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Colonialism, Modernity, and a Stalled Nation-Building Process

The present volume of *Asian Studies* compiles six articles on Philippine history published by the journal over the last several decades. Like the papers in Volume 41, Number 2 (2005), these are early works of their respective authors and/or representative of well-researched scholarship in what has come to be known as "Philippine Studies." The thread that runs through them all is the multifaceted dynamics of colonialism, either of the American, Spanish, or even internal variety, i.e. the so-called "Manila imperialism." Except for Norman Owen's, many of these articles were written in the 1960s through the 1970s, that is, a period of heightened political and ideological awareness which, even if unrelated to some of the authors' temperament and intentions, was beginning to make the reading public receptive to alternative/unexamined approaches to Philippine Studies. But it was not merely nationalistic motivations which accounted for this resurgent interest: the ideological issues vehicled by the prolonged Vietnam War, the Algerian and Palestinian struggles for self-determination, the American civil rights movement, the Cuban Revolution, the Red Guards and even the enragés in Paris -- all of these heterogeneous elements merged in that epochal moment to thrust the matter of questioning all sorts of everyday 'received ideas' onto the international agenda of knowledge production. Serious scholars the world over could only rejoice, but in varying degrees.

Norman Owen's "**Maria Clara and the Market: Women and Change in the 19th Century Philippines**" (2000) initiates a long-overdue examination of the various changes on the general status of women under the modernizing economy and society of the then-Spanish colony. But instead of proposing new interpretations, the author (manifestly influenced by the "Annales" school) only suggests pushing the inquiry into still-unproblematized questions, e.g. the gender-specific consequences of increased state control in the late 19th century, or the role that geography, hence cash crops, might have played in the enlarged participation of working-class women in the economy. Even demographic change (as in those subsequent to migratory movements), Owen suspects, had considerable effect on the breakdown of certain gender stereotypes. But the lack of data on these topics is precisely what should prod scholars to take fresh approaches to the political economy and social history of the late colonial era.

John Schumacher's "**Philippine Masonry to 1890**" (1966) aims to avoid "glorifying or disparaging" the part played by Masonry in the early Propaganda period, but the text ever so subtly deflates the contribution of

Masonic lodges to the Philippine independence struggle. Jose Rizal plays a very minimal role in this narrative: could his portrayal as a passive onlooker have to do with the issue of his alleged, subsequent retraction of Masonry? This indulgent rendition of Rizal may be due to Schumacher's identification with the then politically crusading Society of Jesus, or not.[1] But it will be remembered that the national hero was the object of his religious mentors' efforts to counteract radical liberal ideas he had acquired in Europe, and that the Masonic discourse contributed significantly to this enlightenment. It cannot be denied that the erosion of the hegemonic *frailocracia* was made possible at least in part by these Masonic freethinkers, whether they were *peninsulares* or *insulares*, scoundrels or morally upright men. That iconoclasm is explicit in the case of Marcelo del Pilar, who (unlike Rizal, at least in Schumacher's narrative) "intended to make use of Masonry in his campaign to destroy the power of the Friars in the Philippines."

"**The American Minority in the Philippines During the Prewar Commonwealth Period**" (1966) tweaks somewhat the familiar narrative of colonial power. Belonging at the same time to the dominant ethnic minority in a colonial society and, in terms of citizenship, to the colonizing nation was not seen as problematic in the days of empire. Indeed, that was the universal norm, and it was understood that the white man had the prerogative to rule over the natives, regardless of his minority position. As a unit of analysis, colonial minority status – hinting at being an endangered species of sorts – might seem to be beside the point (a more straightforward identifier would be "the *non-military* American community"). Gerald Wheeler, however, dismisses the idea of a monolithic American presence, as he examines four of the controversial areas (the Japanese threat; economic relationships; US investments in the colony; political independence) in which there were alleged differences of opinion among these demographically outnumbered Americans. In fact, Wheeler represents them as feeling mainly "uneasy and insecure" during the transitional Commonwealth period.

Milagros Guerrero's "**The Colorum Uprisings: 1924-1931**" (1967) participates in the revival of interest in peasant and/or millenarian movements, an interest that started the late 1960s and has continued since. The anti-imperialist discourse of the Colorums during a period of debate about national independence earned them a reputation as ideologically motivated radicals (although, as Guerrero points out, communism was still "a new idea in the Philippines at the time.") Significantly, the movement had, early in the 20th century, spread from Luzon to parts of Mindanao and the Visayas, a geographical progression that would be replicated by other, even more radical elements, starting in the late 1960s. Yet Filipino peasants' mentality apparently resists facile categorization, the kind which originates from outside their world. Admittedly, the latter is in rapid change, and the

ideological fervor may have abated in recent times, but millenarian beliefs persist and rural unrest stemming from landlessness remains a latent threat.

The subjugation and forced march towards modernization of Muslim Mindanao under American colonial auspices is the subject of "**Muslim-American Relations in the Philippines, 1899-1920**" (1968). Although this paper affords but brief glimpses into that epic effort (it reprises Peter Gowing's doctoral dissertation, *Mandate in Moroland*, which covers that exact time period), the reader will gain valuable insights into the long-festering problem of integrating Moro society into the mainstream body politic, the one generated and perpetuated by mainly Christian politicians and bureaucrats. In contrast, the American role in 'complicating' the culturally rooted problem for all concerned is minimized in Gowing's account. But reading this article 40 years after its original publication might also lead one to wonder if the United States had 'learned its lessons' in Iraq and Afghanistan, among other places, in the interim.

Lastly, "**Unity and Disunity in the Muslim Struggle**" (1973) by Samuel K. Tan offers a refreshing (for the era at least) perspective into the problematic of the "struggle" in Muslim Mindanao. Thanks to scholars like Tan, it is now acceptable to think in terms of a more complex multi-ethnolinguistic Bangsamoro (if indeed such a "national" construct exists and is universally accepted as a reality) than before. In the same vein, however, Tan's work also allows us to consider the Tausug component as the one historically and most likely to be resistant to impositions emanating from the seat of national power in Manila. The author, a Sulu native himself, resists the temptation to glorify his subject: he refers to a certain "weakness" stemming from "Tausug individualism," and (somewhat echoing Peter Gowing) decries the opportunistic initiatives of "Christian politicians and traditional Muslim leaders" who have allegedly victimized the (undifferentiated) Muslims of Mindanao.

Since colonialism figures as the prominent leitmotif of these studies, the theme of modernity cannot be far behind. With the possible exception of Owen's, all other papers hint at the difficult process, uneven at best or stalled at worst, of the post-colonial "nation-building" process. For example, the twin readings of the Muslim Mindanao situation wittingly or unwittingly call attention to the fallacy of presuming a seamless weaving of the different clans and warlord dependencies in their own homeland, and much less their integration into the "imagined community" codified by the Republic and its presumptuous laws. For its part, the Catholic hierarchy may have withstood the Masonic "threat" posed in the late 19th century, but in turn has not avoided reappearing since then as an obstacle to socio-cultural development; moreover, its political partisanship – more

or less sporadic, to be sure – has at the very least made it easier for other congregations to behave in a similar fashion. Likewise, the American colonialists bequeathed more durable political institutions, as well as a more viable civil-society template, than their predecessors, but failed to imprint their vaunted democratic model on the Filipinos' political culture. Where agrarian reform policy is concerned, it is true that the US (contrary to the communist dogma circa the 1960s) had a vested interest in breaking down the strictures of the feudal order which fueled so much rural unrest; but this interest was overdetermined by the American government's counterinsurgency imperatives in East and Southeast Asia for the duration of the Cold War, and as such, was abandoned as soon as the Huk rebellion fizzled out.

In short, a straightforward advance towards "modernity" and "progress" in terms of a presumably consensual nation-building experiment cannot be deduced from the available evidence so far – with all due respect to the official (State or even ecclesiastical) discourse. It is no small feat to argue this viewpoint, as the authors herein assembled have done, without recourse to the patented jargon that seems to dominate virtually all fields of contemporary scholarship. This is not to suggest that the authors could have or would have succumbed to the ruling "postmodern" fashion of an ulterior season. It is to state in no uncertain terms that all scholarly productions must be examined in the intellectual context, according to the professional norms, of their time and place.

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End notes

[1] It might also be recalled that certain Jesuits of the Philippine province were known for their anti-Communist preoccupations in a not so distant past: for example, one review in the *Philippine Studies* journal in the early 1960s had somewhat alarmist annotations of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas' 'political transmissions'.

MARIA CLARA AND THE MARKET: WOMEN AND CHANGE IN THE 19TH CENTURY PHILIPPINES

*Norman G. Owen**

A recent surge of women's studies in the Philippines has created what might be called a stereotypic pattern of women's history, which echoes, in its broad outlines, the stereotypic pattern of nationalist history. In each, the relative prosperity and equality of the pre-Hispanic era are destroyed by a ruthless and obscurantist Spanish colonialism that exploits local society for generations, until redeemed by the revolutionary fervor of the late 19th century. The cause is then set back again by the American occupation, though conditions are also ameliorated somewhat by more progressive colonialism, eventually leading to independence and ever-growing enlightenment.[1]

Many aspects of these stereotypes are, naturally, open to question, not at least the near-utopian vision of the pre-Hispanic Philippines, with no significant gender inequality. Male political dominance, it is claimed, was counterbalanced by female religious dominance, making the complementarity of the sexes not simply a popular cultural myth, but a social reality.[2] At times, even legends of dubious provenance, such as that of "Princess Urduja," are used as uncritical support for such interpretations.[3]

It is not necessary to accept this rosy picture fully to acknowledge that from the 16th century onward, the Roman Catholic Spanish state imposed what Charles R. Boxer called "Mary and Misogyny" on the colonial Philippines.[4] Not only were women formally excluded from any political role, but in the religious sphere, they were replaced by Catholic priests, an office still reserved for men today.[5] The gender ideology imposed was heavily paternalistic, with women largely deprived of legal personality, prohibited from divorce and abortion

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(common in the pre-Hispanic era),[6] and told time and again that they were to be secondary and subordinate to men.

The shining (counter?) example of this was the cult of the Virgin Mary, introduced early and spread widely. From the Virgin of Antipolo to Our Lady of Peñafrancia, manifestations of the mother of Jesus became the most popular and potent religious symbols among Filipinos, to the point where an observer might even suggest that she was regarded as holier than her son. But the essence of her role has always been precisely that she herself is not God, but an intercessor, more approachable than actual divinity. In a culture in which there is a predilection for indirect access to power—asking a relative, friend or colleague to intercede rather than approaching higher authority directly—it is not surprising that the supreme intermediary is highly valued—and a woman.

The focus of this paper, however, is not on the significance of Mary as a role model for femininity—virginal yet maternal, always supportive, always suffering, utterly devoted to her "family" yet accessible to all—in Philippine history.[7] Neither is it on gender relations in the pre-Hispanic Philippines, nor on the impact of Spanish ideology and institutions on women's position in that society during the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries.

Instead, I would like to address the question of 19th century change. A major theme in postwar Philippine historiography shows that Spanish rule was not uniform in its intentions and effects over three hundred years. It focuses on the economic and social transformation that began with the "Bourbon Reforms" of the latter 18th century and culminated a hundred years in the rise of a Filipino bourgeoisie, the *ilustrados*, who were capable of articulating a mature nationalism.[8] It seems impossible that this dynamic process should not have affected, for better or worse, the role of women in the Philippines, but relatively few scholars have tried to examine this process. Only Elizabeth Uy Eviota and Ma. Luisa Camagay have, to my knowledge, paid serious attention to the economic and social roles of the 19th century Filipinas, as distinct from general "Spanish era" stereotypes.[9]

Other scholars of the period have focused on women's studies as in Philippine historiography generally, almost exclusively on the emergent *ilustrado* class and the nationalist movement at the end of the 19th century. Their efforts to rescue women from historical oblivion and to restore questions of gender into the discourse of nationalism are admirable, and the work they have done in digging

out evidence is quite useful, but often their analysis remains rather unsophisticated. There is, at times, almost a celebratory quality, as if this historic moment was an occasion for the glorious reconciliation of feminism and nationalism. Jose Rizal and other national heroes are sometimes portrayed almost as proto-feminists,[10] and the women who took part in or supported the revolution are seen (in the extreme case) to be reclaiming their pre-Hispanic role as shamans, since "becoming and being *babaylan* is an inherent quality of the Filipino woman."[11]

My own research on Philippine history has never focused primarily on gender relations, though I have tried to engage the topic when I found it intersecting other themes.[12] This paper reflects more of an effort to assess the field and suggest questions that might be asked than to put forward new interpretations. In doing this, I depend heavily on earlier scholars in both women's studies and social history—at times twisting their findings to my own purposes—rather than on any new primary research of my own. First comes a short overview of the evidence for social and economic transformation in (many) women's lives, to be followed by some observations on gender ideology. The emphasis throughout will be on what we do not know, rather than on what we do know, which is surprisingly little.

Colonialism, Capitalism and Change

The colonial state in the 19th century Philippines became simultaneously more "liberal" and more interventionist, a paradox that has not received the historiographical attention it deserves.[13] The liberalism consisted primarily of a series of measures removing historic restraints on trade, travel and residence. No longer were foreign vessels officially prohibited from trading in Philippine ports; no longer did provincial governors have the right to monopolize trade; no longer were foreigners (Westerners and Chinese) prohibited from living outside Manila, and thus conduct their regular business there. Although it still appeared woefully restrictive to travelers from more open economies,[14] the Philippine economy was far less constrained than it had been before. Tariffs were lowered (at least until 1890), the market prevailed, and the export trade boomed.[15]

The increase in interventionism was rooted not so much in the desire of Spain to control the population and "foment" economic growth—though this can be seen from at least as early as the Bourbon Reforms—as in the greatly expanded bureaucracy. Spurred by the loss of most of its American empire (which had previously provided "places" for ambitious Spaniards) and the greater ease

of travel, especially after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Spain created a far larger colonial establishment in the late 19th century Philippines than ever before. Whereas once a province might have only a couple of Spanish officials (usually a military-governor-cum-judge and a treasury administrator), later there would come vaccinators and public scribes, warehousemen and government secretaries, public prosecutors and defenders, "development assistants" and registrars of land, officers of the *Guardia Civil* and the revenue service, even engineers and doctors.[16] Such officials provided the capacity for the state to supervise and control Filipino life much more closely than ever. Once, Filipinos who were at odds with local authorities (including priests) could simply disappear into the hills, out of the effective reach of church and state, but the opportunity for such "avoidance" resistance had clearly diminished by the late 19th century.[17]

It is probable that on balance, in spite of commercial liberalization, Filipinos were more affected, even controlled, by the state in the late 19th century than ever before. But what were the gender-specific implications of this? On the negative side, we might surmise that greater supervision weighed more heavily on men, who were likelier to be involved in travel, smuggling and violent crimes (including banditry), than on women, who were "traditionally" confined to home, church, town market and nearby fields, where presumably they were already under surveillance by existing authorities. But such "tradition" can hide a multitude of sins, or at least unauthorized mobility, and greater state control would also have inhibited any surviving non-Christian rituals (often conducted by women) and facilitated a crackdown on "female-specific" offenses, such as prostitution.[18]

On the positive side, both men and women would have been able to take advantage of some of the many "development" measures introduced by the late colonial state. Women were able to register property transactions with provincial scribes and notaries, and women were directly affected by the regulation of industrial labor and the professions, though not always favorably. The provision of more (male) doctors presumably made some inroads into the prestige of (female) midwives, though the latter were also "professionalized" under Spanish rule and continued in popular practice throughout the 20th century.[19]

Potentially, the state intervention most valuable for women was educational reform. For almost three hundred years, Spain had talked about providing universal primary education in Spanish, but had done nothing about it. At the local level, schooling was left to friars and other parish priests, many of whom had no interest in teaching Spanish (the *indios* might be exposed to subversive ideas), or in

educating girls, or in education at all. But in 1863, Spain finally got serious. There were to be schools for both boys and girls with salaried teachers, in every municipality in the Philippines, and the children were to be taught in Spanish, not just the vernacular. Priests still chaired boards of education and could undermine or sabotage local schools if they chose (as in the famous case of the young women of Malolos[20]), but they no longer bore sole responsibility for education.

Most commentaries on this reform have focused on its shortcomings: erratic and incomplete implementation; shortages of books, buildings and teachers; the low general quality of education provided; and the separate (inferior?) curriculum for girls, emphasizing needlework, religion and music. Such criticisms are justified and certainly the reforms fell a long way short of what we would expect today, even short of what the Americans were to provide after 1900.[21] But the simple fact that there were many schools for girls helped to create a new kind of "Filipina," who would become much more visible in the 20th century. Hundreds of thousands of girls learned to read and write, even if their only textbooks were religious tracts.[22] The step from the kitchen to the school, even an inadequate school, was a big one; the road to Filipino feminism passed through the Spanish classroom.

Another gender-specific consequence of state expansion, however, was the enormous growth in the number of official positions available to Filipino men. In principle, this was little different from Spanish policy over the previous 300 years, and in some ways there might have been (from a feminist perspective) actual improvement, in that women were now allowed a few areas of official responsibility, especially in education.[23] But in sheer volume, as well as in absolute rank, these opportunities could not compare with those available to men as municipal and provincial officials, justices of the peace, clerks, doctors, surveyors, etc. To the extent that many of these positions offered not only a regular salary, but also leverage that might be used to reward friends, punish enemies or climb to a higher post, women tended to be left further behind.[24]

Far more important than direct state action in shaping the 19th century economy, however, was international capitalism, which entered through the doors opened by "liberal" policies. With foreign merchant houses in Manila playing a key entrepreneurial role, capital was mobilized and the production of export crops—especially sugar, abaca (Manila hemp) and tobacco—was enormously increased. In return, by the end of the 19th century, the Philippines was importing large quantities of rice, textiles and other manufactured goods.

Many of the consequences and concomitants of this trade boom are well known, at least in broad outline. With very little change in the technology of production, the growth of exports had to be achieved by the expansion of cultivated land and the reallocation of labor. The former implied considerable population mobility to internal frontiers: from Ilocos to Cagayan Valley and down into Pangasinan, from Panay into Negros, from the central Visayas into Northern Mindanao, and everywhere from older lowland settlements into the surrounding hills.[25] The latter must have involved, so far as we can tell, the shift of labor from the cultivation of subsistence crops and from spinning and weaving into cash-cropping and it absorbed much of the rapid population growth of the 19th century (averaging close to 1.5% a year).[26]

The monetarization of the Philippine economy also accelerated in this period, as shown by, among other things, the near disappearance of tax payments in kind and the commutation of much labor service to cash. Whether or not the Philippines as a whole prospered or was impoverished remains very much in dispute,[27] but there is no doubt that the gap between rich and poor widened with the emergence of a class of Filipinos possessing conspicuous wealth that would have been extraordinary by previous standards.[28] This new elite was to be found in some provincial municipalities, but as time went by they increasingly gravitated to regional cities (Cebu, Iloilo, etc.) and, ultimately, to Manila.[29] With Manila also hosting various industrial and proto-industrial activities (cigar-making, rope-spinning and late in the century, tramways and electricity), urbanization became a major theme of the 19th century, not just in pure demographic terms, but also increased differentiation between city and country.

Thus, we find in the 19th century millions of Filipinos changing what they did, where they lived or how they related to their neighbors (as well as to Spanish colonialists and to Chinese and Western traders), but scarcely any reflection on what this meant in terms of gender. Although both socioeconomic history and women's history have flourished over the last few decades in the Philippines, they are barely speaking to each other.[30]

There was, of course, no more a single experience for Filipino women in the 19th century, any more than there was for Filipinos in general. Class and region, in particular, should be seen as important variables. The best documented Filipinas of the 19th century would have been members of the new elite, especially in Manila.[31] Our knowledge of them is mostly impressionistic and anecdotal, rather

than systematic, drawn from the novels of Rizal, the observations of European travellers, the memoirs of *ilustrados,* the nostalgia of Nick Joaquin, and the period illustrations lovingly collected in coffee table books of today.[32]

These were families who did not have to worry about going hungry or working with their hands, but who did have to concern themselves with Spanish intrigues and the supervision of servants. Women of this class were largely relieved from physical labor (though many kept up embroidery, almost as a hobby), but often had to replace it with the responsibilities of home management, whether dealing with European guests, Chinese merchants or Filipino chauffeurs and maids. Most had time to cultivate art, or at least the appearance of culture; the imported piano was one of the emblems of this class and time. And a few of them became relatively well-educated, either formally, through attendance at one of the few institutions of higher learning open for women, or informally, through taking advantage of books, newspapers and intelligent conversation.[33]

Numerically, of course, they were swamped by the working women of the Philippines, of whom the best known, again, are those of Manila. Daniel F. Doeppers has made excellent use of civil registers and censuses to show that our impression of the capital as a male-dominant city is, in some respects, erroneous. Among the non-Filipino population—mostly Chinese and Spaniards—there was indeed a surplus of 25,000 males, but the Filipino population was almost equally balanced by gender. And although it has been thought that in this period men were much more inclined to urban migration, the data suggest that roughly one quarter of both male and female Manileños in 1893 were immigrants from the provinces. There were some differences between them, however; women were more likely to have come from the Tagalog provinces close to Manila (especially Bulacan and Rizal), which may imply that they remained more closely linked to their provincial homes.[34]

As for actual occupations, Ma. Luisa Camagay's *Working Women of Manila in the 19th Century* is a valuable pioneering study, based on archival sources. It is, however, primarily descriptive; the author's stated intention is "to document the life of gainfully employed women": cigar-makers, domestic servants, store owners and vendors, seamstresses and embroiderers, schoolteachers, midwives and prostitutes.[35] It serves as a salutary reminder that not all Filipinas married and stayed home, confining their labors to the domestic hearth and fields.

Nor were the women all obedient and compliant to authority. Besides the prostitutes, whose very occupation violated the laws of both church and state,[36]

other Filipinas attempted to assert themselves in petitions for better wages or working conditions, in complaints against abusive employers, even in a strike (of tobacco workers, 1816). There is also considerable evidence of entrepreneurship, especially among female traders and some evidence of what might be seen as "everyday resistance" to exploitation, in the form of chronic absenteeism or other uncooperative behaviors. Yet all of these women remained poorly paid and subject to regular supervision by the state and, in some instances, by the church as well. Qualification as a schoolteacher or midwife, for example, required a letter of reference from the parish priest.

Considered within the Philippines as a whole, the working women of Manila were clearly a minority. Except for cigar-makers (of whom there were around 18,000 in mid-century, representing 90% of that industrial labor force), their recorded numbers were small, though these numbers are misleading, since even the interventionist late-colonial state could not keep track of all the shopkeepers, maids and prostitutes. And Manila itself represented just a fraction of the Philippines (with a population estimated at 200,000-250,000 by the end of the century, out of a total of over seven million). There were no cigar factories elsewhere, and only a few urban centers (chiefly Cebu and Iloilo) sustained large numbers of shopkeepers and prostitutes. Household servants, on the other hand, might be expected to show up everywhere, but in some rural parish registers, 99% of all brides are recorded as either "farmers" or "weavers." This suggests that for many Filipinas, the range of opportunities for gainful female employment remained far more restricted than it was in Manila, or even in provincial cities.[37]

The kind of nondomestic work that most rural women did depended to a large extent on the regional economy, and that, in turn, depended on what commodities it specialized in. Tobacco cultivation in the Cagayan Valley, for example, seems to have called for a considerable input of female labor. Men planted the stalks, harvested the leaves and eventually took them to the Monopoly or the market, but the whole family was involved in transplanting, while weeding and the labor-intensive sorting and preparation of the leaves were entirely the responsibility of women and children.[38] In this respect, tobacco production may have resembled traditional rice cultivation, with "complementary" labor roles resulting in (roughly) equal shares of the total work.

Abaca and sugar—the predominant cash crops along the eastern and western coasts, respectively, of the central Philippines—both seem to have been

somewhat more "masculine" in their labor demands, perhaps because certain critical tasks (abaca-stripping, cane-cutting) called for sheer physical strength that was believed to be beyond the capacity of most women. This is only an impression, however. What scattered evidence we have is mostly in the form of descriptions of a particular situation that may not be applicable to other places or other times.[39] Certainly women (and children) were also involved, however, especially in such wearisome tasks as weeding.

Lumbering, mining, milling, and the transportation of cash crops to the major ports for export (and of rice from the ports and the surplus zones to deficit districts) were, on the other hand, almost exclusively male activities,[40] as weaving and spinning were almost exclusively female. But the former were expanding throughout the 19th century, while the latter went into sharp decline with the introduction of cheap machine-made textiles from the West.[41] Women were also dominant in local retail trade, which was growing, but here they faced increasing competition from (male) Chinese shopkeepers, whose commercial network was spreading throughout the countryside during the latter half of the 19th century.[42]

What all of this suggests is a slight shift, country-wide, in the balance of rural gender roles from the (idealized) "complementarity" of traditional subsistence agriculture, plus weaving, hunting, fishing and gathering, to a new calculus based more on cash crops and/or wage employment. In this arrangement, men would have been more likely to engage in cash-producing activities, while women were increasingly relegated to the sphere of subsistence.

We might therefore suspect a subtle alteration in the dynamics of family relationship, with men's economic role coming to be seen as, in a sense, more important than women's.[43] It is a truism in the Philippines that women are actually harder-working, while men are likely to sit around drinking and gambling away the family income. The historical records certainly suggest that men were more likely to drink and gamble. On the other hand, women were more likely to attend church, an equally nonproductive (and potentially costly) activity, economically speaking.[44] Whether men or women actually worked harder is a question we have no way of answering, except by invoking presuppositions or prejudices, such as the "myth of the lazy native."[45] But it is at least possible that the stereotype of the "lazy Filipino" (male) stems not just from colonial condescension but also in part from an indigenous over-appreciation of his role in the growing cash economy of the 19th century: he brings in the money, so he is entitled to spend it.[46]

Historical demography can provide glimpses into other aspects of women's role in the 19th century Philippines and challenge some of our concepts of what

was "normal" for women under Spanish rule. There was, for example, a high incidence of illegitimacy; some parishes list up to 25% of all births as "father unknown," which suggests that the control of the church over women's lives was considerably less than we have been led to believe.[47] A significant proportion (20-30% in Tigaon, Camarines Sur) of "families" or "households" are listed as headed by women—widows, single mothers and spinsters living alone—though the category is too shifting and nebulous to draw any strong conclusions from these figures.[48]

Marriage in the 19th century Philippines was usually arranged by the families on both sides, and if there was any change in this pattern (*e.g.* in the direction of more elopements, or "love matches"), it does not show up in the records we have examined so far. We can show, however, some correlation between marriage patterns and economics. In abaca-producing areas, for example, the marriage rate tracks closely with the price of abaca, suggesting that many couples were only able to afford the ceremony in times of prosperity.[49] The fact that daughters of the *principalia* (municipal elite) apparently married at an age about a year younger (on the average) than ordinary women also suggests that wealth encouraged weddings.[50] Some evidence points to a general lowering of the age at female first marriage by as much as 2-3 years during the latter half of the century, which, if confirmed, would have had important implications for fertility as well.[51]

Preliminary analysis of data on mortality suggests that women were not discriminated against in the ways that have been documented for other parts of Asia. Recorded life expectancy for women is actually higher than that for men, and women's age-specific death rates appear to be lower, except perhaps for the child-bearing years from 20 to 29.[52] On the other hand, the data examined so far are of poor quality, and might well conceal some female deaths (especially of infants), that would cause this apparent advantage to disappear, or even be reversed.

Migration, too, has implications for gender roles. High sex ratios in frontier areas, such as Samar,[53] draw to our attention the fact that many women were left at home with absent husbands or none, forced to maintain their families and make their own way without male help in the increasingly commercialized economy. The migration of single women from the surrounding provinces to Manila, especially for prostitution, presents a different case. But whether we think of this as arising from the decisions of independent-minded women or, as De Bevoise

suggests, "a culturally sanctioned strategy for families in real need," it, too, presents a sharp alternative to our image of a tradition-bound rural Filipino family.[54]

Most of the time, however, it was entire families—sometimes extended families—who were involved in migration, as both the sex-ratios and descriptions of newly-founded settlements make clear. Yet we do not know how picking up an entire household and setting out to establish a new community, carving it out of the forest, might have affected the dynamics of gender within families or within the new settlements they formed. Was it possible simply to replicate "complementary" relationships from the old village and household? Did men step forward, as primarily responsible for clearing the forest, hunting game and defending the house against bandits and wildlife? Or, conversely, did women emerge as the essential architects of social cohesion? At this stage we have no evidence, and almost no idea.[55]

Gender Ideology: From Mary to Maria Clara

The economic, social and demographic evidence all points toward a history of women more dynamic and diverse than we might have expected from the "stereotype." Women were on the move to frontiers and to cities or, if they stayed at home, they were often heads of households. Besides being subsistence farmers, weavers and churchgoers, they were market vendors, nuns, tobacco leaf sorters, domestic helpers, schoolteachers, cigar-makers, washerwomen and commercial sex workers. They married younger, if they married at all; many were single mothers, at least in the eyes of the church. They owned property, sued their debtors, and even went on strike. And when the revolution came, some supported it or even participated in it.

Yet so far as we know, none of this was inspired by, or reflected in, any major shift in gender ideology. Centuries before, Spain had introduced a set of patriarchal values, which erupted at times into outright misogyny:

> Woman is the most monstrous animal in the whole of Nature, bad-tempered and worse spoken. To have this animal in the house is asking for trouble....
> Casimiro Dias, OSA, 1745[56]

Filipinos had, by and large, adopted and adapted these patriarchal values; the most that can be said (or at least documented) is that they softened them

slightly, emphasizing those aspects of Christianity that stress complementarity, or even equality, between the sexes. A Filipino *pasyon* (popular religious verse) of the early 19th century uses the exemplary marriage of Mary and Joseph to illustrate a lesson (*aral*):

> Thus, under one roof, they did live, / the two friends, without pause, night and day, / praised ceaselessly / the Lord God most wise.
>
> Carpenter was the profession / of this holy man / while the work of the woman / was to sew and weave / and to take care of the household.
>
> Thus, the wills of the two / were united as one / peaceful was their existence / blessed most lavishly / by God the Lord Father.
>
> Lesson
>
> Christians, it is right / that we should imitate
> their good conduct / and gentle spirit / as they lived together.
>
> Every married couple / should always imitate them. / If their companionship is well / mercy and precious grace / will not abandon them.
>
> But those who quarrel much / those who bicker night and day / those full of anger / will be abandoned / by the grace most precious.
>
> Therefore, couples whoever they may be / must heed one another. / Imitate Joseph / and Mary, the comely one, / in their care for their home.[57]

But as Priscelina Patajo-Legasto points out,[58] this remains a "patriarchal text," and she attacks its "phallogocentrism," (sic) which produces "ambivalent, even contradictory, representations of women." Eve, she notes is depicted as "derivative" from Adam. "Power-hungry, vainglorious and feeble-minded," Eve is blamed for the Fall, and so deserves her punishment of "suffering beyond compare." Biological reproduction itself is part of God's "curse" on her, and is contrasted with Mary's later chastity, to the point that Mary even baulked at Joseph as a husband until God promised her that her "purity should suffer no stain." But whether as the source of evil or as consecrated to the good, woman remains "man's Other, the representation of alterity."

The problem, of course, is that this text was (presumably) written by a male,[59] as are virtually all other representations of Filipino thought in the Spanish period. Women did not publish;[60] their letters, by and large, have not survived.[61] What we are left with, for now, is texts produced by (Filipino) men that reflect on

gender relations. Of these, two stand out in the attention they received, both at the time and in subsequent study: *Urbana at Felisa,* a popular Tagalog book of manners written by a secular priest, Modesto de Castro, in the 1860s,[62] and Jose Rizal's famous novel, *Noli Me Tangere* (with its sequel, *El Filibusterismo*).[63] It is beyond the scope of this paper—and beyond my competence—to provide an exhaustive analysis of these texts, but some comment on how they have been interpreted may be in order.

For a start, they, like the *pasyon*, were not only produced by men and censored by priests (with the *Casaysayan* ultimately passing the censor, and *Noli* briefly passed before being prohibited), but they are, almost by definition, the product of the Filipino elite. Despite this, they differed considerably in the class audience for which they were apparently intended. The *pasyon*, as noted, was for the masses, a text for Everyman (and Everywoman). Memorized even by those who could not read, its annual recitation was a major civic-religious ritual in many of the Tagalog provinces. *Urbana at Felisa*, on the other hand, was an etiquette manual clearly aimed at the aspiring bourgeoisie, people who had enough money to buy napkins, but were not quite sure how to use them. It demanded literacy, and among its literate audience it sold well, becoming in effect the "Emily Post" for a whole generation of *ilustrados*. Rizal, finally, was operating at an even higher level. He wrote not just in Spanish (the other works were in Tagalog), but in convoluted literary language, and he tended to satirize those Filipinos whose Spanish was not up to the mark or who had more pretensions that taste—the readers of *Urbana at Felisa*, perhaps?[64] So, although these texts jointly offer a (male) Filipino image of what gender was and should be in the 19th century, there are differences in how they approach this question.

Eviota sees *Urbana at Felisa* as essentially restricting the sexual behavior of Filipinas, along Hispanic/Western lines:

> Daughters should be taught to fear God, to take care of their virginity and to be modest... Women should be taught to keep house and to love the home... Married women were to devote their lives to family and home. A married woman is subservient to the man who is the head of the household. She should serve her husband and look after his needs; she should be self-sacrificing and bear with her husband's faults.[65]

Mina Roces, while not denying any of this, claims that the fact that this book was written for and about women is a sign that women were seen not just as "cultural transmitters" but as "agents of change" and "moral guardians." *Urbana at Felisa* was not just a restatement of traditional customs, she suggests, but an

attempt to prescribe new rules for the newly Hispanized and urbanized Filipino elite. Castro, in effect, acknowledged women as "the means through which modern values were introduced into society." Among the values promoted were "duties to one's town/country" (*katungkulan sa bayan*), which Roces implies is a kind of precursor to both Philippine nationalism and "education for citizenship."[66]

Did Rizal—hero, martyr and greatest writer of the Propaganda Movement—move beyond this? The question has been at the center of debates within Philippine feminism since at least 1963, when Carmen Guerrero Nakpil described Maria Clara, heroine of Rizal's novels, as the "greatest misfortune that has befallen the Filipina in the last one hundred years." Maria Clara, beloved of the protagonist, Crisostomo Ibarra, is beautiful and fragile, humorless and prone to fainting, a perennial victim and a bumbler. She is bullied by her parents and abused by the friars (one of whom turns out to be her real father); she betrays her lover and winds up in a nunnery, only to be further abused there. As Nakpil put it, "she made a talent for unhappiness her greatest virtue."[67]

Most feminists today are inclined to exonerate Rizal, at least partially, for the feminine (but certainly not feminist) icon Maria Clara became. Lilia Quindoza Santiago points to the wide range of more diverse female characters created by Rizal, some of whom are braver than Maria Clara, and have a better sense of humor.[68] Violeta Lopez-Gonzaga suggests that Rizal transcended the model of *Urbana at Felisa,* thanks to his mother, Doña Teodora Alonzo, who provided an "alternative role model." *Noli,* she claims, represents women as they are, not as they should be. "Though commonly thought to be Rizal's ideal role model for women, Maria Clara actually provides a subtle critique of the predominant mold of women in his time."[69]

Readers of Rizal's novels—available in several English translations—will have to decide for themselves whether the portrait of Maria Clara is indeed a satirical social comment or whether the otherwise-perceptive author simply had a blind spot for a certain type of woman (which is my own reading). We can, however, discern other themes in Rizal's writings on women, particularly as mothers and wives.

Rizal's strong admiration of, and identification with, his own mother is well known, and the equation of love of mother with love of country is frequently found in his work (*e.g.* in the "Song of Maria Clara" in Noli). Perhaps the most perceptive analysis of this is by Vicente L. Rafael, who explores metaphors of

dreaming, memory, translation and mourning in Rizal's imagining of the "motherland."[70] The novels are full of mothers, from the tragic peasant Sisa, whose unbearable exploitation eventually drives her insane, to the stoic Capitana Maria, who was able to watch silently as her sons were beaten for a patriotic cause. There are good mothers and bad mothers, but the very worst women, Rizal implies, are those who are never mothers at all.[71]

What, in Rizal's view, was a good woman? Here we may refer to his famous 1889 "Letter to the Young Women of Malolos," written when he learned that twenty daughters of that town's *principalia* had petitioned the Spanish Governor General to reverse the priest-inspired decision not to open a school for them.[72] In it he praises their bravery, especially for standing up to the priests, but his reasons for commending their desire for education have to do not with their own potential, but with their future role as mothers:

> Young womanhood, the nursery of fruitful flowers, ought to accumulate riches to bequeath to its descendants. What could the offspring be of a woman whose only virtue is to murmur prayers…? The mother who can teach nothing else but how to kneel and kiss the hand should not expect any other kind of children but stupid ones or oppressed slaves.[73]
>
> Let us be reasonable and open our eyes, especially you women, because you are the ones who open the minds of men. Consider that a good mother is different from the one created by the friars… The country should not expect honor and prosperity so long as the education of the child is defective, so long as the women who raise the children are enslaved and ignorant. Nothing can be drunk in a turbid and bitter spring.[74]
>
> Everybody knows the power and the prudence of the women in the Philippines. Hence they bind them, chain them, weaken their spirit, so sure are they that so long as the mother is a slave, all her children can be enslaved also.[75]
>
> Teach your children to guard and love their honor, to love their fellowmen, their native land, and to perform their duties. Tell them repeatedly to prefer death with honor to life with dishonor. They should imitate the women of Sparta…[76]

Of the seven points Rizal makes at the end of this open letter, only one applies specifically to women:

> *Fifth.* If Filipino woman will not change, she should not be entrusted with the education of her children. She should only bear them. She should be deprived of her authority in the home; otherwise she may unwittingly betray her husband, children, country and all.[77]

As the last sentence suggests, Rizal also thinks of women as potential wives and helpers (*katulong*) to their patriotic husbands:

> Why does not a young woman ask of the man she is going to love for a noble and honorable name, a manly heart that can protect her weakness, a noble mind that will not permit him to be the father of slaves? Instill in his mind activity and industry, noble behavior, worthy sentiments, and do not surrender your young womanhood to a weak and timid heart. When she becomes a wife, she should help her husband in every difficulty, encourage him, share with him all perils, console him and drive away all his woes.[78]

Yet it appears in both his writings and the contours of his own life that to Rizal, the role of wife was considerably less important than that of mother. Although he waxed sentimental about his female friends and lost loves, Rizal was a bit of a butterfly, flitting across the Philippines and Europe from one flirtation to another until he finally married (Josephine Bracken), literally on the eve of his execution.[79] In the "Letter" he speaks of a vague "longing" for a woman who would be "the partner of our heart, who shares our happiness and our misfortune,"[80] but he spent most of his adult life without any such soulmate, and in his novels, Ibarra managed to be heroic with only the minimum of aid from hapless Maria Clara. A good wife might, indeed, be a useful and pleasant helpmeet, but a good mother was an absolute necessity.

helpmate

What Rizal and his fellow Propagandists were promoting in the face of Spanish patriarchy, in fact, was not true gender equality, but a rival revolutionary masculinity. These were young men who, when in Spain, enjoyed swordplay and shooting, and after seeing a Wild West show in Paris, formed the "Indios Bravos" (Brave Indians/Filipinos), a sporting club. Many of them were inveterate womanizers and gamblers, but, strong in the old double standard, clung to the belief that a woman's true virtue lay in her chastity. Even photographs of the Propagandists tend to reflect their masculine stance.[81] It is not surprising that they constantly proclaimed the (male) necessity to protect the (female) motherland.[82]

Imperialists tended to justify their domination on the grounds that they were more manly, brave and rational than the (implicitly effeminate and irrational) natives.[83] The nationalists fought back by contradiction: We'll show you who's manly![84] Rizal proved himself more than a match for most Spaniards in "rational" discourse, as his scholarly edition of Morga's *Sucesos de Las Islas Filipinas* was

clearly intended to demonstrate. Other Propagandists demonstrated their manliness in other ways; Juan Luna was involved in a celebrated scandal when he defended his honor by killing his allegedly unfaithful wife (and her mother).[85]

In such a context, the role of woman (the motherland) is not to stand up and defend herself, but to choose which masculinity will control and protect her. In his "letter," Rizal appeals to the young women of Malolos to choose brave young revolutionaries over arrogant and greedy friars. This may be understandable, it may even have been necessary, but it was certainly not feminist. Filipino women have had some difficulty in dealing with this nationalist machismo. Most simply ignore it. Others fault Rizal for leaving women in a subordinate position.[86] But no feminist scholar, to the best of my knowledge, has come right out and said that the Propagandists may, in some sense, have been promoting the "nation" at the expense of half of its members.[87]

There may be some justice in the claim that Andres Bonifacio and other heroes of the Revolution were more egalitarian. Bonifacio's wife, Gregorio de Jesus, is said to have regarded him as her "companion in life," implying genuine equality. Emilio Jacinto, in the "Teachings of the Katipunan," exhorts, "Do not look at woman as a mere plaything but rather as a partner and one who shares in the difficulties of our life." Apolinario Mabini actually proposed female suffrage on the same basis as male (*i.e.* with educational and financial qualifications) in the Malolos Constitution of 1899, though his radical draft was defeated in favor of a more conservative version.[88] There is a certain logic to this, if we take Hispanization to be the core of Filipino patriarchal values, since the *ilustrados* of the Propaganda movement were, by and large, more Hispanized than the leaders of the Katipunan. It may not be accurate to characterize the Revolution as "The Revolt of the Masses," but its leaders seem to have been somewhat more in touch with indigenous concepts of gender complementarity than their elite predecessors.[89]

When it comes to the Revolution and the Filipino-American War, there has been a great deal of recent celebration of female participation, a useful corrective to the customary "Boys-Own" version of these events. Much of it simply takes the form of cataloging women revolutionaries. Some actually fought, and a few rose to be called "General," though only one was officially recognized as such.[90] Many more served as spies and couriers, or provided supplies (especially food) and medical services. Some of the most celebrated heroines of the Revolution, in fact, are chiefly known for their nursing activities, including Trinidad Tecson, "The Mother of Biak-na-Bato," though she also fought when necessary.[91]

Most of this research serves to validate (if validation is necessary) the patriotism of Filipinas, but it tells us little about how gender roles were perceived and altered, except for the obvious fact that in the heat of revolution some women chose to take on the traditionally "male" role of warrior. Mina Roces, however, deliberately sets aside "the intrepid women who fought as men," and tries to focus instead on "gendered" roles, "the activities identified with the feminine": running the Red Cross, serving as hostess of (and keeping watch over) meetings of revolutionaries, etc.

Rather than ignoring the implications of the fact that almost all the officials of the women's chapter of the Katipunan and the Red Cross were the wives or sisters of nationalist leaders, with their rank in these organizations corresponding to their husbands' or brothers' standing outside,[92] Roces sees it as evidence of the empowerment of these women. Nepotism does not disqualify their power, but (in a sense) confirms it, since they are operating within a value system in which power is "held not just by the individual but by the kinship group." Ideally, the wife is not just her husband's "helper," but his partner, even his "alter ego." Eventually "women worked the levers of power without holding the institutional symbols of office, all the while preserving the male leadership in the public front."[93]

Certainly, such perceptions were and are held by many Filipinos, yet it is hard to see where they vary significantly from those of traditional patriarchy, in which a woman's status is regularly inscribed in terms of the men to whom she belongs. It is interesting that when Gregoria de Jesus herself (according to Roces) wrote her memoirs, "she chose to describe her role using the male yardstick of what constitutes participating in the revolution, for she saw her most important role as the times she performed similar duties as the *katipuneros*." If women were, indeed, operating in terms of a different value system, they do not seem to have been particularly aware of it.[94]

What Roces seems to be describing is less an alternative to patriarchy than a strategy for manipulating it, and here we have the heart of the paradox of women in the 19th century Philippines. Women's lives clearly changed, but their perception of them did not—or more precisely, if their perceptions did change, we have not managed to track down evidence of it. We do not, as yet, even know "what women learned when men gave them advice," in the form of their own contemporary reworking of patriarchal myths, values and structures.[95]

One simple but powerful explanation for his apparent paradox, offered most explicitly by Cristina Blanc-Szanton, is that Filipinos never fully internalized the values of "Mediterranean" gender ideology in the first place. Instead, they adapted Hispanic culture selectively. Latin machismo fitted in nicely with indigenous patterns of male fighting, drinking and bragging or joking about sex, but women did not accept, and were not forced into, the binary evil-unless-totally-pure stereotypes of Spanish Catholicism. Although chastity was encouraged in Visayan women, Blanc-Szanton observes, its absence did not entail total condemnation or ostracism, as it would have in the Mediterranean. "Among (the images) that did not take hold are (those) of Eve and of the Virgin Mary as the Immaculate Conception."[96]

Her argument is strong, but it leaves us hungry for specific historical evidence that would further illuminate the discrepancy between public gender ideology and daily reality for the Filipinas of the 19th century. There are still many contemporary sources to explore, including literary, theatrical and musical texts—*awit, corrido, kundiman, zarzuela, moro-moro*, etc.—though so far as we know, most of these are also composed by men. To hear genuine Filipina voices, we may have to winkle their utterances out of obscure corners of the archives, where women appear as occasional petitioners, witnesses or the accused in criminal cases. We may also be able to hear them in early 20th century texts, when American education and greater press freedom opened the door for more women's writing, but we will have to use these texts with caution, since the very American presence that made them possible also introduced new gender ideologies (including American feminism, brought over with fervor by Carrie Chapman Catt in 1912).[97] More recent ethnographic and sociological studies, though they may usefully suggest ongoing themes in Filipino practices and perception of gender, cannot by themselves document the mentalities of the Spanish period.

What we are left with, for now, is women who did not dispute the binary opposition of (bad) Eve and (good) Mary in religious texts, who sought out the self-abnegating advice of *Urbana at Felisa*, and who took Maria Clara as a model of Filipino womanhood, but who at the same time were responding to the challenges that colonialism and capitalism presented to Philippine society. The lives of many of them were transformed by the opportunities and problems they faced, but they did not openly articulate any response, so far as we know. Filipinas made the best of their situation, moved or stayed put as they had to, worked in new industries or in old rice-paddies, married younger (if at all), supported the state (or the revolution) quietly, and kept going to church—when they felt like it. They may have admired Maria Clara as an ideal, but they demonstrated a great deal more resourcefulness than she ever did.[98]

Notes

[1]See, for example, Isabel Rojas-Aleta, Teresita L. Silva, Christine P. Eleazar, *A Profile of Filipino Women: Their Status and Role,* prepared for USAID (Manila: Philippine Business for Social Progress, October 1977), 11-17; Aida F. Santos Maranan, "Do Women Really Hold Up Half the Sky?: Notes on the Women's Movement in the Philippines," in *Essays on Women*, ed. Sr. Mary John Mananzan, O.S.B, rev. ed. (Manila: St. Scholastica's College, Institute of Women's Studies, 1989), 39-54; *Women's Role in Philippine History: Selected Essays*, 2nd ed. (Diliman, Q.C.: UP, University Center for Women's Studies, 1996). In most of these works, and in this paper, "the Philippines" refers to those areas brought under control by the Spanish colonial government in Manila; the Muslim south and non-Hispanized uplands are excluded.

The myth of a glorious (Filipino) past, a dismal (Spanish) present, and a glorious (Filipino) future can be traced back at least as far as the late 19th century nationalists; the feminist version no later than the 1920s. See Cristina Blanc-Szanton, "Collision of Cultures: Historical Reformulations of Gender in the Lowland Visayas, Philippines," in *Power and Difference: Gender in Island Southeast Asia,* ed. Jane Monnig Atkinson and Shelly Errington (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 370-71, citing Maria Paz Mendoza-Guanzon, *The Development and Progress of the Filipino Woman* (1928). I am by no means singling out Philippine historiography (nationalist or feminist) as unique in myth-making. It happens everywhere; what is of interest is analyzing the particular patterns that emerge in specific cases.

[2]Zeus Salazar, "The *Babaylan* in Philippine History," *Women's Role in Philippine History*, 209-222.

In implying that this stereotype may be exaggerated, I do not deny the underlying reality to which it refers. There is no question that by comparison with both later Hispanic norms and with much of East and South Asia, the pre-Hispanic Philippines was (like most of Southeast Asia) **relatively** gender-equal in both ideal and practice; Teresita F. Infante, *The Woman in Early Philippines and Among Cultural Minorities* (Manila: University of Santo Tomas, 1969); Shelly Errington, "Recasting Sex, Gender, and Power: A Theoretical and Regional Overview," in Atkinson and Errington, 1-58 (esp. 1-5); Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the*

Age of Commerce 1450-1680, vol. 1, *The Lands Below the Winds* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 146-72 *passim*.

[3]Urduja appears in an Arabic text which Jose Rizal thought, on rather slight evidence, might refer to the Philippines; William Henry Scott, *Prehispanic Source Materials for Study of Philippine History,* rev. ed., (Q.C.: New Day, 1984), 82-83. She is taken as a historic example of powerful Filipina womanhood by Rojas-Aleta *et al.*; Myrna S. Feliciano, "The Filipina: A Historical Legal Perspective," in *Women's Role in Philippine History,* 22-51; Rosalinda Pineda-Ofreneo, "Tracing a Hidden Tapestry: Women and Literature in the Philippines," in *Women Reading... Feminist Perspectives on Philippine Literary Texts,* ed. Thelma B. Kintanar (Q.C.: UP Press and University Center for Women's Studies, 1992), 31.

[4]Boxer, *Mary and Misogyny: Women in Iberian Expansion Overseas, 1415-1815: Some Facts, Fancies and Personalities* (London: Duckworth, 1975).

[5]See Jaime B. Veneracion, "From Babaylan to Beata: A Study on the Religiosity of Filipino Women," and Milagros C. Guerrero, "Sources on Women's Role in Philippine History, 1590-1898: Texts and Countertexts," both papers presented at the Fourth International Philippine History Conference, Canberra, July 1992.

Under Spanish rule, even the role of *babaylan* (shaman), traditionally associated with women, came to be played more often by male transvestites; Alfred W. McCoy, "*Baylan:* Animist Religion and Philippine Peasant Ideology," in *Moral Order and the Question of Change: Essays on Southeast Asian Thought,* ed. David K. Wyatt and Alexander Woodside (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), 338-408; Maria Milagros Geremia-Lachica, "Panay's Babaylan: The Male Takeover," in *Review of Women's Studies* 5/2-6/1 (1996): 53-60.

[6]Ramon Pedrosa, O.S.A, "Abortion and Infanticide in the Philippines during the Spanish Contact," *Philippiniana Sacra* 18 (1983): 7-37.

[7]See Blanc-Szanton, 352, 360-64, 449-52, and sources cited therein.

[8]For a sampling of scholarship on social and economic history, see Benito F. Legarda, Jr., "Foreign Trade, Economic Change, and Entrepreneurship in the Nineteenth Century Philippines" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard, 1955); John A. Larkin, *The Pampangans: Colonial Society in a Philippine Province* (Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1972); Jonathan Fast and Jim Richardson, *Roots of Dependency: Political and Economic Revolution in 19th Century Philippines* (Q.C.: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1979); Alfred W. McCoy and Ed. C. de Jesus, eds. *Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1982); O.D. Corpuz, *An Economic History of the Philippines* (Q.C.: University of the Philippines Press, 1997). On the state actions that accompanied and facilitated this transformation, see Eliodoro Robles, *The Philippines in the Nineteenth Century* (Quezon City: Malaya Books, 1969); Nicholas P. Cushner, S.J., *Spain in the Philippines: From Conquest to Revolution* (Q.C.: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1971); Corpuz, *The Roots of the Filipino Nation, 2 vols.* (QC: Aklahi Foundation, 1989).

[9]Eviota, *The Political Economy of Gender: Women and the Sexual Division of Labour in the Philippines* (London: Zed Press, 1992), Chapter 6 ("Spain's Last 150 Years: the development of export crops and the commercialization of the economy"); Camagay, *Working Women of Manila in the 19th Century* (Q.C.: University of the Philippines Press and University Center for Women's [sic] Studies, 1995). Blanc-Szanton, 359-69, while not focusing on the 19th century in particular, makes perceptive comments on changes between early and late Spanish rule.

[10]Violeta Lopez-Gonzaga, "Images of Women and Their Role in Society in Jose Rizal's Writings," in *Jose Rizal and the Asian Renaissance,* ed. M. Rajaretnam (Manila: Solidaridad, 1996), 171-189.

[11]Romeo V. Cruz, "The Filipina at the Time of Fil-American Revolution," in Mananzan, *Essays on Women*, 55-59, referring to Zeus Salazar's panegyric to the *babaylan* or *katalonan* in the same volume. For more restrained studies of the female revolutionaries, see Rojas-Aleta *et al.*; Maranan; and "The Centennial Issue: Women in History and Revolution," *Review of Women's Studies*, ed. Thelma B. Kintanar. (Quezon City, 5/2-6/1 1996). A subtler appreciation can be found in Mina Roces, "Reflections on Gender and Kinship in the Philippine Revolution 1896-1898" (paper presented to IV Congreso Internacional de la Asociacion Española de Estudios del Pacifico, Valladolid, 26-29 November 1997); I am grateful to Dr. Roces for providing me with a copy of her paper.

Some of the more exuberant conflations of feminism and nationalism have occurred in conjunction with the centennial of the 1896 revolution; this may

exaggerate the apparent "celebratory" quality of women's studies. Roces (personal communication, 5 March 1998) suggests that I am over-simplifying feminist scholarship, which fully recognized that "national liberation" enjoyed priority over other struggles, so that "at no time would a feminist scholar... see a point in Philippine history where feminism and nationalism were ever reconciled."

[12]See, in particular, "Textile Displacement and the Status of Women in Southeast Asia," in *The Past in Southeast Asia's Present,* ed. Gordon P. Means (Ottawa: Canadian Council for Southeast Asian Studies, 1978), pp. 157-70 (revised and published as *Michigan Occasional Papers in Women's Studies,* no. 17 [Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, Women's Studies Program, 1981]); *Prosperity without Progress: Manila Hemp and Material Life in the Colonial Philippines* (Berkeley: University of California Press & Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1984), 149-54 and *passim*; "Life, Death and the Sacraments in a Nineteenth Century Bikol Parish," *Population and History: The Demographic Origins of the Modern Philippines,* ed. Daniel F. Doeppers and Peter S. Xenos (Madison: University of Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), 225-52; "Age Statement and Misstatement in the Nineteenth Century Philippines: Some Preliminary Findings," *Annales de demographie historique* 1988, pp. 327-49.

[13]I use "liberal" here in the classic sense of increasing freedom by removing restrictions (liberalizing), rather than the late 20th century pejorative usage, which is often taken to imply "big government" and other horrors.

[14]*E.g.* Robert MacMicking, *Recollections of Manila and the Philippines: During 1848, 1849 and 1850* (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1967); Fedor Jagor, *Travels in the Philippines* (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1965).

[15]It should be noted that many of the earlier restrictions were often honored in the breach, with the loopholes and violations affecting foreign trade particularly well documented. For example, not only were American (and British) merchant houses established in Manila well before that port was officially "opened" to foreign trade in 1834, but the USA actually had a consulate there. As we cannot be sure to what extent any Spanish regulations actually governed Philippine practice, there is reason to believe that some of the internal prohibitions were also ignored much of the time. See, for example, Corpuz, *Economic History,* 55-68, 112-19, 146-48, on discrepancies between actuality and the law with regard to land ownership and transfer.

[16]Owen, *Prosperity,* 192-97; Robles.

[17]Owen, *Prosperity,* 21-24; on "avoidance" as resistance, see Michael Adas, "'Moral Economy' or 'Contest State'?: Elite Demands and the Origins of Peasant Protest in Southeast Asia," *Journal of Social History* 13 (Summer 1980): 521-46.

In some cases, the growth of the bureaucracy might actually be "liberalizing," in that it could reduce the arbitrary power that some parish priests and provincial governors previously tried to wield. Astute members of the Filipino elite were particularly good at exploiting the potential countervailing powers created by such situations; cf. Owen, "The Power of the Principalia: Local Politics in Early 19th Century Kabikolan" (paper for Fourth International Philippine Studies Conference, Canberra, 1992).

[18]Luis Camara Dery, "Prostitution in Colonial Manila," *Philippine Studies* 39 (1991): 475-89; Greg Bankoff, *Crime, Society, and the State in the Nineteenth-Century Philippines* (Q.C.: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1996), 26-27,41-44; Ken De Bevoise, *Agents of Apocalypse: Epidemic Disease in the Colonial Philippines* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), Chapter 3 ("Venereal Disease: Evolution of a Social Problem"), 69-93.

[19]See Camagay, Chapter 5 ("Las Maestras") on female schoolteachers and Chapter 6 ("Matronas titulares") on registered midwives. The professionalization of medicine also began the marginalization of many traditional healers and herbalists of both sexes.

Men would also have benefited, presumably (as suggested by Ester Boserup, *Woman's Role in Economic Development* [London: Allen & Unwin, 1970]) from state-sponsored improvements in agriculture or other industries, since the Spanish, like most colonialists, tended to assume that men were the managers of production and the effective agents of change. Despite numerous measures devoted to "development," however, I have seen no evidence that any such officially-sponsored government initiative, other than the exploitative tobacco monopoly, actually worked in the Spanish period. (The American record is slightly better.)

[20]Leon Ma. Guerrero, *The First Filipino: A Biography of Jose Rizal* (Manila: National Historical Commission, 1971), 223-24. On Rizal's "Letter to the Young Women of Malolos," see below.

[21]Carolyn Israel Sobritchea, "American Colonial Education and Its Impact on the Status of Filipino Women," in *Women's Role in Philippine History,* 79-108.

[22]According to the U.S., Bureau of the Census, *Census of the Philippine Islands: Taken Under the Direction of the Philippine Commission in the Year 1903,* 4 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1905), vol. 2, there were over one million Filipinas who were literate, 42% of the women over 10 (as against 47% for the men), though only a quarter of that number (11%) could both read and write. Although some of this may be attributed to the Americans (who opened schools almost as soon as a given district was "pacified"), most of this female literacy has to be credited to Spanish schools.

[23]Cf. Camagay, Chapter 5.

[24]If we regard the Roman Catholic church as an "official" institution in the Spanish Philippines, the discrepancy becomes even greater. Although there were some opportunities for women as nuns (as well as positions in lay organizations), these could not compare with the openings available to Filipino men as secular priests, with the possibility of moving up even higher in terms of diocesan rank (though not all the way to bishop, until 1906).

[25]Marshall S. McLennan, *The Central Luzon Plain: Land and Society on the Inland Frontier* (Quezon City: Alemar's-Phoenix Publishing House, 1980); Larkin "Philippine History Reconsidered: A Socioeconomic Perspective," *American Historical Review* 87 (June 1982): 595-628; Alfred W. McCoy, "A Queen Dies Slowly: The Rise and Decline of Iloilo City," in McCoy and de Jesus, 314-26; Owen, *Prosperity,* 115-20, 134-36; Bruce Cruikshank, *Samar: 1768-1898* (Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1985), 139, 284-88; Paul A. Rodell, "Calculating Rural Migration Patterns for the Nineteenth Century Philippines," in *Patterns of Migration in Southeast Asia,* ed. Robert R. Reed (Berkeley: University of California, 1990), 60-77.

[26]Peter C. Smith, "The Turn-of-the-Century Birth Rate," in Wilhelm Flieger and Smith, eds., *A Demographic Path to Modernity: Patterns of Early-Transition in the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, for the Population Institute, 1975), 82-90; Smith and Ng Shui-meng, "The Components

of Population Growth in Nineteenth Century Southeast Asia: Village Data from the Philippines," *Population Studies* 36 (1982): 237-55; Owen, "The Paradox of Population Growth in Nineteenth-Century Southeast Asia: Evidence from Java and the Philippines," *JSEAS* 18 (1987): 45-57; Doeppers and Xenos, "A Demographic Frame for Philippine History," in Doeppers and Xenos, *Population and History,* 3-36; Owen, "Philippine Historical Demography: Sources and Prospects," in *Southeast Asia's Demographic History: A Survey of Themes and Materials*, ed. Peter S. Xenos, forthcoming.

Whether the demand for labor actually stimulated population growth (as suggested by Eviota, 59, after Tilly and Scott), or whether demography was essentially an independent variable, is a question we do not, at present, have the evidence to answer. Similar questions—also unanswered—rise in conjunction with Javanese population growth under the Cultivation System; see Benjamin White, "Demand for Labor and Population Growth in Colonial Java," *Human Ecology* 1 (March 1973): 217-36; Owen, "Paradox," 54-55.

[27]Owen, "Capitalism and Welfare in the 19th-Century Philippines," paper presented at International Conference on the Centennial of the 1896 Philippine Revolution, Manila, August 1996.

[28]This class, composed of landlords and merchants, has been variously labelled the *ilustrados* (literally, "enlightened ones"), the middle class or bourgeoisie (Fil.: *burgis*), the "super-principales," and the elite, among other terms. It is often asserted that the core of this class was ethnically Chinese mestizo, though we lack the evidence to substantiate this in any quantitative sense. The relationship between wealth, power and status remains, as always, a matter for controversy. For overviews of the scholarly literature as it pertains to the Philippines, see Owen, "The Principalia in Philippine History: Kabikolan, 1790-1898," *Philippine Studies* 22 (3rd and 4th quarters, 1974): 297-324; Mark Macdonald Turner, "Interpretations of Class and Status in the Philippines: A Critical Evaluation," *Cultures et Dévéloppement* 10 (1978): 265-96. Such distinctions and disputes need not detain us here, so long as we recognize that there were Filipinos, who, in economic resources and lifestyle, had more in common with their Spanish masters than with the peasant majority.

[29]Robert R. Reed, *Colonial Manila: The Context of Hispanic Urbanism and the Process of Morphogenesis* (Berkeley: University of California, Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, 1978); Wilfredo V. Villacorta, Isagani R.

Cruz, and Ma. Lourdes Brillantes, *Manila: History, People and Culture: The Proceedings of the Manila Studies Conference* (Manila: De La Salle University Press, 1989); McCoy, "Queen Dies"; Michael Cullinane, "The Changing Nature of the Cebu Urban Elite in the 19th Century," in McCoy and De Jesus, 251-96.

[30]This is by no means solely the fault of women's history. Making due allowances for the shortcomings of indexes, it still is remarkable that the index to McCoy and De Jesus, *Philippine Social History,* lists citations to "women" in only three of the fifteen papers, while there is just one index citation each in Corpuz, *Roots and Economic History* (see also comments on De Jesus, *The Tobacco Monopoly,* and Larkin, *Sugar*, below).

[31]A more nuanced analysis might distinguish the provincial and municipal elites as "in-between" classes, in touch with Hispanized society through trips to, or relatives in, Manila (note that *Urbana at Feliza* [below] takes the form of letters between an urbanized woman and her country cousin), yet still involved, to a greater or lesser extent, with the more traditional values and structures of the countryside—or, especially in the case of the sugar plantations, with the growing new opportunities there; cf. Larkin, *Pampangans*, 84-99; Larkin, *Sugar and the Origins of Modern Philippine Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 101-124.

[32]On Rizal, see below. For a sampling of other sources, see Jagor, Felix Roxas, *The World of Felix Roxas* (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1970); Joaquin, *Culture and History* (Mandaluyong: Solar Publishing Corporation, 1988); Gilda Cordero-Fernando, *Turn of the Century,* and (in cartoon style), Mariel N. Francisco and Fe Maria C. Arriola, *The History of the Burgis* (Q.C.: GCF Books, 1987).

[33]It is likely that this class also produced a high proportion of the female religious (*beatas* and nuns), whose convents were heavily concentrated in or near Manila.

[34]"Migration to Manila: Changing Gender Representation, Migration Field, and Urban Structure," in Doeppers and Xenos, *Population and History*, 139-79.

[35]Camagay, 1 and *passim.* On the *cigarreras* (female cigar-makers), see also Edilberto de Jesus, "Manila's First Factories," *Philippine Historical Review* 1 (1971): 97-109.

[36]There was, however, some "regulation" of prostitution in Manila—giving it a quasi-official sanction—late in the century; De Bevoise, 79-84.

[37]Owen, "Textile Displacement"; Owen, "Life, Death, and the Sacraments," 237; both using evidence from 19th century Kabikolan. In any given year, the tendency was for all brides to be listed with the same occupation (*oficio*), suggesting that "farmer" and "weaver" were not distinct occupations but overlapping, even synonymous, terms for women's customary employment.

The absence of domestic servants from the marriage registers is not, of course, proof that they did not exist. In the rural Philippines, such servants might also have been called upon to weave or work the fields, or maids may have been effectively precluded from marriage by their status (and poverty). A significant minority of women (5-10% in Nagcarlan, Laguna; 15-25% in Tigaon, Camarines Sur) apparently never married at all.

[38]Eviota, 47-48 (citing the *Census of 1903*). In Edilberto C. de Jesus' otherwise excellent study, *The Tobacco Monopoly in the Philippines: Bureaucratic Enterprise and Social Change, 1766-1880* (Q.C.: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1980), there is almost no description of the actual cultivation or preparation of tobacco, much less an analysis of gendered labor in the industry (outside the factories).

[39]At least there have been some scholarly studies of these industries, esp. Owen, *Prosperity*, for abaca, and Larkin, *Sugar*. There are, to the best of my knowledge, no studies at all of the 19th century production of such cash crops as coffee (which flourished in Batangas) and coconuts/copra (which would emerge as one of the major 20th century exports). On gendered labor in sugar, Larkin, 7, has only this to say:

> I do not mean to imply that sugar was exclusively a male preserve, for it was decidedly not so. Women, young and old, labored in the fields, especially during planting and weeding season, and they participated in family decision making on economic matters. Some women owned sugar lands in their own right, supervised work on their holdings, and made all kinds of investments from sugar profits. The sources, however, proved somewhat stingy in yielding specific information on the activities of women and children, for in the Philippines the tendency is for men to receive much of the public attention in all economic and political endeavours, even when others deserve a goodly share of the credit. So, while I have not been able to describe the particular impact women may have had upon the industry, let it be recognized that they played a substantial role.

[40]So was *corveé* labor, which was significantly reduced during the 19th century in favor of higher cash obligations to the government.

[41]Owen, "Textile Displacement," 1981 ed., 2-7; McCoy, "A Queen Dies." The introduction of milled rice—whether imported or milled locally—also took a traditional task, that of pounding rice at home, away from many women. It seems likely that they were glad to be free of this particular labor (as those who were not could continue to buy *palay* in the husk), but the implications of what they did with the time thus "released," or how they paid the premium for milled rice, have not been explored.

[42]Edgar Wickberg, *The Chinese in Philippine Life, 1850-1898* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965). Over 99% of the Chinese in the Philippines at that time were male.

One critical factor in shaping the gendered world of commerce may have been the amount of travelling it entailed. By and large, women seem to have restricted themselves to the kind of trade that they could conduct within a day's trip of their home; most commerce over long distances thus fell by default to men, whether Chinese or Filipino. By the end of the century, however, Chinese shopkeepers were challenging Filipinas on their home turf, the municipal market.

[43]In "Textile Displacement," 1981 ed., 13-19, I also speculate on the symbolic loss resulting from women's abandonment of weaving, a traditional feminine-defining activity.

[44]Criminal records (as analyzed by Bankoff, among others) and parish records (see Owen, "Life, Death, and the Sacraments," 243-44) provide quantitative documentation for these commonplace observances. It should be noted, however, that although women were about twice as likely as men to take communion, still 30% or so of them did not do so. Taken collectively, Filipinas were "pious" only in contrast with male Filipinos.

[45]Syded Hussein Alatas, *The Myth of the Lazy Native* (London: Cass, 1977); Owen, *Prosperity*, 222-25.

[46]Among the elite, of course, there were possibilities for leisure on both sides, but the greater opportunities men had for salaried employment, whether with the government, with business firms or in the professions, are likely to have stimulated the same sense of male entitlement.

[47]Owen, "Life, Death, and the Sacraments," 228. I suspect that these data reflect common-law marriages, rather than promiscuity, so that in most cases, the father was indeed "known," just not officially acknowledged in a church wedding (Cf. Blanc-Szanton, 368-70, on common-law marriages). The average illegitimacy rate in the Bikol parishes I have sampled was around 15%; it seems to have been lower in the Tagalog parishes closer to Manila. As late as 1918, 10% of all married Bikolanos were married "consensually" rather than legally; Philippine Islands, Census Office, *Census of the Philippine Islands... 1918* (Manila: GPO, 1920-21), 2:736-37.

[48]Owen, "Life, Death, and the Sacraments," 240-42.

[49]Owen, *Prosperity*, 109.

[50]Owen, "Life, Death, and the Sacraments," 239. Between 1868 and 1900, the recorded age at first marriage of women whose father was listed as "Don" was 20.4 years, as against 21.4 years for all other first marriages. This also conforms to an Asia-wide pattern of elite women marrying younger than the average, perhaps because it was more important that their wealth and social position be suitably deployed and secured for family benefit.

[51]*Ibid*; Smith and Ng, 248-50; Ng Shui Meng, "Demographic Change, Marriage and Family Formation: The Case of Nineteenth Century Nagcarlan, The Philippines." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1979, 119. Whereas, in Nagcarlan there is just a single movement downward, in Tigaon (which I studied), the drop in the 1860s follows an apparent **upward** movement, of roughly the same magnitude, in the 1840s. These trends appear to hold for both the *principalia* and the rest.

This decline in marriage age (if confirmed) apparently implies general rising prosperity in the latter part of the century, at least in cash terms, a conclusion contradicted by some other evidence (see Owen, "Capitalism"). A partial explanation for this paradox may lie in the devaluation of the peso and consequent price inflation in the last few decades of the century. Even though they were not worth as much, pesos were easier to come by than ever before, which may have helped courting couples cross the threshold into marriage.

[52]Owen, "Life, Death, and the Sacraments," 232-33. Recorded maternal mortality rates, undoubtedly understated, are on the order of 1% (100 deaths per 10,000 conceptions), a substantial risk in a society where large families prevailed.

[53]Cf. Cruikshank, 284-88, on Calbayog, Samar, which had a sex ratio of 143.5 in 1896.

[54]The records surviving in the Philippine National Archives show that a majority of Manila women accused of prostitution originally came from the provinces, especially nearby in Luzon; see Camagay, 108; De Bevoise, 75; and Bankoff, 41, for slightly different figures reflecting this.

[55]Scattered evidence on the social structure of newer settlements (*e.g.* from the "Historical Data Papers" in the Philippine National Library) suggests that traditional hierarchies were more likely to be replicated than to be replaced by more democratic or egalitarian institutions. Often a new *visita* would, in fact, be "sponsored" by a member of the traditional elite, who would then (it seems) automatically become its "captain." We may surmise from this that Filipino migrants might have tried to maintain traditional gender roles as well—but with what success?

[56]From a handbook for the instruction of parish priests, as quoted in Boxer, 97.

[57]Rene B. Javellana, S.J., ed. and trans., *Casaysayan nang Pasiong Mahal ni Jesuscristong Panginoon natin na Sucat Ipag-alab nang Puso nang Sinomang Babasa* (Q.C.: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1988), 162-63 (stanzas 157-63). See also Reynaldo Clemeña Ileto, *Pasyon and Revolution* (Q.C.: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979), 15-28 and *passim*, on the significance of this *pasyon* in Tagalog life.

[58]"The Pasyon Pilapil: An-'other' Reading," in Kintanar, 71-89. The "Pasyon Pilapil" is the same text as the "Casaysayan nang Pasiong Mahal...," though Patajo-Legasto is using a different edition from that edited and translated by Javellana.

[59]It is actually anonymous, but it is based on an earlier *pasyon* by Gaspar Aquino de Belen; all the other *pasyon* texts of which the authorship is known are also attributed to men.

[60]Pineda-Ofreneo, 35, refers to Leona Florentino, an Ilocana, as a prolific 19th century poet, some of whose occasional verses were saved from oblivion when her famous son, Isabelo de los Reyes, sent them to Europe for publication. Unfortunately, Pineda-Ofreneo does not cite the poems themselves; her only source appears to be a 1984 article in *Celebrity* by Dolores S. Feria.

During the Philippine-American War, a couple of women were contributors to revolutionary newspapers; Paz Policarpio, "The Filipino Women During the Revolution," in *Review of Women's Studies* 5/2-6/1 (1996): 28-29.

[61]One notable exception consists of Jose Rizal's correspondence with his sisters, which have been published (*Letters Between Rizal and Family Members* [Manila: National Centennial Commission, 1964]); see Patricia B. Arinto, "Reading Correspondences: A Critical Analysis of the Letters Between Rizal and His Sisters," *Review of Women's Studies* 5/2-6/1 (1996): 181-90.

[62]The title begins, in some versions, *Pagsusulatan Na ng Dalauang Binibini na si Urbana at (ni) Feliza* ("Letters of two young women named Urbana and Feliza"). It may be significant that the names given the young women imply a distinction (contrast?) between "urban" and "happy."

I have not been able to confirm the original publication date, but the earliest edition held by a Philippine library is said to be 1864; by 1866 it had been translated into Ilocano.

[63]Originally published in Spanish in 1887 and 1891. "Noli me Tangere" literally means "Touch me not" and refers to the words of Jesus to his female followers after the resurrection; English translations of the book have tended to opt for alternative titles such as *The Social Cancer* or *The Lost Eden.* "Filibusterismo" may be translated as "subversion," the action of a "filibustero" (freebooter, partisan).

[64]Rizal, like other liberal intellectuals, expressed considerable sympathy for the exploited and illiterate masses, who deserved, he suggested, better leadership than they were getting from the elite. It was those who had opportunities and failed to use them, or who thought that they were better than they were, who were the main targets of his wit or wrath. Having said that, it must be acknowledged that the art of Rizal, like that of other great writers, is so rich that it renders any capsule summary unjust.

[65]Eviota, 60-61; cf. Lopez-Gonzaga, 171.

[66]Roces, "Reflections." I am not, as yet, convinced that the distinction Roces makes between women as "bearers of culture" and as "agents of change" is a very significant one. In either case, women can be seen as the instruments of men; Spanish friars employ them to maintain the conservative/colonial status quo, while Filipinos who want change, whether moderate (De Castro), reformist (Rizal), or radical (Bonifacio), also use them for their own ends. In all likelihood, women modified to some extent the messages they were intended (by men) to convey, but that needs to be separately asserted and documented; it is not inherent in their roles as either "cultural transmitters" or "agents of change."

[67]*Woman Enough and Other Essays* (Q.C.: Vibal, 1963), 29-34, as cited in Lilia Quindoza Santiago, "The Filipina as Metaphor for Crisis," in Kintanar, 119-20.

[68]Santiago, 120-122, referring also to the work of Pura Santillan Castrence.

[69]Lopez Gonzaga, 144. Eviota (182 n55) seemingly concurs: Rizal "did not think the woman Maria Clara was an ideal role model for women."

[70]"Nationalism, Imagery and the Filipino Intelligentsia in the 19th Century," in *Discrepant Histories: Translocal Essays on Filipino Cultures,* ed. Rafael (Manila: Anvil, 1995), 136-46. See also Ileto, 121-31, 192-94, and *passim*, on the imagery of "Mother Country" (*Inang Bayan*) in the writings of the Katipunan.

[71]Santiago, 119-20, pointing to "Doña Consolacion" in *Noli* as "the epitome of the devil woman."

[72]Perhaps the most generally accessible version of this document is in Jose Rizal, *Political and Historical Writings*, Centennial edition (Manila: National Heroes Commission, 1964), 7:56-66. I am grateful to Dr. Ruby Paredes for having provided me with a copy.

[73]*Ibid.*, 58-59.

[74]*Ibid.*, 60-61.

[75]*Ibid.*, 61.

[76]*Ibid.*, 63-64.

[77]*Ibid.*, 65.

[78]*Ibid.*, 63.

[79]Ambeth Ocampo, *Rizal Without the Overcoat,* rev. ed. (Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, 1995), provides a light-hearted tour through these affairs, already well-documented in biographies by Leon Ma. Guerrero and Austin Coates, among others.

[80]*Ibid.*, 61-62.

[81]Rafael, 146-47; cf. Ocampo, *Rizal*; Ocampo, *Luna's Moustache* (Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, 1997). Rafael describes the Indios Bravos as "a masculine alternative to what they conceived to be the menacingly androgynous and corrupt regime of the Spanish friars." Although I recognize the roots of the image, I am not entirely convinced by the menace of friar "androgyny." Similar "masculinist" imagery has arisen among rebels elsewhere whose colonial oppressors did not wear long robes.

[82]Owen, "Masculinity and National Identity in the 19th Century Philippines," *Illes I Imperis* (Barcelona) 2 (1999): 23-47. A generation later, the patriotic Filipino playwrights of the early 20th century also encoded the nation and freedom as female, fought over by patriots on one side, colonialists and collaborators on the other. "It is as if these dramas triangulate social desire, casting nationhood in terms of the masculine struggle over a feminized object... Women personify the beloved nation waiting to be rescued." Rafael, "White Love: Surveillance and Nationalist Resistance in the U.S. Colonization of the Philippines," in *Cultures of U.S. Imperialism*, ed. Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 212-13. Rafael goes on to add, however, that "these gender stereotypes appear provisional and shifting... (Women) are objects of masculine contention, but they are also active interlocutors in the debate over the future disposition of their body politic."

[83]Minhalini Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity: The 'Manly Englishman' and the 'Effeminate Bengali' in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995); Warwick Anderson, "The Trespass Speaks: White

Masculinity and Colonial Breakdown," *American Historical Review* 102 (Dec. 1997): 1343-70, esp. 1346-47 and sources cited therein. See also Ronald Hyam, *Empire and Sexuality: The British Experience* (Manchester University Press, 1990), 72-73, 202-3; and, on colonial "hypermasculinity," Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983).

[84]Here, as in so many other situations, Mahatma Gandhi is the conspicuous exception to the rule, generally refusing to try to out-macho the Raj.

[85]Some of the internal tension that so bedeviled the Philippine Revolution, including that between Aguinaldo and Bonifacio and between Aguinaldo and Antonio Luna (Juan's brother) may be ascribed to the friction of strong male egos rubbing against each other.

[86]*E.g.* Camagay, "Women in the Text and in Reality," in *Review of Women's Studies* 5/2-6/1 (1996): 11-18, endorsing Lilia Quindoza-Santiago's "refusal to accept Rizal as a feminist because of Rizal's use of 'helpmate' (*katulong*) instead of 'partner' in referring to women" (11-12).

[87]Cf. Arinto (185): "Although Rizal cannot be considered a feminist—indeed, his view of women remained quite conventional and traditional—he was also not a male chauvinist pig." Cf. Kumari Jayawardena, *The White Woman's Other Burden: Western Women and South Asia During British Colonial Rule* (N.Y.: Routledge, 1995), 6-8; Jayawardena and Malathi de Alwis, eds., *Embodied Violence: Communalising Women's Sexuality in South Asia* (New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1996), ix-xix and *passim*; for a more forthright appraisal of some of the tensions between nationalism and feminism in South Asia.

[88]Roces; Camagay, "Women in the Text."

[89]Cf. Teodoro Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses: The Story of Bonifacio and the Katipunan* (Q.C.: University of the Philippines, 1956); Glenn Anthony May, *A Past Recovered* (Q.C.: New Day, 1987); May, *Inventing a Hero: The Posthumous Re-Creation of Andres Bonifacio* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1997).

It may even be significant that Jacinto, who, like Rizal, refers to women as "helpers" (*katulong*), was the most *ilustrado*-like of Katipunan leaders. In terms of education, Mabini was among the most "enlightened" of *ilustrados*, but

in wealth, background and status, he was closer to the municipal elites, if not the peasant "masses."

[90]This was Agueda Kahabagan of Batangas, commissioned by General Miguel Malvar. The fact that other "Heneralas" were not officially recognized is not necessarily a sign of sex discrimination; in the chaos of guerilla war, many leaders of both sexes simply awarded themselves ranks and hoped that in due course, their reputation would warrant its ratification by some higher revolutionary authority. On "General" Simeon Ola, see Owen, "Winding Down the War in Albay, 1900-1903," *Pacific Historical Review* 48 (Nov): 557-89.

[91]Policarpio, 23-25.

[92]The president of the Women's Katipunan was Josefa Rizal (Jose's sister), the fiscal was Angelica Rizal Lopez (her cousin) and the vice-president was Gregoria de Jesus (Bonifacio's wife). On the involvement of notable *ilustrado* women—including Aguinaldo's wife, sister and mother—in the revolutionary Red Cross see also Policarpio, 30-34.

[93]Roces, drawing on concepts from her *Women Power and Kinship Politics in Post-war Philippines* (Westport: Praeger, 1998).

[94]Roces mentions Lilia Quindoza Santiago as drawing attention to women's ongoing use of "male yardsticks" and wondering what an alternative vision of women's history might be.

[95]Judith E. Walsh, "What Women Learned When Men Gave Them Advice: Rewriting Patriarchy in Late Nineteenth Century Bengal," *JAS* 56 (August 1997): 641-77, based on comparing advice manuals written by men with those written by a woman. Unfortunately, we know of no female counterpart to Modesto de Castro.

[96]Blanc-Szanton, quote from 360. As she also observes, the higher up the Filipino social ladder, the more Hispanized the values, implying that in certain ways, women of the *ilustrado* class were actually less liberated than their poorer sisters.

[97]Mary Grace Ampil Tirona, "*Pañuelo* Activism," in *Women's Role in Philippine History*, 108-130. (The *pañuelo* is the stiff handkerchief worn over

the shoulders in formal Filipina dress; the title refers to the early suffragists.) Blanc-Szanton, 368-71, makes effective use of two early 20th century sources, by American schoolteacher Mary H. Fee (1912) and Mendoza-Guanzon (1928).

[98]Cf. Blanc-Szanton, 380: "And yet she (the Filipina) remained industrious, resourceful and strong, and used daily images of femaleness that did not quite match the Spanish versions."

MUSLIM-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1899-1920

PETER G. GOWING

Introduction

PRESIDENT WILLIAM MCKINLEY IN A MESSAGE TO THE American Congress in 1899 defined the basic policy of the United States towards the Philippines:

> The Philippines are not ours to exploit, but to develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in the science of self-government. This is the path we must follow or be recreant to a mighty trust committed to us.[1]

This policy was, as a matter of fact, a kind of self-assumed mandate (though many Americans at the time would have insisted that it was bestowed by Divine Providence!) and it came to occupy, for quite different reasons, an important place in the thinking and rhetoric of both Americans and Filipinos. The general "mandate" for the Philippines was also the particular mandate for Moroland. "To develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in the science of self-government" — these words, and the attitude they represented, established the character of Muslim-American relations — at least from the American point of view.

This paper focuses on the development of American governmental policy toward Muslim Filipinos between the years 1899 and 1920.[2] These years are especially important in the general story of Muslim-American relations because they cover the period of direct American administration of Moroland. During this time Moroland (and its inhabitants) became effectively a part of the Philippine national concept, and it became integrated into the Philippine governmental framework as well. An understanding of the policies pursued and problems encountered in this period yields some important insights with respect to the relations between Muslim and Christian Filipinos today.

The American administration of Moroland developed in three successive stages between 1899 and 1920. First, there were the years of initial Muslim-American contact and military occupation of Moroland, beginning in May of 1899 and ending with the inauguration of the Moro

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[1] Quoted in Francis B. Harrison, *The Corner-Stone of Philippine Independence* (New York: The Century Co., 1922), page 36.

[2] A detailed, fully documented treatment of this subject is found in my 1968 doctoral dissertation for Syracuse University entitled: *Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos,* 1899-1920, (xix, 893 pp. typescript in two volumes). The study has been published in microfilm by University Microfilms, Inc. It is hereinafter cited as *Mandate.*

Province in July of 1903. Next came the decade (1903-1913) of the existence of the Moro Province which exercised poltico-military control over the region and prepared the Muslims for civil government. And, finally, there folllowed a six-year period (1914-1920) wherein the process of bringing Mindanao and Sulu into the general governmental framework of the Philippines was accelerated. During this third stage, administrative control over Muslim affairs was rapidly transferred from Americans to Filipinos.

The Military Occupation, 1899-1903

Military occupation of Moroland was occasioned by American concern to secure Muslim Filipino acknowledgement of United States sovereignty in Mindanao and Sulu. The Americans also sought to keep the Muslims neutral in the Philippine-American War (1899-1901) which raged in the northern provinces.[3] Since U.S. Army authorities in Manila could not spare many troops from operations in the north, they depended on garrisons at a few strategic points in Moroland[4] and sought by diplomacy to win Muslim friendship and neutrality.

To this end, the Bates Agreement (signed August, 1899) was negotiated with the Sulu Sultanate. Similar, though unwritten, agreements were made with the Muslim chiefs of Mindanao and Basilan. By these agreements the Muslims *seemingly* acknowledged American sovereignty and agreed to help suppress piracy and apprehend persons charged with crimes against non-Muslims. In return, the United States pledged to respect the dignity and authority of the Sultan of Sulu and the other chiefs. Muslims were to be protected from foreign impositions. The United States agreed not to interfere with the religion of the Muslims and, with respect to Sulu, to pay certain emoluments to the Sultan and his principal chiefs.[5]

The Muslim Filipinos undoubtedly saw these arrangements from a different point of view than the Americans. The Americans believed that they were keeping the Muslims peaceful and at the same time securing acknowledgement of United States sovereignty. The Muslim leaders seemed to believe that their diplomacy had kept the Americans out of their internal affairs and guaranteed their way of life on terms no worse than those which had been imposed by the Spaniards. At the beginning, the arrangements were satisfactory to both sides as a *modus vivendi*.

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[3] General E. S. Otis in *Annual Reports of the War Department*...1899, Volume I, Part 4 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899), pp. 130-133. Henceforth War Department Annual Reports will be cited as *ARWD* followed by the year of preparation in parentheses.

[4] Notably, Jolo, Zamboanga, and Cotabato.

[5] General Bates' instructions and the text of the Agreement are found in *Treaty With the Sultan of Sulu*, Senate Document 136, 56th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: 1900). Cf. *ARWD* (1902), IX, p. 482.

During the years of military occupation, the U.S. Army was related to the Muslim Filipinos in much the way it had long been related to the North American Indians. The Muslims, like the Indians, were regarded as living in "a state of pupilage" on territory owned by the United States. The Army's main task was to keep them peaceful. The Army was not to antagonize the Muslims by attempting to regulate their affairs except "to prevent barbarous practices". Army activities were limited mainly to suppressing piracy, curtailing the slave trade (though-not abolishing slavery) and keeping Muslim internecine conflicts within bounds.[6]

The American mandate in the Philippines was only mildly implemented in Moroland during the period of military occupation. The policy of non-interference in Moro internal affairs precluded any vigorous effort to develop, civilize, educate, and train the Muslim Filipinos in the science of democratic self-government. Army authorities were generally unhappy with the non-interference policy because certain features of Muslim Filipino society — judicial procedures, slavery, the "tyrannical" relationship of the chiefs to their followers — offended their Occidental sense of justice and good order. Some officers were eager to take a direct hand in "civilizing" the Muslims.[7]

Within the limitations imposed by the non-interference policy, the Army did what it could to carry out the mandate, especially after the Philippine-American War ended in 1901. The proper authorities took notice of Moro affairs, studied conditions, and began to formulate policies for the future administration of Mindanao and Sulu. Modern medical care was made available to the Muslims at Army hospitals and clinics. Public health and sanitation regulations were introduced. A few schools, taught by soldiers as well as civilian teachers, were opened and the Muslims invited to attend them. Bridges, roads, trails, and wharves were constructed which both directly and indirectly benefited the Muslims.

At the same time, other activities were easily misunderstood by the Muslims. Customs regulations were imposed, taxes were levied, land surveys were made, and mapping and exploring expeditions became frequent. The 1903 Census was also begun. After July of 1901, more U.S. troops were sent to occupy ports in Mindanao.

The Muslim Filipinos could not but speculate as to what this escalation of American activity meant in terms of the security of their religion and way of life. Sometimes their uneasiness and suspicion erupted into violence. Isolated instances of attacks on American soldiers occurred with increasing frequency. In southern Lanao, the freedom of Army troops to move wherever they pleased was openly challenged by the

[6] See Elihu Root, *The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916), pp. 320-321.
[7] Cf. *ARWD* (1900), I, p. 267; (1902), IX, p. 517.

Muslims in March of 1902 and resulted in the first major military action since the American arrival in Moroland almost three years earlier.[8]

The Americans interpreted Muslim hostility as defiance of United States sovereignty. Yet the problem was certainly much more complex. The growing number of Americans in Moroland after the Philippine-American War and the multiplication of their activities, brought two quite different cultures into more abrasive contact than had been the case earlier in the military occupation. Moreover, the decision to take a direct hand in the control of Moro affairs was made towards the end of the period of military occupation. When that decision was implemented under the Moro Province, the conflict between Muslim Filipino and American cultures was exacerbated.

The Moro Province, 1903-1913

The Philippine Bill of 1902 formally committed the United States to the ultimate independence of the Philippines. Civil and military authorities then began to take a closer look at the American policy in Moroland. It was decided to abandon the policy of non-interference and to exercise direct rule over the Muslims with a view to preparing them for integration into the body politic of the Philippines. One factor which influenced this decision was the insistence of the Christian Filipino nationalists that Moroland was inseparable from the Philippine nation. Furthermore, both Americans and Filipinos fully realized the importance of the natural resources of Mindanao and Sulu to the economic future of the country.[9]

The decision to exercise direct control of Muslim affairs resulted in the abrogation of the Bates Agreement and other assurances of non-interference by Americans. In this respect, the American policy toward the Muslims again resembled the treatment of the Indians: "treaties" made with "savages" were not considered binding and could be unilaterally set aside as convenience or changes in policy demanded. Naturally, the Americans rationalized their action in terms of the misbehavior of the Muslims and also in terms of the new policy ultimately being in their (the Muslims') best interest.[10]

The American authorities recognized that preparation of the Moro for integration into a modern Philippine state required, for the time being, a different form of government from the regularly organized provinces wherein most of the Christian Filipinos enjoyed a large degree of autonomy. Taking their model from the Spanish "politico-military

[8] See *Mandate,* pp. 338-349 and *ARWD* (1902), IX, pp. 481-494.

[9] Cf. Charles B. Elliot, *The Philippines to the End of the Commission Government* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1917), pp. 92-94.

[10] See, for example, letter of Leonard Wood to William H. Taft, December 19, 1903 in *Wood Papers* (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.).

district" system, the Americans organized the Moro Province. The administrative structure of the Province was admirably suited for direct rule of the Muslims: the line of responsibility stretched from the Provincial Governor in Zamboanga to the datu who served as headman of the remotest tribal ward.[11]

The officials of the government were carefully selected. Those in the higher offices were, at first, mostly Army officers. A few American civilians were appointed to such posts as Provincial Treasurer, Provincial Attorney, and Provincial Superintendent of Schools. The government of the Province was relatively free from "politics" during the ten years of its existence because it was placed under the direct supervision of the Governor-General in Manila and the Philippine Commission (dominated by Americans until 1913).

The successive governors of the Moro Province — Generals Leonard Wood, Tasker Bliss and John J. Pershing — were men of exceptional ability. For this reason they were given considerable latitude in administering provincial affairs. The power of supervision retained in Manila was used sparingly, giving the governors "the authority of a Roman pro-consul" and holding them responsible for the results.[12]

The Moro Province offered more opportunities to implement the American mandate. Slavery was made illegal. The common people, as far as possible, were protected from the "tyranny" of their traditional leaders, the depradations of lawless persons, and unscrupulous traders. Through the "tribal ward court' system, attempts were made to introduce American concepts of justice. Under American supervision, selected Moro leaders were given limited political authority as headmen in the tribal wards. The program of public works was expanded and more schools, hospitals, and dispensaries were built. Agriculture and commerce were encouraged.[13]

As part of the program to "civilize" the Muslims and at the same time exploit the natural riches of the region, Americans and Christian Filipinos from the northern provinces were encouraged to settle in Moroland. The immigrant's industriousness and agricultural know-how would, it was felt, provide both the example and the incentive for the Muslim Filipinos to become more productive farmers. The organized municipalities, dominated by the non-Muslims, were designed to be models of well-ordered and democratically governed local communities, demonstrating to the Muslims "civilized" community life.[14]

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[11] The text of "An Act Providing for the Organization and Government of the Moro Province" is found in *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province* 1904 (Zamboanga: 1904), pp. 113-131.

[12] J. Ralston Hayden, "What Next for the Moro?", *Foreign Affairs* 6 (1928), 638.

[13] See *Mandate*, pp. 414-448.

[14] Cf. *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province*, 1904, p. 23. Henceforth, these Annual Reports will be cited as *RGMP*, followed by the year of preparation in parentheses.

The American officials believed that it was essential to get the Muslim Filipinos into the practice of paying taxes in support of the Provincial Government. Accordingly, the *cedula* (head-tax) and, later, the road tax were introduced. Fees were charged for the registration of vessels above a certain size. Export and import duties were imposed on Muslims engaged in foreign trade. Property taxes were levied on Muslims living in organized municipalities.

The Moro Province adopted the policy of respecting the Islamic religion and associated customs of the Muslim Filipinos provided they did not conflict with the basic principles of American law. The American administrators of the Province made some effort to accommodate the special features of Islamic law and *adat,* especially in cases concerning domestic relations and inheritance.[15] During the administration of General Bliss, the Muslim *pandita* schools were encouraged and in some places were given limited governmental assistance.[16]

Even so, the American policy of direct rule and attempts to implement the mandate struck at the authority and prestige of the Muslim chiefs and, to some extent unwittingly, at the religion and attitudes of all Muslim Filipinos. The policy of direct rule was *ipso facto* an adverse judgment on the social structure, customs, and laws by which the Muslim Filipinos had lived for centuries. From the Muslim standpoint, "to develop" and "to civilize" seemed to mean the imposition of strange laws and infidel customs. Laws against slavery threatened the politico-economic structure of traditional society. The establishment of the provincial and district governments, whose officials issued decrees enfroced by troops, undermined the power and status of traditional Muslim leaders. By-passing Muslim courts and refusing to recognize the customary judicial functions of the headmen offended Muslim sensitivities.[17] The collection of the *cedula* and other taxes was disliked because payment was made to a foreign, infidel government.[18] The Muslims resented the parcelling out of lands, which they had occupied (but not tilled) for centuries, to foreigners and Christian Filipinos. They also resented the licensing of foreign vessels to fish the waters of Moroland. The Muslims suspected that the American ambition "to educate" them meant to inculcate Christian teachings and Christian values through

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[15] See, for example, *RGMP* (1907), pp. 34-35, 45-46.

[16] *RGMP* (1908), p. 13.

[17] See the conversation between the Sulu *datus* and General Wood, quoted at length in *Mandate,* pp. 458-461.

[18] The battle of Bud Dajo in 1906, which cost the lives of over 600 Muslims, was caused in part by Muslim resistance to the *cedula.* See *Mandate,* pp. 482-486.

the public school system. These teachings would alienate their children from their religion and traditional way of life.[19]

The American administrators of the Moro Province were either unaware of, or chose to completely ignore, the fact that Muslim Filipinos saw no separation whatever between the sacred and the secular. Separation of Church and State, religion and politics, etc. was a peculiarity of the West unknown to the Muslims. They saw Islam in everything they did; their land was *dar-al-Islam,* "the household of Islam." They believed that their laws and customs were consistent with the precepts of the Holy Qur'an. Any move to change their society or to enforce obedience to the laws of foreigners was seen as a fundamental challenge to their religion and to their very existence as human beings. The Moro Province and it policy of direct rule, then, constituted a severe threat to the ideology of the Moros. Many of them resisted to the death.

General Leonard Wood, the first Governor of the Moro Province, typified American New England Puritanical Calvinist values and Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism. He found nothing in Muslim Filipino laws and customs worth preserving. He had only contempt for many of the Muslim leaders, including the reigning Sultan of Sulu, Jamalul Kiram II.[20] With all the passion of a medieval crusader he fought those Muslims who defied American laws. Thousands of them were killed battling his troops. He called them bandits and outlaws.

Wood's successors, Generals Bliss and Pershing, continued to fight "bandits" and oultlaws". To be sure, the majority of the Muslim Filipinos acquiesced in the government of the Americans, some because they found it to their personal advantage to co-operate, others because they felt powerless to resist, and the rest because their contact with the foreigners was so infrequent that their life-ways were very little affected.

Yet the Muslim Filipinos who chose the path of resistance had a large base of moral support among the people. J. Ralston Hayden remarked that never during the continental expansion of the United States were armed encounters between the Indians and American troops so frequent and so serious as the conflicts that took place between the Muslim Filipinos and the American forces from 1904 to 1914.[21] In the end, the Muslims realized that continued resistance in the face of the mo- control.

[19] Speaking in praise of an American-run school for Moro girls in Cotabato, General Pershing remarked in 1913: "Although it is well understood that Christianity as a religion is not mentioned in the school, yet it is lived by the teachers and it may, in some measure, influence the lives of these young girls . . ." (*RGMP*), 1913, p. 32). Many Moros resisted sending their children to the American-run schools precisely for this reason.

[20] *RGMP* (1904), p. 9. See letter of Wood to W. H. Taft, September 5, 1903 in *Wood Papers.*

[21] *Foreign Affairs* (1928), 638.

dern weaponry of the Americans meant annihilation. They were conquered, and, under General Pershing, they were disarmed. This accomplished, the Moro Province could be safely and fully converted to civilian

The Department of Mindanao and Sulu, 1914-1920

The appointment in December, 1913, of Frank W. Carpenter as the first civilian governor of the Moro Province, and the subsequent reorganization of the Province into the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, marked a new development in American policy towards the Muslims. Many Americans at the time felt that preparing the Muslims for integration into Philippine national life would require at least two or three generations. They were convinced that a strong American military presence would be essential for the maintenance of peace and order for a long time to come. And they were certain that if the government of Moroland were turned over to Christian Filipinos, the result would be Muslim uprisings. Christian Filipino nationalists disagreed, of course, and throughout the ten-year existence of the Moro Province they agitated for more Filipino involvement in the government of Mindanao and Sulu.[22] The Democratic Party in the United States, which came to power in 1913, proved more responsive to the demands of Filipino nationalists than the Republican Party had been. President Woodrow Wilson and Governor-General Francis B. Harrison, in accord with the desire of the Democratic Party to accelerate the move towards self-government and independence for the Philippines, virtually put control of the Insular Government into the hands of the Filipinos. A policy of "Filipinization" was vigorously pursued. Frank Carpenter, appointed by Harrison as Governor of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, was assigned the task of implementing this "Filipinization" policy.

Under Carpenter's firm and watchful supervision, Filipino officials (mostly Christians) assumed increasingly greater responsibilities in the government of Moroland.[23] The region (together with Agusan and Bukidnon) was divided into seven provinces, the governments of which were designed for easy transformation into replicas of those in the Visayas and Luzon, chiefly by the eventual substitution of elective for appointive public officials. The unification of the administrative structures of Mindanao and Sulu with those of the Philippine nation was rapidly advanced by extending to Moroland the jurisdiction of the bureaus and agencies of the Insular Government. Thus, direction of education, public works, health, and agricultural development was transferred from Zamboanga to Manila.[24]

[22] See letter of C. F. Richmond to General John J. Pershing (no date given, probably sometime in 1912) in *Pershing Papers*, (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.) and also the clipping from *La Democracia* (September 2, 1910) in the same place. See also *Mandate*, pp. 658-668.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 696-698.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 686-688.

The progressive development of the seven provincial governments and the expansion of centralized administration and control of public services in Moroland were intended eventually to make the Department Government obsolete as an intermediary between the Insular Government and the provinces of Mindanao and Sulu. In May of 1920, the Department Government in Zamboanga was formally abolished and its powers of supervision and administration were transferred to the Insular Department of the Interior in Manila. Thereafter Moro affairs were controlled by the Insular Government directly through the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes in the Department of Interior.[25]

Before its abolition, the Department of Mindanao and Sulu went quite far in implemeting the American mandate among Muslim Filipinos. This was possible, of course, partly because the power of the Muslims to resist had been broken under the Moro Province. But the American policy-makers, and later the Philippine Legislature, which assumed legislative control of affairs in Moroland, exhibited genuine humanitarian concern for the condition and progress of the Muslim Filipinos. Under Governor Carpenter's wise and tactful supervision, Filipino officials got down to the hammer-and-tongs work of educating, civilizing, and training in self-government the half-million Muslims in their care. In the process, the old mandate was given a new name: it was called "the policy of attraction."[26]

Public schools multiplied (from 72 in 1913 to 336 in 1919) and attendance was made compulsory. Muslim *pensionados* (Government scholarship awardees) were sent to Manila and America for higher education. Hospitals and field dispensaries were provided in such numbers that medical care came within the reach of nearly all the inhabitants. Public works were greatly expanded; hundreds of kilometers of new roads and trails ended the isolation of thousands of inhabitants and brought them into contact with commercial and governmental centers. The Muslims were given greater participation in local and provincial governments. Later, some were even appointed to the Philippine Legislature.[27]

Muslim leaders were periodically taken to Manila as guests of the Government so that, on their return, they would be apostles of peace and even more co-operative with government officials.[28] The agricultural activities of the Muslims were given every encouragement. In Cotabato Province, Muslim families together with Christian families successfully participated, at least for a few years, in the "agricultural colonies" estab-

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[25] W. C. Forbes, *The Philippine Islands,* Volume II (Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1928), p. 30.

[26] See Charles E. Russell, *The Outlook for the Philippines,* (New York: The Century Co., 1922), pp. 266-268.

[27] *Mandate,* pp. 701, 754-769.

[28] Cf. the account of Datu Alamada's Visit to Manila in *ibid.,* p. 709.

lished by the Government as experiments in land development and intergroup living.[29]

These developments under the Department of Mindanao and Sulu were no less threatening to traditional Muslim life-ways than the activities of the Moro Province. But as was said earlier, the Muslims were in no position to resist by force of arms. What evidence there is concerning their general attitude in this period seems to suggest that it might have been a sullen acquiescence in a situation they were powerless to change.[30] Perhaps no single event better illustrates and symbolizes this attitude than the abdication (at the insistence of Governor Carpenter) by Sultan Jamalul Kiram II of all his claims to temporal power in Sulu. The abdication was formalized in an Agreement signed on March 22, 1915.[31]

Of course, some Muslims readily submitted to the program of assimilation enthusiastically pushed by the Government. Many, however, clung tenaciously to the old ways, and a few — far fewer than under the Moro Province — chose to become "outlaws."

With the abolition of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu and the transfer of Governor Carpenter to other service in the Insular Government, the effective period of American administration in Moroland came to an end. There continued to be American governors in the Provinces of Lanao (until 1930) and Sulu (until 1935), and the American Governor-General continued to have considerable power to interfere in the conduct of government in Mindanao and Sulu.[32] But, for the most part, administrative as well as legislative control of Moroland was firmly in Filipino hands where it has remained ever since (except for the years of Japanese occupation).

Concluding Reflections

In his final report as the last of the "politico-military" governors of the Moro Province, General Pershing summed up what, in his view, was the total achievement of a decade of government largely by Army officers: "Up to the present we have gone no further than to suppress crime, prevent injustice, establish peaceful conditions, and maintain supervisory control.[33]

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[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 736-741.

[30] Significantly, serious disorders broke out in Moroland in the 1920's.

[31] A full account of the Agreement, including a copy of its text and other valuable appendices is given in the Annual Report of Governor Carpenter in *Manuscript Report of the Philippine Commission January 1 to December* 31, 1915, Volume 4 (in National Archives, Washington, D. C.), pp. 3120-3145.

[32] As, for example, when Governor-General Leonard Wood late in 1921 summarily replaced the first Filipino Governor of Lanao Province (Capt. Paulino Santos of the Constabulary) with an American.

[33] *RGMP* (1913), p. 72.

Certainly it can be shown that something more than that was achieved by the Moro Province. The fact is that the ground *was* prepared for civil government. The development of the land and people of Mindanao and Sulu *was* carried forward. In short, there was a direct connection between what had been accomplished by 1913 and what had been achieved by 1920.

The work of the Moro Province made it possible for the Department of Mindanao and Sulu to pursue its "policy of attraction" toward the inhabitants; to reduce greater Muslim participation in governmental affairs; to further the integration of the people of Moroland into the body politic of the Philippine nation; and to gain their acceptance of — or at least acquiescence in — the collection of taxes, the operation of schools, the abdication of the Sultan of Sulu, and the presence of Christian Filipino officials in positions of authority among them. Under Governor Carpenter's administration, all these *possibilities* became *realities.*

In the process, the usefulness of the Department Government diminished. The Department accomplished what it was established to do: it *laid the foundations* in Mindanao and Sulu for an enduring edifice of economic, political, and even social solidarity with Luzon and the Visayas. Having finished this task — or at least having carried it fairly far along — the Department, like the Moro Province before it, properly and inevitably passed into history.

But it is one thing to lay a foundation and quite another to construct the edifice. A few years of American administration could hardly be expected to solve all the problems standing in the way of the integration of the Muslim Filipinos into Philippine national life. The biggest problem in 1920 was — and still is — the centuries-old animosity between Muslims and Christian Filipinos.[34] The American Government did not exacerbate that animosity. It went to considerable trouble to improve relations between the two groups. However, after 1920, the American Government exercised little direct control over the relations between Mus-Muslims and Christians in the Philippines. The future was in the hands of the two principals. And because they were left with the greater power, the responsibility rested primarily with the Christian Filipinos.

[34] See the discussion of the "Moro Image" in my *Mosque and Moro: A Study of Muslims in the Philippines* (Manila: Philippine Federation of Christian Churches, 1964), pp. 29-30, 83-86.

PHILIPPINE MASONRY TO 1890

JOHN N. SCHUMACHER, S.J.

THE MASONIC LODGES SERVED AS CENTERS FOR MANY OF the Liberal conspiracies in Spain against clerical and reactionary governments during the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century,[1] and Masonry played a considerable part in the emancipation of the Spanish-American republics.[2] In Cuba, too, Masonic influence was strong in the insurrections of the second half of the nineteenth century.[3] It might be expected then, that in a society far more theocratic in nature than those mentioned — as was the nineteenth century Philippines — that Masonry would play a considerable role in any nationalist movement. This was because of its anti-clerical orientation and because of the opportunity its secrecy allowed for clandestine activity. It is a fact that almost every Filipino nationalist leader of the Propaganda Period was at one time or another a Mason. But the role of Masonry in the nationalist movement and in the Revolution which followed it, has, it seems, frequently been exaggerated and misinterpreted by the friends of Masonry as well as by its enemies. Particularly the writing of the Friars and Jesuits of the Revolutionary period (both published works and private correspondence) are wont to see Masons in every corner.[4] Books have not been lacking,

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[1] See Antonio Ballesteros y Beretta, *Historia de España y su influencia en la historia universal* (2nd ed.; Barcelona: Salvat, 1943 ff.), X, 183-184; Gerald Brenan, *Spanish Labyrinth* (2nd ed.; Cambridge: University Press, 1950), 206-208. Books such as Eduardo Comín Colomer, *La Masonería en España (Apuntes para una interpretación masónica de la historia patria)* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1944) and the annotated edition by Mauricio Carlavilla of Miguel Morayta's *Masonería española. Páginas de su historia* (Madrid: Nos, 1956), are almost psychotic in their monomania for finding Masonry at every turn of Spanish history from the early nineteenth century to the present. In the original edition of Morayta's book, the latter details the part of Masonry in Spanish history until 1868, likewise with exaggeration, but favorably, of course, to Masonry.

[2] Salvador de Madariaga, *The Fall of the Spanish Empire* (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1948), 254-262, 338-339; John Francis Bannon, S.J., and Peter Masten Dunne, S.J., *Latin America: An Historical Survey* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1947), 406, 409.

[3] Luis Martín y de Castro, *La masonería en la Isla de Cuba y los Grandes Orientes de España* (Guantanamo, 1890); Francisco J. Ponte Domínguez, *La masonería en la independencia de Cuba* (Habana, 1954).

[4] The Jesuit correspondence preserved in the Archivo de la Provincia de Tarragona de la Compañía de Jesús (henceforth AT), located in the Colegio de San Francisco de Borja, San Cugat del Vallés (Barcelona), Spain, is full of references to "la gente del mandil," "los trabajos del mallete," "la influencia del triángulo," etc. Some of this reappears in the works of Father Pablo Pastells, S.J., *La masonización de Filipinas. Rizal y su obra* (Barcelona, 1897) and *Misión de la Compañía de Jesús de Filipinas en el siglo XIX* (3 vols.; Barcelona, 1916). Some other works, among many, which attribute almost everything concerned with the Filipino nationalist movement and the Revolution to Masonry are: Eduardo Navarro, O.S.A. *Filipinas: estudios de algunos asuntos de actualidad* (Madrid, 1897); Jose M. del Castillo y Jiménez, *El Katipunan ó el filibusterismo en Filipinas* (Madrid, 1897); Manuel Sastrón, *La insurrección en Filipinas y Guerra Hispano-Americana en el Archipiélago* (Madrid, 1901).

even in recent times, which see the entire last two decades of the nineteenth century in the Philippines, in terms of a Masonic plot, obeying orders from the Supreme Council of Charleston, in order to strip Spain of her last overseas provinces.[5] On the other hand, while Masonic works written by Spaniards try to exculpate Masonry from any part in the Philippine Revolution, those by Filipino Masons have often seemed to make Masonry the chief moving force behind the Revolution. There is need, then, of a serious historical study of the real role of Masonry among the Filipino nationalists.

The chief problem in making such an objective study of the role of Masonry has been, of course, the lack of sufficient documentation. The late Teodoro M. Kalaw, himself a past Grand Master of Philippine Masonry, possessed a collection of Masonic documents, on which his book[6] (till now the only available history of Philippine Masonry) seems largely to have been based. However, Kalaw did not give adequate references to his documents in writing his book; in any case, the collection seems to have been destroyed during the past war.[7] In this scarcity of documentation, the discovery of a number of authentic Masonic records from the Filipino lodges—both in Spain and in the Philippines—is of considerable importance. These documents were found among those confiscated from the Spanish lodges by the Spanish Nationalist forces as they occupied Republician territory during the civil war of 1936-1939, and were gathered together by the government agency known as the Delegacion Nacional de Servicios Documentales.[8] Undoubtedly, the archive of this body contains extensive documentation on Spanish Masonry, though I was assured that most of it dealt with the twentieth century. Among the records, however, were a few folders containing some scattered Philippine documentation. Though the records are clearly incomplete and somewhat haphazard, they throw considerable light on the early organization of Masonry in the Philippines and or the Filipino lodges in Spain. With the aid of these documents, this article proposes to attempt a new reconstruction of the role of Masonry during the early part of the Propaganda Period, one made, it is hoped, without the intention either of glorifying this role or disparaging it, but merely of establishing the basic facts, as a first step toward an over-all evaluation.

[5] Comín Colomer, *op. cit.*, 275, 284-288, 311, and *passim*; Carlavilla, *op. cit.*, 26, 398, and *passim*. The prototype of these works was Mauricio, *La gran traición* (Barcelona, 1899). Both Comín and Carlavilla are violently anti-semitic also.

[6] Teodoro M. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, trans. and ed. Frederic H. Stevens and Antonio Amechazurra (Manila, 1956). In spite of some valuable information, the book suffers from the way its assertions are documented. For it is frequently difficult to tell whether Kalaw's statements are based on his authentic documents or on other less reliable accounts. Moreover, the book is an edifying history in the worst hagiographical tradition, and includes long excerpts from Masonic exhortations to virtue and considerable pious rhetoric together with its factual material.

[7] Kalaw, *op. cit.*, 221, n. 4.

[8] The Archive of the Delegación (henceforth referred to as ADN) is located in Salamanca. I was able to locate these documents through the kind help of the late Don Luis Sala Balust, Professor of Ecclesiastical History at the Pontifical University of Salamanca, and was permitted to consult the Archive, not yet open to general research, through the kind permission and generous assistance of the Director, Don Pedro Ulibarri. To both men I am grateful.

Early Masonry in the Philippines

Apart from some vague reports of British Masonic lodges during the occupation of Manila in 1762-1764,[9] the first lodges set up in Manila seem to date from mid-1850's, formed among Spanish army officers in the Philippines, followed by others among the foreign merchants.[10] It is claimed also that sometime before 1872, there were some Filipinos admitted to a lodge in the Pandacan district of Manila, but these apparently were among those exiled in the aftermath of the insurrection of 1872.[11] If any Filipinos did remain in the lodges, they were eliminated in the reorganization which took place under the auspices of the Gran Oriente de España in 1874. The Philippine Masonic lodges remained completely European in their membership until Filipino lodges were introduced in 1891 by Filipino Masons returning from Spain after being initiated there.[12] There is indeed mention of an invitation being extended in 1884 to all *indios* and *mestizos* who "..... knew how to read and write and had a responsible position, provided they loved Spain and had a definite religion."[13] If such an invitation was ever made, which

[9] Kalaw, *op. cit.*, 1.

[10] *Ibid.*, 9-11. There is some inconsistency in the date given by Kalaw here, and he appears to have used conflicting testimony from different sources. The principal source for this chapter in Kalaw, though he only occasionally cites him, is Nicolás Díaz y Pérez, in the works cited in n. 11. Kalaw also once cites Vital Fité, *Las desdichas de la patria* (Madrid, 1899), but this author's treatment of Masonry is entirely taken from Díaz y Pérez, though rarely crediting him, even when transcribing whole paragraphs. Among the initiates of one of the foreign lodges was Jacobo Zóbel de Zangróniz, whom Kalaw (p. 10) notes as "the first Filipino Mason initiated in the Islands." Zóbel, however, was the son of a German father and a Spanish mother, and though born in the Philippines, had been educated in Germany. As a German by culture, he joined a predominantly German lodge. There is an extensive biographical sketch of Zóbel by E. Hubner, "Jacobo Zóbel de Zangróniz. Ein Lebensbild aus der jungsten Vergangenheit der philippinischen Inseln," *Deutche Rundschau* XC (1897), 420-445; XCI (1897), 35-51.

[11] Kalaw, *op. cit.*, 11, apparently in dependence on Francisco-Engracio Vergara [Antonio María Regidor], *La Masonería en Filipinas* (Paris, 1896), 10-13. Nicolás Díaz y Pérez, "La francasonería en Filipinas," *La Epoca* (Madrid) 31 Agosto 1896, however, denies that there were any Filipino Masons before 1884. (This article forms the basis for what is said of Philippine Masonry in the pamphlet by his son, Viriato Díaz-Pérez, *Los Frailes de Filipinas* (Madrid, 1904), 20. Though Nicolás had earlier been prominent in Masonry in Spain, he had been inactive since 1885 and seems to have had no contact with Masonry at the time he wrote "Díaz y Pérez, Nicolás," in Lorenzo Frau Abrines and Rosendo Arús Arderiu, *Diccionario enciclopédico de la Masonería*, 2nd ed. rev., (3 vols.; Buenos Aires, 1947), I, 315. Juan Utor y Fernández, *Masones y ultramontanos* (Manila, 1899) denies that any Masonry existed in the Philippines before 1873, and declares that at least until 1886 no native Filipino was initiated in the Philippines (46, 51-53, 59). Utor had likewise held high positions in Masonry, having brought about the union of various lodges under the Gran Oriente de España in 1875, when he became Gran Maestro Adjunto. ("Utor Fernández, Juan," Frau Arús, II, 851-852. Both Díaz-Pérez' and Utor's pamphlets are anti-Friar polemic tracts and though their authors could well have had considerable knowledge of early Philippine Masonry, both have a number of unreliable or clearly false statements which make it difficult to know to what extent they can be relied on.

[12] Kalaw, *op. cit.*, 11-16, but the story is somewhat confused. Navarro, 239 places the elimination of Filipinos from the lodges somewhat later.

[13] Kalaw, *op. cit.*, 17, summarizing Díaz-Pérez, *op. cit.*, 19. The statement is repeated in "Historia esquemática de la masonería filipina," *Latomia* III (1933), 126; but the article seems to depend on Kalaw's book (in the earlier Spanish edition). *Latomia* was a Masonic publication of Madrid.

is more than doubtful, it received no acceptance except from Jose A. Ramos. Ramos had, however, been initiated in London, and was, moreover, a Spanish *mestizo* married to an English wife.[14] In the extant lists of lodge members from 1884, the only one identifiable as a Filipino is Ramos, affiliated to the lodge *Luz de Oriente.* In 1887 Ramos again appears as one of the founders of the lodge *Constancia* likewise in Manila, in which all members are explicitly noted as Europeans, with the exception of Ramos, denominated "Philippine Spaniard" (*espanol filipino*).[15] Therefore, with the possible, but unsubstantiated, exception of the short period in the 1870's, it would seem that no pure-blooded Filipinos *(indios)* had been initiated into Masonry before the first Filipino lodges were formed in Spain.

Early Filipino Masons in Spain

The fact that Masonry in the Philippines had not, at this time, opened its doors to Filipinos, perhaps helps to explain the readiness of Filipino students in Europe to join the Masonic lodges there where the race barrier did not prevent them. The first clear evidence of Filipino participation in Masonry that I have found is the membership of Rafael Del-Pan, a *creole.*[16] whose father—Jose Felipe del Pan—was a long-time prominent Spanish resident of the Philippines and publisher of the Manila newspaper *La Oceania Española.*[17] The elder del Pan was a member of one of the Masonic lodges of Manila,[18] and this, no doubt, brought the son to be the first of the Filipino student group in Madrid to join Masonry, though it is not clear just when he did so. In April 1886, however, Del-Pan appears—already possessing the eighteenth

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[14] Kalaw (*op. cit.*, 17) cites a letter of Morayta of 1916, addressed to himself, asserting that the doors of Masonry were only opened to Filipinos in 1889. For Ramos' initiation in London, see Antonio Regidor, *El pleito de los Filipinos contra los Frailes* (Madrid, 1901), 6. (This pamphlet is a translation by Isabelo de los Reyes of an interview given by Regidor to *The Independent* of New York, February 7, 1901.) Also, E. Arsenio Manuel, *Dictionary of Philippine Biography* (Quezon City, 1955), I, 355, basing himself on Ramos' unpublished memoirs.

[15] ADN, legajo 219-A[1].

[16] I refer to Del-Pan as a Filipino, even though he was by blood a Spaniard, since he always seems to have considered himself a Filipino, and associated himself with the other Filipinos involved in the Propaganda movement, while other creoles, like Antonio Regidor, the Azcárragas, etc., though born in the Philippines also, considered themselves primarily Spaniards, and later remained in Europe. At a time of transition like the late 19th century, when the Filipino nation did not yet exist as such, but the idea of Filipino nationality was already evolving, the criterion of self-identification seems to me to be the most useful for distinguishing between Filipinos and Spaniards among those of European blood born in the country.

[17] For biographical details of José Felipe del Pan, who seems always to have concealed his Masonic affiliation, and never exhibited any anti-clericalism, see W. E. Retana, *Aparato bibliográfico de la historia general de Filipinas* (3 vols.; Madrid, 1906), III, No. 4483, 1570. According to Retana, when Rafael succeeded his father as publisher of *La Oceanía Española* a radical change in policy took place, as far as that was then possible in the Philippines

[18] His name appears as affiliated with the lodge "Lealtad" of the Gran Oriente de España in a list which should be dated from the 1870's, probably 1874, since some of the other lodges on the list are still in process of formation (ADN, legajo 219-A[1]).

degree—as one of the founders of a lodge called "Solidaridad."[19] Of the other seven founders, two were Peninsular Spaniards, three were Cubans, one a Puerto Rican, and one other Filipino—Ricardo Ayllon.[20] Shortly after the foundation of the lodge *Solidaridad,* two other Filipinos—Evaristo Aguirre and Julio Lorente—[21] also joined; a large proportion of those initiated in succeeding months were either Cubans or Puerto Ricans.[22]

There are several indications that this lodge, largely made up of students from Spain's overseas provinces, was the work of Miguel Morayta. At least one of the founders—a Puerto Rican named Herminio Diaz—was a member of Morayta's own lodge, "Hijos del Progreso." Moreover, Morayta himself is listed as an honorary member of lodge "Solidaridad," with the title of "Honorary Worshipful Master," the highest honorary title that that lodge could give. Finally, though founded in April 1886, the lodge had little life until the following September. It seems to have passed through an early crisis when all but two of those members holding higher degrees withdrew, leaving only a handful of new adepts. When, however, the reorganization and *apertura de trabajos* took place the following September, the first invitation to a joint session went to Morayta's "Hijos del Progreso."

The surviving records of the lodge indicate that it led a rather languid life. Del-Pan and Aguirre had both withdrawn before the end of 1886; in general, there had been a large turn-over of members. Graciano Lopez Jaena, apparently already initiated a Mason in 1882 in the lodge "Porvenir" but long inactive, affiliated with the lodge "Solidaridad" in April 1887.[23] One

[19] In the charter for the lodge "Solidaridad," signed by Manuel Becerra as Grand Master of the Gran Oriente de España, and dated March 30, 1886, Alfredo Sánchez-Ossorio is named as Worshipful Master; Modesto Fonseca, Senior Warden; and Antonio Berenguer, Junior Warden. The records of the lodge, however, date its foundation from April 4, 1886, with Sánchez-Ossorio as Worshipful Master, but Berenguer has become Senior Warden, and Del-Pan is listed as Junior Warden, apparently through the withdrawal of Fonseca, whose name does not appear either among the founders or the members of the lodge (ADN, legajo 736, expediente 11).

[20] I have not been able to find any further information on Ricardo Ayllon, who held the eighteenth degree, and who withdrew to return to the Philippines before October 15, 1886, as did Del-Pan. Ayllon's name does not appear in any other document of the Filipinos in Spain prior to 1886, nor does he appear connected with nationalist activity in any way afterwards.

[21] Aguirre and Llorente were both students at the University of Madrid, and close friends and classmates of Rizal from the Ateneo. Both were active in the Filipino colony during these years, especially in the Filipino newspaper *España en Filipinas.*

[22] Of the thirty-three members initiated or affiliated up till the end of October 1886, ten were Cubans, two Puerto Ricans, four Filipinos, and one was from Martinique. The rest were presumably Peninsular Spaniards, since their place of origin is not usually noted (ADN, legajo 736, expediente 11).

[23] From López Jaena's documents, as found in these records, it seems that he had joined the lodge "Solidaridad" at its founding on April 5, 1886, but because he lacked the necessary document of withdrawal in good standing (*plancha de quite*) from his former lodge, he did not take the oath and become formally affiliated with "Solidaridad" until April 4, 1887. ("Expediente del h.·. Bolivar, prof.·.. Graciano López, gr.·.3", *ibid.*) The article on López Jaena in the *Encyclopedia of the Philippines,* ed. Zoilo M. Galang; 2nd ed.; III, 241, declares that he was initiated in the lodge "Porvenir" in Madrid in 1882. Though no source is given, it seems that this should be accepted in the absence of any contrary information, and since it fits well with other known facts. In this

month later, however, the majority of members of the lodge, including all the Cubans, voted to join with certain other lodges to form a new lodge: "Luz de Mantua" No. 1. Among them, the only Filipino was Lopez Jaena. With this, the lodge "Solidaridad" apparently ceased to exist until it was revived as an all-Filipino lodge a few years later.[24] Though the Filipinos never formed more than a handful in the early lodge."Solidaridad," the importance of the episode is the introduction of Masonry among the Filipino colony in Madrid, and even more, the fact that these contacts were established under the aegis of Miguel Morayta, who was to play a significant role in Filipino Masonry for the next thirty years until his death.

The Lodge "Revolucion"

The first predominantly Filipino lodge, however, was to be founded in Barcelona in April 1889, under the title "Revolucion."[25] The initiative seems to have come from a former Spanish army officer, Celso Mir Deas,[26] who, while in the Philippines, had married a Filipina. Mir Deas was at this time, active in Republican circles in Barcelona, especially as a journalist on the republician newspaper, *El Pueblo Soberano*.[27] The original members of the lodge were Mir, Lopez Jaena, Marcelo H. del Pilar, Mariano Ponce, Jose Ma. Panganiban, Juan Jose Cañarte, and Justo Argudin. These latter two were Cubans; Cañarte had been collaborating with the Filipino newspaper

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case, of course, López Jaena may have been prior to Del-Pan in joining Masonry.

[24] ADN, leg. 736, exp. 11. Seventeen members are listed as voting for the fusion of the lodges. It is not clear whether these are simply the affirmative votes, or whether they are all that were left in the lodge at this time. To judge from the other records of withdrawals, dismissals, and initiations, it would seem that there was a minority of dissenters, among whom was Llorente. This is confirmed by the fact that Lorente in 1890 would propose the reconstitution of the lodge "Solidaridad" rather than any other, on the grounds that he was a member of it, something he could hardly have said if he had withdrawn prior to the fusion.

[25] The records of the lodge, apparently incomplete, are found in ADN, leg. 620, exp. 14. Though Kalaw (*op. cit.*, 20) gives the date of the charter as April 1, 1889, the meeting to petition affiliation was not held till April 2, so Kalaw is in error.

[26] A letter found in AT from a Barcelona Jesuit, Father Antonio Codo, to the Provincial, Father Juan Ricart, who had recently come from the Philippines, casts light on the origin of the lodge:

> "Another reason which has moved me to write to your Reverence is to inform you, as I promised,... of the name of that active propagator of Masonry, a former military man in the Philippines, of whom I spoke to your Reverence shortly before leaving here. His name is Celso Mir... They have finally founded the lodge of which I spoke to your Reverence with the title of 'La Revolucion'.
>
> "This Celso is a very active collaborator and propagandist who promises money and protection to the uncautious who allow themselves to be initiated; he is trying to revive in this lodge the statutes which have fallen into disuse in the others, of assassinating the traitor who makes known its secrets. For this reason, and because of having roundly refused to sign a certain document which they presented to him, it will be difficult for me to acquire other information from the man who favored me with this."

Though the letter is dated June 23, 1889, it is clear that the lodge had been founded some time before, and planned earlier. For Codo mentions that he had not written about the matter sooner, because he did not consider it important.

[27] From a friend and supporter of the Filipinos, Mir was eventually to become their bitter enemy because of the articles of Antonio Luna in *La Soli-*

La Solidaridad for a few issues just before this time.[28] Lopez Jaena was elected Worshipful Master; Argudin, Senior Warden; Mir, Junior Warden; Del Pilar, Orator; and Cañarte, Secretary. Immediately upon its organization, the lodge petitioned Morayta, who had founded the new federation—Gran Oriente Espanol—a few months earlier, recognizing the Masonic legality of Morayta's federation[29] and petitioning affiliation for the lodge "Revolucion."[30] Just two weeks later, Morayta made a trip from Madrid to Barcelona, where he was honored by the Filipino colony with a banquet. It was at this time that Del Pilar made his first contacts with Morayta, from which would spring a close association and friendship between the two men, with Del Pilar eventually coming to hold a high position in Spanish Masonry, and with Morayta lending his collaboration to the Filipino campaign.

The details of the foundation of the lodge "Revolucion" are not completely clear. The records begin with April 2, 1889, as may be seen from the document cited above. However, though this communication with Morayta may well signalize the beginning of the lodge, it might also merely signify the move of a pre-existing lodge to affiliate with Morayta, who had recently won over various Masonic rivals and succeeded in uniting under himself the Gran Oriente Español. Marcelo del Pilar already appears in the records of April 2 as holding the third degree. Since, as we have seen, it is extremely unlikely that he was initiated before leaving the Philippines, his initiation must have taken place sometime within the three months after his arrival in Barcelona on January 1, 1889. Two possibilities, therefore, present themselves: either Del Pilar had, sometime during those three months, joined another Masonic lodge and, at the beginning of April—together with Lopez Jaena, Mir Deas, and others—had withdrawn from his original lodge to form "Revolucion" and affiliate with Morayta; or perhaps, "Revolucion" had already been formed sometime earlier (between January and April) and that it was only at this time that its records begin to appear among those of the Gran Oriente Español, since it was only then that the already existing lodge would have affiliated with Morayta.

The surviving records of the lodge "Revolucion" for the year 1889 show that most of the Filipinos in Barcelona soon joined the lodge, and that

daridad satirizing Spanish foibles. He eventually denounced them to the police who raided the house of Ponce in Barcelona in search of subversive literature, in December 1889. *La Solidaridad* published a separate supplement on December 15, 1889, giving the Filipino side of the story. For biographical data on Mir, see Joan Givanel i Mas, *Materials per a la bibliografia de la premsa barcelonesa (1881-1890)* (Barcelona, 1933), 97-98.

[28] *La Solidaridad* I, 5 (15 Abril 1889), 52-53; I, 7 (15 Mayo 1889), 77-78.

[29] In 1888 after a series of schisms and re-combinations following the resignation of Manuel Becerra as Grand Master in 1886, Morayta had been defeated in an election of the new federation. He protested the election and broke with the Gran Oriente Nacional, recently formed. Followed by apparently the larger number of lodges, he then formed the Gran Oriente Español on January 9, 1889. (These facts are taken from a source friendly to Morayta, Frau-Arús, III, 457-459, but the hostile account, favoring the Gran Oriente Nacional, to be found in Martín y de Castro,. 89-91, agrees as to the substantial fact.)

[30] The first meeting, the minutes of which accompany the petition (ADN, leg. 620, exp. 14), took place on April 2, 1889, and the petition bears the same date. The meeting was held at Rambla Canaletas, 2, 3º, which was the home of Del Pilar, Ponce, and López Jaena at this time, and the publishing office of *La Solidaridad*.

these Filipinos rapidly ascended to the higher degrees of Masonry. In addition to those listed above, other Filipinos who joined during 1889 included Santiago Icasiano, Ariston Bautista, Galicano Apacible, Damaso Ponce, Ramon Imperial, Agustin Blanco, Domingo Marcelo Cortes, and Teodoro Sandico. By August 30, Del Pilar and Mariano Ponce had reached the eighteenth degree; Bautista, the fourteenth. On September 17, Mir Deas, Argudin, Apacible and Panganiban, were proposed for the thirtieth degree; Icasiano, Damaso Ponce, and Imperial, for the eighteenth. Though the records are incomplete, it seems very likely that Del Pilar and Mariano Ponce had likewise reached the thirtieth degree by this time, inasmuch as they had been co-founders with the others proposed for the thirtieth degree, and had begun with them in the same degree. Certainly, by 1890, both men already held the thirtieth degree in the Madrid lodge "Solidaridad," though there is no record among the documents of that lodge of their promotion, indicating that it must have taken place while they were still affiliated with "Revolucion."

When compared with the rate at which men were promoted to higher degrees in other lodges, this rapidity seems rather extraordinary. It could perhaps be attributed to a desire, on the part of Morayta, to build up the new lodges quickly, so as to consolidate the still shaky position of his federation, or possibly also to financial considerations. But, without completely excluding either of these possibilities, it would seem to be the desire of the Filipinos, particularly Del Pilar, to rise to positions in Masonry where they could make use of their Masonic relationships more effectively for their political purposes in the Philippines.[31] Certainly, whatever may have been the motivation of Morayta or of Mir Deas, Del Pilar intended to make use of Masonry in his campaign to destroy the power of the Friars in the Philippines, as will be seen in the following section.

Masonry and the Filipino Anti-Friar Campaign

Two instances of this use of Masonic influence by Del Pilar may be cited, which give an insight into the strategy he proposed in his campaign for Europe. The first of these was the sponsorship by Del Pilar and his associates of Manrique Alonso Lallave, a renegade Friar from the Philippines who had turned Protestant, and in 1889 returned to Manila to open a Protestant chapel there.[32] Lallave had been a Dominican parish priest of the town of Urdaneta, Pangasinan. He had been one of those who attempted to take advantage of the short-lived decree of Segismundo Moret in 1870, authorizing the exclaustration of Friars in the Philippines. Dismissed from the Dominican Order for this and other grave charges, he had been expelled from

[31] Though there are fees recorded for each advance in degree, they do not seem to be excessive amounts, usually ten or fifteen pesetas for each promotion. In any case, it is likely that Del Pilar would have considered the money well-spent for the political connections thus afforded him. Later Morayta would be charged with having opened Masonry to Filipinos to the detriment of Spain, merely out of pecuniary considerations. There is a certain amount of evidence for this charge with regard to the founding of lodges in the Philippines, but at least at this point the charge does not seem to be substantiated.

[32] The data on Lallave and his activities is taken from the biographical article "Lallave, Manrique Alonso," Frau-Arús, I, 614-615, and from the information contained in the letters of Del Pilar cited below.

the Philippines by the government of General Rafael Izquierdo.[33] On his return to Spain, he had published a diatribe against the Friars, entitled *Los Frailes en Filipinas*[34] in which he accused them of every imaginable crime, and demanded the dissolution of the Orders. The pamphlet is full of the most manifest falsehoods and exaggerations, recklessly giving figures, for example, on the enormous wealth of the Friars, which admittedly had no proof for them at all. But the author was by no means a friend or defender of the rights of the Filipinos. In the light of the sponsorship given by Del Pilar to Lallave's pamphlet and to the man's activities as well, it is interesting to note such passage as the following, in which Lallave denies all ability to Filipinos and insults them in a way worthy of the worst of the detractors of the race combatted by Rizal and others:

> ... There you will not find that magnificient brilliance of intelligence...
> nor will you discover there in the works of men the graphic expressions of the power of their will; you will see only lowness, small-mindedness, fear, servilism in execution, poverty of will in every respect, and degradation of the intelligence. That people still lacks poetry; as yet it has not invented a song—rather its songs and its harmonies are the harmonies and the songs of the savages!...[35]

Even worse are his remarks about the Filipinos being "... liars by their very nature..... "[36] and his chapter on public morality, where he denies all sense of morality to the entire race, men and women.[37]

Despite all this, Del Pilar now proposes in his campaign to destroy the influence of the Friars in the Philippines, to cooperate with Lallave and other elements in Spanish political life who were sponsoring him, notably the ex-revolutionary, former Grand Master of the Gran Oriente de España, Manuel Becerra, now Overseas Minister in the Liberal Cabinet of Sagasta.[38] The entire term of office of Becerra was a continuous threat to the Church in the Philippines, though few of his projects ever succeeded in winning cabinet approval, even from the anti-clerical government of Sagasta. In an early circular to the Governor-General, he ostentatiously called on the latter to favor the work of the religious orders in the Philippines, but went on to say that he must not forget

> ... that in the territory of that jurisdiction there are Europeans, Asiatics, and Americans who profess different religions. All these should be respected in their

[33] The account of Lallave's dismissal from the Dominicans and expulsion from the Philippines with three companions, parish priests of towns in Pangasinan, is in the Archivo Histórico Nacional in Madrid, Sección de Ultramar, leg. 2223, "Sobre expulsión de las Islas Filipinas de los Religiosos de la Orden de Sto. Domingo, Fr. José Ma. Isla, Fr. Nicolás Manrique Alonso, Fr. Joaquín Palacios y Fr. Remigio Zapico." All had been found guilty by their Order of a number of serious charges. The documents show on the one hand the possibility of serious abuses on the part of Friar parish priests, and on the other hand, the stern measures taken by their Order to expel members who had shown themselves unworthy. It reflects little credit on Del Pilar, however, to have made use of such a man against the Friars.

[34] Manrique Alonso Lallave, *Los frailes en Filipinas* (Madrid, 1872).

[35] *Ibid.*, 44. This translation, and subsequent ones, are mine.

[36] *Ibid.*, 48.

[37] *Ibid.*, 53-57.

[38] For Becerra's Masonic career, see Frau-Arús, III, 457. His ecclesiastical projects are narrated, and attacked, in Pastells, *Misión*, 176-182.

> beliefs and in their worship, as they have been ever since the wise Laws of the Indies were first laid down. . . .[39]

Beneath this seemingly innocuous statement, apparently simply reiterating ordinary Philippine practice, there was a hidden plan. The key to the plan is the phrase "in their worship" which gave an opening for freedom of worship, something never heretofore permitted in the Philippines. Del Pilar, in a letter to Pedro Serrano Laktaw, pointed out that he considered this to be:

> . . . the gravest threat that can be made under current legislation against the theocratic power. Becerra cannot descend to details. The question is whether we know how to develop its potentialities.

He goes on to explain how he proposes to do so:

> Under protection of that circular, you have coming to you there in person, in body and soul, your Manrique Lallave, now a Protestant pastor. The government will not be able to prosecute him, since he is protected by the circular. If he succeeds in making proselytes, an exposition will be presented to the government with 300,000 signatures in demand of greater tolerance and even of freedom of worship. This latter is still a remote possibility, but even toleration is already a great step against the monastic power. As to their expulsion, you know already that we cannot hope for this from the government; we have to do it ourselves.[40]

He then counsels Serrano to aid Lallave clandestinely with the assistance of Doroteo Cortes and Jose Ramos. In a letter to Teodoro Sandico a few weeks later, he urges him to work with Serrano in helping Lallave, ". . . because here you have the unfolding of one of the plans of Becerra . . . . ."[41]

In his letter to Doroteo Cortes, contemporaneous with that to Serrano, Del Pilar gives some idea of his relationship to Becerra in this matter.

> Senor Manrique Lallave and his companions are going there to carry on some business which they will explain to you. Believing their interests to be antagonistic to those of certain monopolizers of the country, I would wish that, on your part and that of your friends, you would bestow every kind of protection on them, being assured that these gentlemen and the elements on whom they depend, with whom we are in complete understanding, are disposed to render us service in return.[42]

The plan did not prosper, however, since Lallave contracted a fever a few weeks after his arrival in Manila, and after two weeks of sickness, died.[43]

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[39] Text in the newspaper *El Día* (Madrid), 19 Enero 1889.

[40] Carmelo [Del Pilar] to P. Ikazama [Pedro Serrano Laktaw], 3 Mayo 1889, *Epistolario de Marcelo H. del Pilar* (2 vols.; Manila, 1955-1958), I, 112. The editor of the *Epistolario* wrongly identifies P. Ikazama as Pedro Icasiano instead of Serrano. To demonstrate that Serrano is the addressee cannot be undertaken here, but has been done in my doctoral dissertation, *The Filipino Nationalists Propaganda Campaign in Spain, 1880-1899,* from Georgetown University, published on microfilm with University Microfilms (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1965), 251-252.

[41] Piping Dilát [Del Pilar] to Teófilo Codisan [Teodoro Sandico], 30 Mayo 1889, *Epistolario,* I, 161.

[42] Marcelo H. del Pilar to Doroteo Cortés, 1 Mayo 1889, *ibid.*, 106.

[43] R. O. Serna [Pedro Serrano] to Marcelo H. del Pilar, 21 Junio 1889, *ibid.*, 178. There is a more detailed account in "Correo de Filipinas," *El Día* (Madrid), 2 Agosto 1889. These two contemporary accounts, both of them from sources hostile to the Friars, make clear that there is absolutely nothing to the charge, often made in later anti-Friar writings, that Lallave was poisoned by the Friars. Rather, he contracted a fever, and died after two weeks.

All this raises the question as to who were "the elements on which they depend," with whom Del Pilar was "in complete understanding," and who were disposed to render him reciprocal services in return for his cooperation with Lallave's anti-Catholic project. Two possible answers offer themselves: a group of Protestants, or one of Masons. The first of these seems highly improbable, since the scattered Protestants in Spain at this time were scarcely in a position to do anything for Del Pilar and his associates that would justify the phrase "disposed to render us service in return." Moreover, it is known that shortly before this time, Lallave, who had been a Presbyterian in Sevilla from 1874 to 1888, was deprived of his pastorate by his church in the latter year, because of accusations made against him, and reduced to such a precarious economic situation that he was scarcely able to support his wife and numerous children. It is hardly likely that his church, even if it were disposed to undertake such a project, would, after having deprived him of his pastorate for alleged bad conduct, have entrusted him with a new mission in the Philippines.[44]

There is, however, a great deal of evidence which points to Lallave's support being Masonic, specifically, from the Gran Oriente Español, headed by Morayta. Lallave had been a very active Mason for many years, had published a number of Masonic works, and was editor of the Masonic journal *Taller* from its foundation. Having first been a member of the lodge "Numantina" of the Gran Oriente Lusitano Unido, he had helped found the Gran Logia Simbolica Independiente Española in 1881, where he was Gran Orador. He had likewise founded the lodge "Numancia," of which he was Worshipful Master. With this background, Lallave was certainly no stranger to Becerra or to Morayta, since he was active in Masonic circles right up to the period in question, and in circles friendly to those of Morayta and Becerra.[45]

In addition to this Masonic affiliation of Lallave, the consideration of a few dates would seem clearly to point to Morayta and the Gran Oriente Español being the sponsor of Lallave. Del Pilar's letter to Serrano and Cortes in favor of Lallave are dated May 1, 1889. On the preceding April 2, the lodge "Revolucion" had petitioned Morayta for affiliation with the Gran Oriente Español.[46] Two weeks later, on April 16, Morayta arrived in Barcelona. During the period of his stay, it is clear from Del Pilar's letters, that the latter had several conferences with Morayta, the details of which he does not divulge, besides the public banquet which the Filipino colony offered.[47] As will be seen below, it is from precisely this time that Morayta showed himself active in behalf of the Filipinos, and that Del Pilar seems to have taken his final decision to go to Madrid and centralize his organization there

[44] For the situation of Protestantism in Spain at this time, see Ballesteros, XII, 97-98. For Lallave's relations with the Presbyterian Church, see Frau-Arús, I, 614-615.

[45] *Ibid.* The clearest evidence that Lallave must have been closely connected with Morayta is the laudatory article on him, to which reference is here made. For the *Diccionario*, first published by Frau in 1891, is highly biased in favor of Morayta and his associates, so that prominent Masons of other federations, and even the federations themselves, are simply ignored, or even attacked bitterly.

[46] ADN, leg. 620, esp. 14.

[47] Marcelo H. del Pilar to Ka Dato [Deodato Arellano], 17 Abril 1889, *Epistolario*, I, 97; 2 Mayo 1889, *ibid.*, 107-110.

in conjunction with the former. If Morayta proposed to Del Pilar that the Filipino group should aid Lallave, the first opportunity for Del Pilar to recommend that course to his friends in Manila would have been precisely when he did write, at the beginning of May when the next mail boat would have been leaving for the Philippines. As a matter of fact, it is in this same mail that he writes to his brother-in-law, Deodato Arellano, concerning his meeting with Morayta. All this circumstantial evidence is not, perhaps, absolutely conclusive, but the convergence of so many known facts, and the absence of any alternative hypothesis for the sponsoring organization which Del Pilar's letters refer to, give as much certainty as can be expected here.

The other side of this relationship of reciprocal assistance between Masonry and the Filipino nationalists which Del Pilar counted on, may be seen in another project he undertook as a result of the conferences between him and Morayta. At the banquet in honor of Morayta, the Filipinos and their Spanish friends drew up an exposition to the Overseas Minister Becerra, petitioning parliamentary representation for the Philippines, abolition of the censorship, and prohibition of administrative deportation.[48] A few weeks later, Del Pilar wrote to Rizal, who seems to have joined Masonry sometime earlier:[49]

> ... If you can take advantage of the support of the "Gran Familia," now is the time. For Becerra belongs to it, and besides, this oppressive measure [administrative deportation] affects its prestige and good name, since it is its own members and its friends who are subject to this persecution.[50]

Rizal, however, was unwilling to make use of Masonic influence, since he declared that he did not want "... to owe the tranquility of the Philippines to anyone except the forces of the country itself..... ."[51] Del Pilar was undismayed, and without communicating anything further to Rizal, began to campaign among other Masonic lodges to obtain their support for a petition to Sagasta, the Prime Minister, and to Becerra—both of them, Masons—against permitting administrative deportation in the Philippines.[52] On July 2, 1889, Lopez Jaena, as Worshipful Master of the lodge "Revolucion" forwarded to Morayta two copies of an exposition making this petition, signed by various lodges not only of the Gran Oriente Español, but also of other "obediences." He asked in an official letter that Morayta see to it that these expositions be placed in the hands of the Ministers to whom they were addressed.

In another confidential, unofficial letter, which accompanied these documents, he offered the activity of the lodge "Revolucion" in securing the cooperation of lodges outside the Gran Oriente Español as a proof of the Ma-

[48] *Ibid.*, 103-104.

[49] I hope to treat the complicated and somewhat obscure question of when and where Rizal was initiated into Masonry in a separate article. In any case, he was not a member of either the lodge "Revolucion," or of the lodge "Solidaridad" in the period considered in this article.

[50] To Laong Laan [Rizal], 18 Mayo 1889, *Epistolario,* I, 127.

[51] Felipeno [Del Pilar] to Ikazama [Serrano], 27 Junio 1889, *ibid.*, 192.

[52] *Ibid.* After telling that the exposition was to be presented, Del Pilar continues: "... Los peticionarios no somos nosotros, sino otras entidades sociales... Ese Ramos lo entenderá mejor." The reference to Ramos is intended to convey the information that the "entidades sociales" in question are Masonic lodges. Elsewhere in his effort to use cryptic language, guarding against pos-

sonic zeal of the Filipinos, pointing out that this might well be a first step in bringing more lodges under Morayta's leadership. In return for this service, he asked to be rewarded with the thirtieth degree, without having to make a formal request.[53] In spite of the letter of Lopez Jaena, however, it seems clear from the correspondence of Del Pilar cited above, that it was the latter who was behind the whole move, though undoubtedly the political and Masonic contacts of Lopez Jaena were largely instrumental in making the move possible.[54]

The incident is interesting as an example of what Del Pilar hoped to accomplish through Masonry, and as an indication of the close relationship with Morayta which he was nurturing from this time. However, there is no evidence that anything was actually accomplished by these Masonic petitions as far as achieving their object is concerned. Becerra was already embarked on a program of radical reforms for the Philippines, which was meeting extensive opposition, and though he might well have supported the object of the Filipino petition, he was not in a position to propose more new reforms at this time. Sagasta was not willing to compromise himself at any time for the sake of Becerra's projects, and would scarcely have allowed himself to be led into reforms in the Philippines which many considered likely to weaken Spanish control, simply because of lobbying from Masonic lodges.[55]

After September, the records show an increase of non-Filipino members in the lodge, and a corresponding decrease in Filipino activity, no doubt due to the plans of Del Pilar to transfer operations to Madrid. Sandico, Bautista, Damaso Ponce, and perhaps Apacible, all moved to Madrid about this time, as did Del Pilar, with Mariano Ponce soon to follow. Since Panganiban already had only months to live, all the Filipinos who had shown themselves active in the lodge "Revolucion," with the exception of Lopez Jaena, were now gone. The latter resigned as Worshipful Master at the end of November, and there is no mention of the few remaining Filipino members in the other extant records for the months after November, only of Spaniards and Cubans. The last records of the lodge "Revolucion" date from June 1890.[56]

However, though "Revolucion" ceased to exist as a predominantly Filipino lodge, the associations of the nationalist movement under the leadership of Del Pilar with Spanish Masonry had only begun. Once the reorganization

sible opening of the mail by the authorities in Manila, Del Pilar speaks of Masonry as "la familia de Pepe Ramos" (*Epistolario*, I, 186). This use of Ramos' name to designate Masonry is further confirmation that Ramos was the only Filipino initiated into Masonry in Manila at this time.

[53] ADN, leg. 620, exp. 14.

[54] Later, when both López Jaena and Rizal were at odds with Del Pilar, the first would write to the second: "... Yo he sido para ellos, al llegar aquí a España, todo: yo les he hecho algo, yo les he presentado a las sociedades, a los personajes políticos..." (Graciano—Rizal, 15 Octubre 1891, *Epistolario Rizalino* [5 vols.; Manila, 1930-1938], III, 252).

[55] As a matter of fact, the Sagasta ministry never sanctioned Becerra's projects, and when the ministry fell a year and a half later, they were withdrawn by his successor. Even the laudatory article on Sagasta in Frau-Arús (II, 661-662) admits: "... Although an old and tried Freemason, Brother Sagasta took very little part in Masonic affairs....", and though he was persuaded to take the highest post in the Gran Oriente de España in 1876, he resigned it as soon as he had the opportunity to form a cabinet in 1881.

[56] ADN, leg. 620, exp. 14.

in Madrid was underway, a new lodge would be established and the part of Masonry in the activities of the Filipino nationalists would be expanded. But this is another story. The study of the documents for the period up to 1890 has, at least, it is hoped, shed new light on the origins of Philippine Masonry and the course it took until the end of its first phase.

THE AMERICAN MINORITY IN THE PHILIPPINES DURING THE PREWAR COMMONWEALTH PERIOD

GERALD E. WHEELER

A POPULAR IMAGE OF THE AMERICAN MINORITY IN THE Philippines during the prewar Commonwealth Period is easily conjured by using the phrase "Manila Americans." For the reader in the Philippines or one who has been to Manila since World War II, this brings to mind Forbes Park, Makati, San Lorenzo Village, compounds, security guards, and the American School. For the prewar period counterparts: Pasay, Taft Avenue, Ermita, and the American Chamber of Commerce. We call this a popular image, or stereotype, because this is the way many contemporary writers characterized the Americans, and this is the picture we have of them in historical literature. Senator Harry B. Hawes, long associated with Philippine affairs, sponsor of independence legislation, counsel to Manuel Quezon's government, and American lobbyist for the Philippine Sugar Association, helped to create one image of the American community. He did not coin the phrase, but he described the "Manila American" cuttingly in his pro-independence tract, *Philippine Uncertainty:*

> 'Manila Americans' are unconsciously doing more than any other group to bring independence. Leading the fight against it by their disregard or open contempt for the Filipino's pride of race and by their covert attacks on his character and capacity, they are promoting solidarity among the natives and advertising, by their hostile activities, the very cause they so stubbornly and unfairly oppose.[1]

This was 1932. Ten years later, Florence Horn, in her popularly written Philippine travelogue—*Orphans of the Pacific*—opened a chapter on "Americans" with the comment:

> Americans in Manila are like Americans in Mexico City and Americans in Maracaibo and Hong Kong and Rio de Janeiro. They build for themselves a barricaded American life wherever they are. They insulate themselves as thoroughly as possible against the life of the country they are in... They grouse continually about petty inconveniences, and berate this miserable native bitterly and endlessly... The American women heartily despise the Filipinos.[2]

Twenty years after Miss Horn's exegesis on the foibles of the "Manila American," Carlos P. Romulo penned his autobiographical *I Walked with Heroes.* A minor theme that runs through the book is Romulo's, and the Filipino's sensitiveness to the color issue in Filipino-American relations. The Manila Americans are pictured as types that excluded Romulo from their clubs and at a later date would pass up wounded Filipino soldiers on Bataan to give preference to injured white Americans.[3]

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[1] Harry B. Hawes, *Philippine Uncertainty* (New York, 1932), 97.

[2] Florence Horn, *Orphans of the Pacific, The Philippines* (New York, 1941), 90-91.

[3] General Carlos P. Romulo, *I Walked with Heroes* (New York: Avon Books, 1961), 74-76, 88-91, 103-05, 160-61.

Without belaboring the point further, we can generalize that the historical picture of the American minority has been based on casual accounts and a small amount of autobiographical literature by Americans and Filipinos. Not much has been done in depth. The more scholarly books have dealt with such themes as economic legislation, party movements, independence crusades, and the Japanese occupation, but not with this powerful minority within Philippine society. The University of the Philippines textbook by Teodoro Agoncillo and Oscar Alfonso describes, in a most indirect way, the American community in terms of its "Negative Results" on the Filipinos. Because of the Americans, the Filipinos learned dirty politics, developed a taste for "stateside" food and wares, acquired a fondness for gangster movies, rejected the philosophers, became materialistic, and have been saddled ever since with a colonial mentality. This catalogue of criticism in Agoncillo and Alfonso's *A Short History of the Filipino People* (1960) culminates the chapter on the "Results of the American Occupation." It represents a University professor's indictment of the American community. To that observer the Americans of the Commonwealth Period were political-minded, materialistic, anti-intellectual, and economically self-seeking.[4]

Aside from the visceral response that rises naturally in an American from reading the Agoncillo and Alfonso text, this historian must raise another protest. The foregoing descriptions are terribly oversimplified. Eight or nine thousand Americans simply cannot be squeezed into these generalizations. Not even the economic or political elites among them can be so easily typed. Within the limits of this article we cannot possibly draw the "true picture" of the American community; but it may be useful to discuss its diversity.

The census of 1939 revealed that 8,709 Americans, excluding the military forces, were resident in the Philippines. They were distributed from the Cagayan Valley to Sulu, but some 5,149 were concentrated in the City of Manila and neighboring Rizal Province. More than half of all Americans (4,687) were children, dependents, retirees, or individuals otherwise "non-gainfully employed." By census classification, the 4,022 "gainfully employed" American citizens fell into these larger groups:[5]

Agricultural workers or managers	174
Domestic and hotel workers	127
Professionals	764
Clergy, religious workers, professors, teachers	527
Public servants	187
Manufacturing owners, managers, workers	463
Clerical	311
Trade (wholesale or retail) owners, managers, workers	691
Mining and quarrying owners, managers, workers	349
Transportation, forestry, and other industries	429
	4,022

[4] Teodoro A. Agoncillo and Oscar M. Alfonso, *A Short History of the Filipino People* (Diliman: University of the Philippines Press, 1960), 445-7.

[5] Commonwealth of the Philippines, Bureau of the Census, *Census of 1939* (4 vols.; Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1941). For convenience in tabulation, the author has combined several census categories.

As can be seen, more than half (2,253) of all working Americans were connected with business enterprises; but a significant minority (527) was teaching in the country's schools or was in missionary activity. One might assume that the very diversity of their occupations and scattered locations helped to reduce uniformity of viewpoint in these people.

Approached in another way, it may be observed that Americans were present in all but three (Batanes, Marinduque, Romblon) of the Philippine provinces. In many ways they were a much more "visible" minority in a rural province than the 3,191 Americans who were swamped by the 623,492 residents of Manila. Because they were so few in most provinces, and because of the nature of their occupations, Americans did not compete with the Filipinos and did not arouse animosities as easily as their countrymen in Manila. By 1922, ex-Governor General Francis B. Harrison was quite aware that his fellow Americans had trod on many toes in the capital, but he also commented that "In the provinces the relations between the two races are even better than in Manila . . . ." [6] Perhaps the 340 teachers, clergy, and religious workers outside Manila helped to develop that "image" in the provinces that has come down to us today. It is tempting to conjecture that Filipino loyalty to America, in the provinces during World War II, would never have existed had the "Manila American" stereotype prevailed throughout the archipelago.

When we turn from the realm of census figures to that of ideas, we can observe that on very few subjects of political, economic, social, or military content was there unanimity in the thinking of the American minority of the Commonwealth Period. An examination of a few items can demonstrate this.

From the spring of 1936, until the Japanese broke through the beach defenses of Luzon, six years later, President Quezon's military adviser and his staff argued that the Philippines could repulse a Japanese invasion. In fact, General Douglas MacArthur's 1936 plan for the development of a Philippine Army was built on this premise.[7] MacArthur was joined in his optimism by Major General L. R. Holbrook, the Commanding General of U.S. Army forces in the Philippines.[8] These views were in direct contradiction to those expressed, three years before, by Brigadier General S. D. Embick who designed the Manila Harbor defense and Major General E. E. Booth who held Holbrook's position. Embick and Booth did not believe the Philippines could be defended against Japan and merely hoped Manila Harbor could be held.[9]

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[6] Francis Burton Harrison, *The Corner-Stone of Philippine Independence: A Narrative of Seven Years* (New York, 1922), 273-4.

[7] Office of the Commonwealth President, *Report on National Defense in the Philippines* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1936), 52 pp. General MacArthur submitted the *Report* to President Quezon on April 27, 1936; Quezon submitted the *Report* to the National Assembly on June 18, 1936. See also *Manila Daily Bulletin,* August 5, 1936.

[8] Major General L. R. Holbrook to General Malin Craig, Manila, July 27 and August 6, 1936 in Record Group 94, file AG 660.2 Phil. Dept. (8/6/36), U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. (Hereafter cited as RG 94, file AG —, USNA.)

[9] Mark Skinner Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), 414-15.

While not saying so to the Filipinos, General MacArthur wrote to General Malin Craig, Chief of Staff U. S. Army, that his expectations for defending the Philippines rested on the United States providing "a practically impregnable defense for the Islands." [10] But these provisions were never made; in fact, the area of defense in the Philippines was reduced to holding Manila Bay. MacArthur and Holbrook were informed in October 1937, a year after the Philippine National Defense Act was put into operation, that strengthening of the Philippines would depend on "availability of funds," and there would be no enlargement of material and forces except to meet the Manila Harbor defense needs.[11] By January of 1938, the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, was resigned to the fact that the Islands could not be initially defended against a Japanese assault and therefore the United States Pacific Fleet would not steam to the relief of the Filipinos at the outbreak of war.[12] On the other hand, in October, 1938, Rear Admiral G. J. Meyers, the Commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District (Philippines), urged High Commissioner Paul McNutt to press for expansion of Cavite into a major naval base that would be impregnable to Japanese attack. Such a base, the admiral reasoned, would cause the Japanese to abandon any plans to assault the Philippines.[13] As must be expected, the indecision on this basic question of Philippine defense became a problem for all in the American community. Those who wanted America to stay in the Philippines believed the country could be defended; those who wanted the United States to abandon its imperial commitments were pessimistic about the Commonwealth's chances of military survival. There was no "American point of view" on the subject.

In the vital area of economic relationships between the United States and the Philippine Commonwealth, there were stronger differences of viewpoint among the High Commissioners and their staffs than existed in the American community. Both the American Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines advocated a continuing preferential relationship, on a free-trade basis if possible.[14] Except for a few theoretical-

[10] General Douglas MacArthur to General Malin Craig, Manila, July 9, 1936, RG 94, file AG 093.5 Phil. Isl. (7/9/36), USNA.

[11] Memoranda between U.S. Army Chief of Staff and His Assistant, Washington, D.C., September 17, 1937, October 19, 1937, RG 94, file 660.2 Phil. Dept., USNA.

[12] Admiral Harry E. Yarnell to Admiral C. C. Bloch, Shanghai, January 21, 1938, Harry E. Yarnell MSS, U.S. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (Hereafter cited as Yarnell MSS, USLC.)

[13] Rear Admiral G. J. Meyers to High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt, Cavite, October 3, 1938, Yarnell MSS, USLC.

[14] The Economic Adviser, Department of State, wrote a memorandum in February, 1935, in which he noted: "The Philippine-American Trade Association was recently formed primarily for the purpose of securing continued trade preferences between the Philippines and the United States, no matter what the political solution of their relationship might be." Memorandum of the Economic Adviser, February 9, 1935 in RG 57, Department of State, file 811b.01/24½, USNA. (Hereafter cited as D/S file —, USNA.) See also *The Tribune* (Manila), May 26, 1940: "Indefinite continuation of free trade relations between the United States and the Philippines... was unanimously urged in a resolution adopted by businessmen at the closing luncheon yesterday of the National For-

minded Americans and the militantly nationalistic "Young Philippines" movement, led by Wenceslao Q. Vinzons, there was little dissent from this point of view in 1935.[15] As early as August, 1934, a steering committee of Filipino and American businessmen was headed by Horace B. Pond, of the Pacific Commercial Company of the Philippines, to "sell" the United States on the advantages of continuing free-trade between it and the Commonwealth.[16] High Commissioner Frank Murphy pressed these views during his 1936 visit to Washington and quickly came into conflict with the Interdepartmental Committee on the Philippines.[17] This government Committee studied American economic foreign policy as it related to Philippine planning, and it had arrived at the position "that the United States should not continue a preferential commercial relationship with the Philippines after independence." [18] The Committee's reasons were rooted in a policy decision arrived at in February, 1936:

> The United States Government has made the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment the cornerstone of its commercial policy. The United States is not only repeatedly proclaiming the wisdom of this principle but it is actively endeavoring to extend its application by persuading other nations to adhere to it.[19]

Obviously, preferences to an independent Philippines would make it difficult to convince the British that they should abandon their empire preferences system.

When Murphy was succeeded by Paul V. McNutt in July, 1937, the High Commissioner's Office continued its support for a long term preferential relationship.[20] It is quite possible that McNutt's sympathy here, along with his poker playing acumen, helped to close the breach that had opened between him and President Quezon during his first months in Manila. But McNutt's support was soon replaced by High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre's coolness toward continued preferences. As an Assistant Secretary of State, and Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Philippines, Sayre became convinced that the extension of preferences to the Philippines would be

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eign Trade Week celebration under the auspices of the American Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines."

[15] "Memorial to the United States Congressional Mission,... by W. Q. Vinzons, December 26, 1934," (leaflet) Manuel L. Quezon MSS, National Library, Ermita, Manila. (Hereafter cited as Quezon MSS.)

[16] Memorandum by the Economic Adviser, September 7, 1934, D/S file 611.-11b3/23, USNA.

[17] Minutes of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Philippines, July 23, 1936, D/S file 611.11b3/203, USNA. See also *The Mindanao Herald* (Zamboanga), September 26, 1936.

[18] The Interdepartmental Committee on the Philippines had a membership which included representatives from the State Department, War Department, Navy Department, Commerce Department, Treasury Department, Agriculture Department, and the U.S. Tariff Commission. Minutes of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Philippines, February 24, 1936, D/S file 611.11b3/160, USNA.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] Assistant Secretary of State Francis B. Sayre to President F. D. Roosevelt, Washington, October 28, 1938, D/S file 611.11b3/238B, USNA. In this letter Sayre noted that High Commissioner McNutt proposed a broadening of Philippine preferences in the American market and a lengthening past 1946 of this relationship.

harmful to it. He felt that such a policy would cause Filipinos to delay badly needed diversification of their economy. He realized that no Filipino would close down an industry as long as he had a guaranteed profitable market in America. Upon arrival in Manila, as High Commissioner, in August, 1939, Sayre wasted no time in stating his belief that the Filipinos must diversify their industries and markets in order to survive the imposition of American duties applied on a non-preferential basis.[21] While many Filipino entrepreneurs were disturbed by these views, the American business community in Manila was outraged. The new High Commissioner was reversing all that Murphy and McNutt had stood for.

The differences among the High Commissioners on the subject of American economic policy toward the Philippines were matched by equally strong differences concerning the exercise of their powers. Most accounts of High Commissioner Murphy stress the point that he was *simpatico* when it came to Filipinos. Socially, he was gregarious and entertained Filipinos with ease and sincerity. He left the impression of governing so lightly that he had almost abandoned his responsibilities.[22] His relationship with Manuel Quezon was so cordial that the Philippine President-Elect felt free to write a memorandum for him outlining the powers which he believed the High Commissioner should be given. To Quezon, the High Commisisoner was to be a ceremonial figure that observed, reported, but did not interfere.[23] Apparently, Murphy performed to the satisfaction of most Filipinos.

Paul V. McNutt saw things differently and this was to be even truer of Francis B. Sayre. The handsome Indianan determined quite early that he would be no figurehead. Recognizing this after a brief meeting with McNutt in Washington in early 1937, President Quezon drafted a memorandum to President Roosevelt (which he did not send) in which he asked that the High Commissioner's powers be severely curtailed—by act of Congress if necessary.[24] Once in Manila, McNutt worked hard to establish the primacy of his position and in the process titillated the foreign community and upset Quezon's staff enormously. But in the end, even though he stressed the powers he possessed rather than his limits, the High Commissioner established a friendly working relationship with Quezon.[25] In contrast, "Frank" Sayre

[21] Sayre's speech to the American Chamber of Commerce was reported in *The Tribune* (Manila), November 16, 1939. Also: "Two mouths—McNutt and Sayre," (ed.) *Philippines Magazine* (November, 1939), 443-4.

[22] Manuel Luis Quezon, *The Good Fight* (New York, 1946), 149-50. For a view hostile to Murphy's performance, see William H. Anderson, *The Philippine Problem* (New York, 1939), 162-5. The most recent political biography of Murphy notes that he was more concerned about the prerogatives of his office and the sovereignty of the United States than appeared in the newspapers. See Richard D. Lunt, *The High Ministry of Government: The Political Career of Frank Murphy* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1965), 83-122.

[23] M. L. Quezon to Frank Murphy, Manila, November 2, 1935, in U.S. Department of the Interior, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, Miscellaneous Records Box 11, U. S. National Archives. (Hereafter cited as D/I: Box 11.)

[24] (Proposed) Letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt from President Quezon, New York City, March 15, 1937, Quezon MSS.

[25] Anderson, *loc. cit.;* Theodore Friend, *Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines, 1929-1946* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965), 186-188. For Quezon's staff's comments on McNutt, see marginalia and

neither accepted nor was he accepted by the Philippine President. As Assistant Secretary of State and Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Philippines, Sayre had become almost too knowledgeable about Quezon and his government.[26] The evidence suggests that he had come to the personal conclusion that his job would be to tame the Philippine President; it was inevitable that relations between the men would be badly strained. The breaking point came in late 1940 when Sayre insisted, over Quezon's heated protests, that President Roosevelt could veto the Philippine constitutional amendments of 1939 if he chose to do so. Quezon believed, incorrectly, that the Higher Commissioner was attempting indirectly to exercise his own veto.[27] By mid-1941 the fiery Filipino was working assiduously to have Sayre replaced by Frank Murphy.[28] Again, the conclusion is perfectly obvious, there was no standard interpretation of the High Commissioner's role; each American approached the position quite differently.

When we turn to the subject of American investments in the Philippines, two points are worth noting: American and Filipino interests were often the same; and American interests often stood in conflict with those of their fellow countrymen. The sugar industry provides some interesting examples in this area. Americans participated in the sugar refining industry through ownership of *centrales,* though probably not more than 24 per cent of the refining production was in their control during the years 1935-41. Because of this participation, Americans, of necessity, were interested in sugar import quotas that were being established by the American Congress and, therefore, contributed heavily to the leadership and founding of the Philippine Sugar Association's lobby in Washington. And, with the other *centralistas,* they suffered—not always in silence—as Quezon played politics with the independence movement.[29] Americans also owned cane fields, belonged to

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attached memoranda to the carbon copy of "Quarterly Report of the U.S. High Commissioner, Covering the Period April 1—June 30, 1937," Quezon MSS.

[26] *The Tribune* paid Sayre a backhanded compliment when it predicted that he would not be appointed High Commissioner. "It is almost traditional that in choosing a governor general or a high commissioner for the Philippines America has seldom if ever given the post to the man who appeared to be the most logical choice. Mr. Sayre is the most logical choice today." *The Tribune* (Manila), July 13, 1939.

[27] Memorandum of a conversation by Sayre with President Quezon, Manila, September 12, 1940, D/I: Box 3, USNA. Quezon stated his objections to High Commissioners meddling in Philippine government affairs in a letter to an old friend. He was referring to McNutt, but his attitude was the same toward Sayre. "As a matter of principle, there is no more reason for the Federal Government to intervene in purely domestic affairs in the Philippines as there is for them to interfere in [affairs of the American states]... . The choice of the High Commissioner is affected by American politics and experience both in the past and the present shows that the person chosen may not be equal to the responsibilities placed upon him. It is simply an outrage to assume that any green American can come to the Philippines and know more as to how the Philippines should be governed than the man chosen by our own people... ." M. L. Quezon to Roy Howard, San Francisco, California, July 23, 1937, Quezon MSS.

[28] J. M. Elizalde to M. L. Quezon (radiogram), Washington, June 13, 1941; M. L. Quezon to J. M. Elizalde, Manila, June 16, 1941, Quezon MSS.

[29] The best coverage of this topic is in Theodore Friend, "The Philippine Sugar Industry and the Politics of Independence, 1929-1935," *Journal of Asian Studies,* XXII:2 (February, 1963), 179-92. See also Grayson L. Kirk, *Philippine*

the Confederacion de Asociaciones y Plantadores de Caña Dulce, and fought the *centralistas* for a larger share of the milling profits. Americans possessed both milling and planting interests when they lent money. Unfortunately for Americans and Filipinos alike, who earned heavily from the *centrales,* President Quezon leaned to the side of the planters—they controlled more votes than the *centralistas.*[30]

Finally, at the political level, Americans in the Philippines normally followed the lead of their political parties at home when it came to Philippine affairs. In 1936, Democrats and Republicans called for improvements to the Tydings-McDuffie Act. The Republican Party convention in Manila passed resolutions that displayed regrets that the independence bill had ever been passed; the Democrats were silent in this area.[31] In 1940, the Republicans supported "re-examination" of the independence question; the Democrats said the re-examination issue should not be raised by the national party.[32] Generally speaking, the Republican Party adherents among the Americans in the Philippines were regretful and resentful that the Philippine Commonwealth was moving down the road to final independence; the Democrats, when speaking as party members, kept their mouths closed on this sensitive issue.

If we now shift our attention to another area, and examine a few of the problems that troubled the American minority in these years of transition, we can get another measure of this alien community. We can start with the broad generalization that these were tension-filled years for many Americans and the inevitable result of them was a deepening rift between American and Filipino. One might almost picture the American community as being akin to Mathew Arnold's traveller who found himself

> Wandering between two worlds, one dead,
> The other powerless to be born,
> With nowhere yet to rest my head,
> Like these, on earth I wait forlorn.

The Filipinos were not exactly the Carthusian monks simply waiting out their time till inevitable death; yet, many Americans and Filipinos were sure economic disaster would ultimately end the Commonwealth experience.[33]

Independence (New York, 1936), 63-7. Florence Horn discusses some of the personalities in the industry in her *Orphans of the Pacific,* 239-256.

[30] Quezon's deference to the planters, in opposition to the *centralistas,* was clearly displayed in a series of cables to Vice President Osmeña during 1939 when Osmeña was in Washington pressing for passage of the Tydings-Kocialkowski Act. M. L. Quezon to S. Osmeña, Manila, January 18, 1939; S. Osmeña to M. L. Quezon, Washington, June 16, 1939, Quezon MSS. For an insight into the conflict between Quezon and the Philippine Sugar Association, see George H. Fairchild to M. L. Quezon, Manila, June 13, 1940, Quezon MSS.

[31] "Republican and Democratic Unanimity" (ed.), *Philippines Magazine* (April, 1936), 178.

[32] "Philippine Republicans and Re-Examination," *Philippines Magazine* (May, 1940), 174. See also the May 1940 report of the Foreign Service Officer attached to the High Commissioner's staff: D/S file 811b.00 Gen Condits/14, Manila, June 12, 1940, USNA.

[33] The Philippine periodicals were fairly consistent in their forecasts of economic troubles for an independent Philippines. A. V. H. Hartendorp early complained about the Tydings-McDuffie Act: "American and Filipino officials both had had to put the best face on the matter they could while carrying out

It takes no great amount of historical imagination to recognize the mass insecurity that beset many Americans as they lived through the Commonwealth Period. The Philippine Constitution and the Tydings-McDuffie Act protected their economic interests during the transition period, but the Constitution could easily be amended once the republic was established in 1946.[34] In 1939, two constitutional amendments passed the National Assembly. They abandoned the unicameral experiment and changed the presidential tenure from one six-year term to a maximum of two consecutive four-year terms. Some feared that nationalization of alien industries could just as easily be authorized by further amending the Philippine Constitution. During the years 1936 to 1941, President Quezon turned often to the theme of reducing alien control over Philippine economic life. He was probably never more popular with the masses than when he spoke against alien retailers on the fourth anniversary of the Commonwealth:

> I do not wish to stop foreign merchants from engaging in the wholesale trade; but it is now high time that *sari-sari* stores are placed in the hands of Filipinos... . Do you know that under the present circumstances we, as a people, could be starved to death by operators of the *sari-sari* stores?... No people would ever consent to having their daily life's necessities remain in the hand of foreigners.
>
> I am determined to remedy, by proper and legal procedure, such a flaw in our economic situation. I wil exert my best efforts to put the country's retail business in Filipino hands... .[35]

While Quezon's most direct charges and recommendations were aimed at the Chinese and Japanese minorities engaged in the retail trade industry, all foreigners—Americans included—recognized that such ideas, expanded to include wholesale merchants or other types of economic endeavor, could be used against them as well.

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the law... even if it is a bad law." "They know that if the terms of this brutal law are literally carried out that the country will collapse economically and politically long before the ten-year period of slow strangulation is ended." "The Inauguration of the Commonwealth" (ed), *Philippines Magazine* (November, 1935), 539. The Commonwealth Association's monthly magazine was equally gloomy in its predictions: "The economic provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Law hang lke the sword of Damocles over the heads of the Filipino people... ." *The Commonwealth Advocate* (September, 1935), 7-10. The *American Chamber of Commerce Journal* was similarly pessimistic, but a bit more discreet in saying so.

[34] At the beginning of the Commonwealth Period, Americans and Filipinos alike tended to trust Quezon when it came to protecting their economic interests. Gradually this trust weakened. *New York Times* reporter Robert Aura Smith noted this in several articles: *New York Times*, November 10, 1935; May 17, 1936. Full confidence was shown by the Filipino-oriented *Philippine Journal of Commerce*, see editorial "Facing the Future with Confidence" (March, 1934), 16. Some Americans put more faith in their high commissioners: *New York Times*, March 8, 1936.

[35] In 1939 President Quezon was most active in pressing for legislation that would nationalize the retail trade industry in the Philippines. National Assembly Bill 943 of 1939 was designed to accomplish this end, but it would have violated most of America's commercial treaties. "Memorandum written for Mr. Richard Ely, Manila, May 2, 1939," carbon in Quezon MSS. A rousing speech, supporting a retail trade act, was delivered by Quezon in November, 1939. "Accomplishments of the Commonwealth and Government Aid to Philippine Industries and Business, November 15, 1939," *Messages of the President, V*, 211-16.

If some Americans believed they would be protected by a *laissez-faire* spirit among the Filipinos, they were disabused of this idea early in the Commonwealth Period. At the inauguration of the National Economic Council on March 30, 1936, Quezon concluded his talk with this comment:

> Every member of the Council is free to express his opinion honestly and frankly... There is only one limitation to your freedom of opinion. Anyone who believes in good faith, as a matter of principle in the economic philosophy of *laissez-faire,* or in the inherent unfitness of a government to own and operate an industry or any business enterprise has no place in a council created by law and under a constitution that professes an entirely opposite theory.[36]

It was obvious to all that the Commonwealth would not be a replica of the *laissez-faire* American state of the 1920's; and the steady increase in the number of government corporations in the following years made this point abundantly clear.[37] By the end of 1940, with the passage of the Emergency Powers Act, which implied the power to seize private businesses for emergency purposes, Americans in Manila and in Washington began to suspect Quezon of harboring dictatorship ambitions.[38]

Turning to another group, considerably lower on the socio-economic scale, we discover that during the years 1935 to 1937, American pensioners of the Philippine government began to worry about their financial security. The pension structure that dated from 1922 had proved to be actuarially unsound and the government planned to terminate pensions by lump-sum redemptions.[39] The concept of pensions was still essentially alien to Filipinos of the 1930's, and the discarding of an uneconomical system by Commonwealth Act 187 in 1937 seemed eminently sound. Protests from those affected were met by Quezon's counter-charges that the Americans were ingrates. When several American officials in Washington pressured Quezon in the name of the pensioners, he assured them that were any American truly impoverished, he could seek relief from the Philippine National Assembly.[40] Pensions were not considered necessary for Filipinos; by tradition, the elderly were absorbed by their families.

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[36] "Speech of the President of the Philippines Delivered at the First Meeting of the National Economic Council, Manila, March 30, 1936," (typescript) Quezon MSS. See also Manuel L. Quezon, "Government Leadership in Production," *Philippine Journal of Commerce* (May, 1936), 5, 32.

[37] In his first message to the National Assembly, President Quezon promised that the government would enter business fields where private capital was slow to press ahead. Commonwealth of the Philippines, *Message of His Excellency Manuel L. Quezon to the National Assembly, December 18, 1935* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1935), 9-10.

[38] Suspicions of Quezon by High Commissioner Sayre and government officials in Washington can be found in D/S file 811b.001 Quezon/146, August 15, 1940, USNA. Quezon understood the nature of Sayre's suspicions and deeply resented them. See his letter: M. L. Quezon to F. B. Sayre, Baguio, April 7, 1941, Quezon MSS.

[39] J. Weldon Jones (Insular Auditor) to M. L. Quezon, Manila, November 5, 1935, Quezon MSS; "Press Conference, Manila, September 4, 1936" (typescript), Quezon MSS.

[40] Senator Millard Tydings to M. L. Quezon, Washington, March 11, 1937; Brigadier General Charles Burnett to M. L. Quezon, Washington, July 22, 1937; (draft) M. L. Quezon to Charles Burnett, [July 22-28, 1937]; M. L. Quezon to Charles Burnett, At Sea, July 28, 1937; Col. James S.V. Ord. to M. L. Quezon, Pittsburgh, Pa., August 17, 1937, Quezon MSS.

Quezon's attitude toward pensions was symptomatic of a deeper cause for the development of distrust of him by the American community. He was, as Dr. Theodore Friend has so admirably stated recently, a charismatic leader. He had the sense of subject, timing, and control that made his leadership, at all times, real and exciting to the Filipinos.[41] But excitement for his countrymen often meant deepest anxiety for the Americans. For example, take the spring of 1937. While junketing in America, President Quezon electrified the Filipinos by calling for independence in 1939 or 1940, if Congress would not improve the Tydings-McDuffie Act. This was a political gambit. First reactions were found in the plummeting stock prices on the big board in Manila. The morale of the American business community in Manila plunged with the stocks. Soon, the political nature of the move was recognized, but many Americans and Filipinos had been badly shaken. The movement, in the Philippines, to re-examine the independence decision dates from these months.[42]

More disturbing than Quezon's impetuosity to many of the American minority was his championing of policies decidedly at variance with traditional American views. Peacetime conscription for Filipinos was vigorously defended by the Philippine President during his 1937 trip abroad. A good many Americans in the Islands recognized the menace of Japan and the need to build national defenses, but many more saw the call for conscription as a means of building a private army to back a dictatorship.[43] In 1940, a more centralized control of public education was instituted by the National Assembly at the call of Quezon; again, this was a move that contrasted strongly with the American traditions of local control of education, and suspicion of any central government move to control the minds of the young.[44] In 1937, and again in 1940, President Quezon spoke in favor of stricter curbs on individual liberty as a means of better serving the state. More conservative Americans and Filipinos must have shuddered when they read Quezon's address to a University of the Philippines convocation in July, 1940:

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[41] Theodore Friend, "Manuel Quezon: Charismatic Conservative," *Paper No. 34* (mimeographed) *of Proceedings of the International Conference on Asian History*, Hong Kong, August 30-September 5, 1964; see also Friend's *Between Two Empires*, 50-53.

[42] See the author's "The Movement to Reverse Philippine Independence," *Pacific Historical Review*, XXXIII:2 (May, 1964), 172-6.

[43] President Quezon was badly upset by James S. Allen's article, "Manuel Quezon—Philippine Dictator," *The Nation* (March 20, 1937), 320-22. In his speech to the Foreign Policy Association, Quezon answered criticisms of Philippine military conscription: "I can understand an American protest against conscription. With all due respect to you, let me tell you, I am afraid that your conception of liberty is not altogether right. A proper conception of liberty is the performance of duty to nation. It is because you are giving too much importance to the freedom of the individual to do as he pleases as against the interests of the state that you are suffering from the evils that you are suffering today in this country... In our constitution [which] we gave our people, the first duty of the citizen is to serve the state." "Proceedings of the Foreign Policy Association Luncheon, Hotel Astor, New York City, April 3, 1937," (typescript), Quezon MSS. See also *New York Times*, April 4, 1937.

[44] "Message to the National Assembly, Manila, July 5, 1940" (typescript) Quezon MSS. As early as February, 1935, Quezon spoke of the government's responsibility to supervise and regulate education in order to instill "moral character" and develop nationalism in the country's youth. "Address before the University of the Philippines, Manila, February 12, 1935" (typescript) Quezon MSS.

> The second slogan that must be thrown overboard is the theory that in a democracy individual liberty must not be restricted. Liberty is, of course, one of the most precious natural rights of man. But civilization has made progress only at the expense of individual liberty. . . .

While later explanations developed that he was thinking of self-restraints and constitutional restrictions, Americans were uneasy.[45] And in 1939 and 1940, the Philippine President directly challenged the value or utility of competing political parties.[46] From the viewpoint of the American, deeply devoted to the two-party system and ignorant of Philippine history, Don Manuel was paving a broad road to political dictatorship. The uneasiness of an American minority, which had never understood Philippine culture, is understandable; the lack of concern among the Filipinos was equally understandable.

In summation, three points seem to be worth re-statement:

(1) The American minority in the Philippines during the Commonwealth Period was not a simple monolithic society. The "Proconsuls" and their aides had largely departed when government under the Jones Act was terminated on November 15, 1935. The remaining Americans were deeply involved in a large number of Phil-American enterprises as well as in some purely American ventures. This forced the Americans to be as diverse as their Filipino associates.

(2) The American community was uneasy and insecure in this traditional period; at times, their behavior showed it. The years of imperial control had not turned the Filipino into a "Brown American"; and those Americans who stayed in the Islands were constantly reacting to the "un-American" economic and political ideas expounded by the Filipinos.

(3) It cannot be denied that there were many insufferably "Ugly Americans" in the Commonwealth Period; but this same group also included, among it, Otley Beyer, Luther Bewley, A. V. H. Hartendorp, and the fabulous Sam Gaches and many more quiet Americans who left their impress on Rizal's "Perla del mar de oriente."

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[45] "Proceedings of the Foreign Policy Association Luncheon, Hotel Astor, New York City, April 3, 1937" (typescript) Quezon MSS. In the spring of 1936, in a speech at the Philippine Military Academy in Baguio, Quezon noted: "The Constitution of the Philippines entirely reverses this political philosophy. Under our Constitution what is paramount is not 'individuals'; it is the good of the State, not the good of the individual that must prevail." Quoted in E. D. Hester, "Outline of Our Recent Political and Trade Relations with the Philippine Commonwealth," *Annals* (March, 1943), 81.

[46] In his 1939 birthday broadcast from Malacañan, Quezon commented: "The theory that there can be no true democracy without political parties and that the existence of such parties is essential in popular government, is groundless and finds no justification in sound principles of government." "Birthday Speech of President Quezon, Manila, August 19, 1939" (typescript) Quezon MSS. At the University of the Philippines in July, 1940, Quezon was even blunter: "The first fetish we must discard is the discredited theory that democracy cannot exist without political parties. In the very nature of things, the struggle for power between contending political parties creates partisan spirit, and partisan spirit is incompatible with good government." "Speech at University of the Philippines, Manila, July 16, 1940" (typescript) Quezon MSS.

THE COLORUM UPRISINGS: 1924—1931

MILAGROS C. GUERRERO

OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE AMERICAN REGIME THAT have suffered from the distortions of hysteria and indifference, perhaps none has been treated worse than those years when the Colorums staged their abortive uprisings. While the newspapers which covered the uprisings painted the Colorums as gullible ignoramuses, others have regarded them as "reds" and subversives. Failure to look into the causes of the movement and the uprisings has further bemuddled the history of the Colorums. Yet it is quite wrong to dismiss the Colorums as ignorant individuals easily given to violence, or to consider the Colorum uprisings as nothing but a "hash of religion, politics and fanaticism."

The origin of the term *colorum* and the Colorum movement is traced to the Spanish regime when, in 1843, Apolinario de la Cruz, founded the *Cofradia de San Jose* in the province of Tayabas (now Quezon).[1] De la Cruz was a former donné of the Dominican-operated San Juan de Dios Hospital in Manila. His association with the friars must have inspired him to enter the priesthood, to become a Dominican friar. Characteristic prejudice toward Filipinos, however, closed the doors of the Dominican convent to him. Unable to join a legitimate religious order, de la Cruz decided to organize one of his own. He found a following among Filipinos who wanted to go back to the old religion as well as among those discontented with the Spanish rule. The confraternity copied the liturgy of the Catholic Church, meeting frequently in the caves on Mount Banahaw, Laguna. Atavism found its fulfillment in the inclusion of one native folk-belief in the society's tenets: all members of the cofradia were immune from danger if they wore *anting-antings* or talismans and should they face persecution, they would be aided by direct intervention of heaven. Eventually the movement came to be known as *colorum,* derived from their mispronunciation of *saecula saeculorom,* an ejaculation with which many Latin prayers end.[2] De la Cruz attempted to legalize the existence of the organization but was refused by the Spanish authorities. The latter, believing that the cofradia was in reality a political organization, using religion merely as a blind, inaugurated a policy of per-

[1] Report of Juan Manuel de la Matta, February 24, 1843, in Emma Blair and James A. Robertson, *The Philippine Islands* (Cleveland, Ohio: Arthur Clark and Co. 1903-1908), Vol. 52, p. 92.

[2] From the Latin *per omnia saecula saeculorum* (World without end). At present, the term *colorum* is used to signify any unlicensed property, particularly firearms.

secution, thus driving the members of the society to the mountains. Spanish contempt and fear of the organization drove the members to insurrection, which was, however, easily quelled.[3]

The Colorums seemed to have weathered Spanish repression for during the early years of American rule, they were found to be holding out in Mt. San Cristobal. Pilgrims continued to visit the place and paid large fees to persuade "Amang Dios" to talk to them.[4]

More Colorum organizations were established during the American regime: in Nueva Ecija, Rizal, Tarlac, La Union, Batangas and Surigao. There is no evidence that these Colorum societies were related to one another, either in ideology, leadership or organizational structure. Beliefs and practices in fact varied and depended upon the imagination of the leaders. They, however, share one common characteristic: membership was almost always confined to the peasantry and the urban proletariat.

In Tarlac, the Colorums believed in a resurrected Jose Rizal and Felipe Salvador, the latter being notorious for his brigandage during the early part of American rule.[5] They believed that their bodies could not be hurt by bullets. The Colorums of Manila, on the other hand, made a pilgrimage each year from Pagsanjan, Laguna and Lipa, Batangas to Mount San Cristobal in Laguna. The pilgrims then listened to the sermons of a "living Christ" or "Amang Dios" in a cave in the mountain.[6]

The same fanatic fervor dominated the Colorums of Surigao who organized themselves as devotees of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and the Immaculate Heart of Mary. Jose Rizal, who was believed to have been resurrected, was venerated as a god who would later on rule the Philippines. Under his rule, the property of those who refused to join the society would be confiscated and distributed among the Colorums. The members were assured that in case of an uprising, the guns of their enemy would not fire toward them; or that in case the enemy's guns did fire, the Colorums would not be wounded. If by accident, any of them were hit or died, he would revive or resurrect within five days.[7]

Assured thus, the Colorums increased in number in Surigao, and spread to Agusan, Cotabato, Samar and Leyte.[8] During the years 1923 and 1924 the Colorums of Surigao rose up in arms. The enemy, like the later Tayug uprising, was the Philippine Constabulary. On December 27, 1923, five constabulary soldiers on patrol in Bucas Island, off Surigao were murdered by the Colorums. A little more than a week later (January 8) they sur-

[3] Report of Juan Manuel de la Matta, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
[4] Dean C. Worcester, *The Philippines, Past and Present* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1914), Vol. II, p. 944.
[5] Serafin E. Macaraig, *Social Problems* (Manila, 1929), p. 410.
[6] *Manila Times,* January 13, 1924.
[7] Macaraig, *op. cit.*
[8] *Manila Times,* January 20, 1924.

prised a constabulary detachment which attempted to land in a barrio of Surigao, and killed the provincial commander and 12 enlisted men.[9]

These daring attacks on the Constabulary provoked drastic government measures to suppress "the religious fanatics and recalcitrant taxpayers."[10] An expeditionary force was sent to Mindanao to suppress Colorum activities and to check its growth. Attempts to do so literally stirred up a hornet's nest in the south. At first, the Colorums rose in Surigao but soon the rebel territory included "Colorum towns" in Samar, Leyte and Agusan.[11] Colonel H. Bowers, head of the expeditionary force, ordered the burning of Socorro town, the center of the rebellion. Farmers who were not involved in the uprising escaped to safer towns. A later attempt on the part of Senator Jose Clarin to investigate the incident did not materialize when Bowers sent word that the burning of the town was essential for the future safety of his forces.[12] The Constabulary allowed the corpses of the Colorums to rot on the spot where they fell, the better to prove to all and sundry that the Colorums did not have supernatural powers to resuscitate themselves.[13] The purpose of the Constabulary was now clear: to avenge themselves in a relentless campaign against the rebels.

Governor Leonard Wood's office sought to discourage the illegal movement by ordering all pictures of Filipino heroes removed from all public schools in Mindanao. Wood's executive staff, when confronted by protestations of Camilo Osias, then president of the National University, reasoned out that the measure was aimed at allaying the "strong racial feeling existing between the Moros and the Filipinos." "National heroes of the Filipinos, while worthy and patriotic men cannot be held in the same esteem by the Moros."[14] One other reason for this order was to discourage recalcitrant elements from taking a more active stand against the Constabulary, considering that the Colorums were not Muslims and one of their gods was Rizal. But Father Xavier A. Byrne, S. J., rector of the Ateneo de Manila, who perhaps feared that the uprising might have an untoward effect on the peaceful Catholic population, hastened to say in a press release that the Colorums were not Catholics.[15] The American-owned *Manila Times* regarded the Colorum uprising, while purely endemic and "will be quelled by a necessary but proper display of force, . . . [as] symptomatic of what might happen everywhere in the Islands should independence come." The newspaper editorialized:

[9] Philippine Islands, Office of the Governor-General, *Annual Report, 1924* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1926), p. 51.
[10] Philippine Islands, Office of the Governor-General, *Annual Report, 1923* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1925), p. 82.
[11] *Manila Times,* January 20, 1924; February 8, 1924.
[12] *Ibid.,* January 27, 1924.
[13] *Ibid.,* February 3, 1924.
[14] *Ibid.,* January 22, 1924.
[15] *Ibid.,* February 19, 1924.

> Throughout the Philippines there are large groups of uneducated and easily influenced people who would without question become the instruments through which contending political factions would try to achieve their ends. Judging from ease with which the colorum fanatics apparently aroused them into hostile action, there would be plenty of trouble and plenty of fighting were the restraining influence of America removed.[16]

Civil war once independence is granted! The editorial was a reflection of Governor Wood's attitude toward the capacity of the Filipinos for self-government and an indication that the Republican administration was not willing to give due concessions to Filipino agitation for independence.

It was not until October that the situation was brought under control. In the different engagements that took place between January and October, 1924, about 100 Colorums were put to the sword, 500 surrendered and the rest were dispersed. The leaders of the movement were brought before the courts and sentenced to long prison terms for sedition.[17]

After the Colorum uprising of 1924, the society and its activities were to receive only curt mention from the newspapers. The government authorities did not particularly feel obliged to look into the root cause of the uprising, content with dismissing it as a "mere fanatical movement of a religious nature." The Philippine Constabulary, on the other hand, viewed the uprising as one that could always be "quelled by a necessary but proper display of force." When another Colorum uprising took place, the Constabulary was again taken by surprise.

In 1931, the Colorums were again active. This time the hotbed of unrest was Pangasinan.

The acknowledged founder of the Colorum movement in Pangasinan was Pedro Calosa, then a 34-year old farmer from the barrio of Magallanes, Tayug, Pangasinan. Calosa was typical of the Ilocanos of his time. He was born in Bawang, La Union, but at 17, he migrated with his parents to Tayug. He worked for sometime as a magician in an itinerant circus troupe but later went to Hawaii, where he stayed for 11 years. Calosa was involved in a labor dispute there and was imprisoned for nine months. Upon his return, he founded a Colorum society in Tayug. The Philippine Constabulary which got wind of the existence of the secret society as early as the date of its founding failed, however, to pinpoint his actual responsibility for founding the society.[18] Calosa maintained that he was only titular head, not founder, appointed by "Lagondindino Rizal, Abelardo Bonifacio, Artemio Ricarte Bi-

[16] *Ibid.*, January 27, 1924.

[17] Philippine Islands, Office of the Governor-General, *Annual Report, 1924* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1926), p. 51.

[18] Biographical information on Pedro Calosa can be gleaned from an affidavit presented in Criminal Case No. 11885, Pangasinan Court of First Instance, cited in Cynthia B. Urgena, *The Colorum Uprising of Pangasinan* (University of the Philippines, 1960), M. A. thesis, pp. 14-20.

bora, Mateo Careon, Agaton Punzalan and Mrs. Aurora A. Quezon."[19] He took upon himself the leadership of the organization not so much for personal motives but for the "sake of the poor." Twenty-seven years later, when Calosa had become a charcoal dealer living in the foothills of Tayug, he would still harp on the same idea, that the Colorum organization was founded to secure social justice. "We tenants till the soil for rich people but they give us very little for our subsistence."[20]

At various times the Colorum society in Pangasinan operated under two different names. In April, 1930, when the society was organized, it was called *Sociedad ti Mannalon* (Society of Land Tenants), an association for mutual help, particularly for raising stocks and herds.[21] It was also known as *Sinarauay*, a mutual cooperation society for the improvement of barrio conditions.[22] Pedro Calosa and his lieutenants found ready adherents among the ignorant, oppressed peasants of Tayug, Sta. Maria, San Nicolas, and San Quintin.

The secrecy with which the society was organized lent mystery to it, rendering it more attractive to the simple barrio folk. Membership was graded—from corporal to general. Calosa himself was *Primero General.* It had a flag of its own—a Filipino flag with suns taking the place of the stars. The flag bore the words: *Bato a poon ti laoag. Bato a poro. Panagoayaoaya ti Eglesia Filipina Endipindiente* (Stone is the foundation of light. Pure stone. For the liberty of the Philippine Independent Church).[23] Benigno Ramos, founder of Sakdalism and editor of its paper *Sakdal* pointed out that the flag symbolized the aspirations of the simple folk: complete independence from the United States.[24] The Colorums talked incessantly about *libertad* and Philippine independence. The more avid and devoted Colorums wore their uniforms even in public, rakish and gaudy white shirts and trousers with red sashes across the front which bore the inscription "We want the Filipino flag to flay [*sic*] along." To complete their paraphernalia, they wore embroidered *anting-antings,* talismans which they believe gave them extraordinary strength and unusual courage to fight their enemies.[25]

In January, 1931, they seemed ready to launch a program that would achieve these goals. Rumors were rife that the Colorums, in collusion with some municipal officials of Tayug, would take over the town. This was ex-

[19] *Ibid.,* Appendix A.

[20] Conrado B. Mendoza, "Ex-Colorum Becomes Charcoal Dealer," *Philippines Free Press* (September 20, 1958), p. 46.

[21] Urgena, *op. cit.,* p. 26. [*Mannalon* < Ilioko: *Talon,* "farm." Mannalon would mean "he who works in the farm," hence "farmer." Ed.]

[22] *The Tribune,* January 20, 1931.

[23] A. V. H. Hartendorp, "The Tayug 'Colorum'," *Philippine Magazine,* Vol. 27, No. 9 (February, 1931), p. 565.

[24] *Sakdal,* January 17, 1931, p. 1.

[25] A. V. H. Hartendorp, *op. cit.*, p. 563.

pected to be the spark that would kindle a peasant revolution all over Central Luzon.

Late in the evening of Sunday, January 11, 1931, a band of around 70 Colorums assembled by the roadside in San Nicolas, Pangasinan. All of them carried knives and bolos although some were armed with guns. Five kilometers away, the prosperous town of Tayug slept on. The group, taking advantage of the darkness, covered the distance between San Nicolas and Tayug by walking part of the way and later, by commandeering a truck of the Pangasinan Transportation Company (Pantranco).[26] Arriving at Bitong Creek which bounds the town on the north, the truck stopped, the men got off, leaving the 14 women behind.[27]

Shortly after two o'clock, the Colorums broke into the tiny barracks of the Philippine Constabulary in the heart of the town. The soldiers were not at all prepared to offer any defense of the barracks.[28] Lt. Sulpicio Bachinni, one of the officers-in-command in the barracks gave a pistol to his wife and sent her and their three children out of the house. In the meantime, one of the soldiers warned Lt. Martin San Pedro at the latter's quarters. But the Colorums had already swept through the barracks, killing three who crossed their path, including Bachinni and San Pedro, each of them receiving more than 35 wounds from the bolos of the attackers. The Constabulary was routed completely.

Flushed by their victory in the first skirmish, the Colorums set the barracks on fire. They continued marching, now rejoined by the women, to the center of the town. The municipal building was empty and they entered without opposition. They battered down the municipal treasury, brought out to the plaza bundles of documents, and lit them into a huge bonfire.[29] Almost simultaneously they burned the post office, a score of residences and a warehouse. The municipal president, the chief of police and the entire police force did not rally for a common defense of the town. They disappeared with the first alarm. They showed up a day later.

At dawn, a Constabulary detachment arrived in a Pantranco bus. The Colorums were still in the municipal building, ransacking the records of the Treasury office for "records of their taxes, slavery and oppression." The two parties exchanged fire which kept until 9 o'clock in the morning when the Colorums abandoned the Presidencia and rushed across the plaza to the convent. Inside they ordered Father Eusebio Bermudez to celebrate Mass and later demanded that they be served coffee.[30]

[26] *The Independent,* January 1, 1931.
[27] *Ibid.*
[28] *The Tribune,* January 28, 1931.
[29] *Sakdal,* January 17, 1931, p. 1.
[30] Speaker Manuel Roxas, passing the town in his campaign tour of Luzon, was reportedly an "interested spectator" at this stage of the skirmish. *The Sunday Tribune,* January 18, 1931.

Reinforcements came from Constabulary units in San Quintin and Tarlac. The troops converged at Tayug at 4 o'clock and at a signal, the advance on the convent began. It was at this juncture that the fortune of battle turned against the Colorums. Their one disadvantage was their lack of familiarity with rifles. They fired desultorily and when the magazines were empty, they threw away their guns. As the two groups exchanged fire, the shots were accompanied by a pandemonium of whistles which the Colorums had apparently brought with them.[31] The attack on the convent lasted nearly three hours. Three constabulary men were wounded in the rush across the plaza. In the afternoon the soldiers rammed open the convent door. Minutes later, a white flag appeared on the convent wall.

At 6 o'clock, the Colorums that remained, 13 women and 31 men, surrendered. Their standard bearer, daughter of their "colonel' Arcadio Vidal, was killed. The father himself died of his wounds several days later. Five others were killed. Two girls, both high school students, were wounded. The rest of the group escaped through the convent rear.[32] Pedro Calosa, succeeded in escaping the clutches of the Constabulary and was captured days later in his home in San Patricio.

The uprising, if it deserves such a name, lasted for less than a day. Investigations made after the event revealed that 38 houses were burned by the Colorums during the hours on Sunday morning when they had full control of the town, with losses amounting to ₱47,180.00. This would exclude the damage sustained by the municipal building, the post office and the Constabulary barracks.[33] Most of the burned houses were owned by the municipal officials and prominent residents of the town. So great must have been the fear of the Tayug residents that nearly 90 per cent of them went on a mass exodus to neighboring towns at the crack of the first shot. It had so reduced the wretched municipal mayor to such a state of terror that he fled from the town, Paul Revere style, incompletely attired. The Chinese merchants, after barricading their shops, also fled from the town when the firing began.[34]

Governor Bernabe Aquino, on the other hand, thinking that the Constabulary soldiers were too few to handle the situation, requested the Philippine division of the United States Army then engaged in maneuvers in the province, to intervene in the Tayug trouble,[35] for which action he was severely criticized in the editorials of the metropolitan papers. Easily frightened barrio officials in the surrounding towns began to see blood thirsty Colorums in every peasant and field hand they met, keeping the Constabulary in the province on their toes for days after the uprising. A week after the incident,

[31] *The Independent,* January 17, 1931.
[32] *The Sunday Tribune,* January 18, 1931.
[33] *The Tribune,* January 15, 1931.
[34] *Ibid.*
[35] *Ibid.,* January 16, 1931.

soldiers from Bayambang Constabulary headquarters rushed to the town after a rush call had been received that peasants and students from Bayambang High School were preparing to attack the town. It turned out that the people were preparing for a garden festival in the plaza.[36]

The uprising dominated the national scene for days. Labor strikes which had reached serious proportions in the sugar centrals of Occidental Negros, Oriental Negros and Binalbagan, Iloilo, which the authorities believed were caused by "Red agitators," were momentarily forgotten.[37] More soldiers were stationed in barrios of Pangasinan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija suspected to be infested by Colorums. General C. E. Nathorst prescribed the immediate investigation of all officials of the barrios of San Nicolas, San Rafael, Santa Maria and Natividad. Because of the latter's failure to detect the existence of a dangerous Colorum organization in Pangasinan, the Constabulary chief concluded that municipal officials were protecting the Colorums.[38]

The Constabulary was also quick to link the uprising to Communism, albeit a new idea in the Philippines at the time. A certain Agaton Abian, suspected as a "Red agent on the payroll of the Soviet Government" was pinpointed as the "brains" of the Colorum incident. A few days before the uprising, Abian was reportedly seen in the towns of Pangasinan where he was said to have delivered fiery and incendiary speeches. Abian and his driver were arrested, put under heavy guard and held incommunicado for two days. Further inquiry showed that the Constabulary were on the track of a witch hunt, which they probably were not aware of at the time, for Abian was a mere agent for an American packing company who had returned from the United States after thirteen years to look for his wife whom he married in Tayug 18 years earlier.[39]

The Constabulary believed that there were more than 100 Colorums who participated in the affair, but official reports placed the total at 70.[40] Of the 70, however, only 20 were arrested against whom complaints of murder and sedition were filed by Fiscal Pio Fajardo in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.[41] The Colorums impressed Secretary of Interior Honorio Ventura as "timid, harmless-looking people, with the semblance of ignorance in their appearance," with the exception of one "who, supposed to be one of their recognized leaders, looks like a bandit."[42]

The prisoners testified during the preliminary hearings that the uprising was purely endemic, uninfluenced by extraneous elements, the attack

[36] *Ibid.*, January 17, 1931.
[37] *Ibid.*, January 16, 1931; January 28, 1931.
[38] *Ibid.*, January 16, 1931.
[39] *Ibid.*, January 17, 1931.
[40] Report of the Secretary of Interior, March 21, 1931 in Philippine Islands, Office of the Governor General, *Annual Report, 1931* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1932), p. 89.
[41] Urgena, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
[42] *The Tribune,* January 17, 1931.

having been made with the purpose of overthrowing the municipal government of Tayug. They gave as reasons the abuses committed by the town officials, particularly the municipal president, the treasurer, the justice of the peace and the Constabulary soldiers. They also maintained that they fought the Constabulary soldiers to secure liberty for the country, bring about equal division of lands and the recognition of the Philippine Independent Church as the supreme religious church in the country.[43] Calosa, the rebel leader was, however, silent on the reasons for founding the society and launching the uprising during the trial. But in an interview with Cynthia Urgena on April 25, 1958, he shed light on factors that led to his active participation in the uprising. He said:

> If trouble arises through misunderstanding between [the landlords and tenants] the tenant is betrayed and brought to court. Yet the government authorities need one or two persons to defend him when there are officials of the government whose duty is to look into the welfare of those who are harmed. Instead they employ ruses by which the victim will spend much to settle the case. I consider myself an example because at present I am a victim of land trouble. The Court of First Instance has issued a complete document recognizing my ownership to a piece of land. Why was not my land measured? And what is the authority of the two lawyers to have the land title cancelled at the office of the Provincial Assessor? I brought the case to the Provincial Fiscal, yet I was not seen nor heard, be ause I was a nobody. This is the problem between the tenants and the landlords.[44]

In the trial that followed, all defendants with the exception of three Colorums (two of them being minors) were found guilty. They were sentenced to imprisonment, ranging from 14 to 40 years and required to indemnify the heirs of the deceased soldiers. Pedro Calosa and Cesareo Abe, the leaders of the group, were sentenced to imprisonment for a maximum period of 40 years (*cadena perpetua*). While the authorities had made much talk about the seditious character of the uprising, the court could only prosecute them for murder as it could not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the Colorums were indeed guilty of sedition and treachery.[45] Their ignorance and poverty were held as mitigating circumstances without which they would have received stiffer penalties.

Official reaction toward the Colorum uprising saw very little (or none at all) political significance in the actions of the rebels. Sympathy and commiseration for their plight was not even conceded. Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Jorge Vargas, who went to Tayug to look into the agrarian aspect of the affair, reported that it "was not inspired by vengeance growing out of agrarian disputes between tenants and landlords but was a result of blind obedience on the part of ignorant individuals to two

[43] *Ibid.*, January 14, 1931.
[44] Urgena, *op. cit.*, Appendix A.
[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

colorum leaders of a secret society professing patriotic purposes."[46] Ignorance and poverty were regarded as crimes. In the official report of Secretary of Interior Honorio Ventura, he pointed out that the action of the Colorums "can be attributed to the ignorance that prevails among them. These ignorant people exploited by unscrupulous people like Calosa can be led to the wildest excesses. The spirit behind their movement is a hash of religion, politics, fanaticism and a little of everything else that can serve to inflame them."[47] Acting Senate President Sergio Osmeña believed that the Colorum uprising was motivated by reasons other than religious fanaticism but declined to elaborate.[48] Manuel Roxas, Speaker of the Philippine Assembly and president of the *Bagong Katipunan,* opined that the movement was purely fanatical[49] even as prominent Americans in the country, particularly Jacob Rosenthal, criticized his *Bagong Katipunan* as a piece of patriotic fanaticism whose aims, if realized, would also result in consequences as disastrous as the Colorum uprising in Tayug.[50]

Press opinion seemed to be cast in the same mould. There was agreement with Secretary Ventura's report that the Tayug uprising was purely a local affair, as all other Colorum uprisings that preceded it, the Colorum organization being "a fanatical sect which has branches all over the archipelago." The Tayug affair was blamed on the inability of the municipal police and the Philippine Constabulary, "a bunch of nearly useless peace officers," to quash the Colorums before the latter could launch the uprising.[51] The Colorums were compared to the *peons,* "a shiftless and inflammable class responsible for confusion and disorder" in Latin-America.[52]

Mauro Mendez, editor of *The Tribune,* echoed the age-old *cacique* rationale for agrarian uprising. The Colorums' pernicious desire for "equal distribution of land" was "an indication that the tenant farmers have an erroneous idea about property rights. It would appear, to the farmer, that because they do the physical work in the whole process of planting and harvesting the crop, they are entitled to claim an equal share of the acreage they have been tilling for years." "It is a sad commentary on the character of our farming class" who lacked "the decision to go elsewhere to be free from landlordism."[53]

A number of enlightened journalists and government officials took exception from this popular opinion. Federico Mangahas, one of the eminent writers of the 1930's wrote in baffled petulance:

[46] *The Tribune,* January 22, 1931.
[47] *Ibid.;* January 15, 1931.
[48] *Ibid.*
[49] *Ibid.*
[50] Jacob Rocenthal to Manuel L. Quezon, January 19, 1931, in *Quezon Papers,* Bureau of Public Libraries.
[51] *The Tribune,* January 16, 1931.
[52] *The Philippines Herald,* January 17, 1931.
[53] *The Tribune,* January 15, 1931.

> Those simple folk of Tayug who took it upon themselves to establish the millenium by erasing two [*sic*] Constabulary officers for a start must naturally be wrong, and the reason pure and simple is that they are poor.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> In the first expression of public revulsion, at their sanguinary adventure . . . the unanimous cry was for their blood in instant payment. This was articulated through outraged, comfortable writers. It has not developed as an afterthought detail to suggest that perhaps there ought to be some investigation of a sort.[54]

General Emilio Aguinaldo noted that the abuses and cruelty of the Philippine Constabulary, which were in fact "comparable to the excesses of the *Guardia Civil,*" contributed in no small measure to the Colorum uprising.[55] His statement may have been inspired by the testimony of a woman Colorum who, upon her arrest, wailed: "We don't want policemen or the Constabulary. We cannot endure what they are doing to us any longer. They took my boy away from the barrio and locked him up for no cause at all. Then they beat him. We cannot forget that."[56] Apparently alone among government officials, Tomas Confesor, Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry, stated explicitly that "the immense majority of [the Colorums] are in reality nothing but discontented tenants who have been mercilessly exploited and who seek revenge through acts of violence."[57]

The *Philippines Free Press,* even then already noted for its crusading spirit for, and interest in the welfare of, the oppressed masses, exposed the fact that most of the Colorums had been ejected from haciendas or deprived of what they believed to be their lawful lands by the courts and the Constabulary.[58] The Bureau of Lands was criticized for its inability to settle land disputes as they should be settled. As a result, many farmers were dispossessed of everything through "fabricated testimony and combinations between official investigators of the Bureau of Lands and the land-grabbers." It is interesting to note that as of the census year, 1918, there were 3,372 farms of which 635 farms have torrens titles.[59] Of the total population of Pangasinan, 36,021 were tenants[60] receiving an average daily wage of ₱0.75. An objective inquiry into the incident, which the authorities did not make, would in fact tend to confirm the conclusion that there was no way of accommodating to the *caciques* short of slavery. The administrators of the *haciendas* in Pangasinan observed practices whose origins can be traced back to the obnoxious *encomienda* system. If a tenant were to pay 17 cavans as rent to

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[54] *Ibid.*

[55] *The Tribune,* January 17, 1931.

[56] *The Tribune,* January 16, 1931.

[57] *The Philippines Free Press,* Vol. 25, No. 3 (January 24, 1931), p. 30.

[58] *Ibid.,* p. 32.

[59] Philippine Islands, Bureau of Census, *Census of the Philippines, 1918,* Vol 3 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1919), p. 220.

[60] *Ibid.,* p. 81.

the *hacendero,* the rent was upped to 21 cavans.[61] The landlords were also at liberty to get foodstuffs from the tenant and exact personal services from them.

The *Philippines Free Press* did not believe that meting out stiff penalties to the Colorums was enough to solve the problem in Tayug. It called for legislation to improve the conditions among the peasantry. It pointed out that there is no class distinction in the eyes of justice.

> But what about the avaricious landowner, the brutal *cacique,* the oppressive usurer, in short the proponents of the *kasama* system? Who are in reality to blame for the outbreak? Their rapacious greed for huge profits, their utter disregard of the tenants, led to the Tayug uprising. What will happen to them?[62]

In a vein reminiscent of Sinibaldo de Mas' recommendations to the King of Spain after he had made a brief inquiry into the conditions obtaining in colonial Philippines, the magazine editorial warned that he who makes evolution impossible makes revolution inevitable:

> Three courses seem open: (1) Those enforcing the *kasama* system may voluntarily relax their stranglehold enough to allow the tenants to live, rather than merely exist. (2) The government may awaken from its lethargy long enough to secure justice for the down-trodden, abused tenant, who after all forms the backbone of the country. (3) The first two courses failing, the peasant may finally rise in all his might and seize by force those necessities which had been denied [him].[63]

But Manuel L. Quezon, president of the Senate and highest Filipino official, whose opinion and reaction to Philippine affairs were much sought after, was not available for comment. He was at the time of the uprising confined at the Monrovia Sanatorium, California for tuberculosis. In the first press conference which he held with foreign correspondents upon his return home, however, he discussed the Colorum uprising, the upsurge of proletarian organizations as well as the question of independence. He said:

> There is no cause for, nor intention on the part of, the people of the Philippines to rebel against the United States. The Philippine government with the Constabulary and the local police can adequately cope with the situation and maintain public order. There is a feeling of discontent due to the economic depression which is taken advantage of by some demagogues and communists who spread subversive doctrines against the peace and order to gain popularity or money, or both.[64]

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[61] F. Sionil Jose, "Agrarian Unrest in Luzon," *Sunday Times Magazine,* Vol. 13, No. 14 (November 17, 1957), p. 26.

[62] *Philippines Free Press,* Vol. 25, No. 3 (January 24, 1931), p. 30.

[63] *Ibid.*

[64] Manuel Luis Quezon, Press Conference, December 13, 1931, in *Quezon Papers,* Bureau of Public Libraries.

Quezon's view of the uprising was criticized by Crisanto Evangelista, president of the *Congreso Obrero Proletario* and a host of labor organizations.[65] In a letter dated December 14, 1931, he said:

> If you continue in your way of reactionary reasoning and demagogy, we are sure you are the one who will precipitate the social unheaval and consequently, you are digging the grave of your capitalist-imperialist regime, for it will force sudden change in the social relationship.
>
> The fault, therefore, is not ours, whom you are calling "ignorant mass or class" and whom you said are misled by "agitators who are living by becoming agitators." We remind you that we are living in the twentieth century. We cannot go back to the middle ages. . . . We can no longer endure the use of inquisition nor can we compel the peasants to become mere serfs of their feudal landlords, and the workers to live as mere beasts or robots. These are simply out of the question![66]

He further pointed out that it did not seem reasonable that the Tayug peasants could become agitated to such a point without valid cause. Indeed, it is easy for the undiscerning and uncritical observer, even 40 years or so after the Surigao uprisings and the Tayug incident to blame them on fanaticism, ignorance or Red agitation. This is not the intention here: the simplicity of the peasants' orientation certainly do not bear sole responsibility for the Colorum uprisings. Although we must acknowledge the role played by these factors, they would have remained inoperative but for more valid reason that would induce the peasants to violence. A decent familiarity with Philippine history will show that peasant uprisings, whether small or large-scale, were staged in response to intolerable conditions of land tenure, excessive taxation, usurious money lending and general misery in the rural areas. Thus in the 1930's peasant rebellions were endemic as they were during the Spanish regime when conditions were equally intolerable. The Colorum uprisings were but the beginning.

It was in realization of the conditions obtaining among the masses that Quezon redeemed an earlier *faux pas* by issuing a statement recognizing the plight of the peasants and the urban workers (obreros de la ciudad). For the first time, he enunciated the idea of social justice: *La base duradera del orden es la justicia social, no la fuerza del Gobierno.*[67] When he run for the presidency in 1934, his program of social justice no doubt earned many votes from the masses. It was a program he never had the chance to implement. The Sakdals rose even before an efficient machinery to implement social justice was discovered.

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[65] Labor Organizations and Mutual Benefit Societies in Manila, 1931, in *Quezon Papers,* Bureau of Public Libraries.

[66] Crisanto Evangelista to Manuel L. Quezon, December 14, 1931, in *Quezon Papers,* Bureau of Public Libraries.

[67] Manuel L. Quezon, "El Gobierno es fuerte y el pueblo Filipino pacifico," December 1931, in *Quezon Papers,* Bureau of Public Libraries.

In conclusion, the Colorum uprisings, particularly the Tayug affair, suggest a few significant generalizations. The Colorum movement, being politically unsophisticated, failed to sensitize the people to a new spectrum of possible identities and purposes. Moreover, as borne out by the general apathy of the government and the condemnation it received from the public officials, the uprisings did not have any significant political effects, especially in the form of much-expected socio-economic reform. That there is a direct relationship between the Colorum movement and the later Sakdal, Tangulan and other peasant movements must be acknowledged. The emergence of a politically sophisticated Sakdal Party may well owe its establishment to a recognition of the simplicity, defects and relevance of the Colorum movem

UNITY AND DISUNITY IN THE MUSLIM STRUGGLE

Samuel K. Tan

Some stereotyped ideas or theories about Muslim Filipinos have been propagated by both Muslims and Non-Muslims. They have caused some misconceptions and illusions of Muslim history and culture to such an extent that solutions to problems confronting Muslim areas are difficult to find. A re-evaluation is, therefore, necessary for two reasons: first, recent scholarship has shown more light and development in Muslim societies especially during the past decades; second, contemporary problems in Muslim areas, particularly in Sulu, require no less than a serious study. By this is meant not just a compilation of past opinions and statements, but a critical examination of sources of Muslim history and culture and their underlying assumptions. This examination of contemporary and past sources is essential to proper understanding of what has been called the "Muslim Problem."[1]

For purposes of classification, theoretical approaches to Muslim studies, particularly in relation to such an important issue as armed struggle or violence, may be broadly divided into *unitary* and *pluralistic*. The *unitary* approach assumes that Muslims since pre-Spanish period have been a united people and that their oneness had been founded on Malay cultural unity and Islamic tradition, the beginning of which is

[1] The term appears in both official and unofficial sources. Many have questioned the appropriateness of the term including this writer. The term goes back to the Spanish period and, later, carried to the American regime during which the whole situation in Muslim societies was referred to as the "Moro Problem". Subsequently, the term assumed a more religious context in Muslim Problem" possibly related to the increasing dominance of Christian values in society and the polarization of society into Christians and non-Christians. In more recent times, the terms has acquired a regional dimension and problems in Muslim areas have been referred to as "Mindanao", "Sulu", "Cotabato", "Lanao", or "Mindanao and Sulu" problem. Trends seem to point to the adoption of a more ethnolinguistic terminology. In effect, it is inaccurate or unfair to consider the Muslims or Non-Christians as "the problem" since the Christians have also been partly responsible for the problems and tensions in Mindanao and Sulu.

traced to a time before the fourteenth century. The pluralistic view assumes that basically there has been no Muslim unity either on the basis of history or culture and that the unity referred to as "Muslim" or "Islamic" is more of a desired goal of contemporary Muslim movements rather than a present or historical reality. It is thus necessary to put in perspective the two approaches.

Introduction

In the pre-twentieth century period, Spanish and non-Spanish sources assumed that the "Moros"[2] were a fierce group of people, strongly influenced by "Mohammedanism," bound by a common Malay culture, and intensely antagonistic to Christianity. Typical of this unitarism were Francisco Combes,' "*Historia de Mindanao y Jolo* (1897, *Retana*) Jose Montero y Vidal's *Historia de la Pirateria Malayo-Mohametana en Mindanao y Jolo y Borneo* (1888, 2 Vols.); Pio A. del Pazos' *Jolo: Relato Historico-Militar desde su Descubrimiento por los Espanoles en* 1578 *a Nuesto Dias* (1879); Vicente Barrantes' *Guerras Piraticas* ... (1878); and several accounts and commentaries by Spanish writers in Blair and Robertsons' *Philippine Islands* (1903-1908). The effect of such a unitary view on colonial policy and action was to treat all Muslims of Mindanao and Sulu as "Moros," assuming that they were uncivilized and, therefore, had to be either Christianized or put to the sword. This attitude was in keeping with both the impressions and the scholarship of medieval Europe which was dominated by ecclesiastical attacks on Islam and the Prophet.[3] The Muslim reaction in the Philippines was to resist both Christianization and militarism which were the two inseparable instruments of Hispanization.[4]

At the close of the Spanish era and during the first two decades of American rule, Najeeb Saleeby wrote at least three studies on Muslim societies and history. He pursued a unitary pattern of analysis which,

[2] Peter Gowing traced the beginning of the term "Moro" or "Moor" to the Roman "Maurus' which, he concluded, was changed to "Moros". Then, it was introduced to the Philippines where it has been used to designate all the Muslim Filipinos. Gowing advocates the retention of the term on historical grounds and, in effect, suggests that the Muslims dignify the historic connotation of the term. It seems, however, better to replace it with indigenous terms such as *Tausug, Maranaos, Magindanaos* etc.

[3] Francisco Gabrieli, *Muhammad and the Conquest of Islam,* translated from the Italian by Virginia Luling and Rosamund Lenell (N. Y: McGraw Hill, 1968).

[4] John L. Phelan, *Hispanization of the Philippines* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), pp. 136-137.

however, differed in aim from its Spanish or Non-Muslim version. The latter, as was pointed out earlier, attempted to show the "Moros" as uncivilized. Saleeby saw them as one people with a common and proud history, enriched by patriotic resistance to colonialism and united by common belief in Islam and Malay culture. In *Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion* (1905), he showed that Muslim historical unity was strengthened by adherence to customary law and religious tradition. The *History of Sulu* written in 1908 and focused on Tausog society, emphasized diplomatic relations and the role of the Sultanate as a unifying factor. Assumption of unity was related to the continuity of political institutions as shown in the royal genealogies in the *tarsilas;* the important role of the Sultanate; and the numerous treaties between Sulu and foreign powers which considered the Sultanate as a sovereign state. Saleeby's contributions, therefore, to Muslim studies was to provide a theoretical alternative to biased Spanish interpretations of Muslim history and culture and to direct American Moro policy, in which he had part in formulating and implementing, to a positive view of Muslim societies. This was well articulated in the *The Moro Problem* which was published in 1913 when events in Muslimland were moving towards a critical Muslim-American confrontation in Sulu.[5] But as it developed, American Moro Policy had both Spanish and Saleeby's unitarism which has remained in Philippine government policy.

Whether or not Saleeby's unitary approach was in consonance with either historical realities and undetached from its sociological context remains the main issue of contention. But it seems quite difficult to validate his thematic conclusion, either from historical evidences or from contemporary developments.

Providing support for unitarism is Majul's *Muslims in the Philippines* (1973) which seems to depend heavily on historical evidences including Southeast Asian sources. In fact Majul extends the same unitary approach to Muslim societies in Southeast Asia and the rest of dar-al-Islam.[6] His contribution, therefore, to Muslim studies is in

[5] Samuel K. Tan, *Sulu Under American Military Rule,* 1899-1913 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines. Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review, March 1967); Paul D. Rogers, "Battle of Bagsak", *Philippine Magazine,* vol. XXVI, No. 9 (Sept. 1939), pp. 370-71, 380-382.

[6] Cesar A. Majul, *The Muslims in the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973).

providing support for a unitary approach to Muslim problems, in articulating a "Muslim perspective" for Philippine history and culture, and in establishing a theoretical link between Muslim history and that of the Muslim world. With a few exceptions, Majul's writings are limited to the pre-twentieth century period of Muslim history in the Philippines but the theoretical framework has been used by contemporary Muslim movements and by the government. It seems, however, that, although unitary in approach, Majul, in a pamphlet on integration,[7] recognizes the lack of unity in Muslim leadership and movements. But whether or not such recognition is a repudiation of unitarism which has characterized most of his works and others before him remains a question.

What appears to have been left unanswered is the issue of fragmentation, diversity, and disunity in Muslim societies especially in the Muslim armed struggle. Perhaps, such problem can best be treated by inquiry into an analysis of social, political, economic, cultural, psychological, and ecological determinants of Muslim attitudes and behaviour. This is contingent on an integrated research program in which the contributions of the disciplines are recognized and utilized.[8] But this integration of disciplinary methodologies is only possible in a situation where scholars are more aware of their inadequacies and limitations than their contributions. It is in the vacuum of intellectual inadequacy and humility that meaningful interdependence operates between scholars of various persuasions and specializations. Such interdependence in scholarship leads to better perception and, therefore, conceptualization of problems.

The unitary emphasis is also found in Alunan Glang's *Muslim Secession and Integration* and Jainal Rasul's *The Muslim Struggle for Identity*. But it is not clear how much unity is present in Muslim societies in view of more evidences of disunity or diversity. In Lanao, Cotabato, and Sulu, Muslim rebels labelled "Maoists" are fighting not only government troops but also Muslim returnees called "balikbayans" and Muslim recruits called "bagonglipunans."[9] A macro view of the whole Muslim struggle shows the Sulu Muslims left alone in what seems a difficult conflict. The Lanao and Cotabato Muslims have

[7] Cesar A. Majul, *Cultural Diversity, National Integration and National Identity in the Philippines* (Caloocan City: Convislam Press, 1917).

[8] W. G. Runciman, *Social Science and Political Theory* (Cambridge: University Press, 1969), p. 1; Stuart Chase, *Proper Study Mankind* (N. Y: Harper, 1963), p. 202.

[9] *Times Journal,* March 1974.

been pacified following a historical pattern in which the last significant battle against colonial rule was fought in Sulu in 1913 after Lanao and Cotabato had long been subdued.[10]

It seems then that Glang and Rasul provide repetitious support for unitarism referring to historical events in which inter-relationships are difficult to establish. Rasul restates the same assumption of unity somewhat affected by an emphasis on Muslim search for 'identity' which implies absence of social cohesion. The theory of the "Ninth Ray" which Glang articulated in many occasions and, later, Duma Sinsuat, merely expressed in more symbolic terms and form the unitary approach to Muslim problems and Muslim demand for symbolic representation.[11] Thus, the theoretical contributions of Glang and Rasul to Muslim studies offer no alternative to what Saleeby and Majul have already expressed adequately.

Pursuing the same unitary view and expressing it in typical western terminology and methodology are American scholars whose publications and researches on Muslim Filipinos were connected mostly with their graduate work. Clifford Smith in *History of the Moros: A Study in Conquest and Colonial Government*[12] assumed Muslim unity under a benevolent American rule, and Dorothy Rogers in *History of American Occupation and Administration of the Sulu Archipelago,* 1899-1920 developed the same emphasis with a local focus.[13] Peter Gowing in *American Mandate Over Moroland*[14] criticized some aspects of American policy and rule in Muslimland but underscored America's fine record not only in governing the Muslims well but also in bringing them together under one political rule. The same might be said of Ralph Thomas' *Muslim but Filipino; the Integration of Philippine Muslim,* 1917-1946[15] and Thomas Keifer's *Tausug Armed Conflict;*[16] *the Social Organization of Military Activity in the Philippine Muslim*

[10] Samuel K. Tan, *The Muslim Armed Struggle in the Philippines,* 1900-1941, an unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Syracuse University, 1973, pp. 33-34.

[11] Mama S. Sinsuat, "Ninth Ray For the Filipino Flag", *CNI Monthly Bulletin,* Manila (Jan.-Feb. 1970), p. 4.

[12] Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1948.

[13] Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of San Francisco, 1959.

[14] Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, 1969.

[15] Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1971.

[16] (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

Society[17] which assumed the existence of a "Muslim Society." The idea of "Muslim culture" also permeated the studies of Mednick, Saber and Baradas for Maranao society and the Notre Dame of Jolo. A host of others have also written on Muslim culture and History but they all fall within the same unitary context.

Looking back to what had been said, two interrelated questions are brought to focus: first, are the conclusions of unitary Muslim studies reflective of historical and contemporary realities? Or, are they only expressed goals of Muslim movements and leaders vital to the Muslim struggle for justice and recognition in Philippine society? It seems that there are evidences to show that Muslim unity is only found in the hopes, aspirations, and dreams of the Muslim people. The evidences are historical, political, cultural and contemporary.

Historical

The historical argument for unitarism is anchored on the continuity of Muslim resistance to colonialism. Resistance, accordingly had been concerted that the Muslims had never been conquered. Publications, especially by Muslims including the writer's *Sulu Under American Mi'itary Rule,* 1899-1930 have not failed to emphasize the "unconquerability" aspect of the argument. The unitary premise, however, raises some doubt. While persistent and often times furious, Muslim resistance was not necessarily consolidated or unified. Persistence merely revealed the general impact of colonialism on Muslim and Non-Muslim societies, more or less related to the nature and implementation of colonial policies. The continuity of resistance is not necessarily correlated with the existence of basic unity in culture or history, otherwise, the problem of integration would not have arisen. There was, in fact, no connection between depredations from Sulu and from Mindanao or any relation between armed opposition to Spanish rule in Lanao and Cotabato to that of Sulu and the rest of the Muslim areas.[18]

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[17] Melvin Mednik, *Encampment on the Lakes: the Social Organization of a Moslem Philippine (Moro) People* (University of Chicago: Philippine Studies Program, 1965); Gerard Rixhon, editor, *Sulu Studies* (Jolo: Notre Dame of Jolo, 1972), Vol. 2, 1973.

[18] *Historical Sketch Dating From the First Expedition Up the Rio Grande de Mindanao to* 1897, Folder I — "History of the Philippine Island-Zamboanga Intelligence Reports", *John L. Pershing Papers (JJP Papers)*, Subject File, Philippines, 1902-1903, Box 319, pp. 9, 25, and 26.

The Muslim struggle was divided and limited. Sultan Kudarat's struggle considered the most significant in Cotabato and Lanao was limited in involvement and extent. But this does not in any way minimize Kudarat's stature as Cotabato's best leader in History equalled only by Datu Uttu of Buayan. The conflict of Datu Uttu with Spanish forces was plagued by Uttu's feuds or differences with Rio Grande datus, especially Datu Ayunan and Datu Gadung, and later, Datu Piang[19] At one instance, Uttu provided boats for Spanish operations against Muslim groups who were not within his alliance.[20] In Lanao, the struggle was represented by at least three groups: *Bayabaos, Onayans* and *Macius*. The latter clained to be the most important being more ancient, so they said, than the other two. In Sulu the "Amirul-Harun rivalry" for the Sultanate polarized into two contending parties. Harun's faction supported Spanish claim of sovereignty in exchange for Spanish support for Harun's claim. Harun's stand was either in disregard of Muslim consensus or customary law or in line with the recurrent nature of disruptive patterns in Muslim societies.

In the American military regime the pattern of disunity was again apparent in Muslim resistance. There was no connection between resistance in Lanao led by Datu Sajiduciman, the sultans and datus of Bacolod, Bayabao, Bayan Maciu, Tugaya, and Taraca and similar reaction in Cotabato led by Datus Ali, Sansaluna, Mopuk, Tambilawan, several Upper Cotabato chieftains. Nor were they related in any way to uprisings and movements in Sulu led by Panglima Hassan, Datu Usap, Paruka Utik, Maharajah Andung, and Pala. How then could there be basic historical unity in the absence of even one evidence of cooperation or coordination in the resistance?

In fact, dissensions and rivalries affected the Muslim struggle. In Cotabato, Datu Ali, whose rebellion (1903-1906) was the most significant anti-colonial response in Mindanao during this period, attempted to solicit support from Lanao Muslims for what Ali thought was the only meaningful answer to American militarism.[22] But the "united

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[19] Reynaldo Ileto, *Magindanao,* 1860-1888: *Career of Dato Uto of Buayan* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1971).

[20] Tan, *Muslim Armed Struggle....*, p. 133.

[21] *Report of John Pershing to the Adjutant General, May* 15, 1903, Camp Vicars, Mindanao, JJP Papers, Folder I, "Camp Vicars, 1900-1902", Subject File, Philippines, Box 317, p. 1.

[22] *Sunday Star,* Washington D. C., March 24, 1912, Bureau of Insular Affairs File (B. I. A.) 4865-64; Leonard Wood Diary, October 31, 1906;

front" never materialized because there was no interest or sympathy on the part of the Lanao Muslims many of whom had already been won over by the Americans. More detrimental than Lanao's indifference was his father-in-law's alliance with the government. Datu Piang, dictated, perhaps, more by practical realities than ritual kinship ties, supported American campaigns against Ali and subsequently against all "insurrections" in Cotabato. He provided American authorities with vital information on Ali's movements leading ultimately to Ali's death in Simpetan.[23] Piang's attitude was probably influenced by the old rivalry between Piang and Uttu, Ali's uncle or father. This strained relationship never disappeared in Cotabato's history. It continued to hamper Muslim struggle and came to a more defined hostility between the Piangs and the Ampatuans who claimed lineage to Datu Uttu.

The dissension in Lanao was more pronounced than in other areas during the first decade of the century. This was revealed in numerous letters of local datus, sultans, cabugatans, sangkapans etc. who wrote in the local language and in broken and difficult type of Spanish and English. Local chieftains offered to give information or help to the colonial authorities in the campaigns against recalcitrant Muslim groups or bands. Others even fought each other to court colonial recognition and benefits. Some fought for purely personal reasons or for supremacy. This was, for instance, shown in the "Lumamba-Tawakir dispute"[24] over the issue of secular versus religious authority in local matters. The dispute was complicated by customs which recognized avuncular rights or privileges. It was finally settled by American intervention which enforced agreement based on "separation of powers."

Rivalry and dissension were also noted in Sulu.[25] The Sultan helped the government in suppressing uprisings and, in fact, was behind the operations against Panglima Hassan and, later, Pala. At the same time, he gave comfort and sometimes support to the uprisings. The Schuck family whose ancestry goes to a German-Tausug origin, assisted American troops in tracking Jikiri and his band to their death in Patian Island. Datu Julkarnain, Datu Kalbi, and Datu Tahil opposed and fought the forces of Sultan Kiram, Pang'ima Indanan, and Datu Bandahalla. Sometimes they cooperated with American authorities. Jul-

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] *Report of Provincial Governor H. Gilheuser to the Secretary of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu,* Zamboanga, October 18, 1916; B. I. A. 5075-119-A, p. 8.

[25] Tan, *Muslim Armed Struggle...*, p. 37.

karnain, until his death in 1912, became one of America's best friends. He was respected not so much for his acquiescence and friendship, but for his stubborn resistance to American rule in the period of the Bates Treaty (1899-1904) which represented the only tangible basis of Sulu-American relations at that point in time. These inter-Muslim conflicts appeared to have been connected with family rivalries. Julkarnain and Kalbi were brothers and Tahil was Julkarnain's son. Indanan and Bandahalla were rivals of Kalbi. Kiram was a constant target of Julkarnain's opposition and his frustration in failing to win over one of Sulu's most powerful families had never failed to inspire him to take advantage of any opportunity to weaken Julkarnain's popular base even if it meant accommodating Indanan's unpredictable alliance.

In the civil regime (1914-1935), the Lanao Muslims were divided into pro-Americans and pro-Filipinos.[26] The *Americanistas,* as the first group was referred to, were led by Amai Manibilang of Madaya and Datu Lawi Usongan of Maciu. The *Filipinistas,* largely composed of government officials and employees, were led by Datu Ibra. A showdown came during the 1924 visit of Gov.-Gen. Wood in which both factions were eager to demonstrate loyalties and convictions.[27] Wood had to meet separately with the Manibilang-Usongan faction because of tension that the rivalry created, while Secretary of Interior, Felipe Agoncillo, had to confer with the Ibra group. In 1934, Lanao was again torn by strifes and violence when several bands roamed around, particularly those led by Amai Milon, Dimakaling, and Ingud.[28]

About the same time in Cotabato, peace and order were disrupted by a number of incidents. Datu Alamada continued Ali's anti-colonial movement.[29] But Datu Inuk and Datu Piang opposed Alamada and offered to help American troops to bring Alamada to surrender and, if

[26] Maj. Charles S. Livingston, *Constabulary Monograph of the Sulu Province.* November 15, 1915, *Joseph R. Hayden Papers* (*JRH Papers*), Box 29-35, pp. 71-72.

[27] "Inside Story of Wood's Last Tour". *Philippine Herald,* April 2, 1924, B. I. A. Wood File, Clippings, pt. 3.

[28] Gov. Gen. Dwight Davis to Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, May 22, 1930, No. 267, B. I. A. 4865-172; *Report of Provincial Governor J. Heffington,* December 21, 1934, *JRH Papers,* Box 28; Confidential Letters of Elpidio Mamaradlo and Sabar Muto to the Division Superintendent of Schools, Lanao, August 26, 1935: Fred J. Passmore, Superintendent of Schools, to the Director of Education, August 20, 1935, *JRH Papers,* Box 28.

[29] District Governor Edward Dworak to Gen. John Pershing, December 25, 1912, Folder 5— "Gov. of Moro Province 1910-13", *JJP Papers,* Book File, Memoirs (unpublished), 1904-1913, Box 371.

unsuccessful, to liquidate him and his followers. In 1923, Datu Santiago rose up against the government because of abuses committed by school authorities who forced them, under constabulary guards and threat, to repair school buildings without compensation.[30] He was followed four years later by Datu Mampuroc of Kitibud who had grievances against Datu Piang for collecting ₱20,000 from his Manobo people. His reaction, marked by bloody clashes with government troops, led to what became known as the *Alangkat Movement* which included Muslims.[31] The movement started in the heart of Mt. Kitibud, Northern Cotabato where Mampuroc established some kind of mountain or messianic rituals which bound devotees to the cause.

In Sulu, disunity in Muslim leadership and struggle was portrayed in political disputes and intrigues. Datu Tahil, an escapee of the 1913 Bud Bagsak encounter and husband of Princess Tarhata, revolted against the government because of political grievances and economic problems.[32] In the early thirties the Sultan was opposed by a powerful combination of Sangkula, Tulawi, and Indanan who earlier was Kiram's ally against Julkarnain's faction.[33] Toward the close of the decade, the disputes, sometimes accompanied by violence, led to a political fragmentation of Sulu into several contending parties each claiming right to succession.[34] The factions finally polarized into two powerful camps led by Datu Tambuyong on one hand and by Dayang Dayang Piandao and Datu Ombra, her husband, on the other.[35] The resulting establishment of two sultanates, one in Igasan under Tambuyong and another in Maimbung under Ombra in 1937, marked the eclipse of the Sultanate as a significant institution in Muslim History. The unity it had maintained loosely in Sulu through a delicate balance and

[30] *Ibid.;* Frank Carpenter to Frank McIntyre, February 19, 1927, B. I. A. 5075.

[31] *Manila Bulletin,* February 22, 1927, *JRH Papers,* Box 28-34. The term "Alangkat" might have been derived from local terminology which means "ruined".

[32] Frank W. Carpenter to Gen. Frank McIntyre, B. I. A. Chief, January 28, 1927, Frank W. Carpenter "P" File, Pt. II; National Archives, Washington D.C.; *New York Times,* January 15, 1972, B. I. A. 4865-A-88.

[33] Arolas Tulawi to Bishop Mosher of the Episcopal Church, August 23, 1933, *JRH Papers,* Box 28-31; Akuk Sangkula's *Memorandum of Charges Against Governor Spiller,* January 6, 1934, *JRH Papers,* Box 29-35; Sangkula to James Fugate, November 12, 1933, *JRH Papers,* Box 29-39; Fugate to Hayden, May 27, 1934, JRH Papers, Box 29-31.

[34] Howard Eager to Sergeant Walter S. Hurley, December 2, 1938, B. I. A. 21887-147.

[35] *New York Tribune,* January 31, 1937, *JRH Papers,* Box 29-30.

compromise of vested interest, sometimes through intrigues, came to an end. Since unity disappeared with the collapse of the Sultanate structure, was therefore not rooted in strong cultural foundations, either Malay or Islamic, and Muslim unity was at best idealistic.

After the last war the only meaningful outbreak in Muslimland was the Kamlun Uprising in 1952 which was triggered by political threats, agrarian intrigues, and socio-economic problems.[36] During his surrender to Magsaysay, in Jolo, Kamlun revealed what appeared to be the Tausug fear of the future in the face of modern changes which tended to benefit the Christian sectors rather than the natives. In the uprising which dismembered the famed Nenita Unit of the Armed Forces, the pattern of weakness emerged from Tausug individualism. But Magsaysay's program or promise was more idealistic than realistic having no adequate funds to undertake massive development projects for Sulu. Tausug grievances, as the uprising demonstrated, were not eradicated. They were, in fact, nurtured by the "resettlement" of Kamlun and his closest men in Muntinlupa rather than in Tawi-Tawi. These grievances were buoyed up by Tausug fear of dismemberment on account of rapid Christianization in Sulu undertaken by religious missions (Catholic and Protestant) and secular institutions which promoted Christian culture. This created the preconditions to conflict and tensions.

Postwar conflicts or movements were not felt in other Muslim areas such as Lanao and Cotabato which remained quiet until the Muslim struggle gained momentum and gradually assumed *jihadic* pattern as a result of both Christian and Muslim atrocities and prejudice.[37] Violent conflagration was fanned by internal politics in which Christian politicians and traditional Muslim leaders seized the opportunity to get government concessions at the expense of the Muslim people. It was also reinforced by influence from both rightist and leftist elements which sought to mix ideology with religion in an effort to create a Muslim base for revolutionary and counter-revolutionary movements.[38]

From historical patterns, it seems quite difficult to see a "Muslim society" bound together by historical experiences and the struggle against colonialism. It is hard to find any inter-relationship between uprisings,

[36] "Kamlon Case Ends", *Manila Chronicle*, November 23, 1952.
[37] Harvey Stockwin, "A State of Violent Suspense", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 18, 1974, pp. 27-28.
[38] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 25, 1974, reprinted in *Times Journal*, April 3, 1974, p. 6.

movements, or reaction in various areas of Muslimland. It is even more difficult to deny the numerous feuds, rivalries, and bloodshed which occurred between Muslim groups and within Muslim societies. How then can historical events support the unitary approach to Muslim studies and problems?

Political

Based on folk literature, the political structure of Muslim societies such as found in Sulu offers proof of what may be called a "centrifugal" tendency in Muslim development.[39] Structural forms in pre and post-Spanish times were represented by four institutions which probably marked the distinctive structural developments in the political evolution of Muslim societies. The four phases or stages have survived through centuries of interactions with external forces, internal disruptions, and conflicts with foreign powers because Muslim societies were free from colonial imposition as a result of Spanish failure to subdue the Muslims. The subjugation of Muslimland came in the second decade of the twentieth century when American rule was accepted throughout Muslim areas following Muslim defeats in a series of uprisings from the Bud Dajo Encounter in 1906 to the decisive battle of Bud Bagsak in 1913.

The structural evolution of Tausug polity involved delineation of power, role, and status not necessarily along kinship line. This may be seen from an examination of four institutions: *Kamaasmaasan, banua, ḳaduatuan,* and *sultan.*

The *Kamaasmaasan*[40] was probably the earliest not necessarily the simplest form of Muslim society in Sulu. There was no formal ve-

[39] Kiefer used the same terms to describe change in Tausug polity, "Tausug polity and the Sultanate of Sulu: A Segmentary State in the Southern Philippines", *Sulu Studies* (Quezon City: Bustamante Press, 1972), I, pp. 19-64. Although Kiefer leans very much on Majul's theoretical model, yet in making a comparative reference to Southeast Asian structure such as Clifford Geertz' analysis of Balinese polity, he admits the possible existence of a "centripetal pattern" in Tausug society somewhat neutralized by a centrifugal force provided by what he calls a "vision of a unitary state", p. 39.

[40] Based on The Legend. "Manik Buwangsi", told by Bapah Sayuman of South Laud, Siasi, still alive during the Japanese occupation and in whose house the writer and his parents lived. Sayuman was very fond of telling *kissas* or *katakata* after returning from his fishing trips. His *kissas* refer to numerous accounts which show *kamaasmaasan* as an established institution. Such terms as "ha waktu sin kamaasmaasan" or "awal jaman" in the *kissas* or *katakata* seem to refer to pre-hispanic, pre-historic, or pre-islamic eras. The first term means "in the time

hicle which constituted this entity. It was an informal socio-political organization of elders in the village in which age appeared to be one of the bases, if not, the basis of acceptance or inclusion in the group which carried some authority and influence. It was developed possibly by "social consensus" based on familial recognition and acceptance of patriarchal or matriarchal role. Although no existing written sources give information on this institution, it more or less functioned as a mechanism of social control, rendering judgment on the conduct of village affairs and social action. It was only convened when serious problems such as external threat or epidemics required immediate action by the village. The composition of the group was general in a sense that both sexes were represented. But it was also limited in that membership was confined in a descending direction to the heads of the nuclear families. This was the simplest way to determine the age limit within which a person could be called an elder or *maas*. So that the age criterion involved in the *kamaasmaasan* was not chronological or numerical but rather socio-structural. In brief nominal and actual heads of nuclear families, regardless of age, were considered *maas*[41] and, therefore, part of the institution.

It seems that there was no delineation of responsibility and distinction of levels of authority in the *kamaasmaasan*. Group consensus seemed to be the basis of decision or judgment. There was consequently no simplification, based on specialization, of functions or roles in the institution. Possibly, the institution, in the course of social development, was modified and simplified to accommodate needs for a

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of the old" or "in olden times" and could not have meant the time of the old people during which the reciter Sayuman lived or told the *Kissa*. The reference was to a time in history when an institution of old sages was recognized in the community. The second term literally means "historic time". *Jaman* means "time" or "time device" and *"awal"* refers to "beginning" or "start". The time would either be the time of the "bangsawan" a race believed to have developed from a mixture of the three racial groups in Sulu before the Islamic advent: the *Buranuns*, the *Tagimahas*, and the *Bakalya*. Or, the term could refer to the *"Muslims"* who ushered in a historic era in Sulu's development. The term could not refer to post-Islamic time since local terminologies distinguish Spanish, American, and Japanese eras as *waktu* or *timpu kastila, milikan,* and *jipun*.

[41] *Maas* is a Tausug term for an old person, male or female. It is often used by spouses, children, and kinsmen when referring to the mother or the father in the family. *Maas babai* (Literally, old woman) refers to mother and *Maas* usug (Literally, old man) to father. The *Samal term* for old man (general) is *Aa toa* which is a general designation for both sexes. *Matoa dinda* is used when referring to old woman and *Matoa lul'la* when referring to old man.

more efficient way of conducting affairs of the village or of coordinating the increasing and diversifying activities of the people. It was not, however, eradicated. It was only functionally relegated to a nominal overseeing entity serving as an invisible but real, although less influential, instrument of social control. From it probably emerged what became known as the *banua* which manifested clear evidences of relationship to the *kamaasmaasan*.

The transition from *maas* to *banua* followed a socio-transformational process in which social needs preconditioned the emergence of appropriate political forms. In the *banua,*[42] therefore, could be found or traced the beginning of a political role in an institutional level. That is, it was a role more characteristic of a group rather than an individual. The *banua* was thus a small duly-established or recognized association of elders in the village in which membership appeared to have been limited or restricted to male heads of the nuclear families. There was in this institution a definition of political role or function although not status which came in later development, probably in the *kadatuan*. The *banua* member, who was also a part of the larger *kamaasmaasan,* became delineated as a leader with specific political role. He, therefore, with the rest in the *banua*, exercised the prerogative and, consequently, the power of decision-making which involved judicial, legislative, and executive responsibilities although the tripartite distinction in the power structure was not really distinguished or specialized as in the case of the *kadatuan*. But it was, however, more identifiable than in the *kamaasmaasan*.

Growth in population and increase in social activities resulted in the further simplification of the flow of authority in the *banua* system which underwent a "second phase" of structural transformation in which *banua* members became the heads of relatively self-supporting groups. The self-supporting units which were called *kaum* or *lung*[43]

[42] The legend, "Lunsay Buhuk" is a story of a beautiful woman with long hair that reached to her toes. Her final marriage to a wealthy and powerful prince came only after repeated frustrations and intrigues of ambitious women of royalty. The old council of elders (*banua*) finally recognized her right and status. This theme is also found in several similar stories.

[43] *Kaum* and *lung* are Tausug and Samal terms used to designate types of places. The *lung banua* existed in what is now San Raymundo, a part of Jolo Town where the *adjungs* or galleons used to dock. The place could have been an important pre-hispanic area in Jolo where the council of elders (*banua*) lived or met. The term means the "section of the *banua*".

in its narrowest limit became consequently self-governing. The breakdown in the initial interdependence of constituting units in the *banua* system, which in the early phase was characterized by a more or less primitive type of communalism, tended to draw the unit or units around the personality of the *banua* member whose political role and, hence, status were to be clarified by internal rivalries in the system. The issue of leadership of the group was determined by certain "criteria of leadership" such as age, wealth, prowess, consensus, or lineage.[44]

The conflict, which sometimes brought bloody feuds was so allowed to develop that units were alienated from the whole system, aided by absence of any common law and strong mechanism of social control. Individualization and consequently separation of units, in the *banua,* with the emergence of personal leadership provided the ground for what might be termed "the institutionalization of role and status" of *banua* members. Institutionalization led to polarization of Muslim society into "primary wielders of power" — the datus and the "recipients of responsibility," the people. Long period of "unit independence" led not to democratization but to "autocratization" of power represented by the institution of the *datu* or its collective form, the *kadatuan.* In short, the *kadatuan* was the outcome of internal changes in the *banua* system which manifested centrifugal rather than centripetal directions in development.

The *kadatuan,*[45] as a political institution manifested characteristics that differentiated it substantially from either the *banua* or *kamaasmaasan.* It was a loose cooperation or association of independent *datus* with a formalized structure of power. The datu's autocracy was the ultimate development in the process of power delineation and it was probably reinforced, if not, brought about by the economic dependence of the subject on the *datu's* wealth which came from produce of communal lands and raids. It may be essential to point out that, in the communal stage of land tenure, the tendency was to give economic advantage to the *datu* who by virtue of his institutionalized political role and power which accompanied it received portions from each cultivator.

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[44] Literally, in Sulu age continues to be observed as a criterion for proper ethics and conduct.

[45] The term *kadatuan* is a collective term used today in Muslim societies. It has survived in Tausug as well as Samal terminologies.

For purposes of common protection against threats too strong for one *datu* to meet, an organization of more than one *datu* resulted in the formation of the *kadatuan*. But the independence of the datuship seemed to have so developed that no formalization of the *kadatuan* structure resulted and various datus remained loosely bound to each other. The same centrifugal pattern which characterized the *banua* system also marked the process of transformation in the *kadatuan*. The datu was delineated from the people as the source of authority and the dispenser of justice and it was not uncommon or unusual for interdatuship conflicts to occur as a result of personal differences between datus or interkinship conflicts to arise as a consequence of the priority of political over consaguinal ties.[46] It was in this context that the *Su'tanate,* which was not indigenuous in origin, found a place in the political structure of the Muslim society.

The sultanate, being an external introduction in the Islamic advent, provided Muslim societies with one important source of centralizing force. That is, it became a vehicle of political cohesion, because datus tended to accept the authority of an external power rather than that of a rival datu. Acceptance of the sultanate which began with Abu Bakar in Sulu and Kabungsuan in Mindanao was aided partly by an attraction to Islamic beliefs and rituals accompanied by the introduction of gorgeous and impressive attire, ornaments, and displays of Islamic royalties. The Sultan assumed the prerogatives and power of a typical Middle Eastern or South East Asian Sultan or King with a retinue of subordinate chiefs, attendants and guards.

The political process through which Muslim societies passed followed a pattern of development from the complex *kamaasmaasan* through a simplification of the power structure in the banua, kadatuan, and, finally, to the centralization of authority in the Sultan. The process was marked by concentration not the democratization of power, first, in a few in the case of the *banua* and, then, in a person, in the case of the datu and the Sultan. The trend toward absolutism, was, however, checked by the datu's reassertion of independence re-

[46] The Case of Sihaban and Asjali may illustrate kinship in conflict. Sihaban and Asjali were kinsmen or cousins. They both lived in Pata Island. But Asjali worked as a public school teacher and as such was linked to the government which Sihaban did not favor. Sihaban killed Asjali for siding with the government.

sulting in the emergence of the *ruma bichara*[47] which served as a check and help to the Sultanate.

The *ruma bichara* which had acquired important status in Muslim history was a council of recognized leaders or datus within the jurisdiction of the *Sultanate*. Since the jurisdiction of the Sultan was measured initially by the extent to which the sound of the Sultan's gong could be heard, membership was therefore relative to the ability of the datu or his aide's to hear or to the change in ecological conditions. To extend the authority of the Sultanate or to keep datuship within its jurisdiction, a political machinery had to be developed and institutionalized among more objective criteria not affected easily by transitory factors. In effect the *ruma bichara* which served as an advisory body to the Sultan actively shared in the power of the Sultanate and participated in the decision-making process. The body became territorially rather than personally oriented. But the institution was so constituted so that it actually represented a loose combination of power structures represented by the individual datus. The interrelationship between these power units was contingent not on the Sultanate but on the nature of the interests which affected the various datuships and which were sometimes in harmony with that of the Sultanate. The breakdown, therefore, in cooperation or relationship between the datus and the Sultan resulted from the lack of common interest or need.

Such was the case of Muslim opposition and resistance to Spanish and American rule. There appeared to be a united action during the period of serious confrontation (1850-1903) when no definitive policy was pursued by the colonial power except that of militarism which Muslim societies perceived as a common problem requiring armed resistance. But the introduction of American policy of attraction after 1903 and its realistic implementation during the Carpenter Era (1914-1921) brought some Muslim leaders and datus to the side of the colonial administration. The policy was based on the recognition of traditional power structure and status and ambiguous acceptance of an external colonial superstructure. The common interest of armed resistance to foreign domination was lost and conflicts between datu-

[47] *Ruma bichará* means "house of speech". The Tausug term for house is *bai* and *ruma* has no Tausug meaning except in relation to *Ruma Bichara*. *Ruma* seems to be the same as *luma* the Samal term for house. *Banua* is both Tausug and Samal while *kamaasmaasan* is Tausug.

ships became frequent. The so-called "unity" brought by common opposition to colonialism was therefore circumstantial or incidental. It lacked the essence of unity which could come only from a realistic integration of experiences and meaningful communications and relationships which were not present in Muslim societies.

Today the political institutions which outline the evolution of Sulu's society are still evident in Tausug polity except that they are either remembered merely as history or are substantially devoid of their status, role, or power. Interaction with Christian and western civilization has been largely instrumental in bringing about the changes although the the traditional forms have remarkably remained unchanged.

Cultural

Indigenous Malay tradition and Islamic influence have been brought out as proofs of Muslim unity but it seems quite difficult to comprehend or to grasp the nature or meaning of such a tradition or influence. What are evident in Muslimland are works of art and social forms: *masjids* (mosques), *madrassas* (religious schools), and Islamic secular schools. But are these proofs of unity based on Islamic influence? Or, are these mere symbols of Muslim aspirations, ideals, and goals? It seems that historical and non-historical evidences show that the introduction of Islam, like the penetration of Malay culture in pre-Islamic period, was shrouded in ambiguity although some clarifications are found in the works of Saleeby and, more recently, in Majul's.

The Islamic culture or tradition referred to by Muslim scholars as well as by Non-Muslim scholars often refer to that "ambiguous reality" somewhat revealed by visible art forms and artifacts of culture: *sarimanok, ukul, gulis, kalis, barung, kampi'an,* brasswares, ornaments, attire, music, dances, etc. These things, however, vary from one Muslim group to another and it is quite difficult to trace or identify what Islamic strain is present — Southeast Asian syncreticism, sunnism, sufism, or shiism. What in fact appeared in Muslimland were pluralistic or syncretic forms of Islam, showing dominant indigenous features: *adat, omboh. kadja,* and *tampat* which somewhat resembled in structure to but differed in substance from, their counterparts in Southeast Asia.

The only tangible aspects of Islam which became part of Muslim societies were the Arabic script and the Five Pillars. But the integration of these Islamic features was accompanied by the "localization" or "na-

tivization" of indegenous traditions. The Arabic was transformed scriptologically into the *Jawi*[48] which is not substantively intelligible to an Arab or even to other Muslim groups. The adherence to the Five Pillars, especially to the *shahada*[49] was mainly theoretical and the practical application of theological belief in terms of appropriate rituals was done through local customs and practices. In Sulu, for instance, Islamic worship and practice were wrapped up in the *kadja*[50] among the Tapul people, the *omboh*[51] among the *Samals* and *Badjaos*, and the *tampat*[52] which is observed generally by people in Sulu including Non-Muslims. Islamic ethics was submerged in *adat*, *tabiat*, and *martabat* which all involved proper etiquettes, customs, and courtesies.

In theory, one therefore finds Islamic influence and, in practice, one sees a continuous adherence to local beliefs and practices which are not Islamic. Since these local traditions tend to reinforce ethnocentrism along definite practices or norms of conduct, the integration of various ethnic groups and their unity can only be done by something external and by so dominant an influence as to compel independent cultural units to come together. This was what actually happened when American colonial superstructure based on strong militarism and American institutions brought various ethnic groups under one central control, including the Muslims. But American unity was confined mainly to the political organization of Muslim societies and American policy of religious toleration allowed Islam to remain as an important ins-

[48] *Jawi* is the script derived from Arabic and is found in Southeast Asia. Perhaps, in the Philippines it has a better prospect of survival among the Muslim societies of Mindanao and Sulu where it is used in preserving traditional genealogies.

[49] The *shadada* is the "First Pillar" of Islam.

[50] *Kadja* refers to an indigenous practice in Tapul Island, Sulu in which the devotees offer a sacrifice of white chicken, rice, and other foodstuffs in a mountain shrine. The purpose is to prevent *bala* (calamity) or *mulka* (curse) and to attain *pahala* (blessing).

[51] *Omboh* is an animistic practice among Samals and Badjaos of Sulu. It consists of a small shrine located usually in one of the remote corners or areas of the house where certain things (a pillow, a small mat, strings, bones, and other sacred objects) are kept. Disturbances of the site or things means curse or even death unless counteracted by appropriate rituals.

[52] *Tampat* is a small rock shrine located on a mount, near the shore or in the middle of the river or sea. The location is always on top or by the side of a huge weird-looking rock, or huge tree, or mount believed to be the habitation of spirits. It is common practice among natives of Sulu including even some marginal groups. Non-observation of rites before the shrines may mean *sakit* (illness), *busung* (a light curse) or *bala* (curse).

titution in Southern Philippines. In effect, the socio-cultural oneness of the Muslims was left alone to the capacity of Islam to unite. But Islam, unlike Catholicism, which culturally brought "christianized groups" into one society, did not have a monolithic mechanism of socio-religious control such as a priesthood which could standardize practice and impose doctrines. The Islamic *ulama* and *imams* who performed religious functions were independent and, sometimes were in conflict. Cultural unity, therefore, became difficult to achieve. Islam remains diversified and not monolithic.

Linguistically, no common medium has ever been spoken by Muslim groups, in Mindanao and Sulu. Arabic has never been developed or allowed to develop as a proper vehicle of communication. It was submerged by dominant local languages and dialects except as a form of writing, the *Jawi*. The *Jawi*, however, has been limited to and used by men and women of older generations, particularly members of the ruling class. The *Maranao language,* although somewhat akin structurally to the *Magindanao* language of Cotabato is not intelligible to Muslims outside of Lanao. Similarly, *Yakan,* spoken in Basilan, and *Tausug, Samal*, and *Badjao,* used in Sulu, Zamboanga, and Davao, are not intelligible to *Maranaos* and *Magindanaos.* How could there be cultural unity without exchange and how could there be exchange without a common language. The absence, therefore, of a common language in Muslimland strengthened the ethnocentric isolation of Muslim groups and no meaningful exchanges and communications were possible among the Muslims. In fact conflicts have often arose between groups and one could be easily played against another by third parties.

Consaguinal relationship somewhat played an important part in reinforcing centripetal and centrifugal tendencies in *Tausug* society. It seems that the kinship structure which followed either matristructural or patristructural patterns involved two general categories of relationship; *internal* and *external.* The internal structure was a framework of relationship within which were included primary nuclear relationships (*magtaianak, magtaimanghud*) and immediate nuclear extensions collectively called *lahasiya.* The external structure was the framework which included *kakampungan, pamikitan,* and *husbawaris.*

Tausug society was and is exogenous and patrilocal. This was noted also by Keifer in his study of Parang society in Jolo island.[53] For reasons not clear, Tausugs did not and do not encourage marriage within the group except in extremely few cases in which marriage between third cousins or sometimes second cousins were allowed. The search for a spouse had mainly been external necessitating quite an amount of dowry which depended on class value. In most, if not all cases, the wife followed the husband. Patrilocal residence determined the degree of social distance in a kinship group. Social distance was, therefore, closer among men than among women in the kinship domain which might be a *lung*, a *kaum,* or a datuship. The non-consaguinal character of the women group was reinforced by the slave raids or trade which usually carried away women rather than men. Men were often killed and the captive women, contrary to longtime beliefs, were not enslaved in the western sense. They were used as domestic helps and cared for or were taken as wives or concubines, the beautiful ones by the datu and his kinsmen. One reason for preferring women to men was to safeguard internal security of the datuship. Outside men or strangers paused a greater threat than women whose marital adjustment would not be difficult.

The absence of nuclear or biological connection between the women provided a strong base for centrifugal direction in kinship development just as the direct biological link between men furnished the centripetal tendencies. In effect, therefore, it was difficult to create or maintain unity between families in the same territorial jurisdiction although the nuclear families were cohesive units and their patriarchs were related to each other. Consequently, this situation allowed for the growth of individual-oriented leadership not determined categorically and strictly by kinship. It also reinforced the datuship which became both a political and a social institution whose membership was no longer confined to direct kinsmen but also included non-kinship groups. The datu, therefore, had to have resources, prestige, and power to remain the focus of loyalty and the source of unity. Economic dependence and security of individuals or families had to be provided by him or his household. This created the need for communal lands with the datu holding general right of ownership and the subjects merely enjoying the right to use them. It was, therefore, the socio-economic ties that more or less reinforced the kinship ties within the datuship. For this

[53] Kiefer, *loc. cit.*, p. 26.

reason, the datu who lost his lands also lost his influence and power. He became prey to other datuships. Consequently, regular raids even to other outlying datuships were conducted and maintained and alliances with other datuships were forged. In brief, conflicts often arose within and between datuships leading to the strengthening of kinship as the basis of cohesiveness in the institution.

Because of the intricate nature of the datuship in terms of the dichotomy or integration of political and social structures, it was difficult to establish one common law which could bind the various datus and their domains. It could only be done loosely based on some kind of common interest or ambiguous agreement. Or, it could be imposed by a greater authority with more power and resources such as the Sultanate, the American colonial power, and the Philippine government. Moreover, the patrilocal pattern of Tausug society could not provide better opportunities for cohesion as much as a matrilocal society. Tausug men who preferred to be warriors than farmers often left home for raids, war, and adventure. The women were left to till the field, keep the home, and educate the children. Since kinship ties were not strong among the womenfolk except that they were married to related men, the cohesion of the unit could not be properly and essentially reinforced by the women who have always represented the most important factor in the home. The reduction in the number of men as a result of conflicts left Muslim society virtually in the hands of women and children. Centrifugal tendency was increased rather than reduced. The process eventually developed appropriate individualistic values neutralized only by strong and autocratic datu or an outside power.

There seems to be evidences from folk litearture that the same historical, political, religious, and social patterns were also found in Muslim societies of Lanao, Cotabato, Basilan, and other parts of Mindanao.[54] Studies by ethnohistorians and anthropologists reveal close structural relation between Tausug and Samal-Badjao societies. The same is also true with *Maranao* and *Magindanao* societies. But similarity of patterns does not necessarily mean cohesiveness of society. It merely suggests the possibility of a primordial origin in a common ethnolinguistic tradition before fragmentation or diversification began.

[54] Cephas Bateman, *Moros and Their Myths* (1906), Bureau of Insular Files.

Contemporary

Today, it is easy to detect the same pattern of disunity which has always plagued the Muslim struggle since their first confrontation with the Spanish conquistadores. Until more recently the Muslim movements in Mindanao and Sulu had been somewhat unified by a traditional call to *jihad* based on the assumption that there had been conscious and determined efforts on the part of Christians to wipe out not only the Islamic faith but also the Muslim people. This *jihadic* appeal was augmented by Muslim independence agitation particularly the Mamadra movement in Lanao in 1924, the Sulu independence movement in the 1950s, and the Matalam movement in 1968. The realization of this goal came with the declaration of the Bangsa Moro Republic reportedly by Nur Mizuari, at the start of the Sulu Revolt in 1971.

The crack in the Muslim movement came toward the end of 1970. Two factors might be attributed for the dissension in leadership as well as ranks. First was the reassertion of historical patterns in which Muslim groups abandoned anti-colonial resistance in exchange for certain favors or benefits. The Lanao Muslims, organized into "Ansar al Islam" (warriors of Islam) by Domocao Alonto returned to the government for reasons difficult to understand. The abandonment of the Sulu Muslims by the Lanao group followed historical pattern in which Sulu was left as the only one to continue resistance against American power. The second factor was the introduction of an external ideological element into what Muslims considered a "Holy War." The alleged intrusion of a Maoist motivation in the struggle brought disagreement between Sulu and Lanao leaders and eventually a split, one in favor of surrender (Lanao) and the other (Sulu) in favor of continuing resistance.

The disunity in the Muslim struggle is also portrayed in the Sulu resistance in which leadership is divided into those who favored return to the government (*balik-bayans*) and those who wish to continue. This dissension has not been resolved and, in fact, has actually helped in strengthening the government position. Why the Muslim struggle has come to a point of weakness despite the infusion of both traditional *jihadic* fervor and radical sophistication may be explained in two ways. First, Muslim leaders misread Muslim history and culture where they thought the foundation of unity existed. Second, radical elements failed to see the actual level or state of social consciousness

which comes from politicalization or from exposure to ideological influences. They failed to see the correlation between ideological rejection and the nature of Islam. Third, the Muslim leaders failed to realize the extent to which Muslim mentality has been affected by colonialism which includes intense aversion to radicalism and even to new changes.

The evident effect of division in the Muslim struggle is somewhat revealed in the way Muslim groups have been treated or have reacted to such treatment. The Lanao Muslims who were the first to withdraw from the struggle have been elevated to position of prominence, power, and prestige. They occupy key political positions, control the only university created to promote Muslim integration — Mindanao State University, and manage the Amana Bank which represents the single most significant agency for Muslim development. The concentration of privileges, influence, and power in the hands of one Muslim group has created suspicion and resentment on the part of other Muslim groups.[55]

In the case of the Sulu struggle, returnees led by Maas Bawang have been given both financial and political benefits as well as the honor of being the undisputed power in Sulu second only to the Philippine Army. That dissension has weakened the Muslim struggle is quite evident but that it finally resolved the Muslim problem, associated usually with persistent violence, remains still a question. For the same pattern of disunity also guarantees the continuity of the seed of hatred, resentment, and grievances which erupt into uprisings, revolts, and violence. The hope for lasting peace remains anchored not on pure militarism nor on instant programs or benefits, but on a transcendental prespective of the Muslim Problem recognizing its many variations and the distinctiveness of each Muslim group.

Summary

The pattern of disunity or fragmentation in Muslimland followed, therefore, a "centrifugal-centripetal" movements in which the disrupting tendencies (centrifugal) were in the macro levels of Muslim society. That is, within the structures of Tausug, Maranao, or Magindanao societies, the process of disintegration was, perhaps, brought about by the strengthening of the datus' political role which led to the institutionalization of the datuship as an independent power unit in Muslim

[55] Sulu-Tawi-Tawi Professionals, Inc., *Letter of Appeals to President Ferdinand Marcos,* March 1974, p. 1.

society. In the larger framework embracing all groups nominally bound by belief in Islam, the disuniting force was brought about by linguistic-cultural isolation. The only unifying tendency (centripetal) was found in the micro levels. That is, within the structure of the datuship, the datu's autocratic power evoked loyalty and obedience, the people being economically dependent on the datu's resources. In the smallest structure of the nuclear family cohesion was brought about or maintained by kinship ties along either matrilineal or patrilineal patterns. But nuclear cohesiveness is basic to all human societies. Therefore, it cannot be referred to as a unity that permeates all Muslim groups in the Philippines but one which has partly contributed to the preservation of the datuship.

The dichotomy of centrifugal and centripetal tendencies which seem to characterize the process of change or transformation in Muslimland seem to rule out the unitary approach to Muslim studies. It points rather to a need to explore the explicatory range as well as the relevance of a pluralistic approach to Muslim history and culture.

Errata

In preparing this retrospective issue, the editorial staff has identified several errors that have been rectified below:

p. 12 last paragraph, last sentence should read:
"What we are left with, for now, are texts…"

p. 44 last paragraph, last sentence should read:
"In the end, the Muslims realized that continued resistance in the face of the modern…"

p. 45 first paragraph, last sentence should read:
"This accomplished, the Moro province could be safely and fully converted to civilian control."

p. 87 Last paragraph, 2nd to the last sentence, should read:
"… when he ran for the presidency .."

p. 88 last sentence should read:
"…recognition of the simplicity, defects and relevance of the Colorum movement."

p. 110 Last paragraph, 1st sentence should read:
"… from folk literature …"

p. 112 2nd paragraph, last sentence should read:
" …. on a transcendental perspective …"

p. 112 last paragraph, 1st sentence should read:
" …. Followed, therefore,
"centrifugal-centripetal movements …"

About the Authors

Peter Gowing came to the Philippines as a missionary in 1960, but spent most of his academic life in Silliman University in Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental. He became a faculty member of its Divinity School, and later on, Professor in Southeast Asian History, Politics, and Geography. Gowing completed his PhD in 1968 at Syracuse University with a dissertation that would become *Mandate in Moro Land: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899-1920*. He published several other studies on Muslim and Christian Filipinos, including *Of Different Minds: Christian and Muslim ways of Looking at their Relations in the Philippines* (1978) and *Muslim Filipinos: Heritage and Horizon* (1979). Gowing also founded and became the director of the Dansalan Research Center in Marawi City, which sought to promote understanding between Muslims and Christian Filipinos. He passed away on July 10, 1983.

Milagros Guerrero was Professor of History and served as Chair of the Department of History in the University of the Philippines Diliman. A PhD graduate of the University of Michigan, she published several works on Philippine history, including Volumes 5 and 6 of the *Kasaysayan: The History of the Filipino* series, namely, *Reform and Revolution* (1998) and *Under Stars and Stripes* (1998) which she wrote with John Schumacher. Guerrero is also the author of *Peasant Discontent and the Sakdal Uprising* (1965) and *A Survey of Japanese Trade and Investments in the Philippines, with Special Reference to Philippine-American Reactions, 1900-1941* (1967). Her best-known work, however, is *The History of the Filipino People*, which she co-authored with renowned historian Teodoro Agoncillo. As one of the Philippines' leading historians, Guerrero was recognized as an Outstanding Achiever by the National Research Council of the Philippines. She also served as the President of the Philippine Historical Association.

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Samuel Tan obtained his PhD from Syracuse University in 1973 with a dissertation that would become *Muslim Armed Struggle in the Philippines, 1900-1941* (1977). One of the leading and pioneering scholars on Muslim Mindanao, especially on the Moro separatist movement, he was the former chair of the National Historical Institute and of the Department of History, University of the Philippines Diliman. Some of his works include *Decolonization and Filipino Muslim Identity* (1985); *Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle* (1993); *Sulu under American Military Rule, 1899-1913* (1968); *The Socioeconomic Dimensions of the Moro Secessionism* (1995); *A History of the Philippines* (1997), which presents a more balanced view of Philippine history including the Visayas and Mindanao, Muslims and other generally overlooked groups; *The Filipino-American War* (2002); *The Critical Decade, 1921-1930*; and *Surat suq: Letters from the Sultanate of Sulu* (2005).

Gerald Wheeler is a foremost historian who served in the U.S. Navy and later became Chair of the History Department in San Jose State University. His research interests include life histories of US naval officers and American history during the Second World War. Apart from the article in *Asian Studies*, he also wrote *The Movement to Reverse Philippine Independence*, which was published in the *Pacific Historical Review* in 1964. He is the author of *Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The United States Navy and the Far East, 1921-31* (1977); *Kinkaid of the Seventh Fleet: A Biography of Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, U.S. Navy* (1996). Wheeler taught at the University of the Philippines' Department of History as Visiting Professor in the early 1960s, during which he conducted research on the Philippines during the American colonial period.

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