Asian Studies

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SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF REVOLUTION

CESAR ADIB MAJUL

FILIPINO NATIONALISM BEGAN AS A PROCESS INITIATED BY AN ETHNIC group trying to transform itself into a national community in order to make operative an original concept of what was believed to constitute individual progress and social betterment. It slowly emerged and developed as a response to what was judged to be the oppressive and exploitative character of foreign domination.

In time, on account of rising expectations from within and pressures from without, it began to generate new values and techniques, although its general direction remained practically unchanged. The revolution against Spain as well as its transformation into a vigorous resistance against the imposition of American sovereignty were resorted to in order to remove formidable obstacles to the formation of a national community which by its very logic implied political independence. The conception of a national community initially germinated in the minds of some members of the relatively more educated and articulate segment of the native population in the Philippines during the last few decades of the nineteenth century. How and why this conception arose as well as what it intended to accomplish were primarily determined by the nature and results of the Spanish Conquest.

At the beginning of Spanish colonialism in the Philippine Archipelago in 1565, what existed in the islands was a constellation of settlements called *barangays*. Generally representing kinship groups under the leadership of *datus,* they included from a dozen to about a hundred families. While some were linked by trade ties; others were isolated from or hostile to one another. Manifesting varying levels of political development and complexity, some had begun to weld themselves into a wider and relatively more centralized political entity where different *datus* looked up to a *rajah* as their overlord. Such wider political entities were already found among Muslims in the southern part of the Archipelago like those under the rule of the *rajahs* of Sulu, Maguindanao, and Buayan.

The Spaniards came to the Philippines with two unambiguous aims: to Christianize the natives and to extend the material domains of the Spanish King. As a corollary to these, those who had served their King well were to earn their reward from the work of the native and the sustenance of the lands conquered. The Spaniards came when the sultanate of Brunei was extending its political and economic sway over the Archipelago. But the fall of Maynila to the Spaniards in 1571, the destruction of Brunei in 1578

and 1581, the abortive Tondo Conspiracy of 1588, and the gradual elimination of Bornean traders from the Islands, doomed to death Brunei's ambitions in the area. Meanwhile, the Spanish *conquistadores* and missionaries, working hand in hand, carried out the pacification of the Archipelago. Although they failed to conquer the major Muslim sultanates in the South, they at least succeeded in checking the political tendency of these sultanates to expand northwards to Mindoro and the Visayas. Also, the Spaniards were not very successful in fully extending their complete sway over the tribes in the mountain fastnesses of Luzon.

The occupation of the areas collectively denominated "Las Islas Filipinas" or "Filipinas" (after Felipe II) was not entirely unopposed by the natives. A few belated attempts by scions of old ruling families to do away with the Spanish presence and recover a claimed leadership never succeeded. The same fate befell organized attempts to revert to the older religion. Quite a significant number of natives fled to the hinterlands, refusing to the very end to accept the new rulers and their strange ways and beliefs. But that as it may, by the opening of the seventeenth century, Filipinas was securely under Spanish domination.

To more effectively consolidate their gains, collect tributes, govern the natives, and Christianize them or at least prevent them from losing the newly acquired faith, the Spanish authorities began to gradually replace the *barangay* system with new social groupings. A process of resettlement was slowly but progressively carried out which eventually established the new towns or *pueblos*. In effect, a town constituted a parish center. But the process of urbanization initiated by the Spaniards took a long time to accomplish.[1] In the eighteenth century, Spanish authorities were still trying hard to encourage natives living in the mountains to come down and settle in organized communities.

As a reward to those adventurous subjects who had dared to cross strange seas into unknown frontiers to extend his Empire, the Spanish King authorized the *encomienda* system. In certain delineated areas, deserving *conquistadores* or colonizers were granted *encomienda* privileges among which was the authority to collect for themselves part of the tribute. In return, the *encomienderos* were charged with the task of looking after the educational and religious needs of the natives. The *encomienda* served as a very effective arm of the government in its efforts to control the natives, preserve Christianity, and even to collect its revenues, but the invariant rapacity of the *encomienderos* and continuous ecclesiastical objections to the system eventually brought about its dissolution by the end of the eighteenth century.

[1] The most recent work on Spanish attempts at urbanization in the Philippines is Robert R. Reed, *Hispanic Urbanization in the Philippines: A Study of the Impact of Church and State* (Manila: The University of Manila, 1967).

Apart from paying the tribute, the pacified natives, with a few exceptions, rendered forced labor which lasted for a certain number of days a year. To protect the natives (called *indios,* since the term "Filipino" was reserved for Spaniards born in the Philippines) from the rapacity and abuses of adventurers as well as to moderate the conflicts that might ensue from the impact of an advanced civilization on a basically agricultural people, the Laws of the Indies were applied to them. But whereas earlier, these laws tended to protect the *indios* from the harshness of a colonial system that was too far away from the Mother Country to be checked, a time came when its continued application reflected a telling accusation against Spain to the effect that she had done nothing to prepare the *indios* for a time when they would no longer need their protective umbrage.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century what any keen observer of the Philippines scene would have recognized was the existence of two distinguishable but coincident communities. Making some allowances for unchristianized tribes in the interior of the large islands and few pockets of Muslim inhabitants in that part of Mindanao already considered as an integral part of Filipinas, the inhabitants of Filipinas can be conceived as having been integrated into a political community as well as into a religious one. As member of the first community, the *indio* was a colonial subject of the Spanish King; as a member of the second community, he was a Catholic ward of the friars and subject to the Roman Pontiff. Here therefore were two of the most important identity factors for the native as far as the Spanish authorities were primarily concerned. His family, region or linguistic group, were not important, for, as a member of such, he was merely an *indio.*

The above-noted community distinctions can be better appreciated by a short digression on Spanish colonial and ecclesiastical administration in the colony. At the head of the colonial system was the Spanish Governor and Captain General; the first title emphasized his civil functions while the latter referred to his military powers. The different provinces were under the administrative supervision of governors (*alcalde-mayores*) while the different towns were nominally under the administration of native *gobernadorcillos,* assisted by petty native officials. Parallel to this colonial system was the ecclesiastical body. At the top of the hierarchy was the Archbishop of Manila, followed by a few bishops who headed their respective dioceses. A parish priest, who was usually a friar curate, took charge of the smallest unit, the parish. There seemed to be two entirely separate and clearly delineated systems. In practice, however, there was much overlapping of functions between them. For instance, the Governor General exercised the vice-Royal prerogatives in ecclesiastical matters while Archbishops wielded some political powers and quite a number at various times served as *ad interim* Governors General. In brief, there was no separation of Church and

State, an arrangement which consistently produced disquieting results in the colony.

THE SPANISH COLONIAL AUTHORITIES did not actually eliminate the authority of the former *datus* and their families or descendants who, in effect, came to constitute the so-called *principalia,* the principal men of the towns. Since there were not enough Spaniards in the colony, it was essential to utilize the traditional leadership for their experiments in social organization and other colonial purposes. The former *datus* were initially instrumental in persuading their followers to resettle in the larger settlements determined by the Spaniards. They were the agents in collecting the tribute, in harnessing manpower either for the Army and Navy or for labor projects. Moreover, it was from the ranks of the *principalia* that the *gobernadorcillos* and the *cabezas de barangay* were chosen. These were the petty officials in the municipal level and the highest civil positions that an *indio* could aspire to almost up to the last decade of the Spanish regime. The bases of *principalia* power lay initially in their traditional authority, in the fact that their ranks supplied most, if not all, of the native officials, and in political privileges like exemption from the tribute, forced labor, etc. They were privileged, if not encouraged, to have their houses in the centers of the towns, near the churches and government offices — a way of inducing their followers also to move to the town. The *principalia* members stood as intermediaries, between Spanish officials, both civil and ecclesiastical, and the generality of the natives. At times they had to moderate the excessive or harsh demands of Spanish officialdom on the people while exhorting loyalty on the part of the latter to the government — all the while trying to maintain or strengthen their power base. In an important sense, the existence of the *principalia* served to prevent a radical social dislocation in the lives of the natives when the colonial authorities implemented their system of social reorganization.

In the early part of the nineteenth century, through an accelerated movement towards resettlement, a great part of the native population came to live within hearing of church bells. The *indios* stood as mute witnesses to the internal squabbles between and among Spanish colonial and ecclesiastical officials; and the history of Filipinas as written by friar historians remained primarily a history of the Spaniards in the colony. Meanwhile, the *indio* population grew. Probably at this time, the native Christian population had reached about 2 million.

All of these does not mean that the native population had completely adapted themselves to alien rule. From the inception of Spanish rule, at least twenty-five major uprisings took place.[2] The causes were various:

[2] A fair summary of uprisings against Spanish rule in the Philippines is found in Gregorio F. Zaide, *Philippine Political and Cultural History* (Manila: Philippine Education Company), Volume I, pp. 343-367.

attempts of members of the old nobility to regain privileges which had been withdrawn by Spanish officials; abuses and cruelties of Spanish *encomenderos* and government officials; imposition of heavy tributes as well as forced labor; and a desire to revert to the older religion. But the prepondent issue was agrarian in character with tenants or peasants questioning the ownership of land by friar landlords. Regional or local in character and devoid of the notion of nation or even race, most of them were easily crushed by the cunning use of loyal native troops from other regions. However, all this had one thing in common: a general resentment of what was considered the imposition of an alien rule and a general though vague desire to revert to a system of relative greater freedom of movement, thought, and choice. The British capture of Manila in 1762 and the evident inability of the Spanish government to contain the attacks of the Muslims from the South played their part in transforming a belief of Spanish invincibility to that of weakness. It was not with exaggeration that Francisco Leandro de Viana, a Spanish royal official in Manila, wrote in 1765:

> It is certain that the Indians desire to throw off the mild yoke of the Spaniards; that they are Christians, and vassals of our king, simply through fear, and fail to be either Christians or vassals when they consider us weak; and that they neither respect nor obey any one, when they find an opportunity for resistance.[3]

But the general resentment to foreign rule however mild it might have been asserted was sharpened by certain changes which took place in the colony. These changes resulted from the economic expansion around the middle of the nineteenth century, educational reforms, and the coming of European liberal ideas — all contributing to the rise of an educated and professional class of *mestizos* (both Chinese and Spanish) and *indios*.

During the first centuries of Spanish colonial rule, there was no special effort to exploit the natural resources of the country. The native population continued to depend on a subsistence economy. Most Spaniards lived in Manila where a great number of them speculated in the galleon trade. This explains to a great extent why, except for the friar corporations, few landed estates were owned by Spanish settlers. Spanish mercantile policy was restrictive in nature: the galleons that traded with Mexico were government-owned, while the trade with neighboring Asian nations was strictly supervised and regulated. But by the end of the eighteenth century, a determined effort to depend less on Mexican subsidy made it imperative to develop the agricultural possibilities of the country as well as to relax the economic policy. The latter was in line with the shift in Europe from the mercantilistic to the *laissez faire* policy. Corollary to these efforts was the adoption of a new system of taxation calculated to make tax payments more equitable and collection more systematic and effective. Under the more

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[3] Viana's Memorial of 1765," Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands* 1493-1898 (Cleveland, Ohio: 1903-1909), Volume XLVIII, p. 202.

liberal commercial policy, free trade existed between Spain and the Philippines: Manila was opened to world commerce. Soon other ports were also opened.

It was in the middle of the nineteenth century that more and more commercial activities fell into private hands. At this time there were about fifteen foreign commercial firms in Manila which progressively acquired the characteristics of an urban port and commercial center. Hemp, sugar, and copra were exported and plantations were on the increase, especially in the Tagalog provinces and in Central Luzon. At around this time, too, the *principalia* began to strengthen its economic base by acquiring land, some of which had previously belonged to the *barangay* as communal land. According to John Phelan, although the Spaniards recognized communal ownership of land, they introduced the notion of individual ownership of land as a source of wealth. What then ensued was a tendency of the *datus* and their families to "assume the formal ownership of that portion of the barangay land which their dependents ordinarily cultivated (as communal land). During the seventeenth century the trend increased, more and more Filipino chieftains acquiring the actual title to the land that their dependents cultivated." [4] But the best cultivated lands, especially those around Manila, were in the hands of the friar corporations. There were so many agrarian problems and unrest in these lands that the Spanish government in 1880 decided to adopt a system of land titles. But this well-intentioned law enabled the *principalia* to strengthen its economic base, for it was the more intelligent and alert segment of the population that could understand and take advantage of the law. According to Apolinario Mabini, a prominent revolutionary leader, and who as a lawyer became intimately acquainted with the manner of how titles to land were acquired, the law benefited a few to the dispossession of many. Writing in 1900, he reflected:

> When we were adolescents, the General Government of the Islands required that landlords present a sort of declaration of their properties specifying the situation, area, and boundaries of each parcel in order to acquire the titles called "Composicion con el Estado." Setting aside those who include in their declarations the land of others, it can be said that only a few were able to obtain titles and they were the ones who could afford the costs or who were precisely the ones who needed documents to give an appearance of legality to their spoils. Finally, the Mortgage Law (*Ley Hipotecaria*) came, and while it gave a surer title to some honestly acquired properties, it, instead, gave greater stability to the ownership or possession of many invalidly acquired properties; thus favoring the rascals. [5]

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[4] John Leddy Phelan, *The Hispanization of the Philippines*, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1959), p. 117.

[5] Apolinario Mabini, "Cuestiones en relacion con las corporaciones religiosas," *La Revolución Filipina* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1931), Volume II, pp. 146-147.

According to Mabini, the tillers of the soil then ended up as tenants to their new owners but were allowed to remain in the lands of their ancestors, as long as they kept saying the *canon*. Mabini claimed he was witness to all these in the Tagalog areas, that it became a problem to the Revolutionary government, and that a similar situation also existed in the northern part of Luzon. [6]

That before the Revolution in 1896 agrarian unrest or resentment was generally confined to friar estates can be explained partially by the fact that although landlords belonging to the *principalia* had homes in the town centers, they kept familial and familiar relations with their tenants and kept close contacts with their lands, unlike the friar corporations which kept their central offices in Manila and left the supervision of their lands mostly to administrators who were, in effect, business managers solely interested in increased production and profit.

Alongside economic expansion came educational reforms. On December 20, 1863, a royal decree provided for compulsary education with free instruction for the poor. It also stipulated the establishment of a normal school for teachers in primary education. Primary schools were supervised by parish priests while the normal school was placed under the Jesuits. Before this decree, what generally existed for *indios* were parochial catechism schools. [7] Now, the three R's as well as geography, Spanish language and history, and even elements of agriculture were included in the curriculum. [8] Significant about this decree was its provision that teachers who had performed some years of notable service could assume the title of "principal" and be entitled to the same privileges granted to the *principalia.* In this manner the *principalia* was later strengthened by a new factor — the integration into it of relatively more educated men.

By 1870 there were already 1779 primary schools attended by about 385,907 students of both sexes. However, it can be calculated that less than 3% of the students had an adequate mastery of Castillan. [9] In this same year, out of 1,883 students enrolled in secondary schools, 1421 were either *mestizos* or *indios.* [10] There is no evidence that in 1870 there were *indios* in Sto. Tomas University in Manila enrolled in courses of higher learning or studying for a profession. However, around 1875, some *indios* who had been earlier in the secondary schools began to be admitted to study for the professions like Law, Medicine, and Pharmacy. Many persons who were to play roles in the movement for reforms or the Revolution belonged more

[6] *Ibid.,* pp. 147-148.

[7] Cf. Domingo Abella, "State of Higher Education in the Philippines to 1863—A Historical Reappraisal," *Philippine Historical Review* (I, 1), 1965, p. 23.

[8] A copy of this educational decree is found in "Primary Education," Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.,* Vol. XLVI, pp. 79-118.

[9] Cf. "Public Instruction," ibid., Vol. XLV, pp. 299-300.

[10] Domingo Abella, *op. cit.,* Appendix A, p. 29.

or less to the first or second batch of *indios* who studied for a profession. Among them were Jose Rizal, Emilio Jacinto, and Apolinario Mabini.

Before 1870, the highest if not the only important profession generally opened to the *indio* was the priesthood. In 1870, out of nearly 800 parishes only 181 or about 23% were in the charge of native priests. Moreover, whereas parishes under friar control averaged about 6,000 each, those under the native secular priests averaged about 4,500 each. [11] Significant about these figures is that whereas in 1880 the number of native priests rose to 748, the proportion of the parishes held by them did not increase at all but decreased instead. At this time, there were about 911 friars.

The majority of the candidates for the priesthood originated from the *principalia,* for this was relatively the most aggressive and economically better off segment of the native population. *Mestizos,* too, trained for the secular clergy. Because of what they felt as discriminatory policies towards them, the native secular clergy became fierce antagonists of the friars whom they claimed could not validly hold parishes but should have been confined to their monasteries. At bottom, the conflict between the Spanish friars and native secular priests was for the control of the parishes with their attendant political powers and social prestige. When therefore, in 1872, three native priests, one of them a Spanish *mestizo,* were garroted by the Spanish government on alleged complicity in a mutiny of native soldiers, some natives judged the execution as the result of a conspiracy of Spanish officials and friars to do away with the three priests since they were known champions of the native secular clergy. Other members of the *principalia* looked at the issue as a racial one. The so-called secularization controversy thus became such a serious one that the Archbishop of Manila, writing earlier to the Spanish Regent in 1870, warned and foretold that the continued resentment of the native clergy might eventually be transformed into an anti-Spanish sentiment, more so because of the growing belief that the colonial government invariably took the side of the friars in the controversy. He also reflected that the issue was slowly assuming racial implications; sympathy and moral support for the cause of the native priests had reached beyond their families to the larger community. [12]

In the meanwhile political events in the Mother Country were to have repercussions in the colony. Consequent to the Spanish Revolution of 1868 which toppled the monarchy and introduced freedom of speech, press, and assembly, as well as religious toleration in Spain, a confirmed liberal, Carlos Maria de la Torre, was named Governor General of Filipinas.

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[11] Cf. James Le Roy, *The Americans in the Philippines* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1914), Volume I, pp. 60-61.

[12] For an English translation of this letter, see Nicolas Zafra, *Readings in Philippine History* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, Revised Edition, 1956), pp. 485-498.

His appointment was hailed by different segments of the Manila community —by the Filipinos (as distinguished from the *peninsulares* or Spaniards born in Spain), Spanish *mestizos,* and educated *indios.* For the first time, during 1869-1871, Manila had a respite from the traditional colonial policies of Spain. De la Torre's numerous reforms implemented the ideals of the Revolution of 1868. Spaniards, *mestizos,* and educated *indios,* were all placed on the same footing. The governor's official residence was thrown open to all, even as the incumbent himself discarded the trappings of his high office. Freedom of speech, press and assembly generated a sense of urgency and hope for political and religious reforms. But in 1871 the monarchy returned to power in Spain, followed shortly by the designation of Rafael de Izquierdo as successor to De la Torre. A period of reaction set in, characterized by attempts to do away with the liberal changes De la Torre had introduced. It was during Izquierdo's term of office that the Cavite Mutiny of 1872 took place. Although from all indications the affair was a mutiny initiated by native soldiers in Cavite in collusion with others in Manila, to colonial authorities, it was actually a preview of separation from Spain led by those very men who agitated for reforms under the previous regime. Aside from the three native priests who were publicly executed, many Spanish *mestizos* and scions of prominent native families or the *principalia* were exiled. Rumor was rife in Manila that the actions of the government were mostly instigated by friars who were out to eliminate those men who had previously demanded for reforms, and to stop, one and for all, native aspirations for increased secularization of the parishes. This is probably the first time when some members of the *principalia* began to be seriously disillusioned with the colonial government and *status quo.* In an important sense, the secularization controversy, in so far as it represented an attempt of native priests to increase their share of parishes and in their attendant political and social benefits, was a function of the *principalia's* general struggle for a more active share in the control of the social life of the colony. The execution of the three priests in order to be understood in its true significance must be viewed with this background.

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE of the Philippines in 1880's is definable. The Spaniards in the colony were born in Spain (*peninsulares*) or born in the Philippines (*creoles,* Filipinos). The *peninsulares* tended to look down at the Filipinos who, in turn, bitterly resented the fact that the choice offices in the colonial bureaucracy were given to the former. [13] The Spanish friars represented a special group. Their corporations owned vast stretches of the best cultivated land, and those who were curates enjoyed political and

[13] Cf. Sinibaldo de Mas, *Report on the Condition of the Philippines in 1842,* III, Secret Report (Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1963), pp. 17-20; and pp. 122-126.

civil power. On account of the original evangelical aims in the conquests, they enjoyed a special position and the prestige that went with it. The Spanish *mestizos* also formed another segment. The pure-blooded Spaniards also tended to look down on them. According to the figures of 1864, out of 4,050 Spaniards in the colony, there were 500 clerics, 270 merchants, land owners, and proprietors and 3,280 government officials, Army and Navy officers, etc.[14] In 1870, there were 3,823 *peninsulares* (1,000 clerics, 1,000 Army men and soldiers, and 1,800 civil officials and others), and 9,710 *creoles* and *mestizos*.[15] In 1898, the number of Spanish civil and military officials reached 5,800.[16]

The native population can be generally classified into the *principalia* and the masses of the people. The *Guia Oficial* reported that the population of the Philippines in 1871 was 5,682,012, which increased to 6,252,987 in the next twenty years. In 1880, there were about 748 native priests. What is significant about the *principalia* in the 1880's was that Spanish and Chinese blood were being assimilated by it. To strengthen their economic base and probably because many of them had come to look at the colony as their home, some Spaniards married into the best native families. The ever industrious Chinese mestizos also followed the same route.[17] Thus some *principalia* members acquired some prestige by having Spanish blood while others profited by the infusion of the blood of an industrious people. Whatever Spanish or Chinese blood a native might have, he was still generally called an *indio*.

While in the 1870's, the *term ilustrado* could be applied to any educated individual in the colony, it began to be more definitely applied to that segment of the native population which in the 1880's was classified as educated. Probably possessed of a good mastery of the Castillan language, the *ilustrados* were made possible by the educational decree of 1863 providing for universal primary education and normal schools. These, in turn, made it possible for some *indios* to be included among the 1,421 Spanish *mestizos* and *indios* attending secondary schools in 1870. Some of these and certainly others following them would then work for a Bachelor's degree in the few colleges in Manila. By the middle of the 1870's, *indios* were allowed to enter the University and work for degrees in Law, Medicine, and Pharmacy. However, other colleges were also already offering degrees in Law as well as vocational courses.

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[14] Edward Gaylord Bourne, "Historical Introduction," Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, Volume I, p. 60.

[15] "Le Roy's Bibliographical Notes," *ibid.*, Volume LII, footnote pp. 115-116.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 116.

[17] Although pioneering in nature, the best comprehensive treatment of the social structure of the Philippines just before the Revolution in 1896 is Reed, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-173.

The *ilustrados* as an educated elite always enjoyed a prestigious position in the native population especially when they practised a profession. Earlier the only profession open to an *indio* was that of the priesthood, now he could demonstrate other achievements to be at par with the conquerors. It is reasonable to surmise that in the same manner that the *principalia* would supply the bulk of the native clergy, it would also produce most of the *ilustrados*. Only people with means were generally able to sent their sons to secondary schools or to the university. However, this is only part of the picture since facts demonstrate that superior students from the humbler strata of the native population were able to study for a profession and thus earn the right to be classified as *ilustrados*. But because the *principalia* had the edge in sending its sons to work for a higher education, there was a tendency in native colloquial speech to identify the term *ilustrados* with that of *principalia*.

Soon after the events of 1872, a few Spanish *mestizos* and *principalia* members left for other centers of Asia and Europe, principally to study for the professions. They were able to meet some escaped exiles and reflect further on the ills of the colony. The opening of professional schools in Manila to *indios* around 1875 did not stop the steady stream of young native students going to Europe where the political and educational atmosphere did not appear as stifling as that in the colony. Others went to Spain simply to develop greater professional competence or to study something not available in the colony. According to Mabini:

> In order to prevent you Filipinos from going to Spain or abroad to acquire knowledge not offered in Manila and thereby acquire liberal and anti-religious ideas, the friars changed their program of studies and established colleges for medicine and pharmacy to better their control on the choice of textbooks and have a hand in the selection of professors. Among the necessary evils, it was preferrable to choose the lesser one. However, such was the desire to learn and become educated that many scions of well-to-do families preferred to study in Spain and thus they travelled to Europe . . .[18]

Continued harrassment from colonial authorities and friars increased the number of natives going to study in Spain. They brought with them a litany of what was wrong with the conditions in the colony. Breathing in a relatively freer atmosphere, getting themselves exposed to liberal ideas, witnessing the political ferment in Spain, actively joining secret societies, and becoming increasingly conscious of the evils of the colonial regime to which some of their families fell victims, the young *ilustrados* in Spain generated a movement later called "the propaganda." By means of a newspaper, novels, articles, meetings, speeches, and even some pressure on Spanish ministers and politicians, these reformers tried to expose the ills of the colonial regime while proposing remedies for them. Among the most pro-

[18] "La Revolución Filipina," *La Revolución Filipina,* Volume II, p. 285.

minent reformers were: Jose Rizal, Marcelo H. del Pilar, Graciano Lopez-Jaena, Mariano Ponce, Antonio Luna, Juan Luna, Pedro Paterno, and Jose M. Panganiban.

Worthy of note was that although some of these *ilustrados* had once called themselves *"indios bravos,"* they had begun to call themselves "Filipinos" for they had assumed that Filipinas was their country. Some Spaniards, too, in Spain, called them "Filipinos"—something that was still not done in the colony.

What the reformers wanted initially and primarily was the extension of the political rights already enjoyed in Spain under the Constitution of 1876 to all the natives and Spaniards in Filipinas. The liberties asked were those of speech, press, communication, assembly, and the right to petition for the redress of grievances. The demand for equality before the law implied that the natives would naturally be given the same opportunities to hold civil, judicial, and even military positions in the colony if they were so qualified. For the Mother Country to know better the state of the colony, it was demanded that Filipinas be represented in the Spanish Cortes. The secularization of the parishes was also a constant demand. Later on, the reformers asked that Filipinas be transformed from a colony into a regular province of Spain.

The reformers had a great deal of native sympathizers, including priests, who supported their newspaper *La Solidaridad* and helped sustain the movement. The supporters had various motives: the *principalia* who wanted to strengthen its position by the exercise of political rights, the ambitious natives who desired in time to be able to hold civil and military positions monopolized by Spaniards, the ordinary native who aspired to be spared from the vexations of a brutal police and an oppressive political system, and the native priests who wished to have a chance to administer more parishes. The Reform Movement, in effect, represented the desire of a segment of the population to have a greater hand in determining the destiny of the country while ensuring the population of greater share in its social and economic benefits.

But the movement generated the expected reaction not only from colonial authorities in the Philippines but from the Spanish friars as well. If the movement were successful, the Spanish officials would slowly have to give up to the natives many of their offices—both civil and military. If the parishes were secularized, the friars would have to confine themselves to their monasteries and leave the parishes which were the source of their political and civil power.[19] The fact was that the Spanish colonial and ecclesiastical bureaucracies in Filipinas were, except in the very lowest

[19] For an enumeration of the duties of parish priests which demonstrates their religious, political, and social power, see *U.S. Senate Document No.* 190, 2nd Session, pp. 64-66.

levels, a monopoly of Spaniards. Thus Spanish officialdom in the colony represented a special class. So did the friars and the ecclesiastical authorities. There was practically no demand by the reformers that the friars did not oppose vehemently, as evidenced by their Memorial of 1898 which they framed when some quarters in Spain blamed them for the Revolution in 1896. [20] It was the contention of the friars that the demands of the reformers and their attitude towards friars was not a universal phenomena and that they, the friars, were loved and respected by the generality of the people, while the reformers represented a chronically unhappy and ungrateful lot. To belie this contention, the reformers saw to it that their ideas became more widely spread and popularly supported.

What should be noted is that many of the reformers were not simply against what they believed to be friar dominance in the political life of the nation and in the social life of the people but that they were also against those *principalia* members who, besides being under friar dominance or positively corrupt, were profiting from the colonial system and satisfying personal interests. The municipal reforms suggested by M. H. del Pilar in *La Solidaridad* were not only designed to enlarge the electorate but to reduce, in effect, the traditional power and privileges of the *principalia* in the towns. Rizal, in his novels, tried to portray the *principalia* in the towns as tools of the friars and cacique benefiting from the colonial system. As Le Roy put it, the campaign of the reformers "was not alone a protest against ecclesiastical domination, but also against economic and administrative caciquism . . ." [21] Although some of the *ilustrados* who had participated in the Reform Movement were of *principalia* origin, they, for a number of reasons, were able to emancipate themselves from their class interests, and they began to view the interests of a wider community transcending class interests. In brief, a movement initially seeking opportunities for the educated segment of the native population became inevitably transformed into a movement for the rights of a whole people.

Among the reformers, Rizal conceived the clearest and most cogent statement of a national community. He first thought that political reforms in the colony might bring about increased political rights; but realizing that these were not possible as long as Filipinas remained a colony, he began to agitate for her transformation into a province of Spain. Arriving at the sad but realistic conclusion that the Spaniards would never consider the *indios* Spaniards, he sought for another social situation where the *indio* was accepted as a human being with natural rights. By an uncanny and brilliant utilization of various characters in his novels which were in effect veritable social analyses and commentaries, he demonstrated how educational, economic, and social attempts of the natives were blocked. He left it to

[20] See "The Friar Memorial of 1898," Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, Volume LII, pp. 227-286.

his perceptive readers to conclude that the *indio* as a member of a colony was exploited since the essence of a colony implied this; moreover, as a subject of the Spanish King he was denied justice though he paid the tribute and performed other forms of services for his sovereign. As a member of a Church community, his religiosity was not only taken advantage of but did sometimes serve to prevent his progress. Furthermore, ecclesiastical authorities were not only denying the Christian *indio* a desirable form of education but constituted the very enemies of his political and educational betterment. The conclusion was inevitable; there was need to integrate the natives of Filipinas into another community wherein he was neither identified as a subject of the Spanish King or as a Church member. This had to be a national community.

Rizal believed that if there was a larger community to which the natives were loyal and committed, they would be able to discard their petty and even family or regional interests in favor of a greater good. Although he was aware that some *indios* were able to arrive at certain heights of educational attainments or economic well-being, these to him were not significant since they did not necessarily imply social progress. This is the meaning of his lament, "in Filipinas, a man is only an individual; he is not member of a nation." [22] This was as well the meaning of his complaint to a native priest, "In Filipinas, there is INDIVIDUAL progress and perfection but not a NATIONAL or GENERAL one." [23]

Partialy blameable for the so-called proverbial indolence of the *indio* and a slowness in the progress of his economic well being was, according to Rizal, the absence of what he termed as "national sentiment." [24] This absence was exemplified by a depreciation of the results of one's labor, an undue admiration of what was foreign simply because it was not native, and the tolerance of injustice either because fighting it endangered personal interests or simply because one could in some manner benefit from it. On the other hand, the existence of national sentiment meant that a person had self esteem, was not ashamed of the products of his labor, and would fight any form of injustice even at the risk of his life. Reduced to its basic essentials, national sentiment was nothing else but unqualified integrity and a high form of social consciousness. What was thus exhorted was the development of a will to work for the benefit of all as against personal or petty interests. But Rizal himself bewailed the fact that there was unfortunately no nation to speak of. This he started to construct and explain through

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[21] James A. Le Roy, *Philippine Life in Town and Country* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1905), p. 181.

[22] "Sobre la indolencia de los Filipinos," *Escritos Politicos e Historicos* (Manila: Comision Nacional del Centenario de Jose Rizal, 1961), p. 257.

[23] "De Rizal al P. Vicente Garcia," *Epistolario Rizalino* (Manila. Bureau of Printing, 1933), Volume III, p. 137.

[24] "Sobre la indolencia de los Filipinos," *op. cit.*, pp. 254-257.

historical studies. Rizal tried to demonstrate that once upon a time, before the arrival of the Spaniards, the natives of the Archipelago had a culture and an ethics of their own and were not the savages doomed to perdition as portrayed by later friar historians. Moreover, the natives were once an industrious people having commercial relations with other parts of Asia. Here, Rizal was not simply blaming the conquest for a great number of ills plaguing the natives; he was aiming at the development among the Filipinos, of a sense of racial affinity; of continuity with their past and pride in them. In this manner they would come to look upon themselves as an historical people and thus a sense of unity or brotherhood might perchance be effected.

Added to an awareness of a common racial origin and history, Rizal believed that with an educational system fostering intellectual and moral virtues, and with the development of a will for the good of all and the habits of industry, the natives would be progressively integrated into a national community which was essentially to be a moral one. Then and only then would the Spaniards realize that they were facing a matured people who were aware of their rights, had a sense of justice, and most important, were willing to die in its defense. Rizal was once optimistic enough to believe that Spain would slowly but increasingly grant political rights to the natives, such that, after a period of autonomy, independence would normally follow. [25]

Carefully distinguishing the enjoyment of rights from independence, [26] Rizal asserted that independence did not necessarily imply the existence of political liberties since it was possible for a people to become independent while remaining ignorant and politically indifferent or even corrupt. Under such conditions, the existence of a native tyranny would be the more likely possibility. Hence Rizal insisted that before the attainment of independence, the people had to be educated—this was the major criterion to prevent the substitution of an alien oppression by a local one. Again, perceivable here was Rizal's fear that the *principalia* would simply succeed Spanish colonial officials and perpetuate the same abuses should the people not change their habits and attitudes.

When Rizal wrote his novels and major articles, it was significant that he had begun to call the natives of the colony "Filipinos"; but what was revolutionary here was that he asserted that the *indios* were the real Filipinos and that Filipinas was their native country and thus belonged to them. Not all Spaniards in Filipinas cherished such ideas.

But Rizal did not remain content to propose the problem of the necessity of a national community. He devised an organization to bring about an integration of the natives into such a community. The *Liga Filipina* aimed "to unite the whole archipelago into one compact, vigorous, and

[25] "Datos para mi defensa," *ibid.*, p. 333.

[26] *Ibid.*

homogeneous body," and have its members protect each other in "every want and necessity." It was to encourage education, agriculture and commerce, and more important, the organization was to represent a "defense against all violence and injustice." The *Liga* envisioned that ultimately all of the natives of the Archipelago would be members of it—constituting a veritable third community in Filipinas which, by its very logic, would not only give the natives, the true heirs of the land, a new identity, but would dispense with the other two communities as identifying factors for them. Noteworthy, again, about the *Liga* was that it was qualified as "Filipina." [27]

Probably one of the reasons that compelled Rizal to return to Filipinas in 1892 was to establish the *Liga.* In less than a week after his arrival he addressed a group of professionals to explain the plans of the *Liga* and have officers handle the organization. But the organization disintegrated after a few days, for Rizal was exiled to Mindanao on some charges. In the hands of others, nevertheless, it was reorganized in 1893 but then it was dissolved the next year on account of internal dissensions among its officers: those still interested in supporting the Reform Movement that was becoming moribund in Spain and those who had given up hope in a peaceful agitation for the political and social improvement of the colony.

Rizal's exile to Dapitan, the ineffectivity of the *Liga,* the harrassment of *ilustrados* who made a bid for reforms, and the general despair engendered by the increasing repressive character of the colonial government, brought about the formation of the secret society called the *Katipunan.* Its leader, Andres Bonifacio, and its founders generally came from the urban working class in Manila and Tondo. In time its membership extended to other urban areas, in the Tagalog provinces and beyond. In 1895 the organization was becoming complex enough; its Supreme Council had all the characteristics of a government cabinet. It was estimated, probably with some exaggeration, that on the eve of the revolution in 1896, the *Katipunan* had at least 100,000 members, including women. By this time, too. *ilustrados* and priests were, if not formally, enlisted in its ranks or at least supporting it. In Manila, a few scions of the *principalia* also joined it. The appeal of the *Katipunan* lay in its secret character, its impressive and mysterious initiation rites, its native and folk symbolisms, and its revolutionary character—all producing the culminative result that here at last was a truly native power organization. It also performed, by means of its modest publications, a form of outlet for the expression of indigenous literary talents without the normal downgrading by Spanish critics.

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[27] For a more comprehensive and detailed analysis of Rizal's idea of a national community and what it could accomplish as well as how the *Liga Filipina* could help bring it about, see the author's monograph *Rizal's Concept of a Filipino Nation* (Quezon City, 1959).

The leaders of the *Katipunan* were deeply influenced by the works of the reformers and they maintained to the very end the deepest respect for Rizal, who personally never cared to join them. But they had arrived at the conclusion that the Reform Movement was doomed to failure and that what constituted the social good could not be attained except by armed revolution to bring about the independence and that atmosphere of freedom pre-requisite to the good life. Emphasizing that the Filipinos, before the coming of the Spaniards had a developed culture and that the friars had capitalized on the religiosity of the people for their own benefit, the *Katipunan* exhorted its members to develop patriotism and those virtues of industry, bravery, and perseverance, that would make possible a sort of utopia in the not too distant future.

The discovery of the *Katipunan* in 1896 forced the *katipuneros* to raise the standard of revolt at a time not determined or anticipated by their time table. Consequently, they had to suffer a few military reverses. The Spanish authorities and friars prejudging that the revolt was the work of liberals, Masons, anti-clericals, etc., started to arrest numerous *ilustrados* and *principalia* members, to the extent of executing scores of them. Among these was Jose Rizal. This belief enabled the real leaders of the *Katipunan* to escape the Spanish dragnet and flee to the provinces, while innocent men were liquidated by firing squads. Many *ilustrados* were genuinely shocked by a movement that essentially signified force and violence; while other *principalia* members, conservative by nature, feared that any violence might spell a disruption in their enjoyment of a privileged position and a threat to their economic interests. But the panic that governed the highest offices of the colonial government as well as the general cry for blood by the friars and other Spanish residents brought about a heightened repressive policy on the part of the government. Even conservative natives became resentful of the Spaniards while fearing for their lives. Thus was the atmosphere of general disobedience widened.

The *Katipuneros* under Bonifacio suffered a few reverses in the hands of well-disciplined Spanish troops; however, in Cavite, under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, the *katipuneros* were not only able to hold their own but even win some battles. Aguinaldo joined the *Katipunan* while a young student in Manila. Upon his return to his home town, he was elected *capitan municipal*, a position his father had once held. By all indications, he belonged to the local *principalia* and would normally have attained a professional degree in Manila were it not for his father's death which led him to return home to take charge of family affairs. It was inevitable that the contest for the leadership of the Revolution would be between Bonifacio and Aguinaldo. Where Bonifacio believed that the original organization of the *Katipunan* was sufficient to pursue the movement, many of the Cavite *Katipuneros* under the leadership of members of the *principalia* insisted

that another system of government be instituted. It was Aguinaldo who emerged as the president of the new government. The divisions were so clear that even the election of Bonifacio as the Director of the Interior was questioned by the remark that he was not even a lawyer. It may be speculated that regional bias was involved in the election of most of the officials in the new governmental set-up; but what was obvious was that *principalia* members of Cavite played an important role in the election of Aguinaldo. The tragic death of Bonifacio not much later and the practical necessity to close ranks on account of the Spanish offensive, as well as genuine popular support of a hero, all pushed Aguinaldo to become the undisputed leader of the Revolution.

The Spanish offensive was of such an intensity that Aguinaldo and his troops had to leave Cavite for Biak-na-Bato where the decision for renewed effort for the Revolution was made. A provisional constitution along republican lines was then adopted. Realizing that the capture of Biak-na-Bato would not spell the end of the Revolution, the Spanish Governor General Primo de Rivera decided on a new approach which was that of a peaceful settlement in which the revolutionary leaders were to receive a large amount of money in return for their exile and the granting of a general amnesty to all who revolted. With part of the amount given to him and other revolutionary leaders, Aguinaldo and his closest companions left for exile in Hongkong. However, the so-called Pact of Biak-na-Bato did not accomplish what it was intended to do. This was the situation in 1897.

The outbreak of the Spanish American War in April 1898 and United States' ambitions in the Pacific brought a new factor in the resurgence of the revolution against Spain. The defeat of the Spanish Navy by an American squadron in May forced the Spaniards to court support of the Filipinos. Abroad, Aguinaldo was already in contact with American consular officials and his help was solicited. On May 19, Aguinaldo with his aides arrived in Cavite, and the first thing he did was to raise an army with the help of captured Spanish guns and ammunition made available by Admiral Dewey. Soon after, more guns and ammunition purchased from part of the money given to Aguinaldo through the Pact of Biak-na-Bato arrived. With initial successes against Spanish troops, his army grew and it was further swelled by Filipino troops who had deserted the Spanish Army. Appeals of the Governor General for Filipino loyalty and promises of future reforms as well as exhortations by the Manila Archbishop for Filipino support on the basis of a common faith fell on deaf ears. In the meantime, the Filipinos established a dictatorship under Aguinaldo and on June 12, 1898 the independence of the Philippines was solemnly declared. Many *ilustrados* left Manila to join Aguinaldo, offering him every kind of advice and help. With Apolinario Mabini as his major adviser, the Dictatorship was changed into the Revolutionary Government on June 23. To reassure

the new government of their loyalty and commitment, a few hundred municipal officials met in Bakoor on August 1 and ratified the previous declaration of independence.

The refusal of American officers to allow armed Filipino troops to enter Manila after its surrender on August 14, in spite of the fact that the Filipinos played a major part in the siege of the city, signified to Filipino leaders that the Americans were not only determined to deny them a share in the victory but that they intended to stay indefinitely in the country. In the mind of some of Aguinaldo's advisers, war with the Americans seemed inevitable, and therefore, every care was taken to prevent any American pretext for war.

In response to what was considered the American threat, the Revolutionary government made strenuous efforts to extend its sway on as large a territory as possible. By the end of the year, except for the city of Manila and a few pockets nearby occupied by the Americans and other spots occupied by harrassed Spanish garrisons, practically the whole of Luzon had fallen under the authority of the Revolutionary government. Not long after, other islands in the Visayas and some towns in Mindanao pledged their loyalty to it. The Revolutionary government also transferred the capital to Malolos which was not only easier to defend than the towns in Cavite but also made it possible for Filipino troops to have greater maneuverability or even convert themselves into guerrilla units should the need arise. Diplomats were sent abroad to get foreign recognition of the independence of the Philippines—but without success. To strengthen itself further in the face of the American challenge, a Congress was convoked at Malolos to frame a constitution along republican lines and thus while gaining more popular support among all segments of the Philippine population, it was to be demonstrated to all foreigners that the Filipinos were determined to govern themselves and had the capacity to do so. In accordance with the republican constitution promulgated by Congress, the Philippine Republic was proclaimed with Aguinaldo as President on January 23, 1899.

The Malolos Constitution was republican, mainly based on South American models and European ones to some extent. Noteworthy about it was that nearly thirty percent of the document referred to the rights of citizens exemplifying that the Filipinos were out to enjoy those rights never enjoyed before and for which elaborate safeguards had to be secured. It was designed to make the legislature the supreme branch in the government. As a formal document it reflected one of the most important steps in the political development of the Filipino people.

As expected, practically all of the members of the Congress at Malolos were *ilustrados* or members of the *principalia.* Although the membership fluctuated, at one time, out of nearly one hundred members, about eighty percent had professions. Whereas most of them were local graduates,

a few studied in European universities. The majority of the delegates were appointed not only because conditions did not warrant elections in all districts but also to have the town aristocracy become members and thus support the Republic. The electoral laws promulgated by the Revolutionary government in providing that the local officials were to be elected by the leading citizens of the towns guaranteed that the *principalia* would not only remain in control of the towns but would, when elections were possible, be elected into Congress. The *principalia* was now determined to rule in the place of the Spaniards.

More than once the *principalia* tried to exercise undue influence on Aguinaldo as when they almost induced him to approve their plan to have a national bank with the authority to float loans. It was Mabini who thwarted their plans. However, Aguinaldo's recognition that the Malolos Congress had the power to promulgate a constitution represented a victory on their side. Felipe Calderon, the father of the Malolos Constitution, himself confessed that his constitutional plan was to see to it that the *ilustrados* rather than "an oligarchy of the ignorant" would rule the country; probably referring to some Army leaders and soldiers whom he characterized as "ignorant almost in their entirety."

Although probably all *ilustrados* saw eye to eye with Calderon who insisted on the principle that the government ought to be in their hands, not all agreed that the *principalia* should play this role of leadership. The fact was that not all *ilustrados* had the same economic origins or prejudices. Mabini, who was of humble origin, was ever suspicious of "the rich in Manila" and he opposed the idea to allow the Malolos Congress to frame a constitution. To him it was merely a consultative body to the revolutionary government and was intended to reflect a visible sanction and loyalty to the Revolution on the part of a segment of the population. The irony of it all was that it was Mabini who framed the electoral laws that made possible the Revolutionary Congress, which, once convoked, refused to be satisfied with remaining a purely consultative body.

It was agreed by all that Aguinaldo had to remain as head of the state for an indefinite period. Having the general loyalty of the Army and admired for his achievements, he came to be identified with the humbler strata of Filipino society. He was not entirely opposed by the *principalia* as long as he offered them concessions. The *ilustrados* of humbler origin were determined to see to it that he was not made a prisoner of the *principalia.* Yet these *ilustrados,* in common with other *ilustrados,* wanted to guide the direction of the Revolution; depending all the time on Aguinaldo not to allow the "ignorant" to get out of hand.

Meanwhile, the ordinary soldier, of peasant origin, was there to serve and hope for a better future where he could own a piece of land unmolested. But after the friar estates were confiscated by the Revolutionary government,

the ensuing Republic, needing an additional source of income, passed a law enabling "men of means" and "local chiefs" to administer them provided they could present security either in cash or in bond. [28] In brief, the *principalia* was allowed, by law, to further strengthen its economic base by additional land ownership.

But regardless of different interests and basic conflicts a spirit of optimism had permeated all classes in the Philippines. Patriotism became the rule and a sense of nationality was dramatically beginning to extend itself. The Filipino government in extending its sway over a great part of the Archipelago meant that Filipinas was beginning to belong to Filipinos, now the real natives of the country. The persons in the highest offices of the government who had begun to exercise or manage the coercive powers of government began to have a stake in the preservation of their authority. They were all determined to keep it. The generality of the people, having been oppressed in the past, now hoped that the new social situation would eventually offer them many of the things they felt they were denied before. Thus, a new series of aspirations and expectations were generated, bringing, in turn, greater loyalty to a government believed to be the very tool that would concretize such aspirations. All of these factors led Mabini to assert categorically that the Filipinos during the Revolution were able to take the first few steps in the building of a national life.

But the outbreak of hostilities with the Americans dashed all hopes of the expected social amelioration. Faced with superior troops and heavy artillery, the Filipino troops were forced to lose ground steadily. Malolos fell on March 31, 1899 and the capital was transferred various times. American military officials thought the war would soon be finished and the only problem would be one of mopping up operations. But they were mistaken, for they had underrated the persistence of the Filipino soldier and the determination of many revolutionary leaders. But the Filipinos needing pace so badly made various overtures for it. The Americans refused to listen to them unless it was under the premise of unconditional surrender and the laying down of arms by all Filipino troops. On account of the military offensive of the American army, Aguinaldo, on November 12, formally disbanded the Army and converted it into guerrilla units. Thus the war became more difficult for the Americans to contain.

With the American advance scores of members of the Revolutionary government fell as prisoners. Fifty-seven of those well known for their inveterate resistance to the imposition of American sovereignty, including Mabini, were deported to Guam. Their deportation was decreed because, not

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[28] For this law passed on February 19, 1899, see John M. Taylor, *Report on the Organization for the Administration of Civil Government instituted by Emilio Aguinaldo and his followers in the Philippine Archipelago* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903), pp. 70-71.

having accepted the fact of the American presence, they stood as a symbol of opposition that encouraged Filipino resistance in the fields and mountains. Many of these prisoners actually encouraged resistance not because they thought that the Filipinos were eventually to be the military victors but simply to demonstrate to the Americans that they were facing a determined foe that deserved better peace terms that would include the recognition of political rights in the new regime envisioned for them. The capture of Aguinaldo on March 23, 1901, and his taking an oath of allegiance to the United States the next month only signified that the end of the armed struggle against the United States was near at hand. True enough, by 1902, the majority of the resisting generals either surrendered or were captured.

Brutalities of American soldiers and cases of racial prejudice on their part were soon moderated by the introduction of an American system of education even while the war was going on. In pacified areas, the American offer to some of the old leaders of Filipino participation in government appeared sincere, and in a matter of a few years the scars of the war were erased. Many members of the former Revolutionary Congress and government began to assume positions in the new order, and they cooperated with the American authorities. But not all of them gave up their work for the eventual independence of their country. They were biding for their time when political liberties would be given to them such that they could peacefully agitate for it. What appeared as indelicate to Mabini was how some persons who once held high offices in the Revolution rushed unashamedly to cooperate with the new master. He believed that more prudence on their part would have merited the respect of the Americans. Actually to Mabini, the war against the Americans was merely a continuation of the previous struggle against Spain since the Filipinos were still struggling to regain and enjoy those rights that properly belonged to them and which the Americans appeared to be denying. However, Mabini was led to hope that the history of the Americans and their political ideology might eventually force them to progressively grant Filipinos more political rights. Essential to him was that the Filipinos had to merit such rights by working for them instead of waiting for a colonial power to grant them as a sort of grace.

The lack of a truly radical economic program on the part of the revolutionary leaders left unsolved the chronic agrarian problems of the country. It can be speculated that if the Revolution was allowed to run its normal course without American interference, the agrarian problem would have vexed it and affected its direction. This was revealed by Mabini when he wrote:

> When we were connected with the Malolos government, some very frightened *ilustrados* told us that the cry for liberties had begun to germinate socialistic or communistic ideas in the minds of people who got a bad deal in some pro-

perties of questionable origin, without understanding that the discontented ones precisely belonged to the class of those unfortunates who were dispossessed by *hacenderos* and big landowners.[29]

Neither did the Americans introduce any novel economic program to solve the chronic economic ills of the Philippines. Actually, their recruitment of principalia members to hold political or civil offices served, it not to postpone the solution, to make it more difficult. Moreover, friar lands purchased by the civil government were sold to corporations and to those with easily available means to purchase them. The change of ownership did not eliminate the problem.

THE ROAD OF THE NATIVES of the Philippines towards increasing freedom and their integration into a national community as Filipino has been a long and difficult one. From scattered settlements they were welded into a community of subjects to the Spanish King that formed simultaneously a Church one. Finding in time that both systems failed to provide them with what they later on considered essential to a fuller life, they were led to reflect on an alternative one. In the historical stage they found themselves, it was imperative that this community had to be national and independent. Because of colonial obstruction, a revolution was resorted to as a technique to attain independence. The struggle against the Americans was viewed as part of the process initiated against Spain. Independence, too, was looked up to as a means to secure that social situation where Filipinos could develop their native talents in an atmosphere of freedom and where values were not imposed from without but were the result of their free choice and deeply felt needs. Then and only then could the Filipinos effectively contribute to world culture. In brief, to be a universal man, it was essential first of all to be a Filipino.

In a national community, at least in the minds of those who originally conceived it, there was to be no racial prejudice, humiliation, and denigration of the results of one's efforts at self-improvement. In it each person counted as an individual with intrinsic worth but endowed with a preeminently social consciousness directing him to work for the good of all rather than for selfish motives. It was therefore essential that there was to be a complete absence of any form of exploitation in order that each citizen might be more committed to the national community. These then are the major invariants that entered into the original concept of the national community. As the Filipinos become progressively integrated into a national community, their problem is whether these elements are to be retained and achieved or discarded.

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[29] "Cuestiones en relación con las corporaciones religiosas,' *op. cit.*, p. 148.

MIRROR, MIRROR ON THE WALL: AN ANALYSIS OF CHANGING SOCIAL IMAGES IN A DEVELOPING SOCIETY*

GELIA T. CASTILLO

THIS PAPER IS A TAKE-OFF ON REFLECTIONS IN A MIRROR—THE MIRROR on the wall which all of us see and use everyday. The choice of the mirror is symbolic for the following reasons:

(1) Depending upon its fidelity, a mirror tells us more or less what we look like sometimes even what we are especially during the first hour of the morning when the image most faithfully reproduces reality.

(2) How accurately we interpret this image on the mirror depends upon what we want to see and the angle from which we view the image. We can even see ourselves upside down if we so desire. As we sit or stand in full or partial view, the image before our eyes changes. We can be near-sighted or far-sighted, even astigmatic in our vision. We can be blind in spite of a 20/20 vision if we look at the mirror in a completely dark room.

(3) One peculiarity of the mirror-image is that when we look at it, the left is the right and the right is the left. This fact is especially significant nowadays when it is fashionable to be labelled leftist or rightist unless one belongs to the silent majority then position with respect to ideological center is a matter of conjecture. But what is left and what is right depends upon where one is looking from. To the extreme left to be a moderate left is to be right.

Using the analogy of the mirror-image we can say that our perception of the problems in our country is very much colored by our position in society, the values we hold, our access to reliable information as to what is actually happening, and our willingness to believe what we see. Going back to an earlier comment about being blind in spite of a 20/20 vision, it is particularly apropos to point out that someone in power could be so insulated from the truth that he cannot see. But perhaps not being able to see at all is more blessed than seeing something which is not there. The latter becomes a delusion or a hallucination. For example, an 89-year old man can look at his image in the mirror but refuse to acknowledge that he is old so he takes a big leap and cracks his bones. In other words a man can see and yet refuse to believe that which he sees either because he is a

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stubborn fool or he has a mistress who titillates him about his youth meanwhile she has her fingers on his purse and her mind on his will. In drawing the analogy one has to extrapolate so that we can visualize the implications of distorted visions on the problems of our country today.

This paper presents four social images in a changing society:

(a) the generation gap
(b) the challenge to the establishment
(c) the revolution of rising expectations
(d) the green revolution.

From an analysis of relevant research findings from the University of the Philippines, College of Agriculture, one can hopefully derive an understanding of related social phenomena which characterize Philippine society today.

A. The Generation Gap

The first social image deals with what others call the *generation gap* but which can be considered as a case of changing beliefs, values and behavior such that one generation differs from the next and within the same generation further changes take place as the children go through the socialization process. A study done by H. A. Cruz [1] illustrates the phenomenon of increasing secularization in religious values and behavior as one goes from parents to children and among the children, further changes take place as they go through a college education. From the data presented in the study, the following trends are evident when the beliefs, attitudes and behavior of parents are compared with those of their children who are freshmen and senior college students:

(1) The proportion of respondents who believe in God declines from 98 percent for parents, 94 for freshmen to 86 percent for Seniors. Although these figures do not say that "God is dying", 49 percent of the Seniors as against 68 percent of the Freshmen have doubts about their belief in God. And the percentages of those who have definite or occasional doubts on church practices go up from 37 of parents, to 39 of freshmen to 74 percent of Seniors. Thirty-four, 26, and 67 percent respectively have definite or occasional objections to religious practices. Further evidences of increasing doubt are evident in lower proportion of Seniors as compared to Freshmen who believe that God is creator; God is merciful; God is not selfish; and that God provides with the difference being most pronounced in the latter concept that God provides. Seventy-two percent of the Freshmen believe in this but only 35 percent of the Seniors subscribe to the idea.

[1] Helen A. Cruz, Religious Orientation and Religious Commitment of Agricultural Students and Their Parents, U.P. College of Agriculture, 1969. (Typescript)

Membership in church organizations among the three groups of respondents is about 18 percent but membership in non-church organizations has increased dramatically from 22 percent of parents and Freshmen but 69 percent of the Seniors. Giving financial contribution to the church, going to confession and communion, going to the priest for help or personal guidance is practiced less by the children than by their parents.

RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES OF PARENTS AND THEIR COLLEGE — EDUCATED CHILDREN

	Parents	*Freshmen*	*Seniors*
	Percents of Respondents		
1. Believe in God	98	94	86
2. Have definite or occasional doubts on practices of the church	37	39	74
3. Have definite or occasional objections to religious practices	34	26	67
4. Membership in church organization	18	18	17
5. Membership in non-church organization	22	22	69
6. Give financial contribution to the church	95	85	81
7. Go to confession at least once a year to as often as possible	76	78	70
8. Go to communion at least once a year to as often as possible	76	87	70
9. Believe in supporting the church from religious service fees	49	22	27
10. Believe in organized fund-raising	3	26	31
11. Go to priest for help or personal guidance	39	32	16
12. Have heard of the ecumenical council	31	47	53
13. Willing to have non-catholics for gangmates	45	65	80
14. Willing to go steady with non-catholic	37	50	73
15. Willing to marry non-catholic	35	39	63
16. Willing to have child become a religious	41	30	12
17. Willing to give up religion to marry non-catholic	33	14	14
(Concept of God)			
18. Believe that God is Creator		95	84
19. Believe that God is merciful		85	69
20. Believe that God is not selfish		92	78
21. Believe that God provides		72	35
22. Have no doubts about belief in God		68	49
Believe in man's efforts as responsible for the following:			
23. Crop yield	62	71	83
24. Choice of spouse	24	48	66
25. Number of children a person can have	19	25	60
26. Man's life span	7	5	12
27. Choice of occupation	73	84	91
28. Income	76	81	92
29. Health	49	58	72
30. Catching colds	15	50	51
31. Believe that science and religion are separate	55	53	69

Source: Helen A. Cruz, Religious Orientation and Religious Commitment of Agricultural Students and Their Parents, U.P. College of Agriculture 1969 (Typescript)

Except for life occurrences such as rain, eclipse and Sun and moon which are clearly attributed to God, winning the Sweepstakes, getting a big catch of fish and meeting accidents which are considered more a matter of luck than of either God's or man's will, the apparently wavering Faith in God and religion is accompanied by an increasing faith in science and belief in man's efforts rather than in luck or God as being responsible for such things as: crop yield, choice of spouse, number of children a person can have, man's life span, choice of occupation, level of income and state of health. Relatively less of the parents and more of the children, (more of the Seniors than of the Freshmen) attribute these events to man's efforts. This is to be expected after a child has gone through four years of exposure to science and the notion that man is master of his fate and therefore, young people would be expected to turn more to man than to God in their search for solutions to their problems. Judging from what is happening now, youth's supplications are certainly directed toward man. Incidentally, when the children were asked as to who had influenced them most about their belief in God, a total of 80 percent mentioned father, mother, relatives and friends. Only about 20 percent mentioned priests and other churchmen. It is tempting at this point to speculate that one possible explanation for less influence from the priests could be the tendency of the latter to talk less and less about God and more and more about something else.

B. The Challenge To The Establishment

Once upon a time, employees, laborers, tenants, servants etc. referred to their "boss" their "chief", their "amo", their "señorito" with a mixture of pride and resignation. Heads of institutions issued circulars, directives, memoranda, etc. and implementation automatically followed down the line. Students used to bow to their teachers in reverent "Good Morning". Superordinate, subordinate relations were quite clear and distinct then and acceptance of one's station in life seemed to be the proper thing to do. Now more than ever, traditional sources of authority and power are being subjected to scrutiny, if not hostility such that an Executive Order could be met by a manifesto and a list of demands; a directive may be greeted with a hail of stones hurled at the windows of the director. If I may use a more fashionable expression—these are just a few instances of what constitutes the present *challenge to the establishment*. But what is the establishment? Is it real or is it just a figure of speech? Does it make any difference in how social issues are perceived by those who belong and those who do not belong to the establishment?

On this last question, a study done by Contado *et al.* [2] on a College campus boycott in 1969 gives us some clues as to the attitudes of different

[2] T. E. Contado *et al.* The Composition of the UPCA Populace and Their Attitude Toward the February 3-10 Incident, College of Agriculture, University of the Philippines, 1970 (Mimeographed).

sectors of the college community toward the boycott. That the so-called *establishment* has a reality in terms of its pattern of response to a protest addressed to it is revealed in the following findings:

(1) In comparing the attitudes of students, non-academic personnel, faculty, and administration, about three-fourth of the first three groups either approved or highly approved of the boycott and the negotiations on the demands presented to the administration. In general, there was a high endorsement of the boycott among these three groups. On the other hand, majority of the administrators either strongly disapproved or disapproved of the boycott.

(2) When asked what they thought was the main cause of the boycott, the administrators again differed markedly from the other three groups, particularly the students. Most of the students attributed the boycott to dissatisfaction with the college administration and the college as an institution while more of the administrators looked at the boycott as something ideological and "gaya-gaya" or a tendency to imitate student movements elsewhere.

(3) Another area of disagreement between the administration and the other three groups is evident in their evaluation of the list of 19 demands presented to the administration. About two-thirds of the administrator respondents thought that only a *few* or *half* of the demands were good. Meanwhile 75 percent of the faculty, 79 percent of the students and 92 percent of the non-academic personnel included in the study said that *most* or *all* of the demands were good. These are four groups of people looking at the same set of stimuli and yet perceiving them differently with the challengers to the status quo considering their demands as "good" while the administration felt otherwise.

(4) In trying to look for factors associated with high endorsement of the boycott, the study found no significant explanation from such variables as age, sex, education and predisposition toward authoritarianism. What showed more meaningful relationship to level of endorsement of the boycott was *position* of the respondent vis-a-vis the "establishment". Among the non-academic personnel, the temporary employees showed higher endorsement of the boycott than those with permanent appointments. Faculty members with professorial ranks had lower endorsement of the boycott (57%) than the instructors (85%) of whom had strongly approved of this particular course of action. Among students, more of the leaders than of the ordinary students approved of the move. Apparently the more "established" a person is in the institution, the less likely he is to challenge the establishment. In other words, those who "belong" tend to perceive the situation differently from those who have yet to belong to the establishment.

MEMBERS OF THE COLLEGE AND THEIR REACTION TO THE BOYCOTT IN THE CAMPUS [3]

	Administration	*Faculty*	*Non-Academic Personnel*	*Students*	*Total*
		Per Cent			
A. General Attitude Toward The Boycott					
Strongly disapprove	6	4	—	—	1
Disapprove	44	11	—	7	9
Neither approve or disapprove	33	20	20	13	17
Approve	17	44	53	51	48
Strongly approve	—	21	27	29	25
	100	100	100	100	100
Total N	18	81	41	146	286
B. Attitude Toward The Boycott During The Negotiation					
Strongly disapprove	23	3	—	1	3
Disapprove	23	10	7	4	7
Neither approve or disapprove	23	19	21	12	15
Approve	31	47	36	60	51
Strongly approve	—	21	36	23	24
	100	100	100	100	100
C. Perception Of The Quality Of Demands Presented					
Few were good	41	10	3	7	9
Half were good	25	15	5	14	14
Most or all were good	34	75	92	79	77
	100	100	100	100	100
D. Perceived Main Cause Of The Boycott					
Dissatisfaction with the College	42	59	51	70	63
A combination of ideological and tendency to imitate other student movements	58	41	49	30	37
	100	100	100	100	100

POSITION IN THE COLLEGE AND GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE BOYCOTT [4]

	Permanent	Temporary	Total
	Per Cent		
A. Non-academic Personnel			
High endorsement	38	47	45
Low endorsement	62	53	55
	100	100	100
Total N	8	29	37

[3] Figures cited here and some conclusions are based on a secondary analysis of data presented by Contado, *et al., op. cit.*

[4] Figures cited here and some conclusions are based on a secondary analysis of data presented by Contado *et. al. op. cit.*

B. ACADEMIC PERSONNEL

		Professors/Instructors		
Low endorsement		1	5	3
Medium endorsement		42	10	23
High endorsement		40	42	41
Very high endorsement		17	43	33
		100	100	100
	Total N	36	45	81

C. STUDENTS

		Student Leaders	Non-Student Leaders	
Low endorsement		38	48	46
Medium endorsement		60	46	49
High endorsement		2	6	5
		100	100	100
	Total N	29	112	141

In the 1970 boycott, the wide base of support for the protest which was observed the previous year did not seem to recur. Because there was no study done on it one can only speculate on theoretical grounds as to possible explanations for the apparently diminished ardor of the second challenge to the establishment. This may be due to:

(1) Actual changes which may have taken place in the system, in the establishment, so to speak.

(2) Previous militants joining the ranks of the establishment and therefore are in no position to challenge it; or they may no longer be in the institution for one reason or another.

(3) Potential or actual militants not being able to take risks with respect to their status vis-a-vis the establishment due to negative sanctions that may be applied to them.

But the boycott in one college campus is really a small and relatively docile event compared to current student activism displayed in demonstrations, parliament of the streets, vigilantes, teach-ins and pickets which have become such a regular feature of daily life that they no longer make the headlines. Student activism is an unanticipated and perhaps originally an underestimated input into the social change process. Student movements in support of social reforms and in protest against such isms as imperialism, feudalism and fascism have not being counted upon by national leaders but they are real and powerful for students are in the best position to challenge the status quo.

In the first place, they have the idealism, energy and even the ideological fervor of various shades and colors which propel them to action either to change the existing social order or to set up a new one. Secondly, the

status of students is impermanent and their greatest asset is youth. As such they have not had the time to develop vested interests except those that pertain to the vested interests of youth and of those who may be utilizing students to promote their own self-interest. For example, children of landlords and other people in power have not as yet assumed or taken over the status which their parents occupy and therefore there is less appreciation of what they would actually lose if a change in the status quo occurs. Because youth is also a stage in one's life when peer-group influence is strong and offers social support for one's "radical" behavior, students may even feel guilty for the "sins" of their parents. This is a case where the children exert a liberalizing influence on their parent's behavior. Additional assets of students as advocates of reform lie in the fact that the social sanctions which can be brought to bear upon them for protesting against the existing power structure are not like those which can easily be applied to employees, tenants, laborers or teachers whose challenge to the establishment can easily be met with retaliatory measures such as: loss of job, inability to move up the organization especially where alternative work opportunities are limited or non-existent. Furthermore, as students they have the impatience, the time, the centralized location which easily lends itself to organized activity and the requisite ability to articulate their demands either in passive or active styles. Where else can one obtain the concentrated numbers that can be mobilized for action from colleges and universities? Moreover, students are not yet faced with responsibility of having to spell out all the unglamorous specific details incident to the radical changes which all of them seem to advocate. In other words they are not encumbered by the difficult realities that accompany the task of bringing about change. They are not limited by what cannot be done as defined by the establishment. Instead, they are fired by beliefs in what should be done. Earlier the strategy evolved in dealing with student activism is to give allowance for the impulsiveness of youth not realizing that the so-called "concessions", granted to soothe youth's demands, are actual cumulative, expansive and very contagious. It has a demonstration effect on adults. Actually the unexpressed and unfulfilled revolt of the underprivileged adults in our society finds fulfillment in student protests. In many ways, students are ahead of us. We tend to be wrapped up with our little fields of specialization, our jobs and families and the world of crass materialism and moving ahead while the students appear to be worrying about our national and even international problems. Most of us find this difficult to understand because our student days were quite different. We danced, sang, paraded, played hookey, studied occasionally, fell in and out of love but we did not carry the burdens of the world on our shoulders, the way our present day students seem to. And when their demands produce results potential power is actualized and the establishment is shaken up. Suddenly, it is threatened and the image of invincibility is tarnished.

C. Revolution of Rising Expectations

In our not so distant past, it was considered virtuous to accept one's fortune in life with resignation for it was God's will. But with increasing exposure to the good things in life either directly or vicariously and through the socialization process both at home and in school, the motion of predestination is challenged and the role of man in determining his own destiny is increasingly recognized. Somehow within our own society and in spite of all the social constraints operating, we aspire for a better life and learn to expect attainment of our dreams in greater or larger measure. But one of the ironies of achievement is that those who have, want to have even more.

For some insights into the nature of this phenomenon, let me cite F. A. de Leon's [4] study which was done in an agro-industrial estate well-known for its progressive production, labor, and welfare policies. It offers such things as: free quarters, light, water, medical and dental care, hospitalization, subsidized rice and sugar, annual x'mas and crop bonuses, educational facilities for elementary, high school and even an adult school, movies, community TV sets, reading centers, equipped playgrounds, scholarships, market, cooperative store, church and priest. Given such a setting, industrial and agricultural workers in the estate were studied with respect to their social and economic aspirations. When asked how they felt about their present occupation, 75 percent of the industrial and 84 percent of the agricultural workers said they were contented with their jobs. A confirmatory evidence of this contentment is noted in the fact that 96 percent of the industrial and 98 percent of the agricultural workers would not accept job outside the estate if offered the same salary. Even a ₱50 addition in monthly salary would not be enough temptation for them to leave if it means separation from the family. They also felt that this wage increase would not be sufficient to offset the privileges of free house, light and water which they enjoy.

Although these findings speak well of management and of the status quo, other data from the same study point to different implications for the future. For example, in terms of education for themselves, half of the workers would not like to study further even if given a chance. However, among those who want to, more industrial workers would like vocational training and college education while more agricultural workers prefer elementary and high school education only. For a meaningful perspective with which to interpret this and other findings which will be cited, it should be pointed out that industrial workers as a category have higher education, higher income, higher level of living and are more skilled than agricultural workers. Of greater relevance to social change is the workers' aspiration for their children. Ninety-two percent of the industrial and 56 percent of the agricultural workers want college education for their children. When asked how

much education their children could attain considering socio-economic limitations only about half of the respondents who aspire for college education expect their children to actually reach that. In spite of workers' expressed contentment with their present occupation, only 36 percent of the industrial and 51 percent of the agricultural workers want their children to work in the same place. Only 20 and 19 percent, respectively, want to have their children follow their footsteps in terms of having the same occupation. Sixty-four percent of industrial and 49 percent of agricultural workers prefer to see thir children in white-collar jobs outside the estate. Parents' reasons for choosing different occupations for their children were: (1) desire to prevent their children from encountering the same difficulties they had and (2) the belief that their children who have better education should have much better and easier occupations preferably of the white-collar type. In general, these findings show that industrial workers who have higher status also have higher aspirations and expectations than agricultural workers who have lower education, lower income, etc. But equally important is the observed discrepancy between aspirations and expectations as revealed in this and other studies conducted among farmers.[5] Asked about educational aspirations 49 percent want college education for their children but only 7 percent of those who have these aspirations expect fulfillment at that level. Instead, elementary schooling is all they expect. Thirty-nine percent of the farmers prefer white-collar jobs for their children but only 6 percent expect this to happen. Farming is a more realistic expectation for them although about a third of the respondents do not know what the future holds for their children both in terms of education and occupation.

What are the social implications of the discrepancy between aspirations and expectation? To the extent that people scale down their ambitions to suit reality then a resigned acceptance of fate results. However, if the so-called "realities of life" are challenged and some people feel that they do not have an equal opportunity as others to have their wishes come true then we have a revolution of rising frustrations. In the present environment of protest, this is most likely. But perhaps what is more explosive than the discrepancy between aspirations and expectations is the question as to how many of those who succeed in getting a college education actually land jobs which eventually help them toward upward social mobility. As our national statistics show, there is a sizeable number of persons who are educated but unemployed. Recently, the government launched nation-wide manpower training programs in order to improve employability. Such programs which bring together unemployed but relatively skilled and educated individuals raise hopes about eventually finding jobs. To the extent that these hoped-for

[5] These data were obtained from a research project on Social and Political Factors in Barrio Development conducted in 1963 by Staff Member of the U.P. College of Agriculture.

jobs do not materialize through these programs they can contribute substantially to violent repercussions because they help in the crystallization of meaningful social groups which were otherwise an amorphous statistical category referred to as the *educated unemployed.* Present-day expressions of protest and revolt become attractive to them as an object for focusing their time on. They have nothing to lose especially because it is possible to participate in these mass actions without necessarily exposing one's individual identity hence danger of jeopardizing one's future employment opportunity with the establishment is not always immanent. As a matter of fact, the coercive power of mass actions is perceived as a chance to improve one's opportunities in life by changing the existing social structure. While this remains to be seen, the hope is there.

D. The Green Revolution [6]

Our farmers have been characterized as traditional, superstitious and resistant to change although we have called them rhetorically as the "backbone of the nation". With the advent of miracle rice varieties and the inception of the so-called green revolution, the question was whether such traditional and subsistence-oriented farmers would accept an ultra modern product of science. The answer to this is now part of the well-known Philippine success in rice production. The lessons from this story and their implications for our other problems are as follows:

(1) If change has been possible in one of the most traditional sectors in our society, change in other aspects of our social life may not be impossible provided we make a similar all-out commitment to it.

(2) That in attempting to change varieties and rice cultivation practices, we also attempted institutional reforms and even changes in the change agent which if not pursued further and sustained might put an end to the "greening" countryside.

(3) Ironically although many social scientists were pessimistic and skeptical about the rice farmers' ability to respond to the new technology as soon as the positive evidences of acceptance became widespread, the pessimism shifted to whether the farmers or the developing society in general could cope with the second-generation problems arising from the spread of the innovation. These types of questions are picturesquely summarized in "The Green Revolution: Cornucopia or Pandora's Box?" [7] Actually it is not an

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[6] For more details see G. T. Castillo, Technology and Social Change. The Case of Miracle Rice, *Solidarity,* Vol. 3, No. 12, Dec. 1968, pp. 37-47 and G.T. Castillo, "Agricultural Innovation and Patterns of Rural Life" (Paper presented at the SEADAG Meeting on *Agriculture Innovation in SE Asia: The Implications for Development,* N.Y. City, June 24 to 27, 1969.

[7] C. R. Wharton, Jr., "The Green Revolution: Cornucopia or Pandora's Box", *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 47, No. 3, April, 1969.

either-or problem because the issue of Pandora's Box would have never arisen if the green revolution had not brought cornucopia.

(4) The green revolution has earned for the scientist a greater respect from our politicians and policy-makers. This constitutes a major breakthrough because it has dramatized for us the potentials of strategies that harness science and technology for our development.

(5) Although rice in an innocent looking plant, when combined with other social ingredients such as land reform, etc. the inter-actions among these factors bring about ruptures in the social structure as in the effects of high yielding varieties on rental of land when a tenant shifts from share to leasehold. It will be recalled that rental is fixed as 25 percent of the average yield of three preceding crop years. Who gets the better end of the bargain depends upon when the high yielding varieties were used relative to the declaration of an area as land reform area and whether or not increase in yield is known to the landlord and is acknowledged by the tenant. At any rate the green revolution is not an inconsequential variable in our current efforts to develop.

E. What Lies Ahead?

Each one of us occupy a position in society, whether we be young or old, members or non-members of the establishment, parent or child, rich or poor, traditional or modern and as we ponder on the problems of today and look at ourselves in the mirror, may we be reminded of the fact that if we enjoy the comforts of our image now there are others who do not. What can we expect? If members of the establishment acquire a social conscience either voluntarily or coercively and take steps toward social, economic and political reform, then we *might* yet live happily ever after. Note that I said *if* and *might* because sometimes there is an incongruence between public image and personal-private reality as exemplified by the man who espouses social justice but does not even give his household help a decent meal; the man who preaches on the evils of population explosion but has at least seven children to his credit and an eighth on the way; the man who denounces graft and corruption but turns to the nearest "fixer" to reduce his income tax payments; the man who heaps all the responsibility for change on others but prefers status quo for himself. Needless to say, established vested interests here and elsewhere have not been known to give up readily whatever power they have enjoyed. Furthermore, experiences in other parts of the world and especially in the United States with respect to the Blacks indicate that "social eruptions" are even much more prevalent precisely when things have improved for the underprivileged group. For it is when improvements have actually materialized for them, that they per-

ceive increased probabilities of success in achieving their goal — that of obtaining an equal or larger share of the good things in life.

What lies ahead of us? Is it possible that Philippine society which has been known for its resiliency will also learn to live with its *social volcano* such that we will remain for a while on the verge of an eruption, without that eruption ever becoming a reality? Will our basic social structure remain unchanged in spite of a steaming surface, because we are learning how to manage that steam? Or can we expect a major explosion which will so dislocate existing social arrangements that a realignment of social relationships become inevitable? Unfortunately, the mirror on the wall only reflects the present image; it is not a crystal ball that probes far into the future.

THE ZEN CONCEPT OF EMPTINESS

VIOLETA H. ADORABLE

IN THE PAST FEW DECADES THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASING INTEREST in Zen, not confined only to students of Asian philosophy. The peculiar fascination for minds of Zen lies in the fact that it is markedly different from any other form of Buddhism, one might even say from any other form of conventional religion or philosophy.

In its methods of instruction Zen is unique. It dispenses with all forms of theorizing, doctrinal instruction and strict formality; these are treated as mere symbols of wisdom. There is a radical departure from the old pattern of monkish brotherhood, whether Christian or anything else, in that the Zen monks have not always engaged in offering prayers, doing acts of penance or performing other so-called deeds of piety nor in studying canonical books. For Zen is founded on practice and on an intimate, personal experience of reality, a vigorous attempt to come into direct contact with the truth itself without allowing theories and symbols to stand between th knower and the known.

This paper is concerned only with the concept of emptiness (Sanskrit, *sunyata*) in Zen Buddhism. The interest is based on the belief that only an understanding of this doctrine will give a clue as to what Zen itself is.

Although there are many schools of Buddhism, each with something different to offer, all generally agree on a few general concepts deemed fundamental to Buddhism.[1] These include belief in the theory of Karma translated to mean not only action but also includes what all that an individual being speaks and thinks. According to this theory all the phenomena of the universe or of the universe of an individual sentient being are the manifestations of his mind. Whenever he acts, speaks or even thinks, his mind is doing something, and that something must produce results, no matter how far in the future. Belief in this theory is the basis for belief in another doctrine — the doctrine of reincarnation, according to which past Karma will determine the form of future existence. The present life of a sentient being is only one aspect in this whole process. Death is not the end of his being. It is only another aspect of the process. What an individual is in this life, comes as a result of what he did in the past, and what he does in the present will determine what he will be in the future. This chain of causation

[1] For a general discussion of the fundamental concept of Buddhism see Fung-Yu-Lan, *History of Chinese Philosophy*, Vol. II (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1953) pp. 237-292.

is what is called the wheel of Birth and Death. It is the main source of the sufferings undergone by individual sentient beings.

This theory of causation that all things depend on causes and conditions for this origination, provides the starting point for the viewpoint that what is produced by causes is not produced by itself, and does not exist in itself. Because all things are produced by causes and conditions they do not have any independent reality; they do not possess any self-nature. When these causes and conditions disappear, these things also disappear. Hence they are said to be empty. This theory implies the falseness of physical existence — the impermanence and non-reality of the whole phenomenal world.[2]

Ignorance of the true nature of things according to Buddhism is the main source of man's misery. All things in the universe are manifestations of the mind and are illusory and impermanent, yet the individual ignorantly craves for and cleaves to them. This fundamental ignorance is called non-enlightenment. From ignorance come the craving for and cleaving to life because of which the individual is bound to the eternal wheel of Birth and Death from which he can never escape. The only hope for escape lies in replacing ignorance with enlightenment.

Zen like all other various Buddhist schools attempts to contribute something to this enlightenment. Zen is a Japanese word derived from the Chinese *Ch'an* or *Ch'an-na,* which is a transliterated form of the Sanskrit *dhyana.*[3] The translation of *dhyana* is meditation or a concentrated state of consciousness, which is misleading for what Zen proposes to do is to bring about enlightenment through the awakening of a higher spiritual power so as to bring about union with reality itself. This power called *prajna* in Sanskrit is regarded as the highest form of intuition humans are capable of possessing.[4] By exercise of this intuitive power an individual can attain what is known as the "supreme enlightenment".

Briefly, Zen, a sect which belongs to the Mahayana branch of Buddhism, teaches that man suffers because of his craving to possess and keep forever things which are essentially impermanent or empty. The most important possession regarded by man is his own person. He identifies himself with this person and regards it as his castle into which he can retreat, isolate and assert himself against external forces. What man fails to see is that it is not possible for him to isolate himself from life and that only a false sense of isolation is achieved by identifying himself with this castle, the person. For the Buddha taught that all things including this castle are essentially impermanent. Because this castle is impermanent, it has no abiding reality;

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[2] See Kenneth W. Morgan, editor, *The Path of the Buddha* (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1956) pp. 24-26.

[3] Daisetz T. Suzuki, *Zen and Japanese Buddhism* (Tokyo: Japan Travel Bureau, 1958), p. 3.

[4] *Ibid.*

it is empty of any self-nature. A phenomenal human being is only a conglomeration of the five aggregates: material body, sensation, perception, predisposition, and consciousness. At any moment a man is but a momentary collection of these five aggregates, a combination of physical matter and mental energies as forces. As these change every moment so does the composition. He is only a continuous living entity which does not remain the same for two consecutive moments, which comes into being and disappear as soon as it arises.[5] This is also true of all things in the universe, they are all illusory and impermanent, yet the individual ignorantly craves for and cleaves to them. The frustration to possess things whether a person or a thing is the immediate cause of suffering, for as soon as man tries to possess them they slip away. The idea of possession is illusory, for apart from the fact that all things must eventually pass away into some other form and can never remain in one place for eternity, at the root of possession lies the desire that things shall not alter in any way, and this is a complete impossibility.

If the person is empty, and is no more the Self than any other changing object, what then is the Self? The answer to this question is not very clear, but the Buddha taught that when man no longer resists life from behind the barrier of his person he finds that the Self is more than his own being, it includes the whole universe. In other words, in contrast to the philosophy of isolation the Buddha proclaimed the unity of all living things. Enlightenment is the attainment of understanding — that all separate entities are without self and without permanence. But this denial in Zen is completed with an affirmation. While denying the existence of the self in any particular thing, it finds it in the totality of things. Allan Watts in his book, *The Spirit of Zen,* attempts to shed light on the process of enlightenment or of coming into direct contact with the truth itself. He wrote:

> "Thus enlightenment is to deny the self in the castle, to realize that Self is not this person called "I" as distinct from that persons called "You", but that it is both "I" and "You" and everything else included.... Life is therefore affirmed by declaring that all things are taken separately, there is no self".[6]

In Zen as well as in all Buddhist sects belonging to the Mahayana branch of Buddhism, this fundamental unity which pervades all the differences and particular of the world is present in all sentient beings. This reality is called the "Mind" or the "Buddha-nature". Every sentient being possesses this reality, only he does not realize that he has it. This ignorance is what binds him to the wheel of Birth and Death. The necessity therefore is for him first to realize that he has it originally within him, and then by learning practice to "see" his own Buddha-nature.

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[5] Morgan, *op. cit.,* pp. 24-26.
[6] Allan Watts, *The Spirit of Zen* (London: Butler and Tanner Ltd., 1955), p. 22.

The truth of Zen, it is often said, is missed because it is so obvious. Thus a poem by Hakuin translated by Professor Suzuki entitled the "Song of Meditation" runs like this:

> All beings are from the very beginning the Buddhas,
> It is like ice and water,
> Apart from water no ice can exist
> Outside sentient beings, where do we seek the Buddha?
> Not knowing how near Truth is
> People seek it far away.....
> They are like him who, in the midst of water
> Cries out in thirst so imploringly.[7]

The great truth of Zen then is to be found everywhere — with everyone and everything, whether its presence is realized or not. It is no more the property of wise men than of fools and lunatics, for the Buddha-nature is common to all. The rare treasure is the capacity to see the Truth. Man often misses the truth for he is too proud to look for the sublime in the ordinary affairs of his life. He does not see it in human beings, least of all in himself or in the incidents of every day life.

Thus Zen found the followers of the Mahayana looking for truth in the scriptures, in holy men believing that they would reveal it to them if they lived the good life. But Zen taught that nobody could find the Buddha in any heavenly realm until he had first found it in himself and in other sentient beings, and nobody could expect to find it in a hermitage unless he is capable of finding it in the life of the world. For the first principle is that all things, however insignificant and evil they appear to be, contains the Buddha-nature.

Hui-neng, the sixth patriarch of the Zen school of Buddhism in China and regarded as the real founder of Zen sect, wrote a verse before he was appointed patriarch which expresses his understanding of Zen and the emptiness of mere conceptions and analogies.

> Neither is there Buddhi-tree
> Nor yet a mirror bright
> Since in reality all is void
> Whereon can the dust fall? [8]

In contrast a learned scholar Jinshu wrote advocating learning and the practire of *dhyana* as a necessary means to enlightenment:

> And the body is like unto the Buddhi-tree
> And the mind to a mirror bright
> Keep it clean all the time
> And let not dust accumulate.[9]

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[7] *Ibid.*, p. 46.
[8] Fung-Yu-Lan, *op. cit.*, p. 391.
[9] *Ibid.*

Hui-neng although not necessarily against *dhyana* discipline emphasized the importance of *prajna*-intuition. The mind-mirror, according to Jinshu was liable to be stained by external objects and extreme care had to be taken to guard against this possibility. Hui-neng on the other hand, found the mind-mirror forever in a state of purity and beyond the possibility of defilement by external objects. Going even further, he claimed that there was from the first nothing to be described as a bright mind-mirror. This negation did not mean that he advocated nihilism. His was a form of transcendentalism, transcending all forms of relativity or what the Buddhist call the doctrine of "emptiness". Emptiness is not outside this world. Still, it has to be distinguished from relativity, which is a characteristic of the world of human beings. Not belonging in the category of relativity, emptiness is not at all communicable in any ordinary logical way. It is inexpressible in words and inconceivable in thought. But because we human beings all aspire to perfect communication, we attempt to use a medium, language, to impart our experiences. Because the experience is not something intellectual which can be imparted, we are bound to fail in our attempts to communicate, for whatever communication that is at all effective, takes place only between minds that share the same experience. As a result, Zen often remains silent and claims for special transmission outside doctrinal teaching.

> No dependence on letters or words
> Pointing directly at the mind in everyone of us
> And seeing into one's nature, whereby one attains Buddhahood."[10]

Emptiness is a metaphysical term, and the followers of Zen who are more concerned with individual personality, identify Emptiness with "mind" or the "Buddha-nature." "Pointing directly at the mind" means attaining it by the awakening of *prajna*-intuition, though there is really nothing to take hold of or to attain as "mind." Mind is no-mind, and this reality is *sunya*-empty, or void, the mind being *wu* (non-being) possesses no attributes about which anything can be said.[11] It can be called "mind" or referred to by any other name since we wish to speak about it and give it some designation. The result is, as the Ch'anists and Taoist often say, that one "falls into the net of words". The patriarch Ma-tsu, a disciple of the disciple of Hui-neng was once asked: "Why do you say that the very mind is Buddha?" Ma-tsu replied: "I simply want to stop the crying of children." The student asked further, "Suppose they do not stop crying?" "Then not mind, not Buddha," was the answer.[12]

Ma-tsu was also asked the question, "What kind of man is he who is not linked to all things?" The patriarch answered: "Wait until in one gulp

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[10] Suzuki, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

[11] In the Taoist system there is a distinction between *yu* (being) and *wu* (non-being). See Fung-Yu-Lan, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy* (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1960), pp. 100-101.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 257-258.

you can drink up all the water in the West River, then I will tell you." [13] Since such an act is obviously impossible, Ma-tsu is simply letting the student know that what he is asking about is not answerable. For he who is not linked to all things is one who transcends all things.

To express the idea of *wu* another story is told that once Budhhiharna who, according to legend, introduced Zen into China, was brought before the Emperor Wu. "The emperor anxious to meet the sage and to obtain approval of his devout works told the sage about the temples he built, the holy scriptures he had copied and the monks and nuns he ordered to be converted. The emperor asked, 'Is there any merit Reverend Sir in our conduct?' 'No merit at all,' answered the sage. The emperor was upset and thought that such answers were contrary to the teaching of Buddhism, and he asked further, 'What then, is the holy truth, the first principle?' 'In vast emptiness there is nothing holy.' " [14]

Since the First Principle is not something about which anything can be said, the best way to express it is to remain silent. Thus the Zen masters often resorted to silence or negation to express the truth. Being inexpressible and inconceivable, this reality can only be apprehended by intuition directly, completely, and instantly. Intellectual analysis can only divide and describe and scratch the surface but cannot apprehend the fundamental reality. The early masters of Zen devised a means of passing on their teaching which can never be explained away by the intellect. Since the knowledge of the reality is knowledge that is non-knowledge, it follows that it cannot be apprehended through the use of the intellect. The aim therefore of Zen is to throw off all the external paraphernalia which the intellect has woven around the soul and to see directly into the innermost nature of our being.

Conscious efforts also in reciting the sutras, worshipping the Buddha images or performing the rituals are really of no avail and should be abandoned. Instead, one should allow the mind to operate freely spontaneously and naturally. The mind must be calmed and must not have conscious thought. In any conscious thought there is the ego at work, making for the distinction between subject and object. Conscious thought also begets *karma,* which ties one down to the endless cycle of birth and death and breeds attachment to external objects.

Doshin, the fourth patriarch of Zen in Japan, is said to have understood how the teaching and discipline of Zen were to be oriented. To the question of how one can attain to clearness and purity of mind, he answered:

> No invoking the Buddha's name, no contemplation on the mind, no deliberation, no scattering of thought, only let things flow on as they would, never let them pass away nor let them stay on; be one, be alone, clean all of appendages, and ultimately the mind will all by itself be clear unspoiled.[15]

[13] *Ibid.*
[14] Watts, *op. cit.,* p. 29.
[15] Suzuki, *op. cit.,* pp. 24-27.

Hui-neng expressed the same view when he gave the instructions to realize "no-mind," "no form," and "no abiding," and to keep *prajna* ever flowing with no obstructions.[16] To realize this is to follow the "concentration exercise in "one-ness',, defined by Hui-neng as disciplining oneself in "straight forwardness." [17] When a man is altogether free and has no attachment to any object, he can perform his task without deliberate effort or purposeful mind. He lives a life of no-merit or purposelessness. This is exactly what the Taoists called *wu-wei* (non-action) and *wu hsin* (no mind).[18] This is also what Tao-Sheng, a Chinese Buddhist teacher, meant when he said that "a good deed does not entail retribution." [19] When one acts spontaneously, without deliberate effort, choice, or discrimination, one is practicing *wu-wei* or non-action and at the same time practicing wu-hsin or no mind. Following these principles of *wu-wei* and *wu-hsin* means that one has no craving for, or cleaving to, things, even though one may pursue various activities. Under these circumstances, one's *karma* will not entail any retribution or effect. The aim in doing things then is not to obtain good effects, no matter how good these effects may be in themselves. Rather the aim is to entail no effects at all. When all one's actions entail no effects, then after the effects of previously accumulated *karma* have exhausted themselves, one will gain emancipation from the wheel of Birth and Death and achieve enlightenment.

To achieve Buddhahood, there is no place for deliberate effort. The only method is to carry on one's ordinary and uneventful tasks; thus a Zen master when asked, "What is the Tao?" replied immediately "Usual life is the very Tao" [20] It meant simply to carry on one's ordinary and uneventful tasks like wearing one's clothes, eating when hungry, sleeping when tired. All one should do is to pursue the ordinary tasks of one's everyday life, and nothing more. What the Zen masters emphasized is that to achieve reality does not require special acts such as the ceremonies and the prayers of institutionalized religion. One should simply try to be without a purposeful mind or any attachment to anything in one's daily life. Cultivation then results from the mere carrying on of the common and simple affairs of daily life.

Though all the Zen schools have the same aim which is the realization of the innermost mind, they differ in the methods and techniques to reach that end.[21] The Lin-chi or Rinzai branch for instance makes use of the shout, the stick, and the *koan* methodology, in which the masters may pose a riddle or a problem like "What is the sound of one hand clapping?" or "How do you get the goose out of the bottle without breaking the bottle" [22]

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16 *Ibid.*, p. 27.
17 *Ibid.*
18 Fung Yu-Lan, *op. cit.*, p. 249.
19 *Ibid.*
20 Watts, *op. cit.*, p. 47.
21 Suzuki, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37.
22 Watts, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-70.

There is really no intellectual solution to the riddle. The *koan* is meant to stimulate the student to the realization that logic, reason, and conceptualization are stumbling blocks to his awakening and to induce him to resort to resources other than logic and reason, resources that he has hitherto not utilized. This branch of Zen also accepts the idea that words are not necessary to express the truth.

When the Zen follower apprehends the Buddha-nature within himself, he experiences an awakening or an enlightenment called *satori* in Japanese, an awareness of the undifferentiated unity of all existence. He is now one with the whole universe. He sees all particulars and differentiation merged into one fundamental unity. He is no longer troubled by problems and incidents. Such a man practices what the Zen masters call *no-mindness* and *no-thought-ness*. He is also a man who has realized the doctrine of *sunyata*, the emptiness and impermanence of all things. He is a man who has found spiritual freedom, for he is free of all intellectual and material encumbrances. Realizing the evanescence of the outer world, of his own ideas, and of the ego itself, he ceases to cling to these transient forms. Yet this negative aspect of Zen, this giving up, is only another way of expressing the positive fact that to give up everything is to gain all. For included in the realization of the concept of emptiness is a complete affirmation and acceptance of life, with its magic-like transformations and unending changes. In other words, non-attachment does not mean running away from things to some peaceful refuge, for it is impossible to escape from our own illusions about life. They remain with us everywhere we go. Non-attachment therefore means not running away from life but keeping pace with the rhythm of life, for causeless and unconditional freedom comes through complete acceptance of reality.

Thus, the Zen student gains all, by denying all—for ordinary possessiveness is lost which consists actually of denying the right of people and things to live and change. Hence the only loss in Zen is the loss of this denial.

The concept of emptiness in Zen therefore brings awareness that life is something essentially ungraspable and indefineable—never for a moment remaining the same. Thus when the Zen masters tell their pupils to "walk on" and to "let go"— it is only one way of telling them to accept life as that which cannot be made anyone's property, which is always free and unlimited.

When at last it is realized that life can never be caught, a joining of "self" and "life" into close unity and rhythm, a direct contact with the changing and moving process which is the Buddha-nature perpetually manifesting itself is effected. To know the Buddha-nature is to know life apart from interruptions, the chief of which was the concept of the self as an entity distinct from life, occupied intently with its own private reactions to reality as distinct from reality itself.

From all these, it can be deduced that Zen can be defined as the unity of "self" and "life" into so close a unity that the distinction between the two disappears. In the words of Professor Watts, this state of unity is "a state of One-ness in which all distinctions of "I" and not-I, knower and known, sees and seen are set aside." [23]

The Zen masters assert, however, that this apprehension does not mean the acquisition of something new; it means only the realization of something that has always been present in him. The only trouble is that he has not been aware of this, because of ignorance and folly. In this state of awakening, when the mind is calm and tranquil, when the conscious self is eliminated, the mysterious inner mind takes over, and the actor performs his action automatically and spontaneously. Such a state of awakening can be repeated many times.

Now in what ways has Zen, particularly the concept of emptiness, been translated into thought and action?

It may seem strange that Zen exerted any influence at all in Bushido the "way of the Warrior," but it was chiefly Zen that was studied by the samurai. According to Ienaga Saburo, a specialist in the history of Japanese thought, only those who "feel the extreme of suffering" can grasp the meaning of the logic of negation or denial.[24] For it is only they who can understand Buddhism's basic dialectical movement — a movement consisting of absolute denial of the actual and as a result of denial the return to absolute affirmation on another plane. Thus, according to Ienaga, Prince Shokoku Taishi who transcended his time, was the first to clearly understand the Buddhist logic of negation when he said that "the world is empty and false, only the Buddha is true." [25]

This is simply saying that the negative aspect of Zen, the giving up, was only another way of expressing the positive fact that to give up everything, is to gain all. It is the view of Ienaga that the contradictions of suffering could not really be felt in the deepest sense by the aristocrats. As a result of this, it was not the nobles but those who despaired of their salvation who first grasped the doctrine of denial — the warriors, the hunters, the monks who had broken their vows, the prostitutes, etc., whose very way of life bound them to the cycle of birth and death and who had very little hope of salvation. They readily understood the logic of negation, a denial that value resides in man and that salvation can be achieved alone through human effort.

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[23] *Ibid.*, p. 131.

[24] Robert Bellah, "Ienaga and the Search for Meaning in Modern Japan," *Japanese Changing Attitude Toward Modernization*, Marius Jansen, editor; (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 382.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 380.

For the samurai, the problem was one of preserving their mental stability.[26] They were constantly facing death for in a feudal Japan internal wars between rival *daimyo* (barons) often occurred. The Zen concept of emptiness sustained them in two ways: Acceptance of the concept of *sunyata* made possible the disciplining of themselves in "straight forwardness" or "single-mindedness" of going right ahead without looking back once the course is decided upon. They also gathered strength from a concept that gave them a certain philosophical understanding of the question of life and death. For the most capable and efficient samurai was one who would not hesitate to give up his life when the occasion called for it. Here again, emptiness sustained them, for it taught that life and death were but aspects of the same existence and asserted that denial of existence of self in any particular thing is to gain unity with life.

"The samurai is good for nothing unless he can go beyond life and death. When it is said that all things are of one mind, you may think that there is such a thing as to be known as mind. But the fact is that a mind attached to life and death must be abandoned, when you can execute wonderful deeds."[27] This is simply a repetition of Hui-neng's instructions to realize "no-mind" and "no-abiding."

This was stated by the great Zen master Takuan, and it simply means that when one attains the state or mind of "no-mind-ness," all things are accomplished. It is a mind released from the thought of death, a mind no longer bothered by questions of immortality.

Let us now consider the relationship between the principle of emptiness and the art of swordmanship. The practice of this art like all the other arts studied in Japan are not intended for utilitarian purposes only or for purely aesthetic enjoyment. They are also meant to train the mind, indeed, to bring it into contact with the ultimate reality.

People of the West, particularly, may wonder how Zen came to be so intimately related to the art of killing. They are puzzled as to how Zen can endorse the art of swordmanship as Buddhism is considered a religion of compassion. Students of Oriental culture however, come to understand the relationship when they learn that whatever field of art the Japanese may study they always emphasize the importance of the "subjective" side of it, giving only a secondary, almost negligible, consideration of its technique. In other words they give an added significance to art by turning it into an opportunity for their spiritual enhancement, and this consists in advancing toward the realization of the Tao or the Heavenly nature in man or the emptiness or suchness of things.

In feudal Japan the "sword is considered the soul of the samurai."[28] The sword became intimately connected with the life of the samurai and

[26] For discussion of Zen and the samurai see, D. T. Suzuki, *Zen and Japanese Culture* (New York: Panthem Books Inc., 1959), pp. 62-85.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 89.

became the symbol of loyalty, self-sacrifice and benevolence, as well as the symbol of dignity and honor.

In his book, *Zen Buddhism and Japanese Culture,* Mr. Suzuki quotes from a letter written by Master Takuan to Yagyu Tajima concerning the close relationship between Zen and the art of swordsmanship. The letter touches upon the essential teaching of Zen, i.e. the concept of emptiness as well as the secrets of art in general. [29] In this letter Takuan advised Tajima to attain a certain state of mind known as *mushin. Mushin* literarily means "no-mind." It is the mind negating itself, letting go itself from itself, a solidly frozen mind allowing itself to relax into a state of perfect unguardedness.[30] In Buddhism, as explained previously, this means transcending all forms of life and death, good and evil, being and non-being. Attainment of this state of mind is important for the master knows that technique alone will never make a man the perfect sword player. The spirit of inner experience (*satori*) must back the art, and this spirit is gained only by looking deeply into the inmost recesses of the mind. This spirit is grasped only when one's mind is in complete harmony with the principle of life itself, that is when one attains *mushin* or "no-mind."

When this is attained, the mind moves from one topic or object to another, flowing like a stream of water, filling every possible corner and consequently fulfilling every function required of it.[31] This is also what Takuan meant when he gave the instruction to maintain "absolute fluidity" of the mind.[32] When the mind fails to attain *mushin,* the mind is intellectually burdened; it cannot move from one object to another without stopping and reflecting on itself, thus obstructing its innate fluidity. The mind then coagulates before it makes a second move, because the first move still lingers there—"which is *suki* for the swordsman—the one thing to be avoided with the utmost scrupulosity." [33] This corresponds to the mind conscious of itself. It was emphasized that thinking although useful in many ways, must be discarded on occasions when it interferes with the work at hand. On these occasions, it must be left behind, and the 'unconscious" or the mysterious inner mind must be allowed to come forward. In such cases, the self is forgotten, and it becomes an instrument in the hands of the "unknown." This unknown power has no ego-consciousness, and consequently no thought of winning or losing the contest, whatever the contest maybe, because it moves at the level of non-duality, where there is neither subject nor object. Applied to swordsmanship, when the unconscious is allowed to come forward the sword will move where it ought to move making victory inevitable.

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[29] *Ibid.,* pp. 95-100

[30] *Ibid.,* p. 110. *Mushin* is actually identical with the Taoist and Buddhist principle of *wu-hsin* or "no-mind-ness."

[31] *Ibid.,* p. 111

[32] *Ibid.,* p. 108

[33] Suki, literally means any space between two objects where something else can enter. See Suzuki, *Ibid.,* p. 143.

In Japan and also in China therefore the arts are not a matter of technology but of spiritual insight and training. Swordsmanship is no exception. It is a deadly art, for when a man makes one false move he is sure to lose his life. What Takuan and the other masters are telling their pupils is that technique alone is not sufficient. It is necessary to acquire an inner light on the psychology of swordsmanship. On the basis of experience among swordmasters, it is contended that the beginner however fearless and strong he maybe at the start, loses his self-confidence and loses self-consciousness, as soon as he begins taking lessons. He becomes aware of all the technical possibilities by which his life may be endangered. The result is that he is worse off than before he started in spite of his newly mastered technique of training his senses to be alert to keep a sharp watch on his opponent, and of correctly parrying his opponent's thrusts. He is now forced to concede that he is at the mercy of everyone who has a superior technique — someone more agile and practised than he. Now he sees no other way open to him but to practice unceasingly until he acquires a brilliant technique. Still in spite of this he is no nearer to his goal of acquiring the secret of swordsmanship.

The reason, according to Takuan, is that he cannot stop himself from watching closely every movement of the sword of his opponent, always thinking how he can best come at him, waiting to strike when his opponent drops his guard. But as soon as this happens, he is sure to be beaten, for he has failed to keep his mind in a state of "perfect fluidity," causing his mind to stop no matter how briefly. This psychical stoppage is explained as coming from a much deeper source.[34] When there is the slightest feeling of fear or attachment to life, the mind loses its fluidity. On the other hand, when the mind is free of all fears and attachments, it will not know any hindrances, any inhibitions or stoppages. The swordsman is warned to keep his mind always in a state of emptiness so that his freedom of action will never be obstructed. To keep the mind in a state of fluidity therefore is to realize the concept of emptiness. When the sword is held by a swordsman who has attained the state of spirituality of no-mind-ness or emptiness, then "he holds it though not holding it." [35] It is as if the sword wields itself. When one is not conscious of using the sword, being empty of all thoughts and all sense of insecurity arising from fear and all desire to win, then "both man and the sword turns into instruments in the hands as it were of the unconscious and it is this unconscious that achieves wonders of creativity." [36]

Here the swordsman's movements are compared to flashes of lightning "when a flint strikes steel, no movement is lost before a spark issues from

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 144
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 146
[36] *Ibid.*

the contact." [37] Between one movement and another there is not a hair-breath's interval. This is an expression of the fluidity of the mind, not stopping with any object, having no time for deliberation. When the mind calculates so as to be quick in movement, the very thought makes the mind captive, making the mind stop. This is a sure sign of one's being moved by something external.

That is why Takuan and the other masters kept on dilating on the doctrine of emptiness, which may appear to many as something quite remote from daily experience. They emphasized that this doctrine which is the metaphysics of *mushin* or no-mind-ness is actually closely related to the problems of life and death. This fact was recognized by the great masters like Yagyu Tajima, Takuan, Shunzan and others. Both Zen and the Sword's Way are one in the sense that both ultimately aim at transcending the duality of life and death. To transcend the thought that is a great inhibitory factor in the free and spontaneous exercise of the technique acquired, it was recognized that the best way for the swordsman is to discipline himself in Zen, for Zen is not a mere philosophical contemplation on the evanescense of life but a most practical entrance into the realm of nonrelativity.

The practicalness of Zen is again demonstrated when we examine the art of archery. Here again we see a close connection between Zen and archery. As in the art of swordsmanship, the technique has to be mastered, but once this is done again as in the art of swordsmanship, the mental attitude of self-forgetfulness, i.e. an absence of the feeling that "I am doing it," must be attained.

In a little book entitled *Zen in the Art of Archery,* Mr. Herrigel gives an account of how he made use of archery as an avenue towards the understanding of Zen. [38] He described the course which a pupil of the art of archery has to complete. For the Japanese, according to him, archery is not only a pastime nor is it a purposeless game, but rather it is a matter of life and death. The art of archery is not an ability a sportsman can acquire, more or less, by bodily exercises but an ability whose origin is to be found in spiritual exercise and whose aim consists in hitting a spiritual goal. Fundamentally, therefore, the archer aims at himself. Archery then becomes a matter of life and death because it is a "contest of the archer with himself," and this kind of contest is the "foundation of all contests outwardly directed," for instance, at another bodily opponent. [39]

The explanation as to why the contest is between the archer and himself may first sound enigmatic. To the masters, the contests of this kind "consist in the archer aiming at himself, and thus at the same time, becoming simultaneously the aimer and the aim, the hitter and the hit." Using

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 102
[38] Eugene Herrigel, *Zen in the Art of Archery* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959).
[39] *Ibid.*

some of the often used expressions of the masters, one says that "it is necessary for the archer to become, without being conscious of it" an unmoved center." It is then that the "supreme and ultimate miracle happens. "Art becomes artless, shooting becomes not-shooting, a shooting without bow and arrow." [40]

This art then, along with the other arts presupposes a spiritual attitude, and each man cultivates it in his own way. If one really wishes to be the master of an art, technical knowledge of it is not sufficient. One has to transcend technique so that the art becomes an "artless art" growing out of the unconscious.

Applying this to the art of archery, the way of the "artless art" Mr. Herringel tells us is not easy to follow. The first thing that the master wants his pupil to take note of is the "noble forms" which the bow assumes when drawn to its full extent — the bow encloses the "All" in itself.[41] That is why it is of utmost importance for one to learn how to draw it properly. To be able to draw the bow "spiritually," that is, without any kind of effort, involves long periods of practice and repetition. In the next stage which is the loosing of the arrow, the important point to be noted is the fact the certainty of hitting seems to depend on the shot's being smoothly loosed at the right moment, when the tension spontaneously fulfills itself. It is at this point that the influence of Zen begins to make itself felt in archery. The first step, the drawing of the bow, leads to a loosening of the body, without which the bow cannot be drawn properly. In the second step, when it is necessary that the shot be loosed right, the loosening of the body must be accompanied by a spiritual and mental loosening. Again, as in swordsmanship, the secret consists in attaining a state of mentality or spirituality which is a result of the mind acquiring the state of no-mind-ness or *mushin*. It results in the pupil letting go of himself, a stage on the way to emptiness and detachment. The master never tires of repeating to his pupils that all right-doing is accomplished only in a state of true purposelessness in which the doer can no longer be present as himself. Just as the sword wields itself in the art of swordsmanship so also here in archery, in the words of the master of Mr. Herrigel, "It takes aim and hits, 'It' takes the place of the ego, availing itself of a facility and dexterity which the ego only acquired by conscious effort." [42] And here we are reminded that "It" is only a given name for something which can never be really grasped or fully understood, and which only makes itself known to those who have experienced it.

Just as Zen has influenced the civilization of the Far East in the military arts, so do we find that Zen has influenced the civilization of the East in the field of aesthetics. It was Zen which produced the other-world-

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 30
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 30
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 101

liness of the tea ceremony, the arts of garden building and flower arrangement, the work of the Sung and *sumi-e* painters.

The element of negation is still at the base of the art of the tea ceremony as is also the case in the art of landscape gardening and flower arrangement. All these arts start from the dialectical basis of seeing in the smallest things the largest and the greatest or seeing through a stone or a stick the whole universe — all in an attempt to mirror the Universal from the Particular.

Tea was introduced to Japan from China by Eisai, the founder of Rinzai Zen, and the tea ceremony began over six centuries ago.[43] The Zen monks started the practice of drinking tea, and they would pass a large bowl of tea from one to another in the Meditation Hall of their monasteries. They would drink to refresh themselves during their hard struggle with the koan. Soon it was something much more than a drink made from dried leaves, it became associated with all those things which bring quietness and peace of mind. It was not before long that the practice of drinking tea took place in a tea house, "the Abode of Emptiness," an inconspicuous, thatched hut, hidden away in a corner of the garden, usually under a pine tree. The House is of such fragile structure that it immediately suggests the transitoriness and impermanence of things. In conformity with the ideal of simplification and harmony which symbolizes the art of tea, it was essential that the Tea House should be stripped of all unnecessaries and also that it should harmonize with its surroundings as if the hut were part of nature, as natural as trees and unhewn rocks.

In the tea room itself the atmosphere was one of calm and solitude, no bright colors are used, for in the tea-ceremony we find Zen in its most peaceful aspect. There is only the dull yellow of the straw mats, the restful grey of the paper walls. A painting usually adorns the tea-house. As a matter of fact, it was from the requirement for the pictures in the tea house that the monochrome Zen paintings grew.

The tea house was made beautiful with flowers, and thus grew up the art of flower arrangement. The gardens near the tea house were also an expression of the simplicity and modesty which are characteristics of Zen art.

The equipment for the tea ceremony and the ceremony itself all express profundity in simplicity. The bowls in which the tea was served are made of crude thick porcelain of the color of autumn leaves fashioned with great care in sharp contrast to the exquisite "egg-shell" china decorated with flower and birds so highly prized in the West.

The use of simple equipment in the ceremony is an expression of Zen's reverence for the ordinary things of life, for the object of the tea ceremony is to exalt the simplest and most inexpensive materials by making the highest possible use of them.

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[43] Suzuki, *Zen and Japanese Culture, op. cit.*, p. 272.

The host and his guests assembled in the tea house experience together their identity with the universe and taste the pleasure of the oneness of self and others in the great emptiness. In this way, the tea-ceremony has come to be regarded as the best way to refresh the spirit. It affords a temporary escape from cares and distractions of life. According to Mr. Suzuki, in the tea-ceremony we find expressed an element he termed "tranquility" an important factor making up the spirit of the tea. [44] As the term is used in the tea, its implication is "poverty", "aloneness", "simplification". There is an attempt to awaken an "active aesthetical appreciation of poverty," [45] the creation of an environment in the tea-ceremony in such a way as to evoke the highest spiritual freedom and detachment, of separation from evanescence of the objective world.

A close link between Zen and painting is also revealed particularly in the work of the Sung, *sumi-e* and a few contemporary school of modern painting. In the history of landscape painting the works of the Sung masters are generally acknowledged to be the best, and in this type of painting we see the finest flowering of the Zen spirit. To the landscape artist, nature is to be converted to the plane of ideals; all mountains, trees, rivers and lakes are but creations of the mind and subject to the law of impermanence. In the Sung landscape, mountains are to be seen as if floating in the distance, having no real existence. Thus the basic Zen doctrine of emptiness is illustrated. As Professor Suzuki points out, the painting Ma Yuan of the solitary fisherman on a boat is probably the supreme example of this art.[46] In the middle of the lake, a fisherman sits in his boat, rod in hand. The boat is lost in the lake, whose banks are not visible; the water is indicated only by a few lines along the boat. All the rest is emptiness.

Towards the end of the Sung Dynasty, Zen began to die in China and the real tradition of the Sung was taken up in Japan by *sumi-e* and latter-day avant-garde artists who are committed to Zen and who find the Zen still relevant today.

The realism of the Chinese spirit of which Zen is an embodiment brought Buddha down to earth, recognizing him in the everyday reality, in man, animal, plant, flowers, mountains, streams, and so on. Zen opened up an entirely new field for Buddhist art. But the every day can become Buddha only after it has been transcended. The great Zen master Dogen said, "To say the oak in my garden is Buddha would be more than pantheism, unless we have made the pure eye, that other eye, our own. Our other eye must have seen Buddha first, and identified him with the oak in my garden. And to see Buddha is to become Buddha. For one must be Buddha to recognize him." [47]

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[44] *Ibid.*, p. 284
[45] *Ibid.*
[46] Suzuki, Zen and Japanese Culture, op. cit., p. 22.
[47] Tore Haga, *Avant-Garde Art in Japan* (New York: Harry N. Abram, Inc., 1962) p. 22.

At the every end of the difficult path of contradiction Dogen continues, all dualism "between the particular and the general, between man and nature and between the I and the Buddha" are transcended. [48] With our eye purified, we can, Dogen says, experience the direct "encounter" and hence possess intuitive knowledge of the world's reality. This is what a Chinese painter probably meant when he said, "When I paint the river in the spring, my soul enters into the current, the flowers on the banks open at my will and the water is agitated at my bidding." [49]

Again this is what is meant when it is said that to draw bamboos is to become a bamboo and to forget that you are with it while drawing it — this is the Zen of the bamboo, this is moving with the rhythmic movement of the spirit which resides in the bamboo as well as in the artist himself. What is now required of him is to have a firm hold on the spirit and yet not be conscious of the fact. This is a very difficult task achieved only after long spiritual training.

Such vision of reality if it were to be recorded in painting had to be done in the shortest possible time. In executing his paintings, the Zen artist manipulates his brush with the utmost freedom, speed and spontaneity. There is no time for deliberation or hesitation. The inspiration of the artist moves his hand automatically. The paintings of the *sumie* school are executed in this manner. The medium they use is black Chinese ink, and they paint on a particular type of paper, soft and absorbent, often referred to as rice paper. [50]

A stroke once made in this type of paper can never be effaced. The stroke must be drawn swiftly and deftly otherwise the result will be an ugly blot. With such materials it was absolutely necessary for the artist to paint as if a whirlwind possessed his hands. This technique suited the Zen masters perfectly for it required the artist to record his vision on paper while it was still fresh and full of the spontaneity of life itself.

Thus to the Oriental, the concept of contradiction presents no problem, since this notion has long been sanctioned by Zen. The Oriental has also the advantage of being familiar with essential means of artistic expressions, which Michel Tapié identifies as "lyrical graphism and qualitative space.[51] As for graphism, according to Tapié, the Zen monks continue to make use of it as "paroxysmic means" of free and intense expression. As for space, it has always been a characteristic of Zen painting which the Haboku school made the essence of their painting.

For the Chinese Sung painters, and the medieval Zen painters as Sesshu (1420-1506) Tohaku (1539-1610), Hakuin (1685-1768) and others, as

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 24
[49] Ibid.
[50] Key M. Thompson, *The Art and Technique of Sumi-e* (Tokyo, Japan: Charles Etuttle Co., 1965) p. 9.
[51] Tore Haga, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11

well as their modern successors, Insho Domoto, Onishi, Imai, Arai etc., painting is a way of practicing Zen. Insho Domoto, one of the great masters of traditional Japanese painting, is considered by many Japanese as the last master possessing complete knowledge of the secrets of the technique of Sumi painting.

All of these painters have demonstrated through their work their acceptance and understanding of the doctrine of negation or emptiness. For far from maintaining that they are the center of the world, these medieval and modern artists live in their works, moving completely in unison with the rhythm of things in the universe, penetrating them.

Having noted the contributions Zen and the concept of emptiness has made to the building up of Japanese culture, it is significant to note that the other schools of Buddhism have limited their sphere of influence almost entirely to the spiritual life of the Japanese people. Zen has gone beyond it. Zen has entered internally into every phase of the cultural life of the people. This is as true of the art of archery, as of ink painting, of the art of flower arrangement, no less than the art of poetry, the tea ceremony and swordsmanship. All of them presupposes a spiritual attitude, an attitude which in its most exalted form is characteristic of Zen Buddhism.

We must also take note of the role of the arts in Buddhism. While art is art and has a significance all its own, it cannot be denied that Zen made use of the arts as avenues through which the realization of the "Heavenly Nature" in man is accomplished. Viewed in this manner, art becomes only a pretext through which life opens up its secrets to us. Thus, in archery for instance, bow and arrow are only a pretext for something that could just as well happen without them, only the way to a goal, not the goal itself. Objectively speaking, it would be entirely possible to make one's way to Zen from any of the arts that have been named.

On the other hand, if one wishes to master an art, technical knowledge of it is not enough. It is necessary to transcend technique so the art becomes an "artless art" — where there is free and spontaneous exercise of the technique acquired. To do this is to recognize that the best way is to discipline oneself in Zen or, more specifically, in Zen's doctrine of negation or emptiness. For realization of this concept brings about an intuitive or experential understanding of Reality which can be verbally formulated in the phrase, "All in One and One in All." This is a state of "One-ness" in which all distinction of "I" and "not-I" are set aside. When this is thoroughly understood, then creative genius is born.

THE OCCURRENCE OF A NERVOUS MANNERISM IN TWO CULTURES [1]

LEE SECHREST AND LUIS FLORES JR.

NERVOUS MANNERISMS CONSTITUTE A CLASS OF MOTOR BEHAVIORS which betray a relatively high level of tension or anxiety, which are apparently meaningless and useless, and which are at any moment controllable by the person displaying them. There are a variety of other "abnormal" motor responses from which they might be distinguished, such as tics and hysterical limitations. Certainly, one of the bases for the distinction is on the momentary controllability. The tic is involuntary, and the victim of the tic cannot control its occurrence. On the other hand, such a mannerism as nailbiting, while difficult to control over a period of time is certainly controllable at any one moment. The nail biter can keep from biting his nails as long as he is thinking about it. It is only when his attention lapses that he finds the unwanted behavior occurring once more

Very little systematic research has been done on nervous mannerisms, although observations of such mannerisms have been used in order to index levels of tension in a group (Anderson, Brewer and Reed, 1946). Anderson and his associates were interested in the level of tension in school children induced by authoritarian and democratic teaching methods, and they counted various kinds of mannerisms among children exposed to the two teaching techniques and found differences, not always in favor of the less authoritarian methods.

Expressive movements has long been a topic of interest in psychology (Wolff and Precker, 1951), and Kroot (1931, 1935a, 1935b, 1937, 1954a, 1954b) has made rather extensive studies of certain kinds of gestures that might be indicative of fear or tension. How such movements get into behavior repertory of the individual is unknown although many of the general principles of response acquisition would seem to apply. Some of the movements are probably acquired because of the accidental contingencies between the responses involved and tension reduction, much in the same manner as Skinner (1953) describes the development of "superstitious" responses. Other mannerisms and movements may have some slight tension reducing effect (not all mannerisms may be completely useless) by, for example prov-

[1] This paper was read at the annual meeting of the Psychological Association of the Philippines, Manila, 1965. This research was supported by the N.I.M.H. Grant MH 07906-01 and was completed while the first author was a Senior Specialist at the Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West.

iding for discharge of muscular tension that is part of a general state of tension. And still other mannerisms may be acquired by a process of social learning and imitation, a possibility which provides for differential frequencies in various cultures.

It is the purpose of this paper to report on a mannerism which seems to be a result of tension and which has quite a different frequency of occurrence in American and Filipino cultures. During a prolonged visit to the Philippines, the first author noted himself, and had called to his attention by others, the apparently remarkable frequency of Filipino males of a mannerism which we shall call "leg jiggling". The mannerism consists of up and down rhythmic movements, ordinarily rather rapid, of one or both legs. The movements range from rather fine and extremely fast movements that resemble tremors to much slower but broader excursions of the legs. The data which are reported below arose out of an attempt to discover whether the mannerism might be indicative of tension. It might be noted that the initial casual observations were made in a group of college age males who were idling away their time in a small canteen. Th leg jiggling syndrome was noted specially when they were playing chess, as opposed, for example, to merely chatting or singing.

METHOD

Definition of Leg Jiggling

As stated above, leg jiggling was defined as a vertical, rhythmic movement of one or both legs while the subject was in a seated position, it was necessary to make allowance for opportunity for leg jiggling since persons seated with legs crossed in any manner could not easily engage in the behavior. Therefore, the observations reported below are in terms of proportions of those individuals who could engage in the behavior, i.e., whose legs were free and not intertwined. Unfortunately, no data are available on the proportions of persons seated in such a way as to preclude leg jiggling behavior. It has been suggested to the writers that at least some kinds of leg-crossed positions are probably indicative of a relatively low level of tension, but that is a matter of further study.

The duration of the response was not an issue in this investigation. The standard method of observation was to make what were called "visual sweeps". That technique involved a brief observation of the total sample available at a moment in time. For example, an observer seated in a restaurant would make a relatively slow but systematic visual inspection of the room and simply note the number of males who could be engaging in leg jiggling and the number who were actually engaging in the behavior as defined above. The data were recorded in terms of absolute numbers. A period of observation in a given location would include several visual sweeps, typically three, in about a five-minute period. The score for that location

would be the total number of leg jigglers and nonjigglers during the period of observation. An attempt was made to standardize conditions and methods of observation in both cultures although it cannot be claimed that complete standardization was achieved. The first author made observations in both cultures.

Observational Sites

An attempt was made in the Philippines to make observations in a fairly representative but not random selection of sites in which males might be observed in seated positions over at least a brief period of time. Without a taxonomy of situations it would have proven difficult to specify the locations in which observations ought to be made to achieve true representativeness, but the emphasis was upon situations in which males would be at leisure. Thus except for some observations to be reported on classroom situations, none of the observations were made at work. Observations in the United States were made in situations which were thought to be a rough match for Philippine locations with the exception that no observations were made in taverns or bars in the U.S. [2] Table I gives a summary of the

TABLE I

LOCATION OF PLACES IN WHICH OBSERVATIONS WERE MADE IN EACH CULTURE.

Location	*Number of separate places*	
	Philippines	*United States*
First class restaurants	5	2
Second class restaurants	36	9
Third class restaurants	30	5
College campus	8	3
Work (mostly coffee lounges)	8	3
Cocktail Lounges	12	—
Coffee shops	5	8
Total	104	30

locations for the observations in both countries. It will be noted that the distributions are approximately the same although considerably fewer observations were made in the United States. Observations were made only on one occasion in most locations, but two or even three observations were made in some places. For those places the percentages of leg jigglers were averaged across occasions for subsequent analyses.

[2] It is very difficult to find drinking places that are well lighted, equipped with chairs, furnished with short tablecloths, etc., so that observations of leg movements are possible.

It cannot be argued that observations within one location are independent; therefore, the appropriate sampling unit is the location rather than the person. All data were converted into and analysed in terms of proportions of leg jigglers within a sampling unit.

RESULTS

The first analyses are for frequency of leg jiggling in the Philippines and in the U.S. The data are given first for all Philippine locations except bars and for all U.S. locations. Table 2 gives the data for chi-square analysis for the two cultures. It is evident that frequency of the mannerism is greater in the Philippines than in the U.S. We should note that speaking strictly within the limits imposed by the data we can only say that there are some places with a high frequency of leg jiggling in the Philippines than in the U.S. However, we would also note that the absolute frequency in the U.S. is very low, so low that we do not question the former, and less restricted, conclusion.

TABLE 2

PROPORTION OF LEG JIGGLERS IN DIFFERENT LOCATIONS FOR EACH CULTURE

		Philippines	*United States*	*Total*
Proportion of leg jigglers	$> .20$	74	4	78
	$< .20$	30	26	56
Total		104	30	134

$X^2 = 29.67$, df. $= 1$, $p < .001$

Additional data are available for a very much more restricted sample of persons in the two countries since it was possible to make observations of college classes in both. Initially, we would note that observations in college snacks bars and lounges in the Philippines and the U.S. showed the greater prevalence of leg jiggling in the former country, the relevant data being included in the analysis above. However, additional observations were made of males in three college classes in each country. In the Philippines two observations were made during final examination sessions and a third was made during a "theme writing" session in an English class. Observations in the U.S. were made during three examinations, one midterm and two final examinations, three different classes being observed. The observations in the Philippine classes involved 10 to 14 visual sweeps during the class period, and the U.S. observations all were 12 sweeps in extent. Table 3 presents the results. Analysis of such data must be limited since the number of sampling units is so small, but it will be noted that all three

TABLE 3

LEG JIGGLING FREQUENCY AMONG MALE UNIVERSITY STUDENTS DURING EXAMINATIONS.

Frequency			
Philippines		United States	
Leg jiggling	*No Leg jiggling*	*Leg jiggling*	*No Leg jiggling*
8	16	2	21
4	5	0	9
7	6	1	11

Philippine observations are higher by a good bit than all three U.S. observations.

A question of obvious interest is whether leg jiggling is a stable and reliable measure for individuals. We regret to say that we do not have good, definitive data on this point. However, we were able to make repeated observations of the same group of 10 Filipino male students as they sat in a Spanish class. Observations were available for a total of 9 days on which all subjects were present, and the days were spread over a period of about 4 weeks. The periods of observation consisted of four periods of from 45 to 60 seconds during a class session. The data were in the form of the number of times each subject was observed leg jiggling during each class period. The range of possible scores for any given day was from 0 to 4. An analysis of variance [3] showed clearly that there is significant variation among individuals in tendencies to engage in leg jiggling, the reliability coefficient being .90 (Winer, 1962).

We are left with the question whether leg jiggling is an index of tension or not, and at present we do not have conclusive data. That will have to await laboratory studies in which results of induced tension can be studied. However, we would like to present two findings which we believe cast some light on the nature of leg jiggling as a response. First, our observations in Philippine locations were coded according to the composition of the group with which the subject was seated. We would note first that the proportion of persons seated alone who were engaging in leg jiggling far exceeded the proportion for persons seated in the company of others. There is some possible problem with the sampling unit for such data, but the difference is of such magnitude that we are persuaded of its dependability. The analysis was made only for those locations in which there were both persons alone and persons in company. In 53 of 84 locations a higher proportion of the lone subjects than of accompanied subjects were engaging

[3] The analysis of variance was performed on an arcsine transformation of the data because of the very small range of scores which were possible.

in leg jiggling ($x^2 = 5.76$, $p < .01$). We believe that unaccompanied persons are more likely to be under tension than persons in company. For example, persons alone are more likely to be taking time off from important errands, are more likely to be anxious in their interpersonal relationships, are more likely to be going through troubled and nonconvivial periods, etc.

A second type of observation arose out of our attempts to make observations in situations likely to be differentially conducive to tension and relaxation. We noted that there is in Manila an area of town frequented by government employees, medium level business executives, newspaper reporters, young attorneys and the like and that many such persons took coffee in various places in that area during the morning hours. We also noted that the same area is rather well endowed with cocktail lounges which *seemed* to be populated by about the same kinds of persons, but at the end of the working day instead of in the middle. It seemed reasonable to suppose that the dual effects of caffeine stimulation and workday pressures would produce a relatively high level of tension in the coffee shops during the early part of the day, and the dual effects of alcohol and end of day relaxation should produce a relatively low level of tension in bars late in the day. Therefore, we made observations in both places. We recognize the possible objections that (1) the population might not be the same, and (2) the seating arrangements might be differentially conducive to leg jiggling. Neither objection is easily met. We would only propose that the people in the two situations looked about the same, and that seating facilities were not markedly different. The cocktail lounges in which observations were made were not furnished with low, deep, soft-cushiond benches. The data were once more analyzed in terms of sampling units consisting of specific locations and a chi-square was calculated with the results shown in Table 4. Quite apparently leg jiggling is less frequent in cocktail lounges than in places where people take their coffee breaks. This, we believe, will stand until better evidence is available, as supportive of our contention that leg jiggling is a nervous mannerism that reflects level of tension.

TABLE 4

FREQUENCY OF LEG JIGGLING IN COFFEE SHOPS AND COCKTAIL LOUNGES IN AN AREA OF MANILA

Proportion of leg jigglers	Cocktail lounges	Coffee shops	
More than .30	2	9	11
Less than .29	10	3	13
	12	12	

$X^2 = 6.04$, df. $= 1$, $p < .02$

Discussion

We believe that our findings point to an interesting difference between the Philippines and the United States in frequency of a specific nervous mannerism. It may be objected that our observations were not sufficiently well controlled and that various biases, e.g., in location, times, conditions, etc., might account for the differences. At the present time we cannot make a completely adequate reply to that objection. The area of inquiry is sufficiently fresh so that it is very difficult to specify appropriate and necessary dimensions of control for observations. We believe that at our current level of knowledge and viewing our work as exploratory, the observations which were made were satisfactory. We would note that the differences which were seen within the Philippine sample, i.e., between persons in company and persons seated alone, are not easily explainable on the basis of any biases in observation. Perhaps subsequent observations under more carefully controlled laboratory conditions may cast light on the problem in which we are interested.

One anecdotal report substantiating the frequency of the mannerism in the Philippines comes from a Filipina friend of the writers who reports that her three brothers were specifically forbidden by their mother to "leg jiggle" at home. Such a prohibition betrays the ubiquity of the problem. Still another very interesting comment came from a Venezuelan female friend who, when she heard by accident about the data reported in this paper, stated that the same behavior is very common among Venezuelan males. Systematic reports from various cultures would be most interesting.

Some readers might note that we did not study the behavior in question among females. The reason is that it appear to be all but absent in females. In all the observations made in the Philippines, only six or seven females were noted to be engaging in the behavior, and only two were noticed in the U.S. Our Venezuelan friend also told us that women in her country do not engage in the behavior.

We believe that leg jiggling differs in quality as well as in quantity in the two cultures, for it certainly appeared to the first author that Filipino males are "better" at leg jiggling than their American counterparts. Their movements seem more rhythmic and smooth, and they continue over longer periods of time. The writer has never seen American males engage in continuous leg jiggling for over a minute or so. Some Filipino males were noted to be active for periods of as long as five minutes without pause.

It is also our tentative contention that leg jiggling does represent a symptom of tension. We doubt, in fact, that few persons would question such a conclusion and we offer the evidence obtained only in the spirit of methodological enthusiasm. There are many possible deficiencies in the observations leading to the conclusion that leg jiggling is less frequent in cocktail lounges than in coffee shops; so many, in fact, that we are gratified

to have obtained differences at all. We maintain that an *a priori* consideration of the problems would not necessarily have led to the conclusion that the mannerism would be more frequent in coffee shops. We can only suggest that the data are in accord with out supposition and leave to future investigations the support or repudiation of our position. It is somewhat more tortuous to reason from the observation of a greater frequency of leg jiggling alone to the conclusion that the behavior is symptomatic of tension, and we would only state our conclusion tentatively on that basis alone.

We would like to make it clear that we are not suggesting that tension or anxiety is higher in the Philippines than in the United States. In fact, if we had to make a guess, we might well guess otherwise. We concentrated our observations on only one member of what seems to us to be a broad class of behavior which can be viewed as nervous mannerisms and, hence, indicative of tension. We did not, for example, note at all the frequency of "fidgeting" in the chair, of drumming with the fingers on the tabletop, of pulling at the ear, of toying with objects such as pencils, water, glasses and matchboxes. The cultures might be characterized by the same or different frequencies of any other mannerism. We hope to do additional work to cast light on the overall frequency of nervous mechanisms, but first much work must be done in order to discover just what mannerisms exist in each culture.

An interesting question for the student of culture is how a mannerism such as leg jiggling gets transmitted within a culture and why it should not be equally widespread within all cultures. We can begin with the assertion that leg jiggling seems to serve no apparent purpose. Nothing evident is accomplished by it. We have asked leg jigglers why they were engaging in that behavior, and many persons asked denied being aware that they did it. Others said simply that they were "bored", "wanted action," or were "waiting." It seems unlikely that the mannerism is a source of interpersonal gratification, e.g., that it might be admired or reinforced in social interaction. Therefore, we must conclude that the mannerism is not transmitted by direct tuition.

One good possibility is that the mannerism is acquired through imitative processes, probably at an early age and at a relatively low level of awareness. Probably the male child is often subjected to situations conducive to tension, to tension shared by those around him. Without necessarily being aware of it, the child is exposed to models greatly important to him; and what they are doing the child will do. He will emulate irrelevant as well as relevant acts. If he resides in a culture in which any given act is frequent, he has a high probability of being exposed to that act under conditions suitable for acquiring it. The processes involved in such learning are well spelled out by Bandura and Walters (1963). The findings of Olson (1929) concerning intrafamilial correlations in certain forms of oral mannerisms and of correlations between children seated adjacently are suggestive of at least the partial

correctness of the imitative learning hypothesis. We realize that we are begging the question how a mannerism gets to be more frequent in a culture in the first place, and we would continue to beg it except to say that there are many aspects of a culture which operate to determine what acts or gestures are possible and appropriate in any situation. We do not yet understand all these factors.

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SOME PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND/OR ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROBLEM OF KOREAN UNIFICATION: A POLITICAL-GEOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS

LYDLE BRINKLE

KOREA IS A DIVIDED COUNTRY, AND TO THE KOREAN PEOPLE THIS MUST seem like a paradoxical nightmare. Surely once having awakened from their slumber the unreality of the dream will dissipate, and tranquility will be restored to the mind. But the cloak of reality which overshadows the peninsula is one of political separation. The "bamboo curtain" has been drawn shut across the bosom of the peninsula, completely disregarding the cries of the majority of the inhabitants of this ancient land. Does this drawn curtain signal the end of all hope for the reunification of Korea, or is the last act of the Korean drama yet to be unfolded?

For many centuries Korea has undergone political struggle as a result of foreign occupation. Near the end of World War II the Koreans began to think once again that their country could regain its independence. In all sincerity the United States tried vainly within the powers of its influence to bring about a united Korea. The biggest mistake the United States made in Korea was to under-estimate the intentions of the Communists.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a political-geographical analysis of the problem of a politically divided Korea, through discussion of some of the possible alternatives and/or solutions that could produce a permutation in the *status quo* presently existing in Korea. The mainsprings of any peaceful solution of the Korean question will undoubtedly be unwound very slowly if such is at all possible. On the other hand some unforeseen event could produce a break in the delicately balanced and uneasy truce along the Demilitarized Zone or in the surrounding waters off Korea, which could lead to a renewal of hostilities.

The proposals presented in this paper represent this writer's current ideas and thinking pertaining to the problem at hand, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of any particular government or organization. Moreover, it is the author's intention that this paper add new dimensions to the problem of Korea, from a view somewhat differently than that advanced by many writers and interpreters on the subject.

Historians, political scientists, statesmen, etc., whenever speculating and writing about events in Korea, have customarily analyzed that country's political developments largely in terms of varying policies adopted by different governments in their respective relationships with the peninsula. How-

ever dramatic the expressions of those analysts have been in observing and publicizing Korea's problems, there continues to remain a key role for the political geographer to play in the difficult task of analyzing and setting the main problems of Korea in their proper political-geographic perspective. [1] For example, Williston calls attention to the fact that American historians and writers have relegated Korea to such an unimportant role in Far Eastern affairs, ". . . that the reader of the record finishes it with the uneasy feeling that Korea was always incidental to seemingly greater concerns and commitments in the Far East." [2] Several other reliable sources point to somewhat similar apathy on the part of Americans in dealing with the problems of Korea. Lattimore, for instance, notes that in the United States a communication gap exists in the coordination of compartmental research and studies dealing with Asian countries. Moreover, studies of many Asian countries, such as Korea, Burma, Afghanistan, etc. have been relatively neglected and inadequately developed. [3] Shannon McCune, one of the redundant authorities on Korea today, similarly concurs with these interpretations. [4] Accordingly, from the point of view of this political geographer, the following proposed solutions and/or alternatives are examined in the context of Korea's present political situation.

First, the Military Armistice Commission in Korea represents a possible route toward *dénouement* of the Korean dilemma. While it functions as a military arrangement, the Armistice Commission is, nevertheless, a negotiating agency which has resolved certain issues and problems relating to easing tensions in Korea. A significant evidence of its actions was its recent role in negotiations involving the "Pueblo Incident", and eventually serving as the medium through which this incident was resolved. On other occasions the Armistice Commission has been instrumental in negotiating the release of captured or detained military personnel, taken into custody in the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone. In one further illustration, negotiations at Panmunjom resulted in the release of the passengers and crew of a commercial airliner hijacked to North Korea.

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[1] Joseph B. Smith, "The Koreans and Their Living Space: An Attempted Analysis in Terms of Political Geography," *Korean Review*, Vol. II (September, 1949), p. 45.

[2] Frank G. Williston, "Reflections on American-Korean Relations," *Korean Review*, Vol. I (March, 1948), pp. 4-5.

[3] Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), pp. xlix-1.

[4] McCune notes that prior to 1945, Korea was an area of inconsequence to most political observers in the United States of America. Few Americans were concerned with Korea's problems or had any appreciation or understanding of the complex character of the peninsula's geography. Only one official within the U.S. State Department was devoting his entire talent and skills as an advisor and authority on Korea's problems. Shannon McCune, *Korea: Land of the Broken Calm* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), pp.198-201.

Despite its success on various occasions, the Armistice Commission failed in its important role of preventing an armament buildup in Korea, incurring the danger of a renewed war. Under the provisions of Paragraph 13d of the Armistice Agreement the Armistice Commission was obligated to supervise a relative military balance between North and South Korea. [5] To maintain this balance, Neutral Nations Inspection Teams were dispatched to the Korean ports of entry to inspect all arrivals and departures of combat material and military personnel. The Communists, however, with the helpful collaboration of the Czech-Pole Inspection Teams, used the Armistice Agreement as a cloak for covering up their violations and modernizing their armed forces. Subsequently, the UN Command announced on June 21, 1957 at the Military Armistice Commission meeting, that it was absolving itself of its obligations under Paragraph 13d, and was taking appropriate steps to restore the military balance. [6] Today, the governments of both North and South Korea maintain sizeable armies, which represent a considerable drain to their economies. Even if the Armistice Commission should attempt to maintain a relative military balance between the two regions, such an effort would be fruitless. According to Gulick, attempts to achieve regonal power balances are rather futile:

> ". . . where there could once have been an independent existence for such subsystems (the Baltic powers in the early 18th century, for example), today each would be hard-put to pretend its policies were unrelated to the over-riding competition of the superpowers. Regional frameworks have ceased to have a separate identity or any real meaning by themselves. One cannot reasonably consider the balance between North and South Korea as unrelated to the central struggle of the US and the USSR." [7]

The Armistice Commission, nevertheless, continues to remain as an opening toward a peaceful settlement of the Korea question. It is the only agency in existence through which negotiations of a high level are continually being carried on with representatives of Communist North Korea and, perhaps more important, although indirectly, with representatives of the Red Chinese regime. [8] North Korea's puppet government has its strings pulled by Peking and Moscow (though presently leaning towards the latter), and some circumstance or event could occur in the future whereby productive negotiation for reunification might be possible at the Armistice table. Indeed at one of the Armistice Commisson meetings which this writer attended in 1956, such a happening did occur. Although the Communist proposal for reunification was unilaterally drawn up to favor only their side, and was re-

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[5] Headquarters, United Nations Command (Base Camp, Korea), *Text of Agreement, Armistice Agreement,* Vol. I, July 27, 1953, pp. 6-7. (Mimeographed).

[6] *Minutes, Seventy-Fifth Meeting of the Military Armistice Commission* (Panmunjom, Korea: 21 June 1957), pp. 3, 7-8.

[7] Edward L. Gulick, "Our Balance of Power System in Perspective," *Journal of International Affairs,* Vol. XIV, No. 1, (1960), p. 13.

[8] On occasion meetings conducted in secrecy have been held between U.S. and

jected by the UN Command as propaganda, the point is that the Armistice table could be a site for future negotiations on such a matter.

Shortly after World War II it was believed by many that the UN could resolve the Korean question. A UN Temporary Commission was sent to Korea to survey the situation, and to supervise general elections for the reunification of that country. The Commission was futile in its efforts, however, since the Communists refused to cooperate with it or even to allow it to enter North Korea. However, there is a likelihood that Red China might become a UN member at some future date,[9] and some unforeseen circumstance might then arise whereby the Communists would be amenable to working through that organization for a reunited Korea. No doubt the Communists would like to see American troops withdrawn from Korea, thus removing a potential threat of retaliatory power from their doorstep.[10] In return for the withdrawal of American troops, the Communists might be willing to accept two alternatives, either of which could be implemented through a world organization such as the UN. These two alternatives are: 1) a buffer status for all of Korea and, 2) a semi-independent status for Korea under a world organization such as the UN.

Neither status, however, would exclude Korea from the influence of the great powers. Located between powerful neighbors such as Japan, China, and Russia, the geographical position of the peninsula is, indeed, an unfortunate one. Perhaps no other country has been more influenced by its geographic location than that of Korea. Because of its location, Korea has served as a bridge between Japan and the Asian mainland for many centuries.[11] This bridge has often been used for aggressive purposes, but over the years

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Red Chinese representatives in Warsaw.

[9] Neither Red China nor North Korea belong to the UN, as both have been labeled aggressors by that organization.

[10] Korea is of interest to Communist China and Soviet Russia for one rather obvious reason, the propinquity of its relationship as a neighboring country. When the peninsula was threatened with being overrun by UN and ROK forces, the Chinese responded with the sending of "volunteers" to Korea, which was hardly a surprise to many Korean observers, since the move was a natural proclivity on the part of Red China to protect its own frontiers and national interests. Chinese intervention, according to Hartmann, was triggered for two main reasons: first, China feared ". . . the prospect of a United States-dominated and led anti-Communist coalition at the Yalu River gate of her house . . .", and second; China's principal industrial region, South Manchuria, might be shut off from valuable hydroelectric power furnished by Yalu River Basin dams. See F. H. Hartmann in Chapter 21, "Case Studies in Collective Security: Korea," *The Relations of Nations* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), pp. 387-388.

[11] Korea's location has not diminished in strategic importance, despite the passage of centuries. If anything, its location appears to be increasing in significance. The peninsula's proximity to the Soviet Union and Red China, coupled with the growth of American influence and power in the region, has brought about a renewed interest and awareness in the "Doorway to the Asian continent."

the main role of Korea was to serve as a buffer state between the great powers of the Far East. [12] Thus, it is apparent that the Korean peninsula's strategic location contributed to its historical development as a buffer state. According to McCune, ". . . Korea may serve as a significant buffer nation, but this is a role not strongly desired by the Koreans, for they have suffered from buffeting for centuries." [13]

The case of Korea is not an unusual one; historical and political geography supplies other similar illustrations of the application and consequences of buffer states. An often used example of a similar buffer situation is the region known as the "Middle Belt" of Europe. Created as a result of the Versailles Agreement, this chain of buffer states from Poland to Bulgaria found itself in an unfortunate situation in the period between the two World Wars. Concerning this buffer zone's relative weakness, Wight points out:

> "It came into existence while Germany and Russia had temporarily ceased to be Great Powers, but it could not be maintained without relation to them; least of all could it be, as the Allies seem to have hoped, a wall to hem them both in. As soon as the two had resumed their strength they moved into this vacuum again, as the prelude to conflict between themselves." [14]

From previous discussion, the political history of buffer states warns that territorial instability is not unexpected. Against this historical and geographical background, the question is would Korea's status as a buffer or semi-independent state fit Far Eastern conditions and be politically feasible. If so, in either case, the end product must undoubtedly result in a Korea restrained in its external political relations, and one which must remain aloof of the power politics of the great powers. Undoubtedly, the Koreans would prefer other alternatives than those above.

Third, should a mainland revolution of serious magnitude ever occur in Communist China, there is the likelihood that the two Koreas would resort to armed conflict to settle their opposing ideological differences. [15] In such a circumstance, North Korean forces would very likely be hard-pressed to prevent the South Korean forces from occupying the North. Red Chinese troops would probably not be in a position to intervene in behalf of North Korea, as they did once before, and the numerically larger and rather efficient South Korean army would probably be able to overcome the North

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[12] Kyung Cho Chung, *Korea Tomorrow* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956), pp. 4-7.

[13] Shannon McCune, "Korea: Geographic Parallels, 1950-1960," *Journal of Geography*, Vol. LIX (May, 1960), p. 5.

[14] Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power Among Western States," in Joel Larus (editor), *Comparative World Politics: Readings in Western and Premodern Non-Western International Relations* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1964), p. 116.

[15] A comparable situation might prompt similar action should a large scale Sino-Soviet confrontation occur in the Far East.

Koreans.[16] The South Korean army is now a sizeable military force on a world scale, numbering about 600,000 men. It is well trained, battle tested in the previous war, equipped with fairly modern weapons, and a large size. When this writer worked with the Armistice Commission in Korea during 1956 and 1957, a commonly used shibboleth of the South Korean news media was that of "march north." No doubt many South Koreans still feel this is the only way to reunite their country.

Another possibility which cannot be precluded is that the two Korean governments may eventually enter into negotiations for closer ties with one another. Such ties would most likely come in the form of closer economic or trade or some similar relationships.[17] Over half of Korea's industry lies in the North, as well as most of the hydroelectric developments, and the majority of the mineral wealth. South Korea on the other hand, is a heavily populated agricultural region with the better soils. Therefore, it would be economically feasible for the two governments to enter into a trade relationship or economic union such as the Benelux. This relationship would be plausible from the standpoint of the proximity of the two regions, and would not necessitate a final political cohesion or reunification of the two areas.[18] The Han River Estuary, which is contiguous to both North and South Korea, is already open to the civil shipping of both sides, in accordance with the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. This estuary might prove satisfactory for mutual exchange of goods, since both sides are afforded close contacts with each other in that vicinity.

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[16] South Korea's population base of approximately 30 million gives that region a greater human manpower pool upon which to draw, compared to that of North Korea which numbers around 12 million.

[17] In a 1962 speech outlining the theme of North Korea's foreign and domestic policy, Kim Il-sung, Premier of North Korea, set forth his proposals for a unified Korea to be achieved through a gradual transition. One of the steps in the unification plan envisaged the initiation of economic and cultural cooperation between the two Koreas. However, Kim stipulated this step must come as an appurtenance to the withdrawal of American troops from Korea. For further elaboration on this plan, see Robert A. Scalapino (editor), "The Foreign Policy of North Korea," in *North Korea Today* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 30-31.

[18] Paige believes that, in the long run, any movement toward economic union in Korea will depend largely upon North Korea's capacity to act independently in pursuing its own policies and economic growth in the manifest presence of Soviet and Chinese influence. Nationalistic pressures continue to test the process of Communization in the North, and as developing relations between the Soviet and Chinese regimes become more strained, North Korea may have a freer hand in determining its own course of events. Thus, the more flexibility and independence North Korea exercises under Communist hegemony, the more likely South Korea is to look favorably in that direction for forging a new partnership between the two Koreas. Glenn D. Paige, *The Korean People's Democratic Republic*. The Hoover Institution of War, Revolution, and Peace. (Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 51.

Whatever possibilities may exist for North and South Korea to mutually reconcile their differences on grounds of economic motives, may finally rest in the hands of Korea's former colonial master, Japan. The Japanese presently maintain trade relations with the three major powers who have a paramount interest or stake in Korea's future course of development. The Japanese trade not only with the United States (its best market), but also with the Communist giants of Red China and Soviet Russia. In 1965, Japan exported $245 million worth of goods to Red China, and $168 million worth to Soviet Russia. Imports from those two countries, respectively, amounted to 225 and 240 million dollars. Red China is now Japan's best customer in its trade with the Communist Bloc. In addition, the Japanese trade with both South and North Korea. Exports to South Korea in 1965 were valued at $180 million and those to North Korea amounted to $16.5 million. Imports, respectively, were valued at 41 and 14.7 million dollars. Japan's trade with Red China, North Korea, and South Korea recorded significant gains in the period 1960-1965. Thus, on the surface at least, Japan's trade policy appears to separate politics from economics.

Japan's governing principle in matters relating to Korea has been labeled by most observers of Japanese-Korean relations as the "two Koreas policy". The term is not unambiguous, but generally ". . . it implies the policy of *Seikei Bunri* — under which Japan officially recognizes the ROK, but not the DPRK, while continuously trading with both." [19] However, Japanese opinion is sharply divided over the policy. The leftists oppose granting political recognition to either the Republic of Korea or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, but would not preclude cultural and economic ties with the two regimes. The rightists position closely resembles the policy of *Seikei Bunri*. Debate over this issue proved to be a constant source of irritation between Japanese and ROK officials in drawing up the normalization treaties between the two governments in 1965. Only after delicate wording, was the Japan-ROK Treaty on Basic Relations ratified by the two governments. Article III of that treaty recognizes 'the Government of the Republic of Korea is the only lawful government in Korea as specified in the resolution 195 (III) of the United Nations General Assembly.' However, it is this very article containing the phrase 'as specified' (which was added at Japan's insistence) that Japan uses as an equivocation to defend its two Koreas policy. This phrase gives rise to different interpretations by the two governments, and thus creates a source of friction between them. [20]

Prior to April 1961, Japan maintained a 'no direct trade' policy with North Korea. At that time, however, the Japanese government eased this restriction and permitted a small amount of 'barter trade' to be handleh

[19] Soon Sung Cho, "Japan's Two Koreas Policy and the Problems of Korean Unification," *Asian Survey*, Vol. VII (October, 1967), pp. 711-713.

[20] *Ibid*, pp. 703-708.

mainly through French trading firms. Simultaneously, North Korea announced the beginning of a Seven Year Economic Plan to extend through the period 1961-1967. The plan aimed at vitalizing North Korea's economy, by raising industrial output by over 300 per cent. In order to reach their goal, the North Koreans realized it was necessary for them to procure foreign materials and equipment. Red China was unable to supply these materials, and an untimely ideological dispute with the Soviets precluded their assistance. Forced to look elsewhere, North Korea turned toward industrial Japan. Japan's geographical proximity offered inexpensive water transport between the two countries, and the price of Japanese goods was favorable. Thereupon, the North Koreans initiated efforts to improve their relations with Japan, and attempted to persuade the latter to soften its trade policy with them, to the mutual benefit of both countries. With many Japanese investors showing interest in North Korea, Japan agreed to 'barter trade' with that regime, and subsequently, in November 1962, Japan abandoned the barter regulation. Japanese imports from North Korea are mainly mineral resources, raw materials which are vitally needed by Japanese industry. Their procurement was a significant factor prompting expansion of trade relations with the North Koreans.

Despite substantial growth of trade with both Koreas since 1960, the total amount of this trade is relatively small in proportion to Japan's overall trade volume. Even with Red Chinese trade included, the combined total of the three countries' trade with Japan comprises only about four per cent of Japan's total trade. In view of these observations, it is postulated that the two Koreas policy being pursued by Japan is conditioned by motives which override the economic importance of Korean trade to the Japanese economy. According to Cho, Japan's main concern over Korea continues to be the geographic proximity of that peninsula, and the threat of its takeover by a potential enemy.[21] However, as long as South Korea continues to remain independent and militarily strong and seeks Japan's friendship and economic cooperation, it is doubtful that the Japanese government will seek to promote the unification issue. On the other hand, should South Korea achieve a stable economy,[22] and upset the relative economic balance between the two Koreas, such a condition could produce enough frustration on behalf of the North Koreans, whereby they might instigate a serious military endeavor against South Korea. In this predicament Japan might be prompted

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 711-717.

[22] The ROK is presently in its Second Live Year Plan. Designed to extend through 1971, the plan thus far has met with mounting success. Overall economic growth in 1967 amounted to nearly nine per cent, and the predicted growth rate for 1968 exceeds 12 per cent. Per capita income in South Korea rose from $143 in 1967 to $170 in 1968. Communist sources placed North Korea's per capita income at $234 for 1967. Soon Sung Cho, "North and South Korea: Stepped-Up Aggression and the Search for New Security," *Asian Survey*, Vol. IX (January, 1969), pp. 29, 32, 38.

to help alleviate tensions over the divided peninsula. The point is, that Japan is in a favorable position to offer the appeal of greatly expanded trade with Red China, the two Koreas, and Soviet Russia as a basis for bartering for a change in the political climate of the Far East, a change which could have important effect on future developments concerning Korea. And such action may prove to be a step toward the reunification of Korea.

Volatile and dynamic forces for change are now sweeping the Far East, with the result that there is a desire to create some kind of a "third force" or regional organization to counter American, Russian, and Red Chinese political rivalries in the area. Over extensive areas of Asia today there is a keen awareness of a developing political and military vacuum. The growing threat of Red China's nuclear capability, and the apparent conviction that the United States seeks a gradual withdrawal from its assumed responsibilities of a heavy military burden in the Far East, leads many Asians to believe they must assume a more active role in providing for their own security and pursuit of peace. The idea of a "free" Asian collective security arrangement or force has already been sounded out. Reports indicate South Korea strongly favors such a plan, and has made overtures to officials of other Asian countries for their support. At present, however, the only regional organization which approaches the dimensions of such a plan is the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), which strives to promote the economic and cultural cooperation of Asian countries. But, ASPAC, or some similar version of this organization, may eventually seek to undertake action toward providing for political and military cooperation among its members. In other words, the possibility that the "free" nations of the Western Pacific area might move toward closer unity through a progressive stage of separate economic, cultural, and political organizations similar to the "European movement" is a growing likelihood. Asian diplomacy hints more and more in this direction. Accordingly, observers of Asian affairs should be able to detect a gradual change in the mood of Far Eastern governments. This mood will, accordingly, reveal itself in a greater spirit of cooperation among the "free" Asian nations, and an acute awareness on their part for the need of some form of mutual security arrangement.

In light of these interpretations, American geopoliticians might take comfort in the fact that should a "free" Asian defense organization materialize, it may do much to achieve peace and stability in the Far East. Whatever the form of that organization, it may be meaningless in terms of the issue of Korean unification, but the prospects for normalizing peaceful relations between the two Koreas might then become more realistic. And this action undoubtedly will be more acceptable than the existing status quo in Korea.

However, the future United States role in Korea might continue as that of a guardianship of the Republic of Korea for many years to come.

If the North Koreans continue their present level of subversive activities against South Korea, the approximately 55,000 U.S. troops now in Korea, are likely to have their numbers increased in the years to come, rather than reduced.

In past years the political leadership of North Korea has vehemently denounced the United States as its major enemy and obstacle to Korean unification. Pyongyang radio has relentlessly and repeatedly labelled the Americans as imperialists. According to North Korean propaganda, the United States alone is responsible for the failure to unite the two Koreas. North Korea contends that if the United States would withdraw its forces from South Korea, and dissolve the mutual defense arrangement with the latter, the two halves of Korea could proceed with arrangements for unification. The paradox of North Korea's pronouncements is that, on one hand, the Pyongyang regime calls for American disengagement from Korea before procedural arrangements for unification can be implemented; yet, on the other, it apparently recognizes the fact that the United States has no intention of abandoning South Korea. An American withdrawal from South Korea would be like opening a Pandora's Box for the Communists. South Korea would be thrown into a state of confusion, and the North Koreans, based upon their past behavior, might be inclined to capitalize on the situation and bring on a new crisis. The Demilitarized Zone could, then, become a renewed scene of fighting, precipitated by the regime in North Korea, to act as a diversionary and cloak, to cover up its economic failures and loss of face. Based upon the above statements, the ruling clique in North Korea will, presumably, continue its tirade of propaganda against the United States, while simultaneously hoping to dismay the South Koreans.

Therefore, if American military forces in the south are increased, as this writer predicts, the breach now separating North and South Korea will continue, probably becoming wider. The animosities will be intensified. The North Korean Communists will be drawn closer into the camp of the Red Chinese. Whatever leanings, if any, the North Koreans may harbor toward the "peaceful coexistence" stance of the Soviet Union will probably be severed. At present, however, Soviet influence in North Korea appears to be significant, and gaining, as a result of increasing aid to that area.[23] Thus, Korea's significance will continue for the United States. As American troops continue to withdraw from bases in other parts of Asia, the chance that some of them will be reassigned to Korea becomes more of a reality.

One other likelihood seems ever possible. Some incident could produce a spark that would again ignite the conflict which was only temporarily

[23] In viewing or speculating on Russian intentions for Korea in the future, McCune believes the Russians have not entirely given up hope for a united Korea, and one within their sphere of political influence. In the meantime, the Russians intend to make Korea a sore spot for the United States, and continue to force the U.S. to commit valuable resources to that area. McCune, *op. cit.*, pp. 202-203.

terminated by the 1953 truce. No peace treaty has ever been signed to officially end the Korean War, and the existing truce is an uneasy one. Numerous border incidents occur along the Demilitarized Zone, such as shooting of military personnel, firing on aircraft in that vicinity, and violation of the Zone by unauthorized personnel. If accounts by the news media in recent years provide an accurate measure of these violations by numbers, then the situation there seems to be worsening instead of improving. An explosive situation could occur at any time, and thus end the temporary truce that prevails.

On occasions, however, truce lines have evolved into boundaries which are now recognizable as "permanent" features of the landscape, and more important, without many of the original strains and stresses which often accompanied their formation. [24] A good example is the boundary separating the Netherlands and Belgium. [25] According to Fischer, the permanency of a boundary tends to become more fixed with the prolongation of its existence. [26] Old rivalries and tensions do sometimes fade away, but in Korea they, like the "Old Soldier", are not likely to be soon forgotten.

Summary and Conclusions

Twice in its recent history Korea found herself caught up in the web of opposing struggle between the great powers, and was partitioned as a result of warfare. Today, the enigmatic problem of Korea is imposed by the division of the peninsula into separate spheres of influence between Communist and Western ideology. Many of the obstacles hindering movement toward reunification will, no doubt, remain insurmountable in the future, but the political fortunes of countries have shown that in time changes can be manifested in any established order. Through the channels of the Military Armistice Commission in Korea, certain avenues of communication have been kept open by reciprocal agreement whch could lead to negotiation of the Korean dilemma.

Korea was partitioned for the second time in 1953, and all subsequent attempts to bring about an amicable settlement have proved fruitless. Divergent national interests continue to underlie the root of Korea's tensions. Most likely, the direction or course which the Koreans must follow in the years to come, will not be one of their own choosing; rather, Korea will likely remain in the grip of external influences emanating from distant puissant political bases.

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[24] Whether such will be the case in relation to the Korean truce line, is highly speculative. Present indications do not point in that direction.

[25] Norman J. G. Pounds, *Political Geography* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 64-67.

[26] Eric Fischer, "On Boundaries," *World Politics,* Vol. 1 (January, 1949), p. 196.

Obviously, the future of Korea hinges on a great many uncertainties. From the Korean point of view, the unification of their country remains the single most important objective. Whether the Koreans can bring about unification alone appears unlikely, especially in view of the peninsula's strategic importance and its political and geographical division between two opposing ideologies. For the Koreans the unification issue may loom as a matter of life or death, but from a geopolitical viewpoint unification achieved by a Pyrrhic victory is unacceptable. World public opinion will probably continue to prefer a divided Korea with a relative degree of stability as the best accommodation possible, at least for the foreseeable future. And such imposed solutions would probably not be acceptable to the Koreans.

NOTES ON THE SULU ISLANDS IN CHU-FAN-CHIH

WANG TEH-MING

It is a general consensus that the earliest mention of Sulu in Chinese records is the account of Sulu in Wang Ta-Yuan's Tao-I-Chih-Lhio done in 1349. Recently, however, Prof. Rao Chung-Yih (c.1. see Chinese Entries) of the University of Hong Kong reports that Sulu is mentioned in Chen Ta-Chen's *Nan-Hai-Chih* (South Seas Records, c 2) completed in 1304. According to Rao's findings, most of the names of countries in the South Seas as recorded in both of the works, are similar in sound and somewhat different in form. The Chinese characters for the name of Sulu in *Nan-Hai-Chi* is (c.3), while in Tao-I-Chi-Lhio, (c.4).[1]

Now, to my understanding, the land and people of Sulu were actually mentioned by Chao-Ju-Kua in the year 1225. This is referent to the account recorded at the end of the chapter on Po-Ni, in Chao's well known work: *Chu-Fan-Chih*. The text, its English translation, and a brief investigation are hereby presented.

II. THE CHINESE TEXT:

c.5.

Chinese Entries

c.1. 饒宗頤 c2 陳大震：南海志 c3 蘇錄 c4. 蘇祿 c5 西龍宮什庙，胡蘆蔓(一作蔓)頭，蘇勿里，馬膽逾，馬喏(依馮承鈞先生標点)，居海島中，用小船来往，服色飲食與溜泥同，出生香，黃蚺，瑇瑁，商人以白瓷器，酒，米，茶，塩，白絹，貨金易之。

[1] Sin-Teh, "The Earliest History of Sulu in Chinese Records," *The Chinese Weekly*, April 5, 1970, Manila, p. 12.

III. ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

Sai or Se (1, west)—Ling (2, dragon)—King (3, palace or temple) —Chap (4, miscellaneous) —Biio (5, temple) —Lnid (6, sun) —Leh (7, beautiful), —Ho Loh (8-9, gourd), —Bong (10, dream) —Taao (11, head, So (12, awake)—Buud (13, don't)—Lih (14, village), Be or Ma (15, horse)—Tna (16, bile)—Luh (17, pass over), Be or Ma (18, horse) — Liok or Jiok (19, yes),[2] are all living in small islands, plying back and forth in small boats. Their costumes and food and drink are similar to those of the people of Po-Ni. It yields: raw aromatics (raw camphor?), lakawood, yellow wax, soft-tortoise shells. In bartering, Chinese traders use: white porcelain, wine, rice, tea, salt, white taffeta, and trade gold.

IV. INVESTIGATION:

A. The location of the small islands.

Po-Ni was a Chinese name for North Borneo, according to various Chinese accounts of the Sung (960-1277),[3] Yuan (1277-1368), Ming (1368-1644) dynasties. Its location, according to Chao Ju-Kua's description, is "to the southeast of Chuanchow (or Zaitan, near Amoy, in the Southern Fukien—Wang); to Java, it is 45 days voyage; to San-Fo-Chi (or Sumatra), 40 days voyage; to Cham-City (Cambodia) or to Ma-I (Batangas, Luzon),[4] 30 days voyage, in favorable wind." Etymologically, Po-Ni is obviously identified to Porne the name for Borneo, in the Carta de Ptolomeo de 1552.

The small islands off the sea of North Borneo are possibly the Sulu islands, including or not the islands of Cagayan de Sulu. For (1) geographically, the Sulu Islands are the only islands off the coast of North Borneo. (2) Historically speaking, the costumes and customs of the islands' people are similar to those of the northern Borneans. And (3) the products of these small islands and those of Sulu as recorded in Tao-I-Chih-Lhio (i.e., laka-wood of average quality, yellow wax, soft tortoise shells and pearls)[5] are almost all the same, save the pearls or raw aromatics.

B. Probable identification of the names mentioned.

According to the context of the account we have, the names mentioned are of various peoples, and not of places. However, judging with common sense, many of them, or some of them, at least, must be names of islands. A more reasonable interpretation for the nature of the names therefore is

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[2] According to the punctuation made by Feng Cheng-Chua; vide Chao *Ju-Kua's Chu-Fan-Chih,* — annotated by Feng Cheng-Chua, Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1940.

[3] Wang Teh-Ming, *Sino-Filipino Historico-Cultural Relations* (Phil. Social Sciences & Humanities Review, Sept.-Dec. 1964), U.P. Press, 1967, pp. 405 & 409.

[4] *Ibid.,* pp. 405-9.

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 304.

probable that among them, some are names of islands while others are of people. Guided by such a light, we may try our luck as follows:

(I) Sai or Se (1) — Ling (2) — King (3) — Chap (4) — Bilio (5) (or west dragon-palace-miscellaneous-temple), or Sai or Se (1) — Ling (2) — King (3) only, may be a name designated for the whole group of islands. For it, several points can be talked about: (a) To say in the sense of symmetry it was possible that somewhere in the sea to the east of it, there was a place called "East-Dragon Palace." If so, could it be Cagayan de Sulu, or the Cuyo islands? (b) Dragon-Palace is usually connected or thought of with pearls by the Chinese. Hence, the name may mean that under its water there are pearls "guarded by dragons." (c) Dragon was actually another name for crocodile in Chinese. So possibly, the name may imply that the place is swarmed with crocodiles. And, perhaps, because of them, pearls in its water were not easily to be collected. It then, may be served to explain why among its products, there was no pearl yet. (d) Dragon or dragon-king was worshipped by the peoples in China, and especially by the seafarers. Dragon-palace or Dragon-Temples have existed elsewhere along the sea coast of mainland China up to the present time. It, therefore, may mean that a temple for worshipping Dragon-King was built there by Chinese traders; and consequently, the location was known for it.

(II) Chap (4) — Biio (5) (or miscellaneous-temples):
(III) Liid (6) — Leh (7) (or sun-beautiful):
(IV) Ho (8) — Loh (9) (or gourd); Jolo, probably.
(V) Bong (10) — Tao (11) (or dream-head): Bongao (?)
(VI) So (12) — Buud (13) — Lih (14) (or awake-don't-village):
(VII) Be or Ma (15) — Tna (16) — Luh (17) (or horse-bile-over)
(VIII) Be or Ma (18) — Liok or Jiok (19) (or horse-yes):
probably, Badjao, or Simunul: si- is a common prefix for place name of the Sulu Islands.

THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF MICRONESIA TOWARD SELF DETERMINATION

DONALD F. SMITH

THE CHANGING WORLD COLONIAL PATTERN HAS FINALLY CAUGHT UP with the United States and its trusteeship in Micronesia. Controlling one of the last three United Nations trusteeships, [1] it is face to face with a plebiscite to take place among the people of Micronesia sometime during this decade in which they will decide their political future. The dwindling number of trust areas has caused world attention to focus on America's presence in Micronesia. Thus, the United States now finds itself in the same position, and with many of the same problems of colonialism in a changing world, as did France and England only a few years ago.

Geography

Micronesia, [2] or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, is located in the western Pacific north of the equator. Its vastness is difficult to comprehend for those who have never been there. Covering an area of approximately 3,000,000 square miles, equivalent in size to the Continental United States, it would stretch from Nashville, Tennesee, to San Diego, California. Its area extends through four time zones, approaching Japan and Hawaii on its northern and eastern reaches and abutting New Guinea on the south and the Philippines on the west. The vastness of the territory is deceptive because there is so much water and so little land. The three major archipelagos which comprise Micronesia, the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands, [3] are scattered throughout this area and consist of approximately 2,100 islands with a combined land area of only 700-odd square miles. [4] The great distances between island and cultural groups have had a tendency in the past to engender ethnocentricism among the people of Micronesia. While geography has not been kind to the political development of the territory, military historians of the 20th century have been aware of the incredible

[1] The other two are New Guinea, administered by Australia and headed for independence this year, and Southwest Africa, which the United Nations still considers a trust territory, although the administering authority, the Republic of South Africa, does not.

[2] Micronesia described herein is a political unit and does not encompass the total ethnic and geographical description, which covers a much larger area.

[3] Excluding Guam, which is an unincorporated territory of the United States.

[4] It is smaller than the state of Rhode Island and 1/25th the size of Connecticut.

startegic location that places the islands within striking distance of almost every point in Asia and the Pacific.

Political History

History, as well as geography, has not fostered the development of a Micronesian political entity. Although past history has witnessed the domination of Micronesia by Spanish, German, and Japanese regimes, politically the islands are far apart and do not even look like a harmonious whole.

Spain, which dominated the islands for three centuries, brought the Micronesians little except Christianity. Germany challenged the Spanish regime in the 1880's, and as a result of the Spanish-American War in 1899 bought Spain's interest in Micronesia for $4,500,000.[5] The Germans were in Micronesia only a short time and concentrated on making their tropical paradise show a profit, thus encouraging the production of copra. The German administration of Micronesia ended abruptly with World War I when the Japanese seized the islands. By a secret agreement in 1917, the allies recognized Japan's claims to all former German possessions in the Pacific north of the equator.[6] The United States, adhering the Woodrow Wilson's ideal of self-determination[7] and aware that the Japanese had virtually annexed the islands, attempted to circumvent them by creating the mandate system at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. American efforts were rewarded when a special category of Class C Mandates were created to cover the case. Japan, as the administering authority for the League of Nations in Micronesia, was responsible for submitting reports and looking after the social and economic well-being of the indigenous population, permitting freedom of worship and missionary activity. Under the mandate, however, Japan was prohibited from building fortifications and military bases in the islands.[8] On these terms, Japan was confirmed as the administering authority in 1920, with the United States accepting this arrangement in a special agreement in 1922.[9]

The islands were governed after the first year of naval rule by the South Seas Administration (Nanyo-Cho), with the seat of government in Koror, Palau. Laws for the mandate were made by Imperial Ordinances and Governor's Orders. The majority of the civilian administrators were Japanese from the home islands, but on the local level administration was

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[5] Excluding Guam, which was seized by the United States in 1898.

[6] W. G. Beasley, *The Modern History of Japan* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 206.

[7] Wilson stressed the desirability of consulting the wishes of the minority groups involved in the prospective settlements.

[8] John S. Bassett, *The League of Nations* (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1922), p. 56.

[9] Raymond L. Buell, *The Washington Conference* (New York: Appleton and Company, 1928), p. 26.

through village chiefs and headmen. While this was indirect rule by the Japanese, actually little autonomy was left to the indigenous leaders. [10] The Japanese ignored the prohibition on the establishment of military bases, and rumors that they were turning the islands into fortresses were confirmed in December 1941 when from bases in the Marshalls and Eastern Carolines the assault on Pearl Harbor was launched.

Over a quarter of a century ago, the islands of Micronesia were almost daily topics of discussion for millions of Americans. Names like Kwajalein, Eniwetok, Peleliu, and Saipan were household words that brought vivid memories of loved ones killed or wounded in desperate battles for control of those far away places. Wrested from the Japanese at a high cost of men and material, the United States had no definite policy regarding the future political status of the islands. At the end of World War II, the Japanese administration was superseded by American military government under the Department of the Navy, which administered the area on an interim basis until July 1, 1951, when the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Office of Territories in the Department of the Interior. [11]

The Road to Trusteeship

While the United States had no definite plans regarding the future political status of the ex-Japanese mandate, a little publicized view was that it also had no intention of surrendering its control of Micronesia. Political opinion throughout the nation a quarter of a century ago was sharply divided over the political future of the islands. Two alternatives held the spotlight: The military argued for outright annexation of Micronesia because of its strategic location, [12] while the State Department favored trusteeship under the newly formed United Nations. Raging arguments took place between civilian and military representatives resulting in accusations by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes that the military was hindering civilian efforts that would place the Pacific Islands under trusteeship.

President Truman, aware of the difficulties between the followers of Secretary of State Byrnes and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, favored a compromise that would protect American strategic interests in the islands. This was done by classifying the islands as "strategic" and under the aegis of the United Nations Security Council, rather than the General Assembly,

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[10] Tadao Yanaihara, *Pacific Islands Under Japanese Mandate* (London, England: Oxford University Press, 1940), pp. 259-260.

[11] Dorothy Richard, *United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands*, Vol. III (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 1099.

[12] Revelation of the Yalta Agreement in 1946, awarding Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles to the Soviet Union, resulted in demands by U.S. military leaders and Congressmen for annexation of the Pacific Islands.

thus removing the fear that United States strategic interests would be threatened by a Soviet veto. [13]

President Truman then announced in 1946 that the United States was prepared to place under United Nations trusteeship the former Japanese mandated islands. [14]

Trusteeship Agreement

The agreement finally approved by the United Nations Security Council and the United States Congress in 1947 was a unique document under which the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, as a political entity, was designated a "strategic trust," thus making a sharp distinction between a strategic and nonstrategic trust. Two important differences stand out between these categories: (1) The administering authority of a strategic territory is subject to ultimate Security Council supervision rather than to General Assembly supervision, as would be the case for a nonstrategic territory; [15] and (2) the United States as administering authority can declare all or part of the territory a "closed area," thus forbidding access to anyone, including representatives of the United Nations, and also decide whether or not within the closed area it will apply the basic objectives of trusteeship. Within the closed area it also can maintain military forces and build bases not subject to inspection by any other nation. [16]

In discharging its obligations under the trust agreement, the United States in the realm of political development is to:

> Foster the development of such political institutions as are suited to the Trust Territory and promote the development of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory toward self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the Trust Territory and its people and the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned; and to this end...give to the inhabitants of the Trust Territory a progressively increasing share in the administrative services in the Territory; develop their participation in government; give due recognition to the customs of the inhabitants in providing a system of law for the territory... [17]

The preceding section of Article Six of the Trusteeship Agreement spells out the basic foundation for American political action, and this is what America has been attempting in the realm of political development for the past quarter of a century.

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[13] The United States insisted the islands be designated as a strategic trust in in which it could develop military bases, and which Summer Wells at the time deemed "a vicious precedent."

[14] Richard, *op. cit., pp.* 9-11.

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 25.

[16] James N. Murray, Jr., *The United Nations Trusteeship System* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1957), pp. 73-77.

[17] Article Six, *Trusteeship Agreement for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands* (New York: United Nations, 1947), p. 3.

From the inception of the trust agreement to the present, Micronesia has been treated as a poor relative of the United States and never given a realistic budget with which to build a viable economy. This lack of funds is traceable to the United States Congress, which placed a ceiling on the budget of the territory, and to the thinking of the high commissioner of the territory from 1955 to 1961. During this time, Congress put a limit of $7.5 million on the expenditures of the Trust Territory.[18] It was the high commissioner's view that the $7.5 million authorized by Congress each year of his administration was sufficient to provide minimal basic services to people who were largely on a subsistance economy. He believed that additional funds beyond the capacity of the island economy to absorb them would only be harmful.[19] In 1962, however, enactment of Public Law 87-541 increased the Federal appropriations for fiscal year 1963 to $15 million and to $17.5 million thereafter.[20] Thus, beginning in the early 1960's, the budget for the territory began to rise, and this past year reached approximately $60 million. Previously not included in American foreign or domestic aid programs, the islands now participate in numerous Federal programs, particularly in the field of education.[21]

However, over the years the Departments of Interior, Defense, and State have bickered over their conflicting interests in the islands. Having no constituency, Micronesia became a backwash of American interest as each Secretary had more important matters to attend to, and, consequently, no agreed-upon policy with respect to the future of the islands was forthcoming. Rising political pressure from the Micronesians themselves within the past few years has finally forced the United States to start thinking clearly about such a policy as we shape our future political relations with these people.

The Congress of Micronesia

Among the most notable achievements of the United States in the Trust Territory has been the creation of a Micronesian Congress and of legislatures in each of the districts.[22] This political advancement began twenty-five years ago with the initial fostering of the development of self-governing municipalities and local government units in the districts. The next significant political achievement was the creation of an inter-district

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[18] United States Department of State, *Eleventh Annual Report to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 46.

[19] Statement by J. L. Taylor, territorial consultant to House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, personal interview.

[20] United States Congress, *Congressional Record—Senate*, June 15, 1966, Vol. 13, No. 102 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 12534.

[21] Two of these are the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Pacific Law 89-10, and the Library Services and Construction Act, Public Law 89-511.

[22] The six administrative districts of the territory are the Marshall Islands; the Mariana Islands, excluding Guam; Ponape; Truk; Yap; and Palau.

committee to advise the high commissioner in 1956. Delegates, representing all of the districts were chosen by district congresses. This was a major step in promoting territory-wide consciousness, but being only an advisory body, its influence in shaping Trust Territory policy through its various subcommittees is difficult to estimate at this time. In 1961, the inter-district committee recommended that it be changed to the Council of Micronesia.

In 1965, one of the most notable events in the area of self-government and political development occurred in Micronesia. As a result of the promulgation of Order No. 2882 by the Secretary of the Interior in 1964, the formal transfer of legislative authority from the high commissioner to the newly established Congress of Micronesia took place. For the first time in nearly four hundred years an elected group of Micronesians was to shape the destiny of their island paradise. However, although the Micronesians have gained control over the legislative branch of their government, they still feel castrated politically since their actions are subject to veto by the high commissioner.[23] The Congress of Micronesia, consisting of a bicameral legislature of twelve senators (two from each district) and twenty-one members of the house, thus feel that their legislative powers are circumscribed. As a result, the last five years have seen growing demands by the Congressmen for greater responsibilities and an end to this veto power.

Future Political Status

Now, twenty-three years after the signing of the trusteeship agreement between the United States and the United Nations, things are beginning to change politically. The Micronesians themselves are in the forefront of this change. They feel it is about time to assume control of their own destiny, time to redefine their status with the United States, and time to seek an end to the present trusteeship agreement. But the question of what should take its place is now being debated throughout the islands.

In order to assure themselves that their future destiny is decided by Micronesians rather than by Washington, the elected representatives to the Congress of Micronesia established a political status commission in 1967.[24] This group of very capable men, after extensive travel to all parts of the Pacific and to American territories in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, issued in 1969 a commendable report discussing the manageable alternatives available to the Micronesians in deciding their future. The political status commission recommended that the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands become a self-governing state in free association with the United States. This first recommendation recognized two inescapable realities, ". . . the need

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[23] The present high commissioner is Edward E. Johnson, a businessman from Hawaii, appointed by the Secretary of the Interior in 1969. Johnson recently stated that he might be the last American high commissioner.

[24] Congress of Micronesia, *Future Political Status Commission Report* (Saipan, Mariana Islands: Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1969), p. 2.

for Micronesian self-government and the fact of long-standing American interest in this area." [25] The commission pointed out that they chose this free-state status because continuation of a quasi-colonial status would prove degrading to Micronesia and unworthy of the United States. The commission felt it was time the Micronesians themselves assumed responsibility for administering the islands. Aware of the unique historical partnership which has been forged between the Pacific Islands and American over the past years, they seek ". . . not an end but redefinition, renewal, and improvement of this partnership." [26] Aware also that the United States has given to the islands the gift of what it cherishes most, the idea of democratic, representative, constitutional government, they desire continued association between the two peoples. However, this partnership is joined with the wish that the Micronesians maintain their identity and create a "Micronesian State."

Free association would mean that the Micronesians would have internal self-government but would look to the United States for representation and protection in international affairs. Micronesia would also continue to look for material and human assistance in affairs of the government and in development of the islands in times of crises and day-to-day operations.

While the political status commission turned down independence as unrealistic as a first alternative, it recommended that if the negotiations that are currently going on between itself and the United States should fail, the only alternative would be independence. This second alternative, however, is fraught with economic and administrative difficulties.

While these two choices have been recommended by the political status commission, they have caused some misunderstanding among the Micronesian people, who do not realize that these are only recommendations and that other alternatives are available. For example, integration with the United States would have the corresponding advantages of obtaining American citizenship, a higher standard of living, and United States responsibility for the well-being of Micronesia. Disadvantages would include American citizens acquiring equal rights to land ownership, possible loss of Micronesian control over their own affairs, and intensified Americanization which would no doubt diminish Micronesian cultures. Lazarus Salii, chairman of the political status commission, recently supported a United Nations report that warned that further Americanization will destroy the island cultures.

Another alternative the Micronesians could consider is integration with Japan. Micronesians over forty-five fondly remember the "good old days" under the Japanese, when economically they were better off than at present. The status commission, aware of America's strategic interest in the islands,

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[25] *Ibid.*, p. 8.
[26] *Ibid.*

feels this might be an unrealistic alternative since the United States could be expected to veto such a decision.

Before any of these alternatives are to be selected by the people in a plebiscite, the commission recommended that an intensive political education program be conducted throughout the islands.

Just this past summer, President Nixon offered Micronesia commonwealth status, but the political status commission found this totally unacceptable, and it appears the two sides have arrived at an impasse. The conflict centers around the unique status sought by Micronesia. The United States seems reluctant to offer a uniquely different status, but rather prefers a relationship similar to that of Guam or Puerto Rico. The Micronesians, on the other hand, favor only free association, which is a novel and completely different concept. They also want to be able to terminate the pact at any time, agreeable to only one of the two signing parties. [27] At this time, the United States seems to find this position totally unacceptable and not related to the very real American concerns and practical limitations.

Micronesia will not decide its future alone. Any change in political status must be made with the approval of the United States Congress and the United Nations. The Micronesians deserve our best, and after two decades of administering the islands, we are finally waking up to our special legal and moral obligations to them. For our own selfish reasons, many Americans hope that they will freely elect to continue their association with the United States. If the present negotiaions fail, the future for both the United States and Micronesia is uncertain. For America, it may mean a diminishing influence, as well as a threat to her continued presence, in this very strategic area of the world. For the Micronesians, it may mean the birth of a new nation.

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[27] *Ibid.*

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