgar thieves," had been discovered by the outside world.³⁰ With a tactician's directness, MacArthur moved to eradicate the conglomeration of cultists. Hastily concentrated infantry occupied the place after a brief and practically bloodless skirmish. Shortly thereafter, a relieved General Otis received complete telegraphic information on the action's objective:

Cabaruan is . . . located some eight miles east of Malasiqui. . . It has been selected as the rendezvous of a fanatical religious organization of some kind and people from surrounding towns and barrios forced to assemble there. . . . The fana-

²⁵ *Report of Major General E. S. Otis: September, 1899 to May 5, 1900* (Washington, 1900), 142.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 143.

³⁰ James Le Roy, *The Americans in the Philippines*, II (Boston, 1914), 302.

tics are also robbers and murderers, and have recently committed the most cruel depredations on surrounding towns, especially Malasiqui, where nine murders have been committed within the last few weeks. . . . The. . . people there have been ordered home and in a few days it is hoped that the excitement that has kept this part of Pangasinan in an uproar. . . will subside. . . . Precisely how the religious and robber elements are combined I have not yet been able to ascertain, but it is a fact. . . that this part of Pangasinan has been terrorized by these people—the large town of Malasiqui being almost entirely depopulated. . . The importance of this day's work cannot be overestimated.³¹

General MacArthur's modest conclusion proved wrong. The "day's work" exerted about as much influence over the course of affairs in Pangasinan, as the nationalists' proclamation of martial law had worked on events the year before in Tarlac.

MacArthur galloped off to resolve other pressing difficulties leaving regimental officers to grapple with the complexities of Cabaruan. Early in 1900, they stationed an infantry company in the town to oversee the gradual dispersal of its residents. But the inhabitants did not fade away. The tumult subsided. Sectarians devoted more energy to marathon prayer sessions and correspondingly less to terrorizing neighboring settlements.³² Even the population leveled off around the ten thousand mark. With peace seemingly restored, the small garrison withdrew. Baffled officers in Dagupan headquarters instituted a wary surveillance of the troublesome community. Any hope that genuine stability might develop proved ephemeral. The soldiers' departure signalled a fresh outburst of perplexing growth. Within a year, ten thousand more people migrated to Cabaruan.³³ A new, heartier variety of religious dissent had apparently sprung up in Pangasinan.

The ominous revival constituted an additional source of frustration to military personnel overburdened with occupation duties in a large and populous province. Patrols visited Cabaruan regularly. Their sketchy reports revealed a series of mystifying contradictions.³⁴ The town was unusually clean and well laid out. Major streets radiated from the plaza like spokes on a wagon wheel. Each thoroughfare, together with the section through which it passed, was named after one of the twelve apostles. A personable young man, addicted to glittering top-boots and ornate uniforms, presided over the destinies of the devout and disciplined population. He was assisted by twelve efficient lieutenants. These encouraging aspects, however, were cancelled by some highly discouraging circumstances. Cabaruan's burgeoning population manifested all the trappings of rural prosperity, but the town lacked any visible

³¹ Otis, *op. cit.*, 143.

³² Dean C. Worcester, *The Philippine Past and Present*, II (New York, 1914), 944.

³³ Katherine Mayo, *The Isles of Fear: Truth About the Philippines* (New York, 1925), 181. Miss Mayo's book was probably the most "objectionable" collection of "objective" observations written during the 1920's. But her short description of Cabaruan was based on the account of an American officer stationed in Dagupan during the years, 1899-1902. If her remarks are stripped of their Kiplingesque veneer they reveal interesting details on the *Guardia*.

³⁴ United States, War Department, *Report 1900* (Washington, 1901). See I, Part 8, "Reports from Colonel J. F. Bell, Commander, Thirty-Sixth Infantry, U. S. V., to Adjutant-General Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, 331-335. Cited hereafter as *Bell Reports*.

means of support.³⁵ Few, if any, people worked. They made little effort, for example, to cultivate the surrounding countryside. Furthermore, detachments returning to Dagupan, inevitably picked up disturbing rumors concerning Cabaruan. Inhabitants of surrounding communities regarded the place with ill-concealed terror. They complained of chronic criminality and whispered of sordid and sadistic rites.³⁶

Headquarters doubled efforts to unravel the enigma. Suspicious American majors attempted to take the town's leaders by surprise. The new approaches produced no concrete evidence of wrongdoing, but they led to an entertaining cat-and-mouse game between Cabaruan and the United States Army. Patrol patterns were radically and constantly changed. When this failed, small veteran detachments made their way to the community *via* the most devious routes. Vigilant residents of Cabaruan's extensive environs, however, always discovered the interlopers. They notified messengers who, in turn, set into motion a unique alarm system. Within moments after receiving word of the patrol's approach, the ever-alert Cabaruan brass band—drums rolling, cymbals crashing, and trumpets blaring—was marching out to greet the dismayed troops. When musicians and military met, the bandsmen wheeled smartly, and triumphantly led the embarrassed Americans through orderly throngs of smiling residents to the *plaza* where they were graciously welcomed by town officials.³⁷ Incidents of this type led some Manila Americans to chide the Pangasinan regiment for the "Cabaruan fiasco."³⁸

Intelligence and legal officers in Dagupan, however, were not as naive as Cabaruan and Manila believed. While patiently awaiting the accumulation of irrefutable testimony, they compiled a quantity of revealing information on the mysterious town. The manifestation confronting them represented something far more complicated than simple superstition or religious racketeering. The specific problem of Cabaruan was linked to the amorphous and seemingly all-pervasive hysteria which anxious villagers called "*Guardia de Honor*." A lemming-like migration was underway in the north. Peasant families from surrounding provinces, particularly La Union and Ilocos Sur, arrived every day in Cabaruan.³⁹ For a people conditioned to servile acceptance of clerical and proprietary authority, the mass movement constituted a courageous act of spontaneous protest. The pattern of rebellion was devastatingly simple. When the harvest was gathered, farm couples packed up children, pitiful belongings, and poultry; seized the landowner's *palay*, livestock, and carabao; joined like-minded neighbors; and began the liberating trek to the promised land. On arrival, they deposited confiscated rice and

³⁵ Mayo, *op. cit.*, 182.

³⁶ The rumors led the commander in Dagupan to observe, "I am convinced that the conditions of affairs at Cabaruan are unhealthy and need some corrective action before a time of possible crisis arrives," *Bell Reports*, 332.

³⁷ Mayo, *op. cit.*, 181.

³⁸ "...on my recent trip through Pangasinan I passed and met... dozens of families who said they had come from... La Union and Ilocos Sur, on their way, with carabao, carts, and other domestic belongings to... Cabaruan," *Bell Reports*, 333.

³⁹ "Some of them are accused of taking all the palay, which their land produced, away with them... (thereby robbing the proprietor... of his share of the crop), together with the carabao which belonged to the proprietor of the land." *Ibid.*

animals in communal granaries and pens. This seemingly limitless bounty added to the impressive booty collected during terroristic raids on neighboring areas, produced a cornucopian atmosphere verging on perpetual *fiesta*. The town was living parasitically on a large portion of the agricultural yield of at least three provinces.⁴⁰ The place virtually reeked with the heady aroma of social revolution.

The peculiar political organization of the community posed greater analytical problems. Ostensibly anarchistic, the town was not chaotic. Opposition to external authority—whether clerical, national, or colonial—was balanced by rigid internal subjection to paternalistic figures. The resplendant headman and his uniformed aides were more than polite dandies. They directed a rigid, *pure* theocracy. Surrounding them was a discipline-producing halo of holiness. A publicity-shunning individual, known simply as Baltazar, had founded the town in 1897. Many residents believed him to be “God Almighty.” Antonio Valdez, the glittering headman; Gregorio Claveria, his principal aide; and Maria de la Cruz, their constant companion; were worshiped respectively as “Jesus Christ,” the “Holy Ghost,” and the “Virgin Mary.” The twelve lieutenants were reverently regarded as the “Savior’s Apostles.”⁴¹ Such an omnipotent assemblage made anything seem possible. A developing sense of invincibility powered Cabaruan’s gathering momentum.

While there were apparently no apocalyptic pronouncements, the euphoric behavior of the community indicated that the millenium was at hand. Mass elation of such magnitude can be attributed to few factors other than collective anticipation experienced by the elect on the eve of a final reckoning. The corrupt world would be transformed. Justice would replace oppression. If they conceived of the new era in simple terms, utterly incomprehensible to their more sophisticated contemporaries, it was because they were uncomplicated men and women. Pre-political rural folk seldom aspire to an affluent utopia. They “conceive of the good society as a just sharing of austerity rather than a dream of riches for all.”⁴² While awaiting retribution, it was the responsibility of the predestined to strike down perpetrators of evil. Blacklists of sinners, particularly landowners and apostates, were compiled. True believers convinced themselves that when the great day came, lands of those marked for extinction would be divided among the members of the organization. Cabaruan’s wide-ranging raiders, accordingly, did not strike in a hit-or-miss fashion. They preyed specifically on those obviously unfit to enter “the chosen kingdom of the *Guardia de Honor*.”⁴³

The town’s impossible “economy” bothered regimental officers in Dagupan more than its unorthodox “theology.”⁴⁴ The soaring population quickly

⁴⁰ Mayo, *op. cit.*, 182. After the movement had been suppressed, a member of the Philippine Commission observed, “On a trip to Lingayen I saw the persons who had impersonated God, the Son, and the Virgin Mary in a provincial jail.” Worcester, *op. cit.*, 944.

⁴¹ Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels*, 82.

⁴² United States, War Department, *Report 1901* (Washington, 1902), I, Part 3, “Report of Brigadier General J. H. Smith, U.S.A.,” 114. Cited hereafter as *Smith Reports*.

⁴³ “This religious fanaticism might be harmless if it did lead its ignorant followers to the adoption of harmful views concerning rights of property and other material things.” *Bell Reports*, 333.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 334.

consumed confiscated provisions from Cabaruan's communal *bodegas* and bamboo corrals. Mounting pressure to meet the imminent crisis produced two equilibrium-shattering results. On the one hand, disputes over the acquisition and distribution of food shook the doctrinal unity of the leaders. A disgruntled lesser prophet led a minor *hegira* to Santa Ana, a barrio of Asingan town.⁴⁵ There, he established a new spiritual refuge. Ilocanos fleeing personal wildernesses could now choose between rival lands of milk and honey. Santa Ana quickly became a full-blown reflection of Cabaruan. By March 1, 1901, ten thousand people had collected in the "New Jerusalem." On the other hand, Cabaruan passed the economic point of no return. Still absorbing droves of ecstatic pilgrims, it achieved a peak population of twenty-five thousand early in 1901. The resulting frantic quest for food led terroristic bands to modify their tactics. Specific attacks on selected *principales* were supplemented with an ever-increasing number of random assaults on humble outsiders. Small farmers who had tacitly supported and secretly enjoyed *Guardia* activities directed at the rich, turned against the movement when it unleashed its righteous fury on the poor.⁴⁶

With mounting waves of terror sweeping Pangasinan's sectarian sea, aroused officers in Dagupan moved to still the turbulence. Judgment Day came, but not in the vague fraternal form envisioned by members of the *Guardia*. It materialized suddenly and overpoweringly in blue uniforms, bristling bayonets, and a provost marshal. On March 3, 1901, Cabaruan and Santa Ana were occupied by infantry battalions. Ruthlessly efficient platoons sought out the "Trinity" and the "Virgin." The omnipotent trio and their charismatic handmaiden were arrested, shackled, and blasphemously marched off to an army stockade in Urdaneta. Shortly thereafter, they were unceremoniously joined by twelve dispirited apostles.⁴⁷ With their redeemers in chains, the budding self-confidence of Cabaruan's inhabitants withered to traditional subservience. By nightfall, the first crestfallen *tao* were preparing for humiliating returns to their old communities.

The dreary diaspora took several months. March and April saw the counter-migration reach its depressing peak under the persistent prodding of American soldiers. A hard core of faithful remained in the dusty ruins of Cabaruan to await the military tribunal's decision. The Court declared Antonio Valdez and Gregorio Claveria guilty on multiple counts of murder and terrorism. It sentenced them to death. Other leaders, found guilty of aiding and abetting the activities of the headmen, received long prison terms. On June 1, 1901, in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Valdez and Claveria were publicly hanged.⁴⁸ "Jesus" and the "Holy Ghost" were dead. So, apparently, was the *Guardia de Honor*.

It all seemed over. Cabaruan and Santa Ana dwindled back to sleeping settlements, dreaming fitfully of bygone notoriety. Ilocanos went home or—if that grim alternative seemed too unbearable—joined their ubiquitous broth-

⁴⁵ Silent villagers became extremely vocal early in 1901 providing clear proof of widespread murder and terrorism to American authorities in Dagupan. Mayo, *op. cit.*, 182-83.

⁴⁶ *Smith Reports*, 114.

⁴⁷ *Smith Reports*, 118.

⁴⁸ Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels*. 91.

ers in other parts of the Philippines. Except for those who had painfully felt its wrath, or those who had been temporarily transformed by its delirious aspirations, the contagion was forgotten almost as quickly as it had appeared. The patterns followed the classic model of shattered peasant movements throughout the world. Defeat breeds despair. When the frenzy subsides, observed a compassionate student of European protests, nothing is left "but the small group of . . . true believers, and a dispirited mass waiting for the next great moment. And if that small group should be dispersed—by death, or emigration, or the systematic attention of the police, nothing at all remains except a bitter consciousness of defeat."⁴⁹

Filipino farmers, however, have a tenacious hold on hope. The spark of revitalization survived. Remnants of the old organization formed a secret society which kept the spectre of Cabaruan alive. When the army withdrew from Pangasinan, neophyte provincial officials and green constabularymen had to deal with a treacherous undercurrent of peasant anarchism which surfaced from time to time in small, violent upheavals. A minor uprising occurred in Natividad in 1903.⁵⁰ Similar incidents of diminishing intensity continued for another seven years. After 1919, the records of the Argus-eyed Constabulary no longer mention the *Guardia de Honor*. Anonymity, however, did not necessarily mean extinction. The 1920's witnessed the appearance of a new generation of religious rebels. *Colorum* agonies reminiscent of the *Guardia's* birthpangs plagued Central and Northern Luzon. In January 1931, they reached climax in the uprising at Tayug, Pangasinan. Thirty years stand between the two expressions. But less than twenty miles divided the *Guardia's* Cabaruan, and the *Colorum's* Tayug.

Both manifestations—together with a score of other obscure rural protests—deserve the respectful attention of scholars. Within them lie the outlines of the Little Tradition in the Philippines. Had such a widespread and persistent movement as the *Guardia* appeared at another juncture, it would have received undivided post-mortem concentration from the historical fraternity. Occurring in 1880, it would probably have been classified as embryonic popular nationalism. Flaring in 1920, it would very likely have been interpreted as an unsophisticated but heroic gesture to achieve social justice. It rose and fell, however, at the century's turn. As a consequence, it disappeared in the violent cross currents of the Revolution and the Filipino-American War. By ignoring it, historians have consigned the mysterious town and its wonderfully-defiant resident to the limbo of lunatics and lost causes. They deserved a better fate.

⁴⁹ See "Report of the Governor of the Province of Pangasinan," in *Report of the Philippine Commission, 1904*, Part I, 583

⁵⁰ *Annual Report of the Director of Constabulary, 1909* (Manila, 1910), 6.

THE DATUS OF THE RIO GRANDE DE COTABATO UNDER COLONIAL RULE*

Jeremy Beckett

Introduction:

The local elite, whether indigenous or creole, is a problematic element in any colonial system. To the extent that it controls the lower orders it may be either an ally of the regime or its enemy. And to the extent that it exploits them it may either be a partner or a competitor. Whichever course it follows there are dangers. If it is defiant it risks destruction, and at the least jeopardizes the protection given by its masters. If it is compliant it may jeopardize its legitimacy among the common folk. Either way it risks displacement by an alternative elite, more responsive to the situation. Elite groups and families, then, are sensitive indicators of changing conditions; and their fluctuating fortunes deserve close attention.

The Philippines is a particularly interesting case, in this respect, because, despite four changes of regime in the fifty years between 1898 and 1948, its elite remained substantially intact. The degree of continuity among the Principalia from the conquest to the early nineteenth century is hard to establish, but it seems that thereafter the growth of export industries caused a good deal of upward and downward mobility.¹ In Pampanga, for example, Chinese mestizos who had prospered in the burgeoning sugar industry either displaced or married into the old landed elite.² What Owen has called the Super-Principalia attained in Bicol, as in Pampanga, is a level of affluence far greater than their predecessors had enjoyed.³ The Revolution, the American take-over, the explosion of public education, even the Japanese occupation, seem by comparison to have caused little mobility. Individuals rose and fell, but the family coalitions that dominated the early years of the Republic were in many cases the same that had composed the elite of the late Spanish period.

The Muslim areas of the South had a different history. Maintaining a fierce resistance, they managed to remain outside the Spanish pale until the second half of the nineteenth century. Even by 1898 the ordinary *tao* were barely integrated with the rest of Philippine society.

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¹See, for example, Renato Constantino, *The Philippines: A Past Revisited* (Quezon City: Tala Publishing Services, 1975), pp. 127-8.

²John Larkin, *The Pampangans: Colonial Society in a Philippine Province* (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1972).

³Norman G. Owen, "The Principalia in Philippine History: Kabikolan, 1790-1898, *Philippine Studies* 22, No. (1974), pp. 297-324.

but certain of their *datus* had found a foothold in the colonial order. By the end of the American period, these same *datus* had come to occupy much the same position as the big landlords of Luzon and the Visayas, despite continuing cultural differences.

Islam and Malay versions of Islamic political institutions were established in the South by the time the Spaniards came. Majul has argued that these provided the framework for resistance on a scale far greater than non-Muslim Filipinos could achieve.⁴ Exploiting their position on the peripheries of several colonial domains, the so-called Moros were able to carry on a profitable commerce with European and Chinese merchants. This they augmented by yearly raids on Spanish occupied territory. Maguindanao and Sulu became centres of sufficient importance to support sultanates with more than a semblance of centralization and hierarchy.⁵

As the nineteenth century wore on, Spain's naval blockade deprived the sultans of their economic support; then, in the second half, she began undermining their authority through a series of military and diplomatic campaigns. By 1898 they were effectively neutralized, but this did not mean the end of indigenous leadership. The sultanates had always been segmentary states, in which a good deal of the power remained with local *datus*.⁶ These now had to choose between defiance and compliance, with the latter proving the wiser course in the long run.

In Cotabato, particularly, the Maguindanaon *datus* used their client connection with the colonial authorities to legalize traditional land rights, turning their followers into tenants and themselves into landlords. As such they were able to take advantage of the development of commercial agriculture. In the same way, having first option on positions in local government, they were able to reconstitute their traditional authority. They were thus well placed to take command when independence came.

An elaborate ideology of rank, grounded in Islamic belief, supported political authority, and the historical record suggests that the power holders and leaders usually were of the nobility, until the Spanish invasion. The upheavals of the late Spanish period broke the connection, however, leaving the new generation of *datus* to command recognition on pragmatic grounds such as the use of force and access to the colonial authorities. With the years, certain *datu* lines acquired a born-to-rule reputation, but still without the old trappings

⁴Cesar Adib Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973), p. 78.

⁵For an account of Maguindanao in the seventeenth century, see Francisco Combes, *Historia de las Islas de Mindanao, Iolo y sus Adyacentes* (Madrid: 1897). For an account of Maguindanao in the eighteenth century, see Thomas Forrest, *A Voyage to New Guinea and the Moluccas, from Balamabangan* (London: 1779).

⁶For an analysis of segmentary state systems, see J.M. Gulick, *Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaysia, L.S.E. Monographs*, 17 (London: Athlone Press, 1958). Also Thomas Keifer, "The Tausug Polity and the Sultanate of Sulu: A Segmentary State in the Southern Philippines", *Sulu Studies* 1(1972) pp. 19-64

of rank and title. The literature on the Christian Philippines is remarkably vague on the subject of political legitimacy and ideology, but there would appear to be little more than personalistic ties of the patron-client type.⁷ The new Maguindanaon datos, however, were in some sense heirs to the old; moreover they were Muslims who stood between their people and alien domination.

An understanding of the contemporary situation, and of the people's perception of it, could only be achieved through an investigation of the historical record. This paper is an outcome of these investigations, a historical account informed by some first hand acquaintance with the Maguindanaon and their oral traditions.

Documents and Oral Sources

The sources on Cotabato history are extensive. Apart from the Spaniards, who assiduously gathered intelligence from the late sixteenth century, the British and Dutch had a passing interest in Maguindanao and sent home occasional reports. A good deal of this material was published, either at the time or subsequently, though there is no telling what remains undiscovered in the archives.

At the beginning of the American period, Najeeb Saleeby produced his *Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion*, based on an examination of Maguindanaon manuscripts, but thereafter, published sources yield little of consequence besides statistical data and short routine reports.⁸ There is more to be got from the papers of General Wood and Royston Haydon, but Cotabato engaged their interest less than Sulu or Lanao, perhaps because it was the most peaceful of the Moro provinces.⁹ Karl Peltzer, the geographer, carried out a study of Christian settlement in Cotabato in 1940,¹⁰ and Chester Hunt, a sociologist worked in Cotabato City in 1953;¹¹ Otherwise there was little academic interest until the end of the 1960's when there was a sudden, though uncoordinated burst of activity. Majul's *Muslims in the Philippines*, though only published in 1973, was the fruit of many years of research.¹² Pressing its inquiry back to the pre-Spanish period, it traced the history of the Maguindanaon and Sulu sultanates through to their collapse in the mid-nineteenth century. Meanwhile Reynaldo Ilet

⁷See particularly, Carl Lande, *Leaders, Factions and Parties: the Structure of Philippines Politics. Yale Southeast Asia Studies*, 6, (Newhaven: Yale University Press, 1965). Also, James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (Newhaven: Yale University Press, 1977).

⁸Najeeb Saleeby, *Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion: Ethnological Survey Publications*, 4, Pt. 1 (Manila: Bureau of Public Printing, 1905).

⁹Joseph Ralston Hayden *Papers*, Michigan Historical Collections, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Leonard Wood *Papers*, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.

⁹Joseph Ralston Hayden *Papers*, Michigan Historical Collections, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Leonard Wood *Papers*, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.

¹⁰Karl Peltzer, *Pioneer Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics: Studies in Land Utilization and Agricultural Colonization in Southeastern Asia* (New York: American Geographical Society 1948) pp. 127-159.

¹¹Chester L. Hunt, "Ethnic Stratification and Integration in Cotabato," *Philippine Sociological Review*, 5, No. 1 (1957) pp. 13-38.

¹²Majul, *op. cit.*

had completed a study of the final phase of Maguindanaon resistance to Spain, during the second half of the nineteenth century.¹³ A little earlier, in 1968, Peter Gowing completed a study of the American administration of the 'Moro Provinces' up to 1920;¹⁴ and a little later, Ralph Thomas carried the story through to 1946 focussing on the theme of national integration.¹⁵ At about the same time, Samuel Tan was exploring the particular theme of *Muslim Armed Resistance* between 1900 and 1941.¹⁶

Based on field research, aside from the studies made by professional historians whose names have already been cited, this paper attempts an overview of the colonial period from the vantage point of contemporary Cotabato.

The Region

The region known to the Spaniards and the Americans as Cotabato occupies almost the whole of southwestern Mindanao. The Pulangi River or Rio Grande valley almost bisects the region, separating the coastal Cordillera or Tiruray Highlands from the Central Mindanao Highlands. Wernstedt and Spencer describe it as follows:

This extensive, low-lying, swampy plain... includes a lowland area of well over 1,000 square miles. Recent uplift across the mouth of the river, which has formed the low Cotabato and Timaco hills, has resulted in the impounding of river waters and the creation of two large swamp areas, the Libungan Marsh and the Liguasan Swamp. Together these two swamps cover a combined area of 450 square miles during normal water levels; however, the swamplands expand well beyond these limits when heavy seasonal rains and river floods inundate additional areas of the valley floor, and indeed, during heavy rains, all of the lowland downstream from Lake Buluan looks like a vast lake from the air.¹⁷

This valley is the homeland of the Maguindanaon ethno-linguistic group, the name referring, appropriately, to its tendency to flood. At various times in the past small numbers have settled along the coast, or pressed on into the Koronadal valley, but only until the recent build up of population through immigration did they occupy the uplands. These were populated by Muslim Iranon and Maranao in the North, and by pagan groups such as the Tiruray, Manobo and Bila'an in the coastal and central parts.

¹³Ileto *op. cit.*

¹⁴Peter Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland: the American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899-1921*. (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1957).

¹⁵Ralph Benjamin Thomas, *Muslim But Filipino: the Integration of Philippine Muslims, 1917-1946*. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. (University of Pennsylvania, 1971).

¹⁶Samuel Kong Tan, *The Muslim Armed Struggle in the Philippines, 1900-1941*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, (Syracuse University, 1973). Alunan Glang's *Muslim Secession or Integration* (Quezon City: R.P. Garcia 1969) includes some historical pieces, based on the published sources, but is mainly concerned with contemporary problems. Michael O. Mastura's study, *The Condition, Status and Destiny of the Muslim South (Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug) 1880-1871*, is in preparation.

¹⁷Frederick L. Wernstedt and Joseph E. Spencer, *Philippine Island World: A Physical Cultural and Regional Geography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 545.

The indigenous population was for the most part agricultural, but there was no shortage of land until large scale immigration began towards the middle of the twentieth century. When the Americans conducted the first census, in 1903, they reported a total of 125,875, of which 113,875 were Muslims and the rest pagan.¹⁸ This was a sparse population for a region of some 8,800 square miles, and inevitably posed the possibility of immigration from the overcrowded islands, once peace and order could be established. Christian immigrants and their descendants now heavily outnumber the indigenous peoples, but at the last American census, conducted in 1940, Muslims numbered 162,996 out of a total of 298,935, and pagans 70,493.¹⁹ Cotabato City remains the only settlement of any size, with a population of some 60,000. However, it amounted to only a few hundreds at the beginning of the century and had reached only 10,000 by the end of the American period.

Maguindanaon Political Organization

Although the Sultans of Maguindanao have their pride of place in the historical record, they were not the only title holders in the valley. As Iletto notes, the upper valley Rajahs of Buayan were probably of more consequence when the Spaniards first visited in the late sixteenth century; and even at its height Maguindanao did not claim sovereignty over them.²⁰ As it slid into decline through the eighteenth century, several of the Rajahs assumed the title of sultan, as though to assert equality.

The notion of sultanate is, in any case, an inadequate tool for understanding Maguindanaon political organization, referring as it does to form rather than reality. The centralization it suggests could scarcely be realized among a homesteading population, widely dispersed over difficult terrain, with primitive communications.²¹ While a sultan might have sanctity, magical powers and exalted rank, he was just another datu when it came to politics. The basic building blocks of the system were local datudoms, autonomous in theory, but often dependent on others for access to resources such as salt and iron, and intermittently articulated into wider alliances for attack or defense.

The primary meaning of *datu* for the Maguindanaon is ruler, one who controls his people, but also protects them against abuse by other datus.²² For this a datu must be *mawalao*, the meaning of which lies

¹⁸Census Office. *Census of the Philippines Islands Taken in 1903* (Manila: Bureau of Printing 1904). The estimates, particularly of the pagan population, were probably below the actual figure.

¹⁹*Philippines Commonwealth, Census of the Philippines, 1939*. (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1940). See also Frederick L. Wernstedt and Paul D. Simpkins. "Migrations and the Settlement of Mindanao," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 25 (November 1965) 83-102.

²⁰Iletto *op. cit.*, 2.

²¹Although the river was navigable for some 100 kilometers, such a journey would take several days paddling in a banca.

²²For an account from the Maranao perspective, see Melvin Mednick. "Some Problems of Moro History and Political Organization," *Philippine Sociological Review* 5, No. 1 (1957), pp. 39-52.

somewhere between the English brave and aggressive. The size of a datu's following depended on this capacity combined with control of some economic resource. The importance of the upper valley datu seems to have been based on rice production, part of which was exported, through the exploitation of slave labour, the taking of dues from Muslim peasants, and of tribute from upland pagans. As one proceeded down river, however, the exploitation of trade became increasingly important, with datu's controlling strategic points from which they could exact tolls. The Sultans of Maguindanao derived their unusual importance from their control of the region's principal entrepot, just inside the northern mouth of the river. The same location served as the rallying point for the large fleets that raided the Spanish Philippines, year after year, under the Sultan's aegis. Ileta shows how Maguindanao declined with the reduction in raiding and trading, while the upper valley prospered on the traffic in slaves taken from the pagan groups. It is difficult to assess the size of a datu's following, which no doubt varied a good deal; in the 1870's, two upper valley datu's, Utu of Buayan and the Sultan of Kabuntalan, were each reported to have several thousand slaves, apart from other followers.²³ However, as Datu Piang explained in an interview early in the American period, such estimates varied according to whether one included the followers of lesser datu's who attached themselves to the more important ones.²⁴

At one level one could regard the Maguindanaon as living in a state of perfect political competition for followers, slaves and resources. And to judge by the accounts of petty feuding and confrontation, this was indeed a tendency within the system; but it was mitigated by certain ideological principles.

The secondary meaning of *datu* was one entitled to rule on account of his descent from datus. Not all such datus would in fact rule, but their *maratabat* gave them something to live up to.²⁵ Thus certain ruling lines were associated with a particular place, called *ing'd*, a title or *grar*, and servile groups called *ndatuan*.²⁶ Commoner

²³Ileta *op. cit.*, p. 35.

²⁴Datu Piang formulated this principle in an early interview with American personnel.

²⁵Like the Mediterranean notion of honour (c.f. John Peristian ed. *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965). *Maratabat* is inherited in varying degree but must also be vindicated by action whenever the occasion arises. The greater the hereditary *maratabat*, the more jealously must it be defended. See also, Mamitua Saber, Mauyag Tamano and Charles A. Warriner, "The Maratabat of the Maranao," *Philippine Sociological Review* 8, nos. 1-2 (1960).

²⁶Unlike the Tausugs and Maranaos, but like some other lowland Philippine groups at first contact (c.f. Frank Lynch: "Trend Report on Studies in Social Stratification and Social Mobility in the Philippines," *East Asian Cultural Studies* 4 (1965), pp. 163-191.) The Maguindanaon recognized a four tier stratification: 1) *datus*; 2) commoners, 3) *ndatuan* or serfs; 4) *baniaga* or chattel slaves. There were also *olipun* or bond slaves whose condition was created by debt, the clearance of which released them—at least in theory. They emanated from, and presumably might return to any one of the four strata. Membership of the four strata was hereditary, but groups acquired their status through a variety of historical or pseudo-historical events. Thus the cadet branch of a datu line might opt for commoner status. Certain servile groups were descendants of Visayan captives and still called *Bisaya*. Others were associated with certain occupa-

groups or *domato* might also be linked to it, either through a traditional agreement or as cadet lines of the one stock.

In the absence of a rule of primogeniture, the succession to a title was a matter for competition. No doubt the datu qualities of the claimants, who might be numerous, given the prevalence of polygyny, were a major consideration. But here again ideological principles reduced the element of conflict. By taking into account the status of the mother as well as the father, it was possible to make fine distinctions of *bansa*.

The ranking system is complex, but it can be summarized by reference to the charter legend of Sarip Kabongsoan. The *Sarip*, which is the local form of the Arabic *sharif*, was the son of an Arab who had married the Sultan of Johore's daughter. Chance brought Kabongsoan to the mouth of the Rio Grande, where he began preaching Islam. He took wives from his converts, thus establishing a local stock that could claim descent from the Prophet Mohammed. The Sultans of Maguindanao claimed descent from a son of Kabongsoan; the Rajahs of Buayan from a daughter, and most of the other Maguindanaon datus claimed membership of one or other of these stocks, and in some instances both. The Maranao datus also claim descent from the Sarip, while more elaborate versions of the legend assert a common origin for all the datus of Brunei, Sulu and Mindanao. Their relative nobility was assessed in terms of the number of links they could trace with the Sarip, and any datu line of consequence kept a written genealogy or *tarsila* indicating these links.²⁷ The Sultans of Maguindanao seem to have been credited with the purest breeding, and reference is made to their light complexions and aquiline features as evidence of their Arab ancestry.

The legend not only provides a charter for the ranking system, and so of political authority; it also presents a model of political articulation through the transmission of nobility in marriage. It describes how a high born stranger marries the daughter of a local chief, founding a line that is far superior in *maratabat* to any of the others, and so entitled to rule. The wife's kin gain from this arrangement a more prestigious line of rulers and connection with the nobility elsewhere. According to the *tarsila*, young datus often followed this strategy, probably after failing to gain the family title. The legend also describes Kabongsoan bestowing his daughter on a Rajah of Buayan, ennobling his descendants, though in a lesser degree since women transmitted less

tions such as potting. The *baniaga* seem mostly to have originated as captives from the pagan groups.

²⁷The term *tarsila* comes from the Arabic *silsilah*, which means a chain or link. Saleeby, *op. cit.*, copied a number of such documents concerning the principal lines of Maguindanao. However, I have transcribed a number of documents relating to other branches of the Buayan line. I have also seen booklets, printed in Arabic, outlining the legendary origin of the Sultans of Sulu, Maguindanao, Maranao and Brunei. For a discussion of the analysis of such documents, see Cesar Adib Majul, "An Analysis of the Genealogy of Sulu", Paper prepared for a Filipino Muslim History and Culture Seminar-Workshop, Department of History, University of the East, Manila, 20. 10.77.

nobility than men. As Mastura has shown, marriages were regularly arranged in the process of alliance formation.²⁸

Such marriages were governed by a complex calculus, for it was on such occasions that the respective parties brought their respective claims to nobility openly. The degree of nobility conferred by the bride, relative to that of the husband, determined the size of the bride price but also the importance of the alliance. Basic to the system was the principle of hypergamy, according to which a woman might marry a man of equal or higher, but not inferior rank. A man, on the other hand, might marry beneath him; indeed an important datu had wives of every degree, including concubines who were slaves. The sons of these unions were to be called "*datu*," but they were not all of equal standing, and probably only a few would be entitled to claim the succession. In the same way, the rank of daughters varied, which was an advantage to their father since he could always find one to bestow on an ally, however low born. Because of her connection with himself, he could claim a high bride price, but because of her mother's status, he could claim she was not marrying beneath her.

The centralizing tendencies displayed by Maguindanaon society at certain points in its history are to be understood in terms of an interplay between economic and political factors, on the one hand, and ideology on the other. It would seem that when material conditions became favourable the hierarchical forms that came with Islam were there to give structure and legitimacy, lending themselves to elaboration as centralization continued. Among the Maranaos, there was no tendency to centralization, although the forms were present, presumably because the material conditions were lacking in their landlocked situation.²⁹

A reading of Maguindanaon history indicates that power and nobility tended to coincide. And while the system no doubt provided loopholes for *post hoc* ennoblement of the powerful, it nevertheless seems that society did focus on the sultanates of Maguindanao, Buayan and, from the eighteenth century, Kabuntalan. At the same time, it is inconceivable that the highest born *datu* was always the bravest; indeed the histories indicate that the title holder was often either a child or an old man, leaving the real power in the hands of a close kinsman of lesser rank. The focus of political organization, then, was not so much the title holder himself as the line to which he belonged.

The existence of a *datu*-category had the effect of identifying those who were in reality powerless and dependent with the powerful. In the same way, commoners could identify with a line of datus by

²⁸For an analysis of political marriages during the dynastic wars of the eighteenth century, see Michael O. Mastura, "The Maguindanao Core Lineage and the Dumatus," *Notre Dame Journal* 7, No. 2 (1977).

²⁹Melvin Mednick, *Encampment of the Lake: the Social Organization of the Moslem-Philippine (Moro) People*, Research Series 5, *Philippine Studies Program* (University of Chicago, 1965).

claiming descent from a cadet line that voluntarily 'gave way' in the succession. For the lower orders the idiom was one of voluntary support. However, in assessing the factor of ideology, it must be remembered that those who were most exploited lived, or came from, outside the boundaries of Maguindanaon society. The followers of a forceful datu, even his slaves, might share in the plunder and captives taken from Christian settlements, or exact tribute from a group of pagans.³⁰ Moreover, they could expect to receive back a portion of the produce they yielded up to him.

The Datus Under Spain

Although Spain did not establish a presence in Cotabato until 1851, she had played a hand in Maguindanaon affairs from the outset. The sultanates were segmentary states, intermittently capable of uniting for offense or defense, but always liable to internal dissension. In conflict, factions readily accepted outside help, even from Holland and Spain.³¹ The problem was, however, to prevent the allies from becoming masters, and it was just such a miscalculation that enabled the Spaniards to occupy the delta in 1861, without a shot being fired. Securing the upper valley was a less easy matter, requiring a series of campaigns over the next twenty-five years. Once again Spain exploited internal divisions, and as she demonstrated her superiority in the field, more and more datus joined her camp. But when the last of her enemies had made his submission, she was left with allies whom she could scarcely control, and whose loyalty was very much in doubt. She had brought down the old political order, but a new style of datu had emerged in place of the old.

Spain's first target was the Sultan of Maguindanao. Having reduced him to penury by naval blockade, she set about determining the succession by exploiting dynastic rivalries. When the old sultan, Kudarat II, died in 1857—under suspicious circumstances, so it is said—his nominee, Makakwa, succeeded. He it was who invited them into the delta, presumably to shore up his own insecure position. In doing so he alienated what remained of his support, becoming largely dependent on the pension Spain allowed him. Spain may have intended to use the sultan as an instrument of control, but she succeeded only in neutralizing him. He and his successors spent much of their time in the old tributary of Sibugay, in Zamboanga del Sur, avoiding involvement in the upheavals along the river.

Meanwhile in the upper valley, a powerful alliance was forming around Utu, high born datu of the Rajah Buayan line. However,

³⁰The following judgment of Datu Utu could in fact be applied in greater or lesser degree to any datu. "In effect his natural talent, his prestige, his riches, his supporters and above all his fiery despotism, had created around him a certain air of glory which made him like a feared idol or the compelled leader of whatever action took place in the basin of the Rio-Grande." Pablo Pastells, "Memoria de R.P. Pablo Pastells," *Cartas de los Padres de la Compania de Jesus de la Mision de Filipinas*, 9 (Manila: 1877-1895) p. 615. Translated by Iletto, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

³¹Tan *op. cit.*, pp. 132-133. Majul 1973 *op. cit.*, *passim*.

resistance to the Spaniards could only be sustained at the cost of severe strain: manpower losses were unprecedentedly heavy; pagan groups suffered repeated raids for slaves, to be traded for guns; ties of kinship and affinity were stretched to breaking point. Utu's unique reputation in the folk memory for cruelty and caprice was no doubt earned through his use of terror to shore up the crumbling alliance.³²

By 1888, Spain had broken the alliance, but did not attempt to remove Utu from his place in the upper valley. In 1890, however, he came down river to spend his last years under Spanish protection. According to tradition, he woke one morning to find that his followers had all deserted during the night, seeking the protection of his one time lieutenant, Datu Piang.³³ Piang was a Chinese mestizo with no claim to nobility, but he nevertheless replaced Utu as the most powerful datu in the upper valley, forming an alliance that included Utu's nephew, Ali, and several other members of the Rajah Buayan house. He does not share Utu's reputation for cruelty, but he was no less ruthless in dealing with his enemies.³⁴

Piang's alliance was not subjected to the strain of a war with Spain, however. Indeed, he declared himself her friend, and Saleeby supposed that his overthrow of Utu was effected with the approval of Spain. He certainly enriched himself by supplying food to the up-river garrison at Reina Regente, but also established useful ties with Chinese traders at the river mouth. Saleeby reported that "at the time of the Spanish evacuation he [Piang] had become the richest Moro in Mindanao and the most influential chief of the island."³⁵

Despite her superior firepower, Spain could scarcely have defeated Utu without Maguindanaon help. She needed not only additional manpower, but local knowledge, particularly of how to win over Utu's restive supporters. The Sultan and his kinsfolk either could not or would not intervene, but others came forward, most notably Datu Ayunan.³⁶ Ayunan seems to have been the first of his line to assume political importance but he does not seem to have been of the high nobility. His base, a point of minor strategic importance some twelve miles up-river, became the front line when the war with Utu began; but instead of fleeing he chose to stay, becoming the leader of a powerful alliance. He engineered a number of

³²For a general discussion of the kind of conditions under which Utu was operating, see E.V. Walter, *Terror and Resistance: a Study of Political Violence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

³³Regarding Piang's early career and overthrow of Utu, see Pablo Pastells, *Mision de la Compania de Jesus de Filipinas en Siglo XIX* (Barcelona, 1916-1917) Vol. III pp. 215; 262. (See also Iletto *op. cit.*, p. 63). According to this account Piang and others broke with Utu following a dispute over arms. According to oral tradition, which is still current, Utu's followers deserted him when he refused to open his granaries during a time of famine. See Captain C. Mortera, "The career of Bai Bagongan of Buluan, Cotabato", Ms. (1934) in *Hayden Papers op. cit.*

³⁴*Reports of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War*, 9 (1902) p. 481; also Appendix 12, p. 578.

³⁵Najeeb Saleeby, *The History of Sulu* (Manila 1908), p. 262.

³⁶Iletto *op. cit.*, pp. 61-3.

defections from Utu's ranks, and may have been behind the revolt of Piang, who had become his son-in-law. Spain viewed his aggrandizement with unease, and while conferring on him the title *gobernador-cillo*, took steps to curtail his influence once Utu had been defeated. He died in 1898, on the eve of the Spanish withdrawal, passing his title on to his brother Balabaran.

When the Spaniards withdrew at the beginning of 1899 they left Cotabato under a triumvirate, composed of Datu Piang, representing the Maguindanaon, Ramon Vilo, representing the 600 Christian Filipinos now living in the delta, and another, representing the Chinese trading community.³⁷ Within a few months the men of Piang and Ali had invaded the lower valley, seizing and later killing Vilo. The Chinese remained under Piang's protection, but the Filipinos were subject to various outrages, and several datos, unfriendly to Piang, were forced to flee. Among these was Balabaran, who suggested that Piang had taken over what remained of his brother Ayunan's old alliance. In any case, when American troops arrived at the end of the year, the up-river datos promptly withdrew, offering their services to the new regime.

Although the Spaniards maintained sizeable garrisons on the coast and smaller establishments in the interior, they made little attempt to administer the population outside the small delta settlements at Tamantaca and Cotabato. Pursuing a 'policy of attraction', they avoided interference in religious practices or the datos' rights over their followers. They formally abolished slavery, and a Jesuit establishment offered sanctuary to Utu's runaway slaves, but many datos still had theirs when the Americans arrived. In the lower valley even the high born had dwindled into local dignitaries, and a number were seeking escape in opium and gambling. Political marriages were still contracted, but within a narrow span. In the hinterland, however, political alliances were still important, and reinforced by marriage, though the ranking system was already in disarray.

The Datus under the United States

The Maguindanaon offered only one serious challenge to American rule, under the leadership of Datu Ali in 1903.³⁸ Ali was defeated and killed in the following year. Thereafter Cotabato was the most peaceable of the Moro provinces, with only occasional and localized outbreaks of disorder. Continuing the Spanish 'policy of attraction', the Americans left the datos as they were, making friends out of former enemies.³⁹ But the end of fighting meant the end of alliances. The way to prosperity was now through cultivating the favour of the

³⁷R.P.C. 9 (1902) pp. 522-4.

³⁸Gowing *op. cit.* pp. 151-4; Tan *op. cit.*, pp. 35-38.

³⁹This is particularly apparent in the case of Datu Alamada, who carried on a local resistance in the interior up to 1913, and Datu Ampatuan who briefly defied the regime in the same year. (Tan *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38; 62-148). Both leaders subsequently became part of the governmental system.

administration, or through participating in the development of the province as a major producer of rice and corn.

Ali mounted a brave resistance to the Americans, which took guerilla form after his defeat in a major encounter. But there was no question of his becoming another Utu. Piang, the real power in the upper valley, refused to support him, and indeed supplied the Americans with intelligence as to his whereabouts. It may also be true, as tradition says, that he simultaneously warned Ali to move on, and he would surely have given support had the Americans shown signs of weakening. But in the event Ali's death saw him on the winning side and the authorities in his debt.

Piang had impressed the Americans from the outset. In 1902, the following report was forwarded to the Philippine Commission:

He is very shrewd, has brains and is self made, being now quite wealthy and a power in the valley, as he controls all of Datu Ali's influence over the tribes and adds to this his own brain. He is the only prominent Moro who seems to appreciate what the American invasion means and the business opportunities it brings with it. The Chinese blood in him makes him a shrewd businessman, and he has accumulated quite a fortune and is daily adding to it. He practically controls all the business of Cotabato, especially exports, through his Chinese agents in that place; has complete control of the Moro productions, and working with the Chinese merchants makes it practically impossible for a white firm to enter into business in the Rio Grande Valley, even with much capital behind them.⁴⁰

At an interview, he [Piang] guessed that he might have 15,000 people, but could not be sure because the followers of the up-river datu were all his followers since their masters were his friends.⁴¹ Another military observer reported that:

... the control of Piang over his people is absolute and complete. All know the refusal to work or fetch materials as ordered would have resulted in a swift and sure chastisement which might be limited to a flogging with rattan, but possibly would not stop short of beheading.⁴²

Although the Americans at various times declared their determination to break the hold of the datu, Piang retained much of his power to the end. In 1926, when he was in his late seventies, an American observer described him in the following terms:

In late years younger datu have striven to displace him, but although no longer supreme, he is still easily first in the valley. . . . His slaves still surround him, his word is still law, and it is said, although probably could not be proved, that in accordance with the old Maguindano code he still has recalcitrants of certain sorts cast to the crocodiles. I know that he recently put an influential datu on the wood pile for two months for crossing him. Also the old fox has accumulated much wealth during the three or four decades of his power: 42,000 coconut trees (they are good for \$1 per tree each year) thousands of carabao, thousands of hectares of rice, land, horses, cattle, build-

⁴⁰R.P.C. 9 (1902) p. 528.

⁴¹Interview with Datu Piang R.P.C. 8 (1901) p. 105.

⁴²General G. Davis, "Notes on the Government of the Country Inhabited by non-Christians in Mindanao and the Neighbouring Islands", Ms. (1902) in *Dean Worcester Collection*, (University of Michigan Library), p. 256.

ings, boats, and what not—to say nothing of the tithe paid him by his loyal subjects. He is also reputed to have a huge hoard of gold coins. . . .⁴³

What the observer said for Piang went for other datos in lesser degree. He had retained his slaves and followers, his hold over land and those who cultivated it, and his control of both force and legal sanctions.

At the outset it looked as though the American administration would break the power of the datos; instead it came to rely on them. Cotabato's quiescence, compared with the other Moro provinces, was largely due to the influence of Piang and his associates.⁴⁴ Moreover, he was ever responsive to American programs.⁴⁵ He led the way in developing commercial agriculture. He supported modern education to the extent of sending his own sons to study in Manila, one becoming an agriculturist, another an educationist, and a third the first Muslim attorney. He gave his backing to settlement of immigrants from the Visayas, and in the face of nationalist opposition, to a proposal for massive American investment in Mindanao. The pro-Americanism of Piang and the other datos, and their hostility to Philippine nationalism also proved an asset in the earlier years, though something of an embarrassment later, when independence had become a firm prospect.

The datos, for their part, found themselves well placed to take advantage of the economic and political changes that were taking place. In the economic sphere this meant intensifying the production of rice and corn. The Maguindanaon had, of course, long lived by commerce; and while raiding and toll-taking might have been more important sources of wealth at certain periods, agricultural products had always been more important, particularly in the upper valley. With raiding suppressed and the toll posts increasingly by-passed by the new overland routes, and with the demand for forest products declining, they later became of prime importance. The datos' task was to adapt their traditional rights over land and people to meet modern conditions.

Spain's policy had been to choke off Maguindanaon commerce with other countries, but not to stop trade as such. Iletto notes that the need of her establishments for supplies stimulated local trade, and that rice and high quality cacao found their way from the upper valley to Manila and Sulu, through Chinese intermediaries.⁴⁶ In 1901, the Americans found some 204 Chinese in the town of Cotabato, mainly engaged in the sale of rice, wax, coffee, rubber and guttapercha, which last they sent to Singapore.⁴⁷ They estimated the aggregate of exports at about \$150,000 Mexican. The bulk of these products came from the

⁴³Letter, J.R. Hayden to Dr. Barr, 12-9. 1926, *Hayden Papers op. cit.*

⁴⁴See Thomas, *op. cit.* p. 103; Tan *op. cit.*, p. 148.

⁴⁵See, for example, the report on Abdullah Piang's death in the *Philippine Herald*, 10. 12. 1933. Thomas (*op. cit.*, p. 129) notes Piang's support for American investment, as proposed by Congressman Bacon in 1926.

⁴⁶Iletto *op. cit.*, p. 23.

⁴⁷*R.P.C.* 8 (1901) p. 111.

upper valley, and so were under the control of Datu Piang, who also had close ties with the Chinese traders. He, however, seemed to be the only datu to engage in commerce, the rest confining themselves to primary production.

Economic statistics occur irregularly. In 1908, the Governor of Moro province reported the establishment of saw and rice mills, and exports to the value of ₱21,246.50.⁴⁸ By 1919, the figure had reached ₱760,428, exceeding imports by more than ₱200,000.⁴⁹ Rice had become the most important item, with copra coming second and corn third. In the years that followed, the area under rice increased from 1,864 ha. in 1920 to 24,630 ha. in 1935.⁵⁰

In this rapid development of agriculture, Cotabato's problem was not land but people. The population had always been sparse, particularly in the south of the province, and had been further reduced by the cholera epidemic of 1902. It may have been on this account that the datus were prepared to accept Christian immigrants, seeing them as potential followers and payers of tribute. Meanwhile their relations with their Maguindanaon followers underwent certain changes.

The description of Piang's domain in 1926, quoted earlier, suggests that at least some datus kept their slaves, although the institution had been abolished and slaving outlawed. In the long run, however, slaves became servants, bodyguards, tenants or labourers, without their relations with their masters changing a great deal. Muslim farmers, like the Christians, needed protection from the depredations of bandits and cattle-rustlers, and this dependence gave the foundation of need to traditional loyalty.

Given the abundance of land and the critical importance of having followers to occupy it, little thought was given to the drawing of boundaries or the establishment of claims—except where ancestral graves were situated (*pusaka* land). The Americans began a cadastral survey, and introduced procedures for registering claims, but these lagged far behind the taking up of land, and widened the scope for land grabbing. Maguindanao farmers who put faith on their traditional rights, sometimes found that their land had been registered by Christian immigrants, or even their own datus.⁵¹ A new type of tenant appeared, paying a third of his crop to the owner, although the rate of tenancy remained relatively low, even in 1971.⁵²

⁴⁸*Annual Report of the Governor of Moro Province. For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1908* (Zamboanga, 1908).

⁴⁹*Reports of the Governor-General of the Philippines Islands to the Secretary of War*, (Washington, 1909) p. 81.

⁵⁰P.J. Webster, "Mindanao and Sulu Archipelago: Their Natural Resources and Opportunities for Development," *Bureau of Agriculture Bulletins*, 38. (Manila 1920) p. 41. *Statistical Bulletin of the Philippine Islands*, 1935.

⁵¹For an account of agrarian conditions in Cotabato during the American period, see Peltzer *op. cit.*, pp. 127-159.

⁵²In 1939, the date of the earliest estimate, 23% of farms were operated by tenants; in 1960 the percentage of a very much larger total was 26%. It is

While the mass of Maguindanao farmers remained where they were, a number, as in the old days, followed young datos to set up new settlements, either taking up virgin lands or displacing pagan *kaingeros*. In later years these were to provide the springboards for a number of political careers.

The Americans' policy of attraction entailed some recognition of Moro customary and religious laws. This arose from the difficulty in getting Moslems to bring their cases to court rather than to the datos, and also in separating religious from secular cases.⁵³ There is little data on this topic from Cotabato, but it is suggestive that as late as the 1970's, cases of murder were being settled by datos informally rather than in the courts. However, a circular from Governor Guttierrez, dated 1935 reveals further complexities.⁵⁴ He complained that in certain districts, provincial and municipal officials were adjudicating "so-called religious cases", appropriating the fines imposed and making prisoners work for their private benefit. An examination of the names of municipal presidents and other officials indicates that the datos monopolized these positions.

The American authorities were slow to give Muslims responsible political office; no Maguindanaon served as provincial governor until the Japanese occupation, though there was usually one on the provincial board. Piang was for some years a member of the national legislature, but all that most datos could hope for was a municipal district presidency, an office carrying less power and reward than a full municipal presidency and a great deal less than a mayor under the Republic. Nevertheless, these administrative divisions placed a limit on the dominance of figures such as Piang by reserving office for local datos.

Until the 1930's all offices were appointive, so that advancement depended on the favour of the governor rather than ability to rally support. As long as he lived, Piang had first call on it, but he died in 1933 and his eldest son Abdullah, who had taken his place in the National Assembly, died a few months later. There were four other sons, well qualified in terms of education to succeed, but they now had to compete with Sinsuat, son of Balabaran, who had stood second to Piang for some years. He had already had some experience of national affairs when he was appointed senator in 1935.⁵⁵ Then in the first election for the National Assembly in 1936, he defeated Attorney Menandang Piang by 312 votes to 128. Ugalingan Piang regained the seat in the next election, when there was a franchise of more than 20,000 votes.⁵⁶ With this election Maguindanaon politics once again

doubtful whether these estimates took into account traditional relationships through which a datu received a percentage of the farmer's crop. *Philippine Statistics: 1969 Yearbook*.

⁵³Gowing, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-192. Thomas, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-70.

⁵⁴Provincial Circular, 98. (15.1.35). *Hayden Papers, op. cit.*

⁵⁵*Directorio Oficial de la Asamblea Nacional* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1938) pp. 143-144.

⁵⁶*Directorio*. (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1940) pp. 149-150.

became a matter of large-scale alliance formation, though the contest did not begin in earnest until after the Japanese occupation.

The American records have surprisingly little to say about Sinsuat Balabaran.⁵⁷ Born in 1864, he had grown up during the ascendancy of his father's brother Ayunan. His father, Balabaran, succeeded to the title of *gobnadorcillo* on the eve of the Spanish withdrawal, and also proclaimed himself sultan, but evidently lacked Ayunan's political strength for he was forced to flee Taviran for the delta in 1899 and again in 1901, for fear of Piang's men. A subsequent marriage between Sinsuat and the daughter of the Sultan of Kabuntalan suggests a recovery, but Balabaran died soon after and the importance of such alliances declined with the end of fighting. Later, Sinsuat himself retired to the family bailiwick, where he was appointed Municipal President. Between 1923 and 1931, he served as special adviser to Governor Guttierrez, having already represented Mindanao and Sulu in the negotiation of the Jones Act of 1916. Throughout this period he must have been consolidating and extending his political base, for in a 'Who's who among the Datus', dated 1927, he is described as "controlling territory from Tumbao to the southern mouth of the river, and having great influence over the Tiruray in the adjacent mountains."⁵⁸ Evidently he was also acquiring large tracts of land, worked by tenants, while his many brothers and sons were pushing back the frontier, establishing themselves along the coast and even in the growing town of Cotabato. Sinsuat's own move to the outskirts of town reflects his increasing rapport with the Governor and other Christian settlers, which was later to place the mayorship under family control.

Also of note was Ampatuan, who, being of Arab descent, was entitled *Sarip* and accorded equal status with the descendants of Kabongsoan.⁵⁹ A former lieutenant of Datu Ali, he had been won over by Piang, whom he succeeded on the Provincial Board in 1917. He is described as controlling 1,500 families in the upper valley.⁶⁰

Compared with these three, the representatives of the royal houses were at best local notables. A few, like Datu Dilangalen, retained sizeable followings. Others were left with little but their nobility. There was still a sultan in Kabuntalan, but no one claimed the title in the upper valley. Mastura, son of Kuderat II, became *Sultan sa Maguindanao* as a very old man in 1926, but when he died a few years later, the title was claimed by Ismail of the Sibugay line over the protests of the Cotabato line.

⁵⁷Thus, Bureau of Insular Affairs Chief, Frank McIntyre, wrote, "...our record of Datu Sinsuat and my memory are not so detailed." Memorandum of 16.8.26, *Bureau of Insular Affairs*, U.S. National Archives, 5828/42.

⁵⁸Major Carter, "Who's Who Among the Datus" Ms. (1927) *Bureau of Insular Affairs*, U.S. National Archives, 5075-147.

⁵⁹According to local sources, Ampatuan's great grandfather was an Arab immigrant. However, neither he nor the intervening descendants are mentioned in the Spanish records. From this, it may be concluded that Sarip Ampatuan was the first to assume political importance.

⁶⁰Major Carter, *op. cit.*

Piang and Sinsuat also saw to it that some of their sons took advantage of the American education program. Menandang Piang became the first Maguindanaon attorney, closely followed by Duma Sinsuat and Salipada Pendatun. The last was the orphaned son of the upper valley *Sultan sa Barongis*, but owed his advancement to the patronage of an American teacher, Edward Kuder. Some of the old nobility also sent sons to school, but many rejected education as covert Christianization—as indeed it had been under the Spanish regime. The mass of the population likewise remained illiterate and ignorant of English, so that they were dependent on their leaders in any dealings with the government.

The Japanese Occupation and After

The Japanese period is poorly documented, but the oral record is relatively fresh.⁶¹ In many respects it recreated the conditions existing during the late Spanish and early American periods, with the invaders controlling the delta and a few centers up-river, and obtaining the cooperation of the datos thereabouts. In the hinterland, Maguindanaon guerilla groups were in control, nominally under American military direction, but in practice independent of it and of each other for much of the time. Salipada Pendatun, Gumbay Piang, Luminog Mangilen and Mantil Dilangalen were the principal figures, emerging as political leaders in the liberation period. However, none of the collaborators suffered any lasting penalty.

One important consequence of the Japanese period was the release of large quantities of arms, which were never taken in after the war, and the formation of private armies. These became a major factor in the turbulent electoral politics of the Republic. It is not entirely fanciful to see this as a revival of traditional political forms; however, just as outside connections were important in the proto-colonial period, so connections with one or other national party were important under the Republic. Success depended on a combination of high level connections in Manila and widely ramifying alliances in the provinces. These alliances increasingly included Christian immigrants, who were soon to outnumber the Maguindanaon. It is a tribute to the skill and tenacity of the Maguindanaon politicians that they were able to keep hold of the principal positions until 1971.

Politics under the Republic proved a more difficult and costly business than it had been under the Americans, though the rewards were also greater. A number of notable families were eclipsed, most notably the Piangs, with the death of Congressman Gumbay in 1949. They retained control of their home municipality, but it was several

⁶¹Edward Haggerty describes a brief visit to Cotabato in his *Guerilla Padre in Mindanao* (New York and Toronto: Longmans Green and Co., 1946.) A mimeographed newspaper, *Mount Peris Echo*, under the editorship of Gumbay Piang, has yet to be traced. Ralph Thomas has summarized the Japanese sources in "Asia for the Asiatics?" Muslim Filipino Responses to Japanese Occupation and Propaganda during World War II. *Dansalan Research Center Occasional Papers*, No. 7, May 1977. Also in *Asian Forum* (July-September, 1972).

times subdivided to make room for expansive neighbours such as the Ampatuan family.

Salipada Pendatun remained Cotabato's principal representative in Manila up to the suspension of parliamentary government in 1972, first as senator, later as congressman. This removed him increasingly from provincial affairs, but his interests were protected by his brother-in-law, the resistance veteran Datu Ugtog Matalam, who held the governorship. Their control was repeatedly challenged, by the Sinsuats and Ampatuans, and various Christian aspirants. The Sinsuats gained the congressional position only once, in 1949, narrowly losing it in 1969. However, they have always retained their hold on their home municipality, which was recently subdivided, and only lost the predominantly Christian Cotabato City in 1968.

In 1978, Datu Blah Sinsuat was among those elected to the new national body, or the *Interim Batasang Pambansa*. The record of this family is particularly remarkable, running as it does from the beginning of the Spanish period through to the present. However, it is not unparalleled. For example, an appointed governor of one of the new provinces into which Cotabato has been divided was the great grandson of Sultan Mastura.

New Datus for Old

The Spanish occupation of the delta in 1861 presented the Maguindanaon datus with the critical choice between defiance and compliance. Those who chose defiance were eventually broken, but they remained a threat long enough for the complaint to make themselves indispensable to the colonial regime, and so retain a fair measure of autonomy. With the American take-over the sequence was quickly repeated, after which they settled down to converting their domains into agricultural estates. As effective controllers of the Muslim masses they were duly appointed to local government, and having acquired the necessary connections, moved in due course into the national arena.

However, the datus could not maintain a complete hegemony in the rapidly developing regional economy. Increasingly they found themselves part of a composite elite, in which they enjoyed a near-monopoly of political office and controlled wide lands, but left commerce to the Chinese and public administration to Christian Filipinos. Despite the Piangs' example, few established outside connections necessary to commercial enterprises, or the educational qualifications for entry into the upper levels of the public service. Their strength lay in their monopoly of access to the Muslim masses.

The datus' relation to the masses was now very different from what it used to be. With an end to raiding and reduction in toll and tribute taking, they had fewer rewards for their followers. Such patronage as they could dispense took the form of access to land and the occasional use of influence with the authorities. The nature of their

legitimacy had also changed. If Spain had failed to destroy datuism, it had nevertheless, destroyed the traditional order. Whether compliant like the Sultans of Maguindanao, or defiant like the Rajahs of Buayan, the high nobility had been the principal casualties of the period. They survived as dignitaries, perpetuating their rank through appropriate marriages, but without even the semblance of political authority outside their immediate domains. Power had passed to a new style of datu.

The permanent separation of power and rank was made clear in 1902, when Datu Utu's death made a widow of the high born Raja Putri, daughter of Sultan Kuderat II. The American authorities were given to understand that she would marry either Datu Ali or Datu Piang, but the former was not of equal rank while the latter was not of the nobility at all.⁶² Rather than break the rule of hypergamy, she married the current Sultan of Maguindanao, Mangigin, who was of appropriate rank but a political cipher. There were occasional marriages between the old and new datus, but this was no longer a basis for alliance, and the rising generation were more likely to take Christian wives.

Earlier, it was suggested that *datu* had "ruler" as a primary meaning and, "descendant of rulers" as a secondary meaning. The latter, however, provided the basic principle for a notional order that bore some resemblance to reality before colonial rule. Spain destroyed that order and created a new crop of datus who formed part of the colonial order. In fact their place in that order, between the infidel invader and the Muslim masses, was profoundly ambiguous. Seen from above, they mediated the policies of the colonial regime; viewed from below, they provided a defense against alien forces. Thus situated they prospered and their power became entrenched. The datus of the Spanish period had created their own *maratabat*; by the end of the American period they were once again inheriting it, not unlike the old datus, but also not unlike the elite families of the Christian Philippines.

⁶²R.P.C. 9 (1902) p. 528. The rumour that Datu Utu was the real father of Piang is not without significance in this respect.

LEONARD WOOD: HIS FIRST YEAR
AS GOVERNOR GENERAL
1921-1922 *

MICHAEL ONORATO

FORTY-FIVE YEARS AGO THIS OCTOBER 15, LEONARD WOOD became the seventh American governor general of the Philippine Islands. At the insistence of President Harding, as well as many Filipino and American leaders, he agreed to accept the post for one year.¹ In that year, it was expected that he would clean up the debris left by the "New Era" of Francis Burton Harrison. He would stay a year and then return home to a position at the University of Pennsylvania. As provost of that great university, he would have ample opportunity to repair his political fortunes. Yet, he was to remain in the Philippines for six long years.

His first year has been characterized as one of harmony and cooperation. But this was hardly true. Leonard Wood would find it impossible to get the government out of business. He would also find himself enmeshed in the backwash of the Quezon-Osmeña rift. Still, in comparison to what had been anticipated by many Americans and Filipinos, that first year was very calm. Compared to the years that followed the cabinet crisis of 1923, that first year was very harmonious.²

I

Leonard Wood was under no illusion as to any supposed honor his government bestowed upon him when it urged him to be governor general. He was aware that he was jeopardizing his reputation by becoming chief executive of the Philippines so soon after the publication of the Wood-Forbes Report. Earlier in the year, he had told Resident Commissioner Jaime C. de Veyra that the Filipino people would have every right to be angry with any commission that scrutinized them. Moreover, he pointed out that the next governor general would find things difficult after the publication of a commission's report. Yet, Wood had always put service to his country above personal interests.³

* The research was made possible with the support of a grant from the American Philosophical Society in 1964.

¹ It was with even greater reluctance that Wood headed the joint mission with W. Cameron Forbes. See M. Onorato, "The Wood-Forbes Mission," *Philippine Historical Bulletin*, VIII (March, 1964), 1-19.

² For an analysis of the Cabinet Crisis, see M. Onorato, "Governor General Leonard Wood, Manuel L. Quezon, and the Cabinet Crisis of July 17, 1923," in a forthcoming Quezon number of the *Philippine Historical Bulletin*.

³ Leonard Wood to Albert R. Brunner, Personal, June 30, 1922, *Papers of Leonard Wood* (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.) Box 159; Jaime C. de Veyra to Osmeña, Strictly Confidential cable, February 19, 1921, *Papers of Manuel Luis Quezon* (Quezoniana Collection, National Library, Manila); Victor G. Heiser, *An American Doctor's Odyssey* (Seventeenth imp.; New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1937), 419f.

The Filipino leaders, therefore, accepted Wood with mixed emotions. They were curious and anxious, especially in the light of his Report.⁴ His message to the Legislature, however, put them at ease. His willingness to work with the leaders prompted the *Philippines Herald* (October 18, 1921) to say

It is clear, therefore, that the new chief executive deserves nothing but the loyal support of all because he has nothing but the interest of all in his program of government.

The Legislature was quick to pass a resolution of support. As Rafael Palma put it to ex-Governor Harrison in 1924, the leadership was willing to support Wood in the hope that he would further Filipino autonomy.⁵

Some of the Americans in the Philippines felt that Wood had remained behind to reverse the course set by the Harrison administration. They were rudely jolted by his refusal to play their game.⁶ Moreover, his decision to retain the Council of State, as well as those men who had served in Harrison's cabinet, infuriated many Americans. In fact, by the time of the cabinet crisis, Wood had lost the respect of most of the American community. They believed that he had knuckled under to Quezon and Osmeña.⁷

II

On September 19, 1921, Secretary of War John W. Weeks instructed Wood to remove the Philippine government from the businesses that it had acquired during the "New Era." He was to do this quickly but with little loss to the government. In the event that he could not negotiate the immediate sale of those enterprises, he was to see that the government's investment was safeguarded by efficient and competent management.⁸

In March 1922, the Board of Control which was composed of the Governor General, Osmeña and Quezon, decided that the Manila Railroad should be placed under private management. The railroad was to be leased to the J. G. White Company (New York) for a seven per cent return based on the net income. Moreover, the proposed lease had safeguards which were designed to protect the people from exploitation. But Quezon and Osmeña soon found fault with the plan. With an eye on the general election in June, they were

⁴ Gregorio F. Zaide, *The Philippines Since the British Invasion* (Manila: Philippine Education Co., 1949), 259; Maximo M. Kalaw, "The Political Problems That Confront Governor-General Wood," *Philippines Herald* (Manila), October 19, 1921, 4.

⁵ Palma to Harrison, April 24, 1924, *Papers of Francis Burton Harrison* (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.)

⁶ Walter Wilgus, "Cleaning up the Philippines," *Review of Reviews*, 76 (August, 1927), 149.

⁷ Colin MacRae Hoskins to Harrison, February 17, 1922, James Ross to Harrison, March 3, 1923, Ernest Westerhouse to Harrison, July 4, 1923, *Harrison Papers*; Camilo Osias, "A Year of Governor Wood's Administration," in Quezon and Osias, *Governor-General Wood and the Filipino Cause* (Manila: Manila Book Co., 1924), 83. Wood, in fact, believed that the Council of State served as a link between the legislative and executive branches of government. See Wood to Secretary of War Weeks, November 1, 1922, *Wood Papers*, Box 158.

⁸ Weeks to Wood, September 19, 1921, *Wood Papers*, Box 158. For a Filipino scholar's view of Woods efforts to comply with Week's directive, see Jose P. Apostol, *The Economic Policy of the Philippine Government: Ownership and Operation of Business* (Manila: University of the Philippines, 1927), 93-101.

worried over possible political repercussions. In an effort to save them from any embarrassment, Wood suggested that the Board of Control permit the railroad's Board of Directors to appoint a manager which could be either an individual or a corporation.⁹ But when they rejected this suggestion, Wood left it to them to decide what they would do with the MRR.¹⁰ As a result, the railroad was never leased nor sold.

At the same time he was discussing the future of the MRR, Wood was looking at the Philippine National Bank. On April 29, the Board of Control agreed that the PNB should liquidate its holdings as quickly as possible. There were to be no further loans to sugar centrals unless money was needed to facilitate the shipment of crops. The Bank was not to be permitted to risk its depositors' funds in the form of long-term, non-liquid loans. The PNB was to be converted to an agricultural bank as soon as it was feasible.¹¹

The general manager of the PNB, E. W. Wilson, had other ideas. Along with many Filipinos, he had become convinced that his bank had a definite banking role to play in the development of the Philippines.¹² Finally, the Board of Control, together with the Bank's Board of Directors, called for his resignation because of his refusal to follow their directives.¹³ Yet, the fight that Wilson and others had put up, together with the refusal of Osmeña and Quezon to stand by their earlier decision, meant that the PNB was saved. In May 1923, Wood informed Washington that the Bank would remain a regular commercial institution. It would be administered, however, along more conservative and safe lines.¹⁴

During 1922, Wood suggested the sale of several sugar centrals that owed the PNB some \$18,500,000 in unpaid loans. In February 1923, Salvador Laguda, Secretary of Commerce and Communications, suggested—with Quezon's backing—that the government sell only those centrals still hopelessly in debt. Thus, some protection would be afforded those centrals which might otherwise have been forced to compete with the marginal bank-supported sugar centrals. However, at the last moment, Quezon decided against the sales and Wood, once again, acquiesced.¹⁵

⁹ March 10, 12, April 8, 1922, *Wood Diary*, Box 16.

¹⁰ May 9, 1922, *Wood Diary*, Box 16. According to the general manager of the Philippine National Bank, Osmeña and Quezon kept dodging the issue of the railroad whenever Wood tried to bring the matter to their attention. See E. W. Wilson to Harrison, Personal and Confidential, July 14, 1922, *Harrison Papers*.

¹¹ Wood to E. W. Wilson, April 29, 1922, *Wood Diary*, Box 16.

¹² May 16, December 13, 1922, *Wood Diary*, Boxes 16, 17; Wood to Weeks, August 31, 1922, *ibid.*, Box 17.

¹³ January 12, March 28, April 6, 1923, *Wood Diary*, Box 18. An interesting facet of Wilson's stewardship of the PNB is the fact that the Filipino leadership turned on him despite his efforts to save the Bank from closure. See Wilson to Harrison, May 20, 1924, *Harrison Papers*, Box 47. After the cabinet crisis, E. W. Wilson was redeemed—he became an outstanding American banker. See Alfredo Samson, "Too much 'Government by Army Officers' caused the Break," *Philippine Press Bulletin*, V (August, 1923), 2. When he resigned from the Bank, his resignation hardly caused a ripple in the Manila press. This was, no doubt, because the politicians wanted him, an American, out of the Bank.

¹⁴ Wood to General Frank McIntyre, cable, May 19, 1923, *Wood Cablegram Book*, Box 189.

¹⁵ January 20, 1923, *Wood Diary*, Box 18; Apostol, 97.

Despite his inability to carry out the instructions of Secretary Weeks, Wood did everything to get honest and competent management for the government businesses. Because of his determination to keep politics out of the administration of the government enterprises, the PNB and MRR, together with several of the other businesses, began to show some profit before Wood's death.¹⁶

III

In spite of the several setbacks he sustained, Wood was satisfied with the overall cooperation given him by the leaders during his first year in office. While the Quezon-Osmeña rift caused some of the government's plans to be set aside, he was still pleased with the progress made.¹⁷

During that first year, his request for government economy resulted in the budget being reduced from \$52,000,000 to \$37,500,000. This was done without any curtailment of public works, school construction or public health services. At the Philippine government's urgent request, the United States Congress permitted a further increase in the debt limit of the Philippine Islands. This was the second time in two years that Congress raised the limit of indebtedness.¹⁸ As a result of these bond issues, the peso slowly moved back to par. This caused Camilo Osias to write:

One of the greatest services for which Governor Wood must be given unstinted praise is his determination to stabilize credit... This is a national problem which merits the backing of every patriotic man and, making allowances for honest differences of opinion, Governor Wood should be given active support in this to the very last day of his service in the Philippines whenever that day will be.¹⁹

By June 1923, the Legal Reserve Fund of the government was restored. There was now gold behind the peso. Economy was the watchword that first year. Wood was satisfied with the confidence placed in the government by the people and their leaders, especially since his administration was forced to increase the national debt.²⁰

The successes of that first year did not revolve only about fiscal matters. Rinderpest—the dread cattle disease—was curbed. The courts regained the confidence of the people. Efficiency, honesty and competence were restored to the insular government. Public health became a matter of serious concern to the legislators. At the behest of Governor General Wood, who had been

¹⁶ Raymond L. Buell, "Philippine Independence," *Foreign Policy Association Information Service*, VI (April 30, 1930), 66.

¹⁷ Wood to Guy Murchie, September 20, 1922, Wood to Elihu Root, November 11, 1922, *Wood Papers*, Boxes 160, 162.

¹⁸ For the congressional debate relative to increasing the debt limit, see *Congressional Record*, 62, pt. 6 (May 5, 1922), 6408, 6418-6421, 6423.

¹⁹ Osias, pp. 87-88. As Osias wrote his article, it was believed that Wood's departure for the States was imminent. Because of the praise he gave Wood, Osias was sharply criticized. See Osias to Harrison, April 12, 1923, *Harrison Papers*.

²⁰ Wood to Brunner, May 12, 1922, *Wood Papers*; Wood to Brunner, Personal, June 30, 1922, *loc. cit.*; Wood to Root, November 11, 1922, *loc. cit.*; *Philippines Herald* (Manila), June 10, 1923, 1.

a doctor, the first national child welfare congress was held in December 1921.²¹

The leper colony at Culion came under the sympathetic eye of Leonard Wood. At his request, the Legislature appropriated \$500,000 for treatment and research at Culion. In September 1922, he wrote that his efforts for the lepers were worth all the anxiety and loneliness he endured since taking office.²²

IV

His efforts to sell the government businesses were not the only instances where Wood found himself caught up in the whirlwind of Philippine politics. As a result of the Quezon-Osmeña rift of 1921-1922, he found his constitutional authority challenged by Quezon and his followers.

Within three weeks of assuming office, Governor General Wood became the focus of a political attack. Like all his predecessors, he had sought the advice of Sergio Osmeña concerning some appointments. It was established practice. In fact, W. Cameron Forbes advised Wood to seek Osmeña's counsel.²³ As the speaker of the Philippine Assembly (and later the House of Representatives) and as president of the Nacionalista party, Osmeña was the logical choice as advisor to the governors-general since 1907. By 1921, however, Osmeña's iron grip on the Legislature was waning. By turning to the Speaker, Wood had antagonized Quezon's followers in the Senate. Since the Senators had the power of confirmation, they felt that Wood should have consulted them.²⁴ The furor died down when the *Philippines Herald* (November 4, 1921) reported that Wood had promised to discuss appointments in the future with the legislative heads of both houses. This tempest in the Legislature was symptomatic of the growing antipathy between Manuel Quezon and the Speaker.

The second discordant note was sounded in March 1922. As a consequence of the split in the Nacionalista party, only five bills came out of the regular session of the Legislature. Because of the fiscal needs of the government, Wood proclaimed an extra session. Osmeña, however, asked the Governor General if the Legislature might be permitted during the special session to consider those private bills which had been passed by one house, but not by the other, during the regular session.²⁵ Wood gave the necessary consent as a gesture of goodwill and cooperation.²⁶ When the extra session

²¹ Walter Robb, "Wood's Philippines After One Year's Work," *Outlook*, 133 (January 31, 1923), 220. Writing in 1925, Dr. Frank C. Laubach considered the child congress to be Wood's greatest achievement in the Philippines. See *The People of the Philippines* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1925), 425.

²² Wood to Murchi, September 20, 1922, *loc. cit.* Soon after the cabinet crisis of 1923, Wood was ridiculed for his efforts on behalf of the lepers. See *Philippines Herald* (Manila), July 28, 1923, 8.

²³ Forbes to Wood, October 5, 1921, *Papers of General Frank R. McCoy* (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.), Box 28.

²⁴ *Philippines Herald* (Manila), November 3, 1921, 1-2.

²⁵ February 6, 1922, *Wood Diary*, Box 16; Wood to Osmeña, February 14, 1922, *ibid.*, Box 16.

²⁶ Wood to Secretary of War Weeks, Confidential, March 31, 1922, *Wood Papers*, Box 162.

adjourned, the government's measures, save one, had been enacted and quickly signed into law.

As for the private bills, some fifty were sent up to the Governor General for his signature. Wood, however, felt obliged to veto sixteen of them. One bill wanted to void the new assessment law upon which the budget was based. The other vetoed measures were either poorly worded, obviously political in nature, or ill-advised in view of the financial crisis in the Philippines.²⁷

Immediately, Wood became the target of attack. Maximo M. Kalaw, writing in the *Philippines Herald* (March 19, 1922), accused Wood of destroying the Jones Act through his misuse of the veto power. Since the governor general was not elected by the Filipino people, his vetoes were wrong unless suggested and supported by the people themselves. Kalaw pointed to Harrison's refusal to veto any measure, especially after he had been attacked by the politicians for having dared to use the veto power. Thus, Harrison turned down only five measures. On March 31, 1922, the *Philippines Herald* carried another article by Kalaw. Having learned that Wood vetoed all sixteen bills upon advise of his cabinet, Kalaw argued that the Governor General should have sought legislative advice since the Legislature alone reflects the will of the people. The cabinet, he pointed out, while Filipino except for the vice-governor who served as secretary of education, was nevertheless part of the executive branch; and since Wood did not consider the cabinet as responsible to the Legislature, the vetoes were not the result of the people's will as expressed through their Legislature. What Professor Kalaw probably did not know was that Wood had consulted with Quezon as to the merits of the vetoed bills.²⁸ It might have been interesting to see how Kalaw would have continued his line of reasoning.

On March 27, *La Nacion*—the Democrata party organ—asked why the Governor General was being attacked for his use of the veto power. Harrison, by his lack of control, brought ruin upon the country; Wood, because he meant to do his duty, was being abused. (Curiously enough, *La Nacion*—a year later—bitterly abused Wood for supposedly knuckling under to Quezon.) Moreover, the newspaper continued, he had informed the Legislature why he could not sign those sixteen bills. This was more than the Senate was willing to do when he sent in his appointments for confirmation.

In the course of the controversy, the *Philippines Herald* (March 26, 1922) published²⁹ an editorial cartoon which showed Governor General Wood murdering a Filipina, who represented Filipino autonomy, with a two-

²⁷ March 10, 1922, *Wood Diary*, Box 16; Wood to Weeks, Confidential, March 31, 1922, *loc. cit.*; J. Ralston Hayden, *The Philippines, A Study in National Development* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1950), 220-221.

²⁸ March 10, 1922, *Wood Diary*, Box 16.

²⁹ On March 29, the publisher, Conrado Benitez, apologized to Wood for the cartoon. He admitted, however, that the cartoon did captivate the editors. This, in spite of the fact that the cartoon did not reflect the paper's attitude toward Wood. See Conrado Benitez to Wood, March 29, 1922, *Wood Papers*, Box 159. The day before, in a public apology, the paper stated that the cartoon did not represent an actuality but rather a possibility. The paper went on to say that a caption which would have conveyed this meaning had been foolishly

edged dagger entitled "veto power." Since Wood refused to become excited over the cartoon,³⁰ the furor among the American community in Manila died down.³¹ Wood's use of the veto power, which he exercised throughout his six years of service, has left him open to the charge of being an autocrat.³² He was hardly what he has been painted.

On November 9, the Filipino cabinet members called Wood to a meeting. They demanded to know if they were responsible to him or the Legislature. It was really a question for which they already knew the answer. But Senate President Manuel Quezon had just summoned them to his office to suggest that they force the issue of cabinet responsibility. Wood told them that the Jones Act made them his secretaries; that he had been increasing the measure of their initiative and responsibility; that his predecessor's acquiescence resulted in chaos; that they could go before the Legislature if summoned provided that he was first informed. (The governor general had the right, in cases of public security, of refusing to grant the legislators the right of questioning cabinet members on the floor of the Legislature.) Wood, finally, told them their personal alternative was to protest—to Congress for having created the existing system of government—or else resign.

Annoyed at this attempt to provoke an incident, Wood summoned Quezon and his protegee, Speaker Manuel Roxas, to his office. During their meeting, Quezon alluded to the spirit of the Jones Act which, he asserted, placed policy-making power solely in the hands of the Legislature. When Wood pointed out that the organic act gave the governor general a role in policy-planning, the Senate President changed his tack and asked why both branches of the government could not work in harmony. Wood agreed. He went on to say that this had been their first argument since he assumed office. He continued by pointing out that it was discourteous, if not highly irregular, for him—the Senate President—to have summoned the cabinet to his office.

omitted. See *Philippines Herald* (Manila) March 28, 1922, 1, 5. Wood, however, learned that friends of the paper had urged the editors to claim that a modifying caption had been deleted. They were also to point out that the cartoon was not intended as an insult. See Philippine Constabulary Intelligence Report, March 28, 1922, *Wood Papers*, Box 162. The most reasonable explanation for the cartoon, with or without the modifying caption, was stated by Benitez; the cartoon simply captivated the editors. Cf. General Carlos P. Romulo, *I Walked with Heroes* (New York: Avon Book, 1961), 123.

³⁰ Wood was on an inspection tour when he learned of the incident and the commotion it was causing among the American community in Manila. See Franks to Wood, radiogram, March 26, 1922, *Wood Diary*, Box 16. He urged his office to prevent any further American outbursts as soon as the message was received. See Wood to Franks, radiogram, March 28, 1922, *ibid.*, Box 16.

³¹ The American reaction in Manila gave Charles E. Russell, who, for many years, had been in the pay of the Washington office of the Philippine Press Bureau, an opportunity to criticize the use of the veto power. See "Philippines: Independent or Vassal?," *The Nation*, 114 (April 26, 1922), 487-488.

³² Wood realized that his use of the veto power would be misinterpreted. However, the Legislature, by its last hour enactments, allowed no time for a bill to be sent back for modification. As soon as the session ended, the Legislature adjourned. Had there been time for revision, some of the bills that Wood was forced to veto might have become law. See Wood to Weeks, Confidential, March 31, 1922, *loc. cit.*; *Congressional Record*, 67, pt. 5 (March 5, 1926), 5091 (Underhill).

The conference ended on a note of reconciliation and pledges of friendship and cooperation. Wood had shown Quezon that he meant to adhere to the Jones Act. Yet, he demonstrated his willingness to achieve harmony. The Senate President, for his part, had shown his ability to cause trouble for Wood.³³ The next day, the *Philippines Herald* (November 10, 1922) accused the Governor General of taking too much power unto himself. The following day, the newspapers carried Quezon's denial of trouble between himself and Wood.

V

The efforts made that first year to restore Philippine fiscal stability, to repair the damages caused by the "New Era," and to revivify the Philippines, were not those of Leonard Wood alone. What he wanted to do that year was to make the Filipinos conscious of their nationhood and responsibilities toward each other. As one of Wood's critics put it: "if all the things were done... that the newspapers have said would be done by Governor Wood, he would be able to establish the Millenium in the Islands."³⁴ This publicity was what Wood wanted; he felt that the ordinary individual had been left in ignorance too long by the politicians.³⁵ As J. Ralston Hayden has so well stated: the political leaders had merely to oppose Governor General Wood and none of the accomplishments of that first year would have happened. The Legislature had merely to refuse the enactment of the government's legislative program.³⁶ In fact, it can be said that Wood's entire six years in Malacañan, regardless of what critics have written,³⁷ would have been a complete and total failure had it not been for the cooperation of the political leaders, whether openly or otherwise.³⁸ Even the support he received from Washington, would not have been enough to explain the achievements of six years. Those who claim that Wood *restored* honesty, efficiency and competence in the government service, as well as doing so many other fine things, miss the mark: the Jones Act made it constitutionally impossible for

³³ November 9, 1922, *Wood Diary*, Box 17. Wood felt that Quezon's attempt to provoke a fight was somehow connected with the Democratic victory in the American off-year election. See Wood to McIntyre, cable, November 13, 1922, Wood to McIntyre, Confidential, cable, November 17, 1922, *Wood Cablegram Book*, *loc. cit.*

³⁴ Wilson to Harrison, Personal and Confidential, July 14, 1922, *Harrison Papers*. During the Parliamentary Mission (1922), Quezon and Osmeña urged that Wood allow them to share the glory of the achievements that had been accomplished. See Memorandum for the Secretary of War, Confidential, June 14, 1922, *The Papers of Warren G. Harding* (The Ohio State Museum, Columbus).

³⁵ Wood to Murchie, September 30, 1922, *Wood Papers*, Box 160, Wood to Luther Parker, Personal, November 16, 1923, *ibid.*, Box 166.

³⁶ Dean C. Worcester and J. Ralston Hayden, *The Philippines Past and Present* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1930), 759.

³⁷ For the typical view of Wood and his "lack" of success in the Philippines, see Graef Grunder and William Livezey, *The Philippines and the United States* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951), 182.

³⁸ Cf. Worcester and Hayden, 769; Hayden, 183; Henry L. Stimson, "Future Philippine Policy Under the Jones Act.," *Foreign Affairs*, V (April, 1927), 469; Pedro de la Llanza, *A Book of Comment and Criticism* (Manila: n. p., 1926), 50.

him to work alone. Whatever successes there were that first year, or at any time, must be attributed to Quezon, Osmeña and Roxas, as well as to Leonard Wood.³⁹

The political leaders cooperated with Wood that first year, as they did later on, because they appreciated his desire to help the Filipino people. Moreover, Governor General Wood simply refused that first year, as he did throughout his six years, to let anything stand between him and the leaders. Wherever possible, he yielded.

On December 3, 1922, Wood cabled his resignation as provost of the University of Pennsylvania to the trustees of that institution. He regretted that he had to forego the pleasure of working with his country's youth. But he had an unfinished task in the Philippines.⁴⁰ There was so much that had to be done before he could leave. He believed that if the government could present a four-year program to the Legislature and have it enacted, then his job was finished.⁴¹ His job was never finished. Continuous political strife among the leaders would prevent Leonard Wood from ever realizing his dream.

³⁹ The old cliché that Wood was incapable of "government by compadres" is a by-product of Quezon's public anti-Wood stance resulting from the cabinet crisis. Nothing made the Democrata party more furious than Wood's close working relationship with Quezon (despite ups and downs) from 1921 until Wood's death.

⁴⁰ Wood to Chairman, Board of Trustee, cable, December 3, 1922, *Wood Cablegram Book*, Box 189.

⁴¹ Wood to Forbes, December 7, 1922, *Wood Papers*, Box 160.

PEASANT SOCIETY AND UNREST PRIOR TO THE HUK REVOLUTION IN THE PHILIPPINES

BEN J. KERKVLIEF

*Part I: A case study of social and economic changes in the 20th Century
for peasants in Central Luzon.**

AT THE TURN OF THIS CENTURY, THE PLAINS OF NUEVA ECIJA WERE grass lands and forests. Filipinos had used the heavy cover for hiding and surprise attacks in their guerrilla wars against the Spanish and the American armies. After the revolutionaries had surrendered, many of their ilustrado leaders held Sunday outings to shoot wild boar and deer in those forests. At the same time, some of the poor farmers in the area, many of them settlers from other parts of Central Luzon and Ilocos region, hunted to add to their meager food stores, just as Negritos had done before being driven away by the newcomers.

As one travels through Nueva Ecija, he marvels at the expansive rice fields. That the wildlife, grasslands, forests (except for some standing timber high in the Sierra Madres and on balding Mt. Arayat) are gone and in their place stretch rice fields represents a history of interest to more than topographers and botanists. These physical changes betray intricate ecological changes of special importance to the peasants there. If one could study those changes, he could better comprehend the reasons for the growth of agrarian unrest that prevailed in Nueva Ecija and other parts of the central plains, beginning at least as early as the 1930's and peaking about 1948-52. Furthermore, such a study would reveal in some detail the society and economy of Central Luzon peasants. In order to make a manageable study, I have focused on one barrio's history, drawing generalizations by putting the case study data together with more general information about the province and Central Luzon as a whole.

In Tables I and II below the most striking trends are the rapid increases in land use and population growth. Note too the large percentage of farmers who, in 1939, are tenants, with practically all of them being share tenants (*kasama*). The basis of the economy for Talavera, Nueva

* This case study is an abbreviated version of a more detailed one that I am presently writing and will be part of my dissertation. The data was collected, in the main, during four months (March through June, 1970) of interviewing residents over 40 years old living in Talavera, principally in the barrio of San Ricardo. I am deeply grateful to all the people, especially to the peasants in San Ricardo and my hosts in Talavera, who were thoroughly generous to this outsider and talked freely about themselves and their community.

Ecija, as indeed for all of Central Luzon during this time period, was agriculture. *Palay* (unhusked rice) was the most important single crop.

TABLE I: CENSUS DATA¹

		1903	1918	1939
Number of Farms	N.E.	13,381	33,764	78,313
	Talavera	n.a.	1,106	4,515
Total Area of Farms (Hectares)	N.E.	90,367	205,410	289,202
	Talavera	n.a.	7,086	17,196
Total Cultivated Area (Hectares)	N.E.	26,763	97,159	221,956
	Talavera	n.a.	4,881	13,689
Population	N.E.	134,147	226,721	416,762
	Talavera	3,352	8,658	20,442

(Note: n.a. = not available in the Census data for that year.)

TABLE II: NUMBER OF FARMS BY TENURE AND YEAR²

	# Farms Owners (%)			Tenants (%)		Other (%)	
1939							
	N.E.	78,319	26,221 (34)	52,029 (66)	69 (0)		
	Talavera	4,515	1,084 (24)	3,430 (76)	1 (0)		
1960							
	N.E.	58,566	13,168 (22)	44,670 (77)	728 (1)		
	Talavera	2,726	199 (7)	2,518 (93)	9 (0)		

(Note: Owners include both full and part owners; tenants include all types. Percentage figures are rounded to nearest whole number.)

There were two main systems for clearing and planting the land in the early 1900's. The first, *buwis* or *buwisan*, was the less common and by the 1930's was practically extinct. The second, *kasama* or share-tenancy, was popular from the early 1900's and continues right up to the present. (According to the 1960 Census, 90% of all tenants in Talavera were *kasama*. For Nueva Ecija the respective figure is 94%.) Under *buwis*, a man would clear a small, 3-4 hectares, parcel owned by one with many uncleared hectares. For the first season or two he paid nothing to the landowner, and lived off whatever vegetables he could grow on the still rocky, weedy, and stump-filled land. Then he would probably plant *kaingin* style (slash and burn with no transplanting) for his first few crops of rice, and pay a set

¹ Figures taken from the three respective censuses. *Census of the Philippine Islands, 1903*. United States Bureau of Census. Washington: Government Printing Office. *Census of the Philippine Islands, 1918*. Census Office of the Philippine Islands. Manila: Bureau of Printing. *Census of the Philippine Islands, 1939*. Census Office of the Philippine Islands. Manila: Bureau of Printing.

² The 1939 tenancy figures are from the 1939 Census. For 1960, *Census of the Philippine Islands, 1960*. Bureau of Census. Manila: Government Printing Office. Other provinces with high tenancy rates in 1939 were Pampanga, 70%; Negros Occidental, 68%; Bulacan, 64%; Tarlac, 53%.

fee to the landowner. Or he might just continue planting vegetables and bananas, marketing to neighbors and nearby settlements what he could not consume. In the mid-1930's in San Ricardo, Talavera, the fee typically paid for 3-4 hectares was about ₱60 per year.

The reasons why the buwis system did not thrive lie mainly with indebtedness. The majority of those practising buwis could last only a few seasons without going into debt, usually to the landowner himself. Many in fact had to borrow the initial capital, small though it was, to buy tools and rent or buy a carabao. One season of crop failure due to drought, typhoons, or pests was usually enough to put in debt others who had avoided initial debts. In San Ricardo, as elsewhere, the practice was for the landowner and buwis tenant to agree that they shift to the kasama system. Then the tenant would plant palay and give about 50% of the harvest to the landlord.

Most tenants began as kasama right from the beginning. When General Manuel Tinio had hundreds of uncleared hectares in the San Ricardo area, men would approach him and ask for a plot of land. He would assign each man 2-4 hectares, depending on his and the tenant's desires. The tenants for the first year or two paid nothing to Tinio, nor was he paid anything by the hacendero. While the tenant prepared the land for palay cultivation, he raised vegetables to eat and borrowed from the landlord rice rations, which he would repay after he had started palay cultivation. Typically the tenants planted a season of kaingin before the first palay. Thus after about two or three seasons, the land was ready for palay.

Some of Tinio's tenants were families he brought from any one of several haciendas he held in the province. While he held some positions in the Philippine government, he even arranged for ex-prisoners to work his land if they wanted a new start in life. Most tenants, however, were migrants from Pampanga, Bulacan, and Ilocos provinces. Wherever their origin, they were all part of a labor-intensive agricultural system through which Tinio's hacienda of over 400 hectares in San Ricardo was cleared and farmed.

Manuel Tinio was not the only landowner in San Ricardo in the early 1900's, but his holdings were the biggest. His land encompassed the lion's share of the total in the area, and a large number of the people living there were his tenants. It is instructive to examine how he came to own his land.

Like his several brothers and sisters, Manuel Tinio inherited land (about 68 hectares) from his father's estate. The Tinio family had owned large tracts of land dating back to the 19th Century. Before Manuel Tinio could finish his college education in Manila, the Revolution came; he joined and acquired the rank of general. While eluding the Spanish armies, he often hid in the forests around San Ricardo. After making his peace with the Americans, he began purchasing large sections of his former hideout; by 1905 he held between 350 and 400 hectares of formerly public land, paying

50 to 100 pesos per hectare. In 1907 he was appointed governor of Nueva Ecija by the American regime. In 1908 he was elected to that position. Then he was appointed Director of Labor in 1909, the first Filipino to hold a directorship of any agency in the new American colony. He became Director of Lands in 1913, a post he held until 1916 when he apparently retired to hold no more public offices. All this time he continued to collect land holdings in many parts of Nueva Ecija, although some of his methods were reportedly unscrupulous.³ It is not known exactly how many hundreds of hectares he added during those years, but in the Talavera area alone they exceeded three hundred. Some of the land he parcelled out to relatives; some he later sold for profit. Most he developed into rice haciendas.

Each tenant on the Tinio hacienda in San Ricardo cultivated, roughly, 2-4 hectares, and each was allowed a lot for his house. Most of the houses were built in clusters forming sitios and barrios. Sometimes too Manuel Tinio loaned carabaos to those tenants who had none of their own. Tenants paid all expenses for plowing, harrowing, and harvesting; Tinio paid for seeds and transplanting. They generally shared expenses for threshing and maintaining the irrigation canals, which Tinio had built in about 1918. After harvest and after each party had been re-imbursed for his respective expenses, the remainder was divided 50/50. Any debts owed to the hacendero was subtracted from the tenant's share.

Practically every kasama had *utang* (debt) to Tinio. He was the sole source of rice for those who could not keep a surplus to last a full cycle from harvest to harvest. As mentioned above, the typical kasama was borrowing even before he had planted his first palay. The rice tenant family borrowed for eating of *bigas* (milled rice) each year. For this type of *utang* no interest was charged. For any money borrowed, the tenants repaid its equivalent in palay at the prices prevailing for palay at harvest time (about ₱2 per cavan of palay in the 1920's). Whatever was left after paying his debts, the tenant took home, although some choose to leave part of their palay in Tinio's bodega at no charge. Most tenants, however, had only a few cavans remaining; sometimes they had none. In any case, they soon would have to start once again the whole borrowing cycle.

The economic aspect was only one part of the relationship between the tenants and the hacendero during those years. Tinio also saw to his tenants' personal needs, such as medical attention, contributing to families during times of joy (like births and marriages) and times of sorrow (like illness and deaths). While he did not always live on the hacienda, he was frequently there and easily and readily interacted with his tenants, including visiting them at their homes. It is reported that Manuel Tinio looked upon his tenants as extended members of his family, perhaps as a grandfather

³ Several informants said that not only was Manuel Tinio the first Filipino to be a director, he was also the first to be removed from office because of corrupt practices.

looked upon his grandchildren. The tenants, in turn, felt considerable personal debt to Tinio that went far beyond monetary re-payment. Consequently they did all things for him at his asking—e.g., helping around his house and grounds, building and repairing irrigation and canals, clearing land for no re-imbusement, and mending his bull-carts.

The landlord-tenant relationship was reciprocal, with each partner feeling that he benefited. For the tenant there was economic security, knowing he would always have rice to eat, to plant, and enough left over for modest celebrations. The tenant could count on Tinio's ration and loans even in times of crop failures, which were more than occasional. There was also the important social security that the hacendero's paternal protection provided. As regards the landlord, there were financial profit, social prestige, and political benefits for him. His lands were cleared at practically no expense to him, he had a ready source of free labor for any work he might want done around the hacienda or elsewhere, and he could borrow money on the merit of his land and its productivity in order to further expand his holdings or to invest in business endeavors. There too was some capital gain from loaning money to tenants and being repaid its equivalent in palay at the low prices prevailing during harvest. He could hold on to the palay, then sell later in the year at higher prices in order to get more return per cavan. Despite this gain for the landlord, the peasant did not look upon the hacendero as their exploiter. Those old enough to remember describe Manuel Tinio, for example, as their benefactor and protector.

In 1924 Manuel Tinio died. His land was eventually divided among his many children (he had married twice), but from the time of his death until just before the Japanese occupation, one of his eldest sons administered several of Manuel's haciendas, including the one in San Ricardo. Under this new administration, the little world of the peasants there began to change. The causes do not follow simply from that change of hacenderos, yet from their perspective, the peasants attribute much of the cause to that fact. There were both small and large alterations in the system that at first irritated the peasants, but gradually became grave matters of survival.

When he took over his father's haciendas, Manolo Tinio had just graduated in engineering from Cornell University in the United States. He had been away for several years, and did not have the close, paternal-like ties his father had had with the tenants. He set up his house in Cabanatuan, the provincial capital, and rarely was in San Ricardo. He relied more than his father had on *katiwalas* (overseers) to run the hacienda because he had several farms to look after plus other interests in Cabanatuan and Manila. Consequently there was far less interaction with the peasants. This meant not only less of the personal touch but less concern for the tenants' well-being. The tenants knew this—they could feel it and see it.

The hacendero's contributions to a tenant family's baptism, etc., declined in number and amount. There was less assurance that the hacendero would look after a sick tenant or member of a tenant's family. At the same time, the new hacendero's management was *mas mahigpit* (more strict, stringent). Old tenants in Talavera recall that General Manuel Tinio had allowed them to take home free handfuls of palay to feed their chickens and ducks. Manolo Tinio had this stopped. The practice of *pulot* (picking up and keeping for free fallen grain after harvest) was allowed, but was more closely supervised by the katiwalas who had strict orders about exactly what grain could or could not be kept. As the years moved along, the strict enforcement of the new hacendero's policies were institutionalized by means of written contracts that all tenants signed and by armed guards to insure that the contracts and policies were not violated. Theoretically written contracts could have been to the tenant's interest as well as to the landlord's. In practice, not necessarily. The landlord was the one who drew up the terms, for there was no bargaining power on the tenant's part. The tenants were not yet organized enough to play the counterpart to management in a management-employee context. Furthermore, anyone not wanting to follow the rules of the hacienda could be replaced by others with increasing ease. (Recall the earlier population growth figures. Part II of this paper has more discussion on this point.)

The most drastic change for the tenants was the cessation of rations. For a few years Manolo Tinio continued the practice of giving rations but by the early 1930's (if not sooner) he ". . . put a stop to that."⁴ His reasons reflect his way of looking upon the hacienda system he had inherited and his decisions to change it. For one thing, the rations were repaid with no interest. This seemed an un-business-like manner to handle one's capital. Second, the hacendero grew tired of seeing "long, sad faces" after such harvest, since most tenants had little or no palay to take home after having paid their debts to the hacendero. Tinio decided that if the tenants needed loans, it was better for his psyche and business that they get loans elsewhere, or, as the tenants put it, "*sa labas*" (outside the hacienda). That way, too, he and his katiwalas would not have to be bothered keeping accounts of loans and collections.

Changes in the landlord-tenant relationship were occurring not only on this hacienda nor only in this part of Central Luzon during the 1920's and 1930's. Landlords throughout the region were becoming increasingly impatient with the *kasama* system and wanted as little to do with it as possible. Yet in the absence of anything to replace tenant labor, large landowners still had to rely on the *kasama* for economic returns. Landlords began seeing *kasamas* as unequal business partners, with the landlord providing the land and most of the capital, and the tenants their labor and some capital—

⁴ Manolo Tinio, Interview, 21 May 1970. San Ricardo, Talavera, Nueva Ecija.

principally, carabaos and farm implements. The previous ties binding the paternalistic relationship were gradually cut until only the economic strand was left. Yet even that grew weaker since increasingly the economic relationship was insufficient to meet the peasants' minimum needs. The most unfortunate result for the peasant was that he was left trying to cling to a dying socio-economic ecological system.

While the landlords were breaking their ties with tenants, other alternatives for the peasants were narrowing. In earlier years they could move from one area to the next in search of (1) more fertile soil or uncleared land owned by large landowners and (2) better conditions and arrangements with landlords. Such moving about indeed did continue into the mid 1940's, but the satisfaction it brought declined. First, population density was taking its toll of the land. Uncultivated land became scarce. The few unfarmed hectares in the San Ricardo area just before World War II were quickly converted to rice fields after the war. Where before there had been plenty of room to move around in, by the 1940's it was rather close quarters.⁵ Moreover, the soil was less fertile and crop yields suffered. Older tenants in San Ricardo remember pre-World War II days when they could get yields without fertilizers and irrigation that today they can equal only with fertilizers and irrigation (when they have those).

As for searching for better relations with landlords, tenants were finding that practices among landlords were becoming increasingly uniform. Several who left the Tinio hacienda in San Ricardo in the late 1920's and early 1930's found that things were much the same not only elsewhere in Talavera, but all over the province. Example: There was a time when tenants could hope to find landlords who would give loans interest free. But in the 1930's and 1940's, tenants were choosing among landlords who demanded a repayment of only three cavans of palay, rather than four, per cavan of bigas borrowed. At the same time, peasants found themselves in non-bargaining positions. Landlords could set the terms; if a tenant refused, there would be others who would accept.

Homesteading or owning one's own land was one option that a few peasants could try for in the early years of the 20th Century. Then there were favorable homestead laws, which were sometimes administered fairly, and some public lands for that purpose were still available. But in the San Ricardo area, as elsewhere in Central Luzon, the landowner who farms his own small piece of land with his family now, as before World War II, is clearly the exception. This is a consequence not only of big-moneyed people

⁵ A good indication of this density and scarcity of farm land is the system of *puesto* now practiced in Nueva Ecija but did not exist prior to about the late 1940's. Under this system, a tenant farmer who wants to give up his parcel can get a payment (nowadays about ₱1,000 per hectare in the San Ricardo area) from a person who wants to take his place as the tenant on that parcel. Such a payment for the right to cultivate a piece of land was unheard of before because there was at that time land yet to be cleared and cultivated.

buying large tracts of land. Many who did in fact homestead failed to survive the hardships. A handful in San Ricardo, for example, lost their holdings in the 1930's because they were forced to borrow large amounts from money-lenders or larger landowners, then later give up their land in an attempt to pay back their debts.

As another alternative to adjust to the changing ecological system, a peasant could try to augment his income through other work. This became especially crucial as cash, rather than just rice, became important for the peasant family's budget. While there were no reported "cottage industries" in San Ricardo, men and women did look for miscellaneous work such as cutting wood to sell (in the earlier years of the 20th Century, wood was so plentiful that no one sold it), raising a few pigs or poultry to sell in the market, and growing some vegetables on the few hectares irrigated during the off-palay season. There too was short-term agricultural employment such as transplanting rice seedlings. San Ricardo residents report that work that before had often been done free by friends and relatives later, as the need for work and extra income increased, was done for payment. For example, previously, peasants would help each other harvest palay with no payment expected. By the 1930's and especially in the post-war 1940's, it was common to pay a team of harvesters about 6% of the harvest. Since this expense was usually subtracted from the gross harvest (before the net harvest was divided between landlord and tenant), such payment came out of the landlord's pocket, so to speak, as much as the individual tenant farmer's. In such a fashion the wealth of the barrio was shared not only to increase a tenant's income, but also to provide employment for a small but growing number of men who did not even have a plot of land to work on as a tenant.

Another option was *pagtitiis lamang*—to simply endure the changes and hardship as best as possible. For most this meant, at the very least, borrowing rice and money at higher and higher interest rates, either from their landlords or from money-lenders.⁶ Some could get courage and spiritual support through religion. The family system, which included relatives on both the husband's and the wife's side, often helped. People too cut back on their already meager diets, having less meat and more vegetables to accompany their staple food, rice. As an indicator of the desperation and scarcity, elder residents of San Ricardo point to the custom of pulot. They remember when stalks of palay could lie on the ground for week and no one would bother to pick them up. But during the 1930's and even more so after the Japanese occupation, the practice of pulot became very common, with the numerous *namumulot* (those gleaning the fields) following right

⁶ Interest rates varied with the loan source and over time, but for rice the general trend in the Talavera area was 50%, then 100%, and by the late 1930's 150% (5 cavans of *palay* to be paid for every 1 cavan of *bigas* borrowed). (Note: 2 cavans of *palay* equals about 1 cavan of *bigas*.) For money, interest rates before World War II were about 20%.

along behind the harvesters. For many people it became an important way to add a little to their small incomes.

These various responses by peasants were not done one at a time. People did several simultaneously, trying to regain at least economic security in an eroding system. Some responded with more public and even hostile actions. People began placing blame for their worsening situation. As they did, they began pointing more frequently at the landlords, money-lenders, and, later, apathetic or unresponsive government officials. This process will be analyzed in the second part of this paper.

The conditions analyzed above for one part of Nueva Ecija are not isolated phenomena. What was happening in Talavera is but a microcosm of the general situation in the province and in practically all rural areas of Central Luzon and parts of Southern Luzon. As mentioned earlier, older residents of San Ricardo who farmed in other parts of the province, or even other parts of Central Luzon, said that they experienced worsening relations between landlords and tenants no matter where they went. From interviews with peasants in other municipalities of Nueva Ecija (especially Cabiao and Guimba), I found that conditions similar to Talavera had prevailed there too. Another researcher, doing an intensive socio-economic history of Pampanga, has found that from the late 19th century and continuing through the 20th, the economic and social ties previously linking tenants and their landlords were dwindling in number and strength until only a slim strand was left—and even that was increasingly strained.⁷ In *Land and Peasants in Central Luzon* by Takahashi Akira, one can see that in Bulacan as well population pressure on the cultivated land was increasing while ties between landlord and tenant diminished.⁸ Newspaper stories prior to World War II would also help confirm that the situation in San Ricardo, Talavera was a microcosm of Central Luzon. (Newspaper accounts for the 1930's will be analyzed below.) Finally, through interviews several former Huks have described such conditions as characteristics of Central Luzon.

Part II: Building towards revolution.

In this section of the paper, I will argue that preceding the Huk-PKP revolution of the 1940's and early 1950's there was a gradual intensification

⁷ The researcher referred to is Dr. John Larkin. He has just completed a manuscript on the history of Pampanga up to 1922. That manuscript is now in press, but Dr. Larkin kindly allowed me to read it. He continues the argument started in his unpublished dissertation—that the social and economic bonds holding Pampangan society together were becoming untied. Cf. John Larkin, *The Evolution of Pampangan Society: A Case Study of Social and Economic Change in the Rural Philippines*. Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 1966.

⁸ Tokyo: The Institute of Developing Economics, 1969. While Takahashi's excellent work focuses on present day Central Luzon, there is a historical dimension to the study, albeit interspersed among several chapters. Cf. particularly Chaps. 3, 7, and 15. From Takahashi one sees too that time has not improved the peasants' lot, and my interviews about present day conditions with peasants in San Ricardo would support Takahashi's findings in all essential aspects. Significantly, Takahashi's peasant respondents in a barrio in Baliwag, Bulacan, attribute much to the Huk movement (of the 1940's to mid 1950's) for any improvements.

of events revealing spreading frustration and hostility among the peasants of Central and Southern Luzon against a socio-economic system that could no longer satisfy their basic economic and social needs. This intensification involved several staged processes through which peasants tried to regain the security they needed. These steps were not necessarily followed in the same sequence in all parts of the central plains of Luzon. But what the peasants learned individually and as a class of people was the necessity for united action in order to present their grievances and demands, whether to their landlords, their local political leaders, or the national government. This building of unity was first accomplished, generally speaking, only among small groups, such as tenants for a single hacienda or landlord; but gradually these small groups came together forming larger organizations and unions. Their methods were varied, from more or less individual acts, like assaulting a landlord or overseer, to more complex and long-term actions, such as seeking justice through the court system, waging strikes, or electing chief spokesmen to political office. There were also occasional small outbursts of violence that foretold the eventual outcome—revolution—if the far more numerous actions through the legitimate channels failed, as they eventually did, to bring satisfaction.

Unfortunately for Philippine history there is little published research about peasant groups and sporadic uprisings rooted in social and economic disequilibrium. The few that do exist tend to remove the occurrences from their wider context. Nevertheless, it is instructive here to consider briefly four sporadic uprisings in the 1920's and 1930's that have received some attention from historians. These four are the *Kapisanan Makabola Makasinag* (1924-25), Tayug uprising (1931), Tangulan incidents (principally 1931), and the Sakdalista (principally 1934-35).⁹ For more details on each, the reader should refer to the research cited in footnote nine, but for our purposes it is sufficient to extract similarities and differences among the four. Then we can see the relationship of these four to other peasant activity, which will be subsequently analyzed.

In terms of area, these groups had considerable differences; however, they all were confined, for the most part, to Central Luzon. The *Kapisanan* uprising (which its members hoped would become a revolution) was in the area of San Jose, Nueva Ecija. However this secret society had members in other parts of that province as well as in parts of Pangasinan and the Ilocos provinces.¹⁰ Its members, mostly Ilocanos, grew in number from 800 in 1924 to 12,000 one year later. The Tayug uprising was in Tayug, Pangasi-

⁹ For information on the first three groups, see Milagros C. Guerrero, "The Colorum Uprisings: 1924-31," *Asian Studies* 5 (April 1967), pp. 65-78; and Roy M. Stubbs, *Philippine Radicalism: The Central Luzon Uprisings, 1925-35*. Ph.D. Dissertation (unpublished), University of California, Berkeley, 1951. For the Sakdalista group, see David R. Sturtevant, *Philippine Social Structure and its Relation to Agrarian Unrest*. Ph.D. Dissertation (unpublished), Stanford University, 1958; also, see the Stubbs' dissertation.

¹⁰ All my information on the *Kapisanan* comes from Stubbs' dissertation.

nan, but the participants were part of a larger society generally known as *colorums*. During the American occupation *colorum* groups had been sprouting in many parts of the Philippines, including Nueva Ecija, Pangasinan, Tarlac, La Union, Batangas, and Surigao.¹¹ They were not necessarily connected to each other; in all likelihood they were fairly autonomous. But it is difficult to know exactly how autonomous each was from the other since the name *colorum* seems to have been assigned to any band of religious mystics in the country.¹²

The Tugulan was both rural and urban based, being the result of a federation in 1930 between the *Kapatiran Magsasaka* (Brotherhood of Peasants), based in Bulacan, and the *Kapatiran Anak ng Bayan* (Brotherhood of Patriots), confined to Manila. Its members reportedly grew from about one thousand to forty thousand. Its rural membership expanded to include, in addition to Bulacan, parts of Nueva Ecija, Rizal, Laguna, Pampanga, Quezon, Cavite, and Bataan.¹³ In terms of membership and area, the Sakdalista movement was by far the strongest of the four, as revealed in the 1934 elections. In Laguna two Sakdalistas were elected to the House of Representatives, two more to the Provincial Board, and four municipalities elected Sakdalista presidents, vice-presidents, or councilors. In Tayabas (now Quezon province), a Sakdalista was also elected to the House. A Sakdalista was elected governor of Marinduque and several more were elected to municipal offices in Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Rizal, and Cavite.¹⁴ A few months before the abortive uprisings in May 1935, its membership was estimated between 68,000 and 200,000. The Sakdal leaders claimed a following of 150,000.¹⁵

There are several similarities among these four groups that should be emphasized. First, while at first each tried to express their aspirations through a variety of means (including participation in elections by Tugulans and Sakdalistas), each one eventually tried to stage a revolt that would bring a quick end to the established government. In each case repression by the local and national governments (by denying to members basic rights—public meetings, free speech, free press—supposedly protected by law) preceded the outbreak of violence. Also in each case local police and the Philippine Constabulary (PC) quickly put down the revolts. Typically too, members of these groups who had turned informers and revealed plans for the uprisings aided the military considerably. Once crushed, each group disappeared, or, in the case of the Sakdalista, changed its outlook and lost its radicalism. Part of the reason for the death of these groups following their short-lived revolts was the strong tendency for “hero worship” of the prin-

¹¹ Guerrero, “The Colorum Uprisings: 1924-31,” *Asian Studies*, April 1967, p. 66.

¹² Stubbs, pp. 54-58. *The Tribune* in the 1930's does this as well.

¹³ Stubbs, pp. 95-7, 107. Joseph Hayden, *Philippines: A Study in National Development*. (New York: The Macmillan Company), p. 915.

¹⁴ Stubbs, p. 164.

¹⁵ Stubbs, p. 165.

cial leader of each.¹⁶ Once that leader had been killed, imprisoned, or discredited, there was little left to hold the group together.

While the groups as such faded away as their leaders were removed, there is considerable evidence that their members did not completely abandon the issues and aspirations that the groups had expressed. The areas where the organizations were the strongest and most active are also the areas where peasant activities were the most vigorous in the 1930's, according to reports from *The Tribune*. (See Appendix, Table A.) I will support this contention in more detail below, but for purposes of illustration we can point to the Tayug area where, according to newspaper accounts, there was peasant unrest in 1931 (aside from the uprising itself), 1935 (2 incidents), 1936 (4 incidents), and 1937 (3 incidents). All these protests reported in the newspapers and the Tayug uprising itself were, for the most part, aimed at worsening economic conditions on one or two haciendas in the area, which together held virtually all the land there. This continuity of area would suggest that followers of one group frequently became involved in another once the first died or lost its appeal. That is indeed the case for many areas of Central and Southern Luzon, as we shall see below. But again as an illustration, many in the Tanguilans later were among the ranks of the Sakdalista.¹⁷

The reason for such continuities of area and participation among the four groups and with other peasant activities of the 1930's lies in the issues and aspirations involved. From the point of view of most participants (mostly peasants), the basic purpose of these groups was economic improvement. More specifically, the peasants in these groups saw the landlords as the primary cause of their economic impoverishment and thus they were hoping for a new order in which their predicament could be improved. Some participants were even hoping that the new order would bring land re-distribution. Especially important was their realizing that unity among themselves was necessary in order to push for change. The various leaders were the ones who told their respective followers that only through independence from the colonial power and its established government could such improved economic conditions come. Because of this, unrest due to economic and social causes took the form of aborted uprisings for immediate independence.

In terms of planning and organization for revolution, the Sakdalista uprising was the most impressive of the four. David Sturtevant argues that the Sakdalista movement was a kind of midway point between blind (and often messianic-in-kind) peasant outbursts, on the one hand, and well organized, will directed peasant movements, on the other.¹⁸ To some extent that is true.

¹⁶ The phenomenon is easily seen in the findings of Stubbs and Sturtevant. The term "hero worship" was a description used by Pedro Abad Santos, leader of the Socialist movement in Pampanga, for the Sakdalista party. Sturtevant, p. 215.

¹⁷ Stubbs, pp. 102, 115-16, 193-94.

¹⁸ Sturtevant, p. 154.

In 1935 the Sakdalista movement was the largest and most widespread, single peasant organization; and through it peasants did understand more fully the value of unity among themselves. But other Central Luzon peasants, in addition to those in the Sakdalista movement, were also joining together for similar reasons. The Sakdal uprisings in 1935 (principally in Cabuyao and Sta. Rosa, Laguna, and San Ildefonso, Bulacan, involving four to seven thousand people in all) were the most obvious peasant activities at the time. They were by no means, however, the only ones, not even in the provinces where Sakdal strength was greatest (Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, and Laguna). Not even the violence was peculiar to them since there were numerous violent incidents by peasants during that year, even in the same areas. What was unique in 1935 about the Sakdals was their attempt, however premature, to overthrow the government. Most peasant incidents, violent and non-violent, earlier in the decade, as well as after 1935, were aimed not at achieving political power but at demanding solutions for social and economic problems confronting them.

Table A (Appendix) is a summarization of all newspaper (*The Tribune*) reports for the years 1930-40 (inclusive) of peasant and labor activities. Most of the data is summarized by province, but where incidents were few, several provinces were grouped by area, e.g., Northern Luzon and Mindanao. Activities include such things as a few tenants attacking a landlord's bodega; peasant demonstrations in barrios, poblacions, and provincial capitals; petitions of peasants and laborers seeking government help regarding some economic, social, or political problem; burning of cane or palay fields; strikes; notifications of planned strikes; requests from a group of peasants or laborers for improved conditions, etc.; and anything else that indicates an expression of protest or desire for change by laborers or peasants. For the most part there was no difficulty in making a decision about whether or not to code a newspaper item as an incident. Sometimes subjective judgment was unavoidable, but not enough to change the general pattern, which was the main purpose for coding newspaper data.

Each incident was counted as equal. That is, a strike that involved several hundred peasants was counted as one, but so was the burning of a few hectares of sugar cane by a few tenants or a small strike by factory workers in Manila. These qualitative differences among types of activities will come out in the more detailed analysis below.

One additional comment before going to that analysis. When counting incidents, I distinguished between peasant activity and labor activity, but in the summary tables presented in the Appendix those distinctions were eliminated. Labor activity in Central and Southern Luzon was extremely rare, but for the Visayas (except for Negros Occidental), Mindanao, Northern Luzon, and, of course, Manila, labor incidents account for virtually all activity. In Negros Occidental peasant and labor actions were about equal in frequency. Data for peasants actually include a few more incidents than

what would normally be considered strictly peasant activity; I have also included agricultural workers. This means that in addition to actions by peasants *per se*, I have included actions by sugar central workers who worked in the mills themselves or cut and hauled cane for the centrals. The reasons for this inclusion are (1) many who were central workers of this type also were peasants in the narrower sense of the word, (2) such central workers were often fellow union or organizations members with peasants, and (3) frequently newspaper reporting did not draw distinctions between peasants and other agricultural workers.

An examination of Table A immediately reveals a heavy concentration of all peasant incidents in three provinces—Bulacan, Pampanga, and Nueva Ecija. The next most active provinces, but decidedly second to the above three, are Tarlac, Pangasinan, Bataan, Laguna, and Rizal. (One should note, however, that 16 of the total incidents in Rizal are labor, and not related to agricultural work, due to the growing urban nature of Rizal in the 1930's.) Not only are Bulacan, Pampanga, and Nueva Ecija the most active over the whole decade, but practically for any given year within that decade they dominate over the other parts of the country.

Table A also shows that the frequency of incidents was increasing over time. This is a general trend for the whole country, but is even more pronounced in the three principal provinces of Central Luzon—Bulacan, Pampanga, and Nueva Ecija. Table B (Appendix) shows that an increasing number of municipalities recorded incidents of unrest during the decade. Luzon provinces have the greatest degree of unrest for any one year compared to other parts of the country. For a few years Negros Occidental had several incidents in several municipalities, but it does not come close to matching most of the Central Luzon provinces, especially, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Nueva Ecija. Only in 1931, when nine municipalities reported incidents, was that province more active by this measure. An examination of the particular occurrences shows that there was only one incident in each of the nine municipalities and all incidents were labor as opposed to peasant. In that year there was a wave of strikes among lumber and dock workers in Negros Occidental.

Notice that while the number of incidents in Table A is generally increasing in Bataan and Laguna, there is not a large spread in area or number of municipalities (Table B). In each of those provinces there were just one or two large landed estates that repeatedly had trouble throughout the decade—namely, San Pedro Tunasan in Laguna and Dinalupihan in Bataan.

Tables C, D, and E (Appendix) are the breakdowns by municipality for the three core provinces of peasant unrest during the 1930's. Each Table clearly demonstrates the mushrooming number of incidents and the increasing number of municipalities affected. Notice the numerous repeated occurrences within individual municipalities for some of those years, especially as the decade draws closer to 1940. Also note the frequent re-occurrence

of rest within a particular municipality over time. That is, peasant activity not only is continuous and accelerating over time for each of the provinces, but also for many of the municipalities within each province.

In order to better understand the qualitative intensification of these quantitative increases for the three core provinces as well as some of the other areas of Luzon, one must look in some detail at each province in turn.

Nueva Ecija

The first reports in *The Tribune* of strikes in Nueva Ecija were in 1932 when tenants on four different haciendas went on strike in attempts to get loans of rice or cash from landlords who previously refused such requests. The strikes occurred in the months of July and August, the time of year when tenants usually could get loans from landlords. After each strike was settled, a government official announced that trouble in the province was settled and rumors of more strikes or peasant actions pushing similar demands were unfounded. Nevertheless, in the years that followed more strikes occurred, some seeking loans, others increased shares of the crop, reduced agricultural expenses, etc. Simultaneously, peasants in the province, almost all being tenants on large haciendas, pursued through other means similar objectives. The most common method was the use of group petitions. At first it was enough to petition directly to the landlord or his overseer; but increasingly over the decade petitions to local mayors, then to the provincial governors, and eventually to national government officials, including President Quezon, were utilized. Some too sought legal recourse through the courts, starting usually with the local justice of the peace, but almost inevitably having to go to the Court of First Instance (CFI) to appeal the lower court's rulings.

As the peasants went further and further away from the hacienda itself in seeking solutions, they had to rely more on assistance from others to help vocalize strike demands, present their petitions, and argue their court cases. The most public spokesman for Nueva Ecija peasants was Juan Feleo, a former school teacher from Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija. He was a long time peasant leader, starting at least as early as 1922, when he organized tenants in barrio La Fuente, Santa Rosa into a group called *Union ng Magsasaka* (Union of Peasants).¹⁹ While it is certain Feleo served as a spokesman for Nueva Ecija tenants earlier than 1939, it is not until that year that one finds *Tribune* reports of his role.²⁰

In that same year (1939) there are the first reported signs that peasants from various haciendas had come together to present joint demands. While

¹⁹ *Kasaysayan ng Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas* (History of the Peasant Movement in the Philippines), undated, p. 10. Exhibit W-412, Criminal Case No. 15844 (Hernandez, et. al.), CFI, Manila.

²⁰ *The Tribune*, 29 April 1939, pp. 1 ff.

there were peasant organizations that were several years old and had members from many different haciendas in virtually all parts of the province,²¹ not until 1939 do *The Tribune's* accounts show that such an organization, in particular the KPMP (*Kalipunang Pambansa ng mga Magsasaka sa Pilipinas* (National Society of Peasants in the Philippines)), channeled joint demands for thousands of tenants in the province. The KPMP even served as a kind of bargaining agent for its members when they were threatening a massive strike against over 50 hacenderos in the province. By January 1940, the issues of that planned strike were referred to the CIR. All other attempts at settlement had failed, in part because the hacenderos refused to negotiate with the KPMP.²²

In the meantime there were numerous incidents of violence. In 1935, *The Tribune* reported that while a tenant and his landlord argued over the possession of a bundle of newly harvested palay that still lay on the field, the tenant struck the landlord with his scythe, killing him.²³ In later years the more typical acts of violence were confrontation between groups of tenants and PC patrols, whom the landowners would call, or clashes between "old" tenants (those who had worked the land the preceding season but were evicted for the following season) and newly hired tenants.

Liberal interspersed among petitions, court cases, threatened and actual strikes, and violent actions were activities like raiding hacenderos' rice bodegas, carting away harvested palay before the landlords could take their shares, dividing the crop before landlords or overseers could come to supervise the division, "old" tenants destroying fields planted by "new" tenants, holding demonstrations in town poblacions and in the provincial capital at Cabanatuan.

If one makes a list of the specific causes or grievances involved in all this activity, the assortment is certainly wide. But after closer examination practically all revolve around one or more of the following: (1) payment or taking out of loans, (2) whether interests charged on the loans were fair, within the law, or according to the contract between landlord and tenant, (3) procedure for dividing the harvest (including demands for increased shares), (4) who—tenant, landlord, or both—is responsible for payment of particular farming expenses, (5) miscellaneous benefits, and (6) a peasant's right to be a member of a peasant organization or union.²⁴

Often other disputes grew out of these six. For example, in February, March, and April 1939, there was widespread eviction of tenants from their

²¹ *Kasaysayan ng Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas*, pp. 11-13. Also, according to a key informant in Guimba. Nueva Ecija (26 June 1970), the *Kapatirang Magsasaka* (Brotherhood of Peasants) had several chapters in various parts of Guimba, and Nueva Ecija in general, by early 1930's.

²² *The Tribune*, 16 January 1940, pp. 1 ff.

²³ *The Tribune*, 26 December 1935, pp. 1 ff.

²⁴ As an example of common demands, below are the 12 demands of a several-month-long dispute between several thousand tenants in Nueva Ecija (most of whom were in the KPMP) and over 50 landlords: (1) reinstate all tenants disposed during

lands. Removing a tenant from the land was one powerful method a landlord (or overseer) used against tenants who were insisting on the enforcement of amendment to the New Rice Share Tenancy Law, which had been passed the year before. That amended law specified a small number of mandatory conditions for any contract between landlord and tenant. Those requirements were aimed at protecting the tenant's interest regarding some of the six issues listed above. However, the contracts were only good for one year. After the harvest in January for the 1938-39 crop, tenants who insisted on the enforcement of that law were denied renewed contracts, and in their stead other men were hired who would not insist on contracts as specified by that tenancy law. By April 1939 at least 4,000 tenants in Nueva Ecija were "purged" and several additional thousand faced the immediate prospect of such ejection.²⁵ In other rice areas of Central Luzon, including Bulacan, Pampanga, Bataan, and Tarlac, similar "purges" were occurring, but on a lesser scale.²⁶ The peasants sought protection not only through petitioning government officials, including President Quezon, but by unifying themselves and refusing to leave after being ejected. At the same time they tried to persuade, peacefully and otherwise, outsiders from signing contracts to work on the haciendas under conditions sub-standard to those required by law.²⁷ The Philippine Constabulary was very busy that year and the next, forcibly ejecting tenants whom hacenderos had dismissed (a typical method was to wreck the stubborn tenants' homes), intervening in disputes between tenants and hacenderos over the division of the crop, and trying to prevent angry tenants from molesting "new" tenants.

Something very noticeable about the incidents reported in the newspapers was the consistent repetition of trouble. Issues never seemed to be really solved. Indeed attempts at solutions often served only to compound the difficulties. Names of haciendas experiencing incidents repeated occur over the years: for example, the de Leon Hacienda in Cabanatuan; the Santos Haciendas (there were five) in Guimba, Nampicuan, and Cuyapo; the Ja-

1938-39 because there is no just cause for dispossession; (2) give tenants a ration of five cavans of palay per cavan of seedlings planted with no interest the time the fields are prepared up to the time of planting; (3) free rations to each tenant during harvest and threshing; (4) allow tenants to borrow money with which to buy prime necessities, with no interest, during the period immediately after planting up until threshing; (5) expenses for planting, pulling, cutting, must be borne share and share alike by tenants and landlords; (6) planters must be paid ₱2.50 per cavan of seedlings pulled; (7) palay planters must be paid ₱10 for each cavan of seedlings to be planted under *pakiyaw* contract/payment by the job/, and in case of daily engagement, they should be paid ₱0.70 per day; (8) cutters of palay must be paid ₱15 or five cavans of palay for each cavan of seedlings cut; (9) previous agreements entered into between landlords and tenants on the above listed points must be revoked; (10) landlords must recognize the KPMP's rights to collective bargaining for its members; (11) landlords who refuse to recognize tenants' right to ask for immediate liquidation or reliquidation/of the crop/should be punished; and (12) landlords must bear all expenses for irrigation of his farmland. *The Tribune*, 16 January 1940, pp. 1. ff.

²⁵ *The Tribune*, 21 April 1939, pp. 1 ff.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *The Tribune*, 30 March 1939, pp. 1 ff.

cinto Hacienda in Talavera; the Buencamino Hacienda in Cabaio; and the Sabani Estate in Laur, to name but a few.

The trouble at the Sabani Estate is especially noteworthy because that Estate was owned by the Philippine Government, under the direct administration of the National Development Company. The newspaper accounts unfortunately lack background history to the trouble, but apparently the government had owned for many years the 11,000 hectare estate (of which only a fraction was actually cultivated).²⁸ Various grievances lingered without the government paying much heed. Finally in 1937 the tenants joined together in demanding that the government divide the hacienda and sell parcels to the tenants. They also wanted the manager and foreman at the estate removed because of reported maltreatment. The situation grew serious, especially when Philippine Army soldiers were sent.²⁹ But the peasants were temporarily satisfied and no strikes or serious trouble occurred. The government promised a reduction of rent from 33% of the crop to 25%. A year later 2,000 tenants, virtually all, on the estate organized a strike to protest a contract they had been asked to sign that would permit them to stay on the farm for only one year.³⁰ They saw this contract as an attempt by the government to side-step the demand that the estate be sold to the tenants. President Quezon himself investigated and in June 1938 came out in favor of selling the Estate to the tenants on an installment plan.³¹ A full two years later the peasants were still demanding the promised sale.³² In those two intervening years, there had been another strike, several demonstrations, and on at least one occasion the estate manager called in armed guards. The tenants were still asking that the land be sold to them and that the manager be immediately removed. For his part, the manager had reportedly been intimidating peasants from holding meetings concerning their petition and even was removing from the estate some of the leaders, who were tenants there, and threatening the ejection of many others. He eventually ordered that no future meetings be held without a permit, which he alone could grant.³³ Apparently the situation was still in considerable flux up to the time of World War II.

The reader will recall that the first part of this paper was a case study of one area in Nueva Ecija. It is appropriate now to return briefly to the Talavera case; through a closer look at peasant activity there, we can see in more detail the growth of peasant organization for Nueva Ecija and for Central Luzon in general.

²⁸ *The Tribune*, 3 June 1938, pp. 1 ff; 21 January 1939, p. 15.

²⁹ *The Tribune*, 23 February 1937, p. 14; 27 February 1937, p. 3.

³⁰ *The Tribune*, 31 May 1938, pp. 1 ff.

³¹ *The Tribune*, 3 June 1938, pp. 1 ff.

³² *The Tribune*, 23 May 1940, p. 16.

³³ *The Tribune*, 21 January 1939, p. 16; 9 December 1939, pp. 1 ff; 13 December 1939, p. 14; 16 December 1939, p. 2.

The first *Tribune* report of a peasant incident in Talavera was in 1936. But according to interviews in San Ricardo, there was a strike in 1935; and a few years earlier, some tenants in San Ricardo physically attacked a katiwala who had angered them by once too often denying them a bit of palay for their chickens. Peasants acting together while making demands on hacenderos intensified after 1935 in the San Ricardo area. While there is no newspaper report, two key respondents said that there was a rather large strike in 1938 against a landlord in a barrio near San Ricardo. That strike failed to bring results sought. The PC was called in to stop it; also, because unity among the tenants on the hacienda was weak, only some peasants joined the strike. This served as an important lesson to the peasants in the area—the necessity of acting together if they were to be effective.³⁴

As in many other parts of Nueva Ecija and Central Luzon, Talavera had numerous incidents in 1939 and 1940. (See Table D, Appendix). Not all of them were strikes, although many were. One of the troubled areas was the Tinio hacienda in San Ricardo. The increased frequency of activity indicated worsening relations between the landlords (and/or their overseers) and the tenants along with growing solidarity among tenants within a hacienda and signs of unity cross-cutting hacienda and municipality boundaries.

Peasants in the area were learning the importance of united action not only through their own experiences, but also from the experiences of others. One former local peasant leader (himself from a peasant family) said that an important influence in the 1930's was the labor union activity in Manila. "They [the peasants in Nueva Ecija] saw . . . that workers in Manila had joined together and acted as one in order to get better wages, etc." Also important, and more directly related, was an organization that originated in Bulacan called the *Samahang Magbubukid*, which, this informant said, served as an example throughout Central Luzon.³⁵ In the late 1930's two other important "teachers" were the aggressive tenant organization on the Santos Haciendas (in Guimba, Nampicuan, and Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija) and Hacienda Bahay Pare in Candaba, Pampanga.³⁶

By 1938 or 1939, about 30% of the peasants in Talavera were members of the KPMP, the largest peasant organization in Nueva Ecija that also had members in Bulacan and other provinces.³⁷ This figure alone is not an accurate indication of peasant action because many peasants who would not necessarily join the KPMP would band together to push certain

³⁴ Ely del Rosario, Interview, 16 May 1970. Bagong Sikat, Talavera, Nueva Ecija.

³⁵ Felipe Bulanadi, Interview, 7 June 1970. Talavera, Nueva Ecija.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ This figure of 30% is an average of the answers I received from two key informants in Talavera, Nueva Ecija.

demands.³⁸ Nevertheless, it is true, as this figure indicates, that there was considerable room for improvement in the strength of peasant alliances.³⁹

There was usually some form of mutual help among members of the KPMP or other, smaller, peasant groups. When, for example, KPMP members went on strike at a hacienda, fellow members working on other haciendas would supply the strikers food, clothes, etc.⁴⁰ There were also an increasing number of sympathy strikes and protests.⁴¹ Each member of KPMP was supposed to pay yearly dues of 70 centavos, although many could only afford 20-30 centavos. About 15% of the total dues collected stayed in San Ricardo chapter of the KPMP, about 20% went to the Talavera chapter, and another 20% to the Nueva Ecija chapter. The rest went to the national headquarters.⁴²

Strike was not the only method used by Talavera peasants. This is verified in the newspaper reports as well as in interviews. Typically peasants with grievances would go first to the provincial government in Cabanatuan, either to the Governor or to the Public Defender. There they would file their protest or petition and ask that the government intercede for them to persuade the landlord to make the necessary changes. Typically what was at issue was the failure of landlords, in the peasants' estimation, to abide by either their contracts or the various land tenure laws. Sometimes the matter went to court. But all too often the peasants lost out (*natalo*), whether in court or in the Public Defender's office. In the peasant's opinion, the reason for their defeats was that government officials, including the Public Defender, were "*bata*" (pawns) of the landlords and politicians.⁴³

There was at least one instance, however, when peasants were victorious. In 1936 a relative of the deceased General Manuel Tinio, Maria Pilares, claimed as part of the hacienda over which she was in charge large tracts of land in the areas of present day barrios Casili and Bagong Sikat. These barrios are adjacent to San Ricardo; indeed, at that time the latter was still a sitio of San Ricardo. The lands claimed bordered a Tinio hacienda there. Maria Pilares took her claim to the courts, saying that she had been paying the taxes on the land. Meanwhile she tried to evict the peasant families living on and working the land. She argued that at most the peasants were her tenants and that now she wanted them to leave. They refused. Each peasant claimed to be an owner of small parcels of the disputed land. An investigation was made, during which the peasants were represented by an attorney they had collectively hired. At one phase of the

³⁸ del Rosario, Interview.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*; also, learned from an interview with a former KPMP member in San Ricardo, Talavera, 1 May 1970.

⁴¹ This is particularly apparent in *The Tribune* articles on all parts of Central Luzon.

⁴² Interview with former KPMP member, 1 May 1970. San Ricardo, Talavera.

⁴³ del Rosario, Interview.

investigation, the Bureau of Lands representative rejected some documents the peasants offered as proof of ownership, saying the documents were forged. Tension had been rising, and this rejection caused tempers to explode. Three hundred so-called "ejected tenants" stormed the hacienda of Maria Pilares and almost mobbed the agent from the Bureau of Lands. Despite this outburst, a judge ruled several months later that the homestead applications that the peasants had held since about 1925 were valid because the peasants had been paying the taxes on their plots of land. So the land was awarded to them, and the Tinio family's claim was denied. It was after this that Bagong Sikat got its name (literally translated it means the image of a sunrise; loosely translated, Brilliant Hope) because the people felt that through this victory they had indeed been given a chance for a full, prosperous life.⁴⁴ Such success in the courts was the exception rather than the rule, peasants in Talavera emphasized to me. That was true not only then, before World War II, but continues up to the present.

The principal objectives of Talavera peasants, whatever the particular tactics used, were to force landlords to pay the agricultural expenses they were supposed to pay, to prevent the landlords from unfairly ejecting tenants, to increase their shares of the crop (usually seeking 55%), and to have assurances that tenants could borrow rice or money with either no or only reasonable, as opposed to usurious, interest.⁴⁵

Debts and high interest rates were two of the biggest economic problems confronting peasants in the area in the 1930's, according to practically every informant I spoke with, even though their economic needs and aspirations were, relative to present day, still small. (For example, unlike today, peasants then were not even trying to make certain that their children could finish grade school or high school.) The peasants in Talavera, like their counterparts elsewhere in Central Luzon, requested that the government establish loan funds and local banks from which they could borrow at reasonable rates. No such facilities were made available. In the late 1930's, hungry peasants stormed several buildings, including the one in Talavera. They pleaded for rice to eat because either their shares of the harvest were simply too small or they had been removed from their land. As a consequence of these incidents and the general situation in Central Luzon, the national government created an emergency loan fund.⁴⁶ How-

⁴⁴ This narrative was pieced together from three sources: *The Tribune*, 10 December 1936, p. 2; Tomas I. Pagaduan, *Kasaysayan ng Talavera, Nueva Ecija/History of . . .*, unpublished manuscript, 1967, pp. 78-79; and interviews with two peasants in San Ricardo who are sons of two of the claimants in that case. These two respondents, both of whom remember the incidents because they were grown ups at the time, still work the lands that their fathers had homesteaded. I wish to thank Mr. Pagaduan for allowing me to read his manuscript, which he hopes to publish at Manlapaz Publishing Company, Quezon City.

⁴⁵ Manuela Santa Ana, Interview, 16 April 1970. Talavera, Nueva Ecija; also, an interview with a former KPMP member, 1 May 1970, San Ricardo, Talavera.

⁴⁶ *The Tribune*, 3 October 1939, pp. 6, 14.

ever, the landlords were required to stand as guarantors for the tenants before they could qualify for such loans. For those peasants who had been ejected, this was an impossible stipulation. Even for those with parcels to farm that requirement was difficult because landlords were extremely reluctant to stand as guarantors.⁴⁷ After all, landlords themselves had been refusing more and more frequently to give loans. Besides, many disputes in 1938, 1939, and 1940 were over the so called "refusals" of tenants to pay back their debts.

In San Ricardo shortly before World War II, several tenants on the Tinio hacienda and other lands had tried to establish a small cooperative through which members could borrow money or rice. No one could tell me how many members there were; indeed, few could remember much at all about the cooperative since it existed so briefly. That cooperative did manage to purchase a small *telyadora* (threshing machine), which members could rent by paying only 4% of their harvest (as opposed to 6% elsewhere). With earnings from the *telyadora* the cooperative hoped to pay the balance owed on the machine and keep a healthy reserve from which members could borrow. After only two years the cooperative was dead. In 1939 it had to sell the *telyadora* in order to pay its debts.⁴⁸

In Talavera there were several peasant leaders from the peasant class. Each hacienda in the area seemed to have at least one tenant who would act as a chief spokesman and leader. Newspaper reports indicate this is true for most parts of the country where peasants were active. Two individuals in particular stand out in Talavera because they were extremely active and aggressive; furthermore, their involvement reveals some of the continuity in the history of peasant struggle in Central Luzon.

The first of the two is Patricio del Rosario. He was originally from San Miguel, Bulacan (born in 1881), but he left that province in search of new farm lands. He ended up in San Ricardo, Talavera, sometime before 1924 because he was once a tenant for General Manuel Tinio.⁴⁹ He had a fourth grade education, eight children, and his only occupation was tenant farming. In and about San Ricardo he had been a tenant for at least six different landlords (including Manuel Tinio, Manolo Tinio, Vivencio Tinio, and Augustino Tinio). He, like many others in the area, would move from landlord to landlord in search of better conditions. In practically every case he would first have to clear the still virgin land, 3-4 hectares, before he could plant. Not until sometime in the early 1930's did he have

⁴⁷ *The Tribune*, 22 October 1939, p. 7. This article also refers to 400 tenants in Jaen, Nueva Ecija, whose landlords refused to stand as guarantors.

⁴⁸ My principal informant on this cooperative is the former member, referred to in some of footnotes above. Interview, 24 June 1970. San Ricardo, Talavera.

⁴⁹ I am thankful to Ely del Rosario, a surviving son of Patricio, for most of this information about his father. Sometimes Mr. del Rosario could not remember precise dates, but at all portions of the interview he was extremely helpful. 16 May 1970. Bagong Sikat, Talavera.

his own carabao; before then he had borrowed from his landlord. The system for sharing the harvest was fairly standard—50/50 or 45/55 (in favor of the land owner)—but loan terms varied. Frequent droughts and typhoons, which badly damaged the crops, forced del Rosario to borrow; he was never out of debt all through the 1930's. By the mid 1930's, interest rates and borrowing arrangements were practically the same all over; consequently, del Rosario no longer moved in search of better arrangements with landlords. But two times in the second half of the decade he was ejected from the parcels he farmed because he had been active in efforts to get improved conditions—specifically, to increase the tenants' share from 50/50 to 60/40.

In 1932 del Rosario was a leading member of a Tanguan group in Talavera. The objective of this group was to improve the relations between landlords and tenants.⁵⁰ Not much else is known what this group did, or how closely it was linked with Tanguan groups elsewhere. It is possible that being a native of Bulacan, del Rosario's inclination toward peasant organization was influenced by any one of several peasant groups that did exist in that province in the 1920's, aside from any attachment he and other Tanguans of Talavera might have had with the Bulacan Tanguans. In 1938, del Rosario helped organize and lead a strike against a hacienda of an absentee landlord in a barrio near San Ricardo. Del Rosario's son recalls that his father was unhappy that the strike was not more successful because many tenants who were *bata* (pawns) of the hacendero's overseer and because several were afraid they would be evicted if they joined the strike. Del Rosario made a point of telling the tenants at a meeting in front of his house afterwards that all peasants must overcome their fears and stand up to the hacenderos and money-lenders.

By 1939 del Rosario and Amado Santa Ana were the foremost recognized peasant leaders of the Talavera area. By that time both were members of the KPMP. Sometimes they went to Cabanatuan and conferred with other KPMP leaders there, including Juan Feleo. On at least one occasion they led a contingent of KPMP members from Talavera to attend a large parade (over 15,000) celebrating May Day 1939 and hear President Quezon deliver a speech (which tried to persuade peasants not to resort to violence and to take their grievances to the proper government authorities).⁵¹

Amando Santa Ana was originally from Quezon, Nueva Ecija but moved to attend high school in Cabanatuan.⁵² He put himself through high school by working at various part time jobs, and had wanted to go to college but

⁵⁰ Pagaduan, p. 154.

⁵¹ The fact that Patricio del Rosario went with others from Talavera to that parade was stated in the interview with his son. But the figure of 15,000 was taken from *The Tribune*, 2 May 1939, pp. 2, 16.

⁵² Amando Santa Ana's oldest child, Manuela Santa Ana, kindly provided me with some facts about her father as best as she could remember it. She was born in 1924 so was still quite young before World War II. Interview, 16 April 1970. Talavera, Nueva Ecija.

could not afford it. Not much else is known about his younger life, except he married in 1921.

His wife's family had about six hectares of land on which he worked after he was married. This small piece of land was supporting him and his family (he had "many" children) plus several other families, all relatives of his wife. Eventually his in-laws had to sell the land to help pay some debts. Afterwards Amando Santa Ana had no permanent work; he just earned a little by helping other farmers at harvest time and doing odd job in and around Talavera. He and his family were living in San Ricardo.

Later, but exactly when is not known, he became "a-kind-of-president" of a peasant organization in the Talavera area. From this he received a little rice and money because members would sometimes give him contributions. However this was far from sufficient to support his family adequately. His oldest daughter remembers that she and her brothers and sisters would go out and *pulot* (glean) the fields to get additional rice. They also hired out as transplanters and harvesters. Exactly what organization Santa Ana headed is not known, but it was previous to his KPMP activities. Perhaps it was the Tanguan group of which Patricio del Rosario was also a member. A newspaper report says that Amando Santa Ana was one of 10 men convicted for "sacking" the municipal building of Talavera on 3 May 1932. They were arrested; and their banners, insignias, and homemade weapons confiscated. They pleaded guilty of attempted rebellion.⁵³

Apparently jail sentence did not stifle Santa Ana's activism. In 1935 he was a Sakdalista and under surveillance by the Talavera police for his "radical" activities. As mentioned earlier, after his Sakdal days Santa Ana was an important KPMP leader in the municipality. According to his eldest daughter, the reason he continued his activities among peasants and served as a peasant leader was because he was trying to help peasants realize that the only way to get changes was to work together, to organize. And no matter what the particular organization, the central aim was to achieve better conditions for the peasants. This too was the purpose of two strikes which Santa Ana helped organize in 1935 and 1938. He hoped that through the KPMP enough pressure could be put on the government to get legislation passed and implemented that would force landlords to provide basic economic necessities, since landlords had become increasingly unwilling to initiate reforms.

Amando Santa Ana and Patricio del Rosario continued their peasant activities during the Japanese occupation. Both were the principal organizers of the Hukbalahap unit from the Talavera area, and both helped launch the war-time civilian peasant organization that eventually became, in 1945, the *Pambansang Kaisahan ng mga Magbubukid* (PKM; National Union of Peasants). Patricio del Rosario lived to see the end of the occupation and the

⁵³ *The Tribune*, 18 May 1932, p. 10; 10 June 1932, p. 1.

beginning of the PKM. Santa Ana, however, did not. He was killed in a battle with the Japanese.⁵⁴ Del Rosario too was presumably killed, but not by Japanese. He mysteriously disappeared in February 1946. His family never did learn what exactly happened, but they are convinced his death was connected to his political activities. Many in Talavera think assassins hired by hacenderos killed him because at the time he was the president of the local chapters of the Democratic Alliance and the PKM, and was actively campaigning for legislation that would require a 60/40 sharing system (favoring the tenant).⁵⁵

PAMPANGA

In Pampanga, as in Nueva Ecija, peasant activity grew in intensity, and over the decade peasant unity strengthened. There are some indications that peasant organizations were maturing more quickly in Pampanga than in Nueva Ecija. For example, in 1933 and 1934 in three different areas—Sta. Ana, San Simon-San Luis, and Sta. Rita—tenants working for many different landlords in each of those areas presented as a group their respective demands to the landlords involved. In the Sta. Rita case the tenants formed an organization and had a spokesman who tried negotiating with the landlords.⁵⁶ In the Sta. Ana case, the newspapers made a reference to Jacinto Manahan acting as the peasants' representative.⁵⁷ Manahan at that time was the head of the KPMP.⁵⁸ Newspaper reports of similar organized activities among Nueva Ecija peasants working for different landlords came only in 1937 and 1938.⁵⁹ These peasant activities cutting across several landholdings in Pampanga and their apparent absence in Nueva Ecija for this early date may just be a function of the large haciendas that predominated in Nueva Ecija, while in Pampanga there were more comparatively smaller landholdings.

There are other indications of greater strength and unity among Pampanga peasants. While not until 1939 was there a province-wide demon-

⁵⁴ Republic of the Philippines, Bureau of Public Schools, Division of Nueva Ecija; *Historical Data Papers, 1953. Municipality of Talavera and its Barrios*. (This and many other Historical Data Papers on Nueva Ecija and many other provinces are located in the Filipiniana section of the Pambansang Aklatan (National Library), Manila.

⁵⁵ Del Rosario, interview. For speculations that hacenderos killed Patricio del Rosario, my sources are numerous interviews in Talavera.

⁵⁶ *The Tribune*, 22 May 1934, p. 7; 10 June 1934, p. 11; 23 June 1934, p. 20; 23 August 1934, p. 16.

⁵⁷ *The Tribune*, 23 June 1933, p. 9; also, for other reports on the Santa Ana story see *The Tribune*, 2 July 1933, pp. 1 ff; and 8 July 1933, p. 14.

⁵⁸ I think that Manahan was still president of the KPMP in June 1933. He was the first president of that organization (founded in 1928), but was expelled from it sometime in 1933 because he was considered a traitor to the peasant cause. Just exactly when in 1933 is not clear. Cf. *Kasaysayan ng Kilusang Magbubukid*, pp. 11-12.

⁵⁹ According to interview data there were organizations in Nueva Ecija before 1937 that drew members from different parts of the province—e.g. *Kapatitang Mag-sasaka* and the KPMP. But in terms of *public* action involving such organizations, newspaper data is the earliest I have.

stration in Nueva Ecija, as early as May 1935, 3,000 “socialists” mostly from Pampanga, but some from Tarlac as well, marched in San Fernando, Pampanga, to celebrate Labor Day. The first newspaper reference to Pedro Abad Santos as a peasant leader is that article. He reportedly said that there was growing unrest of the masses due to unemployment and oppression, and “unless the abuses and wrongs are immediately stopped, I fear that a movement may break out any time.”⁶⁰ Demonstrations of solidarity were practically yearly, sometimes twice yearly, occurrences in Pampanga from 1935 onward. Usually they took place in San Fernando, it being the capital town. On May Day 1939, 30,000 peasants and other workers marched, carrying placards denouncing “rapacious landlords” and condemning fascism. Among the speakers were Crisanto Evangelista and Pedro Abad Santos (national chairman and vice-chairman respectively of the Communist Party of the Philippines) and peasant leaders from Pampanga, including Agapito del Rosario and Luis Taruc.⁶¹ The preceding February an equal number had gathered in San Fernando from all over Pampanga to hear President Quezon. The growing size and number of such demonstrations indicate the spread of unrest and increased unity among the Pampangan peasants.

President Quezon had come to San Fernando that February (1939) to calm growing anger between peasants, on the one hand, and their landlords and central owners, on the other. The months of December (1938) through February had been filled with strikes, bloodshed, canefields set on fire, and unthreshed rice carted away. A general strike, which had been threatening since late December, finally started on January 21 when 500 central workers at the Mount Arayat Sugar Company walked out. They were quickly followed by central workers (about 1,300) at the Pampanga Sugar Development Company (Pasudeco) in San Fernando and mill workers (about 700) at the Pampanga Sugar Mills (Pasumil) in the Del Carmen area.⁶² These 2,000 sugar mill workers were joined by at least 20,000 peasants working in sugar and rice fields. This general strike effectively paralyzed the province for almost two weeks until representatives of all parties concerned reached some temporary agreements through the mediation of the Department of Labor. On February 5, Pedro Abad Santos ordered all strikers to return to work.⁶³ Negotiations for a final settlement dragged over several months, with intermittent strikes, burned cane fields, etc. (all of

⁶⁰ *The Tribune*, 5 May 1935, p. 4. We know from Luis Taruc that Pedro Abad Santos was working on the behalf of peasants years before 1935. *Born of the People*, (New York: International Publishers, 1953).

⁶¹ *The Tribune*, 2 May 1939, pp. 1 ff. At the end of 1938, the Communist Party of the Philippines, then headed by Evangelista, and the Socialist party, led by Pedro Abad Santos, joined in a coalition. Consequently each man became the two principal leaders of the new organization, which was usually called the Communist Party of the Philippines.

⁶² *The Tribune*, 21 January 1939, pp. 1 ff; 22 January 1939, pp. 1 ff; 25 January 1939, pp. 1 ff.

⁶³ *The Tribune*, 5 January 1939, p. 3.

which indicated that the Socialists under Pedro Abad Santos lacked complete discipline or control over the peasants).

Actually a final settlement never was reached; issues from that 1939 strike carried over to a large strike in 1940. In fact more complexities and cause for unrest sprouted from the 1939 trouble. For example, the hiring of strike breakers, a long time practice of landlords and centrals, created the problem of what to do with the strike breakers once the strikers returned to work. Prolonged hesitation on this question, especially by central managers, contributed to another large strike involving thousands of peasants in late 1939 and early 1940.⁶⁴ The Department of Labor declared that strike illegal, which meant that strike breakers now had even stronger claims to the jobs in the eyes of both the government and the central owners.

As in other parts of Luzon, strikes were far from the only activities among peasants in Pampanga. According to the newspapers, the first strike was in 1934 (120 sugar central workers in Mabalacat),⁶⁵ but Table E (Appendix) shows that there were several activities elsewhere in earlier years. Like the strikes, however, other activities increased in frequency and intensity from 1930 through 1940. For example, in 1935-36, angry tenants of two different landlords burned some cane fields; but ten fields were set on fire in 1938, six in 1939, and nine in 1940.⁶⁶ In addition, many similar acts of vandalism, such as destroying palay seed beds and raiding fish ponds, occurred in 1938-40 whereas only three such incidents were cited in earlier years. Another typical act that increasingly occurred was raiding landlords' bodegas to take rice that the tenants claimed rightfully belonged to them. Clashes between strikers and strike-breakers became more frequent as the number of strikes rose. In 1940, when strikes became so numerous that one loses count, there were at least eight clashes between strikers and strike breakers. Few fights involved guns since few peasants had any prior to World War II. But nevertheless, injuries and sometimes deaths did result since the men typically used bolos and clubs. Most showdowns of this sort were in connection with strikes against landlords, but some were the results of strikes at sugar centrals. Occasionally in 1939 and 1940 there were small battles between the PC, local police, or hired guards of the landlords or central, on the one hand, and peasants, on the other. These brief fights commonly resulted after armed men had been called upon either to protect strike breakers or to stand guard over palay that was being harvested.

By no means were violence and vandalism the peasants' normal activities. In fact, to the extent they occurred, they *usually* followed after other

⁶⁴ *The Tribune*, 19 January 1940, pp. 1 ff; 20 January 1940, pp. 1 ff.

⁶⁵ *The Tribune*, 13 January 1934, p. 14.

⁶⁶ Usually the newspapers do not report any motive for such arsons, but apparently the tenants who had been ejected from the land or who were on strike sometimes burned cane fields as a protest against not only the landlord and his practices but also against his hiring of others to replace them.

procedures had been tried, including petitions (to landlords and central owners and to outside parties, like government officials), court litigation, demonstrations, and strikes. For example, as in Nueva Ecija, various field representatives of the Justice and Labor Departments were kept busy trying to mediate between contending groups in Pampanga. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) played an increasingly important role in this regard all over the Philippines, especially in Nueva Ecija and Pampanga.

One activity that was distinctive to Pampanga was elections. At least the peasants' election activity was more obvious in that province than in any other in 1937 and 1940. In other provinces there may have been some attempts to elect particular candidates who were considered sympathetic to the peasants' cause, but such attempts are not documented in *The Tribune* and certainly must have been less successful than in Pampanga. The Socialist organization ran candidates (under the label of Popular Front) for provincial and municipal offices in those election years, with markedly improved success in the second as compared to the first. In 1937 Socialists won the mayorships in Mexico and San Fernando. In Mexico, Socialists also won for vice-mayor and all six seats on the municipal council. Socialists won six of the eight seats on the council in San Fernando. Their candidate for governor, Pedro Abad Santos, received 16,000 votes, but lost the election to Sotero Baluyut. Pedro Abad Santos' vote was 10,000 more than he had received in 1933 when he tried for the same office. To give an indication of the peasant support in 1937, one of the six councilors elected in San Fernando was a woman peasant, daughter of a tenant farmer. Two others were small farmers. (Of the remaining three, one was a law student and two were tailors). The news article reported that in both municipalities the Socialists won heavily in the barrios in order to make up for the much smaller Socialist votes in the poblacions.⁶⁷

In December 1940, the next provincial elections, Socialist candidates, again under the Popular Front label, won the mayorships in nine municipalities—San Fernando, Vivencio Cuyugan (re-elected); Angeles, Agapito del Rosario; Mexico, Fernancio Sampang; Mabalacat, Virgilio Ocampo; Arayat, Casto Aleandrino; Porac, Marciano Dizon; Floridablanca, Benjamin Layug; Candaba, Eliseo Galang; and San Simon, Patricio Yabot. In San Fernando, Angeles, and Mexico, three of the biggest municipalities in the province, Socialists won all councilors seats. Pedro Abad Santos again ran for governor, but once more lost to Baluyut. Abad Santos did however, continue to increase his vote over previous attempts, receiving 20,538 to

⁶⁷ *The Tribune*, 18 December 1937, pp. 1 ff. Unfortunately there is no information about the councilors elected in Mexico, nor any detail such as how many votes were cast, the distribution of votes by municipality for Abad Santos, etc. Nor is there any account in *The Tribune* for the 1933 election. Moreover, officials at the Commission on Elections have told me that they have no voting data for pre-war elections.

Baluyut's 25,354.⁶⁸ Despite his personal defeat, Pedro Abad Santos was elated with the results:

The result of the election is gratifying even beyond my expectation. We have elected Socialist mayors with Socialist councils in eight out of 21 municipalities of the province. I am especially pleased with our victory in three strategic towns, namely, San Fernando, Angeles, and Arayat. The results shows (sic) that the movement is growing rapidly and steadily. . . . The fact that we won in the municipal governments rather than in the provincial board shows also that the movement is stronger at the foundation of the political structure, which means that the change is coming from below, rather than from above and therefore it is more dangerous to the old order.⁶⁹

It is important to point out that in all nine municipalities except one (San Simon), the peasants had been active during 1940 and in previous years. (cf. Table E). It seems certain that the elections were a continuation of peasants' attempts to improve their situation since these Socialist candidates, and the Socialist organization in general, centered their campaigns around the issues and problems that had been the focus of other peasant activity.⁷⁰ Further evidence of this contention is that at least six of the nine men elected mayors (Cuyugan, del Rosario, Sampang, Alejandrino, Dizon, and Layug) were frequently cited in the newspapers as leaders of and spokesmen for peasants and workers in their respective municipalities. Possibly the other three were also leaders but *The Tribune* neglected to mention their names. These six men also had important roles in province wide activities for they often spoke for Pampanga peasants and attended conferences of leaders and participated in negotiations with landlords and government officials when there were attempts to either avert or settle strikes.

This analysis of Pampanga can now turn to the issues involved in all this ferment. As with Nueva Ecija, there were many complaints, but the list can be reduced to a few central issues: (1) payment or taking out of loans; (2) usurious interest; (3) procedure for dividing sugar and palay harvests (including demands for increased shares); (4) payment of agricultural expenses; (5) miscellaneous benefits; (6) increased wages; and (7) individual rights to join organizations or unions. Comparing these basic demands to the list mentioned earlier for Nueva Ecija, the only difference

⁶⁸ *The Tribune*, 12 December 1940, pp. 1 ff. A Socialist also won the mayorship in La Paz, Tarlac (Leon Parungao), but there are no accounts of Socialists winning elsewhere. However, I was told in Nueva Ecija that a few Socialists were elected municipal councilors in that province in 1940. Unfortunately, I cannot find records of such elections.

⁶⁹ *The Tribune*, 14 December 1940, p. 9. The quote says eight, rather than nine, municipalities, because some Socialists did not regard Marciano Dizon, of Porac, as a true comrade, even though he was registered as a Socialist. (Casto Alejandrino, Interview, 12 November 1970. Camp Crame, Quezon City.)

⁷⁰ Perhaps if one had more local history data for San Simon, one could more easily explain Yabot's victory there. As it is, the newspaper reports only one incident in that municipality—in 1933. However, as late as 1939 there was a rumor that "agitators" were active there, but I did not code such rumors. Cf. *The Tribune*, 9 February 1939, pp. 1 ff.

is the demands for better wages. This demand, stated in various ways, was especially common among central workers, whether they be men in the mill itself or those cutting and hauling cane. Also, wage issues were important for peasants who farmed for a wage. For example, in the general strike of 1939, one of the 13 specific demands was that workers who were hired to plow a field should be paid a minimum of ₱1.50 a day. Regarding crop shares, a common proposal was 55/45 and 60/40, in favor of the tenant. Occasionally groups of tenants pushed for 75/25. Under this latter proposal tenants would have paid all farming expenses, whereas with 55/45 and 60/40 landlords and tenants were to share expenses.

Regarding loans and interests, peasants were trying to get guaranteed loans from landlords while simultaneously seeking to eliminate the ever increasing and burdensome interests. An incident in a barrio of San Fernando in 1935 is typical. A group of 50 tenants on the land of Simeon Aguas had requested the following reforms: each tenant be given three cavans of palay each month (as a ration); each be paid ₱2 per month whether they worked or not; a guarantee that each tenant could borrow up to ₱25 per month; and the landlord should provide free medical facilities. The landlord turned down all of these suggestions. Later when he discovered that some of his cane had been prematurely cut, he called a PC detachment to investigate. During the investigation the PC shot one of the tenants; peasants who were witnesses said that there had been absolutely no provocation. Afterwards one tenant said: "They [the landlords] tightened the screws on us. We cannot live under the present conditions, and when we asked the landlords to be liberal, they told us to accept the old order of things or get out. . . . As for the constabulary, they only serve the rich. They do whatever the landlords tell them to do."⁷¹

The tenant quoted had touched on another factor that sometimes provided additional issues that grew out of attempts to solve the basic ones—the use of the PC or hired guards to break strikes, etc. Other such related grievances were the refusals to re-hire strikers, the use of strike breakers, unfair practices of government authorities who were supposed to be working on behalf of justice, and no implementation of existing land tenure laws.

BULACAN

The situation in Bulacan during the 1930's was similar to both Nueva Ecija and Pampanga, although of the three provinces it was the least active. Table C (Appendix) shows that while there was considerable spread of activity by 1940, it was not as intense in Bulacan compared to Nueva Ecija and Pampanga. That is, most of the long term, recurring incidents fall within a few municipalities (mainly San Miguel, San Ildefonso, and San Rafael). Nevertheless, compared to the whole country or even to other provinces in Central and Southern Luzon, Bulacan peasants were extremely

⁷¹ *The Tribune*, 26 May 1935, pp. 1 ff.

active. The province had incidents in 19 municipalities; nine of these 19 experienced incidents in two or more years.

In order to analyze the qualitative and quantitative growth of peasant activities and organization in Bulacan, one has to divide the province into two areas. It is clear that the most active areas in Bulacan were San Rafael and San Ildefonso. Together these two municipalities made up the bulk of a huge (27,400 hectares) Buenavista estate owned by the San Juan de Dios Hospital, which is to say, by the Catholic Church. Peasants on that estate faced *some* problems that were different from those faced by peasants elsewhere in the province. The second area consists of the non-Buenavista areas.

In the 1930's the estate was in the hands of a management that was responsible to the Church. The land itself was cultivated (practically all palay) by two different arrangements: (1) by small tenant farmers who paid *canon* (rent) to the estate for small (2-3 hectares) plots, which they themselves worked; and (2) by tenants who also worked small parcels but paid rental not to the estate but to another lessee, who in turn paid a canon to the estate. That is, some tenants had a lease directly from the estate, while other tenants rented from individuals (called *inquilinos*) who had leased a large number of hectares. Newspaper reports are frustratingly confusing as to how many tenants and lessees there were in Buenavista, but the most consistent figures cited during the 1930's are between six and eight thousand.⁷² Of this number most by 1940 are tenant-lessees — that is, tenant farmers who leased directly from the estate the small parcels they farmed.⁷³ However there are indications in other news reports that in earlier years there were more *inquilinos* than this last reference would suggest. At any rate, by 1939 an estimated 30,000 people lived on the estate lands in San Rafael and San Ildefonso.⁷⁴

The complex history of the Buenavista estate cannot be analyzed briefly and certainly cannot be adequately studied through a heavy reliance on newspaper reports for just one decade. That history, in fact, could be the subject of an entirely separate piece of research. Yet it is important for our purposes to make one point—the continuously intensifying turmoil for the people, mainly tenant farmers, of this area from 1930 right up to World War II. That turmoil resumed and continued to escalate after the Japanese occupation. To this day it is not clear that the affair is settled.⁷⁵

On May 2 and 3, 1935, there was a Sakdal revolt in San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Elsewhere in the province there were also Sakdalista organizations, including one in the San Rafael area. While to most of the nation the Sakdal

⁷² *The Tribune*, 12 February 1939, pp. 1 ff; 4 April 1940, pp. 1 ff.

⁷³ *The Tribune*, 4 April 1940, pp. 1 ff.

⁷⁴ *The Tribune*, 12 February 1939, pp. 1 ff.

⁷⁵ Primitivo D. Mijares, "The Buenavista Scandal," *The Manila Chronicle*, 29 August 1970, p. 2.

uprisings looked like efforts to gain independence, to the participants and members in San Ildefonso the main objective was to have ownership of the land they and their forefathers had been working but still in the hands of the Church. Through the Sakdalista movement they expressed their impatience with their governments' (provincial and national) numerous broken promises to purchase the land and redistribute it to the people who farmed it.⁷⁶ Both before and after 1935 this demand for land ownership was the principal issue. In 1938, 12,000 residents of the estate demonstrated to ask the government to buy the Buenavista lands for immediate re-sale to those working the land.⁷⁷ In 1939 President Quezon dramatically issued the necessary orders, principally to Manuel Roxas (head of both the Rural Progress Administration and the Department of Finance) to purchase or lease the estate.

Between the Sakdal uprising in Buenavista in 1935 and Quezon's order in 1939, considerable organization, protest, and violence had transpired. Every year an increasing number of tenants and inquilinos had refused to pay their canon, which they claimed was exorbitant. And each year the estate managers would auction off the lands held by the delinquent tenants and inquilinos. Then fighting and sporadic violence would follow, either between "old" and "new" occupants or between the "old" occupants and the PC or estate guards dispatched to evict them. Between 1935 and 1939, at least three organizations had been formed, all in one way or another aimed at protecting their members' claims to the land. The first was the *Kabesang Tales*, which in 1936 had about 1,000 members.⁷⁸ Its members were both tenants and inquilinos. Later the two most powerful groups were the *Dumating Na* (in San Rafael) and the *Handa Na* (in San Ildefonso). In the newspapers there are no decent estimates of membership strength, but between 1937 and 1940 the two organizations grew substantially. Members would refuse to pay the canon and refuse to leave the land. Twice such protests so paralyzed the vicinity and threatened widespread violence that the national government stepped in and prevailed upon the estate management to extend the date for payment of fees. In the meantime the peasants took in their harvests despite management orders to the contrary.⁷⁹ In addition, the two organizations, through their principal leader and lawyer, Juan Rustia, had pushed all the way to the United States Supreme Court their claim that the estate did not in fact belong to the Church but to the Philippine government.⁸⁰ All previous court decisions (including the Philippine Supreme Court's) had denied such a claim. Rustia was insistent, however,

⁷⁶ *The Tribune*, 21 May 1935, pp. 1 ff.

⁷⁷ *The Tribune*, 23 January 1938, p. 3.

⁷⁸ *The Tribune*, 24 April 1936, p. 14.

⁷⁹ Jose G. Sanvictores, "A Study of the Conflicts at the Buenavista Estate in Bulacan," 21 January 1939, 17 pp. Roxas Papers, Bundle 10. Pambansang Aklatan, Manila.

⁸⁰ *The Tribune*, 11 February 1940, p. 32.

and so convincing to the members of the *Dumating Na* and *Handa Na* that he led them to boycott a plebiscite election ordered by Quezon in February 1939.⁸¹

When Quezon had finally started the government machinery moving to take the Buenavista estate, he decided to let the residents themselves decide whether the government should buy the estate and in turn lease it to the residents or whether the government should lease the estate from San Juan de Dios Hospital and sublease it to those farming the parcels. In leading the boycott of the plebiscite, Rustia argued that the land rightfully belonged to the government, thus it should not have to pay anything to the Church for the land. Secondly, since the government owns the land, it should redistribute it to the present farmers either free or at nominal cost.⁸² Thirdly, he and the members of the two organizations opposed certain specific aspects of the government's overall plan for administering the estate. They believed that the proposed "cooperative" would become like NARIC (National Rice Corporation), which they felt was an unwieldy body controlled by a few rice magnates, and hence would just perpetuate the status of the tenants as mere laborers.⁸³ Quezon's angry reaction to the boycott was to denounce Rustia, order the cancellation of the plebiscite, and announce that the government would proceed to lease the estate, with a 25 year option to buy, and in turn sublease it to the present tenants and inquilinos.⁸⁴ Quezon's action aroused the ire of even those residents who did not necessarily agree with Rustia; at the very least the vast majority wanted the government to *immediately* expropriate the land for resale to those farming it.⁸⁵ The *Dumating Na* and *Handa Na* continued their stand with Rustia still their spokesman, even though by now he and others in the organization were being harassed.⁸⁶

Meanwhile, inquilinos were also protesting the government's plan because under it the peasants would have to pay only 40% of the crop to the

⁸¹ *The Tribune*, 21 February 1939, p. 8.

⁸² *The Tribune*, 11 January 1939, p. 3. Also see, "Memo for . . . The President [Quezon]; Subject: More incitements in the Buenavista Estate," 24 March 1939, 2 pp. Signed: Patricio A. Dionisio, Confidential Agent, NBI. "Memorandum for The Chief, Information Division, P. C.; Subject: Non Signing of Government Lease Contract by Tenants of Buenavista Estate, San Ildefonso and San Rafael, Bulacan," 24 April 1939. Both documents are in the Roxas Papers, Bundle 10. Pambansang Aklatan, Manila.

⁸³ *The Tribune*, 21 February 1939, p. 8.

⁸⁴ *The Tribune*, 25 February 1939, pp. 1 ff.

⁸⁵ *The Tribune*, 1 February 1939 pp. 1 ff.

⁸⁶ A document in the Roxas Papers describes Rustia and the organizations *Handa Na* and *Dumating Na* as "subversive" and recommends that the principal leaders, including Rustia, of the two organizations should be prevented ". . . from holding any meetings either private or public, within the Buenavista Estate." Cf. "Memo for. . . The President [Quezon]; Subject: More incitements in the Buenavista Estate," 24 March 1939; Signed: Patricio A. Dionisio. Another document in the Roxas Papers is an account by a PC officer following around Rustia and trying to intimidate him. Cf. "Subject: Juan Rustia; To: Provincial Inspector, Bulacan," 7 June 1939, 2 pp. Signed: A. G. Fajardo, 1st Lt., PC. Both documents are in Bundle 10 of the Roxas Papers. Pambansang Aklatan, Manila.

inquilinos instead of 50%, which had been the previous prevailing arrangement.⁸⁷

President Quezon pushed through with the plan, but the trouble did not stop. Many tenants and inquilinos refused to sign the agreement with the new management of the estate—the Rural Progress Administration. The deadline for signing was extended. Eventually most signed, but when the time came to pay the rental the following year, a large number refused to pay. Agitation continued for the sale of the estate. The government administration began ejecting delinquent lessees (about 40% of the total) in an even more drastic fashion than had the previous management.⁸⁸ Despite the change in management, therefore, the old problems persisted. Not only did the questions of land ownership and distribution remain, but so did other issues, such as loan shortages, high interest rates, and unequitable distribution of agricultural expenses.

While these last mentioned problems were secondary themes for those on the Buenavista estate, they were primary for the peasants in other parts of Bulacan, just as they were for peasants in Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and elsewhere in the central plains of Luzon. Strikes, raiding of landlords' *bodegas*, petitioning, and demonstrations were the typical incidents in the rest of Bulacan, especially San Miguel, Baliwag, Malolos, and Bigaa. And like the two provinces analyzed above and the Buenavista area of Bulacan, the size and intensity of such actions heightened through the decade. While the protests grew larger, the problems remained essentially the same, not only from area to area, but over time in any given area. In the newspapers names of landlords who had conflicts with tenants frequently reappeared, particularly in San Miguel, Baliwag, and Malolos. As an example for the points being made here about Bulacan in the 1930's, one can compare a series of strikes in 1933 with another series in 1940. In June 1933 at least 1,000 tenants of several landlords in the San Miguel area were striking or otherwise agitating for reform. Most were members of the KPMP. They wanted the landlords to share half the agricultural expenses, increase the tenants' share of the harvest to 50%, reinstate tenants who had been ejected because they had gone on strike or otherwise had protested, and guarantee loans to tenants.⁸⁹ In January 1940 over 4,000 tenants affiliated with the KPMP in five different municipalities, including San Miguel, called a strike with the principal demands being (1) a larger share of the harvest for tenants (so as to be in accordance with the Rice Share Tenancy Law), (2) landlords should pay half of the agricultural expenses, and (3) landlords should make low interest loans available to tenants.⁹⁰ Not only are the demands similar

⁸⁷ *The Tribune*, 14 February 1939, p. 16; 25 February 1939, pp. 1 ff.

⁸⁸ *The Tribune*, 5 April 1940, pp. 1 ff; 7 April 1940, p. 14.

⁸⁹ *The Tribune*, 2 June 1933, p. 9; 11 June 1933, p. 14; 13 June 1933, p. 11; 18 June 1933, pp. 5, 40; 23 June 1933, p. 9; 28 June 1933, pp. 1 ff.

⁹⁰ *The Tribune*, 12 January 1940, pp. 1 ff; 16 January 1940, p. 16.

between the two years, but at least two of the San Miguel landlords whose tenants had struck in 1933 also experienced the strikes and agitations of 1940.

GENERAL

I have elaborated on Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and Bulacan to show the quality of the incidents and general unrest quantitatively summarized in Table A-E. The situation in the other Central and Southern Luzon provinces found in these tables could be similarly analyzed; the general picture would be the same, only on a smaller scale. The grievances involved, the gradual building of peasant unity, and the variety of activities found in the three core provinces are also found in other provinces in Central and Southern Luzon. Even the history of Buenavista, with its central issue of land ownership, has parallels in other large estates, particularly the religious estates of San Pedro Tunasan, Laguna, and Dinalupihan, Bataan.

In late 1938 the two biggest peasant organizations in Philippine history up to that time, AMT (Aguman Ding Malding Talapagobra) and KPMP, formally joined together.⁹¹ To commemorate the event they held a large parade on 11 February 1939 in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija.⁹² The event is representative of the principal process that was taking place during the 1930's—peasants were learning the importance of unity among themselves. This process did not begin or end during the decade, but it did make greater advances than perhaps in any other previous decades in Philippine history. Both the AMT and KPMP could trace their origins to several earlier and much smaller peasant groups, most of which historians have yet to rediscover but would include the *Kapatirang Magsasaka*, *Union ng Magsasaka*, *Lege de Campesinos*, *Tangulan*, *Kapisanan Makabola Makasinag*, and *Sakdalista*. The precise history of the building of larger peasant groups with social, economic and, later, political objectives has yet to be written for the Philippines, but this paper has indicated some of the continuities of areas, issues, and individuals involved. By 1939 the AMT, which was the mass organ of the Socialist party, claimed a following of 70,000,⁹³ drawn from all parts of Pampanga, and portions of southeastern Tarlac, southern Nueva Ecija, and western Bulacan.⁹⁴ The KPMP had about 60,000 members,⁹⁵ heavily concentrated in Nueva Ecija and Bulacan but also in Laguna, Rizal and Pangasinan.⁹⁶

⁹¹ Guillermo Capadocia, *History of the Peasant and Labor Movement in the Philippines*, [no date], 28 pp. Huk-PKP captured documents. Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

⁹² *The Tribune*, 12 February 1939, p. 4.

⁹³ Taruc, p. 46.

⁹⁴ Luis Taruc, Interview, 27 January 1970. Quezon City.

⁹⁵ Kenneth Kurihara, *Labor in Philippine Economics*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1945), p. 72.

⁹⁶ Areas of KPMP membership are based on news stories in *The Tribune* for 1938-40.

Together, then, the new AMT-KPMP alliance brought together about 130,000 peasants from Central and Southern Luzon.

The quality of peasant organization is not indicated by size alone. In 1938, 1939, and 1940 several general strikes threatened and sometimes took place. Two of these in Pampanga were cited previously. In early 1940 a general strike of 20-30 thousand peasants in 14 municipalities of Nueva Ecija was only partly avoided through the intercession of government officials.⁹⁷ Significant too are the increasing number of peasants going out on sympathy strike or otherwise showing their solidarity for fellow peasants who were striking or facing a crisis of some sort. Strikes in Calumpit, Bulacan, and Balanga, Bataan, in January 1939 were in part sympathy strikes for the general strike in Pampanga during that month.⁹⁸ The general strike in Pampanga in January 1940 also affected parts of Bataan, Bulacan, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija.⁹⁹ Another recorded event indicating the growing solidarity among peasants in different provinces occurred in 1939. In March, April, and May of that year, landlords all over Central Luzon had been ejecting hundreds of tenants from their parcels of land. In May several thousand tenants in Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and Bulacan simultaneously threatened a sit-down strike should landowners continue to eject tenants who were insisting on the implementation of existing tenancy laws. Eight thousand peasants from Arayat, Candaba, and Magalang, Pampanga, and San Antonio and Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, met at the municipal building in Cabiao to warn about the strike and protest such ejections.¹⁰⁰

Of course there were still many weaknesses in the peasant movement and unity was far from total. For one thing, there were still many peasants, even within Central and Southern Luzon, who were not members of the KPMP, AMT, or any organizations like them. After all, the strike breakers were peasants too, although frequently "imported", so to speak, from other regions.

Secondly, sometimes there were disputes between leaders of different, yet still aggressive, peasant organizations. There were for example, ideological differences among respective leaders of the KPMP and the Sakdalistas.¹⁰¹ Personal rivalries and differences over policy and tactics between some leaders of the AMT-KPMP organization and Juan Rustia may explain why the KPMP-AMT organization did not have an alliance with the *Dumating Na*

⁹⁷ *The Tribune*, 19 October 1939, p. 16; 10 January 1940, p. 12.

⁹⁸ *The Tribune*, 27 January 1939, pp. 1 ff; 31 January 1939, p. 14.

⁹⁹ *The Tribune*, 19 January 1940, pp. 1 ff.

¹⁰⁰ *The Tribune*, 18 May 1939, pp. 1 ff.

¹⁰¹ For some detail, but far from complete, see Jose Lava, *Milestones on the History of the Philippine Communist Party*, [undated; probably written about September 1950], p. 21. This manuscript, prepared from Lava's own knowledge of the CPP and from notes other Party members gave to Lava, was never, to my knowledge, published. Yet there are a few copies available; one is in the Filipiniana section of the Ateneo Library, Quezon City.

and *Handa Na*.¹⁰² Since Philippines organizations have historically tended to be personal followings of the leaders, it is possible that, to the extent these peasant organizations were only personal followings, the building of stronger and wider solidarity among peasants was jeopardized because of disputes among group leaders. Jose Lava says that a serious problem with the peasant and urban organizations prior to World War II was this personal following nature.¹⁰³ Undoubtedly this is true. But relative to earlier periods in Philippine history, there were stronger horizontal ties (or perhaps call it “class consciousness”) among Central Luzon peasants in 1940 than previously. The sheer size of the AMT-KPMP organization suggests this. Also suggestive is the large number of principal leaders in those two groups, both before and after they joined together. Third, judging from the Talavera study, peasants generally joined together not so much because of special charisma or other attractiveness of its local leaders (del Rosario and Santa Ana) or of provincial leaders (e.g., Juan Feleo). What stood out as the important factors to their joint efforts were (1) the issues and problems involved were crucial to all of them, and (2) the realization that unity was important. The question of personal followings versus cause-oriented organizations deserves considerably more attention than can be allowed now in this paper. In a later analysis, I will take it up in more detail.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES

The first law passed to regulate landlord-tenant relations was the Rice Share Tenancy Act of 1933. The law was never in effect anywhere in the Philippines until 1936. Up to that time its implementation was at the discretion of municipal governments, none of which ever took the necessary steps to do so.¹⁰⁴ In 1936 the law was amended to allow the President of the Commonwealth to put the Act into effect in municipalities he so designated. The essential provision of the law required that all contracts between landowners and tenants be in writing. In 1937 President Quezon declared that the law should be enforced in all Central Luzon provinces; later he added others. In reality the law merely stamped legal approval on the arrangements between landlords and tenants prevailing at that time.

The law did not reduce the number of tenant-landlord disputes; on the contrary, they increased because, in part, peasants were seeking implementation of the law.¹⁰⁵ “If enforced the Act would have improved the tenant’s lot somewhat. But for those estates where the tenants were both acquainted with the law and bold enough to demand its applications, the almost univer-

¹⁰² *The Tribune*, 4 March 1939, pp. 1 ff.

¹⁰³ *Lava*, p. 20.

¹⁰⁴ Stubbs, p. 146; *The Tribune*, 1 May 1936, p. 2.

¹⁰⁵ *The Tribune*, 13 March 1939, pp. 1 ff.

sal reaction of landlords was to threaten ejection at the end of the agricultural year."¹⁰⁶

The biggest problem with the law was that contracts were only for one year. Peasant organizations tried to get new laws that would make renewal of the contract automatic so long as the tenant had fulfilled his obligations. No such law was passed. The government did pass some amendments aimed at improving the tenants' economic and social welfare. But if any landlord disliked certain specifications of the law, he could simply refuse a contract renewal at the end of the season to any tenants who insisted on contracts with those specifications. Such "purges", referred to in the Nueva Ecija section above, threatened thousands of Central Luzon peasants by 1939. The Department of Labor admitted it was practically helpless to do anything to prevent those evictions.

More laws followed, all as part of Quezon's "social justice" program. But they suffered from the limitations of earlier ones, such as having no automatic renewal of contract. Furthermore, like previous laws, the new ones would, if effectively implemented, bring only moderate change. Let us consider first the additional problem of enforcement, and then the moderate nature of such laws.

Aside from the inadequate administrative machinery and lack of personnel,¹⁰⁸ laws were never impartially enforced because of the political system in the country. In the provinces the landlords and others of the upper class had practically a monopoly on the economic and political power. This monopoly allowed them not only to influence pending legislation in Manila to fit their own interests, but to bend and even ignore the laws once passed. In Talavera the peasants' unanimous and most bitter criticism against the political system prior to World War II (and afterwards, for that matter) was that the system was inequitable since those with wealth and influence could choose to either use the laws or ignore them, depending on their needs, and there was very little that the rest (those without wealth and influence) could do to counteract. Consequently, as noted earlier, peasants and peasant leaders charged that government officials (both local and national) played favorites with landlords and central owners. The Philippine Constabulary, forever being called upon by landlords and central owners, sometimes acted like personal armies of these influentials. In the eyes of the peasants the PC was

¹⁰⁶ David O. D. Wurfel, *The Bell Report and After: A Study of the Political Problems of Social Reform Stimulated by Foreign Aid*, Ph.D. Dissertation (unpublished), Cornell University, 1960, p. 409.

¹⁰⁷ *The Tribune*, 13 March 1939, pp. 1 ff.

¹⁰⁸ The lack of machinery and the overlapping and conflicting areas of jurisdiction, creating only more confusion, is frequently reported in *The Tribune* for 1930-1940. For example, Manuel R. Joven, a national leader of KPMP, complained that 95% of the tenancy cases filed in the CIR the year before were still pending in November 1940; cf. *The Tribune*, 14 November 1940, p. 11. Regarding the confusing administration of laws, see *The Tribune*, 11 September 1940, p. 10; 18 September 1940, p. 11; and November 1940, p. 5.

in fact just that; peasants rarely would think to call on the PC to enforce an infringement of the law by a landlord.¹⁰⁹

The court system, especially at the local level, was no refuge for those without wealth or influence. The primary lower court in the provinces was the justice of the peace. These justices were appointive offices. Through the informal appointment process, including various intricacies of patron-client relations and family ties, the justices were usually responsible not to the law but to the wealthy and the influential. This was frequently true also of higher court officials.¹¹⁰ Pedro Abad Santos expressed the peasants' cynical view of the courts when he wrote to his brother Jose, who was then Secretary of Justice, "I might as well tell you at the outset that the workers [meaning tenant farmers, central workers, and other agricultural laborers] have lost faith in the courts . . . our ruling class has taken the place of the former [colonial] rulers and use the courts to further their interest and privileges."¹¹¹

Turning now to the extremely modest quality of any attempted reforms for the agricultural system, one can refer to other analyses of the "social justice" program, under which all the government's agricultural laws and plans fell.¹¹² The government (meaning in particular President Quezon) never intended sweeping reforms.¹¹³ While Quezon spoke frequently in favor of "social justice", he did little to implement it because, says Theodore Friend, the government was far more concerned with improving trade relations with the United States than with basic internal development.¹¹⁴ Others argue that the reason lies in the fact that "social justice" for the masses could only come at the expense of certain claims of property owners, which the Quezon government never questioned.¹¹⁵ Consequently, most of the laws had built-in protections for the property owners, be they landowners, central owners, rice dealers, etc.

When the laws and other parts of the political system failed to satisfy the peasants, Quezon relied on tokens and "father-like psychology."¹¹⁶ His

¹⁰⁹ Harlan R. Crippen also argues that the PC were but tools of the politicians and landlords. "Philippine Agrarian Unrest: Historical Backgrounds," *Science and Society*, 10 (Fall 1946), p. 351.

¹¹⁰ Peasants in Talavera told me how the judges were "on the landlords' side." Similar evidence comes from an interview with a former lawyer for peasants in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, during the 1920's and 1930's. Interview, 4 February 1970, Quezon City.

¹¹¹ *The Tribune*, 18 September 1940, p. 11.

¹¹² Theodore Friend, *Between Two Empires, Philippines (1929-1946)*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965). Francisco Nemenzo, Jr., *The Land for the Landless Program in the Philippine Government*, MA Thesis, University of the Philippines, 1959. Loretta M. Sicat, *Quezon's Social Justice Program and the Agrarian Problem*, MA Thesis, University of the Philippines, 1959.

¹¹³ Sicat, p. 87.

¹¹⁴ Friend, pp. 156, 160.

¹¹⁵ Sicat, p. 90; Nemenzo, p. 78.

¹¹⁶ Sicat, p. 90; Friend, p. 160.

favorite method was to journey to the provinces and “perform” a speech that pleaded with the people to be patient and admonished them not to use violence.¹¹⁷ And when there was violence, or widespread strikes and other signs of unrest, Quezon was quick to send reinforcements to the PC units stationed in each province.¹¹⁸

By the end of 1940, the government had failed to meet the unrest with commensurate solutions. Ironically, the very laws that the unrest had helped bring about, having served as a kind of catalyst, created more problems and conflicts for the rural society than they solved. Indeed laws that peasants had hoped would protect them socially and economically were in fact used more and more to their disadvantage. The massive ejections in 1939 and 1940 are the most visible examples. To have contracts with landlords was originally thought to be a step in the right direction but they turned out to be disadvantageous to tenants. Given the nature of the social system, tipped so heavily in favor of the peasants’ former patrons, such laws and contracts could not possibly include all the provisions and benefits that the peasants had so long before relied upon. (Cf. Part I of this paper). Of course, had the landed and wealthy been able they could have continued their role as the traditional patron; but by all evidence, that old order was gone for them. The masses, on the other hand, were still trying to hold on to that system.

In 1933 some tenants in San Miguel, Bulacan, opposed the idea of having contracts with landlords. They did not want to reduce “. . . the relations between tenants and landowners . . . [to] a strictly contractual basis.”¹¹⁹ Symbolic to the whole process taking place in Central Luzon (as seen in Parts I and II of this paper) the landlords increasingly insisted on such contracts while tenants realized, as the ones in Bulacan cited above had realized, that the contracts were contrary to their economic and social security. Such a business like arrangement was not what they wanted. Furthermore, they would always lose, if not by failing to get all the provisions they needed to protect their marginal income, then through the landlords’ superior power and influence to escape from any conditions later found too restrictive. But in the 1930’s peasants were learning the importance of organization and unity in order to stand up to the system in an attempt to regain the social and economic security they were losing. Under the guidance of their leaders, some of whom had visionary ideas very different

¹¹⁷ For example, see the news accounts of three of Quezon’s famous speeches in Central Luzon: San Fernando, Pampanga (*The Tribune*, 15 February 1939, pp. 1 ff.); Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija (*The Tribune*, 2 May 1939, pp. 1 ff. 16); and Buenavista Estate, Bulacan (*The Tribune*, 1 February 1939, pp. 1 ff.).

¹¹⁸ E.g., in March 1939 Quezon prevailed upon the National Assembly to appropriate an emergency fund of ₱500,000 for additional PC being sent to Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and Bulacan and for more employees in the Department of Justice. *The Tribune*, 4 March 1939, pp. 1 ff.

¹¹⁹ *The Tribune*, 6 May 1933, pp. 13, 14.

from the peasants' outlooks, they were trying more political channels, hoping to find the political system responsive where the economic and social system had failed to be.

REVOLUTION, 1946-54

From about 1946-1954, a peasant based movement, which I call the Huk-PKP revolution, unsuccessfully attempted to bring about change through organized violence.¹²⁰ In this section I want to briefly present evidence that that revolution was a continuation of the unrest analyzed above. That evidence centers around two propositions: (1) the areas of unrest prior to World War II correlate highly with the areas where the Huk-PKP revolution was the strongest, and (2) there are close similarities between peasant grievances and demands of 1930-1940 and of the attempted revolution. This comparison must be brief, with many questions left unanswered. In being so brief, the flavor of the whole period is almost lost—the turmoil, the revolutionary build-up, the government reaction, etc. Nevertheless, the purpose now is not to do justice to the revolution itself. That task is left for future writings.

Spaced between the peasant unrest and organizations of 1930-1940 and the Huk-PKP revolution was the Japanese occupation. Several guerrilla groups fought the Japanese forces during that time; the strongest one in Central Luzon was the Hukbalahap. To a degree the Hukbalahap was a continuation of the increasing solidarity and organization among peasantry since numerous Hukbalahap leaders had been peasant worker leaders; also the Hukbalahap was a united front that included, among other groups, the KPMP and the AMT.¹²¹ The principal areas of Hukbalahap strength and mass support were in Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Pampanga, Bulacan and Laguna,¹²² although there were also other guerrillas in these provinces. As an indication of Hukbalahap strength, it reportedly had 10,000 armed men in December 1943. During Liberation, the Hukbalahap was credited with taking from the Japanese three major towns in Central Luzon — Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija; Tarlac, Tarlac; and San Fernando, Pampanga.¹²³

The Huk-PKP revolution was strongest in the areas of the former Hukbalahap and the areas of greatest rural unrest prior to World War II. The

¹²⁰ PKP stands for *Partidong Komunista ng Pilipinas*. Usually this Huk-PKP revolution is referred to simply as the Huk movement or Huk revolution. However, the Communist Party of the Philippines was also important in the revolution, yet not always coterminous with the Huks (or, more properly, the *Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan*/ People's Liberation Army/).

¹²¹ The best treatment to date on the Hukbalahap is Luis Taruc, *Born of the People*. There is also a document at Camp Aguinaldo that provides some valuable details: *History and Organization of the Hukbalahap and United Front Movement*, December 1945, 15 pp. plus appendices. It was prepared by the Military Police Command, AFWESPAC, Intelligence Division.

¹²² William J. Pomeroy, *The Forest*, (New York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 39.

¹²³ *History and Organization of the Hukbalahap and United Front Movement*.

first type of evidence to support this contention comes from Huk-PKP documents. Although a thorough analysis of all the relevant documents will require a separate study, one document in particular will serve the purpose of this paper. In 1950 the Huk-PKP leadership prepared a general organizational report, which was a summary of various regional reports from cadres and commanders.¹²⁴ Included in that report was a ranking of the various regions. (Table III).

Table III. RELATIVE RANKINGS OF HUK-PKP REGIONS, MAY 1950

	<i>No. of cadre</i>	<i>No. of armed men</i>	<i>Degree of mass Organizations</i>
Reco 1	1	1	1
Reco 2	2	2	2
Reco 3	4	4	4
Reco 4	3	3	3
Reco 5	6	6	6
Reco 6 and 7	5	5	5

According to the regional committee (Reco) divisions at that time, Reco 1 was Nueva Ecija, eastern Pangasinan, and northern Quezon; Reco 2, Pampanga, Tarlac, Bataan, and Zambales; Reco 3, Bulacan, Rizal, and Manila; Reco 4, Laguna, southern Quezon, Batangas, and Cavite; Reco 5, Bicol; Reco 6, Negros and Panay; and Reco 7, Mindanao.¹²⁵ In the document, Reco 6 and 7 were grouped together; had they been ranked separately Reco 7 would be last, judging from other related documents. Again based on a cursory examination of several documents regarding strength of the movement, the first four Recos are distinctly much superior to Recos 5, 6, and 7.

A second source of data for Huk-PKP areas are reports in the *Philippine Free Press*, beginning in 1948, that gave a brief summary of all Huk-PKP activity each week. Such activity included Huk appearance in barrios or towns, clashes between Huks and the government soldiers, etc. Table F (Appendix) is a numerical summary of those reports. For each incident a count of one was given. Since the *Free Press* names the municipality where each incident occurred, I coded incidents by municipality. The (b) columns on Table F are the number of municipalities in each particular province where one or more incidents occurred.

As with the summary of incidents from 1930-1940, a striking aspect of Table F is the heavy concentration in Central and Southern Luzon. Also, the three most active provinces are again Bulacan, Pampanga, and Nueva Ecija. The next most active province is Quezon. (I should note that the

¹²⁴ *Pangkalahatang Ulat Pang-Organisasyon* (General Organization Report), May 1950, 20 pp. Exhibit 0-1049, Criminal Case No. 14071 (Lava, et al.; Politburo Trial), CFI, Manila.

¹²⁵ Pomeroy, pp. 39-40.

increasing number of Huk-PKP incidents in Quezon, Zambales, and Bataan is probably due to Huk-PKP armed men retreating to those mountainous areas while being pursued by government forces.) Of course, the reports in the *Free Press* are not totally reliable, so figures in Table F can at best indicate only general trends and relative strength.

If one compares the overall picture of peasant incidents in 1930-1940 (Tables A and B, Appendix) with Table III and Table F (Appendix), the general conclusion is that the Huk-PKP movement was strongest in those same areas where peasant activities had been the most numerous and continuous. It is clear that there is considerable continuity between pre-World War II and post-World War II for Southern and Central Luzon. One can even say that the strongest continuity lies within the three core provinces of Central Luzon—Bulacan, Pampanga, and Nueva Ecija.

Interviews with former Huk-PKP leaders help to verify these continuities. Central Luzon provinces (principally Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and Bulacan, and also southern Tarlac) were the easiest provinces for Huk-PKP cadres to organize in and move about. Even compared to Southern Luzon, the revolutionaries had an easier time in Central Luzon.¹²⁶ One long time peasant and Huk-PKP leader, Casto Alejandrino (the same Socialist who was elected Mayor of Arayat in 1940), compared the people's support in Southern Luzon to that in Central Luzon: "The initial response was the same—warm, hospitable, and attentive to what the Huks said and did. The difference was in their *stability*; the support of the people in Central Luzon is more stable, more dependable, when times become tough and pressure is great."¹²⁷ According to Cenon Bungay, due to politicalization more people in Central Luzon than elsewhere were either in the Huk-PKP movement or supported it. This politicalization had come over time and through struggle to improve their situation.¹²⁸ There were only "pockets" of politicalized people in Southern Luzon; most of these were in Laguna and in the Quezon-Laguna boundary area. As in Central Luzon, these other "pockets" were in large measure politicized as a consequence of activity in the 1930's.¹²⁹

Peregrino Taruc said that lack of politicalization over time among the masses (peasants) was the principal reason why Huk-PKP support was never substantial in Iloilo and Negros Occidental, even though the socio-economic conditions in those provinces were somewhat similar to Central Luzon.¹³⁰ Other former Huk-PKP activists would agree. Looking again at Table A (Appendix), there were some incidents (mostly among laborers)

¹²⁶ Cenon Bungay, Interview, 15 July 1970. Camp Crame, Quezon City.

¹²⁷ Casto Alejandrino, Interview 14 July 1950. Camp Crame, Quezon City.

¹²⁸ Bungay, Interview, 15 July 1970.

¹²⁹ Alejandrino, Interview, 14 July 1950. The term "pockets" of politicalization is from Alejandrino.

¹³⁰ Peregrino Taruc, Interview, 9 July 1970. Camp Crame, Quezon City.

in Negros Occidental and Iloilo in 1930-1940. Table F (Appendix) and Table III indicate that the Huk-PKP movement was indeed weak in those two provinces, and captured documents I have seen would verify this. Yet the Huk-PKP movement spent considerable energy and sent several experienced peasant organizers and cadres to those areas, trying to get the peasants and laborers there to support and join the movement. The minimal success would not only bear out Taruc's analysis. It also suggests that revolution cannot be exported, so to speak, nor created in a short time. Revolution grows as the conditions allow and as the people come to that conclusion after a substantial degree of frustrated political activity.

Perhaps the reasons the workers in Manila did not support the Huk-PKP movement to any significant degree follow from the above generalization. In 1930-1940 there were numerous incidents (practically all strikes) in Manila. But unlike peasant unrest in the nearby provinces, the laborers' strikes seemed to have brought measurable results—e.g. increased wages and collective bargaining rights. Furthermore, in examining the newspaper reports, one does not see the repeated occurrences of strikes at the same factories, businesses, etc., which suggests again that the occasional strike among a group of workers brought some satisfying results. Consequently, as one Huk-PKP leader said, the workers in Manila did not develop a "political consciousness" because they directed their strikes, etc., at economic issues of immediate concern.¹³¹

It seems to me that the workers did not have to develop a "political consciousness" and move to the political realm in order to seek what they wanted. The peasants in Central and Southern Luzon, on the other hand, did have to, and later found that even at the political level there was little response to their needs. This discovery helped push them to revolution.

Turning now to the continuity of issues, the best statements of peasant demands and grievances are position papers, resolutions, and other documents of the PKM. (Between 1946 and 1948 the PKM was theoretically not part of the growing Huk-PKP revolution, but in actuality many of its members, numbering about half a million peasants,¹³² were already directly or indirectly involved.) Before reading such documents, one would expect to find a loud, shrill cry of "land for the landless", or land redistribution. Instead one finds that the documents assume that the tenancy system will continue and advocate reforms within that system. Prior to 1950 the most radical statement for land redistribution appears in a 1946 document that advocates a long range, many staged program through which more people will own their farm lands.¹³³ Other than that, the only call for land redistri-

¹³¹ Jesus Lava, Interview. 19 August 1970. Camp Crame, Quezon City.

¹³² This figure appears in a "Letter to the Congress of the Philippines," 26 January 1948, from The Executive Committee, Pambansang Kaisahan ng mga Magbubukid. Exhibit W-435, Criminal Case 15841 (Hernandez, et al.), CFI, Manila.

¹³³ *Patakarang Pangkabukiran ng PKM* (Agricultural Platform of the PKM), 20 March 1946, pp. 4. 5. Huk-PKP captured documents. Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

bution typically seen is that land owned by Japanese, the Church, and the government should be sub-divided and sold to the tenants. This paper showed earlier that expropriation of such lands was a central issue before the war on a government estate (Sabani in Laur, Nueva Ecija) and a Church estate (Buenavista in Bulacan).

Practically all other proposals regarding agriculture found in PKM and related documents captured from the Huk-PKP movement seek modification of the tenancy system. Most advocate increased shares for tenants (for example, usually 60/40, 70/30 (in favor of the tenants) or *buwisan*—fixed rent—for palay and tobacco; 40/30/30 for sugar, with 40% being for the tenant and 30 each for the landowner and the central); more equitable sharing of agricultural expenses, particularly irrigation fees; and better relations between landlords and tenants.¹³⁴ Like Central Luzon peasants before World War II many documents speaking for postwar peasants assail bad practices of landlords, with unjust evictions of tenants being the most common complaint. In addition to such modifications in the tenancy system, the PKM was also proposing more efficient and technologically advanced farming practices.

A 1952 document from the PKP spoke more forcefully about land redistribution and ending the tenancy system once and for all.¹³⁵ But such references are the exception; furthermore, I doubt whether they spoke aptly for the peasant base of the movement. When peasants in Nueva Ecija discussed the Huk-PKP movement's objectives, very rarely would they mention land redistribution (other than for Church and government owned estates) or anything bordering on ending the tenancy system. The main objective as regards agriculture, according to these peasants, was to increase the peasant's share of the harvest. Jesus Lava, formerly the General Secretary of the PKP, confirmed this in an interview. He said that peasants only wanted to increase their share; they really were not trying to get the land for themselves. "It was the Communist Party [in the Philippines] that popularized the slogan "Land for the Landless;" that didn't come from the peasants' themselves."¹³⁶

Two other peasant grievances of tremendous importance prior to World War II were (1) landlords frequently refused to give food rations and loans to their tenants and (2) the interest rates for loans either landlords or money lenders were usurious. These were also crucial issues for peasants

¹³⁴ *Patakarang Pangkabukiran ng PKM*; Bataan Provincial Committee, Instruction Number 5, to PKM, June 1947; *General Rules and Regulations of the National Peasants Union (PKM)*, September 1945. Huk-PKP captured documents. Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

¹³⁵ *Pahusayin ang ating Pagtuturo ukol sa atin Patakarang sa Pamamahagi ng Lupa sa Kabukiran* (Improve our instruction concerning our basis for the distribution of agricultural lands), June 1952. Huk-PKP captured documents. Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

¹³⁶ Jesus Lava, Interview, 12 August 1970, Camp Crame, Quezon City.

during the Huk-PKP movement. For example, they are the objects of attack in several articles of the PKM publication *Magbubukid* in 1946.¹³⁷ To the PKM the solution was to establish rural banks that would give low-interest loans and to establish cooperatives, which would also provide easy-term loans.¹³⁸ Peasants in Nueva Ecija also mentioned the establishment of loan sources as one objective of the Huk-PKP movement, but they said that was a more long-ranged plan. The more immediate solution was to reduce interest rates landlords and money lenders charged.

As regards the agricultural system, then, grievances and demands of peasants during the Huk-PKP revolution are strikingly similar to those during the unrest prior to the Japanese occupation. There are also similarities among non-agricultural issues. The most important of these is that during both time periods, peasants were highly critical of the political system. In both cases peasants believed the government was in the hands of the elite, particularly the landlords, while the poor people had no influence in government and without influence there was no way to get justice. This is how peasants in San Ricardo, Talavera, including former Huk-PKP participants, described the political system prior to and after the Japanese occupation. Similar descriptions appear in captured documents; e.g., "Only the big people and the wealthy have a decent life, while the rest of the people have no chance to escape their misery. At the same time, the government is in the hands of the reactionary capitalists and the poor people's enemy hacenderos."¹³⁹ Many peasants and captured documents aimed their criticisms at specific acts of repression, such as landlord armies molesting the peasants, government soldiers harassing PKM members even though that organization was legal (until 1948), and the unjust removal in 1946 of several Congressmen who were defenders of the peasants' interests.

Continuity in the areas of unrest and the issues involved in the unrest prior to and after the Japanese occupation supports the contention that the Huk-PKP revolution was the outcome of a process that started decades before, when the traditional socio-economic order began to disintegrate, leaving peasants in an increasingly precarious, insecure position. The evidence presented in this brief paper is admittedly incomplete, but more can be, and in the future will be, brought together to support the argument and analyze the Huk-PKP movement in some detail. From the evidence presented here one can conclude, at the very least, that the typical interpreta-

¹³⁷ *Magbubukid* (Peasant) issues held among the Huk-PKP captured documents at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, are few. There is one issue for each of the following months: January, April, May, and July, 1946. Each issue is about 12 pages.

¹³⁸ "Ang Kahalagan ng Kooperatiba" (The importance of cooperatives), by Mateo del Castillo, *Magbubukid*, January 1946. Huk-PKP captured documents. Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

¹³⁹ "Material Ni Kas. Sigundo, ED ng Secom no. 8" (Material of Comrade Sigundo, Education Instructor of Section Committee no. 8), (not dated; probably written in 1953 or 1954), Huk-PKP captured documents. Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

tions of the Huk-PKP movement have to be abandoned. That revolution was not the work of communists or any other such ideologues. Of course leaders played important roles in the movement prior to and after 1940. They brought organizational, literary, legal, and other skills that helped to shape organizations and to encourage needed discipline and planning. Some of these leaders, especially at the national level, held Marxist-Leninist convictions and acted, in part, in accordance with those convictions. In this sense communism played a role in the whole drama of the movement. That role, however, was limited and directly dependent upon the existence of unrest, which grew out of profound social and economic problems and came from the rural people themselves. People who believe that "outside agitators," communist or otherwise, can somehow create peasant unrest and revolts do a grave injustice to peasants and commit serious errors in judgment. Secondly, the peasants' anger and frustrations were not sudden and new phenomena during the Huk-PKP period. The power holders—American and Filipino—in the Philippines had plenty of time to prevent the revolution. Instead they either could not or would not recognize the signs of unrest all along the way; or perhaps they were incapable of dealing with the basic problems.

APPENDIX *

TABLE A

Number of Incidents	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	Total
Bulacan	3		6	15	5	9	15	10	22	14	20	119
Pampanga	1	3	3	4	4	14	1	19	36	44	64	193
Nueva Ecija	7	3	11	4	0	7	8	24	8	61	38	171
Tarlac	1	2	2		2	1	3	1	11	3	9	35
Pangasinan		2	1			3	11	7	3	1	2	30
Bataan			1	1	1			1		7	15	26
Northern Luzon	2		1		2	2		2	2	4	4	19
Ilocos	1					1		2	2			6
Laguna		1	1		2	5	5	2	1	7	7	31
Rizal	5	1	1		5	7	7	8	5	2	3	44
Cavite	1		1	4				1	1	2	2	11
Batangas		2			1	4	3	5	1	2	3	21
Tayabas	1		1			1	1	1	1	2		8
Bicol							1			1	2	4
Negros Occ.	1	19	16	1		3		2	5	9	6	52
Iloilo	3	4		1	1	2	2		2	2	4	20
Capiz									2	1		3
Visayan (other)		2		2	4	3			2	5	3	19
Mindanao	1		1	4		5	2	2	3	3	1	22
Manila	12	6	4	7	22	9	11	11	29	25	23	159

* Tables A, B, C, D, and E are compilation of peasant and labor incidents as appeared in *The Tribune* (Manila) 1930-1940. It should be noted, however, no coding was done for the following movements: Kapisanan Makabola Makasinag, Tayug up-

TABLE B

Number of Incidents	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	Total
Bulacan	2		4	3	4	6	4	5	5	7	13	
Pampanga	1	2	2	5	5	9		7	14	15	17	
Nueva Ecija	3	1	6	3		5	5	11	5	19	17	
Tarlac	1	2	2		2	1	3	1	6	2	5	
Pangasinan		2	1			2	6	5	3	1	2	
Bataan			1	1	1			1		4	3	
Laguna		1	1		2	3	2	2	1	3	4	
Rizal	5	1	1		4	6	5	8	4	2	3	
Cavite	1		1	4				1	1	2	1	
Batangas		1			1	1	2	2	1	2	2	
Tayabas	1		1			1	1	1	1	1		
Negros Occ.	1	9	3	1		2		1	3	5	6	
Iloilo		2	2		1	1	2	2		3	2	3

TABLE C

Number of Incidents	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	Total
<i>Province of Bulacan</i>												2
San Rafael	2		1	1				4	3	9	2	3
San Ildefonso	1		1	4	1	1	9	2	9	2	2	3
San Miguel			2	10	2	1				1	2	3
Baliwag			2			1						1
Malolos						1				2	1	2
Bigaa						3		1				1
Sta. Maria						1						
Bustos				1				1				
Calatagan								1				
San Jose del Monte									1			
Polo					1				1	1	2	
Calumpit											2	
Bulacan (town)											2	1
Hagonoy												1
Plaridel												1
Guiginto												1
Pulilan												1
Bocau												1
Meycauayan												1
(Unspecified)							1				1	1

rising, Tanguan incidents, and Sakdalista. These four are discussed in the text of this paper. Nor were any counts assigned to two other occurrences: the activities of the Lope de la Rosa gang (principally in Bulacan and Nueva Ecija), and the activities of Asedillo and Encallado (principally in Laguna-Tayabas border area). These two cases must be studied more carefully first.

TABLE D

Number of Incidents	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	Total
<i>Nueva Ecija</i>												
Nampicuan	3								1		1	
Cuyapo				1				3	5		2	
Gapan	2			1		1					2	3
Cabiao			1	1					2		8	4
San Antonio			3						2		3	1
San Isidro			1									4
Cabanatuan			2			1	2	4	4	4	13	3
Aliaga			1									
Jaen			1						1		3	1
Guimba						3					3	2
Muñoz						1					2	
Zaragoza								1				1
San Leonardo								1			1	1
Quezon									3		1	3
Talavera								1	1		8	5
Bongabon		1							1		1	1
Peñaranda				1		1			1	1		
Sta. Rosa		1							3	1	2	2
Laur										1	5	2
Sto. Domingo										1	1	1
San Jose											1	
Lupao											1	
Licab											2	3
San Carlos												1
(Unspecifiel)	1	2	2								3	

TABLE E

Number of Incidents	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	Total
<i>Pampanga:</i>												
Arayat	1	1		1	1	1				7	3	4
San Fernando		1	1				4		1	2	3	11
Candaba			2	2			3		1		6	4
Angeles							1			3	2	2
Sta. Rita					2	2		1	2	2		1
Mexico						1			3	2	7	8
San Luis				1		1						2
Guagua						1				1	1	
Porac						1					2	2
Minalin									1			
Lubao									4	4	6	5
Floridablanca									5	5	3	9
Bacolor										2		1
Maguiapo										1		
Mabalacat					1					3	1	5
Masantol										1	3	1
Sta. Ana					1					1	2	1
Magalang										2	1	5

San Simon		1									1
Del Carmen										1	
Macabebe										1	
Lantakita											1
(Unspecified)	1						1	3		1	

TABLE F: *Huk-PKP Activity—Coded from Philippine Free Press Reports*

Number of Incidents	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	Total
Bulacan		3	3	17	7	20	8	31	13	14	8	85
Pampanga		6	5	14	6	29	11	42	14	64	15	155
Nueva Ecija		6	4	41	21	32	16	55	19	42	15	176
Tarlac		3	3	2	2	5	5	15	9	12	8	37
Pangasinan				2	1	18	10	18	11	7	5	45
Bataan				4	4	4	4	12	9	17	7	37
Zambales						5	3	8	4	10	8	23
Northern Luzon				2		4		17		9		32
Ilocos provinces				6		3		8				17
Laguna		4	2	4	2	20	13	25	15	23	12	76
Rizal		3	3	3	3	4	2	11	6	8	5	29
Cavite				1	1	1	1	1	1	6	3	9
Batangas				1	1	10	7	6	5	13	8	30
Quezon (Tayabas)	4	4	4	4	3	8	7	29	18	31	13	76
Bicol provinces								8		7		15
Negros Occ.												
Iloilo						3	2	12	4	4	2	19
Capiz & Antique								5				5
Visayan (other)								2		3		5
Mindanao												
Greater Manila				4		5		18		10		37

NOTE: Column (a) is total incidents in the year by year; Column (b) is total municipalities that had one or more incidents that year.

GUERRILLA PRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1941-45

JOHN A. LENT

*** "Each page (of the *Cebu Times*) was printed four times, for the printing types evacuated to the mountains by the retreating USAFFE were so few, they were enough only for two or three inches of reading material. The types were redistributed and another third portion of the page was made, and so on and so on until the whole page was printed.¹

"A strong current from a creek in the mountains of Barili turned the waterwheel that activated a dynamo to power a small Minerva press printing the guerrilla paper. The dynamo also produced electricity for recharging the batteries of the Cebu Area Command's radio receiving set. The *Cebu Times* got its up-to-date intelligence on the progress of war through the commentaries of news broadcasts... of American broadcasting agencies."²

*** The *Lico Chronicle*, advertising itself as "the only single copy newspaper in the world with the greatest reader following per copy," did just that—printed only one copy per issue. The one copy circulated to about 500 people and no matter how far it went, the paper was never seen by the Japanese. Every copy returned to the editor.³

*** When the *Liberator* editors felt they had to get rid of one edition (held up because the Japanese were keeping watch for it) which was becoming dated and useless, they put the papers on the false bottom of their jitney and stuffed them into *bayongs* which were covered well with fruits. Sentries stopped the editors who in turn offered the Japanese a bag of the sour fruit. Luckily the Japanese didn't want it and told them to move on. The guerrilla editors went into Manila to distribute the papers and while there received information from a spy on the condition of their captured *Liberator* friends. All this risk when it was almost instant death to be caught in possession of an underground newspaper.⁴

The above excerpts could have been from a war movie. However, these are just a few of the stories of the brave editors who went underground when the Japanese occupied the Philippines in late 1941

¹ Editor of the *Cebu Times*, now and during the war, is Pedro Calomarde. He recalled that during the occupation, the *Times* used folded 8 x 11 paper. The paper appeared every Saturday and copies were distributed to guerrillas "as far away as Mindanao, all parts of the Visayas and even in Cebu City." (Personal interview, Pedro Calomarde, Editor and publisher, *Cebu Times*, Cebu City, December 5, 1964.)

Another source added that Calomarde used coconut oil on the typewriter ribbon to make it last—not knowing when a new ribbon could be obtained.

(Smith, Mason Rossiter, "Journalism in Philippines retains old hell and brimstone tradition," *Quill*, February, 1957, pp. 7-8, 10.)

² I. T. Gica, "Cebu's deathless Times," *Kislap-Graphic*, February 18, 1959, pp. 20-1.

³ Flor Borja, "Really the first," *Philippines Free Press*, May 15, 1948, p. 13.

⁴ Benedicto S. Valenzona, "Guerrilla paper: The story of the *Liberator*," *Saturday Herald Magazine*, August 30, 1958, pp. 8-10.

and early 1942. As expected, the conquerors either confiscated or destroyed the mass media facilities of the islands; the prime media they took over for their own propagandistic purposes were the TVT interests of the Roceses. Left with only pro-Japanese media (which one source said was used only for wrapping cigarette tobacco), Filipino journalists faced three alternatives—work with the TVT, oftentimes for the purpose of hoping to foul up the well-oiled Japanese propaganda mechanism; head for the hills to join guerrillas and there publish underground information, or sit back apathetically and wait until everything blew over. Very few of the Philippine journalists chose the latter. Also, very few Philippine journalists opted to collaborate with the enemy.

FIRST GUERRILLA NEWSPAPERS

As is usual when trying to determine a “first,” historians have found it difficult to pinpoint the original guerrilla newspaper in the Philippines during the occupation. Manuel Buenafe’s *New Era* is given credit for being the first, having been published on February 4, 1942, only 33 days after the Japanese occupied Manila.⁵ The one-page mimeographed sheet appeared almost daily during its six months of publication.⁶ The newspaper appeared less regularly after the Japanese demanded that all mimeograph machines be registered. Two years later, when MacArthur returned to the Philippines, the *New Era* was resurrected in Central Luzon as the *Patriot*.

But, even before *New Era*, an anti-Japanese sheet existed, a second source has reported. The *Lico-Chronicle*, mentioned previously, was established January 3, 1942, and edited by Manuel Abad Gaerlan; it died after 48 days of continuous publication on February 20, 1942.

Typewritten, the eight- to ten-page paper incorporated headlines hand painted in ink for lack of display type. News was gathered from broadcasts via an underground radio. Gaerlan took notes of the broadcasts at night using a pocket flashlight. Because it was feared that Japanese were nearby, during the note-making sessions all electricity was turned off and windows were closed and barred. As an added precaution, the *Chronicle* maintained a corps of security guards who watched for the Japanese. After learning that the Japanese were conducting house-to-house searches, Gaerlan buried copies of the *Chronicle* in a

⁵ Jose Rodriguez, “First underground newspapers?” *Philippines Free Press*, April 17, 1948, pp. 26-7.

⁶ The Japanese raided the *New Era* headquarters looking for Buenafe. One source said Buenafe later organized a radio sabotage group, and that he was assailed violently by other underground workers, to the extent they wanted to shoot him when the war was over. (*Ibid.*)

can, but was later persuaded by neighbors to burn the papers so the Japanese could not get their hands on them.⁷

Besides claims to being first among guerrilla newspapers, there were boasts of being the last too—the last editor of a prewar newspaper to stop publishing when the Japanese landed. For example, in Iloilo, still unoccupied in early 1942, the *Times* was supposedly the last Philippine daily to fold up because of the occupation. Its publisher, Eugenio Lopez, was credited with bolstering local morale through his editorials in the *Times*.⁸

Elsewhere, Calomarde was the last newspaperman to leave Cebu when the Japanese occupied that city. He held his linotypists at their machines long enough to get an edition of the *Cebu Advertiser* in print announcing the fall of Bataan.⁹

THE BIG THREE

Three newssheets mentioned frequently in the literature of Philippine World War II are *Matang Lawin* (Hawk's Eye), *The Liberator* and the *Voice of Free People*.

Matang Lawin, according to Armando Malay,¹⁰ was among the first guerrilla newspapers on Luzon. It was founded by the guerrillas of the 14th Infantry Regiment of Colonel Guillermo Nakar. By June, 1942, Nakar had acquired a mimeograph machine and published the first issue of *Matang Lawin*, the “first guerrilla paper to come out in mimeograph form.”¹¹ Printed on one side of the sheet, two columns wide, *Matang Lawin*'s first issue contained “some news about the last days of Bataan and a warning to civilians to refrain from collaborating with the Japanese. . . . In a notice to the readers, the paper said it was adopting the name (Hawk's Eye) because it would serve as a watch over collaborators and the civilian population in general.”¹²

The second issue promise “truthful news about the war in Europe and in the Pacific.” This it promised to do by reprinting news commentaries gathered by a secret radio receiving set.¹³ Later, when Nakar was arrested the paper died.

The Liberator is listed as the chief guerrilla paper in most of the literature on the World War II resistance movement. Malay calls it the “most famous paper of Central Luzon.”

⁷ Borja, *op cit.*

⁸ L. A. Angayan, “Journalism in Iloilo,” *Philippines Free Press*, January 28, 1950, pp. 26-7, 38.

⁹ Personal interview, Calomarde, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ Armando Malay, “The Philippine guerrilla press,” *Mirror Magazine*, February 12, 1955, pp. 10-1, 27.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

In August, 1944,¹⁴ a former fingerprint expert of the Philippine Constabulary approached Leon Ty (who when the *Philippines Free Press* was closed, went into the hills with the guerrillas) and told him that the chief of President Quezon's Own Guerrillas (PQOG) in Cavite, Benedicto Valenzona, wished to publish a paper to bolster the morale of the guerrillas and to win adherents to the guerrilla movement.

Ty lost no time in contacting two of his colleagues in the *Free Press*, F. V. Tutay and Esmeraldo Izon, a cartoonist. The Manila newspaperman had to have a guide as he did not know how to contact the guerrillas. A former teacher, Agapito Canlas, took Ty to the PQOG headquarters. Four months later Canlas was caught by the Japanese circulating copies of the *Liberator* in Manila along with Fernando Zulueta, Dion Castello Ynigo and Librado Regalado. All but Zulueta were put to death.¹⁵

A number of guerrilla sheets¹⁶ bore the name *Liberator* but it was Ty's that had the longest life of any resistance paper. A news-magazine with a *Reader's Digest* format, the *Liberator* published as many as 40 to 60 pages each issue. The paper was professionally prepared—so much so that the Japanese at first thought it was published in Australia and smuggled into the islands. According to Valenzona, the paper's aims in the beginning were (1) to defend Quezon's leadership against the propaganda issued by the Japanese, (2) to give the radio news from KZEI in San Francisco (the Japanese a short time before, had removed the short-wave apparatus from all Philippine radio sets so that Filipinos could not pick up San Francisco or Australia).

Late in 1944, when the Japanese Propaganda Corps had almost completely undermined the people's morale and Filipinos doubted whether MacArthur would return, the *Liberator* tried to sustain an esprit de corps and warn against collaboration with the enemy.

The paper was created despite what seemed very discouraging circumstances. First of all, other resistance newspapers had short lives, the Japanese finding them and doing away with both the papers and their editors. Secondly, Valenzona's companions, Hans Menzi, "Manny" Manahan, "Gumsy" Alba and Alfredo Filait were too weak to help him, having just been released from nine months confinement at the Japanese internment camp at Fort Santiago.

Valenzona, in describing the beginnings of the *Liberator*, said:

¹⁴ Valenzona said the first issue of *The Liberator* was July 31, 1944.

¹⁵ Malay, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ One *Liberator* appeared as the official organ of the 7th Military District of Negros Occidental in 1943. A second paper by that name was subtitled "American Broadcast in the Headquarters of General MacArthur" and appeared in Manila, July 3, 1944. *The Liberator, The Voice of the Free Philippines* was published in Manila during 1942-3.

(Office of Chief of Counter-Intelligence, Philippine Resistance and Information Section; GHQ, AFPAC, APO500, *Newspapers and Magazines Published Since Re-occupation of the Philippines (1945) in the files of the Philippine Resistance and Information Section*, July 14, 1945, pp. 21.)

So there we were. With a typewriter battered by age and abuse, a mimeograph machine that squeaked with complaints every time we turned its drums, a quire of stencils and a few hundred reams of mimeograph paper we had swiped here and there, we set out on our ambitious task of gumming up the well-oiled Japanese propaganda machine.¹⁷

First issue of the paper did not carry a nameplate — just a photograph of Manuel Quezon to let the people know Quezon was still their leader. It was difficult for the citizenry to know he was their leader because the Japanese used Radio Tokyo, the Japanese-sponsored KZRM and *Manila Tribune* to play up Quezon's serious illness while also calling him a traitor for leaving the country during this time of peril. When Quezon died in the summer of 1944, the *Liberator* found itself "like a babe orphaned in its mother's womb." As the Japanese were harping triumphantly and telling the people "... your wishful thinking should find its death too ... unite now ... help rebuild your country," the *Liberator* came out with a supplement, confirming Quezon's death and asking the people to support the new president (Osmeña).

Throughout its lifetime, the *Liberator* suffered from a lack of supplies and efficient distribution. For example, at times the paper was distributed by men who kept the copies in their underwear. Staff members scouring the countryside for paper supplies and food, would not bother the barrio people; instead, they would go into Manila to beg. On one occasion they stole a Japanese supply truck and some food. Later, the truck was sold piece by piece and the money used to continue publication. But PQOG's short-lived prosperity ended when another guerrilla unit, jealous of PQOG's success, told barrio people that the PQOG received payments from the Japanese.¹⁸ After being ordered out of the area by the other guerrillas, the unit hauled its equipment to Cavite via a Japanese Navy truck driven by a Filipino who worked for the enemy and unbeknownst to the Japanese helped other Filipinos on the side.

Issue number two was devoted to Osmeña. It employed the writing skills of Ty and Tutay whom Valenzona had recruited on a trip to Manila. This issue of the *Liberator* was a dare to the Japanese to "come and get us." At first, suspecting the paper was printed outside Manila, the Japanese heavily guarded all approaches to the city. On August 16, 1944, the enemy raided a secondary headquarters of the *Liberator* in Manila; fortunately, no copies of the paper were stocked there.

The third issue, MacArthur edition, sounded a direct threat to the Japanese and their collaborators. In large letters, the words "I shall

¹⁷ Valenzona, *op. cit.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

return” adorned the pages. The 7,000 copies were distributed in one day in Manila. The fourth issue was the Guerrillero Issue.

Awakened by gunfire on September 23, 1944, the *Liberator* camp of 400 men sneaked off into the darkness, even though half of the men suffered from malaria. From a new camp, a more strongly worded *Liberator* was published. “Patriots, rise and strike, for our liberation is at hand” it declared.¹⁹

Finally, a last daring episode of the PQOG produced another issue of the *Liberator*. On February 5, 1945, the PQOG fought the Japanese at the Bureau of Prisons in an effort to keep a few political prisoners from being executed. The strategy worked, the Japanese fled and the prisoners were saved. With the capture of the prison the *Liberator* made its first appearance in the open as the city was now occupied by American soldiers.

In Eastern Leyte, the fortnightly *Voice of the Free People* was the chief resistance publication. Dr. Ralph Posuncuy, intelligence head of the Eastern Leyte guerrillas, was responsible for this, and a few other, publications. The *VOFP* first published in November 1942. Editor Pedro L. Yap discussed the beginnings:

The Japanese had full control over the press and radio. Japanese periodicals, leaflets and pamphlets literally rained over the country giving the Japanese side to the news and issues of the day. The people were tired of hearing of the exploits of the invincible Imperial Japanese Fleet, the ever-victorious Imperial Japanese Army... They wanted to read some real, honest news — not the sort of hash ground out by the sleek Japanese propaganda machine in Tokyo. If a guerrilla newspaper could only be published...

Soon Capt. Posuncuy and Company got busy translating the idea into reality... Somehow they got together some non-descript equipment and materials; a battered but still serviceable mimeograph, several radio sets badly needing repair, some stencils and paper salvaged from school houses and municipal buildings. The press looked more like a junk room than anything...

The first issue made its debut unobtrusively, with no fanfares and without benefit of any prominent man's benediction. It was a modest beginning, containing some war news and a reproduction of President Roosevelt and President Quezon's inspiring messages to the Philippine people given on the seventh anniversary of the Philippine Commonwealth, then an exile government. The news had to be checked and rechecked carefully against errors; atlases and encyclopedias had to be consulted — a tedious process which became a matter of routine with every succeeding issue and which eventually earned the paper a reputation for accuracy and reliability.²⁰

Editor Yap said the public reaction to *VOFP's* appearance was gratifying. The paper gave people information of Allied air, naval and land victories, of Japanese and Nazi losses and of the “gigantic war

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ P. L. Yap, “The story of a voice,” *The Voice of the Free People*, January 18, 1945, p. 3.

production of America.”²¹ The outer cover of the paper was an original sketch which was varied from issue to issue. Each issue contained editorials and commentary on all phases of the war, Japanese intentions in the Philippines and policies of the local puppet officials, a feature section of moralistic, literary and political matter and a wind-up of world news. In a tidbit column, items such as weddings of guerrillas and new experiments accomplished to push the war effort (such as using tuba for alcohol in motor vehicles) were mentioned.

To give an idea of the content of *VOFP*, here is an editorial that appeared June 19, 1943, discussing the Japanese independence pledge to Filipinos:

But if the Japanese propaganda magicians think that they can hypnotize us into submission by continually harping on the prospect of our getting independent within this year as Premier Tojo promised, they are sadly mistaken. We cannot be easily hoodwinked into accepting promises — especially when such promises came from Tokyo. We know exactly just what value to attach to Japanese promises. . . . Japan is suffering terribly from the heavy blows. . . . If she withdraws from the Philippines, Japan would lose face. And to lose face, for Japan, is unthinkable. For this reason, she must be thinking now of a good face-saving excuse. By promising to grant us our independence on condition that we cooperate with her wholeheartedly, Japan could say later, when she will be forced to withdraw from the Philippines, that she is only making her promise good. . . . Japan’s version of independence is freedom granted to a people to obey and follow her wishes and her dictates. . . . America has promised us real independence. We believe in America’s word. We are fighting side by side with her.²²

The *VOFP* played war news temperately rather than in “blood-thirsty war-whooping against Japan.” Editors kept the press on the move; making sure they did not stay in one place very long. However, the Japanese still surprised the newspaper personnel with a midnight raid on November 7, 1943. Most of the men escaped but three editors were killed, two were captured and the printing equipment was smashed. Yap said of the raid, “equipment at the time was harder to replace than editors.”²³

The difficulty of maintaining a guerrilla newspaper that encouraged the citizenry when everything around them was so discouraging was discussed by the *VOFP* editor:

The *VOFP* job was made harder by the fact that Mr. and Mrs. Average Reader opened their paper expecting to read of the bombing of Tokyo, the landing of American soldiers in the Philippines or the sudden miraculous end of the war. But the day’s news told only of the fighting in remote, far-flung places. . . . The local situation did not lend encouragement to despairing hearts. People

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *VOFP*, June 19, 1943.

²³ Yap, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

scanned the sea and air in vain for a sign of those planes and ships which, they were told, were coming out of American factories and shipyards by the thousands. Not a few Thomases shook their heads in doubt. Japs [sic] and more Japs were pouring into the island. The guerrillas, already running low in ammunition, were carrying on a fight, brave, but seemingly futile and hopeless. The job of the man who has to soothe a suffering patient by telling him that the doctor would surely come—in spite of the fact that a fierce storm is raging, the bridges are down, the rivers swollen, and the roads badly destroyed—has never been easy or enviable. And yet that in effect was the VOFP's job. To tell the people that Americans were coming back, no matter what. . . .²⁴

OTHER RESISTANCE PAPERS

The more than fifty underground newspapers listed here are by no means a complete tally. Scores of others were so clandestine that no traces of them remain today.

The Flash—Initially a typewritten sheet of two columns, *The Flash* first appeared on June 13, 1943. After ten issues, it was mimeographed. Chief writer for the paper was Pedro de la Llana, who, according to Malay,²⁵ “ironically was later to be killed by guerrillas in the Ilocos on suspicion he was a collaborator.” *The Flash* maintained editions in Tagalog, Spanish and English. Copies of the paper reached Mindanao by the batels that traveled between Luzon and the Southern islands.

Pioneer—“The Abuyog guerrilla brigade had its own propaganda. On the morning of March 30, 1943, *Pioneer*, a mimeographed tabloid containing but four pages greeted the people for the first time in many months . . . contained foreign news, local briefs, editorials, columns and a vernacular section.”²⁶ Only four issues were published. “It could not come out beyond June 1943, since we who stood behind it ran short of stationery and were called to teach when schools were re-opened in places not occupied by the enemy.”²⁷ A staff member of the *Pioneer* listened to radio 24 hours a day, alternating with his wife—not wanting to miss any of the news reports. When he heard the Japanese were starting a mopping up campaign, he tore his radio apart and hauled it deeper into the mountains.

The Thunderclap—The first few issues were typewritten; later issues were mimeographed. The organ of the Counter Intelligence Propaganda Corps (CIPC), *Thunderclap* was established July 26, 1943. The chief editor was Jose Resurrecion who wrote under the pseudonym of General Victor Terrible. The paper came out as often as it could and published anywhere possible. Once it was published in a house in Rizal “just a stone's throw from the Japanese barracks,” on other occasions it was

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²⁵ Malay, *op. cit.*

²⁶ Francisco Aurillo, “The Philippine resistance movement—Abuyog version,” Abuyog 1945, pp. 15 (typewritten).

²⁷ *Ibid.*

printed under a choir loft in a Manila church. On February 2, 1945, *Thunderclap* changed its name to *Liberty*.

Kalibo War Bulletin — A unique newspaper in that it was published in Capiz, an area which cannot maintain newspapers even today. After Pearl Harbor, five young men of Kalibo pooled their talents and published the *War Bulletin* “to rally the people and to give them a factual report of the war’s development.” A daily, the paper was a one-page, coupon bond paper size pamphlet printed back to back. A stenographer among the five partners transcribed radio broadcasts he received from Corregidor and the United States. Although the paper sold “like hot cakes”²⁸ at a centavo a copy, it lasted only a few months.²⁹ One day, the printer, a nephew of a partner, printed more copies than ordered, sold the extras and pocketed the profits. This led to a number of petty misunderstandings among the owners and eventually the paper’s demise.

The Bugle — Appeared November 11, 1942, an outgrowth of *News-Highlights*, which was first published October 19, 1942. “This news sheet shall be, as heretofore, issued daily and on a non-profit basis. And for our sources of news we use the daily broadcasts from the following stations: KGEI [sic] San Francisco; KWID San Francisco; KET San Francisco and BBC London,”³⁰ the editor stated.

Karatung — A twice weekly paper distributed widely by intelligence operatives and their agents. Friends provided supplies and recharged radio batteries for the staff. The paper was raided June 19, 1943, by the Japanese.

Ing Masala and *Aspirant* — Both publications of the Hukbalahaps of Pampanga. Former published in barrio of Arayat in October, 1942. *Aspirant* was a literary magazine of the Banal Regiment of the Huks.

Ang Tigbatas (Common People) — A bi-lingual (English and Hiligaynon) paper created by Tomas Confesor, governor of Free Panay. Although aimed at the civilian population, the paper on occasion even reached MacArthur’s headquarters in Australia. Malay said: “so hard up [sic] were the publishers that sometimes pad paper (the kind used by grade school students) was used to print it on.”³¹

Commentator — Published in Sorsogon by Juan Frivaldo, the *Commentator* appeared irregularly — only when Frivaldo received news from

²⁸ Nick Marte, “What’s wrong with the provincial newspapers,” *Philippines Herald Magazine*, May 28, 1955, p. 8.

²⁹ Another source said the paper lived from 1941 to 1944 and had a circulation of 1,000 to 5,000 per issue. He said the paper was closed down twice — each time the Japanese occupied Kalibo. When the school building which housed the mimeograph machine burned down, the paper ceased operations. (Malay, *op. cit.*)

³⁰ Elmer Lear, *Japanese Occupation of the Philippines*, Data Paper 42, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1961.

³¹ Malay, *op. cit.* See also: Angayan, *op. cit.*

the Allied Intelligence Bureau. Mimeographed on bond paper, its number of pages varied. Died at time of liberation.

Onion Skin—Published on onion skin paper which facilitated the hiding of issues. Chief writer was Guerrilla Captain Mena Lardizabal. It published a parody on the Japanese Patriotic March and later the “On to Tokyo” article which caused the zoning of Manila and suburbs by the Japanese.

The Saber—Published by R.O.T.C. guerrillas of Laguna and Bicol province. The paper was first typewritten, then mimeographed later. Chief writer was Wenceslao Q. Vinzons who “carried the Filipino and American flags in every encounter with the Japanese.”

Bahala Na—Edited by Colonel Benito Razon, it first appeared in June, 1943.

The Avenger—A mimeographed two-column paper printed on one side only. The first issue was devoted to the war news in the Pacific and Europe and the second issue to stories of Japanese atrocities and Japanese desires to rule the world.

Palaso—Published December 25, 1944, first as a poster which could be found pasted to buildings and fences early in the mornings.

Kalayaan—A guerrilla paper of Bulacan, named after the famous underground newspaper published nearly fifty years before.

Bolos and Bullets—Published in Bohol from April, 1943, to June, 1944. Fortnightly. Organ of Bohol Force. News of Allied effort and local guerrillas. English and Visayan.

The Bombshell—Manila. 1943-45. Transcripts in pencil and crayon of American short-wave broadcasts. Sometimes written on reverse of Commonwealth Government (Philippines) stationery.

Fortnightly Publication—Panay. January 15, 1943. Typewritten. Radio and local news.

Free Philippines—“Somewhere in the Philippines.” February 12, 1944. Official organ of the United States forces in Philippines. Printed. News reports and editorials. Maintained as a free paper for Filipinos after liberation.

Free Sulu News—Sulu, February, 1945. Weekly official news organ of Sulu Area Command. General and local news.

Freedom—Panay. 1942. Published by the Propaganda Unit, Second Section of U.S. Army. Mimeographed. English and Visayan.

Liberty—Manila. February, 1945. General news. Typewritten.

News—Leyte. 1943. Mimeographed.

News of the Day—Iloilo City. 1943. Mimographed.

Patnubay (Direction)—Manila. 1944. Mimeographed. Tagalog with English section. Left-wing publication.

The Patriot—1944. Published by the Hunters or R.O.T.C. guerrillas. War news and history of the organization. Mimeographed.

Press of Freedom—1944. Published as official organ of the 5th Military District, Philippine Army, USAFFE. Biographical sketches of local guerrilla leaders. Typewritten.

Red, White and Blue—Manila. December, 1944. Issued by employees of Bureau of Science and Bureau of Mines. Transcripts of radio broadcasts. Typewritten.

Red, White and Blue—“Somewhere in the Philippines.” 1943. Fortnightly. By Propaganda Corps, 94th Infantry. News and editorials. English and Visayan. Mimeographed.

An Tanauan—Leyte. 1942. Daily except Monday. News and briefs. English and Visayan. Mimeographed.

Thirty-fourth Anniversary of the Chinese Republic—January 1, 1945. Anniversary brochure edited by publishers of *Sentinel*, Chinese organ in Bicolandia. English and Chinese. Typewritten with pen illustrations.

The Thunderbolt—“American Broadcast in Europe.” March 24, 1944. Handwritten transcript of American news broadcast from Europe. Under blue and red colored pencil headings, accounts of the news were written in long hand with ordinary lead pencil. Halved legal size bond paper used.

Tingug sang Kalwasan (Voice of Liberty)—1943-44. General and local news. Ilongo and Visayan. Mimeographed.

Torch—Cebu. 1942-43. Official organ of Free Cebu. English and Cebuano. Printed.

USAFIP, NL News Letter—“Somewhere in Luzon.” 1944. By the United States Armed Forces in Philippines, North Luzon. Monthly. Local news.

Victory Herald—1943. “Published irregularly under the noses of the Japanese,” the masthead read. News and editorials. Mimeographed.

Victory News—1943. Negros. Branch edition in Negros as well as another called “United with ‘The People’s Gazette.’” Editorials and news. Mimeographed.

Victory News—A Free Panay news broadcast. Panay. 1942-43. Official statements by officers of 61st Division. Later issued with Visayan supplement. Mimeographed.

Vigil of Freedom—1944. “Monthly news magazine of LGV.” News, editorials, poems, correspondence. Typewritten.

The Voice—1943. Fortnightly. Mimeographed.

The Voice of Free Samar—Samar. 1943. “Official news release of the Free People of Samar.” Visayan and English. Mimeographed.

The Voice of Freedom—1942-44. Visayas. General and local news. Mimeographed.

The Voice of Liberty—1942. Tacloban. General and local news. English and Visayan. Mimeographed.

Weekly News Bulletin—1943. Propaganda Section, 6th Military District. Transcripts of radio broadcasts. Mimeographed.

Still other underground newspapers were: *Emancipator*, *Many Voices*, *The Unknown Soldiers*, *Chronicle*, *Multimes*, *Poetry*, *The Serviceman*, *Harbinger* and *Coordinator*.³²

RADIO'S IMPORTANT ROLE

Radio, although relatively underdeveloped in the Philippines at the time, was a prime news source during the Japanese occupation. Initially, the people used their short-wave sets to pick up San Francisco and Australia stations but the Japanese eventually controlled such listenership by first placing a license on all radio sets and later by taking the short-wave apparatus from the sets.

Filipinos who were able to smuggle their short-wave radios into the mountains automatically became sources of news for pamphlets, posters and underground newspapers.³³ "Owners of short-wave sets curled up under tables, in toilets and in dark, hot and sound-proof cellars and attics to hear William Winters or Sidney Rogers of KZEI San Francisco. Then they transcribed this information to leaflets. Many people were thrown into torture chambers for reading the leaflets."³⁴

On these nights at the end of the year, when it was increasingly necessary to find relief from the hot violence of the day, Filipinos (men, women and children) gathered at every house where there was still a radio that worked, and whenever it seemed momentarily safe enough to listen. The punishment for listening to the radio was death, but greater than the Filipino's fear was his need to hear words that promised life.³⁵

KZEI, "This is San Francisco," was the station Filipinos risked death to hear. It was called by one Japanese colonel as "Enemy number one of the Filipinos" because so many Filipinos lost their lives listening to it. Stenographic notes of "Mariano" news digests of the Pacific

³² See: Eufonio Alip, "Fifty years of Philippine progress," *Journal of History*, XV, Nos. 3-4, pp. 205-42.

³³ See: Filemon Guiang, "Our underground journalism," *The Filipino Observer*, October 24, 1945, p. 9.

³⁴ Valenzona, *op. cit.*

³⁵ John Keats, *They Fought Alone*, (New York: Pocket Books, 1965), p. 370. (This book gives an interesting account of Colonel Wendell W. Fertig's campaigns in Mindanao.)

According to Noli Olarte, Fertig posed as a general to get the support of the local people. "He had missed the last boat to Australia during the war and had to stay here and survive," Olarte said. "In late 1943, when Fertig's guerrillas had contact with Australia, the 'general' ordered Australians to send shiploads of American magazines to him. Any news from America meant the people would identify with America. It worked. This was the first time there was good communication with the outside world. Some of these magazines even reached Luzon as did matches and cigarettes marked 'I shall return!'" (Personal interview, Noli Olarte, *Manila Times* correspondent, Cagayan de Oro City, December 13, 1964.)

situation and William White's news commentaries were surreptitiously distributed (sometimes at fantastic prices) throughout the islands.

Manila citizens even had to depend on San Francisco for news developing right in Manila. When Premier Tojo made a surprise visit to the city, it was San Francisco which explained to Manila residents the purpose of the visit. Filipinos, aided by Americans attached to OWI, were responsible for the 24-hour a day, seven day a week broadcasts. They used pseudonyms to protect their families and friends in the Philippines; thus, Jaime Catuira's family did not know that it was their son who did the "Mariano" digests.³⁶ Other broadcasters on KZEI were Eddie Ramos, Dr. Hilario Marquez (pseudonym of Tio Kiko), Victor del Rosario (pseudonym of Florencio Marquez). Broadcasts occasionally were made in Pampango, Ilocano, Pangasinan, Tagalog, Ibanag, Cebuano, Bicolano and Hiligaynon.

How did the news leave the Philippines? Until November, 1943, only sketchy and spasmodic messages had been received from the islands. In 1943, the U.S. War Department activated the 978th Signal Service Corps to establish radio stations and act as scouts in the Philippines. The first party of men landed in the islands for this purpose was captured by the Japanese.

In November of that same year, another group docked near Mindanao. After making contact with several Filipino fighting units, the corps told the world of Japanese atrocities. The next month, KAZ radio, designated as the Philippine Guerrilla Net Control Station, was taken over by the 978th and made into a network which extended to every major guerrilla unit in the Philippines. By August, 1944, KAZ had given MacArthur, and the world, all the information MacArthur needed to know about Leyte, preparatory to his invasion.³⁷

SUMMING UP

Most guerrilla newspapers provided vital services during the occupation — giving the people some grounds to be hopeful, as well as disseminating radio news from Allied sources.

That the efforts of publishing a guerrilla newspaper were worthwhile might be surmised from the risks taken by those who printed the sheets and those who read them.

There was a group called the Porch Club which before the fall of Bataan engaged in anti-Japanese propaganda in Manila. Manuel Arguilla lead the group. Working with the Japanese at the time, Arguilla doubled up by working as an underground man for the Markings (a guerrilla outfit). The

³⁶ Anonymous, "This is San Francisco," *Sunday Times Magazines*, September 15, 1946, pp. 6-7.

³⁷ Anonymous, "Underground radio in Luzon aided Liberation strategy," *Manila Post*, October 25, 1945, p. 2.

Japanese found out and executed him.³⁸ Liling Roces, who wrote "Thorns and Roses" for the *Tribune*, was executed in this same group. I was in the group with Arguilla as we were childhood buddies. Also doing propaganda work with us was Salvador P. Lopez. The Porch Club used mimeograph machines to duplicate its information. I did the translating. We'd listen in on the San Francisco broadcasts and then deliver the information to Arguilla. Then we'd run stories and editorials off by the thousands and disseminate them. We rode bicycles and in the handlebars were the mimeographed newspapers. I'd translate the San Francisco news into Ilocano (I did it left handed so the Japanese could not trace my handwriting if the translations were ever picked up by the Japanese). The papers were one pagers with little poems and news included. When the Japanese sent out notice that all mimeograph machines and typewriters had to be registered, Arguilla registered our machine (remember he worked for the Japanese). Our runners were often caught by the Japanese. . . . All equipment was supposed to be registered, even radio sets. The radio sets were reconditioned so that nothing but local stations could be picked up. The papers were sent all over the city. At twilight, when everything was quiet, people would drive by and throw these sheets out of cars anyplace where a number of people were gathered. Later when everything had to be registered, the news spread by word of mouth.³⁹

Not only was it perilous to publish a guerrilla paper in the face of the Japanese threat, but editors faced still another threat—the jealousies and fears of other guerrillas. Guerrillas were known to have killed or run off other underground workers, thinking them to be collaborators. Yay Marking, a colonel in the Markings guerrilla unit, said of one guerrilla paper and its editor:

This paper was hanging people by its headlines. The editor was ferocious with many sick hates. His paper was sensational and he didn't bother to verify stories. He was fueling his fires with people's lives—a throw-the-maid-into-the-volcano type. He hurt some of our Markings too. For example, we had some of our people posing as collaborators with the Japanese so they could obtain information from the enemy. This other editor accused our people of being Japanese sympathizers.⁴⁰

We have already discussed the methods of obtaining news from abroad; getting the local news for the underground newspapers was oftentimes even more difficult. Here's how Pedro Calomarde picked up local intelligence for his underground *Cebu Times*:

(He'd) leave the publications cave and go down the hills to play the role of a wartime farmer tilling a small tract of land in the occupied areas. He

³⁸ According to Salvador P. Lopez, Arguilla was not too secretive about his double life. He was captured by the Japanese and placed in Fort Santiago August 29, 1944, which was the last time he was seen. (Lopez, Salvador P., "How Manuel Arguilla died," *Orient*, December, 1960, pp. 36-44.)

³⁹ Personal interview, Atmadedo Dacanay, ex-editor *Evening News*, Manila, November 5, 1964.

⁴⁰ Personal interview, the Markings, Manila, November 3, 1964. See: *The Crucible and Where a Country Begins* (both by Yay Marking) for more on the heroes of the underground during World War II.

kept his eyes and ears open for news on the raging war funneling this both from civilian populace and the Japanese officials whose friendship he cultivated for the newspaper ends.⁴¹

To avoid detection when the Japanese raided the guerrilla headquarters, newspaper editors often buried equipment and copies of the papers while other guerrillas fought delaying actions. The ingenuity Filipinos employed to avoid being caught reading underground papers are exemplified by the late archbishop of Cebu. He hid his weekly copies of the *Cebu Times* in his shoes and read the papers inside the comfort room, disposing of them after reading the welcome news.⁴²

A section of an official report released by the Philippine Resistance and Information Office generalizes the underground press movement quite well:

Most of the publications reflect the acute shortage of paper during the period, being published on the reverse side of copies of government notices and stationery . . . these publications vary from sporadic, spontaneous ventures, usually anonymous, to official organs of established and recognized groups, which published the names of their responsible officials. The latter were usually mimeographed (a few even printed) but among the former were typewritten sheets and some pen and ink offerings, passed from hand to hand. Only a few issues of each paper are available. In addition to newspapers, a continuous flow of guerrilla counter propaganda in leaflet form supplemented the more regular publications. These consisted of typewritten and mimeographed flyers of pro-Allied interpretations of the war, condensations of 'traitorous collaborators' and appeals for faith in an American return. Some titles: 'How the Japs tried to break the Filipino spirit,' 'A breeding place for rats,' and 'to puppet Laurel and his Quislings.'⁴³

⁴¹ Gica, *op. cit.*

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Office of Chief of Counter-Intelligence, *op. cit.*

RAPID SOCIAL CHANGE AMONG IGOROT MINERS

WILLIAM HENRY SCOTT

During the summer of 1962, the author conducted a series of interviews as part of a study of rapid social change among Philippine Episcopalians under the direction of the Rev. Dr. Joseph G. Moore, then Director of the Episcopal Church's Unit of Research in Evanston, Illinois. Thirty male Igorots employed in the gold mines in the Baguio area of the Mountain Province—now Benguet Province—were interviewed, and thirty of their same age groups, nativity and education living in their home barrios. The reports of these interviews were duly forwarded to the Unit for analysis and interpretation, but the present article is based on a talk given at the Seminar on Development of the Baguio Mining Community on May 9, 1964 sponsored by the Baguio Cooperative Mining Ministry. A shorter version, abridged by the Editor of *Church and Community*, appeared in that journal, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1967), pp. 22-27.

Three aspects of local culture proved a minor handicap in eliciting accurate information, both in the mines and in the barrios. In the first place, there was strong reluctance to acknowledge wealth in any form or to discuss financial matters. Then there was a concept of being the victim of one's environment so that attempts to examine relations with "the Company" or "the Mission" critically were considered perplexing, eccentric or impertinent. And finally, interrogation was seen as a kind of personal contest rather than a means for eliciting information and attempts to pursue an argument to a logical conclusion frequently roused resentment.

Workers were interviewed at Antamok Tram, Antamok, Acupan and Balatok, all of whom were employed by the same company, and at Baguio Gold, where working conditions and wages differed slightly. At the time, all the mines provided bunkhouses for their men and their families — two or three-story barracks-like buildings with porches on front and back, each individual quarters being a strip approximately 10 x 20 feet from one porch to the other, usually divided into two or

three makeshift rooms by the occupants. Large public toilets and washrooms of concrete were provided in separate buildings, and a few bunkhouses had running water in the individual quarters. Electricity was provided in all. The large mines had hospitals and medical care, elementary school education, and such recreational facilities as a library, movie theater, billiard hall, and basketball courts. All merchandising was done in regulated licensed concessions and alcoholic beverages were strictly forbidden but readily available.

The mines also had areas where they permitted employees to build their own shacks outside the fenced-in mining area itself. In some of these squatter settlements, water pipes, public toilets and electricity were available. Reasons given for preference for living outside the bunkhouses were freedom from such restrictions as those against raising pigs and chickens, inspection of goods being brought in or out, interference by police with rowdy conduct and noisy drinking, and the police right to inspect bunkhouses for stolen property, contraband goods, or homemade smelters. Despite the comparative cleanliness and solid construction of the bunkhouses and the wretched appearance of the flattened-tin can shacks of the squatters, overall living space and luxury did not vary greatly. With one exception, every dwelling observed in the mines was distinguished from the typical barrio house in having some sort of bed and warm blankets of commercial manufacture.

Ten farmers were interviewed in Besao, most of them illiterate and all of them fairly representative of their age groups in a modern Mountain Province town on the national highway, with public and private elementary schools, a mission-supported church, and a local rural health unit. Seven men were interviewed in Sagada of widely varying backgrounds, Sagada being a comparatively prosperous community with an atypically high percentage of literate and cash-earning citizens. Three men were interviewed in Mainit and one in Guinaang (Bontoc), all illiterate practicing pagans in communities as conservative as any in the province. Three men were interviewed in Masla and Lubong, both towns being accessible by bus and the latter being comparatively prosperous and progressive. Six men were interviewed in Agawa, Balili, Data and Taccong, all isolated settlements off the highway, in most of which it was impossible to find the exact opposite numbers of the miners interviewed in cases of higher education. (Men who have gone to high school are expected

to find paying jobs elsewhere rather than returning to their old farming communities.)

It should be noted that since no college graduates were encountered in the mines, the relatively important class of village school teachers is not represented in the survey.

All these men in the barrios lived within walking distance of an elementary school, and a shorter distance from public water pipes (or, in the case of Guinaang and Mainit, natural springs). With few exceptions, they all used pit toilets or piggens; all were engaged in farming or had land being farmed; all raised pigs and chickens for their own consumption, and few were dependent upon purchased food. Their diet included the same items as the miners'—rice when they could afford it and camotes when they couldn't, supplemented by vegetables, salt, lard, canned goods, sugar, tea, coffee and milk depending on their income, and in that general order or preference. Eight men who were over 35 and had less than a fourth-grade education were wearing G-strings. With only two exceptions, all men found their only recreation in conversations with other men, often accompanied by light drinking, and usually in the *dap-ay*, the community male "clubhouse" platforms.

The traditional native houses in the barrio were one-room windowless structures with a thatched roof and no chimney, heated by a pine fire in an open hearth. The more expensive and impressive modern houses were characterized by a roof of galvanized iron and a separate kitchen so that the living space was cleaner and colder. (People "progressive" enough to own a G.I. house expected to keep warm by wearing additional clothing.) Additional features of G.I. houses, in ascending order of affluence, were windows, additional rooms, one bed and one table, glass in the windows, doors between rooms, window curtains, furniture (tables, chairs, wardrobes, cabinets), and a second story. Kerosene was used for cooking only by people with a steady cash income not living in their home towns.

Cooperative agricultural work in all of these communities was traditionally associated with public pagan sacrifices and few farmers found it possible to exist in isolation from the system. At least half the men interviewed performed pagan sacrifices themselves, and ten others participated passively by contributions—e.g., a vestryman of a parish church who held the common view that pagans and Christians

should mutually support one another's civic enterprises for the common weal.

With the exception of a few storekeepers or municipal employees, people in the barrios rarely saw cash, their only access to which being seasonal agricultural labor for those wage-earners who did not work their own fields, and from this meager source they purchased such things as matches and salt or pencils and notebooks for their children. The most frequently expressed concern in this line was for the school expenses of high school age children or the truly staggering sums involved in sending a child to college in Baguio or Manila.

Igorots in the mines, on the other hand, lived on a strict money economy—none of those interviewed subsisted off rice brought from their home barrios even where available, and every mouthful they ate was purchased in cash. Wages were difficult to establish because of the reluctance of miners to admit their affluence: almost all readily named the going minimum daily wage of ₱3.99 or the few centavos deducted for social insurances, but vigorously belittled the possibility of additional bonus from “making their contract,” that is, by meeting a certain quota in cubic content excavated, in proportion to which they were paid more than the minimum. The fact that mine regulations called for the dismissal of workers who repeatedly fail to make these quotas, however, indicates that such pay was not an oddity but the norm, and a local superintendent confidentially stated that eight or ten pesos a day was probably average with twenty by no means rare. Many mining families supplemented this income by other means—weaving cotton cloth, bringing in vegetables or operating stores, running kitchen smelters, dealing in lucrative contraband, lending money at high rates of interest, or “high-grading.” (“High-grading” is stealing ore of such high grade as to make a quantity small enough to be secreted on the person worth the risk.)

It was noteworthy that household furnishings conspicuously implying increased living standards—wall clocks, tablecloths, proper dish storage, reading material, etc.—were not observed as a distinction between people in the mines and those in the barrios; rather they were found in both environments but only in the homes of those who had gone as far as high school. Indeed, some well-paid veteran miners lived with no more physical amenities than they had been used to at home.

Each person interviewed was asked to compare his present status with conditions ten years ago; did he think he was better off or worse off? Here again, reluctance to admit wealth moved the prosperous to answer so inaccurately that bystanders all snickered. One storekeeper, for instance, who had doubled his stock the year before and installed a flush toilet and electric generator, said he could see no improvement in his living standards. At the other extreme, however, in the barrios, the answers were unambiguous: farmers now had more mouths to feed on the same number of fields and therefore had fewer clothes and "never tasted good food" any more.

Conversations seeking to discover the comparative happiness of miners and farmers elicited no contrast whatever, for all expressed the same aspirations—the desire for material amelioration (especially in food), and the education of their children. This latter incentive was named by practically every miner as his reason for laboring in the mines. Some said, on the one hand, that they would be happy to have their children follow the mining profession but, on the other, that they wanted them to escape such drudgery—some expressed this in terms of wanting to give Fate the chance to determine whether their children could make the grade or not.

All men with any experience in the mines were agreed that the work was cruel, unhealthy and even dangerous. Many considered it normal or necessary to quit after a year or two to "rest up" at home for a similar period before returning to work, and many reported as a common expression that "Everytime you go underground you take your life in your hands." These grim facts, however, were accepted as inevitable, and little interest was expressed in the mild agitation of labor unions (which were headed almost completely by lowlanders) for better hours, wages, benefits or working conditions; instead, words like "luck" and "Fate" came easily to the lips of miners discussing their particular underground assignments. Many contrasted the miner's lot with the farmer's by saying that at least in the mines when your shift was over you could clean up and relax. But the most frequently mentioned advantages of life in the mines was the ready availability of cash to borrow when you needed it.

Travel seems not to have been a significant difference between men in the mines and those at home. Few miners had gone farther than the mines and a good number of men in the barrios had travelled

either to Tabuk or Baguio, or to the mines themselves. A few miners had visited the neighboring province of Pangasinan or the seashore with fellow miners from those places, and a select few had become miners only after considerable knocking about in the lowlands in their youth. All miners had gone home during their first few years and built a G.I. house, and some had remained there for the pagan period of taboo appertaining, but the infrequency of visits to the old home town was noteworthy and must represent a considerable factor in the changing society of which these men are a part. However, they almost unanimously retained strong emotional loyalty to their birthplace and expected to die and be buried there; one exception was a well-established police sergeant who had grown up in the mines and whose children had been born there.

Although the main recreation of men both in the mines and in the barrios was conversation, little interest or knowledge was shown in subjects beyond the immediate environment. A few men who were regular newspaper readers were enough aware of world events to suggest that "if America keeps talking tough, there'll be no need to fear Russia," but admitted that they had no companions with whom they could discuss such topics. (One reported that better-informed people like himself had noted with interest that President Kennedy's election had given America "its first non-Anglican president.") The usual topics of conversation in the barrio were the hardships of life and speculation on possible government aid, while in the mines it was the unpleasant working conditions or the injustices of overseers. When qualified voters were asked why they had voted for the candidate of their choice in the last national elections, the young said they voted as they were told, others said they blamed the rising prices on the last administration or that they had heard so much about its corruption, while still others had voted for the one they thought was going to win.

No significant difference was noticed in marital relations between the barrio and mining communities. Although direct inquiry was not possible about extra-marital intercourse or concubinage, against which there are strong sanctions in both traditional and modern society, in both environments there were cases of wives being replaced with an extra-legal straightforwardness not rare under a Civil Code which forbids divorce. The basic family household was the same in both—a couple with their unmarried children or occasional children

of siblings—but the extensive relatives who are an important part of the barrio environment were completely lacking in the mines. This was an immediate material advantage to the miner for, although ready help in non-monetary form was wanting, the steady income from wages need not be shared but could be invested privately or even secretly. Lively conversation was forthcoming every time the interviewer enquired about some miner known to be earning high wages but living frugally; speculations indicated that the purchase of land in Tabuk or the lowlands, or the construction and renting out of houses in Baguio, were favored areas for such surplus wealth. The ability of men to invest large sums of money without even their closest neighbors or companions discovering it was an impressive evidence of the impact of the new money economy upon the life of the Igorot.

But this same separation from such relatives and neighbors as exercised strong social controls on individual conduct has had a serious disrupting effect, too, one which was aggravated by two traditional characteristics of barrio life. The first of these is that, while parental obedience is required of young adults, children are rarely disciplined by their own parents, and the other is that mild social drinking is the normal adult male pasttime. Given this background and the new availability of cheap strong drink, it was probably not surprising to find mining families helplessly deploring the fact that their undisciplined children of all ages were more at home in the teeming streets than in the house. Not a few miners who were respected members of their communities and leaders in the local church habitually gave themselves over to drinking as soon as the rugged day shift was over, falling asleep at night from a state of semi-consciousness so that their children rarely saw Daddy really sober. Understandably, juvenile delinquency was both widespread and serious, with school-age truants more often a part of the household than not. It is an ironic fact, and the source of some disillusionment to the parents involved, that although all miners gave as their main incentive for working in the mines the desire to educate their children, few had seen all their teen-agers graduate from high school.

It is important to add, however, that where financial emancipation from the traditional restrictions of society was met with in the barrios, juvenile delinquency was also present, and although it never reached such extremes as attempted “thrill killings,” the difference would seem to be one of degree rather than kind.

What had happened to the general outlook, the “world view,” so to speak, of the Igorot who left his ancestral village and took up life in the mines? In the barrio way of life, for instance, a guaranteed reward for personal diligence was unknown and the good life was seen as the result of proper personal relations between the “have-nots” and the ‘haves”, which latter category includes deities and deceased relatives as well as powerful mortal members of the community. Did the miner’s experience with regular wages for regular labor suggest a more mechanistic explanation of the universe to him? Evidently not. The miner saw the getting of jobs, promotions, disability benefits, X-rays and vacations as dependent upon magical slips of paper obtainable only by good personal relations with somebody in authority, and remembered with praise such American missionaries as knew how to “get along with people,” by which they meant, not cordiality between pastor and flock, but the ability to manipulate such sources of bounty as a mine superintendent at whose whim a truckload of used lumber might be dumped down for the construction of a chapel.

As part of the same pattern in the old philosophy, individuals rarely bore personal responsibility for their behavior—it was a man’s “nature” to be hot-headed or lazy; school children “have to” be naughty under certain temptations; even one’s soul may impetuously wander off to hobnob with another soul and bring about illness or insanity. So, too, the mining community has given birth to an Igorot verb, *menbulakbol*, which nicely refocuses guilt from the individual to society at large: it stems from the term “blackball” which is applied to any miner caught stealing ore—he is blacklisted and can’t get a job in any other mine—but it is used to mean hanging around pool halls or barber shops, or general deliberate vagrancy. As a teen-ager remarked, “If nobody gives me a scholarship, I won’t go home and work the farm. I’ll *menbulakbol*.”

Nor did there seem to have been any modification of that traditional equation of the desired with the desirable which makes “I do not like” a statement of reason rather than appetite. Miners discussing contracts of the Company’s role in the community never spoke in terms of legality, justice or equity, but of the welfare of the employees involved. Miners might serve as well as their barrio counterparts, too, as examples of one of the tenets Dr. Frank Lynch, SJ, has analyzed as basic to a pan-Philippine metaphysic—“The good is limited.” It was the concensus both in the mines and in the barrios that stealing

in particular and crime in general was the result of poverty, and that it was the Government's job to keep prices down to protect the common people because it was natural for the strong to take things away from the weak.

The interviews produced no information suggesting any change in miner's ethical views, either. High-grading, for instance, was considered so acceptable a practice ("A carpenter's allowed to take the chips home, isn't he?") that the interviewer wasn't even able to get the question across, "Are there any miners who think it's morally *wrong*?" People kept replying, "Sure, some are afraid they'll be caught." The vigorous reaction of the mining companies to high-grading was accepted as a justifiable part of the life-and-death struggle of a world of limited bounty rather than as being based on any intrinsic rightness or wrongness. An incident which was current at the time of the interviews may serve to demonstrate how loyally the mining community preserved the value judgments of the old "clan" culture. Sergeant Jaime Gateb of Posposaan [not true names] was one of five policemen searching miners going off duty when he discovered some stolen ore on a miner who had whispered too late, "You fool! I'm from Posposaan!" Following the miner's dismissal, others from Posposaan petitioned the company for Sergeant Gateb's dismissal, and the sergeant's brother, an influential foreman in a nearby mine, rushed down to smooth things out. As the brother explained it, "I told them Jaime couldn't help it—the other policemen would have reported him if he'd failed in his duty."

To this generally negative picture must be added a few positive examples of a changed or changing world view among members of the Igorot mining community. In discussions of factors involved in making one's contract (that is, earning the bonus for exceeding a day's minimum work), it was agreed that success depended upon the geologic location of one's assignment or his relationship with his foreman, but in private conversations miners would comment that people who worked steadily and paid attention to their business seemed to make higher wages—that is, miners who did their digging instead of wasting time looking around for high grade ore to steal.

Truly noteworthy was the miner's evident emancipation from his native xenophobia, for all seemed to be willing to work in two-man teams with a member of another ethnic group or province, requiring only that he be a hard worker. Experienced miners felt that no one

tribe was any lazier or more hard working than the next, nor did they distinguish between Igorots and lowlanders in this matter. Moreover, in marked contrast to the barrio attitude that the Mountain Provinces were the poorest part of the Philippines, miners attributed the predominance of Pangasinan natives in the mines to the poverty of non-landowners in that province—"After all, no matter how poor we are at home, we can always live on camotes, but poor lowlanders can't even get a bite to eat except from their landlord."

One of the main areas of investigation in the interviews was the relationship between these men and the Episcopal Church, and here participation did not appear to be significantly different between mining families and those at home. In both places, church attendance was predominantly female, although there were more young men regularly present in the mines than in the barrios. There were civil marriages in both places, but a larger proportion of pagan weddings in the barrios were not subsequently blessed by a Christian service. There were almost no unbaptized children in the mining community but there were a number in the barrios, as well as a larger number of men with unbaptized wives. In both places there were also a few "members" who had never been baptized at all, as well as some older illiterates who had not entered a church since the day they were carried in for baptism in their mothers' arms. The eagerness with which these nominal members were claimed by the Christian community in the mines, together with the attendance by young men, is probably indicative of a greater need for group identification there.

Attitudes toward other denominations did not vary between barrio and mine, but according to the presence or absence of other groups. Where the Roman Catholic Church rewarded its members with regular handouts, the comment was made that it seemed more like a business than a church, while in the barrios with pentecostal sects, informants stressed the need for broadmindedness toward other Christians. But it was the common concensus in both environments that (1) all churches are basically the same ("There's only one God, isn't there?"), (2) it's a sin to be baptized twice, and (3) everybody ought to remain loyal to the church into which he was baptized.

Everybody interviewed was asked what he thought was the Church's role in society, and here there was a marked difference between the opinions of Episcopalians in the mines and those in the barrios. With the exception of an ex-catechist who said that the

Church's job was to worship God, barrio folk were unanimous in their view that the Church's *raison d'être* was to convert pagans, make peace between warring tribes, educate children, and assist the Government in ameliorating the physical plight of the people. The emphasis given material charities ranged from Sunday-school chairs to fully equipped and staffed clinics; a number of thoughtful farmers saw no reason why relief goods like cornmeal or milk powder should not continue indefinitely; at least one believed that priests could readily be replaced by school teachers; and most thought the idea of a barrio's supporting its own clergyman was impractical or even ridiculous.

In the mines, on the other hand, people recognized that government and Company agencies had taken over this older Church role, and castigated as childish such people as would change denominations for a sack of cornmeal or used clothing—although they did not doubt such tactics would bring nominal Anglicans back to the fold. More than one discussion group entertained the possibility of paying a clergyman's salary in cash or in kind, but not until there was more faithful attendance by the large majority of lax members in the mines. Like the barrio folk, the miners, too, were fairly unanimous in defining the Church's role—but they considered it to be the spiritual education and moral guidance of both children and adults since men are naturally greedy and given to crime.

All interviews were concluded with a request for specific suggestions as to how the life of the Church could be improved and how the Church could better serve the community. As was to be expected in the light of what has been said above, the barrio people recommended increased material aid—with the exception of one progressive community whose loyal members pointed to the large number of modern houses with G.I. roofs as evidence that the Church had already done a successful job. Igorot miners, however, limited such material requests to recreational facilities for children, and reflective laymen suggested that with the existing shortage of clergy, the responsibility for poorly attended services lay with the people rather than the priests. But everywhere the complaint was heard that the clergy were not “with the people” enough. In the barrios the priest's limiting his personal contact to the church, his office, and pastoral calling, instead of passing his leisure in the common village gathering places, was strongly criticized. In the mines it was frankly stated that the periodic administration of the Sacraments was good but not

good enough, and that laymen should be “authorized” to read and explain the Bible, and, significantly, miners tended to evaluate the possible residence in the community of a Filipino catechist higher than an English-speaking missionary as a means of ameliorating this condition.

Summary

Igorots in the Baguio gold mines live in more crowded conditions than in their home towns, but enjoy such physical amenities as electricity and community toilets and washrooms with running water, as well as minor medical attention and recreational facilities like basketball courts and movies. They live on a strict cash economy, and are able to invest their surplus earnings without sharing it with a large group of relatives, but suffer a higher rate of juvenile delinquency and adult alcoholism. Marital relations, church attendance, ethical outlook and personal morals, travel to other provinces, and disinterest in national politics and world events do not seem to differ significantly from those of Igorots in the barrios, with the exception of an awareness that Igorot economic conditions are no worse than other farmers' and an open-mindedness about Filipinos of other ethnic backgrounds. As far as attitudes toward the Episcopal Church are concerned, Igorots in the barrios see it more as a means of material amelioration than miners do, but both are agreed on its role as a means of moral uplift and the failure of its clergy, both Filipino and foreign, to identify with the people they serve.

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